Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the
proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and
recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this
Resolution.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 123346
SO ORDERED.2
I.
On 18 December 1979, DIMSON filed with the then Court of First Instance
["CFI"] of Rizal a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against
ARANETA. On 7 May 1980, DIMSON amended his complaint and included
Virgilio L. Enriquez ["ENRIQUEZ"] as his co-plaintiff.
It is incorrect to presume that the earlier referral of these cases to the Court of
Appeals for reception of evidence was strictly in accordance with Rule 32.
Notably, Section 1 of said Rule authorizes the referral of the case to a
commissioner "by written consent of both parties," whereas in the cases at
bar, the Court did not endeavor to secure the consent of the parties before
effectuating the remand to the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, our earlier
advertence to Rule 32 remains proper even if the adopted procedure does
not hew strictly to that Rule, owing to our power under Section 6, Rule 135 to
adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding which appears
conformable to the spirit of the Rules to carry into effect all auxiliary
processes and other means necessary to carry our jurisdiction into effect.
Moreover, furnishing the parties with copies of the Sealed Report would not
serve any useful purpose. It would only delay the promulgation of the
Courts action on the Sealed Report and the adjudication of these cases. In
any event, the present Resolution quotes extensively from the sealed Report
and discusses its other substantive segments which are not quoted.
The Report is a commendably exhaustive and pellucid analysis of the issues
referred to the Special Division. It is a more than adequate basis for this
Court to make the following final dispositions in these cases.
7784 in evidence to prove that it is the registered owner of the land described
therein.
On 28 May 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision upholding the title of
DIMSON over the disputed property xxx
Undaunted, ARANETA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 41883, which was later consolidated with CAGR. SP No. 34819 in view of the inter-related issues of the two cases.
In its 30 May 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 41883,
sustained the RTC Decision in favor of DIMSON finding that the title of
ARANETA to the disputed land in a nullity. In CA-GR. SP No. 34819, the
Court of Appeals likewise invalidated the titles of ARANETA, relying on the
Supreme Court ruling in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v.
Court of Appeals, which declared null and void the certificates of title derived
from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 may 1917. It was also held that ARANETA
failed to sufficiently show that the Order sought to be nullified was obtained
through extrinsic fraud that would warrant the annulment thereof.
Dissatisfied still, ARANETA filed a Motion for Reconsideration And/Or
New Trial espousing therein as basis for its entreaty the various letters from
different government agencies and Department order No. 137 of the
Department of Justice, among others.
On 16 July 1998, the various Motions of ARANETA were denied by the
Court of Appeals. Nonetheless, the Court ordered DIMSON to maintain
status quo until the finality of the aforesaid judgment.
Consequently, ARANETA filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
Refuting the factual finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
ARANETA contended that there in only one OCT 994 covering the Maysilo
Estate issued on 3 May 1917 pursuant to the Decree No. 36455 issued by the
Court of Land Registration on 19 April 1917 and added that there were
subsequent certifications issued by the government officials, notably from
the LRS, the DOJ Committee Report and the Senate Committees Joint Report
which attested that there is only one OCT 994, that which had been issued on
3 May 1917.1avvphi1
CLT v. MANOTOK
CA-G.R. CV. No. 45255
[SC-G.R. No. 123346]
On 10 August 1992, CLT filed with the Regional Trial Court ["RTC"] A
COMPLAINT FOR Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery of
Possession and Damages against the MANOTOKS and the Registry of Deeds
of Metro Manila District II (Calookan City, Metro Manila) ["CALOOCAN
RD"].
In its Complaint, CLT alleged that it is the registered owner of Lot 26 of the
Maysilo Estate located in Caloocan City and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T- 177013, a derivative title of OCT No. 994. As a basis of its
proprietary claim, CLT averred that on 10 December 1988, it had acquired
Lot 26 from its former registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito ["HIPOLITO"],
by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage. HIPOLITOs title was ,
in turn, a direct transfer from DIMSON, the registered owner of TCT No.
15166, the latter having acquired the same by virtue of a Court Order dated
13 June 1966 issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No.
4557.
On the other hand, the MANOTOKS maintained the validity of their titles,
which were all derivatives of OCT No. 994 covering over twenty (20) parcels
of land located over a portion of Lot 26 in the Maysilo Estate. In substance, it
was contented that the title of CLT was an offspring of an ineffective grant of
an alleged undisputed portion of Lot 26 by way of attorneys fees to its
predecessor-in- interest, Jose B. Dimson. The MANOTOKS, in this
connection, further contended that the portion of Lot 26, subject of the
present controversy, had long been disposed of in favor of Alejandro Ruiz
and Mariano Leuterio and hence, there was nothing more in said portion of
Lot 26 that could have been validly conveyed to Dimson.
Tracing the legitimacy of their certificates of titles, the MANOTOKS alleged
that TCT No. 4210, which cancelled OCT No. 994, had been issued in the
names of Alejandro Ruiz and Mariano Leuterio on Sept ember 1918 by virtue
of an Escritura De Venta executed by Don Tomas Arguelles and Don Enrique
Lopes on 21 August 1918. TCT No. 4210 allegedly covered an approximate
area of 19,565.43 square meters of Lot 26. On even date, TCT No. 4211 was
transferred to Francisco Gonzales on the strength of an Escritura de Venta
dated 3 March 1920 for which TCT No. T-5261, covering an area of 871,982
square meters was issued in the name of one Francisco Gonzales, married to
Rufina Narciso.
Thereafter, TCT No. T-35485, canceling TCT No. T-5261, was issued to
Rufina Narcisa Vda. de Gonzales which was later replaced with the names of
Gonzales six (6) children. The property was then subdivided and as a result
of which, seven (7) certificates of titles were issued, six (6),under the names
of each of the children while the remaining title was held by all of them as
co-owners.
Adopting the findings contained in the Majority Report, the RTC, on 10 May
1994, rendered a Decision, in favor of CLT and ordered, among others, the
cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of the MANOTOKS.
The MANOTOKS elevated the adverse RTC Decision on appeal before the
Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 28 September 1995, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision, except as to the award of damages
which was deleted. The MANOTOKS then moved for reconsideration, but
said motion was denied by said appellate court in its Resolution dated 8
January 1996. After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, the
MANOTOKS filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
Before the Supreme Court, the Petitioners for Review, separately filed by the
MANOTOKS, ARANETA and Sto. Nio Kapitbahayan Association, Inc.,
["STO. NIO"], were consolidated.
Also submitted for consideration of the Supreme Court were the report of
the Fact Finding Committee dated 28 August 1997 and the Senate Committee
Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 which concluded that there was only one
OCT No. 994 issued, transcribed and registered on 3 May 1917.
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In its Decision dated 29 November 2005 ["THE SUPREME COURT 2005
DECISION"], the Supreme Court, through its Third Division, affirmed the
RTC Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, which declared the
titles of CLT and DIMSON as valid.
In invalidating the respective titles of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, the
Supreme Court, in turn, relied on the factual and legal findings of the trial
courts, which had heavily hinged on the imputed flaws in said titles.
Considering that these trial court findings had been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court highlighted the fact that the same were
accorded the highest degree of respect and, generally, should not be
disturbed on appeal.
Emphasis was also made on the settled rule that because the Supreme Court
was not a trier of facts, it was not within its function to review factual issues
and examine, evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties.
THE SUPEME COURT RESOLUTION
Expectedly, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA filed their respective Motions
for Reconsideration of the Supreme Court 2005 Decision.
Resolving said motions for reconsideration, with the Office of the Solicitor
General ["OSG"] intervening on behalf of the Republic, the Supreme Court,
in its Resolution of 14 December 2007 ["THE SUPREME CCOURT 2007
RESOLUTION"] reversed and nullified its 2005 Decision and categorically
invalidated OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, which was the basis of the
propriety claims of CLT and DIMSON. However, the Supreme Court
resolved to remand the cases to this Special Division of the Court of Appeals
for reception of evidence.
To guide the proceedings before this Special Division of the Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court made the following binding conclusions:
"First, there is only one OCT 994. As it appears on the record, that
mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds
on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be
reckoned as the ate of registration of the title. It may also be
acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted
from the issuance of the decree of registration on (19)* April 1917,
although such dated cannot be considered as the date of the title or
the date when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated (19)
April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that
the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No.
994 dated (19) April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles
since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact,
sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over the
15045; this Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV. No. 52606 between
CLT and PHILVILLE; the Orders of Judge Palma dated 13 June 1966 and 16
August 1966 in Case No. 4557 and the billing statements of SSHG Law
Office. They also submitted in evidence the Affidavits and Supplemental
Affidavits of Rosa R. Manotok and Luisa T. Padora; Affidavits of Atty. Felix
B. Lerio, Atty. Ma. P.G. Ongkiko and Engineer Jose Marie P. Bernabe; a copy
of a photograph of BM No. 9; certified true copy of coordinates and reference
point of L.M. No. 1 and BM No. 1 to 10 of Piedad Estate and TCT No. 177013
of CLT.6
DIMSON EVIDENCE
In their Consolidated Formal Offer of Evidence,7 DIMSON submitted the
previous decisions and resolutions passed relative to these cases, various
certifications of different government agencies, OCT 994, subdivision plan of
Lot 25-A-2, observations of Geodetic Engineer Reggie P. Garcia showing the
relative positions of properties within Lot 25-A; the Novation of
Contract/Deed of Sale and Mortgage dated 15 January 1948 between Rato,
Don Salvador Araneta and Araneta Institute of Agriculture; copies of various
certificates of titles to dispute some of the titles held by ARANETA; several
letter-requests and official receipts.
ARANETA EVIDENCE
ARANETA, in turn, offered in evidence various certificates of title,
specifically, OCT No. 994, TCT No. 8692; TCT No. 21857; TCT No. 26538;
TCT No. 26539; TCT No. (7784)-738 and TCT no. 13574. It also marked in
evidence the certified true copies of Decree No. 36577; the DOJ and Senate
Reports; letters of correspondence to the Land Registration Commission and
the Register of Deeds of Malabon City; survey plans of Lot 25-A and TCT r15169 of Dimson and; the affidavit of Engineer Felino M. Cortez and his
curriculum vitae. ARANETA also offered the certified true copy of TCT No.
6196 in the name of Victoneta, Inc.; TCT No. 13574 in the name of
ARANETA; certifications issued by Atty. Josephine H. Ponciano, Acting
Register of Deeds of Malabon city-Navotas; certified true copy of Judge
Palmas Order dated 16 August 1966 in Case No. 4557; Circular No. 17
(which pertains to the rules on reconstitution of titles as of 19 February 1947)
and its official receipt and; the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 994. 89
III.
We now turn to the evaluation of the evidence engaged in by the Special
Division. To repeat, the Special Division was tasked to determine the
following issues based on the evidence:
i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims
to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 dated 3 May 1917:
ii. Whether the respective imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks
and Araneta, as recounted in the Supreme Court 2005 Decision, are
borne by the evidence. Assuming they are, are such flaws sufficient
to defeat said claims?
iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of the 1966 Order of Judge
Muoz-Palma and the 1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid.
Assuming they are, do these orders establish a superior right to the
subject properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as opposed to
the claims of the Araneta and the Manotoks?
iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of
expropriation proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT
No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so, what are those proceedings, what
are the titles acquired by the Government, and is any of the parties
able to trace its title acquired by the government through
expropriation?
v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of
the conflicting claims of title should prevail.
The ultimate purpose of the inquiry undertaken by the Court of Appeals was
to ascertain which of the four groups of claimants were entitled to claim
ownership over the subject properties to which they claimed title thereto.
One set of properties was disputed between CLT and the Manotoks, while
the other set was disputed between Araneta and the Heirs of Dimson.
As can be gleaned from the Report, Jose Dimson was able to obtain an order
in 1977 issued by Judge Marcelino Sayo of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Caloocan City on the basis of which he was able to register in his name
properties belonging to the Maysilo Estate. Judge Sayos order in turn was
sourced from a 1966 Order issued by Judge (later Supreme Court Associate
Justice) Cecilia Muoz-Palma of the CFI of Rizal. Dimsons titles reflected, as
their mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917.10 Among these
properties was a fifty (50)-hectare property covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 151169, which apparently overlapped with the property of
Araneta covered by TCT No. 13574 and 26538. 11 Araneta was then and still is
in possession of the property. The Araneta titles state, as their mother title,
OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. Consequently, Dimson filed an action for
recovery of possession against Araneta.
Another property in Dimsons name, apparently taken from Lot 26 of the
Maysilo Estate, was later sold to Estelita Hipolito, who in turn sold the same
to CLT. Said property was registered by CLT under TCT No. T-177013,
which also reflected, as its mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917. 12
Said property claimed by CLT encroached on property covered by titles in
the name of the Manotoks. The Manotoks traced their titles to TCT Nos. 4210
and 4211, both issued in 1918 and both reflecting, as their mother title, OCT
No. 994 dated 3 May 1917.1avvphi1
Otherwise stated, both DIMSON and CLT bear the onus of proving in this
special proceedings, by way of the evidence already presented before and
such other forms of evidence that are not yet of record, that either there had
only been an error in the course of the transcription or registration of their
derivative titles, or that other factual and legal bases existed to validate or
substantiate their titles aside from the OCT No. 994 issued on 19 April 1917. 13
Were they able to discharge such burden?
A.
We begin with the Heirs of Dimson. The Special Division made it clear that
the Heirs of Dimson were heavily reliant on the OCT No. 994 dated 19 April
1917.
[DIMSON], on the strength of Judge Sayos Order dated 18 October dated 18
October 1977, was issued separate certificates of title, i.e., TCT Nos. 15166,
15167, 15168 and 15169, covering portions of the Maysilo Estate. Pertinently,
with respect to TCT No. 15169 of DIMSON, which covers Lot 25-A-2 of the
said estate, the following were inscribed on the face of the instrument.
It is evident that both the Heirs of Dimson and CLT had primarily relied on
the validity of OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 as the basis of their claim of
ownership. However, the Court in its 2007 Resolution held that OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917 was inexistent. The proceedings before the Special
Division afforded the Heirs of Dimson and CLT alike the opportunity to
prove the validity of their respective claims to title based on evidence other
than claims to title the inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT No. 994. Just as much
was observed by the Special Division:
"IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on the 19th
day of April in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the Registration Book of
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Volume NA page NA , as Original
Certificate of Title No. 994 pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. Case No.
4429 Record No. ______
From the above accounts, it is clear that the mother title of TCT no. 15169, the
certificate of title of DIMSON covering the now disputed Lot 25-A-2, is OCT
No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. Manifestly, the certificate of title issued
to DIMSON, and as a matter of course, the derivative title later issued to
CLT, should both be voided inasmuch as the OCT which they emanated had
already been declared inexistent.15
This Certificate is a transfer from Original Certificate of Title No. 994/NA, which is
cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described land is concerned.14
The Special Division noted that the Heirs of Dimson did not offer any
explanation why their titles reflect the erroneous date of 19 April 1917. At the
same time, it rejected CLTs explanation that the transcription of the
erroneous date was a "typographical error."
As can be gleaned from the records, both DIMSON and their successor-ininterest CLT, had failed to present evidence before this Court to prove that
there had been a mere typographical error in the transcription of their
respective titles with regard to the date of registration of OCT No. 994. CLT
specifically harps on this assertion that there had only been a typographical
error in the transcription of its title.16 On the other hand, while DIMSON had
refused to categorically assert that there had been such a typographical error
causing the invalidity of their title, their failure to proffer any reason or
argument which would otherwise justify why their title reflects 19 April 1917
and not 3 May 1917 leads this Court to conclude that they simply had no
basis to support their proprietary claim.
Thus, without proffering any plausible explanation as to what led to the
erroneous entry of the registration dated of OCT 994, DIMSON are left
without any recourse but to substantiate their claim on the basis of other
evidence not presented during the proceedings below, which would
effectively prove that they had a valid proprietary claim over the disputed
properties. This is specifically true because DIMSON had previously placed
reliance on the MWSS doctrine to prove the validity of their title. 17
Absent such explanation, the Heirs of Dimson were particularly constrained
to rely on the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo, which was allegedly sourced from
the 1966 Order of Judge Muoz Palma. On that issue, the Special Division
made the following determinations:
It should be recalled that in their appellees brief in CA-G.R.CV No. 41883,
therein appellee Jose Dimson specifically denied the falsity of TCT No. R15169 alleging that the contention "is already moot and can be determined by a
controlling decision."18 Jose Dimson expounded on his reliance as follows:
"In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (for brevity MWSS) case, Jose B.
Dimsons (as private respondent) title TCT No. 15167 issued for Lot 28 on June 8,
1978 derived from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917, is overlapping with
MWSS title TCT No. 41028 issued on July 29, 1940 derived from the same OCT
994, registered on May 3, 1917.
(Same facts in the case at bar; Jose B. Dimson (plaintiff-appellee) title TCT No. R15169 issued for Lot 25-A-2, on June 8, 1978, is overlapping with defendantappellants title TCT Nos. 13574 and 21343, not derived from OCT No. 994." 19
So viewed, sans any proof of a mechanical error in the transcription or
annotation on their respective certificates of title, the present inquiry then
hinges on whether the Order dated 13 June 1966 issued by then Judge Cecilia
Muoz-Palma of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 4557
["PALMA ORDER"] and Judge Sayos Order dated 18 October 1977 ["SAYOS
18 OCTOBER 1977 ORDER"], can be validated and authenticated. It is so
since the brunt of the proprietary claims of both DIMSON and CLT has its
roots on said Orders.
Perforce, in consideration of the foregoing, this leads Us to the THIRD
ISSUE as presented by the Supreme Court, to wit:
"Whether the factual and legal bases of Palmas 13 June 1966 Order and
Sayos 18 October 1977 Order are true and valid. Assuming they are, do these
orders establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the
Dimsons and CLT as opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?"
As it is, in contending that their certificates of title could be validly traced
from the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994, DIMSON point out that their title was
issued pursuant to a court order issued by Judge Palma in Case No. 4557 and
entered in the memorandum of Encumbrance of OCT No. 994. DIMSON also
insist that TCT Nos. 8692, 21857 and 26538 were mere microfilmed or
certified copies and, therefore, inadmissible. Lastly, DIMSON reiterated the
flaws and irregularities which voided the titles of the ARANETA in the
previous proceedings and focused on the burden of ARANETA to present
evidence to defeat their titles.
The foregoing contentions of DIMSON find to factual and legal basis. As we
see it, Sayos 18 October 1977 Order, which apparently confirmed Palmas 13
June 1966 Order, raised serious questions as to the validity of the manner by
which it was arrived at.
I did not see the original also. When the records of this case was brought
here, I checked the records, there were so many pages missing and the pages
were re-numbered but then I saw the duplicate original and there is a
certification of a woman clerk of Court, Atty. Molo.
What is perplexing to this Court is not only the loss of the entire records of
Case No. 4557 but the admission of Judge Sayo that he had not seen the
original of the Palma Order. Neither was the signature of Judge Palma on the
Order duly proven because all that was presented was an unsigned duplicate
copy with a stamped notation of "original signed." Equally perplexing is that
while CFI Pasig had a Case No. 4557 on file, said file pertained not to an LRC
case but to a simple civil case.20 Thus:
Court:
"Atty. Directo:
The purpose of this subpoena duces tecum is to present your Honor the
Order Order (sic) of Judge Palma in order to determine the genuineness and
authenticity of the signature of Judge Palma in this court order and which
order was a basis of a petition in this court to be confirmed. That is the
reason why we want to see the genuineness of the signature of Judge Palma.
Atty. Directo:
That is the reason why we want to see this document, we are surprised why
it is missing.
COURT:
No signature of Judge Palma was presented in this court. it was a duplicate
copy not signed. There is a stamp only of original signed.
No, there should be only number for a particular case; that must be a petition
after decree record.
Atty. Ignacio:
Atty. Directo:
This 4557 is not an LRC Case, it is a simple civil case.
That is the reason why we want to see the original.
xxxxxx
Court:
Moreover, both the MANOTOKS and ARANETA insist that Palmas 13 June
1966 Order had been recalled by a subsequent Order dated 16 August 1966,
["RECALL ORDER"],21 wherein the trial court dismissed the motion filed by
DIMSON on the courts findings that " x x x whatever portion of the property
covered by OCT 994 which has not been disposed of by the previous registered
owners have already been assigned and adjudicated to Bartolome Rivera and his
assignees, as a result of which there is no portion that is left to be given to the herein
supposed assignee Jose Dimson."
However, We are reluctant to recognize the existence and due execution of
the Recall Order considering that its original or even a certified true copy
thereof had not been submitted by either of the two parties relying on it
despite having been given numerous opportunities to do so.
Be that as it may, even if We are to consider that no Recall Order was ever
issued by then Judge Palma, the validity of the DIMSON titles over the
properties in the Maysilo Estate becomes doubtful in light of the fact that the
supposed "share" went beyond what was actually due to Jose Dimson under
the Compromise Agreement with Rivera. It should be recalled that Palmas
13 June 1966 Order approved only the conveyance to Jose Dimson of "25% of
whatever share of Bartolome Rivera has over Lots 25, 26, 27, 28-B and 29 of OCT
994 x x x subject to availability of undisposed portion of the said lots."22
In relation to this, We find it significant to note the observations contained in
the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 that, based on the assumption that
the value of the lots were equal, and "(C)onsidering that the share of Maria
de la Concepcion Vidal was only 1-189/1000 percent of the Maysilo Estate,
the Riveras who claimed to be the surviving heirs of Vidal will inherit only
197, 405.26 square meters (16,602,629.53 m2 x 1.1890%) or 19.7 hectares as
their share.23 Even if we are to base the 25% of Jose Dimson on the 19.7
hectares allotted to the Riveras, it would appear that Jose Dimson would
only be entitled to more or less five (5)hectares of the Maysilo Estate.
Obviously, basing only on TCT No. 15169 of Dimson which covered a land
area of 50 hectares (500,000 square meters),24 it is undisputable that the total
properties eventually transferred to Jose Dimson went over and beyond his
supposed 25% share.
What is more, Palmas 13 June 1966 Order specifically required that "x x x
whatever title is to be issued herein in favor of Jose Dimson, the same shall
be based on a subdivision plan duly certified by the Land Registration
Llorente, 49 Phil. 826) and does not confer any right to the purchaser
(Philippine National Bank vs. Fernandez, 61 Phil. 448 [1935]). The Registrar
of Deeds must, therefore, deny registration of any deed or voluntary
instrument if the owners duplicate is not presented in connection therewith.
(Director of Lands vs. Addison, 40 Phil. 19 [1926]; Hodges vs. Treasurer of
the Phil. 50 Phil. 16 [1927].27
In has also been held that, in cases where transfer certificates of title
emanating from one common original certificate of title were issued on
different dates to different persons or entities covering the same land, it
would be safe to conclude that the transfer certificate issued at an earlier date
along the line should prevail, barring anomaly in the process of
registration.28 Thus, "(w)here two certificates purport to include the same
land, the earlier in date prevails. X x x. In successive registration, where more
than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in
land, the person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the
holder or whose claim is derived directly from the person who was the
holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. x x x" 29
xxx
Still another indication of irregularity of the DIMSON title over Lot No. 25-A
is that the issuance of the Sayo Order allegedly confirming the Palma Order
was in itself suspect. Gleaning from the records, DIMSON filed the Motion
only on 10 October 1977, or eleven (11) years after obtaining the supposed
sanction for the issuance of titles in this name. Besides, what was lodged by
Jose Dimson before the sala of then Judge Palma was not a simple land
registration case wherein the only purpose of Jose Dimson was to establish
his ownership over the subject parcels of land, but, as reflected in the Palma
Order, the subject of the case was the confirmation of Jose Dimsons claim
over the purported rights of Rivera in the disputed properties. The case did
not partake of the nature of a registration proceeding and thus, evidently did
not observe the requirements in land registration cases. Unlike in a land
registration case, therefore, Jose Dimson needed to file an action before Judge
Sayo to seek "confirmation" of Palmas Order dated 13 June 1966.
So viewed the general rule proscribing the application of laches or the statute
of limitations in land registration cases,30 as well as Section 6, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to its provisions on revival of judgment applies
only to ordinary civil actions and not to other or extraordinary proceedings
such as land registration cases, is clearly not applicable in the present case.
The legal consequences of laches as committed by DIMSON and their failure
to observe the provisions of Rule 39 should, therefore, find application in this
case and thus, the confirmation of DIMSONs title, if any, should fail.
Parenthetically, the allegations of DIMSON would further show that they
derive the validity of their certificates of title from the decreased Jose
Dimsons 25% share in the alleged hereditary rights of Bartolome Rivera
["RIVERA"] as an alleged grandson of Maria Concepcion Vidal ["VIDAL"].
However, the records of these cases would somehow negate the rights of
Rivera to claim from Vidal. The Verification Report of the Land Registration
Commission dated 3 August 1981 showed that Rivera was 65 years old on 17
May 1963 (as gathered from the records of Civil Case Nos. 4429 and 4496). 31
It can thus be deduced that, if Rivera was already 65 years old in 1963, then
he must have been born around 1898. On the other hand, Vidal was only
nine (9) years in 1912; hence, she could have been born only on 1905. This
alone creates an unexplained anomalous, if not ridiculous, situation wherein
Vidal, Riveras alleged grandmother, was seven (7) years younger than her
alleged grandson. Serious doubts existed as to whether Rivera was in fact an
heir of Vidal, for him to claim a share in the disputed portions of the Maysilo
Estate.32
These findings are consonant with the observations raised by Justice Renato
Corona in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion on our 2007 Resolution.
To wit:
TCT No. T-177013 covers Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate with an area of
891,547.43 sq. m. It was a transfer from TCT No. R-17994 issued in the name
of Estelita I. Hipolito. On the other hand, TCT No. R-17994 was a transfer
from TCT No. R-15166 in the name of Jose B. Dimson which, in turn, was
supposedly a direct transfer from OCT No. 994 registered on April 19, 1917.
10:50- AM
Based on the description of Lot No. 26 in OCT No. 994, it has an area of
891,547.43 sq. m. which corresponds to the total area sold in 1918 pursuant to
the above-cited entries. Inasmuch as, at the time the order of the CFI of Rizal
was made on June 13, 1966, no portion of Lot No. 26 remained undisposed
of, there was nothing for the heirs of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal to convey
to Dimson. Consequently, Dimson had nothing to convey to Hipolito who,
by logic, could not transmit anything to CLT.
Moreover, subdivision plan Psd-288152 covering Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo
Estate described in Hipolito's certificate of title was not approved by the
chief of the Registered Land Division as it appeared to be entirely within Pcs1828, Psd-5079, Psd-5080 and Psd-15345 of TCT Nos. 4210 and 4211. How
Hipolito was able to secure TCT No. R-17994 was therefore perplexing, to
say the least.
All these significant facts were conveniently brushed aside by the trial and
appellate courts. The circumstances called for the need to preserve and
protect the integrity of the Torrens system. However, the trial and appellate
courts simply disregarded them.33
The Court thus adopts these findings of the Special Division on the validity
of Jose Dimsons titles, which he obtained consequent to the 1977 Order of
Judge Sayo. Consequently, we cannot give due legal recognition to any and
all titles supposedly covering the Maysilo Estate obtained by Dimson upon
the authority of either the purported 1966 Order of Judge Muoz-Palma or
the 1977 Order of Judge Sayo.
B.
Indubitably, as between the titles of ARANETA and the MANOTOKS and
their predecessors-in-interest, on one hand, and those of DIMSON, on the
other, the titles held by ARANETA and the MANOTOKS must prevail
considering that their titles were issued much earlier than the titles of the
latter.
Our findings regarding the titles of Jose Dimson necessarily affect and even
invalidate the claims of all persons who seek to derive ownership from the
Dimson titles. These include CLT, which acquired the properties they laid
claim on from Estelita Hipolito who in turn acquired the same from Jose
Dimson. Just as much was concluded by the Special Division as it evaluated
CLTs claims.
For its part, CLT contended that even at the trial court level, it maintained
that there was only one OCT No. 994 from where its claim emanates. It
argued that its case against the MANOTOKS, including that of STO. NIO,
was never decided based on the doctrines laid down in Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Court of Appeals34 and Heirs of
Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.35
Before this Special Division, CLT insists that the MANOTOKS failed to
submit "new" competent evidence and, therefore, dwelling on the alleged
flaws of the MANOTOKs titles, "the findings and conclusions of the courtappointed commissioners as adopted by the trial court, then upheld by the
Honorable Court in its Decision dated 28 September 1995 and finally
affirmed in the Supreme Courts Decision dated 29 November 2005, therefore
stand, as there is no reason to disturb them."
Furthermore, CLT contends that the Orders of Judge Palma and Judge Sayo
are no longer open to attack in view of their finality. Lastly, CLT asserts that
the properties covered by the MANOTOKS titles and those covered by the
expropriation proceedings did not property pertain to and were different
from Lot 26 owned by CLT. Thus, it maintains that the MANOTOKS cannot
use as basis for the validity of their titles the expropriation undertaken by the
Government as a means of staking their claims.
To restate, CLT claims the 891,547.43 square meters of land covered by TCT
No. T-17701336 located in Malabon, Caloocan City and designated as "Lot 26,
Maysilo Estate, LRC Swo-5268." TCT No. T-177013 shows that its mother
titles is OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917. Tracing said claim, Estelita
Hipoloto executed a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage in favor of CLT
on 10 December 1988. By virtue of this transfer, Hipolitos TCT No. R-1799437
was cancelled and in lieu thereof, CLTs TCT No. 223677/R-17994 of TCT
No. R-17994. Hipolito, on the other hand, was a transferee of the deceased
Dimson who was allegedly the registered owner of the subject land on the
basis of TCT No. 15166.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, invalidating the titles of DIMSON, the
title of CLT should also be declared a nullity inasmuch as the nullity of the
titles of DIMSON necessarily upended CLTs propriety claims. As earlier
highlighted, CLT had anchored its claim on the strength of Hipolitos title
and that of DIMSONs TCT No. 15166. Remarkably and curiously though,
TCT No. 15166 was never presented in evidence for purposes of tracing the
validity of titles of CLT. On this basis alone, the present remand proceedings
remain damning to CLTs claim of ownership.
Moreover, considering that the land title of CLT carried annotations identical
to those of DIMSON and consequently included the defects in DIMSONs
title, the fact that whatever typographical errors were not at anytime cured
by subsequent compliance with the administrative requirements or subjected
to administrative correction bolsters the invalidity of the CLT title due to its
complete and sole dependence on the void DIMSON title. 38
IV.
The task of the Special Division was not limited to assessing the claims of the
Heirs of Dimson and CLT. We likewise tasked the Special Division to
ascertain as well the validity of the titles held by the Manotoks and Araneta,
titles which had been annulled by the courts below. Facially, these titles of
the Manotoks and Araneta reflect, as their valid mother title, OCT No. 994
dated 3 May 1917. Nonetheless, particular issues were raised as to the
validity of the Manotok and Araneta titles independent of their reliance on
the 3 May 1917 OCT No. 994 vis--vis the inexistent 19 April 1917 OCT No.
994.
A.
We begin by evaluating the Araneta titles. The Special Division quoted the
observations of the trial court, which upheld Dimsons claim over that of
Araneta, citing the following perceived flaws of TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539,
from which Araneta derived its titles, thus:
Let us now examine TCT 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma.
Rato from where defendant was said to have acquired TCT 13574 and TCT
7784 now TCT 21343 in the name of Araneta and the other documents related
thereto:
1) Perusal of TCT 26538 shows that its Decree No. and Record No.
are both 4429. In the same vein, TCT 26539 also shows that it has
Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429.
However, Decree No. 4429 was issued by the Court of First Instance,
Province of Isabela (Exhibit I) and Record No. 4429, issued for
Ordinary Land Registration Case, was issued on March 31, 1911 in
CLR No. 5898, Laguna (Exhibit 8, 8-A Bartolome Rivera et al.)
How then could TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 both have
Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, which were issued in Court of
First Instance, Province of Isabela and issued in Laguna,
respectively.
2) TCT no. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of Jose Ma. Rato
are not annotated in the Original Certificate of Title 994, where they
were said to have originated.
3) The Escritura de Incorporacion de Philippine Land Improvement
Company (Exhibit I) executed on April 8, 1925 was only registered
and was stamped received by the Office of the Securities and
Exchange Commission only April 29, 1953 when the Deed of Sale &
Mortgage was executed on August 23, 1947 (Exh. 5 defendant) and
the Novation of Contract, Deed of Sale and Mortgage executed on
November 13, 1947 (Exh. M0. So, that when Philippine Land
Improvement was allegedly given a special power of attorney by
Jose Ma. Rato to represent him in the execution of the said two (2)
documents, the said Philippine Land Improvement Company has
not yet been duly registered.
4) TCT 26538 and 26538 and TCT 26539 both in the name of Jose Ma.
Rato, both cancel 21857 which was never presented in Court if only
to have a clear tracing back of the titles of defendant Araneta.
In TCT 26838 this Entry 5170 T-8692 Convenio Philippine Land Improvement
Company (Exhibit 16-J-1) appears, but the document, Novation of Contract,
Deed of Sale & Mortgage dated November 13, 1947 (Exhibit M) does not
appear.
Entry marked Exhibit 16-J-1 on TCT 26538 shows only the extent of the value
of P42,000.00 invested by Jose Ma. Rato in the Philippine Land Improvement
Company. Said entry was also entered on TCT 26539.
The Court also wonders why it would seem that all the documents presented
by defendant Araneta are not in possession of said defendant, for according
to witness Zacarias Quintan, the real estate officer of the said defendant
Araneta since 1970, his knowledge of the land now in possession of
defendant Araneta was acquired by him from all its documents marked in
evidence which were obtained only lately when they needed for presentation
before this Court.3940
The Special Division then proceeded to analyze these factual contentions,
and ultimately concluded that the Araneta claim to title was wholly valid.
We adopt in full the following factual findings of the Special Division, thus:
As for the proprietary claim of ARANETA, it maintains that it has
established by direct evidence that its titles were validly derived from OCT
No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. With regard to the imputed flaws, it asseverates
that these were unfounded and thus, labored to refute all of them.
ARANETA further expounded on the nullity of the Palma and Sayo Orders
which was the basis of DIMSONs titles.
Focusing on TCT No. 21857 issued on 23 May 1932, this certificate of title
issued in RATOs name,46 cancelled TCT No. 869247 with respect to the
property it covers. On its face, TCT No. 21857, 48 was a derivative of OCT No.
994 registered on 3 May 1917. It covers Lot No. 25 A-3-C of subdivision plan
Psd-6589, being a portion of Lot No. 25-A-3, G.L.R.O Record No. 4429.
Thereafter, TCT No. 21857 was cancelled by TCT No. 2653849 and TCT No.
2653950 which were both issued in the name of Jose Ma. Rato y Tuazon on 17
September 1934.
With respect to TCT No. 26539, the certificate of title showed that it covered a
parcel of land designated as Section No. 2 of the subdivision plan Psd-10114,
1980 filed in Civil Case No. 8050, a mere copy of TCT No. 21343 showed that
it covers a parcel of land designated as Lot 6-B of the subdivision plan Psd24962 being a portion of Lot 6, described as plan Psd-21943, G.L.R.O. Record
No. 4429 with an approximate area of 333,377 square meters. 59 However, for
reasons unknown, a copy of TCT No. 21343, whether original or certified
true copy thereof, was not submitted before this Court.
In summation, ARANETA had shown that RATO, as one of the co-owners of
the property covered by OCT NO. 994, was assigned Lot No. 25-A-3. His
evidence of ownership is reflected on TCT No. 8692 issued in his name.
RATO held title to these parcels of land even after its subdivision in the
1930s. Further subdividing the property, RATO was again issued TCT No.
21857, and later TCT Nos. 26538 and 26539, still covering Lot No. 25 A-3-C.
In all his certificates of title, including those that ultimately passed
ownership to ARANETA, the designation of the lot as either belonging to or
portions of Lot 25-A-3 was retained, thereby proving identity of the land.
More importantly, the documentary trail of land titles showed that all of
them were derived from OCT No. 994 registered on 3 May 1917. For
purposes of tracing ARANETAs titles to Oct No. 994, it would appear that
the evidence presented ultimately shows a direct link of TCT Nos. 7784 and
13574 to said mother title. Suffice it to state, the origin and legitimacy of the
proprietary claim of ARANETA had been well substantiated by the evidence
on record and on this note, said titles deserve validation.
Under the guidelines set, we shall now proceed to evaluate the imputed
flaws which had been the previous bases of the trial court in invalidating
ARANETAs titles.
One of the flaws observed on the titles of ARANETAs predecessor-ininterest was that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in Ratos name refer to
Decree No. 4429 and Record No. 4429, as basis of their issuance. This is being
questioned inasmuch as Decree No. 4429 refers to a decree issued by the CFI
of Isabela while Record No. 4429 was issued for ordinary Land Registration
Case No. 31 March 1911 in CLR No. 5898 of Laguna.
Explaining this discrepancy, ARANETA insisted that the same was a mere
typographical error and did not have any effect on the validity of their title.
It further contended that the number "4429" was the case number of Decree
No. 36455 and was used interchangeably as the record number.
This Court finds that the incorrect entry with respect to the Decree and
Record Number appearing on the title of ARANETAs predecessor-ininterest cannot, by itself, invalidate the titles of ARANETAs predecessors-ininterest and ultimately, that of ARANETA. To the mind of this Court, the
incorrect entries alluded to would not have the effect of rendering the
previous titles void sans any strong showing of fraudulent or intentional
wrongdoing on the part of the person making such entries. Fraud is never
presumed but must be established by clear and convincing evidence.60 The
strongest suspicion cannot sway judgment or overcome the presumption of
regularity. The sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks
upon it is without rudder or compass.61
The Supreme Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc. 62 acknowledged
that certain defects on a certificate of title, specifically, the interchanging of
numbers, may occur and "it is certainly believable that such variance in the
copying of entries could be merely a typographical or clerical error." In such
cases, citing with approval the decision of the appellate court, the technical
description in the title should prevail over the record number. 63
Thus, what is of utmost importance is that the designation and the technical
description of the land, as stated on the face of the title, had not been shown
to be erroneous or otherwise inconsistent with the source of titles. In
ARANETAs case, all the titles pertaining to Lot No. 25 had been verified to
be an offshoot of Decree No. 36455 and are all located in Tinajeros, Malabon.
At any rate, despite the incorrect entries on the title, the properties, covered
by the subject certificates of title can still be determined with sufficient
certainty.
It was also opined that TCT No. 26538 and TCT No. 26539 in the name of
RATO had not been annotated on OCT No. 994 from which said titles had
supposedly originated. It should be stressed that what partially cancelled
OCT No. 994 with respect to this subject lot were not TCT Nos. 26538 and
26539 but TCT No. 8692 issued on 1 August 1924. In fact, TCT Nos. 26538
and 26539 are not even the immediate predecessors of OCT No. 994 but were
mere derivatives of TCT No. 21857. Logically therefore, these two certificates
of title could not have been annotated on OCT No. 994, they not being the
preceding titles.
In any case, a perusal of OCT No. 994 shows an entry, which pertains to Jose
Ma. Rato but, on account of the physical condition of the copy submitted to
this Court, the entry remains illegible for us to make a definite conclusion.64
On the other hand, Entry No. 12343/O-994 found on the Owners Duplicate
Copy of OCT No. 994 specifically recorded the issuance of TCT No. 8692
over Lot No. 25-A-3.65
The other flaws noted on ARANETAs certificates of title pertained to its
failure to present TCT Nos. 21857, 6196 and 21343. As we have discussed,
ARANETA offered in evidence a certified microfilm copy of TCT No. 21857
and a certified true copy of TCT No. 6196 marked as Exhibits 5-A1A and 19A1A, respectively. However, it failed to submit a copy of said TCT No.
21343. Be that as it may, we will not hasten to declare void TCT No. 7784 as a
consequence of such omission, especially so since TCT No. 21343 appears to
be a mere derivative of TCT No. 7784. Given that the validity of TCT No.
7784 had been preponderantly proven in these proceedings, the authenticity
of said title must be sustained. Besides, ARANETAs failure to submit TCT
No. 21343 had never been put into issue in these proceedings.
With respect to the difference in the area of more than 200,0000 square
meters between TCT No. 7784 and TCT No. 26538, we find that the trial court
failed to consider the several conveyances of portions of TCT No. 26538
before they finally passed on to ARANETA. Thus, on the Memorandum of
Encumbrance of TCT No. 26538, it is apparent that portions of this piece of
land had been sold to various individuals before the same were transferred
to ARANETA on 4 march 1948. Naturally, since the subject land had been
partially cancelled with respect to the portion disposed of, it could not be
expected that the area of TCT No. 26538 will remain the same at the time of
its transfer to ARANETA. Even assuming that the entire area covered by
TCT No. 26538 had been disposed of, this fact alone, cannot lend us to
conclude that the conveyance was irregular. An anomaly exists if the area
covered under the derivative title will be much more than its predecessor-ininterest. Evidently, this is not so in the case before us.
The trial court, relying on Exhibit "N", further asserted that ARANETA
should not have been issued TCT No. 7784 considering that the registration
of the Novation of Contract, deed of Sale & Mortgage was
suspended/denied and no title was received by the Register of Deeds of
Pasig at the time the said document was filed in the said Office on march 4,
1948. A perusal of Exhibit "N" submitted before the trial court, shows that the
suspension or denial was merely conditional considering that the person
seeking registration had give days within which to correct the defects before
final denial thereof. As we see it, the Notice merely contained a warning
regarding the denial of the registration of the voluntary deed but, in no way,
did it affect the vested rights of ARANETA to be land. The fact that the title
to the land was subsequently issued free from any notation of the alluded
defect creates a reasonable presumption that ARANETA was in fact able to
comply with the condition imposed. This is especially true since the notice
itself contained a note, "Just Completed," written across the face of the letter.
Records also reveal the RTCs observation with regard to Aranetas failure to
disprove the result of the plotting made on the subject land (Exhibit K) to the
effect that TCT 26538 overlaps portion of TCT 15159 and TCT 26539 also
overlaps the other portion of said TCT R-15169. The trial court further
noted that "TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson) and TCT 26539 (Jose Rato) and TCT
21343 (Araneta) are overlapping each other within Lot 25-A. That portion of
TCT R-15169 (Jose Dimson) along bearing distance points to 17 to 18 to 19 to
20 to 21 to 1 and 2 shaded in yellow color in the Plan is not covered by TCT
21343 (Araneta)."66
Scrutinizing Exhibit "K," it becomes apparent that the said evidence relied
upon was only a private survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Reggie P.
Garcia which had not been duly approved by the Bureau of Lands and was
based only on photocopies of relevant land titles.67 What is more, said
geodetic engineer also failed to adequately explain his observations,
approach and manner of plotting the relative positions of the lots. 68 From all
indications, the conclusions reached by said geodetic engineer were
anchored on unfounded generalizations.
Another defect cited on ARANETAs title was the absence of any entry on
the Memorandum of Encumbrances of TCT No. 26538 of the alleged sale
On 22 August 1938, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled by TCT No. 35486 in the
names of Jose Gonzales y Narciso married to Maria P. Gutierrez, Consuelo
Susana Gonzales y Narciso married to Alfonso D. Prescilla; Juana Francisco
Gonzales y Narciso married to Fortunato de Leon; Maria Clara Gonzales y
Narciso married to Delfin Hilario; Francisco Felipe Gonzales y Narciso
married to Pilar Narciso, and Concepcion Andrea Gonzales y Narciso
married to Melquiades M. Virata, Jr.
Appearing on the "Memorandum" of TCT No. 5261 is NOTA: Ap 2111 which
reads as follows:79
"A/2111 Adjudicado el torreno descrito en este certificado de titulo, a
Rufina Narciso Vda. de Gonzales, a cuenta de la participacion de osia esta en
(not legible) los tienes de la eseledad de genanciales. Habida entre la misma
y el finado Francisco J. Gonzales, per una orden del Hon. Fernando Jugo,
Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila Sala II, dienada el 20 de
Septiembre de 19 (not legible), en el Expidiente de intestado del nombrado
Francisco J. Gonzales, No. 49034, se cancela el presente certificado de tituto y
se expide otre a hombre decha Rufina Narciso, con (not legible) No. 35486,
folio 86, Tomo T-168 del libro de transferencias, archivando se la copia de
dicha orden da que se ha heche referencia en al Legajo T-No. 35486.
(SGD) TEODORO GONZALES,
Registrado de Titulos."
The property was later subdivided into seven lots in accordance with
subdivision plan Psd-21154.80 Partitioning the lots among the co-owners,
TCT No. 35486 was eventually cancelled and in lieu thereof six (6) certificates
of titles were individually issued81 to Francisco Gonzaless six (6) children,
specifically, TCT Nos. 1368-1373 while TCT No. 1374 was issued in favor of
all the children.82
As previously mentioned, the properties covered by TCT Nos. 1368-1374
were expropriated by the Republic of the Philippines and were eventually
subdivided and sold to various vendees. Eighteen (18) lots were obtained by
MRI from the years 1965 to 1974, while it acquired the lot covered by TCT
No. 165119 in 1988. On the other hand, MEC acquired from PhilVille
Development Housing Corporation Lot No. 19-B by virtue of Deed of
Exchange executed in its favor for which, TCT No. 232568 was issue don 9
May 1991.
The 20 certificates of titles were traced by the MANOTOKS, as follows:
1) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 2 of
consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 which has an area of
4,988 square meters. MRI purchased this lot from one Basilio Caina
who was issued TCT No. 7526 which cancelled TCT Nos. 36657-62
registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. 83
2) TCT No. 7762, covering Lot 1-C, was obtained by MRI from one
Narcisa Buenaventura. The Parcel of land has an approximate area of
2,876 square meters. Buenaventuras ownership was evidenced by
TCT No. 7525,84 deriving the same from TCT No. 36657-63.85
3) TCT No. 8012 in the name of MRI covers Lot No. 12-1 having an
area of 20,000 square meters.86 This certificate of title was traced from
one Filemon Custodio who held TCT No. 7792. Custodio was in turn
a transferee of Guillermo Rivera, the latter having been issued TCT
No. 7760 by virtue of sale between him and then Peoples Homesite
and Housing Corporation ["PHHC"]. The latter title eventually
cancelled TCT No. 36557-63 of the Republic.87
4) TCT No. 9866 issued to MRI covers Lot No. 21 and has an
approximate area of 23,979 square meters. MRIs certificate of title
was derived from TCT No. 9854 registered in the name of Filemon
Custodio, a transferee of Jose Dionisio, who was issued TCT No.
9853. Dionisios title in turn cancelled the Republics TCT No. 3665763.88
5) TCT No. 21107 issued to MRI covers Lot 22 with an approximate
area of 2,557 square meters. MRI acquired the same by virtue of sale
between him and Francisco Custodio, holder of TCT No. 21040.
Francisco Custodio was a transferee of Lorenzo Caina, registered
owner of TCT No. 21039 as evidenced by a Deed of Sale between
Caina and the PHHC, the latters certificate of title canceling TCT
No. 36557-63 of the Republic.89
6) TCT No. 21485 was issued to MRI by virtue of sale between it and
Francisco Custodio, registered owner of TCT No. 21484. The
certificate of title covers Lot 20 with an approximate area of 25,276
square meters Custodio was in turn a transferee of Lorenzo Caina,
the latter being the registered owner of TCT No. 21013 by reason of
sale between him and PHHC.90 Under Entry No. 6277/T-21485, it
would appear that portions of the property covered under TCT No.
21485 and TCT No. 232568 had been subject of an expropriation
proceedings to which the Manotok Estate Corporation, et al.
interposed no objections subject to the payment of just
compensation.91
7) TCT Nos. 2640592 and 26406,93 both registered in the name of MRI,
cancelled TCT Nos. 9773 and 9774, respectively. TCT Nos. 9773 and
9774 were registered in the names of Romulo, Rosalina, Lucila, Felix
and Emilia all surnamed Jacinto, [JACINTOS"], before the same were
13) TCT No. 55897 shows MRI as the registered owner of Lot 3 of the
consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828 of the Maysilo Estate
covering an area of more or less 20,531 square meters. This certificate
of title cancelled TCT No. 53122 in the names of MRI (19,531 square
meters) and one Silvestre Domingo (1,000 square meters). TCT No.
53122 in turn cancelled TCT No. 21347 registered in the names of
Jesus Hipona (19,531 square meters) and Silvestre Domingo (1,000
square meters). Notably, TCT No. 21347 cancelled TCT No. 21315/T107 but there is no indication to whom TCT No. 21315 was registered
and what certificate of title it cancelled.103
14) TCT No. C-17272 reflects MRI as the registered owner of Lot 6-C
which has an approximate area of 27,850 square meters. MRIs
certificate of title cancelled TCT No. C-17234 registered in the names
of MRI (27,750 square meters), Roberto S. David (3,0000 square
meters) and Jose Madulid (500 square meters). It would appear that
TCT No. C-17234 cancelled TCT No. 53124 registered in the names of
MRI, Spouses Priscila and Antonio Sebastian and Jose Madulid.104
MRI also submitted in evidence a Deed of Partition between itself,
Roberto David and Madulid thereby subdividing the property into
Lots 6-A, 6-B and 6-C as per subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-277091.105
Again, we note that TCT No. 53124 cancelled TCT No. 21350/T-107
but the records are bereft of any indication what certificate of title it
cancelled and to whom the same was registered.
15) TCT No. C-35267, covering Lot 56-B of subdivision plan (LRC)
Psd-292683 with an approximate area of 9,707 square meters, was a
by-product of TCT No. 25146, also registered in the name of MRI,
after the same was subdivided into two lots, namely, Lot Nos. 56-A
and 56-B. TCT No. 25146 cancelled TCT No. 25145 registered in the
name of Quirino Labing-isa by virtue of sale in favor of MRI. In turn,
TCT No. 21545 cancelled TCT Nos. (36557) 12836 to (36563) 12842. 106
16) TCT No. T-121428, registered in the name of MRI covers Lot No.
5-C of subdivision plan (LRC) psd-315272 which has an approximate
area of 4,650 square meters. It was previously registered in the
names of MRI (4,650 square meters), Ricardo Cruz (941 square
meters) and Conchita Umali (1,000 square meters) under TCT No.
53123 by order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City,
Branch XII and as per agreement of the parties in Civil Case No. C424. TCT No. 53123 in turn cancelled TCT No. 21346 whose
registered owners were Conchita Umali (1,000 square meters),
Ricardo Cruz (941 square meters) and Jesus Hipona (4,650 square
meters).107 Like some of the other titles, TCT No. 21346 cancelled
TCT No. 21316 but there is no trace of this latter certificate of title.
17) TCT No. 163902, registered in the name of MRI, covers Lot No. 4B-2 and has an area of more or less 6,354 square meters and a byproduct of TCT No. 9022, also in the name of MRI, after the same
was subdivided under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-334454. TCT No.
9022, in turn, cancelled TCT No. 8994/T-45 registered in the name of
Filemon S. Custodio whose ownership thereon was transferred to
MRI by virtue of a voluntary sale.108 TCT No. 8894 cancelled TCT
No. 8846/T-45 but this latter certificate of title was not submitted in
evidence for purposes of tracing back to the Republics title.
18) TCT No. 165119109 was issued to MRI by virtue of a Deed of Sale
between Spouses Francisca Labing-isa and Juan Ignacio [SPOUSES
IGNACIO] and MRI, as a result of which, TCT No. C-36960 of the
SPOUSES IGNACIO was cancelled.110 It would appear that TCT No.
C-39690 cancelled TCT No. 35266/T-173 but TCT No. 35266/T-173
was not submitted in evidence.
19) TCT No. T-232568 of the Manotok Estate Corporation, covering
Lot No. 19-B of subdivision plan Psd-13011152 with an area of 23,206
square meters, was derived from the certificate of title held by
PhiVille Development and Housing Corporation under TCT No.
197357. MEC acquired the subject parcel of land by virtue of Deed of
Exchange between it and PHILVILLE DATED 9 May 1991. 111 TCT
No. 197357 cancelled TCT No. 195730/T-974 but there is no trace
what certificate of title the latter title cancelled.
By and large, all the certificates of title submitted by the MANOTOKS,
including their derivative titles, were all traced to OCT No. 994 registered on
3 May 1917. Likewise, they declared all the lots covered by such titles for
taxation purposes. Without doubt, MRI had successfully traced back some of
their certificates of title to the valid OCT No. 994, they having acquired the
lots from some of the vendees of the PHHC after the same were expropriated
by the Republic from the Gonzalezes.
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings
sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to tenants is
beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court in Republic of the
Philippines v. Jose Leon Gonzales, et al. To bolster this fact, paragraph "r" of
the Majority Report noted that the seven properties covered by TCT Nos.
1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the Republic from the Gonzalezes.
The fact that these lots were subjected to expropriation proceedings
sometime in 1947 under Commonwealth Act No. 539 for resale to tenants is
beyond question, as also enunciated by the Supreme Court in Republic of the
Philippines vs. Jose Leon Gonzaels, et al. To bolster this fact, paragraph "r" of
the Majority Report noted that the seven properties covered by TCT Nos.
1368 to 1374 were expropriated by the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation which were later consolidated and subdivided into 77 lots for
resale to tenants. No sign of protest was ever raised by CLT on this point. 112
The fact of expropriation is extremely significant, for titles acquired by the
State by way of expropriation are deemed cleansed of whatever previous
flaws may have attended these titles. As Justice Vitug explained in Republic
v. Court of Appeals,113 and then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno
reiterated in Reyes v. NHA:114 "In an rem proceeding, condemnation acts
upon the property. After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public
under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to
a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for
securing better title against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary
conveyance."115 This doctrine was derived from the opinion of then Chief
Judge (now U.S. Supreme Court Justice) Stephen Breyer in Cadorette v.
U.S.,116 which in turn cited the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in
U.S. v. Carmack117 that "[b]y giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title,
condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title
against all the world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance." 118
In annulling the Manotok titles, focus was laid on the alleged defects of TCT
No. 4211 issued in September of 1918. However, TCT No. 4211 was issued
decades before the property was expropriated. Thus, any and all defects that
may have attended that particular title would have been purged when the
property covered by it was subsequently acquired by the State through
eminent domain. The Special Division noted as much:
As it is, the validity of most of MRIs certificates of title should be upheld
because they were derived from the Republics valid certificates of title. In
fact, some of the MANOTOKS titles can be traced back to the Governments
titles as a result of the expropriation in 1947.
Relevantly, the titles of the Republic, as the predecessor-in-interest of the
MANOTOKS, are presumed valid by virtue of their acquisition resulting
from the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain that need not be
granted even by the fundamental law. Thus, the alleged flaws concerning the
certificates of title issued previous to the exercise of the State of its inherent
power did not affect or render invalid the subsequent transfers after the
forced sale. Indeed, when land has been acquired for public use in fee simple
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase,
the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be
abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any
impairment of the estate or title acquired or any reversion to the former
owner.119
The Special Division also took exception to the majority report of the
Commissioners (Majority Report) who had been tasked by the trial court to
examine the validity of the Manotok titles. The Majority Report
had arrived at several conclusions with respect to the TCTs from which the
Manotok titles were derived.120 The Special Division, however, concluded
that such report was in fact tainted by the fact that it was determined
"outside the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties." To
wit:
In meeting the issue, the MANOTOKS disproved the "opinion" with regard
to the alleged defects of their titles inasmuch as the majority report
submitted before the trial court was made outside the scope of the tasks
which the trial court confined them to perform. The MANOTOKS also
argued that before this proceeding on remand, CLT failed to introduce
evidence of such flaws neither were the concerned geodetic engineers
presented as witnesses. Moreover, the MANOTOKS further maintained that
CLT failed to submit any factual or legal bases to prove the authenticity and
validity of the Palma and Sayo Orders. They insisted that the Palma Order
was a void one for being conditional and having resulted to the issuance of
"duplicate certificates of land title."
With respect to the imputed flaws on the MANOTOKS titles which were
based on the Majority Report, we find that the bases of the alleged defects
proceeded from unreliable sources thus, tainting the veracity of the said
report.
The records of the case between CLT and the MANOTOKS reveal that the
parties approved the creation of a commission to resolve only these two
issues, to wit:
"x x x
These issues to be resolved by the 3 Commissioners are as follows:
1) Whether or not the property covered by the Transfer Certificates
of Title of defendants pertain to or involve Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo
Estate presently titled in the name of the plaintiff; and
2) Whether or not the property covered by the title of the plaintiff
and the property covered by the titles of the defendants overlap. 121
Scrutinizing the Majority Report upon which the trial courts conclusions
were based, it would appear that the findings therein were outside the scope
of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties. Specifically, the
deductions with regard to the technical infirmities and defects of TCT Nos.
4211, 4210, 5261 and 35486 do not involve the question of whether or not the
subject properties were identified as Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo estate or
whether there was overlapping of titles. Records bear out that the
MANOTOKS took exception to the procedure taken citing therein the "ultra
vires" acts of the two Commissioners.
In addition, the majority report focused on the alleged flaws and inherent
technical defects of TCT Nos. 4211, 5261 and 35486, ranging from the
language of the technical descriptions, absence of subdivision plan, lot
number and survey plan. Evidently, these defects go only as far as the
certificates of title issued prior to those of the Republic. Remarkably, no
specific flaw was found on the MANOTOKS titles indicating any
irregularity on their issuance. In fact, the Commissioners who signed the
majority report even concluded that only TCT Nos. 4211, 4210, 5261, 35486,
1368 thru 1324 (sic)122 were irregularly and questionably issued without any
reference to the MANOTOKS certificates of title.123 Otherwise stated, the
imputed flaws affect only those certificates of title issued prior to those
registered in the name of the Republic. No flaw had been specifically
identified or established in the proceedings below, which would taint the
titles held by the MANOTOKS in so far as the regularity of their issuance is
concerned.124
At the same time, the Special Division was not prepared to uphold the
validity of all of the Manotok titles. It took issue with the particular titles
which could not be retraced to the titles acquired by the Republic of the
Philippines by way of expropriation.
Although the MANOTOKS had traced their title from the vendees of PHHC,
there are, however, some certificates of title which could not be traced back
to the titles previously held by the Republic specifically, MRIs TCT Nos.
26405 and 26406, 26407, 33904, 53268, 55897, C-17272, T-121428, 163903,
165119 and MECs TCT No. T-232568. As to these certificates of title, the
MANOTOKS failed to make any specific reference to the preceding
certificates of title which they cancelled and to whose names they were
subsequently transferred and registered. Thus, we find no sufficient basis to
make a conclusion as to their origins.125
titles and overcome the onus of proving that said titles are derivatives of
OCT 994 registered on 3 May 1917, and not 19 April 1917, as what is reflected
in their titles. In contrast, the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, both of which
had consistently anchored their proprietary claims on OCT No. 994
registered on 3 May 1917, have, in this remand proceeding, been able to
support their claims of ownership over the respective portions of the Maysilo
Estate. Except in the case of the MANOTOKS which had failed to
substantiate the validity of some of their certificates of title, the MANOTOKS
and ARANETA presented evidence proving the identity, the extent and the
origin of their titles.
Answering the issues assigned by the Supreme Court relative to the
tenability of the respective imputed flaws in the titles of the MANOTOKS
and ARANETA and whether such flaws are sufficient to defeat said claims,
this Court finds that, as discussed above, such flaws are inconsequential and
ineffectual in invalidating the MANOTOKS and ARANETA titles.
Significantly, since the respective certificates of title of herein contending
parties are contradictory to each other and stand to refute the validity of
their opposing titles, it cannot be gainsaid that said certificates of title have
correspondingly been subjected to dispute on the basis of separate and
distinct imputed flaws. Still, the crucial difference between the imputed
flaws allegedly tainting said contending titles, DIMSON and CLT on one
hand, and the MANOTOKS and ARANETA, on the other, is that the
imputed flaws purportedly beleaguering the respective certificates of title of
the MANOTOKS and ARANETA relate to the mechanical and technical
aspect of the transcription of their titles and are therefore inconsequential to
the import and validity thereof. Said imputed flaws do not depart from the
fact that the predecessors-in-interest of the MANOTOKS and ARANETA
had been clothed with the right of ownership over the disputed portions of
the Maysilo Estate.
V.
The Special Division supplied the following precise and concise summary of
its conclusions:
In prcis, the factual milieu of the present controversy and the evidence on
record clearly establish the failure of DIMSON and CLT to substantiate their
On the other hand, the flaws attending the titles of DIMSON and CLT
primarily stem from infirmities attending or otherwise affecting the very
crux of their claim of ownership. Having derived their titles from RIVERA,
whose title is questionable and dubious to the core, DIMSON and CLT
cannot rightly insist on the validity of their titles. Such flaws are hard to
The third recommendation that eleven (11) of the titles held by the
Manotoks be declared null and void or subjected to further technical
verification warrants some analysis.
The Court has verified that the titles mentioned in the third recommendation
do not, as stated by the Special Division, sufficiently indicate that they could
be traced back to the titles acquired by the Republic when it expropriated
portions of the Maysilo Estate in the 1940s. On the other hand, the Manotok
titles that were affirmed by the Special Division are traceable to the titles of
the Republic and thus have benefited, as they should, from the cleansing
effect the expropriation had on whatever flaws that attached to the previous
titles. However, although the Special Division did not concede the same
benefit to the other Manotok titles named in the third recommendation, at
the same time it did not conclude that such titles were false or fraudulently
acquired. Absent such a finding, we are disinclined to take the ultimate step
of annulling those titles.
Said titles have as their origin what we have acknowledged to be a valid
mother title OCT No. 994 dated 3 May 1917. This is in stark contrast with
the titles of CLT, the oppositors to the Manotoks, which all advert to an
inexistent mother title. On their face, the Manotok titles do not reflect any
error or fraud, and certainly the Special Division do not point to any such
flaw in these titles. Nothing on the face of the titles gives cause for the Court
to annul the same.
It is worth mentioning that the Special Division refused to adopt the Majority
Report earlier rendered in the case between the Manotoks and CLT, said
report having exhaustively listed the perceived flaws in the antecedent TCTs
from which the Manotoks derived their claim. The Special Division
concluded that such findings had been reached by the Commissioners in
excess of their original mandate and, thus, ultra vires. Assuming that such
flaws were extant, they existed on the titles and anteceded the expropriation
of the properties by the Government. As stated earlier, such expropriation
would have cleansed the titles of the prior flaws. But even if the Manotok
titles enumerated in the third recommendation could not be sourced from
the titles acquired by the Republic through expropriation, still the rejection of
the Majority Report signifies that the flaws adverted to therein could not
form the basis for the annulment of the titles involved. Indeed, the Special
Divisions rejection of the Majority Report further diminishes any ground to
annul the Manotok titles referred to in the third recommendation.
Yet, the Court is cognizant that the inability to trace the Manotok titles
specified in the third recommendation to those titles acquired by the
Government through expropriation puts such titles in doubt somehow. In
addition, the Court is aware that the ground utilized by the Special Division
in rejecting the Majority Report that the determinations were made outside
the scope of the issues framed and agreed upon by the parties -- does not
categorically refute the technical findings made therein. Those
circumstances, while insufficient for now to annul the Manotoks titles listed
in the third recommendation, should be sufficiently made public.
Hence, in lieu of annulling the Manotok titles per the Special Divisions third
recommendation, the Court deems it sufficient to require the Registers of
Deeds concerned to annotate this Resolution on said titles so as to
sufficiently notify the public of their unclear status, more particularly the
inability of the Manotoks to trace the titles without any gap back to OCT No.
994 issued on 3 May 1917. If there should be any cause for the annulment of
those titles from a proper partys end, then let the proper case be instituted
before the appropriate court.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby adopts the Report of the Special Division
and issues the following reliefs:
1) The certificates of title of the DIMSONs and CLT including other
derivative titles issued to their successors-in-interest, if any, are
declared NULL and VOID, thus invalidating their legal claims over
the subject parcels of land;
2. The proprietary claims of the MANOTOKS over the parcels of
land covered by the following certificates of title are declared
LEGAL and VALID, to wit:
a) TCT No. 7528 registered in the name of MRI covers Lot
No. 2 of consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-1828
which has an area of 4,988 square meters.
George M. Baladjay, Mario G. dela Victoria, Olegario Sarmiento, Jr., and Democrito
Barcenas for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent Judge.
EN BANC
F.A. Sugue & Elino B. Lingas for Philippine Tourism Authoirity
G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 October 26, 1983
HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA (represented by Gloria Ardona)
ANASTACIO C. CABILAO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO CABILAO
(represented by Jose Cabilao) MODESTA CABILAO, HEIRS OF ROMAN
CABUENAS (represented by Alberto Cabuenas), AGRIPINO GABISAY
and PRUDENCIA MABINI, ANTONIO LABRADOR and LUCIA
GABISAY, GERONIMO MABINI and MARCELINA SABAL,
INOCENCIO MABINI and ARSENIA REYES, PATRICIO MABINI and
GREGORIA BORRES, ANICETO GADAPAN and MAXIMA GABISAY,
BARTOLOME MAGNO and CALINECA E. MAGNO, ALBERTO
CABUENAS, NARCISO CABUENAS and VICTORIA CABUENAS,
EUTIQUIOSENO, HEIRS OF ESPERIDION CABUENAS (represented by
Alberto Cabuenas), MAXIMINA NAVARO, SULPICIO NAVARO,
EDUARDO NAVARO, MARTINIANO ROMA (in representation of
Arcadio Mabini, deceased), MARTIN SENO, FAUSTO ARDA, MAXIMA
CABILAO, ESTRELLA SENO, EDUVEGIS S. CABILAO, ROSARIO
CABILAO, MINORS DANILO, SOCORRO, JOSEFINA and MARITES, all
surnamed Cabilao, JUAN BORRES (represented by Francisca Borres),
RAMON JABADAN, JESUS ALIPAR and LEONILA KABAHAR,
ANTONIO LABRADOR, HEIRS OF NICASIO GABISAY (represented by
Arsenio Gabisay), PACIFICO LABRADOR, DEMETRIO LABRADOR and
FRUCTOSA TABURA, VENANCIO DEL MAR, MARINO DEL MAR,
HEIRS OF TEODORA ARCILLO (represented by Brigida Arcillo)
DIONISIA GABUNADA, HEIRS OF BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO
(represented by Felicidad Sadaya Francisco), HEIRS OF VICTORIA C.
CABUENAS (represented by Alberto Cabuenas) HEIRS OF CIPRIANO
GABUNADA (represented by Claudio Gabunada), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN Y. REYES, Executive Judge and Presiding Judge of Branch I,
COURT OF FIRST instance OF CEBU, and the PHILIPPINE TOURISM
AUTHORITY, respondents.
On May 25, 1982, petitioners filed this petition questioning the orders of the
respondent Judge, The respondents have correctly restated the grounds in
the petition as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
A. The complaints for expropriation lack basis because the
Constitution does not provide for the expropriation of
private property for tourism or other related purposes;
B. The writs of possession or orders authorizing PTA to take
immediate possession is premature because the "public use"
character of the taking has not been previously
demonstrated;
As early as 1919, this Court in Visayan Refining Co. v. Samus (40 Phil. 550)
categorized the restrictive view as wholly erroneous and based on a
misconception of fundamentals.
The petitioners look for the word "tourism" in the Constitution.
Understandably the search would be in vain. The policy objectives of the
framers can be expressed only in general terms such as social justice, local
autonomy, conservation and development of the national patrimony, public
interest, and general welfare, among others. The programs to achieve these
objectives vary from time to time and according to place, To freeze specific
programs like Tourism into express constitutional provisions would make
the Constitution more prolix than a bulky code and require of the framers a
prescience beyond Delphic proportions. The particular mention in the
Constitution of agrarian reform and the transfer of utilities and other private
enterprises to public ownership merely underscores the magnitude of the
problems sought to be remedied by these programs. They do not preclude
nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain for such purposes like
tourism and other development programs.
In the leading case of Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus (supra), this Court
emphasized that the power of eminent domain is inseparable from
The petitioners ask us to adopt a strict construction and declare that "public
use" means literally use by the public and that "public use" is not
synonymous with "public interest", "public benefit", or "public welfare" and
much less "public convenience. "
The petitioners face two major obstacles. First, their contention which is
rather sweeping in its call for a retreat from the public welfare orientation is
unduly restrictive and outmoded. Second, no less than the lawmaker has
made a policy determination that the power of eminent domain may be
exercised in the promotion and development of Philippine tourism.
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which
circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and
which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need
to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to
the Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State, And the necessities
which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas
of scarce public land or limited government resources.
"private" and not a "public use" or, at best, a "public use" not
authorized by the statute. we are unable to agree with the
reasoning and conclusion of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
We think that it is the function of Congress to decide what
type of taking is for a public use and that the agency
authorized to do the taking may do so to the still extent of its
statutory authority, United States v. Gettysburg Electric R.
Co. 160 US 668, 679, 40 L ed 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427. ...
xxx xxx xxx
... But whatever may be the scope of the judicial power to
determine what is a "public use" in Fourteenth Amendment
controversies, this Court has said that when Congress has
spoken on this subject "Its decision is entitled to deference
until it is shown to involve an impossibility." Old Dominion
Land Co. v. United States, 269, US 55, 66, 70 L ed 162, 46 S Ct
39. Any departure from this judicial restraint would result in
courts deciding on what is and is not a governmental
function and in their invalidating legislation on the basis of
their view on that question at the moment of decision, a
practice which has proved impracticable in other fields. See
Case v. Bowles decided February 4, 1946, 437 US 92, 101,
ante, 552, 559, 66 S Ct 438. New York v. United States, 326
US 572 ante 326, 66 S Ct 310). We hold that the T.V.A. took
the tracts here involved for a public purpose, if, as we think
is the case, Congress authorized the Authority to acquire,
hold, and use the lands to carry out the purposes of the
T.V.A. Act.
In the Philippines, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando has aptly summarized
the statutory and judicial trend as follows:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a
time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be
attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of
already been issued to them thereby making the lands expropriated within
the coverage of the land reform area under Presidential Decree No. 2; that
the agrarian reform program occupies a higher level in the order of priorities
than other State policies like those relating to the health and physical wellbeing of the people; and that property already taken for public use may not
be taken for another public use.
We have considered the above arguments with scrupulous and thorough
circumspection. For indeed any claim of rights under the social justice and
land reform provisions of the Constitution deserves the most serious
consideration. The Petitioners, however, have failed to show that the area
being developed is indeed a land reform area and that the affected persons
have emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer.
The records show that the area being developed into a tourism complex
consists of more than 808 hectares, almost all of which is not affected by the
land reform program. The portion being expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly
and unproductive land where even subsistence farming of crops other than
rice and corn can hardly survive. And of the 282 disputed hectares, only
8,970 square meters-less than one hectare-is affected by Operation Land
Transfer. Of the 40 defendants, only two have emancipation patents for the
less than one hectare of land affected. And this 8,970 square meters parcel of
land is not even within the sports complex proper but forms part of the 32
hectares resettlement area where the petitioners and others similarly situated
would be provided with proper housing, subsidiary employment,
community centers, schools, and essential services like water and electricitywhich are non-existent in the expropriated lands. We see no need under the
facts of this petition to rule on whether one public purpose is superior or
inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public
interests. The petitioners have also failed to overcome the showing that the
taking of the 8,970 square meters covered by Operation Land Transfer forms
a necessary part of an inseparable transaction involving the development of
the 808 hectares tourism complex. And certainly, the human settlement
needs of the many beneficiaries of the 32 hectares resettlement area should
prevail over the property rights of two of their compatriots.
control and disposition of the property and the improvements, with power
of demolition, notwithstanding the pendency of the issues before the court,
upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank of an amount equivalent to
10% of the value of the property expropriated. The issue of immediate
possession has been settled in Arce v. Genato (supra). In answer to the issue:
... whether the order of respondent Judge in an
expropriation case allowing the other respondent, ... to take
immediate possession of the parcel of land sought to be
condemned for the beautification of its public plaza, without
a prior hearing to determine the necessity for the exercise of
the power of eminent domain, is vitiated by jurisdictional
defect, ...
this Court held that:
... It is not disputed that in issuing such order, respondent
Judge relied on Presidential Decree No. 42 issued on the 9th
of November, 1972. (Presidential Decree No. 42 is entitled
"Authorizing the Plaintiff in Eminent Domain Proceedings to
Take Possession of the Property involved Upon Depositing
the Assessed Value for Purposes of Taxation.") The question
as thus posed does not occasion any difficulty as to the
answer to be given. This petition for certiorari must fail,
there being no showing that compliance with the
Presidential Decree, which under the Transitory Provisions
is deemed a part of the law of the land, (According to Article
XVII, Section 3 par. (2) of the Constitution: "All
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and acts
promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President
shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid,
legal, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law
or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified,
revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations.
orders, decrees instructions, or other acts of the incumbent
President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or
repealed by the regular National Assembly") would be
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137285. January 16, 2001]
ESTATE OF SALUD JIMENEZ, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE EXPORT
PROCESSING ZONE, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decisioni[1] and the
Resolutionii[2]of the Court of Appealsiii[3] dated March 25, 1998 and
January 14, 1999, respectively, which ordered the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 17, to proceed with the hearing of
the expropriation proceedings regarding the determination of just
compensation for Lot 1406-B while setting aside the Orders dated August 4,
1997iv[4] and November 3, 1997 of the said Regional Trial Court which
ordered the peaceful turnover to petitioner Estate of Salud Jimenez of said
Lot 1406-B.
In an Orderviii[8] dated October 25, 1991, the trial court reconsidered the
Order dated July 11, 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while
the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained. Finding the said order
unacceptable, private respondent PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals.
Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private respondent offering two (2)
proposals, namely:
1.
Withdrawal of private respondents appeal with respect to Lot 1406A in consideration of the waiver of claim for damages and loss of income for
the possession of said lot by private respondent.
2.
The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772
since private respondent has no money yet to pay for the lot.
Private respondents Board approved the proposal and the compromise
agreement was signed by private respondent through its then administrator
Tagumpay Jardiniano assisted by Government Corporate Counsel Oscar I.
Garcia. Said compromise agreementix[9] dated January 4, 1993 is quoted
hereunder:
1.
That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order of the
Honorable Court dated October 25, 1991 which released lot 1406-A from the
expropriation proceedings. On the other hand, defendant Estate of Salud
Jimenez agrees to waive, quitclaim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss
of income which it sustained by reason of the possession of said lot by
plaintiff from 1981 up to the present.
2.
That the parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez shall
transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118 square meters which forms part of
the lot registered under TCT No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to
the name of the plaintiff and the same shall be swapped and exchanged with
lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square meters and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will
be transferred to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez.
3.
That the swap arrangement recognizes the fact that the lot 1406-B
covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is
considered expropriated in favor of the government based on Order of the
Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid the just
compensation for said lot, the estate of said defendant shall be paid with lot
434 covered by TCT No. T-14772.
dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 of the trial court. Petitioner filed
its Commentxvii[17]on January 16, 1998.
4.
That the parties agree that they will abide by the terms of the
foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to be rendered based on
this Compromise Agreement is immediately final and executory.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the approval of
the said compromise agreement entered into between the parties, consequent
with the withdrawal of the appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the
Orderx[10] dated August 23, 1993, the trial court approved the compromise
agreement.
However, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to
petitioner inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the covering TCT
No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on March 13, 1997,
petitioner Estate filed a Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August
23, 1993.xi[11]
In the Orderxii[12] dated August 4, 1997, the trial court annulled the said
compromise agreement entered into between the parties and directed private
respondent to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to the petitioner. Disagreeing
with the said Order of the trial court, respondent PEZA movedxiii[13] for its
reconsideration. The same proved futile since the trial court denied
reconsideration in its Orderxiv[14] dated November 3, 1997.
On December 4, 1997, the trial court, at the instancexv[15] of petitioner,
corrected the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 by
declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot 1406-A that should be surrendered
and returned to petitioner.
On November 27, 1997, respondent interposed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibitionxvi[16] seeking to nullify the Orders
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other
party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist
upon his original demand.
The Supreme Court had the occasion to explain this provision of law in the
case of Leonor v. Sycip (1 SCRA 1215). It ruled that the language of the
abovementioned provision denotes that no action for rescission is required
and that the aggrieved party by the breach of compromise agreement, may
regard the compromise agreement already rescinded, to wit:
It is worthy of notice, in this connection, that, unlike Article 2039 of the same
Code, which speaks of a cause of annulment or rescission of the compromise
and provides that the compromise may be annulled or rescinded for the
cause therein specified, thus suggesting an action for annulment or
rescission, said Article 2041 confers upon the party concerned not a cause for
rescission, or the right to demand rescission, of a compromise, but the
authority, not only to regard it as rescinded, but, also, to insist upon his
original demand. The language of this Article 2041, particularly when
contrasted with that of Article 2039, denotes that no action for rescission is
required in said Article 2041, and that the party aggrieved by the breach of a
compromise agreement may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or
involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise
agreement, without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not
seek a judicial declaration of rescission, for he may regard the compromise
agreement already, rescinded.
Thus, the appellate court partially granted the petition by setting aside the
order of the trial court regarding the peaceful turn over to the Estate of Salud
Jimenez of Lot No. 1406-B and instead ordered the trial judge to proceed
with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings regarding the
determination of just compensation over Lot 1406-B.xx[20]
Petitioner soughtxxi[21] reconsideration of the Decision dated March 25,
1998. However, public respondent in a Resolutionxxii[22] dated January 14,
1999 denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I
In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated when the July 11, 1991 order
of expropriation became final and the parties subsequently entered into a
compromise agreement regarding the mode of payment of just
compensation. When respondent failed to abide by the terms of the
compromise agreement, petitioner filed an action to partially rescind the
same. Obviously, the trial could only validly order the rescission of the
compromise agreement anent the payment of just compensation inasmuch as
that was the subject of the compromise. However, on August 4, 1991, the trial
court gravely abused its discretion when it ordered the return of Lot 1406-B.
It, in effect, annulled the Order of Expropriation dated July 11, 1991 which
was already final and executory.
We affirm the appellate courts reliance on the cases of Aguilar v. Tanxxviii[28]
and Bautista v. Sarmientoxxix[29] wherein it was ruled that the remedies of
certiorari and appeal are not mutually exclusive remedies in certain
exceptional cases, such as when there is grave abuse of discretion, or when
public welfare so requires. The trial court gravely abused its discretion by
setting aside the order of expropriation which has long become final and
executory and by ordering the return of Lot 1406-B to the petitioner. Its
action was clearly beyond its jurisdiction for it cannot modify a final and
executory order. A final and executory order can only be annulled by a
petition to annul the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdictionxxx[30] or a petition for relief from a final order or judgment
under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition to that effect was
filed. Hence, though an order completely and finally disposes of the case, if
appeal is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law or the interest of
substantial justice requires, a petition for certiorari may be availed of upon
showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court.
According to petitioner the rule that a petition for certiorari can be availed of
despite the fact that the proper remedy is an appeal only applies in cases
where the petition is filed within the reglementary period for appeal.
Inasmuch as the petition in the case at bar was filed after the fifteen (15) day
regulatory period to appeal, said exceptional rule as enshrined in the cases of
Aguilar v. Tanxxxi[31] and Bautista v. Sarmientoxxxii[32] is not applicable. We
find this interpretation too restrictive. The said cases do not set as a condition
sine qua non the filing of a petition for certiorari within the fifteen (15) day
period to appeal in order for the said petition to be entertained by the court.
To espouse petitioners contention would render inutile the sixty (60) day
period to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In Republic v. Court of
Appealsxxxiii[33], which also involved an expropriation case where the
parties entered into a compromise agreement on just compensation, this
Court entertained the petition for certiorari despite the existence of an appeal
and despite its being filed after the lapse of the fifteen (15) day period to
appeal the same. We ruled that the Court has not too infrequently given due
course to a petition for certiorari, even when the proper remedy would have
been an appeal, where valid and compelling considerations would warrant
such a recourse.xxxiv[34] If compelled to return the subject parcel of land,
the respondent would divert its budget already allocated for economic
development in order to pay petitioner the rental payments from the lessee
banks. Re-adjusting its budget would hamper and disrupt the operation of
the economic zone. We believe that the grave abuse of discretion committed
by the trial court and the consequent disruption in the operation of the
economic zone constitutes valid and compelling reasons to entertain the
petition.
Petitioner next argues that the instances cited under Section 1 of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Courtxxxv[35] whereby an appeal is not allowed are exclusive
grounds for a petition for certiorari. Inasmuch as the August 4 1997 Order
rescinding the compromise agreement does not fall under any of the
instances enumerated therein, a petition for certiorari will not prosper. This
reasoning is severely flawed. The said section is not phrased to make the
instances mentioned therein the sole grounds for a petition for certiorari. It
only states that Rule 65 may be availed of under the grounds mentioned
therein, but it never intended said enumeration to be exclusive. It must be
remembered that a wide breadth of discretion is granted a court of justice in
certiorari proceedings.xxxvi[36]
In the second assignment of error, petitioner assails the interpretation by the
Court of Appeals of the phrase original demand in Article 2041 of the New
Civil Code vis-a-vis the case at bar. Article 2041 provides that, If one of the
parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may
either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
authority of respondent and the nature of the purpose thereof have been put
to rest when the Expropriation Order dated July 11, 1991 became final and
was duly admitted by petitioner in the compromise agreement. The only
issue for consideration is the manner and amount of payment due to
petitioner. In fact, aside from the withdrawal of private respondents appeal
to the Court of Appeals concerning Lot 1406-A, the matter of payment of just
compensation was the only subject of the compromise agreement dated
January 4, 1993. Under the compromise agreement, petitioner was supposed
to receive respondents Lot No. 434 in exchange for Lot 1406-B. When
respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to deliver Lot 434, petitioner can
again demand for the payment but not the return of the expropriated Lot
1406-B. This interpretation by the Court of Appeals is in accordance with
Sections 4 to 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
We also find as inapplicable the ruling in Gatchalian v. Arleguixxxix[39], a
case cited by petitioner, where we held that even a final judgment can still be
compromised so long as it is not fully satisfied. As already stated, the
expropriation order was not the subject of the compromise agreement. It was
only the mode of payment which was the subject of the compromise
agreement. Hence, the Order of Expropriation dated July 11, 1991 can no
longer be annulled.
After having invoked the provisions of Article 2041, petitioner inconsistently
contends that said article does not apply to the case at bar inasmuch as it is
only applicable to cases where a compromise has not been approved by a
court. In the case at bar, the trial court approved the compromise agreement.
Petitioner insists that Articles 2038, 2039 and 1330 of the New Civil Code
should apply. Said articles provide that:
Article 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation,
undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of Article 1330
of this Code.
However, one of the parties cannot set up a mistake of fact as against the
other if the latter, by virtue of the compromise, has withdrawn from a
litigation already commenced.
The term public use has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the
literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public
has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.
In Manosca v. Court of Appeals, this Court has also held that what ultimately
emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as public
welfare.xlii[42]
Section 23. Eminent Domain. For the acquisition of rights of way, or of any
property for the establishment of export processing zones, or of low-cost
housing projects for the employees working in such zones, or for the
protection of watershed areas, or for the construction of dams, reservoirs,
wharves, piers, docks, quays, warehouses and other terminal facilities,
structures and approaches thereto, the Authority shall have the right and power
to acquire the same by purchase, by negotiation, or by condemnation
proceedings. Should the authority elect to exercise the right of eminent
domain, condemnation proceedings shall be maintained by and in the name
of the Authority and it may proceed in the manner provided for by law.
(italics supplied)
Sec. 12. Functions and Powers of PEZA Board. ---- The Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA) Board shall have the following function and powers:
(a)
Set the general policies on the establishment and operations of the
ECOZONE, Industrial estate, exports processing zones, free trade zones, and
the like;
x
(c)
Regulate and undertake the establishment, operation and
maintenance of utilities, other services and infrastructure in the ECOZONE,
such as heat, light and power, water supply, telecommunications, transport,
toll roads and bridges, port services, etc. and to fix just, reasonable and
competitive rates, fares, charges and fees thereof.xliii[43]
In Manila Railroad Co. v. Mitchelxliv[44], this Court has ruled that in the
exercise of eminent domain, only as much land can be taken as is necessary
for the legitimate purpose of the condemnation. The term necessary, in this
connection, does not mean absolutely indispensable but requires only a
reasonable necessity of the taking for the stated purpose, growth and future
needs of the enterprise. The respondent cannot attain a self-sustaining and
viable ECOZONE if inevitable needs in the expansion in the surrounding
areas are hampered by the mere refusal of the private landowners to part
with their properties. The purpose of creating an ECOZONE and other
facilities is better served if respondent directly owns the areas subject of the
expansion program.
The contention of petitioner that the leasing of the subject lot to banks and
building terminals was not expressly mentioned in the original charter of
respondent PEZA and that it was only after PEZA devoted the lot to said
purpose that Republic Act No. 7916 took effect, is not impressed with merit.
It should be pointed out that Presidential Decree No. 66 created the
respondent PEZA to be a viable commercial, industrial and investment area.
According to the comprehensive wording of Presidential Decree No. 66, the
said decree did not intend to limit respondent PEZA to the establishment of
an export processing zone but it was also bestowed with authority to
expropriate parcels of land for the construction of terminal facilities,
structures and approaches thereto. Republic Act No. 7916 simply
particularized the broad language employed by Presidential Decree No. 66
by specifying the purposes for which PEZA shall devote the condemned lots,
that is, for the construction and operation of an industrial estate, an export
processing zone, free trade zones, and the like. The expropriation of Lot
1406-B for the purpose of being leased to banks and for the construction of a
terminal has the purpose of making banking and transportation facilities
easily accessible to the persons working at the industries located in PEZA.
The expropriation of adjacent areas therefore comes as a matter of necessity
to bring life to the purpose of the law. In such a manner, PEZAs goal of being
a major force in the economic development of the country would be realized.
Furthermore, this Court has already ruled that:
(T)he Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating
private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may
select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled
that the utility of the proposed improvement, the existence of the public
necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location selected, are all questions exclusively for the
legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to
substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people.
We find that respondent capriciously evaded its duty of giving what is due
to petitioner. In the case at bar, the expropriation order was issued by the
trial court in 1991. The compromise agreement between the parties was
approved by the trial court in 1993. However, from 1993 up to the present,
respondent has failed in its obligation to pay petitioner to the prejudice of the
latter. Respondent caused damage to petitioner in making the latter to expect
that it had a good title to the property to be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and
meanwhile, respondent has been reaping benefits from the lease or rental
income of the said expropriated lot. We cannot tolerate this oppressive
exercise of the power of eminent domain by respondent. As we have ruled in
Cosculluela vs. Court of Appeals:xlvii[47]
In the present case, the irrigation project was completed and has been in
operation since 1976. The project is benefiting the farmers specifically and the
community in general. Obviously, the petitioners land cannot be returned to
him. However, it is high time that the petitioner be paid what was due him
eleven years ago. It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to
initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a persons property, allow the
judgment of the court to become final and executory and then refuse to pay
on the ground that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken
and profitably used. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the cavalier
attitude of government officials who adopt such a despotic and irresponsible
stance.
Though the respondent has committed a misdeed to petitioner, we cannot,
however, grant the petitioners prayer for the return of the expropriated Lot
No. 1406-B. The Order of expropriation dated July 11, 1991, has long become
final and executory. Petitioner cited Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Rosa
E. Vda. De Villaroyaxlviii[48] to support its contention that it is entitled to a
return of the lot where this Court ruled that under ordinary circumstances,
immediate return to the owners of the unpaid property is the obvious
remedy. However, the said statement was not the ruling in that case. As in
other cases where there was no prompt payment by the government, this
Court declared in Sorsogon that the Provincial Government of Sorsogon is
expected to immediately pay as directed. Should any further delay be
encountered, the trial court is directed to seize any patrimonial property or
cash savings of the province in the amount necessary to implement this
decision. However, this Court also stressed and declared in that case that In
cases where land is taken for public use, public interest, however, must be
considered.
In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate that this case be
remanded to the trial court for hearing of the expropriation proceedings on
the determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B and for its prompt
payment to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. The Regional Trial
Court of Cavite City is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of the
expropriation proceedings, docketed as Civil Case No. N-4029, regarding the
determination of just compensation for Lot 1406-B, covered and described in
TCT No. T-113498-Cavite, and to resolve the same with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
ARMINDA ORTEGA,
Petitioners,
ARMINDA ORTEGA,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
October 2, 2009
- versus x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x
CITY OF CEBU,
Respondent.
x----------------------------x
CITY OF CEBU,
DECISION
G.R. No. 181583-84
Petitioner,
NACHURA, J.:
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
wit:
SO ORDERED.3[3]
1.
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs denial of Cebu
Citys Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment and to be Allowed to Withdraw
from the Expropriation Proceedings.
2.
Whether the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal
Bank, appropriated for a different purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod,
can be subject to garnishment as payment for the expropriated lot covered by
City Ordinance No. 1519.
1.
Determination of the authority of the plaintiff
to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of
its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. This
ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of
condemnation [or order of expropriation] declaring that the
plaintiff has the lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
the judgment, much less, withdraw its complaint, after it failed to appeal even
the first stage of the expropriation proceedings.
2.
Determination by the court of the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.4[4]
Accordingly, no writ of garnishment may be validly issued against such nonexistent account with Philippine Postal Bank. This circumstance translates to
a situation where there is no valid appropriation ordinance.
SO ORDERED.
ZALDIVAR, J.:p
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its
Civil Case No. 1623, an expropriation proceeding.
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as
the Republic) filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against
defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of
the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as
Castellvi), over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose,
Floridablanca, Pampanga, described as follows:
A parcel of land, Lot No. 199-B Bureau of Lands Plan Swo
23666. Bounded on the NE by Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun;
on the SE by national road; on the SW by AFP reservation,
and on the NW by AFP reservation. Containing an area of
759,299 square meters, more or less, and registered in the
In her "motion to dismiss" filed on July 14, 1959, Castellvi alleged, among
other things, that the land under her administration, being a residential land,
had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market
value of P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force, had been, despite repeated
demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956, thereby
preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by
way of unrealized profits. This defendant prayed that the complaint be
dismissed, or that the Republic be ordered to pay her P15.00 per square
meter, or a total of P11,389,485.00, plus interest thereon at 6% per annum
from July 1, 1956; that the Republic be ordered to pay her P5,000,000.00 as
unrealized profits, and the costs of the suit.
By order of the trial court, dated August, 1959, Amparo C. Diaz, Dolores G.
viuda de Gil, Paloma Castellvi, Carmen Castellvi, Rafael Castellvi, Luis
Castellvi, Natividad Castellvi de Raquiza, Jose Castellvi and Consuelo
Castellvi were allowed to intervene as parties defendants. Subsequently,
Joaquin V. Gozun, Jr., husband of defendant Nieves Toledo Gozun, was also
allowed by the court to intervene as a party defendant.
After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga
the amount of P259,669.10, the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed
in possession of the lands. The Republic was actually placed in possession of
the lands on August 10,
1959. 1
In her "motion to dismiss", dated October 22, 1959, Toledo-Gozun alleged,
among other things, that her two parcels of land were residential lands, in
fact a portion with an area of 343,303 square meters had already been
subdivided into different lots for sale to the general public, and the
remaining portion had already been set aside for expansion sites of the
already completed subdivisions; that the fair market value of said lands was
P15.00 per square meter, so they had a total market value of P8,085,675.00;
and she prayed that the complaint be dismissed, or that she be paid the
amount of P8,085,675.00, plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum
from October 13, 1959, and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
November 19, 1962, the trial court approved the Republic's record on appeal
as amended.
Defendant Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Defendant Toledo-Gozun
did not appeal.
The motion to dismiss the Republic's appeal was reiterated by appellees
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun before this Court, but this Court denied the
motion.
In her motion of August 11, 1964, appellee Castellvi sought to increase the
provisional value of her land. The Republic, in its comment on Castellvi's
motion, opposed the same. This Court denied Castellvi's motion in a
resolution dated October 2,1964.
The motion of appellees, Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, dated October 6, 1969,
praying that they be authorized to mortgage the lands subject of
expropriation, was denied by this Court or October 14, 1969.
On February 14, 1972, Attys. Alberto Cacnio, and Associates, counsel for the
estate of the late Don Alfonso de Castellvi in the expropriation proceedings,
filed a notice of attorney's lien, stating that as per agreement with the
administrator of the estate of Don Alfonso de Castellvi they shall receive by
way of attorney's fees, "the sum equivalent to ten per centum of whatever the
court may finally decide as the expropriated price of the property subject
matter of the case."
--------Before this Court, the Republic contends that the lower court erred:
1. In finding the price of P10 per square meter of the lands
subject of the instant proceedings as just compensation;
2. In holding that the "taking" of the properties under
expropriation commenced with the filing of this action;
In order to better comprehend the issues raised in the appeal, in so far as the
Castellvi property is concerned, it should be noted that the Castellvi property
had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a contract of
lease, typified by the contract marked Exh. 4-Castellvi, the pertinent portions
of which read:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
This AGREEMENT OF LEASE MADE AND ENTERED into
by and between INTESTATE ESTATE OF ALFONSO DE
CASTELLVI, represented by CARMEN M. DE CASTELLVI,
Judicial Administratrix ... hereinafter called the LESSOR and
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by
MAJ. GEN. CALIXTO DUQUE, Chief of Staff of the ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, hereinafter called the
LESSEE,
WITNESSETH:
1. For and in consideration of the rentals hereinafter
reserved and the mutual terms, covenants and conditions of
the parties, the LESSOR has, and by these presents does,
lease and let unto the LESSEE the following described land
together with the improvements thereon and appurtenances
thereof, viz:
Un Terreno, Lote No. 27 del Plano de subdivision Psu 34752,
parte de la hacienda de Campauit, situado en el Barrio de
San Jose, Municipio de Floridablanca Pampanga. ...
midiendo una extension superficial de cuatro milliones once
mil cuatro cientos trienta y cinco (4,001,435) [sic] metros
cuadrados, mas o menos.
Out of the above described property, 75.93 hectares thereof
are actually occupied and covered by this contract. .
It was stipulated by the parties, that "the foregoing contract of lease (Exh. 4,
Castellvi) is 'similar in terms and conditions, including the date', with the
annual contracts entered into from year to year between defendant Castellvi
and the Republic of the Philippines (p. 17, t.s.n., Vol. III)". 11 It is undisputed,
therefore, that the Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by
virtue of the above-mentioned contract, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of
each year to June 30 of the succeeding year) under the terms and conditions
therein stated.
Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic
sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to
vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract, on July 11,
1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the
heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in
question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the
general public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from
receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned in substantially the
same condition as before occupancy (Exh. 5 Castellvi). A follow-up letter
was sent on January 12, 1957, demanding the delivery and return of the
property within one month from said date (Exh. 6 Castellvi). On January 30,
1957, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff, answered the letter
of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in
view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost
P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property, and
that, there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the property by means
of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to the President
(Exhibit "7" Castellvi).
Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 1458, to eject the Philippine Air Force from the
land. While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted these
expropriation proceedings, and, as stated earlier in this opinion, the Republic
was placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959, On November 21,
1959, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, dismissed Civil Case No. 1458,
upon petition of the parties, in an order which, in part, reads as follows:
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a
moment's duration" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596);
"lasting a very short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or
recurring at every moment" (Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1963
edition.) The word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of
(real) property should be construed to mean "a limited period" not
indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one
year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the
lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic,
through the AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does
not alter the fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to
last a year, although renewable from year to year by consent of 'The owner of
the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee,
undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the
time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the
intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be
inferred from the construction of permanent improvements. But this
"intention" cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease
contract. Intent is to be deduced from the language employed by the parties,
and the terms 'of the contract, when unambiguous, as in the instant case, are
conclusive in the absence of averment and proof of mistake or fraud the
question being not what the intention was, but what is expressed in the
language used. (City of Manila v. Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53 Phil. 515, 525);
Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Myrick, 71 Phil. 344, 348). Moreover, in order to
judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the
intention of the lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently
Castellvi's property, why was the contract of lease entered into on year to
year basis? Why was the lease agreement renewed from year to year? Why
did not the Republic expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when,
according to the Republic itself, it expropriated the other parcels of land that
it occupied at the same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of
converting them into a jet air base? 14 It might really have been the intention
of the Republic to expropriate the lands in question at some future time, but
certainly mere notice - much less an implied notice of such intention on
the part of the Republic to expropriate the lands in the future did not, and
could not, bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. The expropriation
must be actually commenced in court (Republic vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil.
461, 484).
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in
the instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as
lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the
circumstance of the property being devoted to public use is present because
the property was used by the air force of the AFP.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property and
its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive
her of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner,
and was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the
renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the
lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to
Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of
all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound
to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the
time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the
Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit
in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of
property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance
and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite
period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was
ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present
when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
appears in the lease contract. What was agreed expressly in paragraph No. 5 of
the lease agreement was that, should the lessor require the lessee to return
the premises in the same condition as at the time the same was first occupied
by the AFP, the lessee would have the "right and privilege" (or option) of
paying the lessor what it would fairly cost to put the premises in the same
condition as it was at the commencement of the lease, in lieu of the lessee's
performance of the undertaking to put the land in said condition. The "fair
value" at the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease agreement, does not
refer to the value of the property if bought by the lessee, but refers to the cost
of restoring the property in the same condition as of the time when the lessee
took possession of the property. Such fair value cannot refer to the purchase
price, for purchase was never intended by the parties to the lease contract. It
is a rule in the interpretation of contracts that "However general the terms of
a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that
are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties
intended to agree" (Art. 1372, Civil Code).
We hold, therefore, that the "taking" of the Castellvi property should not be
reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same
pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid
for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value
of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error
when it held that the "taking" of the property under expropriation
commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the "just compensation" is
to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has
ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes
place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961, 1
SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic
was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court,
on August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes of
determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as
of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
10, 1959 when the same were taken possession of by the Republic, were
residential lands and were adaptable for use as residential subdivisions.
Indeed, the owners of these lands have the right to their value for the use for
which they would bring the most in the market at the time the same were
taken from them. The most important issue to be resolved in the present case
relates to the question of what is the just compensation that should be paid to
the appellees.
The Republic asserts that the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is
P.20 per square meter. The Republic cites the case of Republic vs. Narciso, et
al., L-6594, which this Court decided on May 18, 1956. The Narciso case
involved lands that belonged to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, and to one
Donata Montemayor, which were expropriated by the Republic in 1949 and
which are now the site of the Basa Air Base. In the Narciso case this Court
fixed the fair market value at P.20 per square meter. The lands that are
sought to be expropriated in the present case being contiguous to the lands
involved in the Narciso case, it is the stand of the Republic that the price that
should be fixed for the lands now in question should also be at P.20 per
square meter.
We can not sustain the stand of the Republic. We find that the price of P.20
per square meter, as fixed by this Court in the Narciso case, was based on the
allegation of the defendants (owners) in their answer to the complaint for
eminent domain in that case that the price of their lands was P2,000.00 per
hectare and that was the price that they asked the court to pay them. This
Court said, then, that the owners of the land could not be given more than
what they had asked, notwithstanding the recommendation of the majority
of the Commission on Appraisal which was adopted by the trial court
that the fair market value of the lands was P3,000.00 per hectare. We also
find that the price of P.20 per square meter in the Narciso case was
considered the fair market value of the lands as of the year 1949 when the
expropriation proceedings were instituted, and at that time the lands were
classified as sugar lands, and assessed for taxation purposes at around
P400.00 per hectare, or P.04 per square meter. 22 While the lands involved in
the present case, like the lands involved in the Narciso case, might have a fair
market value of P.20 per square meter in 1949, it can not be denied that ten
years later, in 1959, when the present proceedings were instituted, the value
of those lands had increased considerably. The evidence shows that since
1949 those lands were no longer cultivated as sugar lands, and in 1959 those
lands were already classified, and assessed for taxation purposes, as
residential lands. In 1959 the land of Castellvi was assessed at P1.00 per
square meter. 23
The Republic also points out that the Provincial Appraisal Committee of
Pampanga, in its resolution No. 5 of February 15, 1957 (Exhibit D),
recommended the sum of P.20 per square meter as the fair valuation of the
Castellvi property. We find that this resolution was made by the Republic
the basis in asking the court to fix the provisional value of the lands sought
to be expropriated at P259,669.10, which was approved by the court. 24 It
must be considered, however, that the amount fixed as the provisional value
of the lands that are being expropriated does not necessarily represent the
true and correct value of the land. The value is only "provisional" or
"tentative", to serve as the basis for the immediate occupancy of the property
being expropriated by the condemnor. The records show that this resolution
No. 5 was repealed by the same Provincial Committee on Appraisal in its
resolution No. 10 of May 14, 1959 (Exhibit 13-Castellvi). In that resolution
No. 10, the appraisal committee stated that "The Committee has observed
that the value of the land in this locality has increased since 1957 ...", and
recommended the price of P1.50 per square meter. It follows, therefore, that,
contrary to the stand of the Republic, that resolution No. 5 of the Provincial
Appraisal Committee can not be made the basis for fixing the fair market
value of the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun.
The Republic further relied on the certification of the Acting Assistant
Provincial Assessor of Pampanga, dated February 8, 1961 (Exhibit K), to the
effect that in 1950 the lands of Toledo-Gozun were classified partly as sugar
land and partly as urban land, and that the sugar land was assessed at P.40
per square meter, while part of the urban land was assessed at P.40 per
square meter and part at P.20 per square meter; and that in 1956 the Castellvi
land was classified as sugar land and was assessed at P450.00 per hectare, or
P.045 per square meter. We can not also consider this certification of the
Acting Assistant Provincial Assessor as a basis for fixing the fair market
value of the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun because, as the evidence
shows, the lands in question, in 1957, were already classified and assessed
circumstances, that the lands are titled, that there is a rising trend of land
values, and the lowered purchasing power of the Philippine peso.
In the case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326, 328, this Court
said:
A court of first instance or, on appeal, the Supreme Court,
may change or modify the report of the commissioners by
increasing or reducing the amount of the award if the facts
of the case so justify. While great weight is attached to the
report of the commissioners, yet a court may substitute
therefor its estimate of the value of the property as gathered
from the record in certain cases, as, where the
commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
evidence submitted to them, or where they have disregarded
a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the amount
allowed is either palpably inadequate or excessive. 28
The report of the commissioners of appraisal in condemnation proceedings
are not binding, but merely advisory in character, as far as the court is
concerned. 29 In our analysis of the report of the commissioners, We find
points that merit serious consideration in the determination of the just
compensation that should be paid to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun for their
lands. It should be noted that the commissioners had made ocular
inspections of the lands and had considered the nature and similarities of
said lands in relation to the lands in other places in the province of
Pampanga, like San Fernando and Angeles City. We cannot disregard the
observations of the commissioners regarding the circumstances that make
the lands in question suited for residential purposes their location near the
Basa Air Base, just like the lands in Angeles City that are near the Clark Air
Base, and the facilities that obtain because of their nearness to the big sugar
central of the Pampanga Sugar mills, and to the flourishing first class town of
Floridablanca. It is true that the lands in question are not in the territory of
San Fernando and Angeles City, but, considering the facilities of modern
communications, the town of Floridablanca may be considered practically
adjacent to San Fernando and Angeles City. It is not out of place, therefore,
to compare the land values in Floridablanca to the land values in San
Fernando and Angeles City, and form an idea of the value of the lands in
Floridablanca with reference to the land values in those two other
communities.
The important factor in expropriation proceeding is that the owner is
awarded the just compensation for his property. We have carefully studied
the record, and the evidence, in this case, and after considering the
circumstances attending the lands in question We have arrived at the
conclusion that the price of P10.00 per square meter, as recommended by the
commissioners and adopted by the lower court, is quite high. It is Our
considered view that the price of P5.00 per square meter would be a fair
valuation of the lands in question and would constitute a just compensation
to the owners thereof. In arriving at this conclusion We have particularly
taken into consideration the resolution of the Provincial Committee on
Appraisal of the province of Pampanga informing, among others, that in the
year 1959 the land of Castellvi could be sold for from P3.00 to P4.00 per
square meter, while the land of Toledo-Gozun could be sold for from P2.50
to P3.00 per square meter. The Court has weighed all the circumstances
relating to this expropriations proceedings, and in fixing the price of the
lands that are being expropriated the Court arrived at a happy medium
between the price as recommended by the commissioners and approved by
the court, and the price advocated by the Republic. This Court has also taken
judicial notice of the fact that the value of the Philippine peso has
considerably gone down since the year 1959. 30 Considering that the lands of
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are adjoining each other, and are of the same
nature, the Court has deemed it proper to fix the same price for all these
lands.
3. The third issue raised by the Republic relates to the
payment of interest. The Republic maintains that the lower
court erred when it ordered the Republic to pay Castellvi
interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the total amount
adjudged as the value of the land of Castellvi, from July 1,
1956 to July 10, 1959. We find merit in this assignment of
error.
In ordering the Republic to pay 6% interest on the total value of the land of
Castellvi from July 1, 1956 to July 10, 1959, the lower court held that the
Republic had illegally possessed the land of Castellvi from July 1, 1956, after
its lease of the land had expired on June 30, 1956, until August 10, 1959 when
the Republic was placed in possession of the land pursuant to the writ of
possession issued by the court. What really happened was that the Republic
continued to occupy the land of Castellvi after the expiration of its lease on
June 30, 1956, so much so that Castellvi filed an ejectment case against the
Republic in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. 31 However, while that
ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed the complaint for eminent
domain in the present case and was placed in possession of the land on
August 10, 1959, and because of the institution of the expropriation
proceedings the ejectment case was later dismissed. In the order dismissing
the ejectment case, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga said:
Plaintiff has agreed, as a matter of fact has already signed an
agreement with defendants, whereby she had agreed to
receive the rent of the lands, subject matter of the instant
case from June 30, 1956 up to 1959 when the Philippine Air
Force was placed in possession by virtue of an order of the
Court upon depositing the provisional amount as fixed by
the Provincial Appraisal Committee with the Provincial
Treasurer of
Pampanga; ...
If Castellvi had agreed to receive the rentals from June 30, 1956 to August 10,
1959, she should be considered as having allowed her land to be leased to the
Republic until August 10, 1959, and she could not at the same time be
entitled to the payment of interest during the same period on the amount
awarded her as the just compensation of her land. The Republic, therefore,
should pay Castellvi interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the value of her
land, minus the provisional value that was deposited, only from July 10, 1959
when it deposited in court the provisional value of the land.
4. The fourth error assigned by the Republic relates to the denial by the lower
court of its motion for a new trial based on nearly discovered evidence. We
do not find merit in this assignment of error.
After the lower court had decided this case on May 26, 1961, the Republic
filed a motion for a new trial, supplemented by another motion, both based
upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. The alleged newly
discovered evidence in the motion filed on June 21, 1961 was a deed of
absolute sale-executed on January 25, 1961, showing that a certain Serafin
Francisco had sold to Pablo L. Narciso a parcel of sugar land having an area
of 100,000 square meters with a sugar quota of 100 piculs, covered by P.A.
No. 1701, situated in Barrio Fortuna, Floridablanca, for P14,000, or P.14 per
square meter.
In the supplemental motion, the alleged newly discovered evidence were: (1)
a deed of sale of some 35,000 square meters of land situated at Floridablanca
for P7,500.00 (or about P.21 per square meter) executed in July, 1959, by the
spouses Evelyn D. Laird and Cornelio G. Laird in favor of spouses
Bienvenido S. Aguas and Josefina Q. Aguas; and (2) a deed of absolute sale
of a parcel of land having an area of 4,120,101 square meters, including the
sugar quota covered by Plantation Audit No. 161 1345, situated at
Floridablanca, Pampanga, for P860.00 per hectare (a little less than P.09 per
square meter) executed on October 22, 1957 by Jesus Toledo y Mendoza in
favor of the Land Tenure Administration.
We find that the lower court acted correctly when it denied the motions for a
new trial.
To warrant the granting of a new trial based on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, it must appear that the evidence was discovered after
the trial; that even with the exercise of due diligence, the evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial; and that the evidence is of
such a nature as to alter the result of the case if admitted. 32 The lower court
correctly ruled that these requisites were not complied with.
The lower court, in a well-reasoned order, found that the sales made by
Serafin Francisco to Pablo Narciso and that made by Jesus Toledo to the
Land Tenure Administration were immaterial and irrelevant, because those
sales covered sugarlands with sugar quotas, while the lands sought to be
expropriated in the instant case are residential lands. The lower court also
concluded that the land sold by the spouses Laird to the spouses Aguas was
a sugar land.
We agree with the trial court. In eminent domain proceedings, in order that
evidence as to the sale price of other lands may be admitted in evidence to
prove the fair market value of the land sought to be expropriated, the lands
must, among other things, be shown to be similar.
But even assuming, gratia argumenti, that the lands mentioned in those deeds
of sale were residential, the evidence would still not warrant the grant of a
new trial, for said evidence could have been discovered and produced at the
trial, and they cannot be considered newly discovered evidence as
contemplated in Section 1(b) of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Regarding this
point, the trial court said:
The Court will now show that there was no reasonable
diligence employed.
The land described in the deed of sale executed by Serafin
Francisco, copy of which is attached to the original motion,
is covered by a Certificate of Title issued by the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga. There is no question in the
mind of the court but this document passed through the
Office of the Register of Deeds for the purpose of
transferring the title or annotating the sale on the certificate
of title. It is true that Fiscal Lagman went to the Office of the
Register of Deeds to check conveyances which may be
presented in the evidence in this case as it is now sought to
be done by virtue of the motions at bar, Fiscal Lagman, one
of the lawyers of the plaintiff, did not exercise reasonable
diligence as required by the rules. The assertion that he only
went to the office of the Register of Deeds 'now and then' to
check the records in that office only shows the half-hazard
[sic] manner by which the plaintiff looked for evidence to be
presented during the hearing before the Commissioners, if it
is at all true that Fiscal Lagman did what he is supposed to
have done according to Solicitor Padua. It would have been
Present:
Baguio City
EN BANC
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus -
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
RESOLUTION
Promulgated:
Before the Court are the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of
April 24, 2012
November 22, 2011 dated December 16, 2011 filed by petitioner Hacienda
Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and the Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification dated
December 9, 2011 filed by private respondents Noel Mallari, Julio Suniga,
Supervisory Group of Hacienda Luisita, Inc. and Windsor Andaya
(collectively referred to as Mallari, et al.).
A
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED
IN RULING THAT IN DETERMINING THE JUST
COMPENSATION, THE DATE OF TAKING IS
NOVEMBER 21, 1989, WHEN PARC APPROVED HLIs
SDP [STOCK DISPTRIBUTION PLAN] IN VIEW OF THE
FACT THAT THIS IS THE TIME THAT THE FWBs WERE
CONSIDERED
TO
OWN
AND
POSSESS
THE
AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN HACIENDA LUISITA
BECAUSE:
(1) THE SDP IS PRECISELY A MODALITY WHICH THE
AGRARIAN LAW GIVES THE LANDOWNER AS
ALTERNATIVE TO COMPULSORY COVERAGE IN
WHICH CASE, THEREFORE, THE FWBs CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED AS OWNERS AND POSSESSORS OF THE
AGRICULTURAL LANDS AT THE TIME THE SDP WAS
APPROVED BY PARC;
(2) THE APPROVAL OF THE SDP CANNOT BE AKIN TO A
NOTICE OF COVERAGE IN COMPULSORY COVERAGE
OR ACQUISITION BECAUSE SDP AND COMPULSORY
COVERAGE ARE TWO DIFFERENT MODALITIES WITH
INDEPENDENT
AND
SEPARATE
RULES
AND
MECHANISMS;
Mallari, et al. similarly put forth the following issues in its Motion for
Reconsideration/Clarification dated December 9, 2011:
I
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657 [RA 6657] OR THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW [CARL]
DOES NOT PROVIDE THAT THE FWBs WHO OPT FOR
STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION SHOULD RETAIN
MAJORITY SHAREHOLDING OF THE COMPANY TO
WHICH THE AGRICULTURAL LAND WAS GIVEN.
II
Basically, the issues raised by HLI and Mallari, et al. boil down to the
following: (1) determination of the date of taking; (2) propriety of the
revocation of the option on the part of the original FWBs to remain as
stockholders of HLI; (3) propriety of distributing to the qualified FWBs the
proceeds from the sale of the converted land and of the 80.51-hectare Subic-
Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX ) land; and (4) just compensation for the
HLI, was never deprived of the use and benefit of the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita. Upon this premise, Mallari, et al. claim the date of taking
could not be at the time of the approval of the SDP.18[6]
compulsory acquisition are two (2) different modalities with independent and
Resolution of November 22, 2011) dated January 30, 2012, on the other hand,
alleges that HLI should not be paid just compensation altogether. 19 [7] It
argues that when the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the case 20[8] the
considered as the date of taking as this was the only time that the
won against Tadeco, the CA allegedly imposed as a condition for its dismissal
of the action that should the stock distribution program fail, the lands should
SDP.17[5]
In the instant case, the issue on just compensation and the grounds
HLI and Mallari, et al. rely upon in support of their respective stance on the
matter had been previously raised by them in their first motion for
reconsideration and fully passed upon by the Court in its November 22, 2011
Resolution. The similarities in the issues then and now presented and the
grounds invoked are at once easily discernible from a perusal of the November
22, 2011 Resolution, the pertinent portions of which read:
Sec. 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that the
taking of land for use in the agrarian reform program of the government is
conditioned on the payment of just compensation. As stated:
Just compensation has been defined as the full and fair equivalent
of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.24[12] The measure
is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. 25 [13] In determining just
compensation, the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from
the owner and appropriated by the government shall be the basis. If the
government takes possession of the land before the institution of
avail of a stock distribution or, in the phraseology of the law, the right to
purchase such proportion of the capital stock of the corporation that the
agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation
to the companys total assets, does not detract from the avowed policy of
the agrarian reform law of equitably distributing ownership of land. The
difference lies in the fact that instead of actually distributing the agricultural
could have exacted payment for such shares of stock corresponding to the
landowners, under the stock distribution scheme. The end goal of equitably
And the stubborn fact is that the man days scheme of HLI impelled the
FWBs to work in the hacienda in exchange for such shares of stock.
acknowledges that landowners can require payment for the shares of stock
corresponding to the value of the agricultural lands in relation to the
outstanding capital stock of the corporation.
Although Tadeco did not require compensation for the shares of stock
preferred option in complying with the CARP when it organized HLI as its
this purpose, Tadeco assigned and conveyed to HLI the agricultural lands of
agricultural lands may give their qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase
Tadeco deprived itself of the ownership over these lands when it transferred
such proportion of the capital stock of the corporation that the agricultural
Corollarily, it is the official act by the government, that is, the PARCs
approval of the SDP, which should be considered as the reckoning point for
While it is true that Tadeco has majority control over HLI, the Court
cannot subscribe to the view Mallari, et al. espouse that, on the basis of such
transfer of ownership over the agricultural lands was made prior to the SDPs
majority stockholding, Tadeco was never deprived of the use and benefit of
approval, it is this Courts consistent view that these lands officially became
subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme
only upon the approval of the SDP. And as We have mentioned in Our
November 22, 2011 Resolution, such approval is akin to a notice of coverage
possess and enjoy, jus fruendi or the right to the fruits, jus abutendi or the right
issued on January 2, 2006 should, at the very least, be considered as the date
to abuse or consume, jus disponendi or the right to dispose or alienate, and jus
of taking as this was the only time that the agricultural portion of the
Tadeco to HLI in order to comply with CARP through the stock distribution
lands that they should have gotten early on were it not for the adoption of the
option scheme, sealed with the imprimatur of PARC under PARC Resolution
No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989, Tadeco was consequently dispossessed
and second, by making them pay higher amortizations for the agricultural
lands that should have been given to them decades ago at a much lower cost
two different entities with separate and distinct legal personalities. Ownership
were it not for the landowners initiative of adopting the stock distribution
compensation to HLI, this will also affect the FWBs as they will be paying
higher amortizations to the government if the taking will be considered to
have taken place only on January 2, 2006. As aptly observed by Justice
Leonardo-De Castro in her Concurring Opinion, this will put the land
beyond the capacity of the [FWBs] to pay, which this Court should not
countenance.
may already be resolved based on the records before Us. By analogy, Our
ruling in Heirs of Dr. Jose Deleste v. LBP is applicable:
By a vote of 8-6, the Court affirmed its ruling that the date of
taking in determining just compensation is November 21, 1989 when
PARC approved HLIs stock option plan.
The Court agrees that the option given to the qualified FWBs whether
to remain as stockholders of HLI or opt for land distribution is neither
iniquitous nor prejudicial to the FWBs. Nonetheless, the Court is not
unmindful of the policy on agrarian reform that control over the agricultural
land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Contrary to the stance of HLI,
both the Constitution and RA 6657 intended the farmers, individually or
collectively, to have control over the agricultural lands of HLI; otherwise, all
these rhetoric about agrarian reform will be rendered for naught. Sec. 4, Art.
XIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
MR. NOLLEDO.
And when we talk of
collectively, we mean communal ownership,
stewardship or State ownership?
MS. NIEVA.
In this section, we conceive of
cooperatives; that is farmers cooperatives owning
the land, not the State.
MR. NOLLEDO.
And when we talk of
collectively, referring to farmers cooperatives,
do the farmers own specific areas of land where they
only unite in their efforts?
MS. NIEVA. That is one way.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because I understand that there are
two basic systems involved: the moshave type of
agriculture and the kibbutz.
So are both
contemplated in the report?
MR. TADEO. Ang dalawa kasing pamamaraan ng
pagpapatupad ng tunay na reporma sa lupa ay ang
pagmamay-ari ng lupa na hahatiin sa individual na
pagmamay-ari directly at ang tinatawag na
sama-samang gagawin ng mga magbubukid. Tulad
sa Negros, ang gusto ng mga magbubukid ay gawin
nila itong cooperative or collective farm. Ang ibig
sabihin ay sama-sama nilang sasakahin.
xxxx
MR. TINGSON. x x x When we speak here of to
own directly or collectively the lands they till, is this
land for the tillers rather than land for the landless?
Before, we used to hear land for the landless, but
now the slogan is land for the tillers. Is that right?
MR. TADEO. Ang prinsipyong umiiral dito ay iyong
land for the tillers. Ang ibig sabihin ng directly
ay tulad sa implementasyon sa rice and corn lands
kung saan inaari na ng mga magsasaka ang lupang
binubungkal nila. Ang ibig sabihin naman ng
collectively ay sama-samang paggawa sa isang
Notably, it has been this Courts consistent stand that control over
the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. As We wrote
in Our July 5, 2011 Decision:
as of 1989, the subject 4,915 hectares of Hacienda Luisita were already covered
agrarian reform. Such an adverse situation for the FWBs will not and should
by CARP. Accordingly, the proceeds realized from the sale and/or disposition
not be permitted to stand. For this reason, We maintain Our ruling that the
thereof should accrue for the benefit of the FWBs, less deductions of the 3% of
the proceeds of said transfers that were paid to the FWBs, the taxes and
HLI.
FWBs Entitled
to Proceeds of Sale
Homelots
HLI reiterates its claim over the proceeds of the sales of the 500
hectares and 80.51 hectares of the land as corporate owner and argues that the
return of said proceeds to the FWBs is unfair and violative of the Corporation
Code.
In the present recourse, HLI also harps on the fact that since the
homelots given to the FWBs do not form part of the 4,915.75 hectares covered
by the SDP, then the value of these homelots should, with the revocation of
the SDP, be paid to Tadeco as the landowner.38[26]
resides. In fact, HLI was able to distribute homelots to some if not all of the
FWBs. Thus, in our November 22, 2011 Resolution, We declared that the
homelots already received by the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation
to refund or to return them.
the FWBs shall retain ownership of the homelots given to them with no
obligation to pay for the value of said lots. However, since the SDP was
SEC. 29. Farms Owned or Operated by Corporations or
Other Business Associations.In the case of farms owned or
operated by corporations or other business associations, the
following rules shall be observed by the PARC.
already revoked with finality, the Court directs the government through the
in view of the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance dated March 22, 1989
DAR to pay HLI the just compensation for said homelots in consonance with
Sec. 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution that the taking of land for use in
executed between Tadeco and HLI, where Tadeco transferred and conveyed
to HLI the titles over the lots in question. DAR is ordered to compute the just
compensation of the homelots in accordance with existing laws, rules and
regulations.
1.
3.
Group of Hacienda Luisita, Inc. and Windsor Andaya are hereby DENIED
with this qualification: the July 5, 2011 Decision, as modified by the November
22, 2011 Resolution that the option granted to the FWBs stays
through DAR, is ordered to pay Hacienda Luisita, Inc. the just compensation
revoked;
EXECUTORY. The entry of judgment of said decision shall be made upon the
the sale of the said land to the FWBs less the 3% share, taxes
and expenses specified in the fallo of the November 22, 2011
Resolution;
No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.
4.
SO ORDERED.
JOHNSON, J.:
The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation
proceedings by the city of Manila, may the courts inquire into, and hear
proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation?
That question arose in the following manner:
On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in
the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein
particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a
public improvement. The petitioner, in the second paragraph of the petition,
alleged:
That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely,
the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to
acquire ownership in fee simple of certain parcels of land situated in the
district of Binondo of said city within Block 83 of said district, and
within the jurisdiction of this court.
The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of
Manila], answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged that it was a
corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of
the Chinese Community of the City of Manila; that it was the owner of
parcels one and two of the land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
that it denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the said parcels be
expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and roads furnished
ample means of communication for the public in the district covered by such
proposed expropriation; that if the construction of the street or road should
be considered a public necessity, other routes were available, which would
fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without
disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the
lands in question; that the lands in question had been used by the defendant
for cemetery purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said
cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the
resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large sum of
money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site
and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of
existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their stead, and
would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all those
persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would
have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was without right or authority to
expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes;
and that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public
improvement.
The defendant Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition, denied each
and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said expropriation
was not a public improvement; that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to
acquire the parcels of land in question; that a portion of the lands in question
was used as a cemetery in which were the graves of his ancestors; that
monuments and tombstones of great value were found thereon; that the land
had become quasi-public property of a benevolent association, dedicated and
used for the burial of the dead and that many dead were buried there; that if
the plaintiff deemed it necessary to extend Rizal Avenue, he had offered and
still offers to grant a right of way for the said extension over other land,
without cost to the plaintiff, in order that the sepulchers, chapels and graves
of his ancestors may not be disturbed; that the land so offered, free of charge,
would answer every public necessity on the part of the plaintiff.
The defendant Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose Maria
Delgado, and each of the other defendants, answering separately, presented
substantially the same defense as that presented by the Comunidad de Chinos
de Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting above referred to.
The foregoing parts of the defense presented by the defendants have been
inserted in order to show the general character of the defenses presented by
each of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was
necessary. The defendants each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said
expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had
been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and
monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for
public purposes.
Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the
Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, in a very elucidated opinion, with
very clear and explicit reasons, supported by ambulance of authorities,
decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular
strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from
all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs.
From that judgment the plaintiff appealed and presented the above question
as its principal ground of appeal.
The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the
law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it
may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to
ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the
owners of the land can inquire into the advisible purpose of purpose of the
expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that
the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation
proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted
by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public
purposes, is not denied. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of
Manila) provides that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn private property
for public use."
The Charter of the city of Manila contains no procedure by which the said
authority may be carried into effect. We are driven, therefore, to the
procedure marked out by Act No. 190 to ascertain how the said authority
may be exercised. From an examination of Act No. 190, in its section 241, we
find how the right of eminent domain may be exercised. Said section 241
provides that, "The Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province
or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or
private corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private property for
public use, shall exercise that right in the manner hereinafter prescribed."
Section 242 provides that a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be
presented; that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of
condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be condemned
together with the interest of each defendant separately.
Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right to
expropriate the land in question exists, it shall then appoint commissioners.
Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of procedure and duty of the
commissioners. Section 248 provides for an appeal from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance to the Supreme Court. Said section 248 gives the
Supreme Court authority to inquire into the right of expropriation on the part
of the plaintiff. If the Supreme Court on appeal shall determine that no right
of expropriation existed, it shall remand the cause to the Court of First
Instance with a mandate that the defendant be replaced in the possession of
the property and that he recover whatever damages he may have sustained
by reason of the possession of the plaintiff.
It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the phrase in said section, "and
if the court shall find the right to expropriate exists," means simply that, if the
court finds that there is some law authorizing the plaintiff to expropriate, then
the courts have no other function than to authorize the expropriation and to
proceed to ascertain the value of the land involved; that the necessity for the
expropriation is a legislative and not a judicial question.
Upon the question whether expropriation is a legislative function
exclusively, and that the courts cannot intervene except for the purpose of
determining the value of the land in question, there is much legal legislature.
Much has been written upon both sides of that question. A careful
examination of the discussions pro and con will disclose the fact that the
decisions depend largely upon particular constitutional or statutory
provisions. It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority
should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some
specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to
inquire into the purpose of that legislation.
If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant general
authority to a municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public
purposes, we think the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction,
under the provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon
an issue properly presented, concerning whether or not the lands were
private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public. In other words, have no
the courts in this jurisdiction the right, inasmuch as the questions relating to
expropriation must be referred to them (sec. 241, Act No. 190) for final
decision, to ask whether or not the law has been complied with? Suppose in
a particular case, it should be denied that the property is not private property
but public, may not the courts hear proof upon that question? Or, suppose the
defense is, that the purpose of the expropriation is not public but private, or
that there exists no public purpose at all, may not the courts make inquiry
and hear proof upon that question?
The city of Manila is given authority to expropriate private lands for public
purposes. Can it be possible that said authority confers the right to determine
for itself that the land is private and that the purpose is public, and that the
people of the city of Manila who pay the taxes for its support, especially
those who are directly affected, may not question one or the other, or both, of
these questions? Can it be successfully contended that the phrase used in Act
No. 190, "and if the court upon trial shall find that such right exists," means
simply that the court shall examine the statutes simply for the purpose of
ascertaining whether a law exists authorizing the petitioner to exercise the
right of eminent domain? Or, when the case arrives in the Supreme Court,
can it be possible that the phrase, "if the Supreme Court shall determine that
no right of expropriation exists," that that simply means that the Supreme
Court shall also examine the enactments of the legislature for the purpose of
determining whether or not a law exists permitting the plaintiff to
expropriate?
We are of the opinion that the power of the court is not limited to that
question. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist
conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the
question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise
of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is
being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two
conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First,
the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the
court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either
one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being
exercised in accordance with law.
Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is
public, is a question of fact. Whether the land is public, is a question of fact;
and, in our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the
Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for
the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire
into, and hear proof upon, those questions. Is it possible that the owner of
valuable land in this jurisdiction is compelled to stand mute while his land is
being expropriated for a use not public, with the right simply to beg the city
of Manila to pay him the value of his land? Does the law in this jurisdiction
permit municipalities to expropriate lands, without question, simply for the
purpose of satisfying the aesthetic sense of those who happen for the time
being to be in authority? Expropriation of lands usually calls for public
expense. The taxpayers are called upon to pay the costs. Cannot the owners
of land question the public use or the public necessity?
As was said above, there is a wide divergence of opinion upon the authority
of the court to question the necessity or advisability of the exercise of the
right of eminent domain. The divergence is usually found to depend upon
particular statutory or constitutional provisions.
It has been contended and many cases are cited in support of that
contention, and section 158 of volume 10 of Ruling Case Law is cited as
conclusive that the necessity for taking property under the right of
eminent domain is not a judicial question. But those who cited said section
evidently overlooked the section immediately following (sec. 159), which
adds: "But it is obvious that if the property is taken in the ostensible behalf of
a public improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is being
taken for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for
protection by the courts. While many courts have used sweeping expression in
the decisions in which they have disclaimed the power of supervising the
power of supervising the selection of the sites of public improvements, it may be
safely said that the courts of the various states would feel bound to interfere
to prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature, by an attempted
appropriation of land in utter disregard of the possible necessity of its use, or
when the alleged purpose was a cloak to some sinister scheme." (Norwich
City vs. Johnson, 86 Conn., 151; Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245
Ill., 544; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368; State
vs. Stewart, 74 Wis., 620.)
Said section 158 (10 R. C. L., 183) which is cited as conclusive authority in
support of the contention of the appellant, says:
The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private
etc. Co., 160 U. S., 668; Traction Co. vs. Mining Co., 196 U.S., 239; Sears vs.
City of Akron, 246 U.S., 351 [erroneously cited as 242 U.S.].)
In the case of Traction Co. vs. Mining Co. (196 U.S., 239), the Supreme Court of
the United States said: "It is erroneous to suppose that the legislature is
beyond the control of the courts in exercising the power of eminent domain,
either as to the nature of the use or the necessity to the use of any particular
property. For if the use be not public or no necessity for the taking exists, the
legislature cannot authorize the taking of private property against the will of
the owner, notwithstanding compensation may be required."
In the case of School Board of Carolina vs. Saldaa (14 Porto Rico, 339, 356), we
find the Supreme Court of Porto Rico, speaking through Justice MacLeary,
quoting approvingly the following, upon the question which we are
discussing: "It is well settled that although the legislature must necessarily
determine in the first instance whether the use for which they
(municipalities, etc.) attempt to exercise the power is a public one or not,
their (municipalities, etc.) determination is not final, but is subject to
correction by the courts, who may undoubtedly declare the statute
unconstitutional, if it shall clearly appear that the use for which it is
proposed to authorize the taking of private property is in reality not public
but private." Many cases are cited in support of that doctrine.
Later, in the same decision, we find the Supreme Court of Porto Rico says:
"At any rate, the rule is quite well settled that in the cases under
consideration the determination of the necessity of taking a particular piece or
a certain amount of land rests ultimately with the courts." (Spring Valley etc.
Co. vs. San Mateo, etc. Co., 64 Cal., 123.) .
In the case of Board of Water Com'rs., etc. vs. Johnson (86 Conn., 571 [41 L. R.
A., N. S., 1024]), the Supreme Court of Connecticut approvingly quoted the
following doctrine from Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.), section 599: "In
all such cases the necessity of public utility of the proposed work or
improvement is a judicial question. In all such cases, where the authority is
to take property necessary for the purpose, the necessity of taking particular
property for a particular purpose is a judicial one, upon which the owner is
entitled to be heard." (Riley vs. Charleston, etc. Co., 71 S. C., 457, 489 [110
Am. St. Rep., 579]; Henderson vs. Lexington 132 Ky., 390, 403.)
The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the
necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable
exercise of the right of eminent domain, and beyond the power of the
legislature to delegate. (Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633; Wilson vs.
Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222 Pa. St., 541, 545; Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132
Ky., 692, 697.)
In the case of New Central Coal Co. vs. George's etc. Co. (37 Md., 537, 564), the
Supreme Court of the State of Maryland, discussing the question before us,
said: "To justify the exercise of this extreme power (eminent domain) where
the legislature has left it to depend upon the necessity that may be found to
exist, in order to accomplish the purpose of the incorporation, as in this case,
the party claiming the right to the exercise of the power should be required
to show at least a reasonable degree of necessity for its exercise. Any rule less
strict than this, with the large and almost indiscriminate delegation of the
right to corporations, would likely lead to oppression and the sacrifice of
private right to corporate power."
In the case of Dewey vs. Chicago, etc. Co. (184 Ill., 426, 433), the court said: "Its
right to condemn property is not a general power of condemnation, but is
limited to cases where a necessity for resort to private property is shown to
exist. Such necessity must appear upon the face of the petition to condemn. If
the necessary is denied the burden is upon the company (municipality) to
establish it." (Highland, etc. Co. vs. Strickley, 116 Fed., 852, 856; Kiney vs.
Citizens' Water & Light Co., 173 Ind., 252, 257 ; Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks,
etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544 [137 Am. St. Rep. 338].)
It is true that naby decisions may be found asserting that what is a public use
is a legislative question, and many other decisions declaring with equal
emphasis that it is a judicial question. But, as long as there is a constitutional
or statutory provision denying the right to take land for any use other than a
public use, it occurs to us that the question whether any particular use is a
public one or not is ultimately, at least, a judicial question. The legislative
may, it is true, in effect declare certain uses to be public, and, under the
operation of the well-known rule that a statute will not be declared to be
unconstitutional except in a case free, or comparatively free, from doubt, the
courts will certainly sustain the action of the legislature unless it appears that
the particular use is clearly not of a public nature. The decisions must be
understood with this limitation; for, certainly, no court of last resort will be
willing to declare that any and every purpose which the legislative might
happen to designate as a public use shall be conclusively held to be so,
irrespective of the purpose in question and of its manifestly private character
Blackstone in his Commentaries on the English Law remarks that, so great is
the regard of the law for private property that it will not authorize the least
violation of it, even for the public good, unless there exists a very great
necessity therefor.
In the case of Wilkinson vs. Leland (2 Pet. [U.S.], 657), the Supreme Court of
the United States said: "That government can scarcely be deemed free where
the rights of property are left solely defendant on the legislative body,
without restraint. The fundamental maxims of free government seem to
require that the rights of personal liberty and private property should be
held sacred. At least no court of justice in this country would be warranted in
assuming that the power to violate and disregard them a power so
repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty lurked in
any general grant of legislature authority, or ought to be implied from any
general expression of the people. The people ought no to be presumed to
part with rights so vital to their security and well-being without very strong
and direct expression of such intention." (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec.
603; Lecoul vs. Police Jury 20 La. Ann., 308; Jefferson vs. Jazem, 7 La. Ann.,
182.)
interpretation. (Bensely vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases
cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent
is one of the most delicate exercise of government authority. It is to be
watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the
government, the inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the
right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of the
substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the
exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. Not only must the
authority of municipal corporations to take property be expressly conferred
and the use for which it is taken specified, but the power, with all
constitutional limitation and directions for its exercise, must be strictly pursued.
(Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited;
Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil., 411.)
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the English Law said that the right to
own and possess land a place to live separate and apart from others to
retain it as a home for the family in a way not to be molested by others is
one of the most sacred rights that men are heirs to. That right has been
written into the organic law of every civilized nation. The Acts of Congress
of July 1, 1902, and of August 29, 1916, which provide that "no law shall be
enacted in the Philippine Islands which shall deprive any person of his
property without due process of law," are but a restatement of the timehonored protection of the absolute right of the individual to his property.
Neither did said Acts of Congress add anything to the law already existing in
the Philippine Islands. The Spaniard fully recognized the principle and
adequately protected the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands against the
encroachment upon the private property of the individual. Article 349 of the
Civil Code provides that: "No one may be deprived of his property unless it
be by competent authority, for some purpose of proven public utility, and
after payment of the proper compensation Unless this requisite (proven
public utility and payment) has been complied with, it shall be the duty of the
courts to protect the owner of such property in its possession or to restore its
possession to him , as the case may be."
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or
by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and
the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No
species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is
guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the
freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and,
for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without
his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly
The Charter of the city of Manila authorizes the taking of private property for
public use. Suppose the owner of the property denies and successfully proves
that the taking of his property serves no public use: Would the courts not be
justified in inquiring into that question and in finally denying the petition if
no public purpose was proved? Can it be denied that the courts have a right
to inquire into that question? If the courts can ask questions and decide,
upon an issue properly presented, whether the use is public or not, is not
that tantamount to permitting the courts to inquire into the necessity of the
appropriation? If there is no public use, then there is no necessity, and if
S E C O N D
LOURDES
MASIKIP,
D I V I S I O N
DE
LA
PAZ
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
Petitioner,
Present:
SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J.:
GARCIA, JJ.
Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the benefit of a
small community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility,
notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance
away, such taking cannot be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation
is not valid. In this case, the Court defines what constitutes a genuine necessity
for public use.
Promulgated:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals dated October 31, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 affirming the
Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig City, dated May 7, 1996
in S.C.A. No. 873. Likewise assailed is the Resolution[3] of the same court
the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.
The facts of the case are:
In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land
with an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City,
Metro Manila.
Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a
In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of
that the trial court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the
square meter portion of her property to be used for the sports development
pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang
Bayan of Pasig.
On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the
Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but
following grounds:
this time the purpose was allegedly in line with the program of the Municipal
Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our
community.
I
On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended
expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as
On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to
Dismiss,[5] on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the
II
property for the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig.
As to the issue of just compensation, the trial court held that the same is to be
determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court
in its Order of July 31, 1996. Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and City
Treasurer of Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation.
This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41860. On October 31, 1997, the
Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 20, 1998.
A. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO
PROVE THAT THERE IS
GENUINE NECESSITY FOR
THE TAKING OF THE
PETITIONERS PROPERTY.
B. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO
PROVE THAT THE PUBLIC
USE REQUIREMENT FOR
THE EXERCISE OF THE
POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN
HAS
BEEN
COMPLIED WITH.
C. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO
PROVE
THAT
RESPONDENT CITY OF
PASIG HAS COMPLIED
WITH ALL CONDITIONS
PRECEDENT FOR THE
II
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING
OF RULE ON ACTIONABLE
DOCUMENTS
TO
THE
DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO
RESPONDENT CITY OF PASIGS
COMPLAINT DATED 07 APRIL
1995 TO JUSTIFY THE COURT A
QUOS DENIAL OF PETITIONERS
RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE
COMPLAINT
FOR
EXPROPRIATION (THE MOTION
TO DISMISS DATED 21 APRIL
1995).
III
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING
THE RULE ON HYPOTHETICAL
ADMISSION OF FACTS ALLEGED
IN A COMPLAINT CONSIDERING
THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISS
FILED BY PETITIONER IN THE
EXPROPRIATION CASE BELOW
WAS
THE
RESPONSIVE
PLEADING REQUIRED TO BE
FILED UNDER THE THEN RULE 67
plaintiff to expropriate the defendants property for the use specified in the
complaint. All that the law requires is that a copy of the said motion be served
on plaintiffs attorney of record. It is the court that at its convenience will set
the case for trial after the filing of the said pleading.[6]
The foregoing arguments may be synthesized into two main issues one
substantive and one procedural. We will first address the procedural issue.
The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that the motion to dismiss
filed by petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint, specifically that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
Petitioner filed her Motion to Dismiss the complaint for expropriation on April
25, 1995. It was denied by the trial court on May 7, 1996. At that time, the rule
on expropriation was governed by Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provides:
petitioners property for public use. Pursuant to the above Rule, the motion is
a responsive pleading joining the issues. What the trial court should have done
was to set the case for the reception of evidence to determine whether there is
indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property, instead of summarily
making a finding that the taking is for public use and appointing
commissioners to fix just compensation. This is especially so considering that
the purpose of the expropriation was squarely challenged and put in issue by
The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly constitutes the
responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for
expropriation. Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue the right of the
The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
41860 on October 31, after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, is of
no moment. It is only fair that the Rule at the time petitioner filed her motion
to dismiss should govern. The new provision cannot be applied retroactively
to her prejudice.
In the early case of US v. Toribio,[7] this Court defined the power of eminent
domain as the right of a government to take and appropriate private property
to public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done
government.[8]
areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the
taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.[11]
property. While she does not dispute the intended public purpose,
nonetheless, she insists that there must be a genuine necessity for the proposed
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the
units and lays down the parameters for its exercise, thus:
City, fully operational and being utilized by its residents, including those from
categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering
that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community
recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of
Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates
from the necessity and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of
Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila,[12] we held that the very foundation
The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished
rights of men. It is so fundamental that it has been written into organic law of
every nation where the rule of law prevails. Unless the requisite of genuine
necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land.
In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College,[13] we ruled that necessity within the
be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private
property. Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable
would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least inconvenience
requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be
and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent with
specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public
such benefit.
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 are
property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification[14] issued
REVERSED. The complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by
by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the
SO ORDERED.
She prays for such other remedy as the Court may deem just
and equitable in the premises.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-51078 October 30, 1980
CRISTINA DE KNECHT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA, as Judge presiding over Branch III of the
Court of First Instance (Pasay City) and the REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Cristina de Knecht
against the Honorable Pedro JL. Bautista, as Judge presiding over Branch III
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay City), and the Republic of the
Philippines pines seeking the following relief:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that judgment
be rendered annulling the order for immediate possession
issued by respondent court in the expropriation proceedings
and commanding respondents to desist from further
proceedings in the expropriation action or the order for
immediate possession issued in said action, with costs.
Petitioner prays that a restraint order or writ of preliminary
injunction be issued ex-parte enjoining respondents, their
representative representative and agents from enforcing the
here questioned order for mediate posession petitioner
offering to post a bond executed to the parties enjoined in an
amount to be fixed by the Court to the effect that she will
pay to such parties all damages which they may sustain by
reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide
she is not entitled there
was docketed as Civil Case No. 7001-P and entitled "Republic of the Philippines
vs. Concepcion Cabarrus Vda. de Santos, etc."
The herein petitioner filed a motion to dismiss dated March 19, 1979 on the
following grounds:
(a) court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action because the
complaint failed to allege that the instant project for expropriation bore the
approval of the Ministry of Human Settlements and the Metro Manila
Government nor pursuant to Presidential Decrees Nos. 824, 1396 and 1517;
(b) The choice of properties to be expropriated made by the Ministry of
Public Highways was arbitrary and erroneous;
(c) The complaint was premature as the plaintiff never really had gone
through serious negotiations with the defendant for the purchase of her
property; and
(d) The complaint relied on an arbitrary and erroneous valuation of
properties and disregarded consequential damages.
An urgent motion dated March 28, 1979 for preliminary junction was also
filed.
In June 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for the issuance of
a writ of possession of the property sought to be expropriated on the ground
that said Republic had made the required deposit with the Philippine
National Bank.
The respondent judge issued a writ of possession dated June 14, 1979
authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take and enter upon the
possession of the properties sought be condemned. 3
The petitioner contends that "Respondent court lacked or exceeded its
jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order to take over
and enter upon the possession of the properties sought to be expropriatedpetitioner having raised a constitutional question which respondent court
must resolve before it can issue an order to take or enter upon the possession
of properties sought to be expropriated." 4
The petitioner assails the choice of the Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets
route on the following grounds:
SA Extension to Roxas Boulevard along Del Pan Fernando Rein Streets were duly notified of such proposed
project. Petitioner herein was one of those notified Annex 1).
It be conceded that the Cuneta Avenue line goes southward
and outward (from the city center while the Del Pan
Fernando Rein Streets line follows northward and inward
direction. It must be stated that both lines, Cuneta Avenue
and Del Pan Fernando Rein Streets lines, meet
satisfactorily planning and design criteria and therefore are
both acceptable. In selecting the Del Pan Fernando Rein
Streets line the Government did not do so because it wanted
to save the motel located along Cuneta Avenue but because
it wanted to minimize the social impact factor or problem
involved. 7
There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take
private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation.
Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution of the Philippines provides: "Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
It is recognized, was, that the government may not capriciously or
arbitrarily' choose what private property should be taken. In J. M. Tuazon &
Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure administration 31 SCRA, 413, 433, the Supreme Court
said:
For the purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity,
it is enough if the respondents or defendants named be the
government officials who would give operation and effect to
official action allegedly tainted with unconstitutionality.
Thus, where the statute assailed was sought to be enforced
by the Land Tenure Administrative and the Solicitor
General, the two officials may be made respondents in the
action without need of including the Executive Secretary as a
party in the action
The failure to meet tile exacting standard of due process
would likewise constitute a valid objection to the exercise of
this congressional power. That was so intimated in the above
leading Guido Case. There was an earlier pronouncement to
that effect in a decision rendered long before the adoption of
the Constitution under the previous organic law then in
B. Social Impact
The following factual data which have a direct bearing on
the issue of social impact were culled from the records of the
case and the evidence presented during the public hearings:
Alignment 1
73
Alignment 2
49
25 (34.3%)
Alignment 2
31 (63.3%)
547
Alignment 2
290 (estimated)
C. Cost
It is obvious from the immediately table that the right- ofway acquisition cost difference factor of the two alignment is
only P269,196 and not P2M as alleged by the Department of
Public Highways and P1.2M as claimed by the oppositors.
Consequently, the cost difference factor between the two
alignments is so minimal as to be practically nil in the
consideration of the issues involved in this case. 10
After considering all the issues and factors, the Human Setlements
Commission made the following recommendations:
Lots
Improvement
Residential
41
46
Commercial
25
24
Industrial
Church
Educational
TOTAL
72
75
Improvements
Total
Alignment
1
P9,300,136
P5,928,680
Alignment
2
8,314,890
6,644,130
Difference
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue posed in this case is whether an expropriation proceeding that was
determined by a final judgment of this Court may be the subject of a
subsequent legislation for expropriation.
On February 20, 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed in the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal in Pasay City an expropriation proceedings
against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan
streets among them Cristina De Knecht (de Knecht for short) together with
Concepcion Cabarrus, and some fifteen other defendants, docketed as Civil
Case No. 7001-P.
On March 19, 1979 de Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of
jurisdiction, pendency of appeal with the President of the Philippines,
prematureness of complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the
properties. On March 29, 1979 de Knecht filed an ex parte urgent motion for
the issuance by the trial court of a restraining order to restrain the Republic
from proceeding with the taking of immediate possession and control of the
property sought to be condemned. In June, 1979 the Republic filed a motion
for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property to be expropriated on
the ground that it had made the required deposit with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) of 10% of the amount of compensation stated in the
complaint. In an order dated June 14, 1979 the lower court issued a writ of
possession authorizing the Republic to enter into and take possession of the
Gallina (which drains the area of Marikina, Pasay, Manila and Paranaque);
and (3) thus completing the Manila Flood and Control and Drainage Project.
So the petitioner acquired the needed properties through negotiated
purchase starting with the lands from Taft Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard
including the lands in Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets. It acquired through
negotiated purchases about 80 to 85 percent of the lands involved in the
project whose owners did not raise any objection as to arbitrariness on the
choice of the project and of the route. It is only with respect to the remaining
10 to 15 percent along the route that the petitioner cannot negotiate through
a sales agreement with a few land owners, including de Knecht whose
holding is hardly 5% of the whole route area. Thus, as above related on
February 20, 1979 the petitioner filed the expropriation proceedings in the
Court of First Instance.
There is no question that in the decision of this Court dated October 30, 1980
in De Knecht vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-51078, this Court held that the "choice of
the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets as the line through which the EDSA
should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive
judicial approval." 5 It is based on the recommendation of the Human
Settlements Commission that the choice of Cuneta street as the line of the
extension will minimize the social impact factor as the buildings and
improvement therein are mostly motels. 6
In view of the said finding, this Court set aside the order of the trial court
dated June 14, 1979 authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take
possession of the properties sought to be condemned and enjoined the
respondent judge from taking any further action in the case except to dismiss
the same.
Said decision having become final no action was taken by the lower court on
the said directive of this Court to dismiss the case. Subsequently B.P. Blg. 340
was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa on February 17, 1983. On the basis of
said law petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case before the trial court
and this was granted.
On appeal by de Knecht to the Court of Appeals the appellate court held that
the decision of the Supreme Court having become final, the petitioner's right
as determined therein should no longer be disturbed and that the same has
become the law of the case between the parties involved. Thus, the appellate
court set aside the questioned order of the trial court and issued another
March 9, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order of
Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasay City in Civil
Case No. 7001-P dated September 2, 1983 is hereby reinstated without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
Respondents. Promulgated:
x---------------------------------------------------------------------- x
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
CARPIO,
-versus- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES,
The Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA 3) was
conceived, designed and constructed to serve as the countrys show window
to the world. Regrettably, it has spawned controversies. Regrettably too,
despite the apparent completion of the terminal complex way back it has not
yet been operated. This has caused immeasurable economic damage to the
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, TINGA,
In the first case that reached this Court, Agan v. PIATCO,[1] the
reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities. Still, in his
contracts which the Government had with the contractor were voided for
being contrary to law and public policy. The second case now before the Court
follows:
involves the matter of just compensation due the contractor for the terminal
complex it built. We decide the case on the basis of fairness, the same norm
that pervades both the Courts 2004 Resolution in the first case and the latest
expropriation law.
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Courts
decision in Agan v. PIATCO,[2] promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This
decision nullified the Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-andTransfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger
Terminal III entered into between the Philippine Government (Government)
and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as
for the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision. These motions were denied by
However, the Court this time squarely addressed the issue of the rights of
franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession
period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo
construction of the NAIA 3 facilities. The holding of the Court on this crucial
point follows:
capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement
was contrary to public policy.[3]
At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had
already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion.[4] However, the
ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the
nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for
January 2005 Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted that
its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67
The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic
Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as An Act to Facilitate the
purposes.[14]
Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many
respects.
The case[15] was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided
by respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the
same day that the Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order[16] directing
procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the
or enter upon the possession of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of
Manila v. Serrano,[17] the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue
in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an
sufficient in form and substance, and upon deposit made by the government
initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes
of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard
that [t]he case record shows that [the Government has] deposited the assessed
for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax
complaint. Also on the same day, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession.
According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take possession over the
NAIA 3 facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession was issued.[18]
Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8974 and
Section 10 of the Implementing Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its
However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to
earlier issuances. First, it directed the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran
supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the 4
Branch
(LBP-Baclaran),
to
immediately
release
the
amount
of
which the Government specifically made available for the purpose of this
The very next day after the issuance of the assailed 4 January 2005
Order, the Government filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was
Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was filed
on 13 January 2005. The petition prayed for the nullification of the RTC orders
dated 4 January 2005, 7 January 2005, and 10 January 2005, and for the
inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the expropriation
case. A concurrent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction was granted by this Court in a Resolution dated 14
January 2005.[21]
set for hearing on 10 January 2005. On 7 January 2005, the RTC issued another
Order, the second now assailed before this Court, which appointed three (3)
Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3
Complex. That same day, the Government filed a Motion for Inhibition of Hon.
(i) that Rule 67, not Rep. Act No. 8974, governs the present
expropriation proceedings;
Gingoyon.
(ii) that Hon. Gingoyon erred when he ordered the immediate release
The RTC heard the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Inhibition on 10 January 2005. On the same day, it denied these motions in an
Omnibus Order dated 10 January 2005. This is the third Order now assailed
before this Court. Nonetheless, while the Omnibus Order affirmed the earlier
dispositions in the 4 January 2005 Order, it excepted from affirmance the
(iii) that the RTC could not have prohibited the Government from
enjoining the performance of acts of ownership;
Before we delve into the merits of the issues raised by the Government, it is
essential to consider the crucial holding of the Court in its 2004 Resolution in
Agan, which we repeat below:
laid down by this Court through any mode of judicial action, such as the
complaint for eminent domain.
it could acquire the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, the actions of respondent judge
under review, as well as the arguments of the parties must, to merit
affirmation, pass the threshold test of whether such propositions are in accord
with the 2004 Resolution.
It is from these premises that we resolve the first question, whether Rule 67 of
such case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint. The
the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings
instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex stands on a
in this case.
the Government may have acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the
requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain though may be the most
The Government insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the
expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the
other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does apply.
of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which
Earlier, we had adverted to the basic differences between the statute and the
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised
Still, in applying the laws and rules on expropriation in the case at bar,
we are impelled to apply or construe these rules in accordance with the Courts
guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For
prescriptions in the 2004 Resolution to achieve the end effect that the
Government may validly take over the NAIA 3 facilities. Insofar as this case is
concerned, the 2004 Resolution is effective not only as a legal precedent, but as
enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers
the source of rights and prescriptions that must be guaranteed, if not enforced,
in the resolution of this petition. Otherwise, the integrity and efficacy of the
projects.
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable
to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the
national government expropriates property for national government
infrastructure projects.[28] Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national
government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the
assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues
to apply.
Under both Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government commences
expropriation proceedings through the filing of a complaint. Unlike in the case
of local governments which necessitate an authorizing ordinance before
...
c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure
project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is
no existing valuation of the area concerned, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted texts, Rule 67 merely requires the
Government to deposit with an authorized government depositary the
assessed value of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of
possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the Government
make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ may issue.
Moreover, such payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR in the case
of land, the value of the improvements or structures under the replacement
cost method,[29] or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost
urgency, the proffered value of the property to be seized.
Section 2 of Rule 67 provides that the State shall have the right to take
or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if [the plaintiff]
deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to
the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such
bank subject to the orders of the court.[30] It is thus apparent that under the
provision, all the Government need do to obtain a writ of possession is to
deposit the amount equivalent to the assessed value with an authorized
government depositary.
xxx
squarely contradicts the letter and intent of the 2004 Resolution. Hence, the
position of the Government sanctions its own disregard or violation the
prescription laid down by this Court that there must first be just compensation
paid to PIATCO before the Government may take over the NAIA 3 facilities.
xxx
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Oo. Because this is really
in favor of the landowners, e.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. VERGARA). Thats why we need to
really secure the availability of funds.
xxx
Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the
requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just
compensation to PIATCO before the Government may take over the property.
xxx
2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this
case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all,
adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Courts
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Okay, okay, no. Unanguna, it is not deposit, no. Its payment.
It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit
under Rule 67 with the scheme of immediate payment in cases involving
national government infrastructure projects. The following portion of the
Senate deliberations, cited by PIATCO in its Memorandum, is worth quoting
to cogitate on the purpose behind the plain meaning of the law:
Projects And For Other Purposes. Obviously, the law is intended to cover
the parties, and such other incidents affecting the complaint shall be resolved
projects. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8974 explains what are considered as
Given that the 2004 Resolution militates against the continued use of the norm
under Section 2, Rule 67, is it then possible to apply Rep. Act No. 8974? We find
that it is, and moreover, its application in this case complements rather than
contravenes the prescriptions laid down in the 2004 Resolution.
projects normally financed by the public sector but which are now wholly or
soil.[38] Certainly, the NAIA 3 facilities are of such nature that they cannot just
There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities
which it had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution squarely
recognized that right when it mandated the payment of just compensation to
PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3. The fact that the
Government resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a
concession on its part of PIATCOs ownership. Indeed, if no such right is
recognized, then there should be no impediment for the Government to seize
control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings.
Since the rights of PIATCO over the NAIA 3 facilities are established, the
properties that may be expropriated under Rep. Act No. 8974 are parcels of
the Civil Code, these facilities are ineluctably immovable or real property, as
land. Rep. Act No. 8974 contemplates within its coverage such real property
they constitute buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the
the soil. Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8974, which sets the declaration of the laws
expropriation. Both the land itself and the improvements thereupon are
stating that the scope of the law relates to the acquisition of real property,
which under civil law includes buildings, roads and constructions adhered to
the same degree of loss as the owner of land seized through similar means.
the soil.
Equal protection demands that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. For
purposes of expropriation, parcels of land are similarly situated as the
It is moreover apparent that the law and its implementing rules
constructed. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8974 itself recognizes that the
improvements or structures on the land may very well be the subject of
expropriation proceedings. Section 4(a), in relation to Section 7 of the law
Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that laws
provides for the guidelines for the valuation of the improvements or structures
application in this case, the threshold test must still be met whether its
Resolution. Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974
will not contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just
The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties just like the
soil to which they are adhered. Any sub-classifications of real property and
divergent treatment based thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be
based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is violated. There may be perhaps a molecular distinction
between soil and the inorganic improvements adhered thereto, yet there are no
under Rep. Act No. 8974, one which facially complies with the prescription laid
PIATCO is not the owner of the land on which the NAIA 3 facility is
Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC when it ruled that
Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the instant expropriation proceedings.
Then, there is the matter of the proper amount which should be paid
to PIATCO by the Government before the writ of possession may issue,
consonant to Rep. Act No. 8974.
of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Government that there could be no BIR
zonal valuations on the NAIA 3 facility, as provided in Rep. Act No. 8974, since
rules and regulations for the equitable valuation of the improvements and/or
zonal valuations are only for parcels of land, not for airport terminals. The
structures on the land. Under the present implementing rules in place, the
Court agrees with this point, yet does not see it as an impediment for the
replacement cost method.[42] However, the replacement cost is only one of the
factors to be considered in determining the just compensation.
In addition to Rep. Act No. 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also
mandated that the payment of just compensation should be in accordance with
equity as well. Thus, in ascertaining the ultimate amount of just compensation,
the duty of the trial court is to ensure that such amount conforms not only to
the law, such as Rep. Act No. 8974, but to principles of equity as well.
under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974, as required for judicial review of the
proffered value.
of judicial determination of the propriety of the proffered value.[46]
The Court notes that in the 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order, the RTC
In filing the complaint for expropriation, the Government alleged to
noted that the concessions agreement entered into between the Government
and PIATCO stated that the actual cost of building NAIA 3 was not less than
representing the assessed value of the property. The making of the deposit,
US$350 Million.[47] The RTC then proceeded to observe that while Rep. Act
No. 8974 required the immediate payment to PIATCO the amount equivalent
under the erroneous notion that Rule 67, and not Rep. Act No. 8974, is the
applicable law. Still, as regards the amount, the Court sees no impediment to
constituted only 18% of this value. At this point, no binding import should be
recognize this sum of P3 Billion as the proffered value under Section 4(b) of
given to this observation that the actual cost of building NAIA 3 was not less
Rep. Act No. 8974. After all, in the initial determination of the proffered value,
compensation can come only after due ascertainment in accordance with the
standards set under Rep. Act No. 8974, not the declarations of the parties. At
review using the standards enumerated under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974.
the same time, the expressed linkage between the BIR zonal valuation and the
amount of just compensation in this case, is revelatory of erroneous thought on
the part of the RTC.
We have already pointed out the irrelevance of the BIR zonal valuation
proves problematic in that regard. While the initial sum of P3 Billion may have
as an appropriate basis for valuation in this case, PIATCO not being the owner
been based on the assessed value, a standard which should not however apply
of the land on which the NAIA 3 facilities stand. The subject order is flawed
in this case, the RTC cites without qualification Section 4(a) of Rep. Act No.
8974 as the basis for the amount of $62.3 Million, thus leaving the impression
that the BIR zonal valuation may form part of the basis for just compensation,
which should not be the case. Moreover, respondent judge made no attempt to
It does appear that the amount of US$62.3 Million was based on the
maintained a total balance in that branch amounting to such amount. Yet the
dated 5 January 2005 fails to establish such integral fact, and in the absence of
actual representation of the $62.3 Million is not clear. The Land Bank
Certification expressing such amount does state that it was issued upon
Strikingly, the Government submits that assuming that Rep. Act No.
8974 is applicable, the deposited amount of P3 Billion should be considered as
the proffered value, since the amount was based on comparative values made
by the City Assessor.[51] Accordingly, it should be deemed as having faithfully
complied with the requirements of the statute.[52] While the Court agrees that
P3 Billion should be considered as the correct proffered value, still we cannot
deem the Government as having faithfully complied with Rep. Act No. 8974.
For the law plainly requires direct payment to the property owner, and not a
Still, such intention the Government may have had as to the entire
US$62.3 Million is only inferentially established. In ascertaining the proffered
mere deposit with the authorized government depositary. Without such direct
payment, no writ of possession may be obtained.
In any event, for the RTC to be able to justify the payment of US$62.3
Million to PIATCO and not P3 Billion Pesos, he would have to establish that
the higher amount represents the valuation of the structures/improvements,
and not the BIR zonal valuation on the land wherein NAIA 3 is built. The Order
The Court thus finds another error on the part of the RTC. The RTC
authorized the issuance of the writ of possession to the Government
notwithstanding the fact that no payment of any amount had yet been made
to PIATCO, despite the clear command of Rep. Act No. 8974 that there must
first be payment before the writ of possession can issue. While the RTC did
PIATCO. This is the inevitable consequence of the clear command of Rep. Act
No. 8974 that requires immediate payment of the initially determined amount
of the final amount of compensation would prove highly disputed. Under the
new modality prescribed by Rep. Act No. 8974, the private owner sees
intention of Rep. Act No. 8974 of ensuring payment first before transfer of
immediate monetary recompense with the same degree of speed as the taking
of his/her property.
While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the State,
there is no requirement that it undertake a prolonged procedure, or that the
payment of the private owner be protracted as far as practicable. In fact, the
expedited procedure of payment, as highlighted under Rep. Act No. 8974, is
the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates immediate payment of the initial
Immediate payment placates to some degree whatever ill-will that arises from
just compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the
Government.
The Court has the duty to implement Rep. Act No. 8974 and to direct
Rep. Act No. 8974 is plainly clear in imposing the requirement of immediate
particularly the declaration that [f]or the government to take over the said
facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said
structures. The obvious import of this holding is that unless PIATCO is paid
just compensation, the Government is barred from taking over, a phrase which
in the strictest sense could encompass even a bar of physical possession of
diminished every day that passes with the NAIA 3 remaining mothballed. For
another, the continued non-use of the facilities contributes to its physical
deterioration, if it has not already. And still for another, the economic benefits
to the Government and the country at large are beyond dispute once the NAIA
3 is put in operation.
parties. To be certain, the RTC, in its 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order, expressly
stated that it was not affirming the superfluous part of the Order [of 4 January
2005] prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding concessions or leasing any part
Rep. Act No. 8974 provides the appropriate answer for the standard that
of NAIA [3] to other parties.[56] Still, such statement was predicated on the
governs the extent of the acts the Government may be authorized to perform
notion that since the Government was not yet the owner of NAIA 3 until final
upon the issuance of the writ of possession. Section 4 states that the court shall
acts of ownership.
the property and start the implementation of the project. We hold that
accordingly, once the Writ of Possession is effective, the Government itself is
authorized to perform the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA
3 as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of
Possession. These would include the repair, reconditioning and improvement
At the same time, Tagle conforms to the obvious, that there is no transfer of
ownership as of yet by virtue of the writ of possession. Tagle may concede that
pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and transport, and other services that
the Government is entitled to exercise more than just the right of possession by
Certainly, neither Tagle nor any other case or law, lends support to the
Court. It argues that with the writ of possession, it is enabled to perform acts
statement therein that the expropriation of real property does not include mere
physical entry or occupation of land, and from them concludes that its mere
physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title,
which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject
Indeed, this Court has been vigilant in defense of the rights of the property
property.
owner who has been validly deprived of possession, yet retains legal title over
the expropriated property pending payment of just compensation. We
reiterated the various doctrines of such import in our recent holding in Republic
v. Lim:[60]
particularly important in the case, as there was a pending suit against the
Republic for unlawful detainer, and the writ of possession would serve to
safeguard the Government from eviction.[59]
Lim serves fair warning to the Government and its agencies who consistently
refuse to pay just compensation due to the private property owner whose
property had been
expropriated. At the same time, Lim emphasizes the fragility of the rights of
compensation in that case.[64] It was noted in that case that the Government
without diminishing the potency of such rights. Indeed, the public policy,
deliberately refused to pay just compensation. The Court went on to rule that
in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5)
pay for the private property it expropriates. Consequently, the proper judicial
years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the
compensation.
property.[65]
Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates a speedy method by which the final
determination of just compensation may be had. Section 4 provides:
The issuance of the writ of possession does not write finis to the expropriation
proceedings. As earlier pointed out, expropriation is not completed until
payment to the property owner of just compensation. The proffered value
stands as merely a provisional determination of the amount of just
compensation, the payment of which is sufficient to transfer possession of the
property to the Government. However, to effectuate the transfer of ownership,
it is necessary for the Government to pay the property owner the final just
compensation.
We hold that this provision should apply in this case. The sixty (60)day period prescribed in Rep. Act No. 8974 gives teeth to the laws avowed
policy to ensure that owners of real property acquired for national government
The next argument for consideration is the claim of the Government that the
RTC erred in appointing the three commissioners in its 7 January 2005 Order
there already has been irreversible delay in the prompt payment of PIATCO of
just compensation, and it is no longer possible for the RTC to determine the
just compensation due PIATCO within sixty (60) days from the filing of the
It must be noted that Rep. Act No. 8974 is silent on the appointment of
accordance with the guidelines laid down in Rep. Act No. 8974 and its
Implementing Rules.
protocol though is sanctioned under Rule 67. We rule that the appointment of
commissioners under Rule 67 may be resorted to, even in expropriation
proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, since the application of the provisions
of Rule 67 in that regard do not conflict with the statute. As earlier stated,
Section 14 of the Implementing Rules does allow such other incidents affecting
shown in Lim and other like-minded cases, the Governments refusal to make
of the Rules of Court. Even without Rule 67, reference during trial to a
commissioner of the examination of an issue of fact is sanctioned under Rule
32 of the Rules of Court.
But while the appointment of commissioners under the aegis of Rule 67 may
be sanctioned in expropriation proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, the
standards to be observed for the determination of just compensation are
provided not in Rule 67 but in the statute. In particular, the governing
standards for the determination of just compensation for the NAIA 3 facilities
Appointment of Commissioners
are found in Section 10 of the Implementing Rules for Rep. Act No. 8974, which
Nothing in Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the RTC consult with the
parties in the expropriation case on who should be appointed as
commissioners. Neither does the Court feel that such a requirement should be
imposed in this case. We did rule in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez[69] that
there is nothing to prevent [the trial court] from seeking the recommendations
of the parties on [the] matter [of appointment of commissioners], the better to
ensure their fair representation.[70] At the same time, such solicitation of
The final argument for disposition is the claim of the Government is that Hon.
Gingoyon has prejudged the expropriation case against the Governments
cause and, thus, should be required to inhibit himself. This grave charge is
predicated on facts which the Government characterizes as undeniable. In
What Rule 67 does allow though is for the parties to protest the appointment
of any of these commissioners, as provided under Section 5 of the Rule. These
objections though must be made filed within ten (10) days from service of the
order of appointment of the commissioners.[71] In this case, the proper
recourse of the Government to challenge the choice of the commissioners is to
particular, the Government notes that the 4 January 2005 Order was issued motu
proprio, without any preceding motion, notice or hearing. Further, such order,
which directed the payment of US$62 Million to PIATCO, was attended with
error in the computation of just compensation. The Government also notes that
the said Order was issued even before summons had been served on PIATCO.
file an objection with the trial court, conformably with Section 5, Rule 67, and
not as it has done, assail the same through a special civil action for certiorari.
Considering that the expropriation proceedings in this case were effectively
halted seven (7) days after the Order appointing the commissioners,[72] it is
permissible to allow the parties to file their objections with the RTC within five
and should not be allowed on the basis of mere speculations and surmises. It
law. Neither could inhibition be justified merely on the erroneous nature of the
rulings of the judge. We emphasized in Webb v. People:[74]
respects. Still, at least, the 4 January 2005 Order correctly reformed the most
basic premise of the case that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation
2005 Order, which according to the Government establishes Hon. Gingoyons
proceedings.
bias, was promulgated precisely to correct the previous error by applying the
correct provisions of law. It would not speak well of the Court if it sanctions a
5(g), Rule 135 as patently without merit. Certainly merit can be seen by the fact
Neither are we convinced that the motu proprio issuance of the 4 January 2005
Order, without the benefit of notice or hearing, sufficiently evinces bias on the
part of Hon. Gingoyon. The motu proprio amendment by a court of an erroneous
order previously issued may be sanctioned depending on the circumstances,
in line with the long-recognized principle that every court has inherent power
if not for the fact that the earlier order with the 4 January 2005 Order sought to
correct was itself issued without the benefit of any hearing. In fact, nothing
the scope of its jurisdiction.[76] Section 5(g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court
either in Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8975 requires the conduct of a hearing prior
further recognizes the inherent power of courts to amend and control its
immediately upon the filing of the complaint provided that the requisites
power which Hon. Gingoyon noted in his 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order.[78]
attaching thereto are present. Indeed, this expedited process for the obtention
This inherent power includes the right of the court to reverse itself, especially
and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant.[79]
Certainly, the 4 January 2005 Order was designed to make the RTCs previous
order conformable to law and justice, particularly to apply the correct law of
the case. Of course, as earlier established, this effort proved incomplete, as the
4 January 2005 Order did not correctly apply Rep. Act No. 8974 in several
Indeed, every losing litigant in any case can resort to claiming that the judge
was biased, and he/she will gain a sympathetic ear from friends, family, and
The Government likewise faults Hon. Gingoyon for using the amount of
people who do not understand the judicial process. The test in believing such
US$350 Million as the basis for the 100% deposit under Rep. Act No. 8974. The
a proposition should not be the vehemence of the litigants claim of bias, but
Court has noted that this statement was predicated on the erroneous belief that
the Courts judicious estimation, as people who know better than to believe any
old cry of wolf!, whether such bias has been irrefutably exhibited.
compensation in this case. Yet this is manifest not of bias, but merely of error
on the part of the judge. Indeed, the Government was not the only victim of
the errors of the RTC in the assailed orders. PIATCO itself was injured by the
issuance by the RTC of the writ of possession, even though the former had yet
to be paid any amount of just compensation. At the same time, the Government
was also prejudiced by the erroneous ruling of the RTC that the amount of
US$62.3 Million, and not P3 Billion, should be released to PIATCO.
The Court acknowledges that it had been previously held that at the
The Court has not been remiss in pointing out the multiple errors
committed by the RTC in its assailed orders, to the prejudice of both parties.
This attitude of error towards all does not ipso facto negate the charge of bias.
Still, great care should be had in requiring the inhibition of judges simply
because the magistrate did err. Incompetence may be a ground for
administrative sanction, but not for inhibition, which requires lack of
objectivity or impartiality to sit on a case.
very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded
or not, the judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the
case.[80] But this doctrine is qualified by the entrenched rule that a judge may
not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances
appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of
either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith
in the Courts of Justice is not impaired.[81] And a self-assessment by the judge
that he/she is not impaired to hear the case will be respected by the Court
(2) Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the
immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered value of the
NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or
methods for the determination of just compensation.
(3) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in
favor of the Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is
directly paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered value of
NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law.
The mere vehemence of the Governments claim of bias does not translate to
clear and convincing evidence of impairing bias. There is no sufficient ground
(4) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is authorized to start the
to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from hearing the expropriation case.
(1) The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be
observed before the Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must
airport.[83]
the RTC is obliged to comply with law and equity as ordained in Again and the
standard set under Implementing Rules of Rep. Act No. 8974 which is the
dated 4 January 2005 and 10 January 2005 of the lower court. Said orders are
improvements.
1)
(6) There was no grave abuse of discretion attending the RTC Order
insofar as they are not inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 8974, its Implementing
2)
(7) The Government shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision of
the trial court to PIATCO immediately upon the finality of the said decision.
RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60) days from
finality of this Decision, to determine the just compensation to be
paid to PIATCO by the Government.
(8) There is no basis for the Court to direct the inhibition of Hon.
Gingoyon.
The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all respects subject to
the qualification that the parties are given ten (10) days from finality of this
All told, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC to warrant the nullification of the questioned orders. Nonetheless,
portions of these orders should be modified to conform with law and the
pronouncements made by the Court herein.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.