Professional Documents
Culture Documents
AUDITOR
State Auditor
Deputy State Auditor
Chief of Staff
Chief Government Accountability Officer
Deputy Chief of Staff
Director, Special Investigations Division
Audit Supervisor
Audit Supervisor
Audit Supervisor
Senior Auditor
Senior Auditor
Intern
The Office of the State Auditor acknowledges with gratitude the invaluable contributions of the
New Mexico Coalition of Sexual Assault Programs and its Statewide SANE Coordinator,
Connie Monahan.
Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Page 1
Page 4
Page 6
Page 7
DNA BASICS
Page 8
Page 9
Page 10
Page 13
Page 15
Page 19
Page 25
Page 29
APPENDICES
Page 32
Table of Figures
Figure 1: Distribution of Historically Untested Kits
Page 2
Page 7
Page 10
Page 15
Page 16
Figure 6: Time Elapsed Between Sexual Assault Evidence Kit Collection and
Submission to a Forensic Laboratory, based on OSA sample
Page 17
Figure 7: Untested Kits in Various States, Total and Per 100,000 Residents
Page 18
Figure 8: Reasons Cited by Law Enforcement Agencies for Not Sending an SAE Kit
to a Forensic Laboratory for Testing, as Examined in the Special Audit
Page 20
Figure 9: Reasons Cited by Law Enforcement Agencies for Not Sending an SAE Kit
to a Forensic Laboratory for Testing, as Reported in the OSA Survey
Page 21
Figure 10: Comparison of Reasons Given for Not Testing Kits to Goals of Testing Kits
Page 22
Page 25
Page 29
ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Sexual assault is a massive problem across the country and in New
Mexico, where one in every four women and one in every 20 men
experiences an attempted or completed sexual assault in their
lifetime and 65% of sexual assault victims are minors. Law
enforcement agencies work diligently on these cases every day and
in every corner in the state, yet it is estimated that for every 1,000
sexual assaults, only 344 will be reported to law enforcement, and
only six offenders will ever be incarcerated.
Of the extensive work that must be done to address this problem, the
timely testing of Sexual Assault Evidence Kits (SAE Kits or Kits) is
one critical piece. Across the country, state and local governments
have been discovering thousands of untested Kits, and New Mexico
is among those states that recognized the problem.
In December 2015, the Office of the State Auditor (OSA) assisted the
Department of Public Safety (DPS) in completing the first-ever
inventory of untested Kits, which found a total of 5,410 untested Kits
across the State. Through late reporting after the 2015 DPS Survey,
the December 2015 number of historically untested Kits rose to 5,440.
Of those Kits, 3,948 Kits (73%) would ordinarily be tested in the City
of Albuquerques Forensic Lab, which tests Kits from Albuquerque
Police Department and tested kits from Bernalillo County Sheriffs
Department from approximately 2002 to 2014. The remaining Kits
would ordinarily be processed at the Department of Public Safety
Forensic Lab in Santa Fe, which tests Kits from all other local law
enforcement agencies and the State Police.
Immediately it became clear that the State and the City of
Albuquerque had two significant tasks ahead of them: (1) testing the
untested Kits and (2) understanding why those Kits were not tested
sooner so as to prevent this same situation from happening again. As
the only agency with oversight responsibilities spanning state, county
and municipal law enforcement agencies, and the City of Albuquerque
and the Department of Public Safety labs, the OSA was uniquely
positioned to ask the tough questions related to these challenges.
This was the impetus for the Office of the State Auditors statewide special audit of untested SAE Kits.
In May 2016, the OSA prepared and distributed a brief survey in an effort to understand how the large
number of untested SAE Kits came to be. Also in May 2016, the OSA designated various law
enforcement agencies for a special audit in order to perform a more detailed review of policies,
procedures and internal controls related to SAE Kits (the Special Audit). The Special Audit included
analysis of survey data, completion of audit procedures of law enforcement agencies across the state,
and interviews and research into the backlogs in other states and academic studies on sexual assault.
Working closely with the New Mexico Coalition of Sexual Assault Programs, OSA staff met with over
75 law enforcement officials and advocates statewide, conducted five public meetings, and
participated in the legislatively established Sexual Assault Evidence Kit Task Force. OSA staff also
had countless conversations with people whose lives have been tragically altered by sexual assault,
and reviewed investigative files describing violence against New Mexicans from infants to the elderly.
The over 5,000 untested sexual assault evidence Kits across the State of New Mexico have been
described as a backlog, but that term is a misnomer. The untested Kits were not in a queue waiting
to be tested, as the term backlog implies. Instead, when the OSA started this project, the untested
Kits were in the custody of law enforcement agencies across the State. This was either because a
decision had been made not to test the Kit or because the Kit had fallen through cracks in evidence
management systems. Contributing to both of those root causes was a lack of human and financial
resources throughout the criminal justice system.
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the December 2015 DPS Survey, largely in response to the Special Audit, law enforcement
agencies sent over 800 Kits to the State Forensic Lab. As of November 15, 2016, the total inventory of
untested Kits has decreased from 5,440 to 5,302, with the entire decrease of 138 Kits resulting from
testing by the Department of Public Safety. In other words, the inventory of historically untested Kits
has not been reduced materially, but many have shifted from local law enforcement to the State
Forensic Lab, where most of them still await testing. The number of historically untested Kits in
Albuquerque remains the same.
The way to prevent this problem from occurring in the future is simple: (1) law enforcement agencies
should submit for testing every Kit for which a police report is filed, as required by law, and (2) the
State and City of Albuquerque must fund the forensic labs to meet these demands. In addition, we
must fund the service providers like SANE programs and rape crisis centers that play a critical role
throughout the processes of reporting, investigating and prosecuting sexual abuse.
Understanding how we got here and fixing those systemic issues are more complicated endeavors.
Over half of the documented reasons for not submitting a Kit for testing were based on the credibility
of, cooperation from or contact with the victim. This suggests a disconnect with the realities of sexual
assault victims and with research indicating that sexual assault is not falsely reported more frequently
than other crimes. When we, as a society, believe victims when they speak of their experiences, Kits
will not sit untested in evidence rooms. Until that time, the law makes it simple: test every Kit.
Both the State and the City of Albuquerque must break the cycle of underfunding law enforcement and
adopting policies to cope with underfunding that institutionalize misconceptions about victims and
result in sexual assault cases not being pursued. The untested Sexual Assault Evidence Kits are a
byproduct of this cycle, which in turn require even more funding to be tested and incorporated into
investigations. In other words, the longer these systemic shortcomings persist, the more expensive
they will be to fix.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The OSA identified 15 Risk Factors that contributed to the amassing of untested Kits, listed in full in
Appendix A. If unaddressed, these Risk Factors may result in Kits continuing to go untested. The Risk
Factors include:
Two root causes led to the untested Kits: (1) the decision of some law enforcement agencies not
to test all Kits as they were received, and (2) shortcomings in the systems used to track and
monitor the testing of Kits.
A lack of financial resources adversely affects (1) law enforcement agencies wishing to implement
stronger internal controls and handle untested Kits, (2) the two Forensic Labs and (3) the service
providers like SANE programs and rape crisis centers that play a critical role throughout the
processes of reporting, investigating and prosecuting sexual abuse.
A lack of standardized tracking systems and institutionalized practices govern SAE Kits. While
guns, drugs and money tend to be subject to specialized handling procedures, SAE Kits do not.
The OSA also identified 11 Best Practices aimed at mitigating these Risk Factors, enhancing public
safety and honoring the victims of sexual assault. They are listed in full in Appendix A, and include:
Adopting policies at every law enforcement agency that require submission of every Kit
associated with a police report to the appropriate lab for testing, within a minimal amount of time.
Adopting policies and procedures to ensure that law enforcement agencies pick up Kits when
notified by SANE programs; that there is centralized tracking of all movement of the Kits, the lab
results and Kit destruction; and that victim rights are respected, victim advocates are involved and
agencies are using the best practices for victim notification.
Funding the resource needs throughout the steps involved in testing the untested kits, including
the needs of law enforcement agencies, the two forensic labs in the State that do DNA testing,
victim advocates, district attorneys, public defenders and courts.
Without these changes, the state runs the risk of spending substantial resources to test thousands of
Kits now, only to find itself accumulating untested Kits again in a few years. It is encouraging that, due
in large part to increased public awareness of the issue, local law enforcement has been sending
untested Kits to the Forensic Labs. However, despite funding from the Legislature and the U.S.
Department of Justice, resource constraints and personnel challenges remain as barriers to testing all
untested Kits. These challenges are especially pronounced in Albuquerque, where a lack of
resources hampers progress and where more than 70% of the untested Kits reside.
Ultimately, testing the untested Kits and ensuring this problem does not occur again come down to
priorities. During the course of the Special Audit, the OSA witnessed a tangible shift in priorities as
the act of publicly announcing an audit drove hundreds of Kits, some two decades old, from local
enforcement inventories to the state lab. OSA staff was deeply grateful for the cooperation and
gratitude expressed by the audited agencies, who are all striving to do the right thing. Protecting the
public is one of the most basic functions of government. By prioritizing the testing of old Kits and by
funding and implementing practices that will prevent a backlog from occurring again, our State can
invest in the safety of its citizens, honor the victims of sexual assault, and take a significant step
towards ending the tragic pattern of unchecked sexual assault.
3
PURPOSE
In 2015, the OSA worked with the Department of Public Safety and other agencies and advocates to
identify over 5,000 untested Sexual Assault Evidence Kits (SAE Kits or the Kits) in the State. Since
that time, law enforcement agencies have been working with the forensic labs to begin processing the
untested Kits. The Legislature appropriated funds to the Department of Public Safety to assist with this
effort. However, in addition to testing previously untested Kits, it is imperative to understand the policies, procedures and internal controls that may have contributed to the accumulation of untested Kits.
Without this insight, our state runs the risk of spending substantial resources to clear the backlog
now, only to find itself with a new accumulation of Kits in a few years.
In order to better understand these issues, the OSA conducted a statewide audit of the inventory of
untested SAE Kits. In May 2016, the OSA selected various law enforcement agencies to designate for
a special audit in order to perform a more in-depth review of policies, procedures and internal controls
related to Sexual Assault Evidence Kits. From an accounting perspective, a sexual assault evidence
Kit is a type of inventory, but the OSA team never forgot that a Kit is more than that. Each Kit is a story
of both trauma and courage. Each Kit represents a person who subjected their body to search and examination in order to increase the chances that the community might become safer. Each Kit may become a tool for investigation, for prosecution, or even for exoneration. A Kit is more than inventory, but
because it is also a type of inventory, some standard accounting and audit principles can ensure that a
Kit is subject to appropriate internal controls. This was the focus of the Special Audit.
2.
Document and obtain copies of the agency policies and procedures utilized to:
a.
Collect or receive completed Kits from hospitals or other sources
b.
Track competed Kits at all stages while in agency custody
c.
Store completed Kits
d.
Determine when to send Kits to appropriate lab
e.
Track Kits that have been sent to the lab
f.
Notify victims and prosecutors at different points in time
g.
Recall Kits in cases where the victim has withdrawn a complaint
h.
Destroy or dispose of completed Kits why and when
i.
Handle the Kits and information from the lab after testing
3.
Apply audit procedures to the inventory of SAE Kits containing evidence for compliance with
all policies and procedures obtained above. Representative sampling was used when 100% sampling
was impractical.
a.
Document the number of SAE Kits on hand that contain evidence in total and by year
of collection. Create a schedule showing the total number of SAE Kits containing evidence by
reason for retention. (ie: charges dropped, prosecuted with other evidence, no suspect
identified, etc)
b.
Document the number of SAE Kits submitted to the state lab for testing within the last
3 years. Include a schedule of the dates the SAEKs were submitted to the lab and the dates
the results were received from the lab.
c.
Conduct interviews to confirm procedures and ask questions. A list of people
participating in these interviews is attached as Appendix C.
The OSA conducted additional site visits and interviews and participated in the statewide SAE Kit
Task Force. Interviews generally included law enforcement officers working on sexual assault cases,
evidence room managers and personnel, victim advocates, SANE nurses, representatives of law
enforcement from communities neighboring the audited agencies, representatives of New Mexico
State Police, the heads of and personnel from both Forensic Labs and representatives of law
enforcement in Indian Country. These participants are also listed in Appendix C. This Report uses the
term interviewees to describe Special Audit participants. The OSA reviewed academic literature
related to sexual assault, from which this report cites sexual assault statistics. A list of key resources
appears in Appendix D.
DNA BASICS
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is the hereditary material in humans and almost all other organisms.
DNA is a chemical structure that forms chromosomes. A piece of a chromosome that dictates a
particular trait is called a gene. Structurally, DNA is a double helix: two strands of genetic material
spiraled around each other. Each strand contains a sequence of base pairs, also called nucleotides.
The chemical structure of everyone's DNA is the same. The only difference between people (or any
animal) is the order of the base pairs. There are so many millions of base pairs in each person's DNA
that each person has a different sequence. Using these sequences, every person could be identified
solely by the sequence of their base pairs. However, because there are so many millions of base
pairs, the task would be very time-consuming. Instead, scientists are able to use a shorter method,
because of repeating patterns in DNA. These patterns do not give an individual "fingerprint," but they
are able to determine whether two DNA samples are from the same person, related people, or nonrelated people. Scientists use a small number of sequences of DNA that are known to vary among
individuals a great deal, and analyze those to get a statistical probability of a match.
Criminal investigations typically involve many different pieces of evidence. Physical evidence is any
tangible object that can connect an offender to a crime scene. Biological evidence is a type of
physical evidence that is derived from a human body and includes bodily fluids, hair and skin cells.
Biological evidence can be subject to DNA testing. When biological evidence is subjected to DNA
testing, laboratories perform several basic steps. The general procedure includes:
Extraction: The DNA is first extracted from its biological source material and then measured to
evaluate the quantity of DNA recovered. It is not always possible to extract DNA from biological
evidence. When this is the case, the laboratory will report that no human DNA samples were
obtainable from the evidence.
Replication: After isolating the DNA from its cells, specific regions are copied with a technique
known as the polymerase chain reaction, or PCR. PCR produces millions of copies for each DNA
segment of interest and permits very small amounts of DNA to be examined.
Developing a DNA profile: Laboratories then analyze the DNA to look for patterns. This process is
called sample genotyping. Analysts generate a DNA profile, which is a combination of genotypes.
Comparison: The next step is to compare and interpret the test results from the sample to
determine whether a known individual is the source of the DNA or is included as a possible source
of the DNA. This may include comparison to samples from the victim, samples from consensual
partners of the victim, samples from a suspect, or information from DNA databases.
3.
4.
That no DNA was detected, insufficient DNA was detected to obtain and interpret a profile, no
profile was detected, or no DNA foreign to the victim was detected;
There may be a mixture of DNA from two or more individuals. If this is the case, some part of a
DNA profile may be attributable to the victim and/or to persons known to have had a
consensual encounter with the victim, which is determined using reference samples, and/or to
one or more non-consensual perpetrators; or
There may be a non-mixed, single source DNA profile that may be attributable to a single
consensual partner or non-consensual perpetrator; and
DNA profiles from one or more perpetrators in either #2 or #3 above, may be suitable for entry
into a DNA database.
New Mexico has two laboratories that are capable of performing DNA testing. The Department of
Public Safety Forensic Laboratory (the State Forensic Lab) processes the Kits for all law
enforcement agencies in the State except for the Albuquerque Police Department, which processes
its Kits at the City of Albuquerque Police Department Criminalistics Laboratory (the Albuquerque
Forensic Lab).
8
10
BEST PRACTICE
The Forensic Labs emphasized that obtaining reference samples from victims
and consensual partners as early as possible can significantly expedite testing.
Generally speaking, the State Forensic Lab tests only the items contained in the white envelope and
does not test other pieces of evidence unless the initial testing suggests that testing other items would
be appropriate or necessary. The testing process takes an average of 50 to 55 hours from start to
finish. It is estimated that a fully trained lab employee can test an average of 20 Kits per month.
BEST PRACTICE
The SANE programs have changed the packaging of evidence to include
underpants in the white envelope to ensure that those items are tested in the first
round of lab work. This reflects research suggesting that some of the best
biological material samples often come from underpants. In addition, SANE nurses
are considering adding key case descriptors to the white envelope in order to
support work at the Labs.
11
4. Fostering public trust. As OSA travelled throughout the state and spoke to leaders on this issue
across the country, interviewees repeatedly underscored that the public needs to be reassured
that Kits will be tested. As a matter of transparency and accountability, all Kits for which a police
report is filed must be accounted for and tested. This will also encourage the public to continue
to utilize SANE services.
RISK FACTOR
A common misconception is that the sole purpose of a SAE Kit is to identify
unknown perpetrators of sexual assault. When viewed in light of the additional
goals of enhancing DNA databases, upholding the commitment made by law
enforcement to the victims and instilling public confidence, it becomes clear why
all Kits associated with a police report should be tested.
12
RISK FACTOR
The law tolling the limitation period in sexual assault cases where a suspect has
not been identified and a DNA evidence is available may be ambiguous as to
whether it would apply to crimes committed prior to its enactment date in 2003.
An opinion from the Attorney General addressing this issue would be helpful
when Kits from before 2003 are tested.
Submission of DNA samples by law enforcement and labs, NMSA 1978, Section 30-9-19.
This statute states: Samples from biological material collected pursuant to a medical examination of a
sexual assault victim shall be submitted by the investigating law enforcement agency to that agency's
servicing laboratory for DNA testing. It also requires the Administrative Center to enter eligible DNA
records into CODIS.
RISK FACTOR
Law enforcement agencies expressed a lack of clarity on whether the statute
requiring submission of biological samples for DNA testing applies to all SAE Kits,
or only those Kits related to cases in which an investigation has been open. The
plain language of the statute states that all Kits must be tested, except for nonreported Kits (i.e., Kits from incidents in which the victim has chosen not to file a
police report).
13
RISK FACTOR
Law enforcement agencies, advocates and district attorneys who participated in
the Special Audit expressed concern that the decision in State v. Thomas
compounds issues related to the cost of DNA testing. Forensic lab personnel can
have a high turnover rate, and personnel who leave for the private sector often
demand high witness fees and incur high travel costs to testify live at trial. Some
interviewees stated that their agencies received costly bills for expert witness
testimony that reflected the higher rates of the private forensic industry, and which
their agencies could not afford to pay.
CODIS Concerns. Some interviewees expressed concern that DNA recovered from a Kit would be
wrongfully entered into CODIS. Without a thorough investigation that resulted in corroboration of the
victims story, these interviewees suggested, they did not feel confident in submitting Kits to the lab.
They further expressed concern that if such wrongfully entered DNA evidence then resulted in a
match, it could jeopardize the prosecution arising from that match. However, the laws and procedures
related to CODIS contain a number of safeguards against wrongful uploads of DNA records. First,
initiating the testing a Kit does not automatically result in a CODIS upload. As described on page 8,
testing the Kit can result in a finding of no biological material. That could be critical information for the
criminal investigation. Second, when a Kit does result in biological evidence, the existence of a
CODIS match may be the corroborating evidence otherwise lacking in the case.
Second Judicial District Criminal Case Management Pilot Project for Criminal Cases. In 2015, in
response to concerns about the length of pre-adjudication detention in the Albuquerque-Bernalillo
County Area, the Supreme Court approved a special pilot rule governing time limits for criminal
proceedings in the Second Judicial District Court. LR2-400. The Rule states that judges must hold a
hearing within 60 days after being assigned to a new criminal case, and establishes deadlines for the
parties to make discovery disclosures and pretrial motions. The deadline for disclosing scientific
evidence is 120 days before the scheduled trial date. Interviewees in the Second Judicial District
expressed concern that processing SAE Kits within the time limits set by LR2-400 was very difficult,
especially given the large quantity of untested Kits. Kits that are subpoenaed for trial move to the top
of the processing queue, but may still take significant time to process.
14
15
16
Figure 6: Time Elapsed Between Sexual Assault Evidence Kit Collection and Submission to a
Forensic Laboratory, based on OSA sample
RISK FACTOR
Alarmingly, 20% of the untested Kits subject to the OSA Special Audit were from
sexual assaults of minors.
After the DPS Survey, the landscape of untested Kits changed in a number of respects. The
designation of this Special Audit spurred the designated entities to submit their Kits for testing.
Professional groups including the New Mexico Police Chiefs Association discussed the issue with a
view to reducing the number of untested Kits. DPS contacted agencies that reported small numbers
of untested Kits and encouraged them to send the Kits to the State Lab. The State Lab began issuing
blanket authorization codes, which facilitated the transfer of 20 Kits at a time from local law
enforcement.
17
In the 2016 regular legislative session, the New Mexico Legislature passed companion memorials, HB
58 and SM 50, establishing a Task Force to to assess the progress of processing backlogged sexual
assault examination Kits and to make related recommendations. The Task Force met in July 2016 and
September 2016.
In addition, in 2016 the Legislature in HB 2 appropriated $1.2 million to the State Lab to for the
processing of backlogged rape Kits at [DPS].
In July 2016, the City of Albuquerque announced Project 333, allotting $200,000 to assist in the testing
of untested Kits in the Albuquerque Forensic Lab. Although originally intended to test about 10% of the
historically untested Kits, the Albuquerque Forensic Lab estimates that only 200 additional Kits or fewer
can be tested using these funds, which constitutes closer to 5% of untested Kits that remain to be tested
in the Albuquerque Forensic Lab.
Relative to other states, when viewing the numbers of historically untested Kits, New Mexico ranks in
the middle of the pack. However, when normalized for population, however, New Mexico has the
highest rate of historically untested Kits per capita, as illustrated in Figure 7.
Number of Historically
Total Number of
Untested Kits per 100,000
Historically Untested Kits
residents
8,998
23
3,044
24
1,133
24
879
24
2,369
28
3,770
29
3,482
63
3,542
65
19,018
69
2,217
74
6,000
84
2,700
90
6,006
104
13,930
120
4,902
122
9,062
137
15,217
153
5,302
254
18
RISK FACTOR
In 36% of Kits subject to the OSA Special Audit, the reason why the Kit was not sent
to the Lab was not documented. The lack of documentation precluded a full
understanding of the significance of each Kit in the context of its case.
Throughout the Special Audit, interviewees reported to the OSA that the widespread existence of
untested Kits was not news, was not unexpected and was the logical result of the way they did
business. Specifically, most law enforcement agencies had policies that required a discretionary
decision as to whether to send Kits for testing. Unfortunately, much of the logic behind these
discretionary decisions was lost, as 36% of Kits subject to the OSA Special Audit did not have
documentation as to the reason why the Kit was not sent to the Lab.
RISK FACTOR
When the reasons for not testing the Kits were documented, over half of the reasons
were based on the credibility of, cooperation from or contact with the victim. These
statistics are particularly troubling because they suggest a failure to understand the
realities of sexual assault victims. In addition, it may be necessary to raise
awareness that research indicates that sexual assault is not falsely reported more
frequently than other crimes, and that DNA testing is an easy way to advance an
investigation independent of victim cooperation.
As illustrated in Figure 8, for 21% of the Kits that the Special Audit reviewed (and 32% of the Kits for
which a reason for not testing the Kit was documented), the reason for not testing the Kit was a
perceived lack of victim credibility. For another 21% of the Kits that the Special Audit reviewed, the
reason for not testing the Kit was loss of contact with or perceived lack of cooperation from the victim.
This means that for over the half of the untested Kits for which the OSA could determine the reason
they were not sent to the Lab, that reason was related to the victim, not the offender. This mirrored the
responses to the OSA Survey, which asked responding agencies to list all the reasons why they might
not send a Kit to the lab. The leading OSA Survey responses were also loss of contact with or lack of
cooperation from the victim, with 19% citing loss of contact and 43% of respondents citing lack of
cooperation, as illustrated in Figure 9.
19
These statistics are particularly troubling because they suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of the
realities of the victims experience after a sexual assault. First, victim cooperation and contact can be
particularly difficult for victims of sexual assault. Sexual assault victims are three times more likely to
experience depression, four times more likely to contemplate suicide, six times more likely to
experience PTSD, 13 times more likely to abuse alcohol and 26 times more likely to abuse drugs. Up
to 50% of sexual violence victims quit or are forced to leave their jobs in the year following the assault.
Given those statistics, the apparent non-cooperation or non-availability of sexual assault victims is not
an appropriate reason to terminate an investigation. In addition, without the involvement of trained
counselors and victim advocates, contact between law enforcement and victims may not be optimal.
RISK FACTOR
Because law enforcement agencies did not have a policy to test every Kit, and
because of resource constraints, outdated ideas and misinformation about consent
and victim credibility resulted in many Kits not being tested.
Second, the 21% of Kits in the Special Audit that were not tested due to lack of victim credibility are
particularly troubling given research indicating that sexual assault is not falsely reported at a higher
level than other crimes. The National Center for the Prosecution of Violence Against Women has
narrowed the range of possible false reporting of sexual assault to 2-8%, which is in line with other
types of crimes. In addition, antiquated concepts of consent such as the belief that silence is
equivalent to consent or that intoxicated persons, spouses or sex workers cannot be sexually
20
assaulted contribute to a lack of belief in sexual assault victims. In any case, New Mexico law makes
this decision simple: law enforcement agencies are required to test the Kit whether they believe the
victim or not.
Law enforcement agencies did not initially report a lack of financial or personnel resources as a
reason for not submitting Kits to the Lab. However, interviewees repeatedly emphasized the
challenges of large caseloads and the need to prioritize on a day-to-day basis. Law enforcement
agencies also reported that as different issues come into the public spotlight, there is a temporary
push to prioritize that issue. This temporary push subsides when the next issue hits the newspapers.
However, the OSA considers many of the Best Practices set forth in this report to be beneficial to
agencies as a whole and not limited just to the issues of SAE Kits. Furthermore, a non-discretionary
approach to testing Kits that is coordinated by evidence room personnel rather than detectives should
result in an overall reduction of work for other law enforcement personnel.
BEST PRACTICE
Special Audit interviewees reported that training in trauma-informed interview
techniques had significantly altered their perception of victim credibility. For
example, dispatchers and first line officers may receive training to understand that
as a result of the trauma, sexual assault victims may say unusual things and may
be smiling or even laughing, none of which speaks to their credibility. The Kit has
the potential to corroborate certain aspects of a victims account of the assault and
may ultimately assuage concerns about victim credibility if those Kits are not
excluded from testing.
21
Figure 10: Comparison of Reasons Given for Not Testing Kits to Goals of Testing Kits
Reason given for not testing Kit
Enhance public
safety by
contributing to
CODIS
Honor the
victim
Foster
confidence
in the
system
Suspect known
Suspect unknown
Victim deceased
Suspect deceased
Suspect known and arrested
Case has been adjudicated but not
as a sexual assault case
RISK FACTOR
The OSA observed tracking systems for evidence based on the detective assigned
to the case, which contributed to losing track of Kits because of turnover within law
enforcement agencies.
RISK FACTOR
The OSA observed tracking systems for evidence that do not connect to other
aspects of case management. This resulted in a labor- and time-intensive effort in
which law enforcement personnel needed to retrieve physical or electronic case files
and reconstruct case timelines in order to understand why a Kit had not been sent to
the Lab.
RISK FACTOR
The OSA observed a lack of documentation to support Kit destruction. When courts
or district attorneys had authorized or approved destruction, then supporting
documentation was more likely to be present than when destruction resulted from
internal decision-making based on the need to clear space in the evidence room.
23
RISK FACTOR
A lack of resources affects (1) law enforcement agencies wishing to implement
stronger internal controls for untested Kits, (2) the two Forensic Labs and (3) the
service providers like SANE programs and rape crisis centers that play a critical role
throughout the investigation and prosecution of sexual abuse.
At the law enforcement level, interviewees reported unsuccessful attempts to obtain funding to
modernize evidence rooms. Multiple interviewees also reported a need for additional staff with
experience in sexual assault cases and trauma-informed interview techniques. In addition, some
agencies did not have a dedicated evidence room custodian, and instead required an officer to serve
as custodian in addition to other duties in the agency or in the field.
The lack of adequate resources is due in part to the rural-urban dynamics of our State, which increase
the burden on law enforcement agencies in urban centers without providing any additional revenue.
For example, one law enforcement agency reported that the daytime population of the city nearly
tripled over the permanent population, and staff could barely cover traffic and drug-related
emergencies. Another community reported a more than twofold increase in the population of the city
at the beginning of each month. In both cases, the budget of the law enforcement agency was
determined by the municipality, which does not necessarily recognize enough revenue from this
added activity to offset the added demands on law enforcement.
RISK FACTOR
Our site visits revealed that many agencies have one or two individuals who have
championed the issue of tackling the untested Kits. However, as those people move
within or outside of their agencies, it is critical that their work become institutionalized
so it is not dependent on any one person.
Law enforcement agencies overwhelmingly reported that the State Forensic Lab is easy to work with
and processes Kits in a timely fashion. That said, both Forensic Labs, while acknowledging gratitude
for increases in resources, reported inadequate staffing for their caseload. In the 2016 regular
legislative session, the New Mexico Legislature appropriated $1.2 million to the State Lab to assist in
testing the untested Kits. However, additional funds are not a quick fix. Making the changes that result
in increased capacity can take a long time. It is rare for either Lab to be fully staffed because of
turnover and training requirements. New employees require training, which can take up to a year and
also requires more experienced staff to engage in training new employees, decreasing their time for
testing. New equipment and instrumentation must be tested and validated, which diverts lab staff from
case work. Changes in technical requirements for DNA testing has pulled away staff to validate new
instruments and new equipment. Furthermore, complete technical review requires multiple persons to
be involved with each Kit.
Interviewees from the service provider and advocacy community also reported a deficiency in
resources. As just one example, one SANE program reported difficulties in getting outlying
communities to send law enforcement personnel to retrieve Kits. This problem was exacerbated by
the fact that the SANE program did not have enough resources to devote staff time to repeatedly
contacting law enforcement agencies that were non-responsive.
24
Interview data suggests that SAE Kit-specific policies are not necessary for implementing best
practices. Instead, a written policy generally governing evidence may contain the appropriate
guidelines for handling SAE Kits, as many policies do for guns, drugs and money. Special Audit
interviewees emphasized that caution be used because excessive policy can become detrimental to
the investigative process. Interviewees reported that ideal policies are understandable and
comprehensive, but allow an investigation to proceed without spending hours of research.
BEST PRACTICE
OSA identified the following best practices for general or specific policies that
govern the handling of SAE Kits:
Procedures to ensure that law enforcement picks up Kits when notified by SANE
programs.
Centralized tracking of all movement of the Kits, the lab results. For more details, see page 26.
Procedures that emphasize victims rights, involve victim advocates and include the best
practices on victim notification (see Appendix E).
Procedures for receiving, storage and destruction of Kits.
Procedures for expedited handling of Drug-Facilitated Sexual Assault (DFSA) samples, which
take into account the period during which the sample is appropriate for analysis.
Procedures for tracking the Kits that are at the Lab and following up when results are not
received.
Procedures for tracking Kit destruction, including documentation of the reasons for destruction.
Appendix F contains a more detailed outline of key elements for policies applicable to SAE Kits.
25
RISK FACTOR
While most agencies we visited had sophisticated evidence tracking systems, we
also observed agencies that still track evidence in a combination of manual logs
and spreadsheets.
In order to facilitate the best practices we observed statewide, a computerized evidence system
should have the following attributes:
The system manages evidence by case number so that the user can easily access a list of all
pieces of evidence associated with a case.
The system assigns a unique identification number for each piece of evidence. This is a standard
feature in most systems.
The system facilitates the attachment of imaged documents to the record for each piece of
evidence. A system that allows the user to attach these images creates efficiencies throughout the
case. Some examples of documents that may be imaged and connected electronically to pieces of
evidence are:
The computerized evidence system documents the reasons for destruction or disposal of
evidence, including the person(s) who authorized destruction and images of any authorizing
documents.
The system uses a pre-set list (drop-down menu) of evidence types for consistency. For example,
we reviewed systems that had open text fields for evidence type, resulting in Kits being entered
as SAEK, SAE Kit, rape kit and other designations.
The system gives the user the ability to create custom evidence types within the drop-down menu.
This would allow the creation of a unique classification for SAE Kits, DFSA Kits and many other
types of evidence. In contrast, many systems the OSA observed did not facilitate a simple search
that would produce a list of all SAE Kits.
The system links to the case management software so that evidence can easily be accessed and
tracked through the course of the investigation.
The system tracks the names or other identifying information for each person who accesses and
make changes to a record (auditable change log). This reduces the likelihood of fraudulent
changes and makes it easier to identify and train personnel who are not using the system
correctly.
26
BEST PRACTICE
Implementing and financially supporting MDTs, SARTs and the rape crisis centers
and SANE programs that facilitate them are critical steps in processing the
untested Kits and continuing the progress we have made in handling sexual
assault cases and implementing the best practices in victim notification. Financial
support may include money for staff, training, mileage reimbursement and
outreach.
Non-Reported Kits. A non-reported Kit is a SAE Kit from a patient who had not, at the time of the
exam, filed a police report (see page 10). The OSA observed varying practices for storage of nonreported Kits including:
Some SANE programs are storing non-reported Kits.
Some law enforcement agencies are storing non-reported Kits for their own agencies.
Some SANE programs are storing non-reported Kits for only those law enforcement agencies that
will not accept them.
Some non-reported Kits are stored physically separately from other evidence with no case
number. The risk in this approach is that the Kit will not be subject to the same strict protocols
governing other evidence.
Some non-reported Kits are given a generic case number and held collectively under one number
unless and until a police report is filed and the Kit is moved with the evidence for that case. The
risks in this approach are that it makes it easier to lose track of individual non-reported Kits.
Some non-reported Kits are given a placeholder case number so they can be tracked specifically.
BEST PRACTICE
SANE programs do not have the resources or authority to handle non-reported
Kits in the long term, nor can they meet the regulations or standards for
maintaining evidence. Evidence rooms, with their enhanced policies and internal
controls, are preferable repositories for non-reported Kits.
27
BEST PRACTICE
The OSA observed that in agencies where the evidence custodians had automatic
protocols for sending Kits to the lab, the chances of recurrence of accumulating
untested Kits had been reduced significantly.
28
29
BEST PRACTICE
The Albuquerque Forensic Lab has implemented a career path that provides a
path for retention and promotion within the Lab. This is intended to help the Lab
compete with private labs and labs in other states that pay technicians
considerably more.
When Kits are tested, the resource needs will shift back to local law enforcement agencies and victim
advocates. Personnel will need to evaluate results, track down lead and re-open, continue or conclude
investigations. In addition, because half of adult victims of sexual assault move and/or change jobs
within one year of the assault, simply locating victims may be challenging.
BEST PRACTICE
The Victim Notification Procedures set forth in Appendix E contains the best
practices for notifying victims in cases that have been dormant for a long period
but have been reactivated as a result of testing the Kits, and were developed by a
working group of advocates and law enforcement personnel.
30
BEST PRACTICE
Law enforcement personnel, in consultation with experts and the community, has
developed a written and video training module that will be implemented at the
mandatory biennial training program for law enforcement officers statewide.
DOES THE STATE NEED MORE FORENSIC LABS THAT CAN DO DNA TESTING?
Across the state, interviewees and the public inquired about the possibility of opening additional
forensic laboratories that are capable of DNA testing. Interviewees who travel considerable distance
to deliver Kits expressed a desire to have a lab closer to them. The OSA analyzed this issue and
concluded that expanding existing facilities is a significantly more efficient use of limited financial
resources for the following reasons:
31
The cost of establishing a new forensic laboratory capable of DNA testing is estimated to be $40
million, with $1 million in annual recurring costs. The salaries for forensic lab technicians ranges
from the low $30,000s for entry-level positions to over $90,000 for top-level employees.
Certifying a new forensic laboratory is time-intensive and may take up to two years. Instruments
must be duplicated with back up and validation takes a significant amount of time and other
resources.
Supplies for the lab, like reagents, are expensive and have short shelf-lives. Decentralizing the
labs would increase the likelihood of spoilage of these supplies.
New Mexico has significant challenges in finding and retaining qualified professionals to conduct
DNA testing. Additional laboratories would result in additional competition for scarce labor
resources.
APPENDICES
A. Risk Factors and Best Practices
B. Sample Letter from Department of Public Safety to Law Enforcement Agencies
C. Special Audit participants
D. Key articles and related resources
E. Victim Notification Procedures
F. Key Policy Elements for handling SAE Kits
G. Multi-Disciplinary Teams and Sexual Assault Response Teams
H. Sample Memorandum regarding Drug Facilitated Sexual Assault samples
I.
32
A common misconception is that the sole purpose of a SAE Kit is to identify unknown
perpetrators of sexual assault. When viewed in light of the additional goals of enhancing
DNA databases, upholding the commitment made by law enforcement to the victims and
instilling public confidence, it becomes clear why all or nearly all Kits should be tested.
The law tolling the limitation period in sexual assault cases where a suspect has not been
identified and a DNA evidence is available may be ambiguous as to whether it would apply
to crimes committed prior to its enactment date in 2003. An opinion from the Attorney
General or a legislative fix addressing this issue would be helpful when Kits from before
2003 are tested.
Law enforcement agencies expressed a lack of clarity on whether the statute requiring
submission of biological samples for DNA testing applies to all SAE Kits, or only those Kits
related to cases in which an investigation has been open. The plain language of the statute
states that all Kits must be tested, except for non-reported Kits (i.e., Kits from incidents in
which the victim has chosen not to file a police report).
Law enforcement agencies, advocates and district attorneys who participated in the
Special Audit expressed concern that the decision in State v. Thomas compounds issues
related to the cost of DNA testing. Forensic lab personnel can have a high turnover rate,
and personnel who leave for the private sector often demand high witness fees and incur
high travel costs to testify live at trial. Some interviewees stated that their agencies
received costly bills for expert witness testimony that reflected the higher rates of the
private forensic industry, and which their agencies could not afford to pay.
Alarmingly, 20% of the untested Kits subject to the OSA Special Audit were from sexual
assaults of minors.
In 36% of Kits subject to the OSA Special Audit, the reason why the Kit was not sent to the
Lab was not documented. The lack of documentation precluded a full understanding of the
significance of each Kit in the context of its case.
When the reasons for not testing the Kits were documented, over half of the reasons were
based on the credibility of, cooperation from or contact with the victim. These statistics are
particularly troubling because they suggest a failure to understand the realities of sexual
assault victims. In addition, it may be necessary to raise awareness that research indicates
that sexual assault is not falsely reported more frequently than other crimes, and that DNA
testing is an easy way to advance an investigation independent of victim cooperation.
Because law enforcement agencies did not have a policy to test every Kit, and because of
resource constraints, outdated ideas and misinformation about consent and victim
credibility resulted in many Kits not being tested.
The OSA observed tracking systems for evidence based on the detective assigned to the
case, which contributed to losing track of Kits because of turnover within law enforcement
agencies.
The OSA observed tracking systems for evidence that do not connect to other aspects of
case management. This resulted in a labor- and time-intensive effort in which law
enforcement personnel needed to retrieve physical or electronic case files and reconstruct
case timelines in order to understand why a Kit had not been sent to the Lab.
The OSA observed a lack of documentation to support Kit destruction. When courts or
district attorneys had authorized or approved destruction, then supporting documentation
was more likely to be present than when destruction resulted from internal decision-making
based on the need to clear space in the evidence room.
A lack of resources affects (1) law enforcement agencies wishing to implement stronger
internal controls for untested Kits, (2) the two forensic Labs and (3) the service providers
like SANE programs and rape crisis centers that play a critical role throughout the
investigation and prosecution of sexual abuse.
Our site visits revealed that many agencies have one or two individuals who have
championed the issue of tackling the untested Kits. However, as those people move
within or outside of their agencies, it is critical that their work become institutionalized so it
is not dependent on any one person.
The systems used to track Kits varies widely across the state, with strong systems
contributing to the improved handling of cases. While most agencies we visited had such
systems, we also observed agencies that still track evidence in a combination of manual
logs and spreadsheets.
BEST PRACTICES
The SANE programs have changed the packaging of evidence to include underpants in the
white envelope to ensure that those items are tested in the first round of lab work. This
reflects research suggesting that some of the best biological material samples often come
from underpants. In addition, SANE nurses are considering adding key case descriptors to
the white envelope in order to support work at the Labs.
Forensic Labs emphasized that obtaining reference samples from victims and consensual
partners as early as possible can significantly expedite testing.
Law enforcement agencies should submit every Kit associated with a police report to the
appropriate lab for testing, within a minimal amount of time. Taking this non-discretionary
approach will reduce the impact of difficulties in contacting victims and misconceptions
about victim credibility.
OSA identified the following best practices for general or specific policies that govern the
handling of SAE Kits:
Procedures to ensure that law enforcement picks up Kits when notified by SANE
programs.
Procedures that emphasize victims rights, involve victim advocates and include the
best practices on victim notification (see Appendix D).
Procedures for tracking the Kits that are at the Lab and following up when results
are not received.
Procedures for tracking Kit destruction, including documentation of the reasons for
destruction.
Implementing and financially supporting MDTs, SARTs and the rape crisis centers and
SANE programs that facilitate them are critical steps in processing the untested Kits and
continuing the progress we have made in handling sexual assault cases and implementing
the best practices in victim notification. Financial support may include money for staff,
training, mileage reimbursement and outreach.
SANE programs do not have the resources or authority to handle non-reported Kits in the
long term, nor can they meet the regulations or standards for maintaining evidence.
Evidence rooms, with their enhanced policies and internal controls, are preferable
repositories for non-reported Kits.
The OSA observed that in agencies where the evidence custodians had automatic
protocols for sending Kits to the lab, the chances of recurrence of accumulating untested
Kits had been reduced significantly.
The Albuquerque Forensic Lab has implemented a career path that provides a path for
retention and promotion within the Lab. This is intended to help the Lab compete with
private labs and labs in other states that pay technicians considerably more.
Law enforcement personnel, in consultation with experts and the community, has
developed a written and video training module that will be implemented at the mandatory
biennial training program for law enforcement officers statewide.
The Victim Notification Protocol set forth in Appendix D contains the best practices for
notifying victims in cases that have been dormant for a long period but have been
reactivated as a result of testing the Kits.
[ATTACHED]
Last Name
Bell
Kresbsbach
Manogue
McDonald
Garcia
Landavazo
Peterson
Runyan
Sagbakken
Agency
Albuquerque Forensic Lab
Albuquerque Forensic Lab
Albuquerque Forensic Lab
Albuquerque Forensic Lab
Albuquerque Police Department
Albuquerque Police Department
Albuquerque Police Department
Albuquerque Police Department
Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center
Teresa
DAnza
Gail
Detective Amanda
Starr
Wilde
Leigh Ann
Chief Mike
Detective Amy
Captain Andi
William F.
Kevin
McKenzie
Jackie
Wendell
Captain Roman
Sergeant David
Undersheriff Mike
Eugene
Heal
Dudewicz
Taylor
Corvin
Hallstrom
McIntosh
Tsosie
Blair
Romero
Ford
Reeves
Sheriff Wesley
Amy
Secretary Scott
Seargent John
Chief Richard
Victoria
Francisco
Detective George
Deputy Chief Matthew
Eva F.
Terry
Chief Steve
Lieutenant Joshua
Det. Sergeant Brandon
Candice
Waller
Orlando
Weaver
Lovelace
Gallegos
Gallegos
Galvan
Martinez
Vigil
Barron
Eagle
Hebbe
Laino
Lane
Morales
Last Name
Noon
Warner
Kice
Martin
Stinson
Hudson
Spencer
Spencer
Yazzie
Hoelscher
Clark
Richmond
Askin
Carbajal
Carbajal
Dominguez
Dunivan
Kinney
Montoya
Mullins
Rosa
West
Monahan
Agency
Farmington Police Department
Farmington Police Department
Federal Bureau of Investigation
First Judicial District Attorney's Office
First Judicial District Attorney's Office
Gallup Police Department
Gallup Police Department
Gallup Police Department
Gallup Police Department
Kentucky State Auditor
La Pinon Sexual Assault Services
La Pinon Sexual Assault Services
Las Cruces Police Department
Las Cruces Police Department
Las Cruces Police Department
Las Cruces Police Department
Las Cruces Police Department
Las Cruces Police Department
Las Cruces Police Department
Las Cruces Police Department
Las Cruces Police Department
Navajo Department of Criminal Investigations
New Mexico Coalition of Sexual Assault Programs
Captain Matt
Lieutenant Randy
Captain Eric
Captain Dale R.
Lieutenant Jesse
District Attorney Andrea
Colleen
Broom
Larcher
Schum
Wagoner
Williams
Reeb
Dearmin
Debra
Hicks
Tawnya
Burton
Racheal
Eleana
Cynthia
Sheila
Jayann
Killgore
Butler
Miller
Lewis
Sepich
Websites
New Mexico Coalition of Sexual Assault Programs, Inc.: http://www.nmscap.org
End the Backlog, a Joyful Heart Foundation Initiative: http://endthebacklog.org/
National Institute of Justice, Rape and Sexual Violence Page: http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/
rape-sexual-violence/pages/welcome.aspx
U.S. Department of Justice Sexual
ProgramDetails.aspx?Program_ID=117
Assault
Kit
Initiative:
https://www.bja.gov/
[ATTACHED]
Victims should be kept informed and be told the truth even when there is no good news.
Victims should be given options and time to make informed choices. Victims should have
input into the decisions that will affect their cases and their lives. Victims should be
supported and given resources for what happens next. Should the victim have an adverse
reaction or choose not to participate at that time, they should be provided with a packet of
information including a contact name in case they change their mind.
Practices should be tailored for certain populations such as children and youth 17 and
under, vulnerable adults, tribal members, and other underserved populations.
WHAT:
WHEN:
Once the SAEK is tested, whether a DNA strand was identified or not, and
whether DNA has resulted in a CODIS (Combined DNA Index System) hit
or not.
HOW:
Recommendation #1.
The Multi-Disciplinary Team will implement Victim Notification for victims
affected by the delayed testing of SAEKs.
The multi-disciplinary team (MDT) will take the lead in developing and implementing how
Victim Notification will occur within their community, using local resources, and being sensitive
to cultural concerns.
1. The MDT should be comprised of at least law enforcement, victim advocates, prosecution,
and social work/counselors who have knowledge and skills in working with victims of sexual
assault.
2. The MDT should collaboratively review and adopt core recommendations of this document
into a written policy for Victim Notification. The policy should reflect local resources,
outline the responsibilities of the agencies involved, and define timelines for action steps
within the victim notification process.
3. The process of Victim Notification needs to be culturally sensitive to the various populations
within New Mexico, including children and youth, tribal, LGBTQ, immigrant, those with
limited English proficiency, and other under-served populations.
a. Special attention needs to be given to children and youth as well as to victims who
were children and youth at the time of the initial assault and investigation.
b. Special attention and support needs to be given to tribal victims and tribal agencies
4. Communities without an established sexual assault MDT are encouraged to join existing
nearby MDTs and/or contact their nearest Rape Crisis Center, Sexual Assault Service
Provider, Child Advocacy Center, SANE Program, or the New Mexico Coalition of Sexual
Assault Programs for direction and support in implementing a policy.
Recommendation #2.
MDT members need training and resources to conduct trauma-informed
Victim Notification for SAEKs that were not tested when the victim reported
the sexual assault.
MDT members need training, skills and necessary resources to implement trauma-informed
Victim Notification. The goal of the training is to ensure a coordinated and consistent response to
notifying sexual assault victims of SAEK results from a cold-case.
3
Recommendation #3.
Information will be made available to keep victims and the general public
informed and engaged in the process of testing SAEKs.
Victims should be kept informed and be told the truth even when there is no good news.
Victims should be given options and time to make informed choices. Victims should have input
into the decisions that will affect their cases and their lives. Victims should be supported and
given resources for what happens next. Victims who may have initial adverse reactions or who
are not ready to participate should be provided a packet of information with a contact name.
Information needs to be tailored to both the individual and the general public. We
recommend four concurrent approaches:
1. Law enforcement agencies and district attorney offices need to have trained victim advocates
and/or liaisons to respond to direct victim inquiries with real-time information on their cases.
2. MDT members need to provide updates to community leaders and elected city and state
officials, to solicit their leadership and on-going support of the Victim Notification process.
3. A general awareness campaign needs to inform victims and the public of the collaborative
work being done to test the SAEKs and provide Victim Notification. Media outreach may
include billboard, radio/television public service announcements, and news interviews.
4. Local and statewide sexual assault and crisis service providers can support the dissemination
of public, non-victim-specific information through social media and website information,
highlighting FAQs, the MDT activities, and resources pertaining to our states untested
SAEKs.
b. The law enforcement/advocacy team will make every attempt to notify a victim in a
time, place, and manner that provides privacy, respect, and safety.
c. The team will be prepared to have multiple, in-person contacts when notifying
victims. The team will allow time in between first contact and subsequent contacts for
decisions regarding the case.
d. An information and resource packet including specific contact information will be
provided.
6. The law enforcement/advocacy team may benefit from having prosecutor and/or other legal
guidance to provide information relating to deadlines about approaching Statute of
Limitations (SOL), legal implications of victim decisions, victim concerns about the identity
and/or location of suspect, and otherwise help the victim feel supported and engaged in the
criminal justice process.
7. The decision to participate in the case lies ultimately with the victim.
8. PLEASE NOTE:
a. Implementation of Victim Notification for native and tribal members will need extra
attention and details beyond the prescriptions listed above. There will need to be
tribal-specific policies guided by tribal members and tribal agencies for notification in
tribal communities. For example, in #1 above, locating victims for tribal communities
may involve extra steps for victims that do not have a physical address, or, in the case
of tribal lands without a tribal law enforcement presence, the notification team may
need to be modified to accommodate available resources.
b. Implementation of Victim Notification for children/youth or for cases where the
victim was a minor at the time of the assault will need extra attention and detail
beyond the prescriptions listed above. How and when to involve the parents may need
to be part of the Victim Notification process. Some of the untested SAEKs may have
been collected from very young children who may not remember the event. Lastly,
family dynamics who knew or didnt know about the disclosure or the relationship
of the offending family member may make Victim Notification more prolonged and
less direct.
This project was supported by subgrant 2016-WF-223 awarded by the NMCVRC for the STOP
Formula Grant. The opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations expressed in the
publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NMCVRC or
the US Department of Justice Office on Violence Against Women.
Ensuring that law enforcement picks up Kits when notified by SANE programs
Consider making evidence room personnel the back-up for officers designated to
pick up Kits
Date that law enforcement agency retrieved or received SAE Kit from SANE
location
Date that law enforcement agency placed and logged SAE Kit into evidence room
Date that SAE Kit package was returned to law enforcement agency from lab
Key dates
DFSA samples should be refrigerated if they will be held by law enforcement for
more than 48 hours prior to transfer to the State Laboratory Division of the
Department of Health (SLD)
Child, Adult or
Other*
County/Community
Child, Adult or
Other*
Alb/Bernalillo Co.
Adult
McKinley Co.
Adult DV/SA
Alb/Bernalillo Co.
Child
McKinley Co.
Child
Alb/Bernalillo Co.
Disability
Mora Co.
UNKNOWN
Adult
Navajo/NAHZCASA
Catron Co.
UNKNOWN
Northern Pueblos
Chavez Co.
Child
Otero Co.
Adult
Chavez Co.
Adult
Otero Co.
Child
Cibola Co.
UNKNOWN
Quay/DeBaca Co.
Colfax/Union Co.
Child
Child
Crownpoint
Sandoval Co.
Child
Curry/Roosevelt Co.
Sandoval Co.
Adult DV/SA
Child
Child
Child
Adult
Dulce/Jicarilla Apache
Child
Eddy Co.
Child
st
Child
st
Grant Co.
Adult
Harding/Union Co.
Shiprock
Hidalgo Co.
Sierra Co.
Child
Lea Co.
Socorro Co.
UNKNOWN
Lincoln Co.
Adult
Taos Co.
Adult
Lincoln Co.
Child
Torrance Co.
UNKNOWN
Child
Union/Harding Co.
Luna Co.
UNM SMART
Adult
Mescalero
Valencia Co.
Adult
505-266-7711
http://www.rapecrisiscnm.org/
505-717-2877
http://nmafc.org/
Clayton
Alternatives to Violence-Clayton
110 Walnut St, Clayton, NM 88415
575-643-5335
575-643-5335 crisis
Espaola
Tewa Women United
912 Fairview Lane, Espaola, NM 87532
505-747-3259
http://tewawomenunited.org/
Farmington
Sexual Assault Services of Northwest New Mexico
622 W Maple Suite H, Farmington, NM 87401
505-325-2805
http://sasnwnm.org/
Gallup
Sexual Assault Services of Northwest New Mexico-Gallup 505-399-5940
506 W Historic Hwy 66, Gallup, NM 87301
866-908-4700 crisis
http://sasnwnm.org/
Las Cruces
La Pion Sexual Assault Recovery Services
525 South Melendres St., Las Cruces, NM 88005
Los Lunas
Valencia Shelter Services
303 Luna Avenue, Los Lunas, NM 87031
http://www.valenciashelterservices.org/index.html
Portales
Arise Sexual Assault Services
Roosevelt General Hospital, Portales, NM 88130
http://www.arisenm.org/
Santa Fe
Solace Crisis Treatment Center
6601 Valentine Way, Santa Fe, NM 87507
575-526-3437
http://www.lapinon.org/
505-565-3100
575-226-7263
575-226-7263 emergency
505-988-1951
http://www.findsolace.org/
Silver City
Silver Regional Sexual Assault Support Services
301 W College Ave Suite 11, Silver City, NM 88061
http://www.silverregionalsass.org/
575-313-6203
866-750-6474 crisis
Taos
Community Against Violence
945 Salazar Rd, Taos, NM 87571
http://www.taoscav.org/
575-758-8082 x-117
575-758-9888 crisis
The Bernalillo County Sheriffs Office also developed a tier-based prioritization system, as
follows:
Tier 1 consist of cases in which the offender is unknown, the investigation supports the
allegation and the agency believes that DNA may contribute to successful prosecution.
Tier 2 consists of cases in which the offender is unknown, there is evidence that a sexual
encounter occurred based on the SANE exam and the agency believes that DNA may
contribute to successful prosecution.
Tier 3 includes a variety of circumstances, including cases in which a suspect has been
identified, the investigation has not concluded if the sexual assault was coercive or forced, or
the victim has not cooperated.
Tier 4 consists of cases in which all allegations were unfounded after investigation. These
would still be tested, but later in time.
Tier 5 consists of cases prosecuted or dropped by the District Attorney. These would also still
be tested, but would have the lowest priority.