INHIBITIONS EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the
debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials
should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the
constitutions manifest intent and the peoples understanding thereof.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Ex Officio Officials Members of the Cabinet Singularity of Office EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284
which allowed members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed
this EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is
being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to
Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment
in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The VicePresident may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),
Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to
prohibit the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above
clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio
capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office,

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2),
Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting
the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows
them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

FUNA VS. ERMITA

Section 13, Article VII Prohibition Against Holding Another Office or Employment
(stricter prohibition against Presidents official family)
Nature of the Case:
Facts:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent
Maria Elena H. Bautista (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), vice Agustin R. Bengzon. Bautista
was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport of the department under
SpecialOrder No. 2006-171 dated October 23, 2006.On September 1, 2008,
following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.,
Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator,
MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. On October 21, 2008,
Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed
the
instant
petition
challenging
the
constitutionality
of
Bautistas
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President,
Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to
hold any other office or employment. On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of
this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA vice Vicente T.
Suazo, Jr. and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2,
2009.
Issue:

The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the designation of respondent

Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary
for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional
proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their
deputies and assistants.
Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma.
Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime
Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore,
NULL and VOID.

Clearly, respondents reliance on the foregoing definitions is misplaced considering

that the above-cited case addressed the issue of whether petitioner therein
acquired valid title to the disputed position and so had the right to security of
tenure. It must be stressed though that while the designation was in the nature of
an acting and temporary capacity, the words hold the office were employed. Such
holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation because the
appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1987
Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices,
refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or
designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in
Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To hold an office means to possess or
occupy the same, or to be in possession and administration, which implies
nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.

Ratio:
Finally, the Court similarly finds respondents theory that being just a designation,
and temporary at that, respondent Bautista was never really appointed as OIC
Administrator of MARINA, untenable. In Binamira v. Garrucho, Jr., we
distinguished between the terms appointment and designation, as follows:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the
power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of
tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the
nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the
imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the
case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution,
three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in
the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that
appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise
involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the
common understanding of the term.
However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the
implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be
replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer
security of tenure on the person named. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

Prohibition Against Holding of Dual or Multiple Offices Apply As Well To Temporary

Designations (FUNA VS AGRA, 2013) - GR 191644 Feb 19 2013
Facts:
Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated
him as the Acting Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who
has been appointed as the Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra was designated as
the Acting Secretary in place of Secretary Devanadera when the latter resigned.
Agra then relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel and continued to perform
the duties of an Acting Solicitor General.
Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his
concurrent designations were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that
he was holding multiple offices at the same time, his designation as an Acting Sol
Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so that he never received salaries and
emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was appointed as the Acting
Secretary of Justice.
Issue 1: W/N Agras designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid
No. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition under
Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution.
It is immaterial that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary capacity.
Section 13 plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to

impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so far
as holding other offices or employments in the Government or in GOCCs is
concerned. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one
official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether
permanent or temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to prevent the
concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants.
Issue 2: W/N Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the hold-over
principle

No. Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio
capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the
two positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the
other.
Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot
liberally apply in his favor the broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2)
of the Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not
sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other office was allowed by law
or the primary functions of his position. To claim the exemption of his concurrent
designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Section 13, he
needed to establish that his concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the
Constitution.
Issue 3: W/N the offices of the Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice is in an
ex officio capacity in relation to the other
No. The powers and functions of the Solicitor General are neither required by the
primary functions nor included in the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG,
while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent of the latter, as in fact, the
Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG is independent and
autonomous. With the enactment of RA 9417, the Solicitor General is now vested
with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
prerogatives, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of Presiding Judges of
the Court of Appeals.

BETOY V BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Facts:
EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the electric power
industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation.
As a result, the officials and employees who would be affected by the restructuring
of the electric power industry and the privatization of the assets of the NPC will be
given separation pay and benefits as provided in the resolution.
On November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the
IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002124 which, among others, resolved
that all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003 and shall
be entitled to separation benefits. On the same day, the NPB passed NPB
Resolution No. 2002125 which created a transition team to manage and implement
the separation program. Cabinet secretaries were designated to the position as
board of directors.
As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together
with thousands of his co-employees from the NPC were terminated.

Issue:
Whether or not the designation of cabinet secretaries as board of directors of NPC
valid
Ruling:
The delegation of the said official to the respective Board of Directors were
designation by Congress of additional functions and duties to the officials
concerned, i.e., they were designated as members of the Board of Directors.
Designation connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a
person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the
person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position. Without
an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary of
the position. The legal basis of an employee's right to claim the salary attached
thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere
designation.
This Court, therefore, finds the designation of the respective members of the
Cabinet, as ex-officio members of the NPB, valid. the constitutional prohibition was
not violated, considering that the concerned Cabinet secretaries were merely

imposed additional duties and their posts in the NPB do not constitute any other
office within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE power of the government to withhold information from

the public, the courts, and the Congress or the right of the President and high-level
executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and
public
1. Informers privilege privilege of the Government not to disclose the
identity of a person/s who furnish information on violations of law to
officers charged with the enforcement of the law; privilege accorded to

presidential communications which are presumed privileged without

distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security, to
protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial Power.
- Not necessary concern threat to national security
2. Deliberative process privilege covers documents reflecting advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated
3. Diplomatic negotiations privilege meant to encourage a frank exchange
of exploratory ideas between the negotiating parties by shielding such
negotiations from public view
4. Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the
President rooted in the constitutional