EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37673

March 31, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.
Carlos S. Tan for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCEA, C.J.:
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores,
municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the
said barrio and visitors were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner
and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while
sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who
tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred
Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself.
Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result
of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he
was sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to
indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From this
sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the
defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin
Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight, and when he was about to go down, he
was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the day of the commission of the crime, it
was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he had a
severe stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then when he
fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes
was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got
up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed
himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to
him that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in
desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply around him, he
attacked everybody that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife,
but that he loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or
have any motive for assaulting them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he
is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.

In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent
lack of a motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are
none, but that simply they are not known to us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's
conscience where they may be found, hidden away and inaccessible to our observation.
We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral perversion may lead a man
commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it. But under
the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife
whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to
attack also his father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides
attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred
from the evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to
voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor
stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a
dream, under the influence of an hallucination and not in his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the
deceased was direct result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it.
Nevertheless we may say further that the evidence does not clearly show this to have
been the case, but that it may have been caused accidentally. Nobody saw how the
wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded his wife. He only
seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is that
the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as
he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but he
was defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really
wounded, in desperation, he stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the courts
finds that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged,
and it is ordered that he be confined in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall
not be released until the director thereof finds that his liberty would no longer constitute
a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33211 June 29, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ERNESTO PUNO y
FILOMENO, Accused whose death sentence is under review.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the exempting
circumstance of insanity.

There is no doubt that at about two o'clock in the afternoon of September 8, 1970,
Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver, entered a bedroom in the house of Francisca Col
(Aling Kikay), 72, a widow. The house was located in the area known as Little Baguio,
Barrio Tinajeros Malabon, Rizal
On seeing Aling Kikay sitting in bed, Puno insulted her by saying: "Mangkukulam ka
mambabarang mayroon kang bubuyog". Then, he repeatedly slapped her and struck her
several times on the head with a hammer until she was dead.chanrobles virtual law
library
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz, 23, who was in the bedroom with the old
woman, and by Lina Pajes, 27, a tenant of the adjoining room. They testified that Puno's
eyes were reddish. His look was baleful and menacing. Puno was a neighbor of Aling
Kikay.chanrobles virtual law library
After the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken refuge, and,
according to Hilaria, he made the following confession and threat: "Huwag kayong
magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin ninyo na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi
ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa matanda." Or, according to Lina, Puno said:
"Pinatay ko na iyong matanda. Huwag kayong tumawag ng pulis. Pag tumawag kayo ng
pulis, kayo ang paghihigantihan ko. "
After the killing, Puno fled to his parents' house at Barrio Tugatog, Malabon and then
went to the house of his second cousin, Teotimo Puno, located at Barrio San Jose,
Calumpit, Bulacan, reaching that place in the evening. How he was able to go to that
place, which was then flooded, is not shown in the record.chanrobles virtual law library
Disregarding Puno's threat, Lina, after noting that he had left, notified the Malabon police
of the killing. Corporal Daniel B. Cruz answered the call. He found Aling Kikay sprawled
on her bed already dead, Her head was bloody. Her blanket and pillows were
bloodstained. He took down the statements of Lina and Hilaria at the police station. They
pointed to Puno as the killer (pp. 15- 17, Record).chanrobles virtual law library
A medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation conducted an autopsy. He
certified that the victim had lacerated wounds on her right eyebrow and contusions on
the head caused by a hard instrument, On opening the skull, the doctor found extensive
and generalized hemorrhage. The cause of death was intracranial, traumatic hemorrhage
(Exh. A).chanrobles virtual law library
Puno's father surrendered him to the police. Two Malabon policemen brought him to the
National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Rizal on September 10, 1970 (p. 14, Record).
He was charged with murder in the municipal court. He waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation.chanrobles virtual law library
On October 21, 1970, he was indicted for murder in the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig,
Rizal. Alleged in the information as aggravating circumstances were evident
premeditation, abuse of superiority and disregard of sex.chanrobles virtual law library
Puno, a native of Macabebe, Pampanga, who testified about five months after the killing,
pretended that he did not remember having killed Aling Kikay- He believes that there are
persons who are "mangkukulam," "mambabarang" and "mambubuyog and that when

one is victimized by those persons, his feet might shrink or his hands might swan. Puno
believes that a person harmed by a "mambabarang" might have a headache or a
swelling nose and ears and can be cured only by a quack doctor (herbolaryo).
Consequently, it is necessary to kill the "mangkukulam" and "mambabarang".chanrobles
virtual law library
Puno is the third child in a family of twelve children. He is married with two children. He
finished third year high school. His father is a welder. Among his friends are drivers. (ExhB).chanrobles virtual law library
Zenaida Gabriel, 30, Puno's wife, testified that on the night before the murder, Puno's
eyes were reddish. He complained of a headache. The following day while he was
feeding the pigs, he told Zenaida that a bumble bee was coming towards him and he
warded it off with his hands. Zenaida did not see any bee.chanrobles virtual law library
Puno then went upstairs and took the cord of the religious habit of his mother. He wanted
to use that cord in tying his dog. He asked for another rope when Zenaida admonished
him not to use that cord. Puno tied the dog to a tree by looping the rope through its
mouth and over its head. He repeatedly boxed the dog.chanrobles virtual law library
Aida Gabriel, Zenaida's elder sister, saw Puno while he was boxing that dog. Aida
observed that Puno's eyes were bloodshot and his countenance had a ferocious
expression.chanrobles virtual law library
Teotimo Puno testified that on the night of September 8, 1970, Ernesto Puno came to
their house in Barrio San Jose, Calumpit. Ernesto was soaking wet as there was a flood in
that place. He was cuddling a puppy that he called "Diablo". He called for Teotimo's
mother who invited him to eat. Ernesto did not eat. Instead, he fed the puppy.chanrobles
virtual law library
Ernesto introduced Teotimo to his puppy. Then, he sang an English song. When Teotimo
asked him to change his wet clothes, Ernesto refused. Later, he tried on the clothes of
Teotimo's father. When told that Teotimo's father had been dead for a couple of years
already, Ernesto just looked at Teotimo.chanrobles virtual law library
While he was lying down, Ernesto began singing again. Then he emitted a moaning
sound until he fell asleep. Ernesto was awakened the next morning by the noise caused
by
persons
wading
in
the
flood.
Ernesto
thought
they
were
his
fellow cursillistas.chanrobles virtual law library
The defense presented three psychiatrists. However, instead of proving that puno was
insane when he killed Aling Kikay, the medical experts testified that Puno acted with
discernment.chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, Doctor Araceli Maravilla of the Psychiatry Section of the Dr. Jose R. Reyes Memorial
Hospital, to whom Puno was referred for treatment ten times between September 8,
1966 and July 24, 1970, testified that Puno was an out-patient who could very well live
with society, although he was afflicted with "schizophrenic reaction"; that Puno knew
what he was doing and that he had psychosis, a slight destruction of the ego. Puno
admitted to Doctor Maravilia that one cause of his restlessness, sleeplessness and

irritability was his financial problem (7 tsn November 4, 1970). Doctor Maravilla observed
that Puno on July 4, 1970 was already cured.chanrobles virtual law library
Doctor Reynaldo Robles of the National Mental Hospital testified that Puno was first
brought to that hospital on July 28, 1962 because his parents complained that he
laughed alone and exhibited certain eccentricities such as kneeling, praying and making
his body rigid. Doctor Robles observed that while Puno was suffering from "schizophrenic
reaction", his symptoms were "not socially incapacitating" and that he could adjust
himself to his environment (4 tsn January 20, 1971). He agreed with Doctor Maravilla's
testimony.chanrobles virtual law library
Doctor Carlos Vicente, a medical specialist of the National Mental Hospital, testified that
from his examination of Puno, he gathered that Puno acted with discernment when he
committed the killing and that Puno could distinguish between right and wrong (5 tsn
January 1 1, 197 1). Doctor Vicente also concluded that Puno was not suffering from any
delusion and that he was not mentally deficient; otherwise, he would not have reached
third year high school (8-19 tsn January 1 1, 197 1).chanrobles virtual law library
On December 14, 1970 or three months after the commission of the offense, Doctors
Vicente, Robles and Victorina V. Manikan of the National Mental Hospital submitted the
following report on Puno (Exh. B or 2):
Records show that he had undergone psychiatric treatment at the Out-Patient Service of
the National Mental Hospital for schizophrenia in 1962 from which he recovered; in 1964
a relapse of the same mental illness when he improved and in 1966 when his illness
remained unimproved.chanrobles virtual law library
His treatment was continued at the JRR Memorial Hospital at the San Lazaro Compound
up to July, 1970. He was relieved of symptoms and did not come back anymore for
medication. On September 8, 1970, according to information, he was able to kill an old
woman. Particulars of the offense are not given.
MENTAL CONDITION
... Presently, he is quiet and as usual manageable. He is fairly clean in person and
without undue display of emotion. He talks to co-patients but becomes evasive when
talking with the doctor and other personnel of the ward. He knows he is accused of
murder but refuses to elaborate on it.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS
In view of the foregoing findings, Ernesto Puno, who previously was suffering from a
mental illness called schizophrenia, is presently free from any social incapacitating
psychotic symptoms.
The seeming ignorance of very simple known facts and amnesia of several isolated
accounts in his life do not fit the active pattern of a schizophrenic process. It may be
found in an acutely disturbed and confused patient or a markedly, retarded individual of
which he is not.chanrobles virtual law library

However, persons who recover from an acute episode of mental illness like schizophrenia
may retain some residual symptoms impairing their judgment but not necessarily their
discernment of right from wrong of the offense committed.
The foregoing report was submitted pusuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court and the
order of the trial court dated November 16, 1970 for the mental examination of Puno in
the National Mental Hospital to determine whether he could stand trial and whether he
was sane when he committed the killing.chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court concluded that Puno was sane or knew that the killing of Francisca Col was
wrong and that he would be punished for it, as shown by the threats which he made to
Hilaria de la Cruz and Lina Pajes, the old woman's companions who witnessed his
dastardly deed.chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court also concluded that if Puno was a homicidal maniac who had gone
berserk, he would have killed also Hilaria and Lina. The fact that he singled out Aling
Kikay signified that he really disposed of her because he thought that she was a
witch.chanrobles virtual law library
Judge Onofre A. Villaluz said that during the trial he "meticulously observed the conduct
and behavior of the accused inside the court, most especially when he was presented on
the witness stand" and he was convinced "that the accused is sane and has full grasp of
what was happening" in his environment.chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court convicted Puno of murder, sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay
the heirs of the victim an indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos (Criminal Case No.
509).chanrobles virtual law library
His counsel de oficio in this review of the death sentence, contends that the trial court
erred in not sustaining the defense of insanity and in appreciating evident premeditation,
abuse of superiority and disregard of sex as aggravating circumstances.chanrobles
virtual law library
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from responsibility, the evidence on
this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very
moment of its execution (U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547). Insanity should be proven by
clear and positive evidence (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204).chanrobles virtual law
library
The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col because he had
chronic schizophrenia since 1962; he was suffering from schizophrenia on September 8,
1970, when he liquidated the victim, and schizophrenia is a form of psychosis which
deprives a person of discernment and freedom of will.chanrobles virtual law library
Insanity under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime (People vs- Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).chanrobles virtual law
library
Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act,
that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because

there is complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of
freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude
imputability." (People vs. Ambal, G.R. No. 52688, October 17, 1980; People vs. Renegade,
L-27031, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 275, 286; People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292. As to "el
trastorno mental transitorio as an exempting circumstance, see I Cuello Calon, Codigo
Penal, 15th Ed., 1974. pp. 498-504 and art. 8 of the Spanish Penal Code.)
After evaluating counsel de oficio's contentions in the light of the strict rule just stated
and the circumstances surrounding the killing, we are led to the conclusion that Puno
was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and helpless victim. The facts and the
findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion he was not completely
deprived of reason and freedom of will.chanrobles virtual law library
In People vs. Fausto y Tomas, 113 Phil. 841, the accused was confined in the National
Mental Hospital for thirteen days because he was suffering from schizophrenia of the
paranoid type. His confinement was recommended by Doctor Antonio Casal of the San
Miguel Brewery where the accused used to work as a laborer. About one year and two
months later, he killed Doctor Casal because the latter refused to certify him for reemployment. His plea of insanity was rejected. He was convicted of murder.chanrobles
virtual law library
In the instant case, the trial court correctly characterized the killing as murder. The
qualifying circumstance is abuse of superiority. In liquidating Francisco Col, Puno, who
was armed with a hammer, took advantage of his superior natural strength over that of
the unarmed septuagenarian female victim who was unable to offer any resistance and
who could do nothing but exclaim " Diyos ko ".chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, it was held that "an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed
and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which
qqqs sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was
unable to defend herself" (People vs. Guzman, 107 Phil. 1122, 1127 citing U.S. vs.
Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; U.S. vs. Camiloy 36 Phil. 757 and People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil.
446).chanrobles virtual law library
Evident premeditation (premeditacion conocida) cannot be appreciated because the
evidence does not show (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime,
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination and (c) a
sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to
allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs. Ablates, L-33304, July
31, 1974, 58 SCRA 241, 247).chanrobles virtual law library
The essence of premeditation "es la mayor perversidad del culpable juntamente con su
serenidad o frialdad de animo." It is characterized (1) "por la concepcion del delito y la
resolucion de ejecutarlo firme, fria, reflexival meditada y detenida" and (2) "por la
persistencia en la resolucion de delinquir demostrada por el espacio de tiempo
transcurrido entre dicha resolucion y la ejecucion del hecho Premeditation should be
evident, meaning that it should be shown by "signos reiterados v externos, no de meras
sospechas" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 1974 or 15th Ed., pp- 582-3).chanrobles virtual
law library

Dwelling and disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of her old age should
be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances. Disregard of sex is not
aggravating because there is no evidence that the accused deliberately intended to
offend or insult the sex of the victim or showed manifest disrespect to her womanhood
(People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; People vs. Mori, L-23511-2, January 31, 1974, 55
SCRA 382, 404, People vs, Jaula, 90 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. De Jesus, 14 Phil. 190).chanrobles
virtual law library
However, those two aggravating circumstances are off-set by the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities and, as contended by counsel de
oficio, the offender's mental illness (mild psychosis or schizophrenic reaction) which
diminished his will-power without however depriving him of consciousness of his acts.
(See People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, People vs. Amit, 82 Phil. 820 and People vs.
Formigones, 87 Phil. 658.)
Thus, it was held that la equivocada creencia de los acusados de que el matar a un brujo
es un bien al publico puede considerarse como una circunstancia atenuante pues los que
tienen la obsession de que los brujos deben ser eliminados estan en la misma condicion
que aquel que, atacado de enfermedad morbosa pero consciente aun de lo que hace, no
tiene verdadero imperio de su voluntad" (People vs. Balneg 79 Phil. 805, 810).chanrobles
virtual law library
It results that the medium period of the penalty for murder should be imposed (Arts.
64[41 and 248, Revised Penal Code).chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua The indemnity imposed by the trial court is affirmed. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and MelencioHerrera, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45130

February 17, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.
Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information
charging Celestino Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the crime of murder,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any justifiable motive and with
the decided purpose to kill one Carlos Guison, attack, assault and stab the said
Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon
him the following injuries, to wit:
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the
superior surace of the right lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab
wounds located respectively at the posterior and lateral lumbar region, and left
elbow", which directly caused the death of the said Carlos Guison three days
afterwards.
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The
defense counsel forthwith objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant
was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The
court thereupon issued an order requiring the Director of the Hospital to render a report
on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist,
rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23, 1935, the case
was again called for the arraignment of the accused, but in view of the objection of the
fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the doctor of the Psyhopatic Hospital who
examined the defendant to appear and produce the complete record pertaining to the
mental condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared
before the court on March 26, 1935 for the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution
and the defense asked the court to summon the other doctors of the hospital for
questioning as to the mental condition of the accused, or to place the latter under a
competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial court then issued an order directing
that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the
Psychopatic Hospital for his personal observation and the subsequent submission of a
report as to the true mental condition of the patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant
alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report, Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On
June 28, 1935, the case was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court and
ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused was not in a condition to defend
himself. In view thereof, the case was suspended indefinitely.

On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be
discharged from the hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a recovered
case." Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez, appeared and testified that the accused
"had recovered from the disease." On February 27, 1936, the accused was arraigned,
pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the
information above-quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following assignment
of errors:
A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused
has had dementia only occasionally and intermittently and has not had it
immediately prior to the commission of the defense.
B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows that
during and immediately after the commission of the offense, the accused did not
show any kind of abnormality either in behavior, language and appearance, or any
kind of action showing that he was mentally deranged.
C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden was
on the defense to show hat the accused was mentally deranged at the time of the
commission of the offense, and that the defense did not establish any evidence to
this effect.
D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in not
acquitting him thereof.
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan
met the now deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's
Dixie Kitchen. Francisco Beech, who was at the time in the barbershop, heard the
defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you." Beech turned around and saw the accused
withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the side of Guison who said, also in
Tagalog, "I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him and then
stabbed Guison thrice on the left side. The assaultt was witnessed by policeman Damaso
Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took possession of the knife,
Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General Hospital where he died two days
later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr.
Sixto de los Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem
necessary to indulge in any extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution. The defense set up being that of insanity, the only question to be
determined in this appeal is whether or not the defendant-appellant was insane at the
time of the commission of the crime charged.
On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental corollaries
as to the legal presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence required, theories
abound and authorities are in sharp conflict. Stated generally, courts in the United States

proceed upon three different theories. (See Herzog, Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence
[1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p. 11 et
seq.) Thefirst view is that insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance and as
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is
established, and the defense of insanity is not made out beyond a reasonable doubt,
conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the time of committing the
criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground
of insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is
that an affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence,
and in this view, insanity is not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. According
to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the rule in
England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The third
view is that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs.
United States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United
States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs.
Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No. 15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730).
This liberal view is premised on the proposition that while it is true that the presumption
of sanity exists at the outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the
crime charged, and hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients, and that
a fortiori where the accused introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the duty of
the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos
[1922], 44 Phil., 204). The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime, but insanity is presumed, and
". . . when a defendant in a criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity,
the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34
Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this doctrine.
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the
time he killed the deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests on
the defense. Without indulging in fine distinctions as to the character and degree of
evidence that must be presented sufficiently convincing evidence, direct or
circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the accused was insane at
the time of the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's mental
condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of
his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not
required (Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S. W.,
1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People
vs. Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of derangement essential
(People vs. Tripler, supra) to established insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known
by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person
and come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound
mind. To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice
(People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time of
the commission of the act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the insanity

was only occassional or intermittent and not permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561,
p. 757). We are appraised of the danger of indulging in the preseumption ofcontinuity in
cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason forthe contrary rule.
To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or
eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The
State should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a general plea
of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not cconcerned with connecting two or
more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof during the intervening period
or periods but with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack prior to the
commission of the crime charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity
immediately following the commission of the act complained of. Upon the other hand,
there are facts and circumstances of record which can not be overlooked.The following
considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in
arriving at a conclusion different from that reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the
prosecution, it appears that the herein defendant-appellant, during the periods
from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and from January 6 to January 10, 1926, was
confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a
disease diagnosed as dementia prcox. His confinement during these periods, it is
true, was long before the commission of the offense on December 12, 1934, but
this is a circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of the ailment at
the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any rational or
scientific foundation.
(b) All persons suffering from dementia prcox are clearly to be regarded as
having mental disease to a degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for
their actions (Mental Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in
Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I, p. 613).
According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Insular Psychopathic Hospital,
the symptoms ofdementia prcox, in certain peeriods of excitement, are similar to
those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in either case, the mind
appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes affected by this kind of
disease, either dementia prcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the period
of excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if
viewed under the general medico-legal classification of manic-depressive insanity,
"it is largely in relation with the question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations
of manic actions will have to be considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic
lessening or normal inhibitions and the case with which impulses may lead to
actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to motor impulses"
(Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I,
p. 617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, at one
time an interne at San LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately preceding
December 12, 1934 the date when the crime was committed the defendant
and appellant had "an attack of insomnia", which is one of the symptoms of, and
may lead to, dementia prcox (Exhibit 3, defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio S.
Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).

(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police
station on the very same day of the perpetration of the crime, and although
attempted were made by detectives to secure a statement from him (see Exhibit B
and D and testimony of Charles Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent by the police
department to the Psychopathic Hospital the day following the commission of the
crime. This is an indication that the police authorities themselves doubted the
mental normalcy of the acused, which doubt found confirmation in the official
reports submitted by the specialists of the San Lazaro Hospital.
(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio Joson,
which report was made within the first month of treatment, the defendant was
suffering from a form of psychosis, called manic depressive psychosis.We quote
the report in full:
INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL
January 15, 1935.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic

Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

SUBJECT:

Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,

Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.

1. MENTAL STATUS:
(a) General behavior. The patient is undetective, staying most of the time
in his bed with his eyes closed and practically totally motionless. At other
times, however, but on very rare occassions and at short intervals he
apparently wakes up and then he walks around, and makes signs and
ritualistic movements with the extremities and other parts of the body.
Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he refuses to take even the food
offered by his mother or sister, so that there have been days in the hospital
when he did not take any nourishment. On several occassions he refused to
have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear
untidy. He would also sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the
intervals he displayed impulsive acts, such as stricking his chest or other
parts of the body with his fists and at one time after a short interview, he
struck strongly with his fist the door of the nurse's office without apparent
motivation. He also sometimes laughs, or smiles, or claps his hands strongly
without provocation.
(b) Stream of talk. Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to
speak, and would not answer in any form the questions propounded to him.
Very often he is seen with his eyes closed apparently praying as he was
mumbling words but would not answer at all when talked to. At one time he
was seen in this condition with a cross made of small pieces of strick in his

hand. He at times during the interviews recited passages in the literature as

for example the following.
"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del
hombre. (Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are among the attributes of
a dependable character.)"
At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.
(c) Mood. Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks
anxious and rather irritable. He himself states that the often feels said in the
hospital.
(d) Orientation. During the periods that he was acccessible he was found
oriented as to place and person but he did not know the day or the date.
(e) Illusion and hallucination. The patient states that during the nights that
he could not sleep he could hear voices telling him many things. Voices, for
example, told that he should escape. That he was going to be killed because
he was benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow of his former
sweetheart in the hospital. There are times however when he could not hear
or see at all anything.
(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. On one occassion he told the examiner
that he could not talk in his first day in the hospital because of a mass he felt
he had in his throat. He sometimes thinks that he is already dead and
already buried in the La Loma Cemetery.
(g) Compulsive phenomena. None.
(h) Memory. The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but
his memory for recent events or for example, for events that took place
during his stay in the hospital he has no recollection at all.
(i) Grasp of general informartion. He has a fairly good grasp of general
information. He could not, however, do simple numerial tests as the 100-7
test.
( j) Insight and judgment. At his fairly clear periods he stated that he
might have been insane during his first days in the hospital, but just during
the interview on January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment
were, of course, nil during his stuporous condition. During the last two days
he has shown marked improvement in his behavior as to be cooperative, and
coherent in his speech.
2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:
The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering
from a form of physchosis, called Manic depressive psychosis.

(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.

Assistant Alienist
In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez,
another assistant alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the following conclusion
was reached:
I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the
Manic Depressive form of psychosis. It might be premature to state before
the court has decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state, that this
person is not safe to be at large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a
personality lacking in control, overtly serious in his dealings with the every
day events of this earthly world, taking justice with his own hands and many
times executing it in an impulsive manner as to make his action over
proportionate beyond normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly religious,
too idealistic has taste and desires as to make him queer before the average
conception of an earthly man.
He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.
(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at
the time of the commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso
Arnoco. Arnoco testified that upon arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from the
latter for the reason for the assault and the defendant-appellant replied that the
deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that appellant bought the knife, Exhibit
A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been watching for
Guison in order to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called
and corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not
necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the commission of the offense, is
clear from what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of
Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type
of dementia prcox, "the crime is ussually preceded by much complaining andplanning.
In these people, homicidal attcks are common, because of delusions that they are being
interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was
demented at the time he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information and
that conseuently he is exempt from criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the
lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de
oficio in both instances. In conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code, the defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such
other hospital for the insane as may be desiganted by the Director of the Philippine
Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First Instance of Manila shall
otherwise order or decree. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

PARAS, J.:p
This is an automatic review of the Decision * of the Regional Trial Court of the Third
Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the accused of the crime of
murder.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an
information charging Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of
murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit,
Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with
a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the
chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body thereby inflicting upon
her fatal wounds which directly caused the death of said Belen Macalino
Sigua.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident
premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect
towards her sex, the crime was committed inside the field office of the
Department of Agrarian Reform where public authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties, taking advantage of superior strength and cruelty.
(Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987
between the hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as
the accused, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department of
Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga. After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the
envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs. Sigua several times. Accomplishing the
morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's office with blood stained
clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46, April 13, 1987;
TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan reveals
that the victim sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter part of
February, 1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the
actuations of his wife (the victim) in requiring so many documents from the accused.
Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused the procedure in the Department of Agrarian
Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it my own way." Rodolfo Sigua
further testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he spent the amount of
P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses due to the untimely death of his wife.
(TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the
commission of the offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused.
According to her, her husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to
Lebanon for six (6) months. Later, in December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi
Arabia and worked as welder. Her husband did not finish his two-year contract because
he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent medical treatment. He was confined for one
week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his monthly check-up. Because of his
sickness, he was not able to resume his farming. The couple, instead, operated a small
store which her husband used to tend. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, she noticed
her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their children when he was not
used to it before; demanding another payment from his customers even if the latter had
paid; chasing any child when their children quarrelled with other children. There were
also times when her husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when
in truth they were not. On the fateful day of March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her
husband complained to her of stomach ache; however, they did not bother to buy
medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain therein. Thereafter, he went back to
the store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no longer there. She got
worried as he was not in his proper mind. She looked for him. She returned home only
when she was informed that her husband had arrived. While on her way home, she heard
from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as "stabbing" and "has
stabbed"). She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling
around, including the barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did
such act, but he replied, "that is the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my
heart." Her husband further said that if he would not be able to kill the victim in a
number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even in jail. The
testimony on the statements of her husband was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma
Santos who heard their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10, 1987). Turning to the
barangay official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me."

However, the barangay official did not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day
the accused went to Manila. (TSN, pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health
testified that the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial
court dated August 17, 1987, on August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff,
they concluded that Rosalino Dungo was psychotic or insane long before, during and
after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity was classified under
organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33,
June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).
Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However, he was
not able to finish his two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone medical
treatment at Macabali Clinic. However, he claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing
incident nor of the death of Mrs. Belen Sigua. He only came to know that he was accused
of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)
Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified that
the accused was his patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke.
While Dr. Ricardo Lim testified that the accused suffered from oclusive disease of the
brain resulting in the left side weakness. Both attending physicians concluded that
Rosalino Dungo was somehow rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their
clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further testified that the accused is functioning at a low level
of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).
On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal for the crime of murder, the Court hereby renders judgment
sentencing the accused as follows:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;
2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as
actual damage, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)
The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of the
criminal act. The act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a
pattern to kill the victim. He was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which
indicates that he embarked on a flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the
trial court is another indication that the accused was sane when he committed the crime.
It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by
the defendant-appellant. The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the accused
was insane during the commission of the crime changed.

One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged
cannot in a legal sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally
responsible for his acts. His unlawful act is the product of a mental disease or a mental
defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person from criminal responsibility, it is
necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act,
that is, that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least
discernment; that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will.
(People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border
between sanity and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in
determining the existence of insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and
the right and wrong test. Insane delusion is manifested by a false belief for which there is
no reasonable basis and which would be incredible under the given circumstances to the
same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion test, an insane person
believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational person would believe. A
person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease,
he has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question,
his free agency being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is
insane when he suffers from such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties
as to render him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or
criterion for insanity. However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity
under Section 1039 of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a
manifestation in language or conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less
permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and
characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by disordered function of the sensory or of the
intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition." Insanity as defined above is
evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is
manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding
of the nature and consequence of his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the
subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and
appearance, his acts and conduct inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his
irrational acts and beliefs, and his improvident bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose
sanity is in issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry.
However, it is permissible to receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable
period both before and after the time of the act in question. Direct testimony is not
required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a
defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts: thereby we read
the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through which we determine
whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64
Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National Center for
Mental Health, concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity
classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke

before, during and after the commission of the crime charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4).
Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused was characterized by perceptual
disturbances manifested through impairment of judgment and impulse control,
impairment of memory and disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. The accused
allegedly suffered from psychosis which was organic. The defect of the brain, therefore,
is permanent.
Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused was
permanent and did not have a period for normal thinking. To quote
Q Is there such a lucid intervals?
A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental
disorder, the lucid intervals unfortunately are not present, sir.
(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)
However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis
may be treated with medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus, although the defect
of the brain is permanent, the manifestation of insanity is curable.
Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since January
of 1987, thus:
Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the
length of time the patient has been mentally ill?
A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke
abroad. If I may be allowed to scan my record, the record reveals
that the patient had a stroke in Riyadh about seven (7) months
before his contract expired and he was brought home. Sometime
in January of 1987, the first manifestation is noted on the
behavioral changes. He was noted to be in deep thought, preoccupied self, complaining of severe headache, deferment of
sleep and loss of appetite; and that was about January of 1987,
Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)
The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National
Center for Mental Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused has
been insane since January of 1987 or three (3) months before the commission of the
crime charged. The doctors arrived at this conclusion based on the testimonies of the
accused's wife and relatives, and after a series of medical and psychological
examinations on the accused when he was confined therein. However, We are still in
quandary as to whether the accused was really insane or not during the commission of
the offense.
The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though he may
be insane, has no lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or few weeks prior
to the commission of the crime charged the accused confronted the husband of the
victim concerning the actuations of the latter. He complained against the various

requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly against the victim. We quote
hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:
Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having
met the accused Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February
1987, when you met the accused at your residence?
A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he
wanted, accused told me that he wanted to know from my wife
why she was asking so many documents: why she was requiring
him to be interviewed and file the necessary documents at the
Office of the DAR. Furthermore, he wanted to know why my wife
did not want to transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of the
landholding of his deceased father in his name.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February
1987 that your wife the late Belen Macalino Sigua was making
hard for him the transfer of the right of his father, what did you
tell him?
A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why
are you asking this question of me?"
Q What was his answer?
A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent
somebody to her office to make a request for the transfer of the
landholding in the name of his deceased father in his name.
Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what
was the comment of the accused?
A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making
things difficult for the transfer of the landholding in the name of
my father and my name."
(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be
mentally ill during this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to
confront a specified person who may have wronged him. Be it noted that the accused

was supposed to be suffering from impairment of the memory, We infer from this
confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts. This event proves that the accused
was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the appellant
could have been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it. To quote:
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not
necessarily the accused, when asked by the Court the
whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is not yet
in Court and that he is waiting for his counsel to appear and
because his counsel did not appear, he asked for the
postponement of the hearing of the case and to reset the same
to another date. With those facts, do you consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your
conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I
made a laboratory examination, in short all the assessment
necessary to test the behavior of the patient, like for example
praying for postponement and fleeing from the scene of the
crime is one situation to consider if the patient is really insane or
not. If I may elaborate to explain the situation of the accused, the
nature of the illness, the violent behavior, then he appears
normal he can reason out and at the next moment he burst out
into violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is one of
the difficulties we have encountered in this case. When we
deliberated because when we prepared this case we have really
deliberation with all the members of the medical staff so those
are the things we considered. Like for example he shouted out
"Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular moment he was
aware of what he did, he knows the criminal case.
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he
shouted that he killed the victim in this case, Mrs. Sigua, do we
get it that he shouted those words because he was aware when
he did the act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there. (TSN,
pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983; emphasis supplied)

Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The statement
of one of the expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused
knew the nature of what he had done makes it highly doubtful that accused was insane
when he committed the act charged. As stated by the trial court:
The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the
act was sane. The evidence shows that the accused, at the time he
perpetrated the act was carrying an envelope where the fatal weapon was
hidden. This is an evidence that the accused consciously adopted a pattern
to kill the victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the killing as
treacherous and therefore murder. After the accused ran away from the
scene of the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he was
apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight
in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that
he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the
victim (Rollo, p. 63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence
presented. (People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of
examining the deportment and demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can discern if
such witnesses were telling the truth or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However, in
the defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of
sanity. The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense.
Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime,
the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound
mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise stated,
the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to presume
that acts were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . . .
Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving
its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA
451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance and as
such must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and
satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground of insanity. Appellant
has not successfully discharged the burden of overcoming the presumption that he
committed the crime as charged freely, knowingly, and intelligently.
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through a
general plea of insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
questioned decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.
SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., concurs in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54135 November 21, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR., defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Causapin, Millar & Tutana Law Office for defendant-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:p
Policarpio Rafanan, Jr. appeals from a decision of the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan convicting him of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount of P10,000.00 by way
of moral damages, and to pay the costs.
The facts were summarized by the trial court in the following manner:
The prosecution's evidence shows that on February 27, 1976, complainant
Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a
househelper by the mother of the accused, Ines Rafananalias "Baket Ines"
with a salary of P30.00 a month.
The accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his mother in the
same house at Barangay San Nicholas, Villasis, Pangasinan. Policarpio was
then married and had two children.
On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by
the mother of the accused to help in their store which was located in front of
their house about six (6) meters away. Attending to the store at the time was
the accused. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the
complainant to help him close the door of the store and as the latter
complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled the complainant inside the
store and said, "Come, let us have sexual intercourse," to which Estelita
replied, "I do not like," and struggled to free herself and cried. The accused
held a bolo measuring 1-1/2 feet including the handle which he pointed to
the throat of the complainant threatening her with said bolo should she
resist. Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants
and after unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of

complainant and succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her

resistance and struggle. After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned
the complainant not to report the matter to her mother or anybody in the
house, otherwise he would kill her.
Because of fear, the complainant did not immediately report the matter and
did not leave the house of the accused that same evening. In fact, she slept
in the house of the accused that evening and the following morning she
scrubbed the floor and did her daily routine work in the house. She only left
the house in the evening of March 17, 1976.
Somehow, in the evening of March 17, 1976, the family of the accused
learned what happened the night before in the store between Policarpio and
Estelita and a quarrel ensued among them prompting Estelita Ronaya to go
back to her house. When Estelita's mother confronted her and asked her why
she went home that evening, the complainant could not answer but cried
and cried. It was only the following morning on March 18, 1976 that the
complainant told her mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon
knowing what happened to her daughter, the mother Alejandra Ronaya,
immediately accompanied her to the house of Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of
the Villasis Police Force who lives in Barrio San Nicolas, Villasis, Pangasinan.
Patrolman Mairina is a cousin of the father of the complainant. He advised
them to proceed to the municipal building while he went to fetch the
accused. The accused was later brought to the police headquarter with the
bolo, Exhibit "E", which the accused allegedly used in threatening the
complainant. 1
At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial
and in due course of time, the trial court, as already noted, convicted the appellant.
The instant appeal is anchored on the following:
Assignment of Errors
1. The lower court erred in basing its decision of conviction of appellant
solely on the testimony of the complainant and her mother.
2. The lower court erred in considering the hearsay evidence for the
prosecution, "Exhibits B and C".
3. The lower court erred in not believing the testimony of the expert
witnesses, as to the mental condition of the accused-appellant at the time of
the alleged commission of the crime of rape.
4. The lower court erred in convicting appellant who at the time of the
alleged rape was suffering from insanity. 2
Appellant first assails the credibility of complainant as well as of her mother whose
testimonies he contends are contradictory. It is claimed by appellant that the testimony
of complainant on direct examination that she immediately went home after the rape
incident, is at variance with her testimony on cross examination to the effect that she

had stayed in the house of appellant until the following day. Complainant, in saying that
she left the house of appellant by herself, is also alleged to have contradicted her
mother who stated that she (the mother) went to the store in the evening of 17 March
1979 and brought Estelita home.
The apparently inconsistent statements made by complainant were clarified by her on
cross examination. In any case, the inconsistencies related to minor and inconsequential
details which do not touch upon the manner in which the crime had been committed and
therefore did not in any way impair the credibility of the complainant. 3
The commission of the came was not seriously disputed by appellant. The testimony of
complainant in this respect is clear and convincing:
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, we go back to that time when according to you
accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside
store after you helped him closed the store. Now, after
accused pulled you from the door and brought you inside
store what happened then?

the
the
the
the

A "You come and we will have sexual intercourse," he said.

Q And what did you say?
A "I do not like," I said.
Q And what did you do, if any, when you said you do not like to
have sexual intercourse with him?
A I struggled and cried.
Q What did the accused do after that?
A He got a knife and pointed it at my throat so I was frightened
and he could do what he wanted to do. He was able to do what
he wanted to do.
Q This "kutsilyo" you were referring to or knife, how big is that
knife? Will you please demonstrate, if any?
A This length, sir. (Which parties agreed to be about one and
one-half [1-1/2] feet long.)
xxx xxx xxx
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, you said that the accused was able to have sexual
intercourse with you after he placed the bolo or that knife [at]
your throat. Now, will you please tell the court what did the

accused do immediately after placing that bolo your throat and

before having sexual intercourse you?
A He had sexual intercourse with me.
Q What was your wearing apparel that evening?
A I was wearing pants, sir.
Q Aside from the pants, do you have any underwear?
A Yes, sir, I have a panty.
Q Now, before the accused have sexual intercourse with you
what, if any, did he do with respect to your pants and your
panty?
A He removed them, sir.
Q Now, while he was removing your pants and your panty what,
if any, did you do?
A I continued to struggle so that he could not remove my pants
but he was stronger that's why he succeeded.
Q Now, after he had removed your panty and your pants or
pantsuit what else happened?
A He went on top of me, sir.
Q At the time what was the accused wearing by way of apparel?
A He was wearing pants.
Q When you said he went on top of you after he has removed
your pantsuit and your panty, was he still wearing his pants?
A He unbuttoned his pants and unfastened the zipper of his
pants.
Q And after he unbuttoned and unfastened his pants what did
you see which he opened?
A I saw his penis.
Q Now, you said that after the accused has unzipped his pants
and brought out his penis which you saw, he went on top of you.
When he was already on top of you what did you do, if any?
A I struggled.

Q Now, you said that you struggled. What happened then when
you struggled against the accused when he was on top of you?
A Since he was stronger, he succeeded doing what he wanted to
get.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Alright, what do you mean by he was able to succeed
in what he wanted to get?
Fiscal Guillermo:
Considering the condition of the witness, your honor, with tears,
may we just be allowed to ask a leading question which is a
follow-up question?
Witness:
A He inserted his private part inside my vagina.
Fiscal Guillermo:
Q Now, when he inserted his private part inside your vagina what
did you feel, if any?
A I felt something that came out from his inside.
Q Now, how long, if you remember, did the accused have his
penis inside your vagina:?
A Around five minutes maybe, sir.
Q After that what happened then?
A He removed it.
Q After the accused has removed his penis from your vagina
what else happened?
A No more, sir, he sat down.
Q What, if any, did he tell you?
A There was, sir. He told me not to report the matter to my
mother and to anybody in their house.
Q What else did he tell you?

A He told me that if I told anyone what happened, he will kill me.

Q After that where did you go?
A I went home already, sir. 4
The principal submission of appellant is that he was suffering from a metal aberration
characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent intentions upon Estelita. At
the urging of his counsel, the trial court suspended the trial and ordered appellant
confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment.
In the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital on 29
December 1976 and stayed there until 26 June 1978.
During his confinement, the hospital prepared four (4) clinical reports on the mental and
physical condition of the appellant, all signed by Dr. Simplicio N. Masikip and Dr. Arturo E.
Nerit, physician-in-charge and chief, Forensic Psychiatry Service, respectively.
In the first report dated 27 January 1977, the following observations concerning
appellant's mental condition were set forth:
On admission he was sluggish in movements, indifferent to interview, would
just look up whenever questioned but refused to answer.
On subsequent examinations and observations he was carelessly attired,
with dishevelled hair, would stare vacuously through the window, or look at
people around him. He was indifferent and when questioned, he would just
smile inappropriately. He refused to verbalize, even when persuaded, and
was emotionally dull and mentally inaccessible. He is generally seclusive, at
times would pace the floor, seemingly in deep thought. Later on when
questioned his frequent answers are "Aywan ko, hindi ko alam." His affect is
dull, he claimed to hear strange voices "parang ibon, tinig ng ibon," but
cannot elaborate. He is disoriented to 3 spheres and has no idea why he was
brought here.
The report then concluded:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations, Policarpio Rafanan,
Jr. y Gambawa is found suffering from a mental disorder called schizophrenia,
manifested by carelessness in grooming, sluggishness in movements, staring
vacuously, indifferen[ce], smiling inappropriately, refusal to verbalize,
emotional dullness, mental inaccessibility, seclusiveness, preoccupation,
disorientation, and perceptual aberrations of hearing strange sounds. He is
psychotic or insane, hence cannot stand court trial. He needs further
hospitalization and treatment. 5
The second report, dated 21 June 1977, contained the following description of appellant's
mental condition:
At present he is still seclusive, undertalkative and retarded in his reponses.
There is dullness of his affect and he appeared preoccupied. He is observed
to mumble alone by himself and would show periods of being irritable saying

 "oki naman" with nobody in particular. He claim he does not know whether
or not he was placed in jail and does not know if he has a case in court. Said
he does not remember having committed any wrong act
and the following conclusions:
In view of the foregoing examinations and observations Policarpio Rafanan,
Jr. y Gambawa is at present time still psychotic or insane, manifested by
periods of irritability cursing nobody in particular, seclusive, underactive,
undertalkative, retarded in his response, dullness of his affect, mumbles
alone by himself, preoccupied and lack of insight.
He is not yet in a condition to stand court trial. He needs further
hospitalization and treatment. 6
In the third report, dated 5 October 1977, appellant was described as having become
"better behaved, responsive" and "neat in person," and "adequate in his emotional tone,
in touch with his surroundings and . . . free from hallucinatory experiences." During the
preceding period, appellant had been allowed to leave the hospital temporarily; he
stayed with a relative in Manila while coming periodically to the hospital for check-ups.
During this period, he was said to have been helpful in the doing of household chores,
conversed and as freely with other members of the household and slept well, although,
occasionally, appellant smiled while alone. Appellant complained that at times he heard
voices of small children, talking in a language he could not understand. The report
concluded by saying that while appellant had improved in his mental condition, he was
not yet in a position to stand trial since he needed further treatment, medication and
check-ups. 7
In the last report dated 26 June 1978, appellant was described as behaved, helpful in
household chores and no longer talking while alone. He was said to be "fairly groomed"
and "oriented" and as denying having hallucinations. The report concluded that he was
in a "much improved condition" and "in a mental condition to stand court trial." 8
Trial of the case thus resumed. The defense first presented Dr. Arturo Nerit who
suggested that appellant was sick one or two years before his admission into the
hospital, in effect implying that appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia when
he raped complainant. 9 The defense next presented Raquel Jovellano, a psychiatrist
engaged in private practice, who testified that she had examined and treated the
appellant.
Appellant's plea of insanity rests on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval.
Where the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of

the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall
not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same
court.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the Court has ruled many times in the past on the insanity defense, it was only
in People vs. Formigones10 that the Court elaborated on the required standards of legal
insanity, quoting extensively from the Commentaries of Judge Guillermo Guevara on the
Revised Penal Code, thus:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting
circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that
the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his
own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.) that there
be a complete absence of the power to discern, (Decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain of April 29, 1916; 96 Jur. Crim. 239) or that there be a total
deprivation of freedom of the will.(Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
April 9, 1872; 6 Jur. Crim. 239) For this reason, it was held that the imbecility
or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely
deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (Decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain of April 20, 1911; 86 Jur. Crim. 94, 97.)
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be
[equated with] imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without
positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or
was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the
crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized
by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude
that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on
the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are
proved. (Emphasis supplied.)
The standards set out in Formigones were commonly adopted in subsequent cases. 11 A
linguistic
or
grammatical
analysis
of
those
standards
suggests
that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition
"complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the test of
volition "or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the will." But our caselaw
shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on a test relating to
"freedom of the will;" examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case where
this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of
"freedom of the will," i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of
intelligence." This is perhaps to be expected since a person's volition naturally reaches
out only towards that which is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that
intelligence be diseased or healthy. In any case, where the accused failed to show
complete impairment or loss of intelligence, the Court has recognized at most a

mitigating, not an exempting, circumstance in accord with Article 13(9) of the Revised
Penal Code: "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power
of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts." 12
Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder
characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly calleddementia praecox, it is said
to be the most common form of psychosis an usually develops between the ages 15 and
30. 13 A standard textbook in psychiatry describes some of the symptoms of
schizophrenia in the following manner:
Eugen Bleuler later described three general primary symptoms of
schizophrenia: a disturbance of association, a disturbance of affect, and a
disturbance of activity. Bleuler also stressed the dereistic attitude of the
schizophrenic that is, his detachment from reality and consequent autism
and the ambivalence that expresses itself in his uncertain affectivity and
initiative. Thus, Bleuler's system of schizophrenia is often referred to as the
four A's: association, affect, autism, and ambivalence.
xxx xxx xxx
Kurt Schneider described a number of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia
that he considered in no way specific for the disease but of great pragmatic
value in making a diagnosis. Schneider's first-rank symptoms include the
hearing of one's thoughts spoken aloud, auditory hallucinations that
comment on the patient's behavior, somatic hallucinations, the experience of
having one's thoughts controlled, the spreading of one's thoughts to others,
delusions, and the experience of having one's actions controlled or
influenced from the outside.
Schizophrenia, Schneider pointed out, also can be diagnosed exclusively on
the basis of second-rank symptoms, along with an otherwise typical clinical
appearances. Second-rank symptoms include other forms of hallucination,
perplexity, depressive and euphoric disorders of affect, and emotional
blunting.
Perceptual Disorders
Various perceptual disorders occur in schizophrenia . . . .
Hallucinations. Sensory experiences or perceptions without corresponding
external stimuli are common symptoms of schizophrenia. Most common are
auditory hallucinations, or the hearing of voices. Most characteristically, two
or more voices talk about the patient, discussing him in the third person.
Frequently, the voices address the patient, comment on what he is doing and
what is going on around him, or are threatening or obscene and very
disturbing to the patient. Many schizophrenic patients experience the
hearing of their own thoughts. When they are reading silently, for example,
they may be quite disturbed by hearing every word they are reading clearly
spoken to them.

Visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory hallucinations in

schizophrenic patients, but they are not rare. Patients suffering from organic
of affective psychoses experience visual hallucinations primarily at night or
during limited periods of the day, but schizophrenic patients hallucinate as
much during the day as they do during the night, sometimes almost
continuously. They get relief only in sleep. When visual occur in
schizophrenia, they are usually seen nearby, clearly defined, in color, life
size, in three dimensions, and moving. Visual hallucinations almost never in
one of the other sensory modalities.
xxx xxx xxx
Cognitive Disorders
Delusions. By definition, delusions are false ideas that cannot be corrected
by reasoning, and that are idiosyncratic for the patient that is, not part of
his cultural environment. They are among the common symptoms of
schizophrenia.
Most frequent are delusions of persecution, which are the key symptom in
the paranoid type of schizophrenia. The conviction of being controlled by
some unseen mysterious power that exercises its influence from a distance is
almost pathognomonic for schizophrenia. It occurs in most, if not all,
schizophrenics at one time or another, and for many it is a daily experience.
The modern schizophrenic whose delusions have kept up with the scientific
times may be preoccupied with atomic power, X-rays, or spaceships that take
control
over
his
mind
and
body.
Also
typical
for
many schizophrenics are delusional fantasies about the destruction of the
world. 14
In previous cases where schizophrenia was interposed as an exempting
circumtance, 15 it has mostly been rejected by the Court. In each of these cases, the
evidence presented tended to show that if there was impairment of the mental faculties,
such impairment was not so complete as to deprive the accused of intelligence or the
consciousness of his acts.
The facts of the instant case exhibit much the same situation. Dr. Jovellano declared as
follows:
(Fiscal Guillermo:)
Q Now, this condition of the accused schizophrenic as you found
him, would you say doctor that he was completely devoid of any
consciousness of whatever he did in connection with the incident
in this case?
A He is not completely devoid of consciousness.
Q Would you say doctor, therefore, that he was conscious of
threatening the victim at the time of the commission of the
alleged rape?

A Yes, he was conscious.

Q And he was conscious of forcing the victim to lie down?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious of removing the panty of the victim
at the time?
A Yes.
Q And he was also conscious and knows that the victim has a
vagina upon which he will place his penis?
A Yeah.
Q And he was conscious enough to be competent and have an
erection?
A Yes.
Q Would you say that those acts of a person no matter whether
he is schizophrenic which you said, it deals (sic) some kind of
intelligence and consciousness of some acts that is committed?
A Yes, it involves the consciousness because the consciousness
there in relation to the act is what we call primitive acts of any
individual. The difference only in the act of an insane and a
normal individual, a normal individual will use the power of
reasoning and consciousness within the standard of society while
an insane causes (sic) already devoid of the fact that he could no
longer withstand himself in the ordinary environment, yet his
acts are within the bound of insanity or psychosis.
Q Now, Doctor, of course this person suffering that ailment which
you said the accused here is suffering is capable of planning the
commission of a rape?
A Yes, they are also capable.
Q He is capable of laying in wait in order to assault?
A Yes.
Q And would you say that condition that ability of a person to
plan a rape and to perform all the acts preparatory to the actual
intercourse could be done by an insane person?
A Yes, it could be done.
Q Now, you are talking of insanity in its broadest sense, is it not?

A Yes, sir.
Q Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is
right and what is wrong?
A Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They
may know what is wrong but yet there is no inhibition on the
individual.
Q Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge
that an act they are going to commit is wrong?
A Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we
call they lost the inhibition. The reasoning is weak and yet they
understand but the volition is [not] there, the drive is [not]
there. 16 (Emphasis supplied)
The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the
time of commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is
critical if the defense of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan
threatened complainant Estelita with death should she reveal she had been sexually
assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the
reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense sought to suggest, through Dr.
Jovellano's last two (2) answers above, that person suffering from schizophrenia sustains
not only impairment of the mental faculties but also deprivation of there power selfcontrol. We do not believe that Dr. Jovellano's testimony, by itself, sufficiently
demonstrated the truth of that proposition. In any case, as already pointed out, it
is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of
insanity is to be found.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of
proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. 17 Here, appellant failed to present clear
and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the
sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the
accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is
committed. 18 Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians (Dr.
Jovellano and Dr. Nerit) which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental
condition during that critical period of time. They did not specifically relate to
circumtances occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape. Their testimonies
consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted
with schizophrenia. Curiously, while it was Dr. Masikip who had actually observed and
examined appellant during his confinement at the National Mental Hospital, the defense
chose to present Dr. Nerit.
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.
In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not
exempting because it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of
his acts, may be considered as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the
Revised Penal Code, i.e., as an illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender's willpower without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. Appellant should

have been credited with this mitigating circumstance, although it would not have
affected the penalty imposable upon him under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code: "in
all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua in
this case), it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed."
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount of
moral damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132319. May 12, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO MADARANG y
MAGNO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.: HTML
What distinguishes man from beast is his intellect. Man's action is guided and controlled
by his mind. Law is designed for rational beings as it is based on our inherent sense of
right which is inseparable from reason. Thus, when man's reasoning is so distorted by
disease that he is totally incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, he loses
responsibility before the law. In the case at bar, we are asked to resolve whether or not
the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he
committed.
Accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO was charged with parricide for killing his wife
LILIA MADARANG in an Information[1] which reads:
"That on or about September 3, 1993, at Poblacion, municipality of Infante,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with evident premeditation and
treachery, armed with a bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab LILIA M. MADARANG, his legitimate
wife, inflicting upon her stab wound 4 1/2 inches by 1 1/2 inch(es)long and
3/16 of an inch wide, located just below the left clavicle 1 3/4 inch(es) lateral
to the supra-sternal notch, and plowed along the interpace slightly coursing
upward and posteriorly and stab wound 1 inch in length, gaping and 3 1/2
inch(es) deep, located at the right arm at its medial aspect, coursing
upwards and medially towards the apex of the right axilla which caused her
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Lilia M.
Madarang."
"Contrary to Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code."

At the arraignment, the accused refused to enter a plea. Pursuant to the Rules, the trial
court entered a "not guilty" plea for him. At the initial hearing of the case on May 5,
1994, the accused's counsel manifested that his client had been observed behaving in
an abnormal manner inside the provincial jail. Thus, the Court called the accused to the
stand but he refused to answer any of the questions propounded by the court. Hence, on
the same date, the Court issued an Order[2] directing the transfer of the accused to the
National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) for psychiatric evaluation to determine his
fitness to stand trial. CODES
The initial examination of the accused at the NCMH revealed that he was suffering from a
form of psychosis known as schizophrenia. The accused was detained at the hospital and
was administered medication for his illness. On June 19, 1996, after more than two (2)
years of confinement, the accused was discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to
the provincial jail as he was already found fit to face the charges against him. [3]
At the resumption of the hearing, a reverse trial was conducted. The accused proceeded
to adduce evidence on his claim of insanity at the time he committed the offense.
As culled from the testimonies of the accused, his mother-in-law AVELINA MIRADOR, and
his daughter LILIFER MADARANG, the following facts were established: The accused and
Lilia Mirador were legally married and their union was blessed with seven (7) children.
The accused worked as a seaman for sixteen (16) years. He was employed in a United
States ship until 1972. In 1973, he worked as a seaman in Germany and stayed there for
nine (9) years, or until 1982. Thereafter, he returned to his family in Infanta, Pangasinan,
and started a hardware store business. His venture however failed. Worse, he lost his
entire fortune due to cockfighting.[4]
In the latter part of July 1993, the accused, his wife Lilia and their children were forced to
stay in the house of Avelina Mirador as the accused could no longer support his family.
Moreover, Lilia was then already heavy with their eight child and was about to give birth.
[5]

On September 3, 1993, at about 5:00 p.m., the accused and Lilia had a squabble. The
accused was jealous of another man and was accusing Lilia of infidelity. In the heat of the
fight and in the presence of their children, the accused stabbed Lilia, resulting in her
untimely demise.[6]
AVELINA MIRADOR was then in the pigpen when she heard the children of the accused
shouting and crying inside her house. She called out to them and asked what was wrong.
She received no reply. Her nephew barged into the house and brought out the children
one at a time, leaving the accused with Lilia. While passing by Avelina, her nephew
warned her: "You better run." Avelina then saw the accused emerge from the house
holding a bolo. She scampered for safety.[7] yacats
She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house,
she did not notice anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would suggest that he
was suffering from any mental illness. Neither did she know of any reason why the
accused killed his wife as she never saw the two engage in any argument while they
were living with her.[8]

The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He
could not remember where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts
of his wife. It was only during one of the hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a
picture of his wife in a coffin that he learned about her death. He, however, was not
aware of the cause of her demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he suffered
from any mental illness and did not remember being confined at the NCMH for
treatment.[9]
DR. WILSON S. TIBAYAN, a resident doctor of the National Center for Mental Health
(NCMH), declared that the accused was committed to the NCMH on July 4, 1994
upon order of the court. The NCMH conducted three (3) medical and psychiatric
evaluations of the accused during his confinement therein. Based on the first medical
report, dated August 2, 1994,[10] the accused was found to be suffering
from insanity or psychosis, classified as schizophrenia. Dr. Tibayan explained that
schizophrenia is a mental abnormality characterized by impaired fundamental reasoning,
delusions, hallucinations, preoccupation with one's thoughts, poor self-care, insight and
judgment, and impaired cognitive, social and occupational functions. The patient may be
incapable of distinguishing right from wrong or know what he is doing. He may become
destructive or have a propensity to attack any one if his hallucinations were violent. [11] A
schizophrenic, however, may have lucid intervals during which he may be able
to distinguish right from wrong.[12] Dr. Tibayan opined that the accused's mental
illness may have begun even prior to his admission to the NCMH and it was highly
possible that he was already suffering from schizophrenia prior to his commission of the
crime.[13]
By December 21, 1994, as per the second medical report, the accused was still
suffering from schizophrenia. After one and a half years of confinement, the third
psychiatric evaluation of the accused, dated May 27, 1996,[14] showed that his
mental condition considerably improved due to continuous medication. The accused was
recommended to be discharged from the NCMH and recommitted to jail to stand trial.
[15]
olanski
The trial court convicted the accused as his evidence failed to refute the presumption of
sanity at the time he committed the offense. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing facts and circumstances of this
case, this Court is of the view that accused Fernando Madarang is of sound
mind at the time of the commission of the offense and that he failed to rebut
by convincing proof the evidence on record against him to exempt him from
criminal liablity. And since the death penalty was suspended or abolished at
the time of the commission of the offense, this Court hereby sentences the
accused FERNANDO MADARANG y MAGNO to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos.
"SO ORDERED."[16]
Hence this appeal.

The appellant insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely deprived of
intelligence, making his criminal act involuntary. His unstable state of mind could
allegedly be deduced from the following:
First. He had no recollection of the stabbing incident. Hence, he was completely
unaware of his acts that fateful day and must have committed the crime without the
least discernment.
Second. His behavior at the time of the stabbing proved he was then afflicted with
schizophrenia. He cited the testimony of Dr. Tibayan that a schizophrenic may go into
extremes -- he may be violent and destructive, or very silent and self-focused. The
appellant exhibited his violent tendencies on that fateful day. He killed his wife and
Avelina and her nephew were so frightened that they ran away at the sight of him
holding a bolo. He did not seem to recognize anybody and could have turned to anyone
and inflicted further injury. He avers that this is peculiar only to persons who are
mentally deranged for a sane person who just committed a crime would have
appeared remorseful and repentant after realizing that what he did was
wrong.
Third. The appellant also relies on Dr. Tibayan's opinion that there was a high
possibility that he was already suffering from insanity prior to his commission
of the crime on September 3, 1993.[17] The defense posits that his mental illness
may have been caused by his loss of fortune. His hardware business, which he
started through 16 years of working as a seaman, went bankrupt. He ended up virtually
dependent on his mother-in-law for his family's support and all these may have been
beyond his capacity to handle. haideem
The appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a fight
prior to that fateful day should be considered. The marked change in his behavior when
he uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife on that day and suddenly turned violent
on her confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he committed the crime.
Lastly, the appellant urges that he had no motive to kill Lilia who was scheduled to give
birth to their eighth child three (3) days prior to the killing. Unless overpowered by
something beyond his control, nobody in his right mind would kill his wife who was
carrying his child. Jealousy, the appellant posits, is not a sufficient reason to kill a
pregnant spouse.
We find these arguments without merit.
In all civilized nations, an act done by a person in a state of insanity cannot be punished
as an offense. The insanity defense is rooted on the basic moral assumption of criminal
law. Man is naturally endowed with the faculties of understanding and free will. The
consent of the will is that which renders human actions laudable or culpable. Hence,
where there is a defect of the understanding, there can be no free act of the will. An
insane accused is not morally blameworthy and should not be legally punished. No
purpose of criminal law is served by punishing an insane accused because by reason of
his mental state, he would have no control over his behavior and cannot be deterred
from similar behavior in the future.[18]

A number of tests evolved to determine insanity under the law. In Anglo-American

jurisprudence, the traditional test is the M'Naghten rule of 1843 which states that "to
establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time
of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing,
or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten
rule is a cognitive measure of insanity as the accused is required to know two things: the
nature and quality of the act, and that the act was wrong. This rule has been criticized
for its ambiguity. It was debated whether the word "wrong" referred to moral or legal
wrong. The importance of the distinction was illustrated by Stephen[19] as follows: A kills
B knowing that he is killing B and it is illegal to kill B but under an insane delusion that
God has commanded him to kill B to obtain the salvation of the human race. A's act is a
crime if the word "wrong" means illegal but it is not a crime if the word "wrong" means
morally wrong. The word "know" was also assailed as it referred solely to intellectual
reason and excluded affective or emotional knowledge. It was pointed out that the
accused may know in his mind what he is doing but may have no grasp of the effect or
consequences of his actions.[20] MNaghten was condemned as based on an obsolete and
misleading concept of the nature of insanity as insanity does not only affect the
intellectual faculties but also affects the whole personality of the patient, including his
will and emotions. It was argued that reason is only one of the elements of a personality
and does not solely determine man's conduct.[21] kirsten
Subsequently, M'Naghten was refined by the "irresistible impulse" test which means
that "assuming defendant's knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and
knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason of disease of the mind, defendant has
been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would enable him to prevent himself
from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." Thus, even if the accused knew that
what he was doing was wrong, he would be acquitted by reason of insanity if his mental
illness kept him from controlling his conduct or resisting the impulse to commit the
crime. This rule rests on the assumption that there are mental illnesses that impair
volition or self-control, even while there is cognition or knowledge of what is right and
wrong.[22] This test was likewise criticized on the following grounds: (1) the "impulse"
requirement is too restrictive as it covers only impulsive acts; (2) the "irresistible"
requirement is also restrictive as it requires absolute impairment of the freedom of the
will which cases are very rare; (3) it will not serve the purpose of criminal law to deter
criminals as the will to resist commission of the crime will not be encouraged, and; (4) it
is difficult to prove whether the act was the result of an insane, irresistible impulse.[23]
Then came the Durham "product" test in 1954 which postulated that "an accused is
not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
defect."[24]Critics of this test argued that it gave too much protection to the accused. It
placed the prosecution in a difficult position of proving accused's sanity beyond
reasonable doubt as a mere testimony of a psychiatrist that accused's act was the result
of a mental disease leaves the judge with no choice but to accept it as a fact. The case
thus becomes completely dependent on the testimonies of experts.[25]
Then came the ALI "substantial capacity" test, integrated by the American Law
Institute (ALI) in its Model Penal Code Test, which improved on the M'Naghten and
irresistible impulse tests. The new rule stated that a person is not responsible for his
criminal act if, as a result of the mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of

the law.[26] Still, this test has been criticized for its use of ambiguous words like
"substantial capacity" and "appreciate" as there would be differences in expert
testimonies whether the accused's degree of awareness was sufficient. [27] Objections
were also made to the exclusion of psychopaths or persons whose abnormalities are
manifested only by repeated criminal conduct. Critics observed that psychopaths cannot
be deterred and thus undeserving of punishment.[28] barth
In 1984, however, the U.S. Congress repudiated this test in favor of
the M'Naghten style statutory formulation. It enacted the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act which made theappreciation test the law applicable in all federal courts. The test is
similar to M'Naghten as it relies on the cognitive test. The accused is not required to
prove lack of control as in the ALI test. The appreciation test shifted the burden of proof
to the defense, limited the scope of expert testimony, eliminated the defense of
diminished capacity and provided for commitment of accused found to be insane.[29]
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity
to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of
intelligencein committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted
without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power
to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of
the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.[30]
The issue of insanity is a question of fact for insanity is a condition of the mind, not
susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man can know what is going on in the
mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be measured and
judged by his behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires opinion
testimony which may be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the
accused, by a witness who has rational basis to conclude that the accused was insane
based on the witness' own perception of the accused, or by a witness who is qualified as
an expert, such as a psychiatrist.[31] The testimony or proof of the accused's
insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the commission
of the offense with which he is charged.[32] Jksm
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering
from schizophrenia when he was committed to the NCMH months after he killed his
wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a chronic mental disorder characterized by
inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied by
hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia pracecox, it is the most common
form of psychosis.[33] Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are recognizable
through odd and bizarre behaviorapparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive
destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently
directed. The interpersonal perceptions are distorted in the more serious states by
delusions and hallucinations. In the most disorganized form of schizophrenic living,
withdrawal into a fantasy life takes place and is associated with serious thought disorder
and profound habit deterioration in which the usual social customs are disregarded.
[34]
During the initial stage, the common early symptom is aloofness, a withdrawal behind
barriers of loneliness, hopelessness, hatred and fear. Frequently, the patient would seem
preoccupied and dreamy and may appear "faraway." He does not empathize with the
feelings of others and manifests little concern about the realities of life situations. The
schizophrenic suffers from a feeling of rejection and an intolerable lack of self-respect. He
withdraws from emotional involvement with other people to protect himself from painful

relationships. There is shallowness of affect, a paucity of emotional responsiveness and a

loss of spontaneity. Frequently, he becomes neglectful of personal care and cleanliness.
[35]
A variety of subjective experiences, associated with or influenced by mounting
anxiety and fears precede the earliest behavioral changes and oddities. He becomes
aware of increasing tension and confusion and becomes distracted in conversation
manifested by his inability to maintain a train of thought in his conversations. Outwardly,
this will be noticed as blocks or breaks in conversations. The schizophrenic may not
speak or respond appropriately to his companions. He may look fixedly away, or he may
appear to stare, as he does not regularly blink his eyes in his attempt to hold his
attention.[36]
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared that he exhibited
any of the myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before
or simultaneous with the stabbing incident. To be sure, the record is bereft of even
a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant prior to
that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high possibility that the
appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he also
declared thatschizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable
of distinguishing right from wrong.[37] Hence the importance of adducing proof to
show that the appellant was not in his lucid interval at the time he committed the
offense. Although the appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia a few
months after the stabbing incident, the evidence of insanity after the fact of commission
of the offense may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal
behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime.
Evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution.[38] Chiefx
In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish
his claim of insanity at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record
to show that the appellant was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous
with the commission of the crime. The arguments advanced by the appellant to
prove his insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has
absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that
can be made with facility. The fact that Avelina and her nephew were frightened at the
sight of the appellant holding a bolo after he killed his wife does not, by any stretch of
imagination, prove that the appellant has lost his grip on reality on that occasion. Neither
is the appellant's seemingly non-repentant attitude immediately after he stabbed his
wife an indicium of his alleged insanity. Even criminals of stable mental condition take
this non-remorseful stance. Similarly, that the appellant and his wife were never seen
quarreling prior to that fateful day does not by itself prove the appellant's unstable
mental condition. Neither can it be said that jealousy is not a sufficient reason to kill a
pregnant spouse. Our jurisprudence is replete with cases where lives had been
terminated for the flimsiest reason.
The appellant attributes his loss of sanity to the fact that he lost his business and
became totally dependent on his mother-in-law for support. We find this,
however, purely speculative and unsupported by record. To be sure, there was no
showing of any odd or bizarre behavior on the part of the appellant after he lost his
fortune and prior to his commission of the crime that may be symptomatic of his
mental illness. In fact, the appellant's mother-in-law declared that during the time
that she knew the appellant and while he lived in her house, she did not notice

anything irregular or abnormal in the appellant's behavior that could have

suggested that he was suffering from any mental illness.
An accused invoking the insanity defense pleads not guilty by reason thereof. He admits
committing the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he was insane at the time
of its commission. Hence, the accused is tried on the issue of sanity alone and if
found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered without any trial on the
issue of guilt as he had already admitted committing the crime.[39] As the appellant,
in the case at bar, failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the
time he killed his wife, we are constrained to affirm his conviction.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting the appellant of the crime
of parricide is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. PUNOJ
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 138453. May 29, 2002]

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.
ROBIOS y DOMINGO, appellant.

MELECIO

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, as in the
present case for parricide with unintentional abortion, the lesser one shall be applied in
the absence of any aggravating circumstances. Hence, the imposable penalty here
is reclusion perpetua, not death.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the April 16, 1999 Decision [1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68), in Criminal Case No. 95-45, finding
Melecio Robios[2] y Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion and sentencing him to death. The decretal portion
of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Melecio Robios guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court hereby renders
judgment sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection. He is also
ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim; and P22,800.00
as actual damages.[3]

In an Information dated May 31, 1995,[4] appellant was accused of killing his pregnant
wife and the fetus inside her. It reads thus:
That on or about March 25, 1995 at around 7:00 a.m. in Brgy. San Isidro, Municipality of
Camiling, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Melecio Robinos, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab by means of a bladed knife 8 inches long, his legitimate wife Lorenza
Robinos, who was, then six (6) months pregnant causing the instantaneous death of said
Lorenza Robinos, and the fetus inside her womb.[5]
[6]

When arraigned on July 27, 1995, appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,
pleaded not guilty.[7] After due trial, the RTC convicted him.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the prosecutions version of how
appellant assaulted his pregnant wife, culminating in a brutal bloodbath, as follows:
1. On March 25, 1995, at around seven oclock in the morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo
Robios was in his parents house at Barangay San Isidro in Camiling, Tarlac. While Lorenzo
was cooking, he heard his parents, appellant Melecio Robios and the victim Lorenza
Robios, who were at the sala, quarrelling.
2. Lorenzo heard his mother tell appellant, Why did you come home, why dont you just
leave? After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, at a distance of about five meters,
saw appellant, with a double-bladed knife, stab Lorenza on the right shoulder. Blood
gushed from where Lorenza was hit and she fell down on the floor. Upon witnessing
appellants attack on his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their house and ran to his
grandmothers house where he reported the incident.
3. At around eight oclock in the morning of the same day, Benjamin Bueno, the brother
of the victim Lorenza Robios, was at the house of his mother Remedios Bueno at
Barangay San Isidro.Benjamin, a resident of Barangay Mabilang in Paniqui, Tarlac, went
to his mothers house for the purpose of informing his relatives that on the evening of
March 24, 1995, appellant had killed his uncle, Alejandro Robios, at Barangay
Mabilang. However while Benjamin was at his mothers house, he received the more
distressing news that his own sister Lorenza had been killed by appellant.
4. Upon learning of the attack on his sister, Benjamin did not go to her house because he
was afraid of what appellant might do. From his mothers house, which was about 150
meters away from his sisters home, Benjamin saw appellant who shouted at him, Its
good you would see how your sister died.
5. Benjamin sought the help of Barangay Captain Virgilio Valdez who called the police
station at Camiling, Tarlac. SPO1 Herbert Lugo and SPO3 Tirso Martin, together with the
other members of the PNP Alert Team at Camiling, Tarlac, immediately went to Barangay
San Isidro. The police, together with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials and
barangay folk, proceeded to the scene of the crime where they saw blood dripping from

the house of appellant and Lorenza. The police told appellant to come out of the
house. When appellant failed to come out, the police, with the help of barangay officials,
detached the bamboo wall from the part of the house where blood was dripping. The
removal of the wall exposed that section of the house where SPO1 Lugo saw appellant
embracing [his] wife.
6. Appellant and Lorenza were lying on the floor. Appellant, who was lying on his side and
holding a bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand, was embracing his
wife. He was uttering the words, I will kill myself, I will kill myself. Lorenza, who was lying
on her back and facing upward, was no longer breathing. She appeared to be dead.
7. The police and the barangay officials went up the stairs of the house and pulled
appellant away from Lorenzas body. Appellant dropped the knife which was taken by
SPO3 Martin. Appellant tried to resist the people who held him but was overpowered. The
police, with the help of the barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet with a
plastic rope. However, before he was pulled away from the body of his wife and
restrained by the police, appellant admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and
a barangay kagawad, that he had killed his wife, showing him the bloodstained knife.
8. Upon examining Lorenza, SPO1 Lugo found that she was already dead. She was pale
and not breathing. The police thus solicited the services of a funeral parlor to take
Lorenzas body for autopsy. Appellant was brought to the police station at Camiling,
Tarlac. However, he had to be taken to the Camiling District Hospital for the treatment of
a stab wound.
9. After the incident, Senior Inspector Reynaldo B. Orante, the Chief of Police at Camiling,
Tarlac, prepared a Special Report which disclosed that:
The victim Lorenza Robios was six (6) months pregnant. She suffered 41 stab wounds on
the different parts of her body.
That suspect (Melecio Robios) was under the influence of liquor/drunk [who] came home
and argued/quarreled with his wife, until the suspect got irked, [drew] a double knife and
delivered forty one (41) stab blows.
Suspect also stabbed his own body and [was] brought to the Provincial Hospital.
Recovered from the crime scene is a double blade sharp knife about eight (8) inches long
including handle.
10. During the trial of the case, the prosecution was not able to present the doctor who
conducted the autopsy on Lorenza Robios body. Nor, was the autopsy report presented
as evidence.[8]
Version of the Defense
Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he indeed
killed his wife, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the defense of
insanity as follows:

Pleading exculpation, herein accused-appellant interposed insanity. The defense

presented the testimonies of the following:
FEDERICO ROBIOS, 19 years old son of Melecio Robios, testified that his parents had
occasional quarrels[. B]efore March 23, 1995, his father told him that he had seen a
person went [sic] inside their house and who wanted to kill him. On March 23, 1995, he
heard his father told the same thing to his mother and because of this, his parents
quarreled and exchanged heated words.
LOURDES FAJARDO, nurse of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that she came to know
Melecio Robios only in May to June 1996. Every time she visited him in his cell, accused
isolated himself, laging nakatingin sa malayo, rarely talked, just stared at her and
murmured alone.
BENEDICT REBOLLOS, a detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified that he
and the accused were seeing each other everyday from 6:00 oclock in the morning up to
5:30 oclock in the afternoon. He had observed that accused sometime[s] refused to
respond in the counting of prisoners. Sometimes, he stayed in his cell even if they were
required to fall in line in the plaza of the penal colony.
DOMINGO FRANCISCO, another detention prisoner of the Tarlac Penal Colony, testified
that as the accuseds inmate, he had occasion to meet and mingle with the
latter. Accused sometimes was lying down, sitting, looking, or staring on space and
without companion, laughing and sometimes crying.
MELECIO ROBIOS, herein accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1995, he was
in their house and there was no unusual incident that happened on that date. He did not
know that he was charged for the crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. He could
not remember when he was informed by his children that he killed his wife. He could not
believe that he killed his wife.[9]
In view of the penalty imposed by the trial court, this case was automatically
elevated to this Court for review.[10]
The Issues
Appellant submits for our consideration the following assignment of errors:
I
The court a quo erred in not giving probative weight to the testimony and psychiatric
evaluation of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza finding the accused-appellant to be suffering
from psychosis or insanity classified under schizophrenia, paranoid type.
II
The court a quo erred in disregarding accused-appellants defense of insanity.[11]
The Courts Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious.

Main Issue
Insanity as an Exempting Circumstance
At the outset, it bears noting that appellant did not present any evidence to
contravene the allegation that he killed his wife. Clear and undisputed are the RTC
findings on the identity of the culprit and the commission of the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion. Appellant, however, interposes the defense of
insanity to absolve himself of criminal liability.
Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason or
discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. [12] A
defendant in a criminal case who relies on the defense of mental incapacity has the
burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment when the crime was
committed.[13] Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of
the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be
considered.[14]
The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound mind. [15] Accordingly, one who
pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving it. [16] Failing
this, one will be presumed to be sane when the crime was committed.
A perusal of the records of the case reveals that appellants claim of insanity is
unsubstantiated and wanting in material proof. Testimonies from both prosecution and
defense witnesses show no substantial evidence that appellant was completely deprived
of reason or discernment when he perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife.
As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, a domestic
altercation preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it cannot be said that appellant attacked
his wife for no reason at all and without knowledge of the nature of his action. To be sure,
his act of stabbing her was a deliberate and conscious reaction to the insulting remarks
she had hurled at him as attested to by their 15-year-old son Lorenzo Robios. We
reproduce Lorenzos testimony in part as follows:
Q: Before your father Melecio Robios stabbed your mother, do you recall if they
talked to one and the other?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. IBARRA:
Q: Did you hear what they talked about?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you hear?
A: Why did you come home, why dont you just leave?, Sir.
COURT:
In other words, you better go away, you should have not come back home.
ATTY. IBARRA:

Q: After your mother uttered those words, what did your father do?
A: That was the time that he stabbed my mother, sir.[17]
Furthermore, appellant was obviously aware of what he had done to his wife. He was
even bragging to her brother, Benjamin Bueno, how he had just killed her. Bueno
testified thus:
ATTY. JOAQUIN:
Q: Now, from the house of your mother, can you see the house of your sister?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you arrived at the house of your mother, Lorenzo Robios was already
there in the house of your mother, is that right, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And he was the one who informed you about your sister already dead?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did you go near the house of your sister upon learning that she was already
dead?
A: No, sir.
ATTY. JOAQUIN:
Q: Why?
A: My brother-in-law was still amok, Sir.
COURT:
Q: Why do you know that he was amok?
A: Yes, sir, because he even shouted at me, sir.
Q: How?
A: Its good you would see how your sister died, Sir.[18]
Finally, the fact that appellant admitted to responding law enforcers how he had just
killed his wife may have been a manifestation of repentance and remorse -- a natural
sentiment of a husband who had realized the wrongfulness of his act. His behavior at the
time of the killing and immediately thereafter is inconsistent with his claim that he had
no knowledge of what he had just done. Barangay Kagawad Rolando Valdez validated the
clarity of mind of appellant when the latter confessed to the former and to the police
officers, and even showed to them the knife used to stab the victim. Valdezs testimony
proceeded as follows:
Q: And what did you discover when you went there at the house of Melecio
Robios?
A: When we arrived at the house of Melecio Robios, it was closed. We waited for
the police officers to arrive and when they arrived, that was the time that we
started going around the house and when we saw blood, some of our
companions removed the walling of the house and at that time, we saw the
wife of Melecio Robios lying down as if at that moment, the wife of Melecio
Robios was already dead, Sir.

Q: When you were able to remove this walling, what did you do?
A: We talked to Melecio Robios, Sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: What was he doing when you talked to him?
A: When we saw them they were both lying down and when we got near, he said
he killed his wife and showing the weapon he used, sir.
Q: What is that weapon?
A: Double bladed weapon, Sir.
COURT:
What is that, knife?
A: Its a double bladed knife, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
He admitted to you that he killed his wife?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did he say that, tell the court exactly how he tell you that, in tagalog,
ilocano or what?
A: What I remember Sir he said, Pinatay ko ni baket ko meaning I killed my wife,
Sir.[19]
Clearly, the assault of appellant on his wife was not undertaken without his
awareness of the atrocity of his act.
Similarly, an evaluation of the testimonies of the defense witnesses hardly supports
his claim of insanity. The bulk of the defense evidence points to his allegedly unsound
mental condition after the commission of the crime. Except for appellants 19-year-old
son Federico Robios,[20] all the other defense witnesses testified on the supposed
manifestations of his insanity after he had already been detained in prison.
To repeat, insanity must have existed at the time of the commission of the offense, or
the accused must have been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would still be
criminally responsible.[21] Verily, his alleged insanity should have pertained to the period
prior to or at the precise moment when the criminal act was committed, not at anytime
thereafter. In People v. Villa,[22] this Court incisively ratiocinated on the matter as follows:
It could be that accused-appellant was insane at the time he was examined at the
center. But, in all probability, such insanity was contracted during the period of his
detention pending trial. He was without contact with friends and relatives most of the
time. He was troubled by his conscience, the realization of the gravity of the offenses
and the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of these circumstances may
have conspired to disrupt his mental equilibrium. But, it must be stressed, that an
inquiry into the mental state of accused-appellant should relate to the period
immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is the subject of the
inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is
inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability. In fine, this Court needs

more concrete evidence on the mental condition of the person alleged to be insane at
the time of the perpetration of the crimes in order that the exempting circumstance of
insanity may be appreciated in his favor. x x x.[23] (Italics supplied)
Indeed, when insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal
responsibility, the evidence must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution
or to the very moment of its execution. If the evidence points to insanity subsequent to
the commission of the crime, the accused cannot be acquitted.[24]
The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercedita Mendoza, the psychiatrist who conducted an
examination of the mental condition of appellant, does not provide much help in
determining his state of mind at the time of the killing. It must be noted that she
examined him only on September 11, 1995, or six months after the commission of the
crime.[25]Moreover, she was not able to make a background study on the history of his
mental condition prior to the killing because of the failure of a certain social worker to
gather data on the matter.[26]
Although Dr. Mendoza testified that it was possible that the accused had already
been suffering from psychosis at the time of the commission of the crime, [27] she likewise
admitted that her conclusion was not definite and was merely an opinion. [28] As correctly
observed by the trial court, her declarations were merely conjectural and inconclusive to
support a positive finding of insanity. According to the RTC:
The testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita Mendoza, who examined accused at the National
Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, that at the time of examination accused
Melecio Robios was still mentally ill; that accused was experiencing hallucination and
suffering from insanity and it is possible that the sickness have occurred eight (8) to nine
(9) months before examination; and in her opinion accused was suffering from delusion
and hallucination. And her opinion that at the time accused stabbed himself, he was not
in his lucid interval, is merely her conclusion. xxx xxx xxxAside from being her opinion,
she conducted the mental, physical and neurological examinations on the accused seven
(7) months after the commission of the offense. That span of seven (7) months has given
accused an opportunity to contrive and feign mental derangement. Dr. Mendoza had no
opportunity to observed (sic) and assessed (sic) the behavior of the accused immediately
before, during and immediately after the commission of the offense. Her finding is
conjectural, inconclusive. She did not conduct background examination of the mental
condition of the accused before the incident by interviewing persons who had the
opportunity to associate with him.[29]
Hence, appellant who invoked insanity should have proven that he had already been
completely deprived of reason when he killed the victim. [30] Verily, the evidence proffered
by the defense did not indicate that he had been completely deprived of intelligence or
freedom of will when he stabbed his wife to death. Insanity is a defense in the nature of a
confession or avoidance and, as such, clear and convincing proof is required to establish
its existence.[31] Indubitably, the defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required to
overthrow the presumption of sanity.
Second Issue:
Proper Penalty

Although the RTC correctly rejected the defense of insanity, it nonetheless erred in
imposing the death penalty on appellant. It imposed the maximum penalty without
considering the presence or the absence of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. The imposition of the capital penalty was not only baseless, but contrary
to the rules on the application of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. Even
the Office of the Solicitor General concedes this error in the imposition of the death
penalty.[32]
Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the graver offense which is
parricide. This is in accordance with the mandate of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
which states: When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, x x
x, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, x x x.
The law on parricide, as amended by RA 7659, is punishable with reclusion
perpetua to death. In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two
indivisible penalties, the court is mandated to impose one or the other, depending on the
presence or the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. [33] The rules with
respect to the application of a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties are
prescribed by Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portion of which is
quoted as follows:
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxxxxxxxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission
of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. (Italics supplied)
Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of two indivisible penalties and
there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty shall be
imposed.[34] Considering that neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances were
established in this case, the imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.[35]
Indeed, because the crime of parricide is not a capital crime per se, it is not always
punishable with death. The law provides for the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death -- two indivisible penalties, the application of either one of which depends on the
presence or the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances.[36]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac (Branch 68)
in Criminal Case No. 95-45 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty
is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua. Consistent with current jurisprudence, appellant shall
pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P22,800 as
actual damages, which were duly proven. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona,
JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 147674-75. March 17, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANACITO OPURAN, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts of murder before the Regional
Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr.,
and Allan Dacles under separate informations, the accusatory portions of which
respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 4693
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road, Municipality of
Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, said accused, with deliberate intent to kill and treachery, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr.,
with the use of a bladed weapon (5 long from tip to handle with scabbard), thereby
inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the back of his body, which wounds
resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.[1]
Criminal Case No. 4703
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Purok 3, Barangay 7, Municipality
of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, said accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Allan Dacles,
who was lying on the bench, with the use of a bladed weapon, locally known as pisao,
thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the different parts of his body,
which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.[2]
After Anacito entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment, trial ensued.[3]
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that on 19 November 1998, at about 6:30
p.m., prosecution witness Bambi Herrera was studying his lessons inside his house. His
brother and a certain Jason Masbang were outside sitting side by side with each other on
a plastic chair; opposite them was Allan Dacles, who was lying on a bench. [4]
Moments later, Jason barged into Bambis house, shouting: Theres a long-haired
man! Bambi stood up and looked through the open door. He saw appellant Anacito
Opuran stab Allan on the chest with a knife while the latter appeared to be trying to
stand up from the bench. Although Allan had several stab wounds on different parts of
his body, he managed to stand up and run inside Bambis house, with Anacito chasing
him. Bambi immediately locked the door from the inside to prevent Anacito from

entering. But the latter tried to force the door open by thrusting a knife at the door
shutter. He also threw stones at the door. After a short while, Anacito left.[5]
With Anacito gone, Bambi went out to ask the aid of his neighbors so he could bring
Allan to the hospital. He saw Anacitos two brothers and asked for their assistance. But
one of them merely said: Never mind because he [referring to Anacito] is mentally
imbalanced.[6] As nobody from among his neighbors responded to his plea for help,
Bambi carried Allan on his shoulders and dragged him to the lower portion of the
neighborhood. Several persons, who were having a drinking session, helped Bambi bring
Allan to the hospital. Allan, however, died about fifteen minutes later.[7]
At about 7:45 p.m. of the same day, prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., of
Barangay San Pablo, Catbalogan, Samar, was in the house of Demetrio Patrimonio, Sr.,
seeking medical advice from the latters wife. While there, Tomas heard a commotion
outside. He looked out from the balcony and saw people running. He learned that Anacito
had stabbed somebody.[8]
After about fifteen minutes, while Tomas was on his way home, he saw Demetrio
Patrimonio, Jr. He likewise noticed Anacito hiding in a dark place. When Demetrio Jr.
reached the national highway, near the so-called lovers lane, Anacito emerged from his
hiding place and stabbed Demetrio Jr. with a knife about three to four times.[9]
Tomas immediately ran to the house of the Demetrios to inform them of what he had
just witnessed. He then saw Demetrio Jr. running towards his parents house, but the
latter did not make it because he collapsed near the fence. Tomas also caught sight of
Anacito running towards the direction of the house of the Opurans. Meanwhile, Demetrio
Jr. was brought by his parents to the Samar Provincial Hospital, where he died the
following day.[10]
Dr. Angel Tan, Medical Specialist II of the Samar Provincial Hospital, conducted an
autopsy on the cadavers of Allan and Demetrio Jr. He found five stab wounds on Allans
body, one of which was fatal because it affected the upper lobe of the right lung and
bronchial vessel.[11] Demetrio Jr. sustained four stab wounds and died of pulmonary
failure due to hypovolemia from external and internal hemorrhage.[12]
For its part, the defense presented, as its first witness, the appellant himself, Anacito
Opuran. He declared that on the evening of 19 November 1998, he was resting in their
house in Canlapwas, another barangay in Catbalogan, Samar. He never went out that
night. While he was sleeping at about 8:30 p.m., eight policemen entered his house,
pointed their guns at him, and arrested him. He was brought to the police station and
detained there until the following morning. He denied being present at the place and
time of the stabbing incidents. He admitted knowing Demetrio Jr. as a distant relative
and friend whom he had not quarreled with. As for Allan, he never knew him. He had no
misunderstanding with prosecution witness Bambi Herrera. He asserted that the
accusations against him were fabricated because he was envied and lowly regarded by
his accusers.[13]
Subsequent hearings were postponed owing principally to the failure of the defense
to present witnesses. Then on 16 February 2000, the defense moved for the suspension
of the hearing on the following grounds: (1) on 10 January 2000, upon motion of the
defense, the trial court issued an Order authorizing the psychiatric examination of

Anacito; (2) in consonance with that Order, Anacito underwent a psychiatric examination
on 26 January 2000 conducted by Dr. Angel P. Tan; (3) Dr. Tan issued a Medical Certificate
dated 26 January 2000 stating that Anacito had a normal mental status on that date but
was suffering from some degree of Mental Aberration, which required further psychiatric
evaluation at Tacloban City.[14]
The trial court thus ordered a deferment of the hearing and granted the motion for
the psychiatric examination of Anacito at the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center
(EVRMC), Tacloban City.[15]
On 3 August 2000, the trial court received the Medical Report of Dr. Lyn Verona,
physician-psychiatrist of the EVRMC, on the psychiatric examination she conducted on
Anacito. At the resumption of the hearings on 20 November 2000, Dr. Verona testified
that she examined Anacito three times through interviews. From her interview with
Anacitos sister, Remedios Opuran Manjeron, she learned of Anacitos psychiatric history
of inability to sleep and talking irrelevantly. She found that Anacito had a psychotic
disorder characterized by flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations. She confirmed her
medical findings that Anacito was psychotic before and during the commission of the
crime and even up to the present so that he could not stand trial and would need
treatment and monthly check-up. Her diagnosis was that Anacito was suffering from
schizophrenia.[16]
Remedios Opuran Manjeron testified that she brought his brother Anacito to
the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong, in 1986 because Anacito
had difficulty sleeping and was talking irrelevantly. [17] Anacito was treated as an outpatient, and was prescribed thorazine and evadyne. [18] They stayed in Manila for one
month. In 1989, they returned to the NCMH, and Anacito was prescribed the same
medicine. Since they could not afford to stay long in Manila for follow-up treatments,
Remedios requested that her brother be treated in Catbalogan. Dr. Belmonte of the
NCMH, however, referred them to the EVRMC. Sometime in 1990, Remedios
accompanied Anacito to the EVRMC for examination. A certain Dra. Peregrino prescribed
an injectable medicine. But it was a certain Dr. Estrada of the NCMH who came to
Catbalogan to administer the medicine in that same year. Since then until the year 2000,
Anacito did not take any medicine, nor was he subjected to examination or treatment.[19]
Anacitos other sibling, Francisco Opuran, testified that at about 6:00 p.m. of 19
November 1998, he heard a loud voice outside their house. Anacito heard also the loud
voices and then went out. When Francisco went out to verify, he did not see anything. A
few minutes later he saw Anacito at the corner of the street carrying a knife. He
surmised that Anacito had committed a crime, and so he hugged him. Anacito struggled
to free himself, but Francisco brought him to Remedios house. Before the incident, he
observed Anacito to be sometimes laughing, shouting, and uttering bad words, and
sometimes silent.[20]
In its decision[21] of 23 January 2001, the trial court found Anacito guilty of murder for
the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and homicide for the death of Allan Dacles. It
decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court Finds Anacito Opuran y Balibalita GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes specified hereunder, to wit:

Murder, in Criminal Case No. 4693, and sentences him to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. in the amount of P50,000.00
plus P43,500.00 by way of actual damages, and to pay the costs; and
Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 4703, and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum to indemnify the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amount of P50,000.00
plus P10,000.00 for burial expenses and to pay the costs.
Anacito seasonably appealed to us from the decision attributing to the trial court
grave error in disregarding the exempting circumstance of insanity. [22] He contends that
he was suffering from a psychotic disorder and was, therefore, completely deprived of
intelligence when he stabbed the victims. Even assuming in gratis argumenti that he is
criminally liable, he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance under paragraph 9, Article
13 of the Revised Penal Code, which is illness as would diminish the exercise of the
willpower of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his
acts. He likewise maintains that since treachery was not specifically alleged in the
Information as a qualifying circumstance, he cannot be convicted of murder for the death
of Demetrio Jr.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees and avers that Anacito failed to
establish with the required proof his defense of insanity or his claim of the mitigating
circumstance of diminished willpower. The mental state of Anacito, as testified to by Dr.
Verona, corresponds to the period after the stabbing incidents. Further, Dr. Verona was
certain that Anacito was not grossly insane, but she was uncertain that Anacito was
unconscious at the time he stabbed the two victims. The OSG also argues that treachery
was duly alleged and proved by the prosecution and should, therefore, be treated as a
qualifying circumstance in the killing of Demetrio Jr.
We agree with the OSG and affirm the trial courts judgment.
In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness is an
essential element. Without it, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the imposition
of the corresponding penalty cannot be legally sanctioned. The human mind is an entity,
and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but is dependent to a large
degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. A mans act is presumed
voluntary.[23] It is improper to assume the contrary, i.e. that acts were done
unconsciously,[24] for the moral and legal presumption is that every person is presumed
to be of sound mind,[25] or that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition
of a person.[26] Thus, the presumption under Article 800 of the Civil Code is that everyone
is sane. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by evidence of insanity, which
under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code exempts a person from criminal liability. [27]
He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it,
for insanity as a defense is in the nature of confession and avoidance. [29] An accused
invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he is not guilty
because he is insane. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must, however,
relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the
offense with which he is charged. [30] It is, therefore, incumbent upon accuseds counsel to
prove that his client was not in his right mind or was under the influence of a sudden
[28]

attack of insanity immediately before or at the time he executed the act attributed to
him.[31]
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of
proof. As no man can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or
condition of a person's mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. [32] Thus,
the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts, by means of which we read
the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine whether the acts
conform to the practice of people of sound mind.[33]
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties
which is manifested in language and conduct. [34] However, not every aberration of the
mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity. [35] As consistently held by us, A man may
act crazy, but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so. [36] Thus,
we had previously decreed as insufficient or inconclusive proof of insanity certain strange
behavior, such as, taking 120 cubic centimeters of cough syrup and consuming three
sticks of marijuana before raping the victim; [37] slurping the victims blood and attempting
to commit suicide after stabbing him; [38] crying, swimming in the river with clothes on,
and jumping off a jeepney.[39]
The stringent standard established in People v. Formigones[40] requires that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused acted
without the least discernment because of a complete absence of the power to discern or
a total deprivation of the will.
In People v. Rafanan, Jr.,[41] we analyzed the Formigones standard into two
distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition whether there was a complete deprivation
of intelligence in committing the criminal act and (b) the test of volition whether there
was a total deprivation of freedom of the will. We observed that our case law shows
common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of volition, and has
failed to turn up any case where an accused is exempted on the sole ground that he was
totally deprived of the freedom of the will, i.e., without an accompanying complete
deprivation of intelligence. This is expected, since a persons volition naturally reaches
out only towards that which is represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that
intelligence be diseased or healthy.[42]
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may
be given by a witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis
to conclude that the accused was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as
an expert, such as a psychiatrist.[43]
Let us examine the evidence offered to support Anacitos defense of insanity. The
appellant points to the testimony of prosecution witness Bambi Herrera that Anacito was
a silent man who would sharply stare at the lady boarders a few days before the
stabbing incident, and would wear Barong Tagalog and long pants when there was no
occasion requiring a formal attire. The appellant also highlights that the testimony of
prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., that there was a 15-minute time interval between
the two stabbing incidents shows that the stabbing spree was without any known motive.
[44]

The testimonial evidence of the defense also attempted to prove the alleged
behavioral oddity of Anacito two to three days prior to the killing. His sister Remedios
noticed that his eyes were reddish and that he was angry with her. [45] His brother
Francisco also observed that he (Anacito) would sometimes talk to himself, laugh, shout,
and utter bad words, and , at times, he was just quiet. [46] Also relied upon by the
appellant are the testimony of Remedios on his psychiatric history and the expert
testimony of the EVRMC psychiatrist, Dr. Verona.
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that Anacito failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence the defense of insanity. For one thing, it was only Bambis
personal perception that there was no reason or occasion for Anacito to wear Barong
Tagalog. Tested against the stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting, such
deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence, and his acts of laughing, talking to himself,
staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-minute interval are not sufficient
proof that he was insane immediately before or at the time he committed the
crimes. Such unusual behavior may be considered as mere abnormality of the mental
faculties, which will not exclude imputability.[47]
Anacitos psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established
by case law. What it shows is that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and
later an injectable medicine to remedy his lack of sleep and noisiness. As the trial court
noted, it was never shown that these drugs were for a mental illness that deprived
Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito was just an out-patient at the NCMH, EVRMC,
and Samar Provincial Hospital. While Remedios claimed that she requested the
confinement of Anacito and that the doctors did not refuse her, the fact remains that
Anacito was never confined in a mental institution. Although Dr. Verona testified that
there was a recommendation for Anacitos confinement, there was no indication in the
records as to when the recommendation was made, who made the recommendation, and
the reason for the recommendation.[48]
At any rate, in People v. Legaspi,[49] we discarded the confinement of the accused at
the NCMH prior to the incident in question to be by itself proof of his insanity, there being
no proof that he was adjudged insane by the institute. Applying this principle to Anacitos
case, we find another cogent reason to reject his plea of insanity.
The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to treatment from 1991
until 1999. While Remedios insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito ran out of
stock allegedly in 1990, there was no proof that Anacito needed the medicine during that
period. In fact, there was no intimation that he needed the medicine prior to the stabbing
incident. She bought medicine for Anacito only in April 2000 because he was again noisy
in the jail.[50] It seems that it was only after the stabbing incident, when he was in jail,
that his symptoms reappeared.
Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr. Veronas examinations on
Anacito were based on incomplete or insufficient facts. [51] For one thing, she admitted to
have examined Anacito for only three sessions lasting one to two hours each. [52] Her onepage medical report[53] reads in part:
Patient came in accompanied by policemen and sister. He was fairly kempt in
appearance, wearing blue shirt and pants. Mesomorphic, dark complexion with earring
on the left ear. Had flight of ideas, with auditory hallucination, kabastosan, kanan yawa.

He further said his sleep was minanok and complained of occasional headache. He had
no delusion. Judgment and insight fair. Fair impulse control.
Comments:
From the foregoing interviews and examinations, it is determined that the patient has a
psychiatric disorder. It is most likely that the patient is psychotic before and during the
commission of the crime. He is presently psychotic and cannot stand trial. He would
need treatment and monthly check-up.
We observe that Dr. Veronas conclusions have no supporting medical bases or
data. She failed to demonstrate how she arrived at her conclusions. She failed to show
her method of testing.[54] Further, she did not have Anacitos complete behavioral and
psychiatric history. On the witness stand, she mentioned that Anacito could not
distinguish right from wrong, but she was not certain that he was not conscious of killing
his victims in 1998. She also declared that Anacito had a diagnostic case of
schizophrenia, but stated in the next breath that Anacito was not grossly insane. [55]
Truly, there is nothing that can be discerned from Dr. Veronas short psychiatric
evaluation report and her testimony that Anacitos judgment and mental faculties were
totally impaired as to warrant a conclusion that his mental condition in 1998 when he
killed his victims was the same in 2000 when he was psychiatrically examined. The most
that we can conclude is that her findings refer to the period after the stabbing accident
and, hence, would prove Anacitos mental condition only for said time. It could be that
Anacito was insane at the time he was examined by Dr. Verona. But, in all probability,
insanity could have been contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He
was without contact with friends and relatives most of the time. He was perhaps troubled
by his conscience, by the realization of the gravity of his offenses, or by the thought of a
bleak future for him. The confluence of these circumstances may have conspired to
disrupt his mental equilibrium.
It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate
to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of the commission of the act
which is the subject of the inquiry.[56] His mental condition after that crucial period or
during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability. [57]
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it
for the first time in the year 2000 and only after he had already testified on his defenses
of alibi and denial. It has been held that the invocation of denial and alibi as defenses
indicates that the accused was in full control of his mental faculties. [58] Additionally, the
trial judge observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was attentive, well-behaved, and
responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus, the shift in theory from denial and
alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after the appellant realized the futility of his
earlier defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a mere concoction [59] or an
afterthought.[60] In any event, Anacito failed to establish by convincing evidence his
alleged insanity at the time he killed Demetrio Jr. and Allan Dacles. He is thus presumed
sane, and we are constrained to affirm his conviction.[61]
We likewise reject the alternative plea of Anacito that he be credited with the
mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. In the cases where we credited this
mitigating circumstance after rejecting a plea of insanity, it was clear from the records

that the accused had been suffering from a chronic mental disease that affected his
intelligence and willpower for quite a number of years prior to the commission of the act
he was being held for. [62] The situation does not exist in the cases at bar. It was only in
2000 that Anacito was diagnosed as psychotic with flight of ideas and auditory
hallucinations and was found to be schizophrenic. There is nothing on record that he had
these symptoms the previous years or at the time he stabbed the victim. Curiously, Dr.
Verona did not make a diagnosis of schizophrenia in her report, only at the witness stand.
We agree with the trial court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as the
killing of Allan is concerned because the sole eyewitness did not see the commencement
of the assault.[63] For treachery to be considered, it must be present and seen by the
witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no particulars are known as to how
the killing began, the perpetration with treachery cannot be supposed.[64]
Treachery was correctly appreciated in the killing of Demetrio Jr. Anacito was lying in
wait for his victim in a dark place at the national highway. When Demetrio Jr. reached the
lovers lane, Anacito emerged from his hiding place and stabbed the former several
times. Anacitos attack came without warning; it was deliberate and unexpected,
affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or
defend himself.[65]
We do not find merit in appellants contention that he cannot be convicted of murder
for the death of Demetrio Jr. because treachery was not alleged with specificity as a
qualifying circumstance in the information. Such contention is belied by the information
itself, which alleged: All contrary to law, and with the attendant qualifying circumstance
of treachery. In any event, even after the recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such
asqualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense.[66]
We, therefore, sustain the penalty imposed by the trial court on Anacito. For the
crime of murder, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he was correctly
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties, since
there was no other aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime. For
the crime of homicide, which is punishable by reclusion temporal, he may be sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the range of prision mayor and
whose maximum is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, there
being no modifying circumstances.
Coming now to the matter of damages. While Demetrio Sr. testified that he
spent P43,500 for the wake and burial of his son, only P11,945[67] is substantiated by
receipts.Hence, in lieu of actual damages we shall award to Demetrio Jr.s heirs temperate
damages[68] of P25,000[69] conformably with current jurisprudence.[70]
As to the burial expenses for Allan, his father Alfredo Dacles testified that he
spent P10,000. However, he failed to present receipts to substantiate his
claim. Nevertheless, we also grant temperate damages in the amount of P10,000 on the
ground that it was reasonable to expect that the family of the victim incurred expenses
for the coffin, wake, and burial.
The award of civil indemnity of P50,000 for the respective heirs of Demetrio Jr. and
Allan is affirmed in line with recent jurisprudence. [71] Civil indemnity is mandatory and is

granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the
crime.[72]
Apart from the civil indemnity, we shall award in favor of the heirs of each victim
moral damages in the amount of P50,000 consistent with controlling case law.[73] Moral
damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of
the victims heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death
invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victims family.[74]
We shall also award in favor of the heirs of Demetrio Jr. exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000 in view of the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery.[75]
Thus, Anacito shall indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., damages in the
total amount of P161,945 and the heirs of Allan damages in the total amount
of P110,000.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM, with modifications as to the damages, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, finding appellant Anacito Opuran
guilty of the crimes of murder in Criminal Case No. 4693 and homicide in Criminal Case
No. 4703, and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and an indeterminate penalty
of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, respectively. Apart from the P50,000 civil
indemnity, he is ordered to pay (1) the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., in the amounts
of (a) P50,000 as moral damages; (b) P25,000 as temperate damages; and (c) P25,000
as exemplary damages, or a total of P150,000; and (2) the heirs of Allan Dacles in the
amounts of (a) P50,000 as moral damages; and (b) P10,000 as temperate damages, or a
total of P110,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 46539

September 27, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VALENTIN DOQUEA, defendant-appellant.

Primicias, Abad, Mencias and Castillo for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Assistant Attorney Paredes, Jr., for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
The accused-appellant, who is a minor, was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, for having killed Juan Ragojos by stabbing him in the breast with
a knife on November 19, 1938, in the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan. The court, after
trying the case, held that the accused acted with discernment in committing the act
imputed to him and, proceeding in accordance with the provisions of article 80 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 99, ordered him to be sent
to the Training School for Boys to remain therein until he reaches the age of majority.
From this order the accused interposed an appeal alleging that the court erred in holding
that he had acted with discernment and in not having dismissal the case.
On the date of the crime, the appellant was exactly thirteen years, nine months and five
days old. The incident that gave rise to the aggression committed by him on the
deceased is narrated in the appealed order as follows:
Between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon of November 19, 1938, the now deceased
Juan Ragojos and one Epifanio Rarang were playing volleyball in the yard of the
intermediate school of the municipality of Sual, Province of Pangasinan. The herein
accused, who was also in said yard, intervened and, catching the ball, tossed it at
Juan Ragojos, hitting him on the stomach. For this act of the accused, Juan Ragojos
chased him around the yard and, upon overtaking him, slapped him on the nape.
Said accused then turned against the deceased assuming a threatening attitude,
for which the reason said deceased struck him on the mouth with his fist, returning
immediately to the place where Epifanio Rarang was in order to continue playing
with him. The accused, offended by what he considered an abuse on the part of
Juan Ragojos, who was taller and more robust than he, looked around the yard for a
stone with which to attack the now deceased Juan Ragojos, but finding none, he
approached a cousin of his named Romualdo Cocal, to ask the latter to lend him
his knife. Epifanio Rarang, who had heard what the accused had been asking his
cousin, told the latter not to give the accused his knife because he might attack
Juan Ragojos with it. The accused, however, succeeded in taking possession of the
knife which was in a pocket of his cousin's pants. Once in possession of the knife,
Valentin Doquea approached Juan Ragojos and challenged the latter to give him
another blow with his fist, to which the deceased answered that he did not want to
do so because he (Juan Ragojos) was bigger that the accused. Juan Ragojos,
ignorant of the intentions of the accused, continued playing and, while he was thus
unprepared and in the act of stopping the ball with his two hands, the accused
stabbed him in the chest with the knife which he carried.
The order also contains the following conclusions and findings of fact which we are not at
liberty to alter, not being called upon or authorized to do so, in view of the nature of the
appeal before us, by section 138 of the Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 3:
Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin Doquea committed
the crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the
municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in

said school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof, and during
the time he was studying therein he always obtained excellent marks, this court is
convinced that the accused, in committing the crime, acted with discernment and
was conscious of the nature and consequences of his act, and so also has this
court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf during the trial
of this case.
The proven facts, as stated by the lower court in the appealed order, convinces us that
the appeal taken from said order is absolutely unfounded, because it is error to
determine discernment by the means resorted to by the attorney for the defense, as
discussed by him in his brief. He claims that to determine whether or not a minor acted
with discernment, we must take into consideration not only the facts and circumstances
which gave rise to the act committed by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time
the crime was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of
meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have
had at that moment. It is clear that the attorney for the defense mistakes the
discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the Revised Penal Code, for
premeditation, or at least for lack of intention which, as a mitigating circumstance, is
included among other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of said Code. The
discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a
minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is
his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong, and such
capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the very appearance, the
very attitude, the very comportment and behaviour of said minor, not only before and
during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial
(U.S. vs. Maralit, 36 Phil., 155). This was done by the trial court, and the conclusion
arrived at by it is correct.
Wherefore, the appealed order is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
JOEMAR ORTEGA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 151085

Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*

CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
August 20, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [2]dated October 26,
2000 which affirmed in toto the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod
City, Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999, convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega [4] (petitioner) of
the crime of Rape.
The Facts
Petitioner, then about 14 years old,[5] was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate
informations both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA, [6] then about eight (8)
years of age. The accusatory portions thereof respectively state:
Criminal Case No. 98-19083
That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and
there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of
and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old,
against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Criminal Case No. 98-19084

That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX,
Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously

(sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a
minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.[9] Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying
versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM. [10] Among her siblings
CCC, BBB, DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these disturbing
events, AAA's family members were close friends of petitioner's family, aside from the
fact that they were good neighbors. However, BBB caught petitioner raping his younger
sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then informed their mother MMM who in turn
asked AAA.[11] There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped her three (3) times on three (3)
different occasions.
The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then
6

years

old

and

son

BBB,

then

10

years

old,

in

the

care

of

Luzviminda

Ortega[12] (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner, for two (2) nights because MMM had to stay
in a hospital to attend to her other son who was sick. [13] During the first night at
petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together with
Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There
petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the following day, again at the
petitioner's residence. Observing that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to
their comfort room and raped her there. AAA testified that petitioner inserted his penis
into her vagina and she felt pain. In all of these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to
tell her parents, otherwise, he would spank her. [14] AAA did not tell her parents about her
ordeal.
The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner
went to the house of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered
television.

At

that

time,

Luzviminda

was

conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching,

petitioner called AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the
said room which was lighted by a kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door,
removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's shorts and panty, and in a standing position
inserted his penis into the vagina of AAA.[15] AAA described petitioner's penis as about
five (5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated that she saw
pubic hair on the base of his penis.[16]
This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to
drink water in their kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see
petitioner and AAA both naked from their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse.
BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told
petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB reported the incident
to his mother, MMM.[17]
MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that
petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this was
not the only incident that petitioner molested AAA as there were two previous occasions.
MMM also learned that AAA did not report her ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner
would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported the matter to her, petitioner and
Luzviminda already left her house. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go to sleep, MMM,
with a heavy heart, examined AAA's vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish
and a whitish fluid was coming out from it. Spouses FFF and MMM were not able to sleep
that night. The following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda and
petitioner to come to their house. MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did
to her daughter, and consequently, she demanded that AAA should be brought to a
doctor for examination.[18]
MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas [19] (Dr. Katalbas),
the Rural Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that
she was molested.[20] Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM
went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health
Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report [21] showing that there were abrasions
on both right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the posterior
fourchette. She also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals were

relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could disappear after a
period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her findings
required the confirmation of the Municipal Health Officer of the locality.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement[22] was reached between the two families through
the DAWN Foundation, an organization that helps abused women and children. Part of
the settlement required petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA.
[23]

As such, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the locality. However, a few months

later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in order to bring his dirty clothes for
laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated and confrontations
occurred. At this instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape. However, the
prosecutor's office only filed the two (2) instant cases.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and
Luzviminda Ortega.[24] He is the second
child
of
three
siblings an
elder
brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the accusations made against him. He
testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good friends; when MMM left AAA and
her brothers to the care of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room together with
BBB and CCC while AAA slept together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never
touched or raped AAA or showed his private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten AAA
in any instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort room, but he merely
accompanied and helped AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in
the process of washing, he may have accidentally touched AAA's anus; on December 1,
1996, petitioner together with his parents, went to AAA's house; [25] they were dancing
and playing together with all the other children at the time; while they were dancing,
petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act, at the instance of which BBB ran
and reported the matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda, saying that
petitioner and AAA were having sexual intercourse; [26] petitioner explained to MMM that
they were only playing, and that he could not have done to AAA what he was accused of
doing, as they were together with her brothers, and he treated AAA like a younger sister;
[27]
BBB was lying; AAA's parents and his parents did not get angry at him nor did they
quarrel with each other; petitioner and his parents peacefully left AAA's house at about
nine o'clock in the evening; however, at about four o'clock in the morning, petitioner and
his parents were summoned by MMM to go to the latter's house; upon arriving there they

saw BBB being maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to BBB as the one who molested
her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to a doctor for examination.[28]
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a
minor
at
the
time
of
the
incident;
CCC
and
BBB
were
the
children of MMM in herfirst marriage, while AAA and the rest of her

siblings were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when MMM
entrusted AAA and her brothers to her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with AAA
and her youngest daughter in a separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996,
she was at AAA's house watching television and conversing with MMM, while FFF and
Loreto were having a drinking spree in the kitchen; from where they were seated, she
could clearly see all the children, including petitioner and AAA, playing and dancing in
the dining area; she did not hear any unusual cry or noise at the time; while they were
conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual
intercourse; upon hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood up
and looked for them, but both mothers did not find anything unusual as all the children
were playing and dancing in the dining area; Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's
statement; the parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine her in order to verify BBB's
statement nor did they get angry at petitioner or at them; and they peacefully left AAA's
house. However, the following day, MMM woke Luzviminda up, saying that FFF was
spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing to BBB nor to petitioner as the one who
molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened, telling FFF not to spank BBB but
instead, to bring AAA to a doctor for examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr.
Katalbas who found no indication that AAA was molested. She also accompanied her to
Dr. Jocson. After getting the results of the examination conducted by Dr. Jocson, they
went to the police and at this instance only did Luzviminda learn that MMM accused
petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied to Luzviminda that he raped AAA.
Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer who recommended that they
should seek advice from the Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed on an
amicable settlement wherein petitioner would stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner
stayed with a certain priest in the locality for almost two (2) years. But almost every
Saturday,
petitioner
would
come
home
to
visit his parents and to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came
home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner, calling him a rapist. Confrontations occurred until an
altercation erupted wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda. Subsequently, AAA's
parents filed the instant cases.[29]
The RTC's Ruling

On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over
the positive identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB,
who testified with honesty and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not
perceive any motive for AAA's family to impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner,
considering the close relations of both families. Thus, the RTC disposed of this case in
this wise:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y
Felisario GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation
of the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 9819084 and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be
imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day of
Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as
maximum. The accused is condemned to pay the offended party AAA, the
sum of P100,000.00 as indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.[30]

Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding
bail bond for his provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the
petitioner's release pending appeal.[31]

The CA's Ruling

On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the
petitioner's defense of denial could not prevail over the positive identification of the
petitioner by the victim AAA and her brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and
without any showing of ill motive. The CA also held that the respective medical
examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is established that the
slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal
laceration is not an element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with
discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded great weight and
respect to the factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies
of witnesses.

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration [32] of the assailed Decision which the CA
denied in its Resolution[33] dated November 7, 2001.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF
SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT
OF THE CASE.

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
III.
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT,
THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF
COMMITTING
THE
ALLEGED
RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE
ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MOTHERS
WERE PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS
SET FORTH BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES
ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.[34]

Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive
on this Court, we are not prevented from overturning such findings if the CA had
manifestly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if considered might
affect the result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from the testimonies of AAA and
BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain. Petitioner
contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner inserted his
fingers and his penis into her vagina, certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions,
wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking into consideration her age at
the time and the alleged size of petitioner's penis. However, such allegation is
completely belied by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day after the alleged

rape, conducted a medical examination on AAA and found that there were no signs or
indications that AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA committed a
grave error when it disregarded such medical report since it disproves the allegation of
the existence of rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus,
the presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner
opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent,
unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. As such, it is incredible and contrary to
human reason that a 13- year-old boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of
AAA, whose reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be controlled or subdued.
Petitioner

claims

that

poverty

was

MMM's

motive

in

filing

the

instant

case,

as she wanted to extort money from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner points out
that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that the abrasions that were inflicted on
the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period
of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the medical examination on
December 12, 1996, or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after the alleged incident of
rape, and that AAA's parents only filed the instant case after almost a year, in order to
deter Luzviminda from filing a case of slander by deed against FFF, it is not
inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to depart
from the initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally,
petitioner submits that AAA and BBB were merely coached by MMM to fabricate these
stories.[35]
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere
reiterations of his disquisitions before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely
on the testimonies of both doctors since despite the absence of abrasions, rape is
consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ; what is
relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her in August
and December of 1996; even in the absence of force, rape was committed considering
AAA's age at that time; as such, AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing petitioner;
and it is established that the crime of rape could be committed even in the presence of
other people nearby. Moreover, the OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made
by a trial court is accorded the highest respect as it had the opportunity to observe
directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said witness was telling

the truth or not. Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment when he
committed the said crime, as manifested in his covert acts.[36]
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, [37] or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006.[38] The law
establishes a comprehensive system to manage children in conflict with the law [39] (CICL)
and children at risk[40] with child-appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs
and services such as prevention, intervention, diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration
and after-care programs geared towards their development. In order to ensure its
implementation, the law, particularly Section 8 [41] thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with certain duties and functions [42] such as the
formulation of policies and strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to enhance the
administration of juvenile justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of
the CICL. The law also

provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67
and 68 of R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.[43]
The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:
Title VIII
Transitory Provisions
SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and
Below. Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old
and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social
welfare and development officer. Such officer, upon thorough assessment of
the child, shall determine whether to release the child to the custody of
his/her parents, or refer the child to prevention programs, as provided under
this Act. Those with suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at
the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be released, unless it is
contrary to the best interest of the child.
SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. If the child is detained
pending trial, the Family Court shall also determine whether or not
continued detention is necessary and, if not, determine appropriate
alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary and he/she is detained
with adults, the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a
youth detention home.

SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with

the Law. The PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to
the JJWC, within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, an
inventory of all children in conflict with the law under their custody.
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending
Diversion and Court Proceedings. If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18)
years pending diversion and court proceedings, the appropriate diversion
authority in consultation with the local social welfare and development
officer or the Family Court in consultation with the Social Services and
Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall
determine the appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court
executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the child in conflict with the
law has already availed of probation under Presidential Decree No. 603 or
other similar laws, the child may apply for probation if qualified under the
provisions of the Probation Law.
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences. Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at
the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which
they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from
the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate
dispositions provided under this Act and their sentences shall be adjusted
accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified
under this Act or other applicable laws.
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both theRTC and the
CA. However, with the advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before
this Court, a new issue arises, namely, whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344
apply to petitioner's case, considering that at the time he committed the alleged rape,
he was merely 13 years old.
In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a
prosecution for rape, the complainant's candor is the single most important factor. If the
complainant's testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted
solely on that basis.[44] The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility,
and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous crime of rape and to
positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's
testimony that he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While
petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the imputation of the crime,

we discard such assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low
as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial
knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their daughter's psyche and
mar her life if the charge is not true. [45] We find petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the
abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money from
petitioners parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases of rape
committed

against

young

girls

like

AAA

who was

only 6 years old then, total penetration of the victim's organ is improbable due to the
small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that actual penetration of the victim's
organ or rupture of the hymen is not required. [46] Therefore, it is not necessary for
conviction that the petitioner succeeded in having full penetration, because the slightest
touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape.
[47]

However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he
commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free
will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. [48] Therefore, while there is a
crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus, inGuevarra v. Almodovar,[49] we
held:
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the
exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete
absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the
absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In expounding on
intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has stated:
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power,
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish
a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the
infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal
liability."
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are
not capable of performing a criminal act.

In its Comment[50] dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer
covered by the provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999,
petitioner was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001.

R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with the petitioner now approximately 25
years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344. Moreover, the
OSG

claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A.No. 9344 is

applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under
Sections 67 and 68 thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner may avail himself of
the provisions of Section 38[51] of R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of
sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a recognized
principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given retroactive application, such
principle does not apply if the law itself provides for conditions for its application.
We are not persuaded.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. A child fifteen (15)
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be
exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in
accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old
and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed
and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and development
officer

(LSWDO).

What

is

controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is
not the CICL's age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the
time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of
criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.[52]

Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive
application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the wellentrenched principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda.
Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. [53]This
principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded
application in certain instances involving special laws.[54] R.A. No. 9344 should be no
exception.
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the
deliberations on the bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to
35, may I humbly propose that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the
following provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW
PENDING THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND
RESTORATION (OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR, SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO
DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION PROGRAMS
FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS OF
AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these
adult offenders?
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not
have the capability at the moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.
Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever
the facilities are ready.

Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak

here of children who do not have criminal liability under this law, we are
referring here to those who currently have criminal liability, but because of
the retroactive effect of this measure, will now be exempt. It is quite
confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their
parents or through a diversion program, Mr. President. That is my
understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of
sifting before that. That is why I was proposing that they should be given to
the DSWD, which will conduct the sifting process, except that apparently,
the DSWD does not have the physical facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We
will now have to just craft it to ensure that the input raised earlier by the
good Senator is included and the capacity of the DSWD to be able to absorb
these individuals. Likewise, the issue should also be incorporated in the
amendment.
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law
becomes effective, all those children in conflict with the law, who
were convicted in the present Penal Code, for example, who will
now not be subject to incarceration under this law, will be
immediately released. Is that the understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen
to them?
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been
settled . . . . . provides, for example, for conferencing family mediation,
negotiation, apologies, censure, et cetera. These methodologies will
apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require
some sort of infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel from the
DSWD will have to address the counseling. So, there must be a transition in
terms of building the capacity and absorbing those who will benefit from this
measure.

The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an

amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
the Santiago amendment is accepted.[55]
xxxx
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
xxxx
Senator Pimentel.
xxxx
Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their
application, I would like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could
incorporate some kind of a transitory provision that would make this
law apply also to those who might already have been convicted but
are awaiting, let us say, execution of their penalties as adults when,
in fact, they are juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the
Transitory Provisions wherein we address the issue raised by the
good Senator, specifically, Section 67. For example, Upon effectivity
of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the
time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed
and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social
welfare and development officer. So that would be giving retroactive
effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.

Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I
was trying to cite the instance of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as
adults awaiting execution.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an
additional amendment, subject to style.
Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality
that we have to address, otherwise injustice will really be . . .

Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a

separate provision.
The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the
offender is able to prove that at the time of the commission of the offense he
is a minor under this law, he should be given the benefit of the law.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment.
[56]

The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in
interpreting a statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that
intent is the soul of the law, viz.:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect
according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital
part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in
enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent
and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to
a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start
out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense
which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner
the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.[57]

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. [58] In this case, the
plain meaning of R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers'
intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the
simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the
CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission
of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's
own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioners age was
never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably,

petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under
R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of
rape committed against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no
concomitant exemption from civil liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of
the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay
AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of actual or
compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.
The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the
civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code,
without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral
damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the
odious crime of rape.[59]
A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law
intended to protect our children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure,
the ills of the growing number of CICL and children at risk in our country, has been
enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped us that major concerns have been
raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale for the
Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that:
The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006 raising the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15
years old has compounded the problem of employment of children in the
drug trade several times over. Law enforcement authorities, Barangay
Kagawads and the police, most particularly, complain that drug syndicates
have become more aggressive in using children 15 years old or below as
couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act No.
9344 has rendered them ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in
that they are proscribed from taking into custody children 15 years old or
below who openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit
drugs, simply because their age exempts them from criminal liability under
the new law. [60]

The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates
petitioner of rape, a heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the
tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the
laws greater protection. However, this consequence is inevitable because of the
language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to review by this Court.
[61]

Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be

addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts,
and we have done so in this case.[62]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed
against petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred
to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate
intervention program. Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private
complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00). No costs.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC).
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

G.R. No. 186227

Present:

- versus -

CARPIO,* J.
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:

ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA,

Accused-Appellant.
July 20, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Decision [1] dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment [2] dated
September 14, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case
No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act
(RA) 9165.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City
received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen
(17) years old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District,
Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1
Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces of P100
marked bills to be used in the purchase.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the
marked money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the
buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner
and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant
talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the
poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseurbuyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been
completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the
appellant as he was leaving the place.

The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence
of barangay officials Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant
and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the
marked money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police
officers made an inventory of the items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one
big sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of
shabu which they marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces of one hundred
pesos marked money and a fifty peso (P50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-request was prepared
by Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory examination of the two (2) sachets
containing a crystalline substance, ultra-violet examination on the person of the
appellant as well as the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The request
was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally received by Police Inspector Virginia SisonGucor, Forensic Chemical Officer of the Regional CrimeLaboratory Office XII Butuan City,
who immediately conducted the examination. The laboratory examination revealed that
the appellant tested positive for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent
powder; and the crystalline substance contained in two sachets, separately marked as
RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City
against appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:
Criminal Case No. 10250
That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3,
Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero point zero four one two
(0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
shabu which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165). [3]
Criminal Case No. 10251
That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3,
Agao, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess zero point six one three
one (0.6131) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known
as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).[4]

Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
In its Omnibus Judgment[5] dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which,
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y
Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for
selling shabu, a dangerous drug, as defined and penalized under Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165,
where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As such, Allen
Mantalaba y Udtojan is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen
Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for illegally
possessing shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing 0.6131 gram as defined and
penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and accused
being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, after applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly sentenced to six (6)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum
of prision mayor and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00).
SO ORDERED.[6]

The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1,
Butuan City dated September 14, 2005 appealed from finding the accusedappellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the
crime of Violation of Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Thus, the present appeal.
Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting
him of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the
poseur-buyer. He also argues that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not

established. Finally, he asserts that an accused should be presumed innocent and that
the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale
took place. However, based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that
the buy-bust operation was successfully conducted, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did
you conduct your buy-bust operation at the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian
assets that Allen Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling
shabu. And after we evaluated this Information we informed Inspector Dacillo
that we will operate this accused for possible apprehension.
Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you
take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We
prepared a request for powder dusting for our marked moneys to be used for
the operation.
Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?
xxxx
Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.
Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?
A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of
shabu there should be a pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to the
police officer.
Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this
marked moneys, approached the guy who was selling shabu at that
time?
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to
the suspect.
Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the
poseur-buyer and the suspect.
Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement
signal because in the pre-arranged signal we used a cap and a
towel. (sic) In the case, of this suspect, there was no towel there
was no cap at the time of giving the shabu and the marked moneys
to the suspect and considering also that that was about 7:00
o'clock in the evening. The poseur-buyer immediately proceeded to
us and informed us that the shabu was already given by the
suspect.
Q: What did you do next after that?

A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic
containing white [crystalline] substance, we immediately approached the
suspect.
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust
operation[?] Was he alone or did he had (sic) any companion at that time?
A: He was alone.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this
constitutional rights and we immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the
suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We called the attention of
the barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.
Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the
buy-bust operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.
xxxx
Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2
pieces of 100 peso bills as marked moneys.[8]
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation
is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor.[9] From the above testimony of the prosecution
witness, it was well established that the elements have been satisfactorily met. The
seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well
as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also
clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.
To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of
Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic chemical officer, who confirmed that the
plastic containing white crystalline substance was positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride and that the petitioner was in possession of the marked money used in the
buy-bust operation, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on
the sachets of suspected shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated
specimen, the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
xxxx
Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the
accused, as well as the marked money mentioned in this report?

A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan
Mantalaba is positive to the test for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet
flourescent powder. x x x[10]

The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again,
this Court stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure,
sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. [11] It is often utilized
by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution
of their nefarious activities.[12] In People v. Roa,[13] this Court had the opportunity to
expound on the nature and importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling that:
In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation.
While it is true that Section 86 [14] of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the
National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain
"close coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the provision
does not, by so saying, make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua
non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an
in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 [15] of the Rules of the
Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending
violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA. [16] A buy-bust
operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v.
Lacbanes[17] is quite instructive:
In People v. Ganguso,[18] it has been held that prior
surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust team
members were accompanied to the scene by their informant. In
the instant case, the arresting officers were led to the scene by
the poseur-buyer. Granting that there was no surveillance
conducted before the buy-bust operation, this Court held
in People v. Tranca,[19] that there is no rigid or textbook method of
conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of good
police work. The police officers may decide that time is of the
essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance.[20]
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled
to great respect because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of
the witnesses as they testify. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the
appellate court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.[21]
In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that
the appellant is equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal

possession of dangerous drug. As an incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after
the consummation of the buy-bust operation, the arresting officers had the authority to
search the person of the appellant. In the said search, the appellant was caught in
possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to
be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[22]
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money
confiscated from him. However, based on his cross-examination, such denial was not
convincing enough to merit reasonable doubt, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by
they recovered from your possession one sachet of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were
searched they also found another sachet of shabu also in your
pocket?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the
prosecution that no money was taken from you because you have none at
that time, is it not?
A: None sir, only the P250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.
Q: This P250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from
your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were not P200 of the P250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time
you were arrested by the police?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was taken from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had
your hands tested for ultra-violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested
positively for the presence of the said powder?
A: Yes, sir.[23]

Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this
Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the
defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.[24]
Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the
chain of custody of the recovered dangerous drug. According to him, while it was
Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the request for laboratory examination, only
police officers Pajo and Simon were present in the buy-bust operation.

Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition
in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long
as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team.[25] Its non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.[26] What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. [27] In this
particular case, it is undisputed that police officers Pajo and Simon were members of the
buy-bust operation team. The fact that it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed
the letter-request for laboratory examination does not in any way affect the integrity of
the items confiscated. All the requirements for the proper chain of custody had been
observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken after the
consummation of the buy-bust operation:
Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic
containing white [crystalline] in substance, we immediately approached the
suspect.
xxxx
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this
[constitutional] rights and immediately handcuffed him.

Q: Where were the marked moneys?

A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the
suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We called the attention of
the barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.
xxxx
Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of
the barangay officials. Now, when these barangay officials were present,
what did you do on the suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.
Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2
pieces of P100.00 peso bills as marked moneys.
Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him,
where were the marked moneys?
A: On the ground.
Q: Who picked these marked moneys?
A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.
Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the
2 pieces of sachets of shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other one
during the search, what did you do [with] these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu
and the marked moneys?
A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate
of Inventory.[28]
As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the
confiscated item which, in the present case, was complied with, thus:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking[29] of the seized drugs or
other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus, it is vital
that the seized contraband are immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking
of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of
all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings,
obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.[30]
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to
discuss the effect of his minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant was
seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said
offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the
RTC's Decision.

It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated
its decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a
minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D.
603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code[31] and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,
the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law,[32] the laws that were applicable at the time
of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section
5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of
his sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive
application, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is
found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain
any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall
place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall
still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at
the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which
they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from
the retroactive application of this Act. x x x

However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia[33] that while Section 38 of
RA 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in
conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of
sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child
in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with
the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition
or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought
before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer
avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of
sentence, because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would
not have happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the
sentence of the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal
at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was
20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have
suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the
provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence
of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192
of P.D. 603.[34]
Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under
Section 51 of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as
follows:[35]
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other
Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and
upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of
RA 9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section
98[36] of the same law. A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life
imprisonment to death; however, in Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is
a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the
same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty

can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties

provided for in the Revised Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court
in People v. Simon,[37] thus:
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in
imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating
or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and
should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases,
however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws
involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished
thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to
those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the
special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or
maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the
aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine
the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the
Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions
of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given
supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter
were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided
by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code
to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked
where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the
special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in
and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually
taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and,
necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system
of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved
speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it
would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.
xxxx
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently
determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article
61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the
stage of execution of the crime and the nature of the participation of the
accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or
more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance,
the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of
privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and
68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even
more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not applyin
toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second
paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous
results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.

Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a

penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding
paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence,
when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of one or two penalties to
be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall
likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale in
Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in
this case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that
is, prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one
degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There
could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which
must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine
and public censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be
appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or
even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of
penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the
second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent
principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision
correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug
offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such
interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy
rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an
imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is
accordingly addressed to Congress.[38]
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority [39] can now be
appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the
appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one
degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall
be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating
circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. [40] The ISLAW is applicable in the present
case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion
perpetua to death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion
temporal) by virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority. Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment dated September 14, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal
Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed on appellant's conviction of
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5418

February 12, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CECILIO TAEDO, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as alleged in
the information, as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with the
intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon
reaching the forest, with premeditation shot him in the breast with a shotgun which
destroyed the heart and killed the said Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide
the crime, buried the body of the deceased in a well. The motive is unknown. The
premeditation consists in that the accused had prepared his plans to take the
deceased to the forest, there to kill him, so that no one could see it, and to bury
him afterwards secretly in order that the crime should remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Tarlac and sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal, accessories, indemnification and costs. The defendant appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all as to the
important facts. The accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January,
1909, he, with Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan

Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam on his land. The defendant took with him a
shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his
laborers at work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short
distance away across a stream to see how the alteration which he had made in
the malecon affected the flow of water from the rice filed on the other side of the stream.
He carried his shotgun with him across the stream. On the other side of the stream he
met the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had been living in a small shack for a
month or so during the rice-harvesting season. The accused asked the uncle of the
deceased where he could find a good place in which to hunt wild chickens. The uncle was
lying on the floor in the interior of the shack sick of fever. The deceased, a young man
about 20 years of age, was working at something under a manga tree a short distance
from the shack. Although the accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the
shack, the deceased answered the question and pointed out in a general way a portion
of the forest near the edge of which stood the shack. There is some contradiction
between the testimony of the accused and the Government witnesses just at this point.
The uncle of the deceased testified that the boy and the accused invited each other
mutually to hunt wild chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation. The
accused, however, testified that he did not invite the deceased to go hunting with him,
neither did the deceased go with him, but that he remained under the manga tree
"trying something." At any rate the accused went into the forest with his gun. What took
place there is unknown to anybody except the accused. Upon that subject he testified as
follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where the wild
chickens were to be found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place, if I
could kill some wild chickens we would have something to eat on that day. So when
I arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens and I shot him. And after I shot that
chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up the chicken and went near the place
where I heard the noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a man I went back
toward the malecon, where my companions were working, running back, and when
I arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by a tree not far from where my
companions were working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the
occurrence, and to him I told of that occurence because he is my friend and
besides that he was a relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this he
and myself went together to see the dead body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot wound.
Chicken feathers were found in considerable qualities at the point where the chicken was
shot and where the accident occurred. The defendant within a few minutes after the
accident went out of the woods to the malecon where he had left his laborers at work,
carrying the dead chicken with him. The accused called Bernardino Tagampa, on of the
laborers, to go with him and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa says that they
went a little way toward the woods and came back. The accused says that they went to
the place where the body of the deceased lay and removed it to a place in the cogon
grass where it would not be easily observed. It is certain, however, that the body was
concealed in the cogon grass. During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his
fellow laborers were working, probably to hunt for a place in which to hide the body. The
rest of the laborers saw the witness Yumul take the chicken which had been killed by the
accused. He delivered it to the wife of the accused, who testified that she received the
chicken from Yumul and that it had been killed by a gunshot wound. That evening the
accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the body finally. They took it from the

cogon grass where it lay concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred
meters from the place where it had originally fallen, and buried it in an old well, covering
it with straw and earth and burning straw on top of the well for the purpose of concealing
it. Tagampa said that he helped the accused dispose of the body because he was afraid
of him, although he admits that the accused in no way threatened or sought to compel
him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial denied all knowledge of the death of the
deceased or the whereabouts of the body. On the trial, however, he confessed his
participation in the death of the deceased and told the story substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the accused
and the deceased had been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a
relative of the accused. There was no enmity and no unpleasant relations between them.
No attempt was made to show any. There appears to have been no motive whatever for
the commission of the crime. The Government has not attempted to show any. The only
possible reason that the accused could have for killing the deceased would be found in
the fact of a sudden quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is wholly negative
by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having been
only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless
the contrary shall appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere
accident without liability or intention of causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily
shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is taken
by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a lawful act executed with due
care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State,
70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex.
Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U.
S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused.
Neither is there any question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act
when the accident occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the
accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all suspicious
upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):

Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to
prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a
denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the State to show that it was
intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the State
and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was
accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . . But where accidental killing is
relied upon, the prisoner admits the killing but denies that it was intentional.
Therefore, the State must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to
instruct the jury that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a
preponderance of the testimony, and instruction B in the Cross case was properly
held to be erroneous.
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for
homicide, which must be submitted to the jury. And since a plea of misadventure is
a denial of criminal intent (or its equivalent) which constitutes an essential element
in criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it must be negative by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of
conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his
discharge from custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 172695

Appellee,
Present:
- versus - Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario, and
Nachura, JJ.
ISAIAS CASTILLO y COMPLETO,
Appellant. Promulgated:

June 29, 2007

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In an Information[1] dated January 19, 1994, appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo was
charged with the crime of parricide, committed as follows:
That on or about November 5, 1993, in the Municipality of Cabuyao,
Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Isaias Castillo y Completo, while conveniently armed with illegally
possessed sling and deadly arrow, with intent to kill his wife Consorcia
Antiporta with whom he was united in lawful wedlock did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot and hit his wife Consorcia Antiporta
with the aforesaid deadly arrow, hitting the latter on the right side of her
neck causing the laceration of the jugular vein which caused her
instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8590-B and raffled to Branch 24 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on April 15, 1994. Trial
thereafter ensued.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
There is no dispute that the victim, Consorcia Antiporta Castillo, died
violently in the evening of November 5, 1993. The cause of her death was
massive hemorrhage due to laceration of the jugular vein of her
neck. According to Dr. Solita P. Plastina, Municipal Health Officer of Calamba,
Laguna, who conducted the autopsy on the victims body, the fatal weapon
could have been a pointed instrument like a nail. There is no dispute likewise
that the accused shot with a dart from a rubber sling, his wife hitting her at
the neck and causing her instantaneous death. The letters written by the
accused from his detention cell addressed to his mother-in-law, to his fatherin-law, and lastly, the victims sister, speak so eloquently of someone who
accepts the fault for the early demise of the victim. Asking forgiveness from
the close relatives of the victim is a clear admission of authorship of the fatal
act.

In the same letters, the accused raised as an issue his lack of intent to
do the fatal harm to his wife. This is the same issue to be resolved by this
Court. Whether or not the fatal injury sustained by the victim was accidental.
xxxx
Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim, narrated in Court that in the
evening of November 5, 1993, between 9:00 oclock to 10:00 oclock, the
accused came home drunk and was in an angry mood. The accused kicked
the door and table, and then threw the electric fan away. He was prevailed
upon by Guillermo to take a rest. But the accused did not heed the advice of
Guillermo as he took instead his sling and arrow from the house ceiling
where he was keeping them. Dejectedly, Guillermo transferred to the
adjacent house of her x x x daughter [in-law] Yolanda. From there, Guillermo
heard the victim crying and, afterwards, shouting at the accused. Guillermo
concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was happening inside the house of
Consorcia, and Yolanda obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused
carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the accused, and Yolanda
brought Consorcia to the hospital but to no avail.
From all the circumstances gathered, the infliction of the fatal injury
upon Consorcia was preceded by a quarrel between her and the
accused. This spat negated the accuseds version that he was practicing the
use of the weapon when Consorcia was hit by the arrow, and lends credence
to the prosecutions contention that the shooting was intentional.
x x x To sustain the accuseds assertion that he was practicing the use of said
weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even
failed to rebut Guillermo Antiportas testimony that the accused was keeping
said sling and arrow inside his house.
It might be true that the accused was one of those who rushed the victim to
the hospital and while on the way, he sounded remorseful. But Guillermo
Antiporta further testified that while the victim was being attended to by the
medical personnel of said hospital, the accused stayed outside the hospital
premises, then he disappeared. He was later on apprehended by police
authorities while hiding inside the comfort room of a premises in an adjoining
barangay. The accuseds omission to surrender himself to the authorities is a
clear indication of guilt.[3]

[4]

After several hearings, the trial court rendered on October 5, 1998, a decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds accused ISAIAS CASTILLO Y
COMPLETO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE and
hereby sentences him to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00, as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.[5]

Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the prosecution
failed to sufficiently establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a
Decision[6] dated February 28, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied appellants appeal and
affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 5, 1998
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24 of Bian, Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED
with the modification that accused-appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo is
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated
June 16, 2005.
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant alleged that the pieces of circumstantial evidence on which his
conviction was based did not sufficiently establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
that the prosecution failed to prove his motive in killing his wife; or that they had a
quarrel immediately prior to the incident.
Appellant likewise claimed that it was not established that he was the one who
shot his wife with a deadly arrow considering that at the time of the incident, he and his
drinking buddies were all engaged in target shooting using the sling and arrow. Hence,
he surmised that any one of them could have shot the victim. At any rate, even
assuming that he was the one who killed his wife, the same was accidental and not
intentional.
Furthermore, he claimed that his presence at the crime scene did not establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His arrest while hiding inside a toilet in the adjoining
barangay, while his wife was being treated in the hospital, likewise does not prove his
complicity since the prosecution did not prove that he deliberately hid inside the toilet.
Finally, the letters he sent to his father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law
where he asked for forgiveness should not be considered as admission of guilt.
The petition lacks merit.
Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix wherefrom
a trial court may draw its conclusions and finding of guilt. Conviction can be had on the
basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial
evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and
at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every

other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable conclusion that
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person. [8] Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding the possibility of error
and producing absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind is required.[9]
In the instant case, all the essential requisites for circumstantial evidence to
sustain a conviction, are present. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the
following pieces of circumstantial evidence indubitably established that appellant was
the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:
1. Consortia would often confide to her sister Leticia about the violent
behavior of her (Consortia) husband, herein accused-appellant. And
even if Consortia would not tell Leticia about the beatings, the latter
would see her face with black eyes as evident proofs of maltreatment.
2. On the night of the incident, accused-appellant arrived at their house
drunk and displaying violent behavior, kicking the door and table.
3. Accused-appellant was last seen holding and practicing his sling and
arrow.
4. Immediately afterwards, Consortia was heard crying and shouting.
5. Accused-appellant was thereafter seen carrying Consortia, bloodied and
unconscious, to be brought to the hospital where she later died.
6. The autopsy findings indicate that Consortia sustained a punctured wound
in the neck which fatally lacerated her jugular vein. The cause of the
wound was a pointed object.
7. While detained, accused-appellant wrote letters to the parents and sister
of Consortia asking for forgiveness.
Also notable is accused-appellants behavior immediately after the
incident. He disappeared and did not enter the clinic where Consortia was
rushed for treatment. And when Consortias sister later sought police
assistance in searching for accused-appellant, the latter was found by the
police hiding inside a toilet at a nearby barangay.[10]
There is no merit in appellants contention that the prosecution failed to prove
motive in killing his wife. Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of the
offense on which his conviction rests. [11] Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature,
location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors
before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances
under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies
as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.[12]
In the instant case, the following circumstances satisfactorily established
appellants intent to kill his wife:
First: The killing was immediately preceded by a quarrel between the appellant and
his wife. Leticia, the victims sister, testified that the deceased suffered from the violent

behavior of the appellant who would often lay hand on the victim during their marital
squabbles.
Guillermo, appellants father-in-law, testified that on the night of the incident,
appellant arrived in their conjugal abode drunk and in a foul mood. He kicked the door
and table and threw away the electric fan. Guillermo tried to prevail upon appellant but
to no avail. Instead, appellant got his sling and arrow which he kept near the ceiling.
Guillermo left appellants house and went to the house of his daughter-in-law,
Yolanda, located about four meters away; but he could still hear the victim and appellant
arguing and shouting at each other. After a while, Guillermo requested Yolanda to look on
her sister-in-law. On her way, Yolanda met the appellant carrying Consorcia soaked in
blood.
Second: It has always been said that criminal cases are primarily about human
nature.[13] In the instant case, appellant disappeared after his wounded wife was rushed
to the hospital. This is indeed contrary to human nature. A husband is expected to lend
comfort to his dying wife up to her last breath. In this case, however, appellant took
flight. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to
indicate his guilt, and flight, when unexplained, as in this case, is a circumstance from
which an inference of guilt may be drawn.[14]
Appellant alleged that his arrest by police authorities inside a toilet at the adjoining
barangay is not an indication of guilt because the prosecution failed to prove that he
deliberately hid in order to evade being arrested.[15]
The contention lacks merit.
As above-discussed, it is contrary to human nature for a husband to leave his dying
wife, more so if his absence is unexplained. Appellant did not offer any explanation for
his flight. In appellants brief, he claimed that in all probability, it might have happened
that he (appellant) was merely answering the call of nature at the precise time when he
was arrested.[16] However, we find it is highly illogical for appellant to go as far as the
adjoining barangay to answer the call of nature especially since he could do so inside the
premises of the hospital. Moreover, the allegation that he was fearful of reprisal coming
from the victims relatives[17] is contrary to his claim of innocence.
Third: The location of the wound and its extent likewise proved appellants intent to
kill the victim. The autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained a punctured wound
in the neck, a vital organ, which fatally lacerated her jugular vein causing massive
hemorrhage. The extent of the physical injury inflicted on the deceased manifests
appellants intention to extinguish life.[18]
Fourth: As regards appellants act of carrying the body of his wounded wife and
bringing her to the hospital, the same does not manifest innocence. It is merely an
indication of an act of repentance or contrition on the part of appellant. [19]
In fine, all these circumstances prove appellants intent to harm his wife.

There is likewise no merit in appellants contention that he was not the one who
shot the deadly arrow because at the time of the incident, he and his drinking buddies
were all playing and practicing target shooting with the use of the sling and arrow.
Prosecution witness Guillermo Antiporta categorically testified that appellant was
alone with his wife inside their house when the incident happened. This completely
discounts the possibility that other than appellant, there could be another person or
persons who could have perpetrated the crime. There is no paucity of evidence because
the time when Guillermo left the appellant and the victim up to the time Yolanda saw him
carrying his wife, were all accounted for. Moreover, the testimony of defense witness
Galang supports the prosecutions contention that appellant was alone with his wife at
the time of the incident. As noted by the Court of Appeals:
Defense witness, Jose Nelson Galang, testified that he left his drinking
buddies and headed home at about 9:00 p.m., as in fact he was already in
bed at about 10:00 p.m. when he saw that Consortia was being rushed to the
hospital. Instead of weakening the evidence for the prosecution, Galangs
testimony even supports the prosecutions version that between 9:00 p.m.
and 10:00 p.m. of that fateful night, accused-appellant arrived at their house
drunk, presumably going home from that drinking session with his friends. x
x x[20]
There is likewise no merit in appellants contention that assuming he was the one
who killed his wife, the same was accidental and not intentional. The exempting
circumstance of accident is not applicable in the instant case. Article 12, par. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
xxxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes
an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
Accident is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with
clear and convincing evidence.[21] The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of
proof. The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance, are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

A person is performing a lawful act;

With due care;
He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
Without fault or intention of causing it.[22]

By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow
be considered as performing a lawful act. Thus, on this ground alone, appellants defense
of accident must be struck down because he was performing an unlawful act during the
incident. As correctly found by the trial court:

Furthermore, mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under

the law. In penalizing the act, the legislator took into consideration that the
deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury, mostly
fatal, upon other persons. Let it be stressed that this crude weapon can not
attain the standards as an instrument for archery competitions.To sustain the
accuseds assertion that he was practicing the use of said weapon at the time
of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed to rebut Guillermo
Antiportas testimony that the accused was keeping said sling and arrow
inside his house.[23]
Furthermore, by claiming that the killing was by accident, appellant has the burden
of proof of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of
responsibility, and to prove justification he must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be
disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. [24] Other than his claim that the
killing was accidental, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to prove the same.
Likewise, we cannot lend credence to appellants contention that the letters he
wrote to his parents-in-law and sister-in-law, where he asked for forgiveness, should not
be considered as an implied admission of guilt. He claimed that he wrote the letters in
order to explain that what happened was an accident and that he was to be blamed for it
because he allowed his drinking buddies to play with the sling and arrow.
Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or
those allowed by law to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise
by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Evidently,
no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong and a plea for
forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. [25] Under the
present circumstances, appellants plea for forgiveness should be received as an implied
admission of guilt. Besides, contrary to appellants assertion, the killing of Consorcia was
deliberate, and not by accident.
Finally, we find no cogent reason to review much less depart now from the findings
of the lower court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When the trial courts factual
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive
and binding upon this Court, for it is not our function to analyze and weigh the parties
evidence all over again except when there is serious ground to believe a possible
miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Our task in an appeal viacertiorari is limited,
as a jurisdictional matter, to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by
the Court of Appeals.[26]
Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Likewise, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 were properly awarded by the courts below.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 28, 2005 which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Bian, Laguna, Branch 24, finding appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo guilty of
parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering
him to pay the heirs of his victim P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, is AFFIRMED.
With costs. SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124058. December 10, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JESUS G. RETUBADO alias JESSIE, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Branch 29, in
Criminal Case No. TCS-2153 convicting the appellant Jesus G. Retubado of murder, sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua, and directing him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Emmanuel Caon the sum
of P50,000.00.
The appellant was indicted for murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
Thatonthe5thdayofNovember,1993at9:30oclockintheevening,moreorless,atBarangayIPoblacion,
MunicipalityofTuburan,ProvinceofCebu,Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,the
abovenamedaccused,withdeliberateintenttokill,bymeansoftreachery,evidentpremeditationandtaking
advantageofsuperiorstrength,didthenandtherewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslyattack,assaultandshoot
EmmanuelCaonwiththeuseofunlicensedrevolverofunknowncaliber,therebyhittingthelatteronhis
forehead,resultingtotheinstantaneousdeathofthesaidvictim.
CONTRARYTOLAW.[2]
Shortly before November 5, 1993, someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellants
younger brother who was mentally ill. Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and
gave it to Edwin. He brought the cigarette home and placed it on the dining table as he was having
dinner with his father. Momentarily, the firecracker exploded. The suspect was Emmanuel Caon, Jr.,
The Caons and the appellant were neighbors. The matter was brought to the attention of the
barangay captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out that Emmanuel Caon, Jr. was not the
culprit. The barangay captain considered the matter closed. The appellant, however, was bent on
confronting Emmanuel Caon, Jr.
On November 5, 1993, at about 9:00 p.m., 50-year-old Emmanuel Caon, Sr., a pedicab driver
called it a day and decided to go home after a days work. He drove his pedicab and stopped at the
junction of Rizal and Gallardo Streets, at the poblacion of Tuburan. The appellant, who was
conversing with Marcial Lucio saw him. Noy, why is [it] your son did something to my
brother? Emmanuel ignored the appellant. The appellant was incensed and ran after Emmanuel. He

overtook Emmanuel, grabbed and pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Emmanuel again
ignored the appellant and pedaled on until he reached his house. His wife, Norberta Caon was in the
balcony of their house, above the porch waiting for him to arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was
already asleep. Undeterred, the appellant continued following Emmanuel.
Shortly after Emmanuel had entered his house, the appellant arrived and tarried at the porch.
Emmanuel suddenly opened the door and demanded to know why he was being followed. The
appellant told Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel, Jr., but Emmanuel told the
appellant that his son was already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her hand
on her husbands shoulder to pacify him.
The appellant forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel on the
forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene. Norberta shouted
for help. The neighbors, her daughter, and her son-in-law arrived. They brought Emmanuel to
the Tuburan District Hospital, but the victim died shortly thereafter. Dr. Ivar G. Arellano, the Municipal
Health Officer, performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Emmanuel and prepared a report thereon
with the following findings:
ExaminationinDetail:
Ondetailedexamination,agunshotwoundwasfoundattheleftsideoftheforehead,measuring1cm.in
diameter.Attheskinsurroundingthiswoundwasfoundpowderburnswhichmeasured3cms.indiameteras
theskinhadbeenblackenedandburnedbypowderofthebullet.Theunderlyingfrontalbonewasfracturedand
depressed.Theunderlyingmeningesofthebrainaswellasthefrontalareaofthebrainwastraumatizedand
injured.Bloodandcerebrospinalfluidwereleakingfromthiswound.Theedgesofthisbulletwoundwas
invertedthusthiswasthegunshotentrywound.Thewoundwasfoundtobecircularinshape.Theexitwound
wasfoundattheleftparietalbonemeasuring1.2cm.insizeordiameterforthiswoundcommunicatedwiththe
entrywoundoftheleftsideoftheforehead.Theconnectionfromthewoundofentrytotheexitwound
measured8cms.Theparietalbonewasfracturedandwasdepressedandtheparietalpartofthebrainand
meningeswastraumatized.Bloodandcerebrospinalfluidaswellasbraintissuesleakedoutfromthiswound.
Possiblecauseofdeath:
1.Gunshotwoundatthehead(leftside)withinjurytobrainandmeninges
2.Hypovolemicshocksecondarytolossofblood(Severelossofblood)
(Sgd.)
IvarG.Arellano
MUN.HealthOfficer[3]
Dr. Charity Patalinghug and the victims daughter Loreta C. Claro signed Emmanuels Certificate of
Death.[4] The appellant surrendered to the police authorities but failed to surrender the firearm he
used to kill the victim. Forensic Officer Myrna P. Areola of the PNP Regional Office subjected the
appellant to paraffin tests. The Chemical Analysis of the paraffin casts gave the following results:
FINDINGS:
...
1.POSITIVEforthepresenceofgunpowderresidueonhislefthandcast.

2.NEGATIVEforthepresenceofgunpowderresidueonhisrighthandcast.[5]
Norberta also testified on the expenses incurred by her family due to her husbands death. No
documentary evidence was, however, offered to support the same. She declared that she felt sad and
lonely as a result of her husband's death.
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act
with due care; hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victims death.He testified that when he
insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom
holding a handgun with his right hand. Emmanuels trigger finger was outside the trigger guard, and
he held the firearm with the muzzle facing downward. Fearing that he would be shot, the appellant
took hold of Emmanuels right hand with his left, and pulled the gun towards Emmanuels
stomach. The appellant grabbed Emmanuels free hand with his right hand, and the old man almost
fell on his knees to the ground. Emmanuel still resisted. The appellant pulled the gun to the level of
Emmanuels forehead, and the gun suddenly went off. The bullet hit Emmanuels
forehead. Norbertafled from the house. For his part, the appellant rushed to his house to change
clothes. He placed the gun on the dining table before entering his bedroom. When he went back to
the dining room to get the gun, his younger sister, Enrica told him that their brother Edwin had taken
the gun. He found Edwin outside their house near the church, and the latter told the appellant that he
threw the gun into the sea. When the appellant asked his brother to show him where he threw the
gun, Edwin refused to do so.
Marcial Lucio corroborated the appellants testimony. He testified that he was talking with the
appellant at around 9:00 p.m. at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo streets when the victim Emmanuel
passed by in his pedicab. When the appellant called the victim, the latter ignored the call, prompting
the appellant to chase the victim, and eventually push the pedicab into a canal.
The appellants father, Iigo Retubado, testified that on the evening of November 5, 1993, he was
in their house with Edwin, his son who was mentally-ill. It was already late when the appellant
arrived. The appellant was disheveled, and laid down the gun he was carrying on the table. The
appellant told his father that he would surrender to the police because he had shot somebody. [6] The
appellant thereafter went to his room to change clothes while Iigo went to the comfort room to answer
the call of nature. When he was done, he saw the appellant frantically looking for the gun. As Edwin
was also nowhere to be found, Iigo concluded that Edwin might have taken the gun with him. He also
testified on Edwins mental imbalance and on the latters confinement at the Psychiatric Department of
the Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center in Cebu City sometime in 1991.[7]
On November 6, 1993, the appellant surrendered to the police authorities. Although he was
required by the municipal trial court to file his counter-affidavit, the appellant refused to do so.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. TCS-2153,
convicting the appellant of murder, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. Thedecretal portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoing,thisCourtfindsaccusedGUILTYbeyondreasonabledoubtofthe
crimeofMurderunderArt.248R.P.C.andsentencestheaccusedtothepenaltyofReclusionPerpetuaandto
indemnifytheheirsofthedeceasedthesumofP50,000.00.
However,accusedisgivenfullcreditofhispreventiveimprisonment.

SOORDERED.[8]
On appeal, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:
I
FirstAssignmentofError
THELOWERCOURTERREDINNOTFINDINGTHEDEATHOFTHEDECEASEDASCAUSEDBY
MEREACCIDENTWITHOUTFAULTORINTENTIONOFCAUSINGITWHILETHEACCUSEDWAS
PERFORMINGALAWFULACTWITHDUECAREOR,INTHEALTERNATIVE,ITERREDINNOT
CONVICTINGHIMJUSTMERELYOFHOMICIDEINSTEADOFMURDER.
II
SecondAssignmentofError
THELOWERCOURTERREDINDISREGARDINGTHEVERYRELEVANTANDMATERIAL
CONTENTSOFEXHIBITBOFTHEPROSECUTIONCHEMISTRYREPORT,PARAFFINTEST
WHICHAREFAVORABLETOTHEACCUSED.
III
ThirdAssignmentofError
THELOWERCOURTERREDINCONCLUDINGTHATTHETESTIMONYOFTHESOLEWITNESSOF
THEPROSECUTIONISSATISFACTORYANDSUFFICIENTTOCONVICTTHEACCUSEDOF
MURDER.
IV
FourthAssignmentofError
THELOWERCOURTERREDINFAILINGTOCONSIDERTHATTHEACCUSEDHASEXPLAINED
WHYHEFAILEDTOSURRENDERTHEGUNWHICHHEGOTFROMTHEDECEASED.[9]
The appellant asserts that he was merely performing a lawful act of defending himself when he
grabbed the victims hand which held the gun. The gun accidentally fired and the bullet hit the victims
forehead. The accident was not the appellants fault. The appellant asserts that when he wrestled with
the victim for the possession of the gun, he was merely defending himself. He contends that he had
no intention of killing the victim, as he merely wanted to talk to his son. If he had wanted to kill the
victim, he could have easily done so when he met the latter for the first time that fateful night
of November 5, 1993. Moreover, the appellant submits, he did not commit any felony; hence, under
paragraph 4 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he is not criminally liable for the death of the
victim.[10] In the alternative, the appellant asserts that he should be convicted only of the crime of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery
is wanting. He and the victim had a heated exchange of words before they grappled for the
possession of the gun. Such heated discussion had already forewarned the victim and placed him on
guard; thus, treachery cannot be legally considered.

The contention of the appellant has no merit. Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
reads:
ART.11.Justifyingcircumstances.
...
4)Anypersonwho,inordertoavoidanevilorinjury,doesanactwhichcausesdamagetoanotherprovided
thatthefollowingrequisitesarepresent:
First.Thattheevilsoughttobeavoidedactuallyexists;
Second.Thattheinjuryfearedbegreaterthanthatdonetoavoidit;
Third.Thattherebenootherpracticalandlessharmfulmeansofpreventingit.
The provision was taken from Article 8, paragraph 7 of the Spanish Penal Code, which reads:
ARTICULO8.
7.Elqueparaevitarunmalejecutaunhechoqueproduzcadaenlapropiedadajena,siemprequeconcurran
lascircumstanciassiguientes:
Primera.Realidaddelmalquesetratadeevitar.
Segunda.Queseamayorqueelcausadoparaevitarlo.
Tercera.Quenohayaotromediopracticableymenos
perjudicialparaimpedirlo.
Article 11, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is not an accurate translation of the Spanish
Penal Code. The phrase an injury does not appear in the first paragraph in the Spanish Penal
Code. Neither does the word injury appear in the second subparagraph of the Spanish Penal Code.
The justification is what is referred to in the Spanish Penal Code as el estado de necessidad:
Esunasituaciondepeligro,actualoimmediatoparabienes,juridicamenteprotegidesquesolopuedeser
evitadamediante,lalesiondebienes,tambienjuridicamentoprotegidos,pertenecientesaotrapersonas.[11]
The phrase state of necessity is of German origin. Countries which have embraced the classical
theory of criminal law, like Italy, do not use the phrase. The justification refers to a situation of grave
peril (un mal), actual or imminent (actual o imminente). The word propiedad covers diverse juridical
rights (bienes juridicos) such as right to life, honor, the integrity of ones body, and property (la vida, la
integridad corporal, el pudor, el honor, bienes patrimoniales) belonging to another.[12]
It is indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional
provocation of the party invoking the same. [13]
A number of legal scholars in Europe are of the view that the act of the accused in a state of
necessity is justifying circumstance; hence, lawful. Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised

Penal Code, a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance. The accused does not commit a crime
in legal contemplation; hence, is not criminally and civilly liable.Civil liability is borne by the
person/persons benefited by the act of the accused. Crimes cannot exist unless the will concurs with
the act, and when, says Blackstone, a man intending to do a lawful act, does that which is unlawful,
the deed and the will act separately and there is no conjunction between them which is necessary to
constitute a crime.[14]Others are of the view that such act is a cause for exclusion from being meted a
penalty; still others view such act as a case of excluding the accused from culpability.
According to Groizard, rights may be prejudiced by three general classes of acts, namely, (a)
malicious and intentional acts; (b) negligent or reckless acts; (c) acts which are neither malicious,
imprudent nor negligent but nevertheless cause damages.
Nuestrapropiedadpuedeserperjudicada,puedesufrirdetrimentosportresclasesdehechos.Poractos
maliciosos,intencionales,encaminadosdirectamenteacausarnosdao;poractosque,sinllevaresemalicioso
finyporfaltadeprudencia,porculpaotemeridaddelquelosejecuta,denesemismoresultado,yporactos
que,sinconcurrirensuejecucionunpropositodoloso,niculpa,ninegligenciasinembargoproduzcan
menocaboennuestrosbienes.[15]
The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4 of
the Revised Penal Code. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear
and convincing evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution
because if such evidence is weak but the accused fails to prove his defense, the evidence of the
prosecution can no longer be disbelieved. Whether the accused acted under a state of necessity is a
question of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The legal aphorism is
that the findings of facts by the trial court, its calibration of the testimony of the witnesses of the
parties and of the probative weight thereof as well as its conclusions based on its own findings are
accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored,
misconstrued or misapplied cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will
change the outcome of the case. We have meticulously reviewed the records and find no basis to
deviate from the findings of the trial court that the appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful
aggressor and the author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the victim at close range on
the forehead.
First: When Norberta heard her husband and the appellant arguing with each other in the porch
of their house, she went down from the balcony towards her husband and placed her hand on the
latters shoulders. She was shocked when the appellant pulled out his handgun and deliberately shot
the victim on the forehead, thus:
Q Now, you said that when your husband was about to go out again in order to see
his trisicad and as he opened the door he saw Jesus Retubado near the door. What
happened after that?
A He asked Jesus Retubado why Jesus Retubado chased him when he was driving
his trisicad.
Q Now, as your husband was asking this question to the accused Jesus Retubado what was
the distance to your husband at the time?
A Just very near to him.

Q And you to the accused at that very moment what was more or less your distance?
A About an armslength.
Q When your husband asked Jesus Retubado why the latter chased him while your husband
was driving his trisicad what was the answer of Jesus Retubado, if any?
A My husband asked the accused Jesus Retubado what is his grudge to him and Jesus
Retubado answered that it is not you who has a grudge to me but it is your son.
Q When Jesus Retubado uttered that statement what transpired after that?
A He immediately pointed his firearm that he was bringing (sic) to my husband Emmanuel
Caon.
Q By the way considering that you were just near to both your husband and the accused
where did that firearm that you said was pointed by the accused to your husband
come (sic) from?
A While the accused was standing in front of our door his hands were placed inside his T-shirt
covered by his T-shirt.
Atty. Pepito:
We move to strike out the answer. It is not responsive, Your Honor. The question was, where
did it come from?
COURT:
Let the answer stay in the record but let the witness answer again.
A From the hands of accused Jessie.
Fiscal Pansoy:
Q Now, just a while ago you were making a motion using your hand placed inside your Tshirt. Now, when you saw the firearm for the first time where did you saw (sic) the firearm
for the first time where did the firearm come from as you saw it from the hands of the
accused?
Atty. Pepito:
Already answered. It came from the hands of the accused.
Fiscal Pansoy:
I will reform.
Q Before you saw the firearm in the hands of the accused where did the firearm come from?
Atty. Pepito:

She is incompetent. We object.

COURT:
Reform the question.
Fiscal Pansoy:
Q Now, Mrs. Witness, before this question was asked to you as to where the firearm came
from you were making a motion by placing your hands inside your shirt when you were
only asked as to where the firearm came from?
A That was what the position of the accused when he was standing in front of our door and I
do not know what was inside his T-shirt. I only know that he was carrying a firearm when
it fired.
Q Now, when the accused pointed the firearm to your husband and fired the same more or
less what was the distance between the accused and your husband at the very precise
time when the firing was made?
A It was just very near because his hand did not bend. (Witness demonstrating by pointing to
her forehead).
Q Now, more or less, describe to the Court the approximate distance between the firearm
that was pointed to your husband and the forehead of your husband at the time when the
firing was done?
A It touched the forehead of my husband.
Q That was the very time that you heard the gunburst?
A Yes.
Q When the accused fired the firearm that was carried by him, what happened to your
husband?
A My husband fell down backward to the ground inside the house.
Q By the way, what was the flooring of your house where your husband fell backward to the
ground?
A Cemented.
Q By the way considering that you were just very near to where the incident occurred can you
describe the length of the firearm that was used by the accused in firing your husband?
A It was a short firearm about 6 inches.
Q Now, as your husband fell down to the floor where did the accused proceed and what did
the accused do?

A He was just casually walking away as if nothing had happened.

Q Now, what did you do to your husband, if any, after he fell down to the floor?
A I have done nothing because I was somewhat shocked. I could not move because I was
shocked.[16]
Second: After shooting the victim, the appellant fled from the situs criminis. He surrendered to the
police authorities only on November 6, 1993, but failed to surrender the gun he used to kill the
victim. The appellants claim that he placed the gun on the dining table before entering his bedroom to
change his clothes is incredible. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police
authorities that he killed the victim in a state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun
into the sea. The appellant never presented the police officer to whom he confessed that he killed the
victim in a state of necessity.
Third: The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim. The victim ignored the appellant
as the latter talked to him at the junction of Rizal and Gallardo streets, in the poblacion of
Tuburan. The appellant was incensed at the effrontery of the victim, a mere pedicab driver. The
appellant followed the victim to his house where the appellant again confronted him. The appellant
insisted on talking with the victims son but the victim refused to wake up the latter. The appellant,
exasperated at the victims intransigence, pulled out a gun from under his shirt and shot the victim on
the forehead. It was impossible for the victim to survive. With the appellants admission that he shot
the victim, the matter on whether he used his right or left hand to shoot the latter is inconsequential.
We agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that there is no treachery in the present
case to qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present,
namely, (a) the employment of the means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted.[17] The prosecution failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support the confluence of the
abovementioned conditions. Thus, the appellant is guilty only of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Although the Information alleges that the appellant used an unlicensed firearm
to shoot the victim, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant had no license to possess the
same. Hence, the aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm to commit homicide
should not be appreciated against the appellant.
The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. He turned himself
in to the police authorities prior to the issuance of any warrant for his arrest.
The trial court awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity[18] to the heirs of the deceased. In addition,
the heirs are entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00[19] and the temperate damages
in the amount of P25,000.00 since no sufficient proof of actual damages was offered. [20]
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant Jesus
G. Retubado alias Jessie is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of homicide defined in and
penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years of prision mayor, in its medium period, as minimum, to
fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the
victim, Emmanuel Caon, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 150647. September 29, 2004]

ROWENO POMOY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Well-established is the principle that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on the highest court of the land. However, when facts are
misinterpreted and the innocence of the accused depends on a proper appreciation of the factual
conclusions, the Supreme Court may conduct a review thereof. In the present case, a careful
reexamination convinces this Court that an accident caused the victims death. At the very least, the
testimonies of the credible witnesses create a reasonable doubt on appellants guilt. Hence, the Court
must uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
February 28, 2001 Decision and the October 30, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CAGR CR No. 18759. The CA affirmed, with modifications, the March 8, 1995 judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No. 36921, finding Roweno
Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,MODIFIEDastopenaltyinthesensethatthe[Petitioner]
ROWENOPOMOYissentencedtosufferanindeterminateprisontermofsix(6)years,four(4)
monthsandten(10)daysofprisionmayorminimum,asminimum,tofourteen(14)yearseight(8)
monthsandtwenty(20)daysofreclusiontemporalmedium,asmaximum,thedecisionappealed
fromisherebyAFFIRMEDinallotherrespects.
[6]

The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:

Thatonoraboutthe4thdayofJanuary1990,intheMunicipalityofSara,ProvinceofIloilo,
Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,armed
withhis.45servicepistol,withdeliberateintentanddecidedpurposetokill,andwithoutany
justifiablecauseormotive,didthenandtherewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslyassault,attack
andshootoneTOMASBALBOAwiththeservicepistolhewasthenprovided,inflictinguponthe

lattergunshotwoundsonthevitalpartsofhisbody,whichdirectlycausedthedeathofsaidvictim
thereafter.
[7]

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented respondents version of the facts as follows:

TomasBalboawasamasterteacheroftheConcepcionCollegeofScienceandFisheries
inConcepcion,Iloilo.
OnJanuary4,1990,about7:30inthemorning,somepolicemenarrivedat
theConcepcionCollegetoarrestBalboa,allegedlyinconnectionwitharobberywhichtookplace
inthemunicipalityinDecember1989.Withthearresteffected,Balboaandthepolicemenpassed
bytheConcepcionElementarySchoolwherehiswife,Jessica,wasinagettogetherpartywith
otherSchoolAdministrators.Whenhiswifeaskedhim,Whywillyoubearrested?[H]eanswered
[EvenI]donotknowwhyIamarrested.ThatiswhyIamevengoingthereinordertofindoutthe
reasonformyarrest.
BalboawastakentotheHeadquartersofthealreadydefunct321 stPhilippineConstabulary
CompanyatCampJalandoni,Sara,Iloilo.Hewasdetainedinthejailthereat,alongwithEdgar
Samudio,anothersuspectintherobberycase.
Laterthatday,aboutalittlepast2oclockintheafternoon,petitioner,whoisapolicesergeant,
wentnearthedoorofthejailwhereBalboawasdetainedanddirectedthelattertocomeout,
purportedlyfortacticalinterrogationattheinvestigationroom,ashetoldBalboa:Letsgotothe
investigationroom.Theinvestigationroomisatthemainbuildingofthecompoundwherethejail
islocated.Thejailguardonduty,NicostradoEstepar,openedthejaildoorandwalkedtowardsthe
investigationroom.
Atthattime,petitionerhadagun,a.45caliberpistol,tuckedinaholsterwhichwashangingbythe
sideofhisbelt.Thegunwasfullyembeddedinitsholster,withonlythehandleofthegun
protrudingfromtheholster.
WhenpetitionerandBalboareachedthemainbuildingandwereneartheinvestigationroom,two
(2)gunshotswereheard.Whenthesourceoftheshotswasverified,petitionerwasseenstill
holdinga.45caliberpistol,facingBalboa,whowaslyinginapoolofblood,abouttwo(2)feet
away.WhentheCommandingOfficeroftheHeadquartersarrived,hedisarmedpetitionerand
directedthatBalboabebroughttothehospital.Dr.Palma(firstnamenotprovided)happenedtobe
atthecrimesceneashewasvisitinghisbrotherinthePhilippineConstabulary.WhenDr.Palma
examinedBalboa,he(Dr.Palma)saidthatitwasunnecessarytobringBalboatothehospitalforhe
wasdead.
UpontherequestofMrs.JessicaBalboa,thewifeofthedeceased,Dr.RicardoJabonete,the
medicolegalofficeroftheNationalBureauofInvestigation,RegionVI,IloiloCity,conductedan
autopsyontheremainsofTomasBalboa.Thefollowingwerehisfindings:

Pallor,integumensandnailbeds.
Wound,gunshot:(1)ENTRANCE,downwardsandmedially,edges,modifiedbysutures,
surroundedbyabrasioncollar,0.6cm.Initschest,leftside,10.0cms.fromanteriormidline,121.0
cms.Fromleftheel,directedmediallybackwardsfromlefttoright,penetratingchestwallthru
5thintercostalsspaceintothoraciccavity,perforatingthruandthru,upperlobe,leftlung,lacerating
leftventricularwallcausingpunchedoutfracture,8ththoracicvertebraandmakeanEXIT,stallate
inshape,1.0x0.8cm.Edges,modifiedbysutures,back,rightside,8.0cms.Fromposterior
midline,117.0cms.Fromrightheel(2)ENTRANCE,ovaloid,orientedmediallydownwards,
edgessutured,0.7cm.onitswidestportion,atinferomedialborder,hypochondriacregion,left
side,4.0cms.Fromanteriormidline,105.0cms.Fromleftheel,directedbackwards,laterallywall
intopenetratingabdominalcavity,perforatingthruandthru,stomach,headofthepancreasand
mesentery,makeanexit,ovalid,1.0x0.8cm.,orientedmediallyupwards,edges,sutured,back,
leftside,levelof9thintercostalspace,4.5cms.Fromposteriormidline,110.0cms.Fromleftheel.x
xx.
CAUSEOFDEATH:Hemorrhage,massivesecondarytogunshotwoundsonchestandabdomen.
REMARKS:Bodypreviouslyembalmedandautopsied.
Dr.Jabonetatestifiedthatthetwo(2)woundshefoundonxxxBalboasbodyweregunshot
wounds.Theentranceof[W]oundNo.1wastotheleftsideofthechestabouttheleftnippleand
exitedtotherightsideoftheback.Itstrajectorywasbackwardsthendownwardsfromleftto
right.Astothepossiblepositionoftheassailant,Dr.Jabonetaopinedthatthenozzleofthegunwas
probablyinfrontofthevictimandwasmoretotheleftside,andthegunmusthavebeenalittlebit
higherthantheentrancewound.WoundNo.2waslocatedimmediatelybelowthearchoftheribs,
leftside.Itsdirectionwasbackwardsandlaterallyupwards.Dr.Jabonetaestimatedthatwhenit
wasinflicted,theassailantmusthavepointedthegunsnozzletotherightsidefrontofthevictim.
ThedistancebetweentheentrancepointsofwoundsNo.1andNo.2wasfoundtobeabout16.0
centimeters.
[8]

Version of the Defense

The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the assailed CA Decision, which in turn culled them
from the trial court. The RTC summarized the testimonies of Defense Witnesses Erna Basa, the lone
eyewitness to the incident; Eden Legaspi; Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.; and petitioner himself, as follows:

ErnaBasa:
xxx[O]nJanuary4,1990,shewasworkingintheirofficeinthecampuptotheafternoon;at
aboutpast2oclockthatafternoonwhileworkingonthebacklogs,sheheardsomenoiseand
exchangeofwordswhichwerenotclear,butitseemedtherewasgrowingtrouble;sheopenedthe
doortoverifyandsawRowenoPomoyandTomasBalboagrapplingforthepossessionofthegun;
shewasinsidetheroomandonemeterawayfromthedoor;PomoyandBalboawhilegrappling

weretwotothreemetersawayfromthedoor;thegrapplinghappenedsofastandthegunofPomoy
wassuddenlypulledoutfromitsholsterandthentherewasexplosion;shewasnotcertainwho
pulledthegun.xxx.
EdenLegaspi:
xxx[A]searlyas1:30oclockintheafternoonofJanuary4,1990shewasinsidetheinvestigation
roomofthePCatCampJalandoni,Sara,Iloilo;atabout2oclockthatsameafternoonwhilethere
inside,sheheardacommotionoutsideandsheremainedseatedonthebench;whenthecommotion
startedtheywereseatedonthebenchandafterthecommotionthatwomansoldier(referringto
ErnaBasa)stoodupandopenedthedoorandshesawtwopersonsgrapplingforthepossessionofa
gunandimmediatelytwosuccessiveshotsrangout;shedidnotleavetheplacewhereshewas
seatedbutshejuststoodup;aftertheshots,oneofthetwomenfalldownxxx.
AccusedpetitionerRowenoPomoy:
Heis30yearsoldandaPNPmemberoftheIloiloProvincialMobileForceCompanythenattached
tothedefunct321stPCCompany;hewasoneoftheinvestigatorsoftheiroutfit;about2oclockor
pastthattimeofJanuary4,1990hegotTomasBalboafromtheirstockadefortactical
interrogation;ashewasalreadyholdingthedoorknoboftheirinvestigationroomandaboutto
openandenterit,allofasuddenhesawTomasBalboaapproachhimandtakeholdorgrabthe
handleofhisgun;TomasBalboawasasuspectinarobberycasewhowasapprehendedbythe
policeofConcepcionandthenturnedovertothem(PC)andplacedintheirstockade;heaskedthe
sergeantoftheguardtoletBalboaoutofthestockadeforinterrogation;fromthestockadewith
Balboawalkingwithhim,hehadhis.45caliberpistolplacedinhisholsterattachedtohisbelton
hiswaist;thenashewasholdingthedoorknobwithhisrighthandtoopenthedoor,thevictim,
whowastwometersawayfromhim,suddenlyapproachedhimandgrabbedhisgun,butallofa
suddenheheldthehandleofhisgunwithhislefthand;hereleasedhisrighthandfromthe
doorknoband,withthatrighthand,heheldthehandleofhisgun;TomasBalboawasnotableto
takeactualholdofthegunbecauseofhiseffortsinpreventinghim(Balboa)fromholdingthe
handleofhisgun;heusedhislefthandtoparrythemoveofBalboa;afterheheldthehandleofhis
gunwithhisrighthand,inamatterofseconds,hefeltsomebodywasholdinghisrighthand;heand
Balboagrappledandintwoorthreesecondsthegunwasdrawnfromitsholsterasbothofthem
heldthegun;moregrapplingfollowedandfivesecondsafterthegunwastakenfromitsholsterit
fired,thevictimwastohisrightsidewhentheattempttograbhisgunbeganandwasstilltohis
rightwhenthegunwasdrawnfromitsholsteruntilitfired,astheywerestillgrapplingor
wrestling;hisgunwasalreadyloadedinitschamberandcockedwhenhelefthishouse,anditwas
lockedwhenitfired;duringthegrapplingheusedhislefthandtopreventBalboafromholdinghis
gun,whilethevictimusedhisrighthandintryingtoreachthegun;afterthegunfired,theywere
separatedfromeachotherandBalboafell;heistallerthanBalboathoughthelatterwasbiggerin
build;hecannotsaynordeterminewhoofthemwasstronger;afterBalboafell,Sgt.Alagshouted
sayingstopthatandhesawSgt.Alagapproaching;sometimeafter,Capt.RolandoMaclang,their
commandingofficer,came,gothisgun,andsaidthatthecasebeinvestigatedastowhatreally

happened.Hesaidthatwhenhisgunwasputinitsholsteronlyitshandleprotrudesorcomesout
fromit.
Uponcrossexamination,hesaidthatBalboawasasuspectinarobberycasethathappenedduring
thefirstweekofDecember,1989;hewastheonewhofiledthatcaseinthetownofSanDionisio
andthatcaseinvolvesotherpersonswhowerealsodetained;beforeJanuary4,1990hehadalsothe
chancetoinviteandinterrogateBalboabutwhodeniedanyrobberycase;xxx[I]twasafterhe
tookhislunchthatdaywhenCapt.Maclangcalledhimtoconducttheinterrogation;whenhetook
Balboafromthestockadehedidnottellhimthathe(Balboa)wastobeinvestigatedinthe
investigationroomwhichwashousedinthemainbuildingwhichisfiftymeters,moreorless,from
thestockade,likewisehousestheadministrativeoffice,theofficeofthecommandingofficer,
officeroftheoperationsdivisionandthatofthesignaldivision;hisgunwasinitsholsterwhenthe
victimtriedtograbit(gun);fromthetimehesensedthatthevictimtriedtograbhisgun,helocked
thevictim;thehandofthevictimwasontopofhishandandhefeltthevictimwasattemptingto
gethisgun;thattheentirehandleofhisgunwasexposedwhenplacedinsideitsholster;hecannot
tellwhetherthevictim,whilestrugglingwithhim,wasabletoholdanyportionofhisgunfromthe
tipofitsbarreltothepointwhereitshammerislocated;duringtheincidenthisgunwasfully
loadedandcocked;Sgt.Alagdidnotapproach,butjustviewedthemandprobablyreportedthe
incidenttotheircommandingofficer;hewasnotabletotalktoSgt.Alagashe(Pomoy)wasnotin
hisrightsense;whenhiscommandingofficercamesomefivetotenminuteslaterandtookaway
hisgunhedidnottellhimanything.
Dr.SalvadorMalloJr.
HeistheRuralHealthPhysicianofSarawhoconductedtheautopsyonthecadaverofTomas
BalboathatafternoonofJanuary4,1990;inhisautopsyfindingsrespectingwhichhemadean
autopsyreporthesaidhefoundtwoentrancewoundsonthevictim,thefirstontheleftchestwith
trajectorymediallydownward,whilethesecondoneisontheleftsideofthestomachwith
trajectorysomewhatgoingupward;atthesametimeofhisexaminationhesawthisvictimtobe
wearingalightcoloredTshirtandajacket;otherthantheTshirtwornbythevictim,hedidnot
seeorfindanypowderburnsandmarksandthatthosedottedmarksintheTshirtwerebelievedby
himtobepowderburnsastheylooklikeone;healsofoundadeformedsluginthepocketofthe
jacketofthevictim.
[9]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual findings: 1) the victim was not successful in
his attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in control of the weapon when the shots were
fired; 2) the gun had been locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident and immediately before it went
off; it was petitioner who released the safety lock before he deliberately fired the fatal shots; and 3)
the location of the wounds found on the body of the deceased did not support the assertion of
petitioner that there had been a grappling for the gun.
To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim of petitioner that the death of
Balboa resulted from an accident. Citing People v. Reyes, the CA maintained that a revolver is not
[10]

prone to accidental firing if it were simply handed over to the deceased as appellant claims because
of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure was exerted on the
trigger in the process of allegedly handing it over. If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had
to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver. Either way, the shooting of the deceased must have
been intentional because pressure on the trigger was necessary to make the gun fire.
[11]

Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred with this observation of the OSG:

[Petitioners]theoryofaccidentwouldhavebeeneasiertobelievehadthevictimbeenshotonly
once.Inthiscase,however,[petitioner]shotthevictimnotonlyoncebuttwice,thereby
establishing[petitioners]determinedefforttokillthevictim.Byanystretchoftheimagination,
evenassumingwithoutadmittingthatthefirstshotwasaccidental,thenitshouldnothavebeen
followedbyanothershotonanothervitalpartofthebody.Thefactthat[petitioner]shotthevictim
two(2)timesandwashitontwodifferentanddistantpartsofthebody,inflictedfromtwodifferent
locationsorangles,meansthattherewasanintenttocausethevictimsdeath,contraryto
[petitioners]pretensionsoftheallegedaccidentalfiring.Itisanoftrepeatedprinciplethatthe
location,numberandgravityofthewoundsinflictedonthevictimhaveamorerevealingtaleof
whatactuallyhappenedduringtheincident.xxx.
[12]

Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-defense. It held that petitioner had
miserably failed to prove the attendance of unlawful aggression, an indispensable element of this
justifying circumstance.
While substantially affirming the factual findings of the RTC, the CA disagreed with the conclusion
of the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position had attended the
commission of the crime. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the RTC was modified by the appellate
court in this manner:

xxx[F]orpublicpositiontobeappreciatedasanaggravatingcircumstance,thepublicofficial
mustusehisinfluence,prestigeandascendancywhichhisofficegiveshiminrealizinghis
purpose.Iftheaccusedcouldhaveperpetratedthecrimewithoutoccupyinghisposition,thenthere
isnoabuseofpublicposition.(Peoplevs.Joyno,304SCRA655,670).Intheinstantcase,thereis
noshowingthatthe[petitioner]hadapremeditatedplantokillthevictimwhentheformerfetched
thelatterfromthestockade,thus,itcannotbeconcludedthatthepublicpositionofthe[petitioner]
facilitatedthecommissionofthecrime.Therefore,thetrialcourtsfindingthatthesaidaggravating
circumstancethat[petitioner]tookadvantageofhispublicpositiontocommitthecrimecannotbe
sustained.Hence,therebeingnoaggravatingandnomitigatingcircumstanceproved,themaximum
ofthepenaltyshallbetakenfromthemediumperiodofreclusiontemporal,apenaltyimposablefor
thecrimeofhomicide.xxx.
[13]

Hence, this Petition.

[14]

Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues for the Courts consideration:

I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in affirming petitioners conviction
despite the insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to convict the petitioner, in contrast to
petitioners overwhelming evidence to support his theory/defense of accident.
II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in affirming the conviction of the
petitioner on a manifestly mistaken inference that when the gun fired, the petitioner was in full
control of the handle of the gun, because what the testimonies of disinterested witnesses and the
petitioner reveal was that the gun fired while petitioner and Balboa were both holding the gun in
forceful efforts to wrest the gun from each other.
III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the solicitor generals observation that the fact that
petitioner shot the victim twice establishes petitioners determined effort to kill the victim.
IV. The appellate court committed serious misapprehension of the evidence presented when it ruled
that the trajectory of the wounds was front-to-back belying the allegation of petitioner that he and
the victim were side-by-side each other when the grappling ensued.
V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real import of petitioners reaction to the incident when it
stated that the dumbfounded reaction of petitioner after the incident strongly argues against his
claim of accidental shooting.
VI. The appellate court committed grave error when it disregarded motive or lack of it in determining
the existence of voluntariness and intent on the part of petitioner to shoot at the victim when the
same was put in serious doubt by the evidence presented.
VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that the defense of accident and self-defense are
inconsistent.
VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the imposition of the penalties and damages.[15]

In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to two: First, whether the shooting of Tomas
Balboa was the result of an accident; and second, whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Accidental Shooting
Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, are conclusive. Both courts possess time-honored expertise in the field of fact
finding. But where some facts are misinterpreted or some details overlooked, the Supreme Court may
overturn the erroneous conclusions drawn by the courts a quo. Where, as in this case, the facts in
dispute are crucial to the question of innocence or guilt of the accused, a careful factual
reexamination is imperative.
[16]

Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code:

Article12.Circumstanceswhichexemptfromcriminalliability.Thefollowingareexemptfrom
criminalliability:
xxxxxxxxx
4.Anypersonwho,whileperformingalawfulactwithduecare,causesaninjurybymereaccident
withoutfaultorintentofcausingit.

Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due
to the fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been foreseen or
controlled. Thus, in determining whether an accident attended the incident, courts must take into
account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This
determination inevitably brings to the fore the main question in the present case: was petitioner in
control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment the shots were fired?
[17]

Petitioner Not in Control

of the Gun When It Fired
The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it was Erna Basa who witnessed the incident
firsthand. Her account, narrated during cross-examination, detailed the events of that fateful
afternoon of January 4, 1990 as follows:
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. You said that while you were inside the investigation room you heard a commotion. That
commotion which you heard, did you hear any shouting as part of that commotion which you
heard?
A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue was not clear. It could not be understood.
Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that commotion?
A. No, sir.
Q. From the time you entered the investigation room you did not hear any voice while you were inside
the investigation room as part of that commotion?
A. There was no loud voice and their conversation could not be clarified. They were talking somewhat
like murmuring or in a low voice but there was a sort of trouble in their talks.
COURT:
Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their conversation?
A. Yes, sir.

xxxxxxxxx
Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy and Mr. Balboa the deceased in this case? Am I
correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a gun?
A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating by pointing to her side) and I saw both of them
grappling for that gun.
Q. Where was the gun at that time?
A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by pointing to [her] side.)
Q. When you demonstrated you were according to you saw the hands holding the gun. It was Sgt.
Pomoy who was holding the gun with his right hand?
A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in its holster, the hand of Sir Balboa and Sgt.
Pomoy.
COURT:
Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its holster?
A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster with both hands grappling for the possession
of the gun.

Q. How many hands did you see?

A. Two.
Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that of the victim?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY TEODOSIO:
Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the gun?
A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy.
Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, was it holding the gun?
A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on the gun and Sir Balboas hand was also
there. Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding?
A. The handle.
Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?
A. At first they were not directly facing each other.
Q. So later, they were facing each other?
A. They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as they were
grappling for the possession of the gun force against force.
COURT:
Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots were fired?
A. When I saw them they were already facing each other.
Q. What was the distance?
A. Very close to each other.
Q. How close?
A. Very near each other.
Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1) foot?
A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such a manner that their bodies would touch each
other.
Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the gun fired?
A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were heard.
Q. And they were directly facing each other?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken out from its holster?
A. While they were grappling for the possession of the gun, gradually the gun was released
from its holster and then there was an explosion.

Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired because they were
grappling for the possession of the gun.
Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were grappling for its possession?
A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from that very gun.
Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two times?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to because the
gun was turning.

xxxxxxxxx
Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun when the gun fired?
A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in the possession of Sgt. Pomoy. He was the one
holding the gun.
Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was already in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the gun in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had separated themselves with each other, it was then that I
saw Sgt. Pomoy holding the gun.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster, Sgt. Pomoy was the one holding the handle of the
gun? Am I correct?
A. Both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two of them were holding the gun?
A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun, Sgt. Pomoy and Sir Balboa.
Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun as you testified?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the gun with his left hand, was he in front of Sgt.
Pomoy?
A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each other. Pomoys right and Balboas left sides
[were] towards each other. They were side by side at a closer distance towards each other.

xxxxxxxxx
Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun during that time?
A. When I looked out it was when they were grappling for the possession of the gun and the
right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was holding the handle of the gun.

Q. When you saw them did you see what position of the handle of the gun was being held by Tomas
Balboa? The rear portion of the handle of the gun or the portion near the trigger?
A. When I looked at them it was the hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding the handle of the gun with his
right hand with the hand of Sir Balboa over the hand of Pomoy, the same hand holding the
gun.
Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed from its holster?
A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I was not able to notice clearly anymore whose
hand was holding the gun when I saw both their hands were holding the gun.
Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, Daw duha na sila nagakapot, what you really mean?
A. Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the gun?
A. Still both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand of Sgt. Pomoy as what you have previously
said when the gun was in the holster of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I saw that Sgt. Pomoys right hand was still on the
handle of the gun with the left hand of Sir Balboa over his right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, like
this (witness illustrating by showing his right hand with her left hand over her right hand as if
holding something. The thumb of the left hand is somewhat over the index finger of the right
hand.)
COURT:
Which hand of the victim was used by him when the gun was already pulled out form its holster and
while the accused was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding a portion of the handle of the gun up to the time
when the gun was pulled out from its holster?
A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his right hand because the left hand of Pomoy was
used by him in parrying the right hand of Sir Balboa which is about to grab the handle of the gun.
COURT:
Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left hand in pushing the victim away from him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was he doing with his right hand?
A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with his right hand and Pomoy was using his left
hand to protect the victim from reaching the gun with his right hand.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was able to hold the barrel of the gun of Sgt.
Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was at the time before the shots were fired?
A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the gun using his right hand.

COURT:
Q. That was before the gun fired?
A. Yes, sir.[18]

The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have control of the gun during the
scuffle. The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried
to thwart those attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the victim were all over the weapon
was categorically asserted by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling for the gun, both hands of
petitioner were fully engaged -- his right hand was trying to maintain possession of the weapon, while
his left was warding off the victim. It would be difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances,
petitioner would coolly and effectively be able to release the safety lock of the gun and deliberately
aim and fire it at the victim.
It would therefore appear that there was no firm factual basis for the following declaration of the
appellate court: [Petitioner] admitted that his right hand was holding the handle of the gun while the
left hand of the victim was over his right hand when the gun was fired. This declaration would safely
lead us to the conclusion that when the gun went off herein [petitioner] was in full control of the gun.
[19]

Release of the Guns Safety Lock and

Firing of the Gun Both Accidental
Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a safety lock that, unless
released, would prevent the firing of the gun. Despite this safety feature, however, the evidence
showed that the weapon fired and hit the victim -- not just once, but twice. To the appellate court, this
fact could only mean that petitioner had deliberately unlocked the gun and shot at the victim. This
conclusion appears to be non sequitur.
It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. This
frenzied grappling for the weapon -- though brief, having been finished in a matter of seconds -- was
fierce and vicious. The eyewitness account amply illustrated the logical conclusion that could not be
dismissed: that in the course of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been accidentally released and
the shots accidentally fired.
That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and conclusively negate the
claim that the shooting was accidental, as the same circumstance can easily be attributed to the
mechanism of the .45 caliber service gun. Petitioner, in his technical description of the weapon in
question, explained how the disputed second shot may have been brought about:

xxxPetitioneralsotestifiedoncrossexaminationthatacaliber.45semiautomaticpistol,when
fired,immediatelyslidesbackwardthrowingawaytheemptyshellandreturnsimmediately
carryingagainalivebulletinitschamber.Thus,theguncan,asitdid,fireinsuccession.Verily,
thelocationof,anddistancebetweenthewoundsandthetrajectoriesofthebulletsjibeperfectly
withtheclaimofthepetitioner:thetrajectoryofthefirstshotgoingdownwardfromlefttoright
thuspushingBalboasupperbody,tiltingittotheleftwhileBalboawasstillclutchingpetitioners
handoverthegun;thesecondshothittinghiminthestomachwiththebulletgoingupwardof
Balboasbodyashewasfallingdownandreleasinghisholdonpetitionershandxxx.
[20]

Thus, the appellate courts reliance on People v. Reyes was misplaced. In that case, the Court
disbelieved the accused who described how his gun had exploded while he was simply handing it
over to the victim. Here, no similar claim is being made; petitioner has consistently maintained that
the gun accidentally fired in the course of his struggle with the victim. More significantly, the present
case involves a semi-automatic pistol, the mechanism of which is very different from that of a
[21]

revolver, the gun used in Reyes. Unlike a revolver, a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently described
by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing when possession thereof becomes the object of a struggle.
[22]

Alleged Grappling Not Negated

by Frontal Location of Wounds
On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing that the wounds of the deceased were all
frontal, the appellate court rejected petitioners claim that a grappling for the weapon ever occurred. It
held that if there was indeed a grappling between the two, and that they had been side [by] side x x x
each other, the wounds thus inflicted could not have had a front-to-back trajectory which would lead
to an inference that the victim was shot frontally, as observed by Dr. Jaboneta.
[23]

Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of the parties at the
precise moment when the gun was fired. Their positions would in turn be relevant to a determination
of the existence of variables such as treachery, aggression and so on.
In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the wounds becomes
inconsequential. Where, as in this case, both the victim and the accused were grappling for
possession of a gun, the direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the process, such that the
trajectory of the bullet when the weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case, the
eyewitness account of that aspect of the tragic scuffle shows that the parties positions were unsteady,
and that the nozzle of the gun was neither definitely aimed nor pointed at any particular target. We
quote the eyewitness testimony as follows:
Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired because they were
grappling for the possession of the gun.

xxxxxxxxx
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to because the
gun was turning.[24]

xxxxxxxxx
Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?
A At first, they were not directly facing each other.
Q So later, they were facing each other?
A They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as they were
grappling for the possession of the gun force against force.[25]

In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:

xxx.TheCourtofAppealserredinconcludingthatBalboawasshotfrontally.First,becausethe
positionofthegundoesnotnecessarilyindicatethepositionofthepersonorpersonsholdingthe
gunwhenitfired.Thisisespeciallytruewhentwopersonsweregrapplingforthepossession
ofthegunwhenitfired,aswhatexactlytranspiredinthiscase.xxx.
[The]testimonyclearlydemonstratesthatthepetitionerwasontheleftsideofthevictimduringthe
grapplingwhenthegunfired.Thesecondwoundwasthusinflictedthiswise:whenthefirstshothit
Balboa,hisupperbodywaspusheddownwardowingtotheknockingpowerofthecaliber.45
pistol.Buthedidnotletgoofhisgripofthehandofpetitionerandthegun,Balboapullingthegun

downashewasgoingdown.WhenthegunwentoffthesecondtimehittingBalboa,thetrajectory
ofthebulletinBalboasbodywasgoingupwardbecausehisupperbodywaspusheddownward
twistingtotheleft.ItwasthenthatBalboaletgoofhisgrip.Oncrossexamination,petitioner
testified,whatInoticedwasthataftersuccessiveshotsweseparatedfromeachother.This
sequenceofeventsislogicalbecausetheprotagonistsweregrapplingoverthegunandwere
movingveryfast.xxx.
[26]

Presence of All the

Elements of Accident
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act
with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the accused,
there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury. From the facts, it is clear that all these elements
were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member -- specifically, one of the
investigators -- of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the
instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latters cell for a routine interrogation.
[27]

Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend
his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an
enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by
anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody.Such weapon was likely to be used to
facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to prevent
his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had
kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at all times, especially
within the premises of his working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the
deceased, much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the guard in charge of the detention of
Balboa, did not testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to harm
the victim while being fetched from the detention cell.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victims death was limited only to acts committed in the
course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun from
its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of which led
to the death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of
circumstances beyond the control of petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create
serious doubt on the latters culpability.
Petitioners Subsequent Conduct
Not Conclusive of Guilt
To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct of petitioner immediately after the incident
was indicative of remorse. Allegedly, his guilt was evident from the fact that he was dumbfounded,
according to the CA; was mum, pale and trembling, according to the trial court. These behavioral
reactions supposedly point to his guilt. Not necessarily so.His behavior was understandable. After all,
a minute earlier he had been calmly escorting a person from the detention cell to the investigating
room; and, in the next breath, he was looking at his companions bloodied body. His reaction was to
be expected of one in a state of shock at events that had transpired so swiftly and ended so
regrettably.
Second Issue:

Self-Defense
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo that he intentionally shot
Balboa, he claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no
intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in
order to defend oneself from imminent danger. Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did not
occur out of any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim for the purpose
of self-defense against any aggression; rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental
result of both parties attempts to possess the firearm.
[28]

Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun of petitioner
-- an exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code -- a further
discussion of whether the assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner
is ACQUITTED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1352

March 29, 1905

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appelle,

vs.
APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MAPA, J.:
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years
ofpresidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of
the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without
having taken part in the said crime as principals or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the
victims in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he confessed to
having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was compelled to do so by the
murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated by the only
eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he
was present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the
Americans, but the he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the
shots he began to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter
called to him and striking him with the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.

The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8).
Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any way in the
execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as
well as one of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did not take
any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of the occurrence when the burial took
place. The confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the
Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal
proof, because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a
confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another witness for the prosecution,
Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to
the other defendants that nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made
freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec.
4, Act No. 619 of the Philippine Commission).
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems to be one of
the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished by
the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we acquit the
defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1481

February 17, 1904

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
LIBERATO EXALTACION, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Alberto Barretto for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the court of that province an information charging
Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco with the crime of rebellion, in that they, subsequently to the 4th
day of November, 1901, willfully and illegally bound themselves to take part in a rebellion against the Government of
the United States in these Islands, swearing allegiance to the Katipunan Society, the purpose of which was to
overthrow the said Government by force of arms, this against the statute in the case made and provided.
In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor of Bulacan, testified under oath that the two
defendants were arrested in the month of March, 1903, the police some days before having captured a number of
documents in the encampment of one Contreras, as so-called general of bandits, situated at a place called Langca,
of the town of Meycauayan, among which documents appeared the papers now on pages 2 and 3 of the record,
signed by the said Exaltacion and Tanchinco, who recognized the said documents when they were exhibited to

them; that the said defendants stated to the witness that they had signed the said documents under compulsion;
that the purpose of the Katipunan Society was to obtain the independence of the Philippines; that this statement
was made in the house of the parish priest of Meycauayan in the presence of Exequiel Casas and Fernando Nieto.
The latter, upon their examination as witnesses, testified to the same facts, stating that the defendants told Governor
Tecson that they had signed the said documents under fear of death at the hands of the thieves by whom they had
been captured. The witness Casas, the municipal president of Meycauayan, testified that he held office as such in
place of the former president, Don Tomas Testa, who was kidnapped in the month of October, 1902.
The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the second July 17, 1902, were written in Tagalog, and
contain an oath taken in the name of God, and a covenant on the part of the subscribers to carry out the superior
orders of the Katipunan, and never disobey them until their death in the defense of the mother country. The two
accused, under oath, testified to having signed the said documents and alleged that they did so under compulsion
and force while they were held as captives by the thieves; that the defendant Tanchinco was captured in the fields
one day when he was going to work on his farm by three armed men, unknown to him, who asked him if he was an
agent or friend of President Testa, and upon his replying in the negative they compelled him in view of his denial to
sign a document, now on page 3 of the record.
The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact that he was captured at a place called Kaibiga in
the township of Novaliches, and that on the day following his release, having been unable to pay the $300 which
was demanded of him, he reported to the president, Tomas Testa. The defendant Liberato Exaltacion under oath
testified that he was captured near Meycauayan by five persons, unknown, dressed as policemen and armed with
guns or revolvers; that these men bound him and took him into the forest and there compelled him by threats of
death to sign the documents now on page 2 of the record; that thereupon they allowed him to go upon promise to
return. This defendant testified that Antero Villano and Tomas Rivera saw him while on the road in the hands of the
thieves. Both the accused testified that as soon as they were released they presented themselves to the president,
Don Tomas Testa, in the presence of witnesses, and subsequently went to Bonifacio Morales, a lieutenant of
volunteers, and reported to him the fact that they had been captured.
The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio Ferrer, and Hipolito de Leon of whom the last
two were present when Tanchinco appeared before Senor Testa, the president of Meycauayan, and reported to him
what had happened to him all testified to the same fact and corroborated the statements of the accused with
respect to their capture and their subsequent report to President Testa and to the witness Morales.
The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents above referred to, signed by the accused, is
not sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the imposition upon them of the penalty inflicted by the
judgment of the court below.
The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnapped by brigands who belonged to the
Contreras band, and that they signed the said documents under compulsion and while in captivity, relieve them from
all criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are charged. The conduct of the defendants in
presenting themselves first to the local president of Meycauayan and subsequently to Lieut. Bonifacio Morales, of
the Bulacan Government Volunteers, as soon as they were released by the bandits is corroborative of their
testimony, and is the best demonstration of their innocence. This conclusion is not overcome by the trifling
discrepancy between the testimony of the witness Yusay and that of the defendant Tanchinco nor the fact the
Exaltacion was unable to determine the date when he was captured or that on which he appeared before President
Testa.
The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act No. 292 not having been established at the trial
beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion that the judgment below must be reversed and the defendants
acquitted with the costs de oficio. The judge below will be informed of this decision and a copy of the judgment
entered herein will be furnished him for his information and guidance. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Willard, Mapa, McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-54414 July 9, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUSTAQUIO LORENO y MALAGA and JIMMY MARANTAL y LONDETE, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo Herrera for accused-appellants.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

In an information filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and
Jimmy Marantal y Londete were charged with tile crime of Robbery with Double Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 7th of January, 1978, in the Barangay of Magsaysay, Municipality of Libmanan,
Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, together with John Doe, Jose Doe, Richard Doe, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe,
and Ricky Doe, who are still at large, armed with firearms, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and rob, taking advantage of nighttime to better
accomplish their purpose, did then and there were Ifully unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack
and use violence and intimidation upon the person of Elias Monge by tying his two hands and the
hands of the members of his fully and on the occasion hereof, while they were made lying flat on the
floor, the herein accused take, rob and carry away, without the consent of said Elias Monge, owner
thereof, of the following properties, to wit:
One camera with trademark Olympus worth P400.00
Two birthstones rings worth 700.00
One wedding ring with name MONDING 100.00
One pair of earrings heartshape 100.00
Two pieces of necklace solid worth 400.00
Two pieces of mosquito net 110.00
Three pieces of blankets color orange and spotted 200.00
Three men pants and also one cut of cloth 235.50
One beach towel, with decoration 35.00
One aluminum Reynold kettle 30.00
One One caserola 15.00

Two pieces of pillow case 12.00

Two cans of rice 70.00
One flashlight Eveready two batteries 30.00
TOTAL P10,619.50
all in the total amount of TEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETEEN PESOS and FIFTY
CENTAVOS (P10,619.50), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in
the aforementioned amount. That on the occasion thereof, the abovenamed accused with lewd
design, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit sexual intercourse with Monica Monge, a virgin of 16 years old, and with Cristina
Monge, all against their will. 1
Upon arraignment, both accused Eustaquio Loreno y Malaga and Jimmy Marantal y Londete entered a plea of not
guilty to the crime charged.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment adverse to the accused, the dispositive portion of which read:
ACCORDINGLY, we find the guilt of the accused Eustaquio Loreno has been established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt and hereby find him GUILTY of Robbery with Double Rape, penalized by
Par. 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. There being present aggravating circumstances in
the commission of the offense, Eustaquio Loreno is hereby sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, the
maximum penalty provided by law.
Likewise, the Court finds that the guilt of the accused Jimmy Marantal has been established beyond
reasonable doubt and hereby finds him GUILTY of the crime of ROBBERY penalized under Par. 5 of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. Jimmy Marantal is sentenced to indeterminate penalty
ranging from TWO (2) YEARS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, in view of the aggravating circumstances present.
Said accused Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal shall indemnify jointly and severally Elias
Monge in the sum of P10,619.50 without subsidiary imprisonment, In addition, Eustaquio Loreno
shall indemnify Monica Monge and Cristina Monge in the sum of P10,000.00 each or a total of
P20,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment.
The accused herein shall pay one-half of the costs each.

The facts of the case as stated by the Solicitor General in his Brief, areas follows:
In the evening of January 7, 1978, Barangay Captain Elias Monge was at his house located at barrio
Magsaysay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. He and his two young daughters, namely: Monica Monge,
single, then 14 years old, and Cristina Monge, married, then 22 years old, were preparing to attend
the dance to be held in the barrio proper that evening. But they had to wait for a while because his
wife, Beata Monge, was still changing the diaper of baby Rachel Baybayon, four-month old daughter
of Cristina Monge. The other occupants present in the house that evening were his sons, Mario, then
11 years old, and Nilo, then 13 years old, and their farm helper, also staying with them, by the name
of Francisco Fable. Cristina was then vacationing at her parents' house. Her husband, Raymundo
Baybayon, was in Manila (pp. 2-5, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM: pp, 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM: pp. 2-4,
tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
At about 7:40 o'clock that same evening, while he was at the balcony of said house, Francisco Fable
saw at first four men with flashlights approaching. When they came near, he heard one of them call
Elias Monge saving that there was a letter from the chief hepe). Fable called Elias Monge who was
in the sala, informing him that there was a letter from the chief. Two of the visitors, one wearing red
clothes and the other in dark sweater. came up the house. When Elias Monge went out to the

balcony the man in dark sweater handed to him the letter. Because it was dark to read it, Elias
Monge invited the man in dark sweater to come inside the sala. The other man in red clothes posted
himself near the post of the balcony (pp. 4-5, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM:
pp. 4-9, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AMOUNT pp. 4-7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM: pp. 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979
PM).
When be and the man in dark sweater were inside the sala Elias Monge asked his daughter, Monica
to fetch his reading glasses. On reading the letter, Elias Monge and Monica read the following: "Kami
mga NPA", which caused Monica to run to her mother, seized with fear, informing her what she came
to know about camme visitors. Cristina Morgagor came attempted to run to the kitchen to get a bolo
but she was held back by the man in dark sweater who then announced to all those inside not to
make any scandal. kitchen Elias Monge turned to look at him the man in dark sweater poked his gun
at him, and ordered all those inside the on the floor (pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 Pvl p. 7, tsn, Oct.
18, 1979 AM pp. 4 4, 12-13, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 4, 13, 16, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM)
In the meantime outside at the balcony the man in red clothe asked Fable for a glass of water arid
the latter asked Mario Monge to get the glass of later, but Mario did not obey and instead went to the
sala Hence, fabie himself outside inside the house to the the glass of water. But, as he went inside
the sala, he noticed the man in red clothes following him. As Fabie reached the door to the sala, the
man in red clothes poked his gun on Fabie's back and pointed a sharp instrument on his neck and
then he wish pushed to go inside the sala. Once inside the sala, which Aras lighted, Fable saw and
recognized the man in red clothes these to Estaquio loreno. Also Elias Monge and his two
daughters, Monica and Cristina, saw and recognized Eustaquio Loreno as he entered the sala as
one of the companions of the man in dark sweater. All tile occupants of the house were ordered by
the man in dark sweater and Loreno to remain lying flat on their stomachs on the floor (pp. 5-6, tsn,
Oct. 19, 1979 AM: pp. 10-12, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 1-8, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 21-22, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 5, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM p. 5, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed loreno to tie all their victims on the floor. Loreno tied
them with rattan. The man in dark sweater cut the baby's hammock (duyan) and got the ropes with
which he and Loreno used to reinforce in tying the victim's hands together behind their backs.
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater instructed Loreno to go downstairs and drive the barking dog
away. Loreno held Fable and brought him downstairs to drive the barking dog away (pp, 8-9, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 6, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM).
On reaching the corner of the house below the flashlight used by Loreno happened to focus on the
person of Jimmy Marantal. Fable immediately recognized Jimmy Marantal as one of the visitors who
remained on the ground as lookouts. Jimmy Marantal beamed his flashlight on the face of Fable,
and seeing the latter, he kicked him (Fabie) on the right side of his rib which caused him to fall on the
ground. Marantal kicked Fable who managed to roll on his side and was hit on his left thigh. After a
while, Loreno lifted Fable bodily from the ground, and brought am back upstairs (pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct.
19, 1979 AM pp. 13-14, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM).
After Loreno and Fable returned to the sala, the man in dark sweater got hold of Monica Monge and
dragged her up to a room located above the balcony. She tried to resist but she was then still tied,
Inside the room, Monica was asked to reveal the whereabouts of her piggy bank savings. She said
there was none. He ransacked the room but found none. The man in dark sweater then seized
Monica and forcibly removed her pants. Monica resisted and shouted at her parents for help. He
boxed and slapped her. Despite her struggle, he was able to remove her panty and then made her
he on the floor near the bed. After undressing himself, he forcibly went on top of her. She kept on
struggling and shouting for help, but he succeeded in inserting his organ into her vagina. She felt
pain. He proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. She could not do anything to stop him from
consummating his lust as she was still tied. When he was through with her, she noticed blood in her
private part (p. 9, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 5, 14, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM
pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Below in the sala, Monica Monge's parents and others heard her shouts for help and the struggle
she put up inside the room. Hearing her shouts for help, Loreno menacingly pointed his gun at them,

telling them not to rise if they wanted to live, Then Loreno brought Beata Monge first to the masters
room and then to the teacher's room. During these two occasions, he forced Beata Monge to open
the aparador and the trunk respectively, with her keys, and he got their contents, which he brought to
the sala, holding on to Beata Monge who remained tied. All the things he got from the two rooms
were poured on the floor of the sala (pp. 7, 9, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 10-1 1, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979
AM pp. 7-13, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 5-6, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM pp. 17-19, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979
AM).
Thereafter, the man in dark sweater returned to the sala, dragging along Monica Monge whose hair
was dishevelled and was crying, and he made her joined the others on the floor of the sala. He
reached for a can of pineapple j nice from the aparador and the sala and drank its contents. Not long
thereafter, he turned his attention to Cristina Monge, and he dragged her to the room which was then
rented by school teacher Miss Olitoquit (who was then in Naga City). Inside the room, the man in
dark sweater forced his lewd designs on her but she resisted and struggled although her hands were
still tied behind her back. He boxed her, hitting her on her right eye which caused her to lose
consciousness. He then proceeded to satisfy his lust on her. When she regained consciousness, the
man in dark sweater returned her shorts. She then realized that he had succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her (p. 6, 17-19, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 7-8, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM pp. 11-12, tsn,
Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 6, 14-15, 18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
While the man in dark sweater and Cristina Monge were still inside the teacher's room, a third man
entered the sala, and he told Loreno to cover their victims on the floor with a mat. Loreno found
instead a piece of lawanit with which they covered their victims. The third man proceeded to the
kitchen, and when he returned to the sala, he was bringing along some rice. Then, a fourth man
entered the sala and he asked from Elias Monge for a cigarette. Elias Monge stood up and told him
to get it from his pocket as he was still tied. Reacting to Monge's reply, the fourth man boxed him,
hitting him on his breast and solar plexus which caused him to fall on the floor. Then Loreno asked
Elias Monge to accompany him to the house of a nearby neighbor. On reaching the balcony, Elias
Monge protested and refused to accompany Loreno who then held Elias Monge by the neck,
pointing his gun at him. Beata Monge protested, telling her husband not to go along. loreno desisted
from his plan to go to the nearby neighbor's house, Elias Monge did not recognize the Identities of
both the third and fourth men (pp. 12-15, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16-17, 25-26, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979
PM pp. 12-13, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 7, 14-15, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM).
Thereafter Loreno entered the room where Cristina Monge was earlier brought by the man in dark
sweater, and he found her still lying on the floor. Loreno embraced her trying to kiss her and touch
her private parts. One of the malefactors on the ground called those upstairs to hurry because a man
was approaching. Loreno then released Cristina Monge and told her to return to the sala to
breastfeed her daughter who was continuously crying. Thereafter, the malefactors went down from
the house one by one, bringing along all the things they robbed from their victims. The man in dark
sweater returned to the sala and touched the thighs of Cristina Monge, who was already wearing her
shorts, and he told them not to tell anybody what happened to them, otherwise he will kill them. And
then all the malefactors left the place (pp. 15-16, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 16, 18, 19-20, tsn, Oct.
29, 1979 PM).
Soon thereafter, Elias Monge heard Sixto Agapito who was On the ground near the fence of the
house calling him, asking if he was going to the dancehall Elias Monge replied from upstairs that he
was not feeling well, and Agapito left. EUSTAQUIO Monge was able to untie himself, and then he
also untied the others. Fable then revealed to him that earlier when he had gone down with Loreno,
he (Fabie) saw and recognized Jimmy Marantal as among those left on the ground as lookout for the
group that had just robbed them. Cristina and Monica Monge also told their father that they were
abused by the man in dark sweater when they were brought inside the rooms. For the rest of the
night, they remained on guard and could hardly sleep (pp. 15-16, 17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 1011, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979 AM p. 7, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Elias Monge and his family later discovered that they were robbed of their following personal
properties: jewelry valued at Pl,000.00' two mosquito nets, P70.00; three bets, P200.00; one caldero
of rice, P30.00; one reversible jacket, P40.00; three chickens, P30.00; one camera, P400.00; one

beach towel, P35.00; cash in the amount of P6,500,00; and several others, all in the total of
P10,305.00, more or less (pp. 4-6, 8, 14-17, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979; pp. 16-17, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM).
Fabie had often seen and had known Loreno because the latter's daughter married a member of the
youth organization in the barrio when he (Fabie) was its president. Elias Monge had already known
Loreno whose occupation was catching wild pigs, and the latter used to place bobby traps in his
(Monge's) place to catch pigs, during which occasions Loreno usually slept in his house, Monica
Monge and Cristina Monge also had already known Loreno because his daughter married a
neighbor near their house. Monica often saw Loreno traverse the playground of the Magsaysay
Elementary School where he was studying. Fable had also known Jimmy Marantal because the
latter often attended dances held by the barrio youth organization, and he (Marantal) even married
one of its members, He had engaged Marantal in conversations many times p. 3, tsn, Oct. 19, 1979
AM pp. 2-3, tsn, Oct. 22, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 8-9, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM pp. 2-3, 7-8, tsn, Oct. 18-1979
AM pp. 2-3, 21-22, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM pp. 2, 8-10, 17-18, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Despite the revelation of her daughters to him that they were sexually abused that fateful evening,
Elias Monge forced himself to report the following day, Sunday the robbery-rape incident at the PC
detachment in Sipocot, but there was no one to talk there. So he proceeded to the PC headquarters
at Camp Tara, bringing along the ropes and rattan which were used by the malefactors in tying him
and his family during the robbery-rape incident. He was given a written recommendation from the PC
to the hospital with instructions to have himself and his daughter Monica be physically examined.
Cristina Monge was informed that there was no need for her to submit for physical examination
because she was already married. (pp. 18-19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM p. 18; tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 PM p.
8, tsn., Oct. 29, 1979 PM).
Sgt. Victoriano del Socorro, the chief of the investigation section of the 243rd PC Company,
stationed at Tara, Camarines Sur, investigated on January 10, 1978 the robbery-rape incident. He
was informed by Barangay Captain Elias Monge that his house was robbed and his two daughters
were raped by the robbers in the evening of January 7, 1978 in their house and that he (Monge) was
able to Identify two of the robbers, mentioning their names as Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal
of Barrio Calabnigan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. After Sgt. del Socorro and his team made an ocular
inspection of the place on that same day, they proceeded to barrio Calabnigan where they picked up
Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal and brought them to the PC camp. At the PC camp on
January 17, 1978, the two suspects were duly Identified upon confrontation as two of the robbers by
the above-mentioned barrio captain, his daughters Monica and Cristina Monge, and their helper
Fable. During the investigation, the two suspects refused to give their written statements. Thus, Sgt.
del Socorro was able to secure the written statements of Elias Monge, Francisco Fable, Monica
Monge, and Cristina Monge about the robbery-rape incident. Upon being Identified both said
suspects told their victims ff they could just talk and settle the matter, but Elias Monge replied that
what they did that evening was an oppression (kaapihan) against him and his family, The two
suspects retorted that it was up to him (pp. 19-21, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM pp. 18-20, tsn, Oct. 18,
1979 PM pp. 1-5, 6, 8- 12, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 AM).
Dr. Jesus H. Miraflores, resident physician of the Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital at Naga City,
examined Elias Monge on January 10, 1978. The X-Ray examination's result was negative. But the
doctor found him to have sustained an external injury which he classified as "resolving hematoma,
right cestal region" a close wound, already spread out but and the process of healing, located on the
right side of the middle portion of the thorax. He gave Elias Monge a prescription for anti-infection to
stop the bleeding as there was still slight bleeding and to subside the swelling. Afterwards he gave
the corresponding medical certificate to Elias Monge (Exhibit "A"; pp. 22-26, tsn, Oct. 29, 1979 AM p.
19, tsn, Oct. 18, 1979 AM
Dr. Erlie S. Cabral, another resident physician of the same provincial hospital examined Monica
Monge on January 10, 1978. The doctor did not find any fresh wound on her body, but examining her
hymen, she found fresh and incomplete lacerations of said hymen at 3:00 and 9:00 o'clock locations
and, inserting her index finger inside her patient's sex orifice, lt easily admitted her forefinger. She
had the patient's vagina smeared for spermatozoa but none was found after laboratory examination
The doctor observed that the lacerations did not reach the base of the hymen but the edges of the

lacerated portions were still reddish and slightly swollen. The doctor opined that the lacerations
could have been caused by the forcible penetration of a male's penis into the patient's vagina. The
doctor further expeled that the laceration of the hymen heals after five days. She also expeled that
male spermatozoa stays inside the female vagina at the most for 72 hours. She stated that,
admitting there was orgasm during the forcible sexual intercourse, any sperm must have already
disappeared when she examined Monica Monge on January 10, 1978 which was already beyond 72
hours since she was raped in the evening of January 7, 1978 (pp. 26-28, 31, 33-34, tsn, Oct. 29,
1979 AM; Exhibit "B"). 3
Appellants Eustaquio Loreno and Jimmy Marantal claimed that they acted under the compulsion of an irresistible
force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury. They admitted that they were in the
house of Elias Monge on the night of January 7, 1978, 4 but they were only forced by a man wearing black sweater and
his five companions who claimed to be members of the New People's Army (NPA), operating in the locality, with the threat
that if they did not obey, appellants and their families would be killed. We, however, find the contention untenable.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom.
The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of Appellee's Brief. death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future
injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of Such a character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for
escape or self-defense in equal combat. 5
A perusal of the appellants' statement of the robbery-rape incident as summarized in their joint brief (pp. 3-10),
showed that they admitted their participation in the commission of the crimes of robbery and rape against Elias
Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further established were facts inconsistent with appellant's claim of
having acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury, to wit:
1. Appellant Eustaquio Loreno was armed with a short firearm when he and the man in dark sweater
went up the house of Elias Monge. While inside the house, Loreno pointed the gun to the victims
which enabled the malefactors to ransack the house (p. 38, tsn, Oct. 30, 1979 PM
2. When Eustaquio Loreno and the man in dark sweater reached the balcony, Loreno positioned
himself next to the post in the balcony, while the man in dark sweater delivered the letter to Elias
Monge. Loreno admitted that, without prior instructions, he immediately positioned himself near the
post of the balcony (p. 10, tsn, Id.), an act which showed his voluntary participation in the criminal
acts.
3. Eustaquio Loreno himself tied the victim with rattan and thereafter, with ropes of the hammock.
Loreno in fact admitted that he was the one who furnished the rattan which he got from inside the
house (pp. 14-15, tsn, Id.).
4. When Monica Monge was struggling and shouting for help from inside the room where she was
earlier dragged by the man in dark sweater, Loreno's immediate reaction was to point his gun to the
victims who were then lying on the floor, telling them not to rise if they wanted to live (p. 38, tsn., Id.).
The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno brought Beata Monge to the master's
room and the teacher's room where he made her open the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys and got the
contents which he brought and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat and
assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in dark sweater consummated his lust on Cristina Monge
in the teacher's room and seeing Cristina Monge still lying on the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss and
touch her private parts.
When Eustaquio Loreno and Francisco Fable went downstairs to drive the barking dog away, the flashlight of
Loreno happened to be focused on the face of Jimmy Marantal who in turn beamed his flashlight on the
approaching Fable. Upon seeing Fable, Jimmy Marantal kicked the former twice causing him (Fabie) to fall to the
ground. Marantal's reaction towards Fable was due to the fact that Fable had recognized him and the blows which

he gave to Fable who was still tied at the moment was to serve as a warning to Fable not to report his presence and
participation in the robbery-rape incident to the authorities.
Jimmy Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard the shouts of Monica Monge
for help and must have known by then that Monica Monge was being abused by his two companions who earlier
went up the house. As a "lookout" or guard, Jimmy Marantal gave his companions effective means and
encouragement to commit the crimes of robbery and rape. There was no showing that Jimmy Marantal raised a
voice of protest or did an act to prevent the commission of the crimes.
All these demonstrated the voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The foregoing acts, though
separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed their community of interest and
concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions which constituted conspiracy without the need of direct
proof of the conspiracy itself. 6 Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the acts of the accused themselves and when
said acts point to joint purpose and concert of action and community of interest, which unity of purpose and concert of
action serve to establish the existence of conspiracy, 7 and the degree of actual participation petition by each of the
conspirators is immaterial. 8 Conspiracy having been establish, all the conspirators are liable as co-penpals regardless of
the extent and character of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. 9
The foregoing crime of robbery with double rape was combat muted on January 7, 1978, by more than three
persons, all armed, 10 in conspiracy with each other, attended by the aggravating circumstances of band, nighttime and dwelling and is, under P.D. 767,
promulgated on August 15, 1975, punishable by death. But, for lack of the required number of votes, the accused should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
accused cused JIMMY MARANTAL is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. With costs
against appellants.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127755. April 14, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y
PASCUAL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding accused Joselito del Rosario
y Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death
and to pay the heirs of the victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages.[1]
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias Jun, Virgilio Santos alias Boy Santos and
John Doe alias Dodong were charged with special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for
having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry
and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her.[2]
While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty, [3] Virgilio Boy Santos and John Doe alias
Dodong remained at large. Ernesto Jun Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only Joselito del
Rosario was tried.

These facts were established by the prosecution from the eyewitness account of tricycle driver
Paul Vincent Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, Alonzo stopped his
tricycle by the side of Nitas Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women
flagged him. Parked at a distance of about one and a-half (1) meters in front of him was a tricycle
driven by accused Joselito del Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling
for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started
chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman
sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still on the
ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused del
Rosario where someone inside received the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his
companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get
the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest
police headquarters and reported the incident. [4]
Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30 in the
afternoon he was hired for P120.00[5] by a certain Boy Santos,[6] his co-accused.Their original
agreement was that he would drive him to cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum. [7] However, despite
their earlier arrangement boy Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch Jun
Marquez and Dodong Bisaya. He (del Rosario) acceded.[8] Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of
the parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the public market.[9] Subsequently, he was asked to proceed
and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretest of
buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the
possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help Dodong Bisaya. [10] Accused del
Rosario tried to leave and seek help but Boy Santos who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him
from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot him.
Meanwhile, Dodong Bisaya succeeded in taking the victims bag, but before boarding the tricycle
Jun Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying prone on the ground. After
the shooting, Dodong Bisaya boarded the sidecar of the tricycle while Jun Marquez rode behind del
Rosario and ordered him to start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del
Rosario overheard his passengers saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where there
were cogon grasses.[11]Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario
not to inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed.
[12]
Del Rosario then went home.[13] Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the
owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police. [14]
As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as charged and
sentenced him to death. He now contends in this automatic review that the court a quo erred in: (1)
Not finding the presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon him by his co-accused Virgilio
Boy Santos, Ernesto Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya; (2) Not considering his defense that he was
not part of the conspiracy among co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya to
commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide; (3) Not considering the violations on his constitutional
rights as an accused; and, (4) Not considering that there was no lawful warrantless arrest within the
meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court.[15]
The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from criminal liability
under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force
must be sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at
gunpoint by his co-accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and
killing, and was only forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime. [16]

But the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote, hence, could not
be considered uncontrollable; and that a gun pointed at him did not constitute irresistible force
because it fell short of the test required by law and jurisprudence. [17]
We disagree. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts
under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability
because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by
me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the
actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a wellgrounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is
not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused
for escape or self-defense in equal combat.[18]
As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with weapons, even those
less powerful that a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will normally, usually and probably do
what an armed man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was
threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A
person under the same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and
security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day.[19]
Corollary with defense of del Rosario, we hold that the trial court erred when it said that it was
Boy Santos who left the tricycle to chase the companion of the victim and then shot the victim on the
head, instantly killing her.[20] A careful and meticulous scrutiny of the transcripts and records of the
case, particularly the testimonies of the witness Alonzo and del Rosario himself, reveals that it was
Jun Marquez who ran after the victims helper and fired at the victim. Witness Alonzo testified on direct
examination Q: What was that unusual incident that transpired in that place at that time?
A: I saw two men and a lady grappling for the possession of a bag, sir x x x x
Q: What happened after the bag of the lady was grabbed by the two men?
A: One helper of the lady was chased by the other man, sir.
Q: Who was that man who chased the helper of the lady?
A: He was the one holding the gun, sir x x x x
Q: What happened when the bag of the woman was already taken by the two men who grappled the same
from her?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned to the scene while the other man was then kicking
the lady who in turn fell to the ground, sir.
Q: What happened to the lady who to the ground?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned and then shot the woman who was then lying on
the ground, sir x x x x
Q: What about the bag, what happened to the bag?

A: The bag was taken to a motorcycle, sir.

Q: Will you please state before the Court what you noticed from the tricycle which was at a distance of
about one and a half meter?
A: There was a passenger inside the tricycle, sir x x x x
Q: What happened to that woman that was shot by the man who grappled for the possession of the bag?
A: She was no longer moving and lying down, sir.
Q: After the shooting by one of the two men of the woman what else happened?
A: They went away, sir x x x x
Q: Will you please tell the Court in what portion of the tricycle did these men sit in the tricycle?

A: The man who was holding the gun sat himself behind the driver while the other man entered
the sidecar, sir.[21]
On the continuation of his direct examination, after an ocular inspection on the crime scene
conducted by the trial court, witness Alonzo categorically stated
Q: Will you please tell us where in particular did you see the accused who was then holding the gun fired at
the victim?
A: At the time one man was kicking the victim it was then his other companion holding the gun chased the
helper of the deceased going towards Burgos Avenue, sir.
Q: What happen (sic) afterwards?
A: The man with the gun returned and then while the victim was lying down in this spot the man holding the
gun shot the victim, sir.[22]

On cross-examination, the same witness further clarified

Q: So, you saw the two other accused returned back to the tricycle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And one of their companion was already inside the tricycle?

xxxx
Court: There was somebody inside the tricycle where the handbag was given.

xxxx
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And the one who sat at the back of the tricycle driver was the person with the gun?
A: Yes, sir.[23]

On the other hand, accused Del Rosario declared during the direct examination that
Q: x x x x On the evening of May 13, 1996 you were the driver of the tricycle as testified to by Eduardo
Nalagon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you also heard that there was a shoot out near the Cathedral and the Nitas Drugstore at Gen. Tinio
St.?
A: Yes, sir.

xxxx
Court: At that time you were seated at the tricycle, which tricycle was used by the assailants?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Then what did you do?
A: I tried to escape, sir, but I was stopped by them.
Q: When you said they to whom are you referring?
A: Boy Santos and Jun Marquez, sir.
Q: And at that time where was Boy Santos?

A: He was inside the tricycle, sir.

Q: And what about Jun Marquez?

A: He alighted from the tricycle and helped him grabbed (sic) the bag of the victim.
Q: And was the bag grabbed and by whom?
A: Yes, sir, by Dodong Visaya was able to grab the bag.
Q: And after that what happened?
A: Both of them rode inside my tricycle, sir.
Court: Did you not see any shooting?
A: There was, sir.
Q: Who was shot?
A: Jun Marquez shot the woman, sir x x x x
Q: When the bag of the woman was being grabbed you know that what was transpiring was wrong and
illegal?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you did not try to leave?
A: I tried to leave but Boy Santos who was inside my tricycle prevented me.
Q: During that time before you leave (sic) how many firearms did you see?
A: Two firearms, sir, one in the possession of Boy (Jun?) Marquez and one in the possession of Boy Santos
xxxx
Q: And at the time when the shooting took place where was Boy Santos?
A: He was still inside my tricycle, sir.
Q: And during the shooting when Boy Santos was inside the tricycle and when you tried to escape that was
the time when Boy Santos threatened you if you will escape something will happen to your family?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After the shooting who first boarded the tricycle, Boy (Jun?) Marquez or Dodong Visaya?
A: Dodong Visaya, sir.
Q: And immediately thereafter Jun Marquez boarded your tricycle sitting at your back?
A: Yes, sir.[24]

On cross-examination, accused further stated

Q: After shopping in that place for one minute what else happened?
A: I saw Dodong Bisaya grabbing the bag of the woman, sir.
Q: How about your two companions, what are (sic) they doing while Dodong Bisaya was grabbing the bag
of the woman?
A: Jun Marquez was helping Dodong Bisaya, sir.
Q: What happened after Jun Marquez helped Dodong Bisaya?
A: I heard a gunshot and I saw the woman lying down x x x x
Q: You could have ran away to seek the help of the police or any private persons?
A: I was not able to ask for help because Boy Santos pointed his gun to me, sir.
Q: Was the gun being carried by Boy Santos, is the one that is used in shooting the old woman?
A: No, sir x x x x.
Q: Where was Boy Santos when Dodong Bisaya and Jun Marquez were grappling for the possession of the
handbag?

A: He was then inside the tricycle, sir x x x x[25]

Q: Mr. Witness, you testified that the reason why you just cannot leave the area where the incident occurred
is because a gun was pointed to you by Boy Santos and he was telling you that you should not do
anything against their will, they will kill you and your family will be killed also, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, is it not a fact that at the time you stop (sic) your tricycle which was loaded by your other three coaccused in this case, all of them alighted and that Boy Santos ran after a helper of the victim going
towards the public market along Burgos Street?
A: He did not alight from the tricycle, sir.
Court: Are you quite sure of that?
A: Yes, sir.[26]

Del Rosario maintains that Boy Santos never left the tricycle and that the latter pointed his gun at
him and threatened to shoot if he tried to escape. He also asserted that it was Jun Marquez who shot
the victim and sat behind him in the tricycle.
From the narration of witness Alonzo, these events stood out: that after the bag of the victim was
grabbed, her male helper was chased by a man holding a gun; that the gunwielder returned and shot
the victim and then sat behind the driver of the tricycle; and, the bag was given to a person who was
inside the tricycle. Taking the testimony of witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of del
Rosario, it can be deduced that Jun Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was referring to when
he mentioned that a helper of the lady was chased by the other man and that this other man could not
be Boy Santos who stayed inside the tricycle and to whom the bag was handed over. This conclusion
gives credence to the claim of del Rosario that Boy Santos never left the tricycle, and to his allegation
that Boy Santos stayed inside the tricycle precisely to threaten him with violence and prevent him
from fleeing; that there could have been no other plausible reason for Boy Santos to stay in the
tricycle if the accused was indeed a conspirator; that Boy Santos could have just left the tricycle and
helped in the commission of the crime, particularly when he saw the victim grappling with Dodong
Bisaya and resisting the attempts to grab her bag; and, that Boy Santos opted to remain inside the
tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of threatening del Rosario and insuring that he would not escape
and leave them behind.[27]
Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half (1) in front of the tricycle
of witness Alonzo, the latter still could not have totally seen and was not privy to events that were
transpiring inside the vehicle, i.e., the pointing of the gun by Boy Santos at del Rosario
simultaneously with the robbing and shooting of the victim. From the exhibits submitted by the
prosecution panel the back of the sidecar of del Rosario tricycle was not transparent. [28]
There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun directly pointed at
him was real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and subject to the will of Boy Santos,
making him for the moment of automaton without a will of his own. In other words, in effect, he could
not be any more than a mere instrument acting involuntarily an against his will. He is therefore
exempt from criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his will
to transport his co-accused away from the crime scene.

On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court anchored del Rosarios conviction on his participation in
the orchestrated acts of Boy Santos, Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya. According to the trial court,
del Rosario facilitated the escape of the other malefactors from the crime scene and conspiracy
between accused and his passengers was evident because while the grappling of the bag, the
chasing of the helper of the victim and the shooting that led to the death of Virginia Bernas were
happening, accused Joselito del Rosario was riding on his tricycle and the engine of the motor was
running;[29] that the accused did not deny that the tricycle driven by him and under his control was
hired and used by his co-accused in the commission of the crime; neither did he deny his failure to
report to the authorities the incident of robbery, killing and fleeing away from the scene of the crime. [30]
We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The
objective of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission punishable by law. That must be their
intent. There is need for concurrence of wills or unity of action and purpose or for common and joint
purpose and design. Its manifestation could be shown by united and concerted action. [31]
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature conspiracy is
planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct evidence.Consequently, the presence of
the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete
whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.[32]Nevertheless, mere
knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to cooperate,
is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy must
be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. In fact, the same degree
of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal
conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. [33]
In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he was the driver
of the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of guilt against him by asserting that he
had no inkling of the malevolent design of his co-accused to rob and kill since he was not given any
briefing thereof. He was merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was
prevented at gunpoint from leaving the scene of the crime since he was ordered to help them escape.
In this case, the trial court stated that "there is no evidence that the accused came to an
agreement concerning the commission of the felony and decided to commit the same." [34] Therefore,
in order to convict the accused, the presence of an implied conspiracy is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. However, the fact that del Rosario was with the other accused when the crime was
committed is insufficient proof to show cabal. Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.
[35]
The only incriminating evidence against del Rosario is that he was at the scene of the crime but he
has amply explained the reason for his presence and the same has not been successfully refuted by
the prosecution. As stated earlier, he feared for his safety and security because of the threat made by
his co-accused that he would, be killed should he shout for help. No complicity can be deduced where
there is absolutely no showing that the accused directly participated in the overt act of robbing and
shooting although he was with the persons who robbed and killed the victim. [36]
That del Rosario did not disclose what he knew about the incident to the authorities, to his
employer or to the barangay captain does not affect his credibility. The natural hesitance of most

people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. [37] It must be recalled that del Rosario
was merely a tricycle driver with a family to look after. Given his quite limited means, del Rosario
understandably did not want to get involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he
was threatened with physical harm should he squeal.
Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to remain silent, right to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and right to be informed of these
rights as enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. [38] As testified to by SP04 Geronimo de Leon,
the prosecution witness who was the team leader of the policemen who investigated the 13 May
incident, during his cross-examination -

Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the
house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in
turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview. The driver was accused
Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to name his passengers on May 13, 1996. On the
way to the police station, accused informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and
the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their
officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma
composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they
found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening,
accused del Rosario was at the back of the school, after which they went back to the
police station. The investigator took the statement of the accused on May 14,1996, and
was only subscribed on May 22,1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station
as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. He also
executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the
assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera.[39]
A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma, del Rosario was
handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against him
and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape. [40]
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police
who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is wellsettled that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. [41] This concept of
custodial investigation has been broadened by RA 7438 [42] to include "the Practice of issuing
an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed."Section 2 of the same Act further provides that -

x x x x Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place,
who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall
inform the latter, in a language known and understood by him of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall
at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he
must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.

From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial
investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he
was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof
by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was
already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution
failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his
participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same
transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights.
Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no warrant therefor. Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:[43]

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police raid at the
place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs Sucro[44] we held that when a
police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec.
5, par. (a), Rule 113, since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In
essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or caught
immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is obviously outside the
purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day following the commission of the
robbery with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent requirements before
a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed it. Hence, there must be a large measure ofimmediacy between the time the offense was
committed and the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest
and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of
immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of
certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime. [45] Again, the
arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest
came a day after the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime
had not been "just committed" at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the
offense since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became
aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
However the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the
court a quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional
defect and any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested submits to arraignment without
any objection, as in this case.[46]

A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost her life and
property in the process. Someone therefore must be held accountable, but it will not be accused
Joselito del Rosario; we must acquit him. Like victim Virginia Bernas, he too was a hapless victim
who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del
Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. On
the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a
doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting accused
JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate
RELEASE from confinement is ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the
Director of Prisons is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ. concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 45186

September 30, 1936

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the corresponding
accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said sentence alleging that the trial
court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she had thrown
away her newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion perpetua,
with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant
go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was

there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from
the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not
being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported
and helped her go up to her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to
her house, what happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone
with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them,
and later requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant.
Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the
thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to
bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby which had just been shown to her was
hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the
sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and found her lying in bed still
bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his
opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in her own
bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from
the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of
another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To give force to his conclusions, he testified that
the appellant had admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on the
date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose testimony was not
corroborated but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the very witnesses for the prosecution and by the appellant,
as will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court furthermore held, that the appellant was an
infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree with both. On the contrary, he maintains that the
appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of article 276 of the Revised Penal Code,
the abandonment having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno
himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by the hand of man but by bites
animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or consciously, or at least it
must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed
through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment
of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one way or another, or in
abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to
expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol,
took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirol she considers him her husband as he
considers her his wife began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant was pregnant
and he believed from the beginning, affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the
appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child.
The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the child
was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's house after the appellant had left the place,
staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact she was
helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear how far from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's
affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that the appellant denied having made any admission to
said physician and that from the time she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness and her extreme
debility undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled
with the circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to
childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and the fact that she, like her lover
Luis Kirol a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day is uneducated and could supplant with what
she had read or learned from books what experience itself could teach her, undoubtedly were the reasons why she

was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or
dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance
(art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it
abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according to her, to respond
to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she
caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of
imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should
not be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and
behaves under such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the appellant was aware
of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom, having been so
prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the alleged errors attributed to
the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such circumstances said appellant has the
fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had bee
accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is
ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.
Avancea, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.

Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not on the ground that she is exempt from criminal liability
but because she has committed no criminal act or omission.
The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question the accused Josefina Bandian had spent a year of
marital life with her lover Luis Kirol by whom she was begotten with a child for the first time. Her said lover knew that
she was pregnant and both were waiting for the arrival of the happy day when the fruit of their love should be born.
Since she became pregnant she continuously had fever, was weak and dizzy. On January 31, at about 7 o'clock in
the morning, she went down from her house and entered a thicket about four or five brazas away, where the
residents of said place responded to the call of nature. After some minutes the accused emerged from the thicket
staggering and apparently unable to support herself. Her neighbor Valentin Aguilar, who saw her enter the thicket
and emerged therefrom, ran to help her, supported her and aided her in going up to her house and to bed. Asked by
Aguilar what happened to her, she merely answered that she was very dizzy. Thinking that he alone was unable to
attend to her, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, and requested him to take bamboo leaves
to stop the appellant's hemorrhage. Adriano had scarcely gone about five brazas, when he saw the body of a
newborn child near the path adjoining the thicket where the accused had been a few moments before. Upon being
informed of the discovery, Valentin Aguilar told Adriano Comcom to bring the child into the appellant's house. Upon
being asked whether or not the child shown to her was hers, the appellant answered in the affirmative. After an
autopsy had been made of the body, it was found that the child was born alive.
Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well known in legal medicine among young primipar who, by
reason of their ignorance of the symptoms of parturition and of the process of expulsion of fetus, are not aware that
they are giving birth when they are responding to an urgent call of nature (Dr. A. Lacassagne, Precis de Medicine
Legale, pages, 799-781; Annales de Medicine Legale, December 1926, page 530; Vibert, Manual de Medicina
Legal y Toxicologia, vol. I, pages 512-514). There is no doubt that the accused, in her feverish, weak and dizzy
condition when she went into the thicket to defecate and being a primipara with no experience in childbirth, was not
aware that upon defecating she was also expelling the child she was carrying in her womb. Believing that she did
nothing more to respond to an urgent call of nature which brought her there, she returned home staggering for lack
of strength to support herself and for being dizzy, without suspecting that she was leaving a newborn child behind

her, and she only knew that she had given birth when she was shown the already dead child with wounds on the
body produced by the bites of pigs.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies, which may be
committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa); there being deceit when the act is
performed with deliberate intent, and fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill.
As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered and that the child had been exposed to the rough
weather and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot be held that she deceitfully committed the crime of infanticide or that
of abandonment of a minor, because according to the above-cited legal provision there is deceit when the act
punishable by law is performed with deliberate intent. Suffering from fever and from dizziness, the appellant under
the circumstances was not aware that she had given birth and, consequently, she could not have deliberately
intended to leave her child, of whose existence she was ignorant, to perish at the mercy of the elements and of the
animals. Neither can it be held that she faultily committed it because, as already stated, not knowing for lack of
experience in childbirth that in defecating a perfectly lawful physiological act, being natural she might expel the
child she carried in her womb, she cannot be considered imprudent, a psychological defect of a person who fails to
use his reasoning power to foresee the pernicious consequences of his willful act. Having had no knowledge of the
fact of her delivery, the accused could not think that by leaving the child in the thicket, it would die as a consequence
of the rough weather or of the cruelty of animals. Neither can she be considered negligent because negligence is
the omission to do what the law or morals obliges one to do, which implies knowledge of the thing which is the
subject matter of the compliance with the obligation. Inasmuch as the accused was not aware of her delivery, her
mind cannot contemplate complying with her legal and moral duty to protect the life of her child. Neither can it be
held that the appellant lacked foresight because, having been absolutely ignorant of her delivery, she could not
foresee that by abandoning her child in a thicket it would die. Neither can it be held that her act was the result of
lack of skill because she did not know that to defecate in a state of pregnancy might precipitate her delivery, and as
defecation is a natural physiological function, she could not refrain from satisfying it.
We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which
reads: "Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault
or intention of causing it," because although the lawful act of satisfying a natural physiological necessity accidentally
provoked the delivery, the delivery itself was not an injury, but the exposure of the child at the mercy of the elements
and of the animals which cased its death. As the child was born alive, if the accused had been aware of her delivery
and she had deliberately abandoned the child, her accidental delivery would not exempt her from criminal liability
because then the death of said child no longer would have been accidental. Neither can we consider the seventh
exempting circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code consisting in the failure to perform an act required
by law, when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, because this exempting circumstance implies
knowledge of the precept of the law to be complied with but is prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause, that
is by some motive which has lawfully, morally or physically prevented one to do what the law commands. In the
present case, what the law requires of the accused-appellant, with respect to the child, is that she care for, protect
and not abandon it. Had she been aware of her delivery and of the existence of the child, neither her debility nor her
dizziness resulting from the fever which consumed her, being in the full enjoyment of her mental faculties and her
illness not being of such gravity as to prevent her from asking for help, would constitute the lawful or insuperable
impediment required by law. Having been ignorant of her delivery and of the existence of the child, to her there was
subjectively no cause for the law to impose a duty for her to comply with.
Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the death thereof resulting from its exposure to the rough
weather and to the cruelty of the animals cannot be imputed to the accused, because she had neither deceitfully nor
faultily committed any act or omission punishable by law with regard to the child.
Imperial and Laurel, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 34917

September 7, 1931

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants-appellants.
Gibbs and McDonough, Gullas, Lopez and Tuao, H. Alo and Manuel G. Briones for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
convicting them of the illegal importation of opium, and sentencing them each to four years' imprisonment, a fine of
P10,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to
pay the proportional costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following alleged errors as committed by the court below in its
judgment to wit:
The lower court erred:
1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the Insular Collector of Customs to exhibit in court
the record of the administrative investigation against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and
Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, both of whom have since been dismissed
from service.
2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium consignments have passed thru the customhouse
without the knowledge of the customs secret service."
3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan Samson in denouncing the accused was actuated by
a desire to protect himself and to injure ex-collector Joaquin Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was partly
instrumental in the dismissal of Samson from the service.
4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed chief customs secret service agent of Cebu, is
above reproach and utterly irreconcilable with the corrupt motives attributed to him by the accused.
5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to remain in the court room while other prosecution
witnesses were testifying, despite the previous order of the court excluding the Government witnesses from
the court room, and in refusing to allow the defense to inquire from Insular Collector of Customs Aldanese
regarding the official conduct of Juan Samson as supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu.
6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.
7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the defendant Uy Se Tieng to order the opium from
Hongkong.
8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan
Samson and the appellant Uy Se Tieng.
9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan Samson and
the appellant Lua Chu.
10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu guilty of the crime of illegal importation of
opium, and in sentencing each to suffer four years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs,

despite the presumption of innocence which has not been overcome, despite the unlawful inducement,
despite the inherent weakness of the evidence presented by the prosecution, emanating from a spirit of
revenge and from a contaminated, polluted source.
The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial:
About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se Tieng wrote to his correspondent in
Hongkong to send him a shipment of opium.
About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret service of Cebu, Juan Samson, had returned from a
vacation in Europe, he called upon the then collector of customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his
office, and the latter, after a short conversation, asked him how much his trip had cost him. When the chief of the
secret service told him he had spent P2,500, the said collector of customs took from a drawer in his table, the
amount of P300, in paper money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is for you, and a shipment will arrive shortly,
and you will soon be able to recoup your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took the money, left, and put it into the
safe in his office to be kept until he delivered it to the provincial treasurer of Cebu. A week later, Natividad called
Samson and told him that the shipment he had referred to consisted of opium, that it was not about to arrive, and
that the owner would go to Samson's house to see him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house and
told him he had come by order of Natividad to talk to him about the opium. The said accused informed Samson that
the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and that he had agreed to pay Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and that
the opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October awaiting a ship that would go direct to Cebu.
At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam Tai loaded on the steamship Kolambugan,
which the Naviera Filipina a shipping company in Cebu had had built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to Uy
Seheng and marked "U.L.H." About the same date Natividad informed Samson that the opium had already been put
on board the steamship Kolambugan, and it was agreed between them that Samson would receive P2,000,
Natividad P2,000, and the remaining P2,000 would be distributed among certain employees in the customhouse.
Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson. Towards the end of November, Natividad informed
the latter that the Kolambugan had returned to Hongkong on account of certain engine trouble, and remained there
until December 7th. In view of this, the shipper several times attempted to unload the shipment, but he was told
each time by the captain, who needed the cargo for ballast, that the ship was about to sail, and the 30 cases
remained on board.
The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929. While he was examining the manifests,
Samson detailed one of his men to watch the ship. After conferring with Natividad, the latter instructed him to do
everything possible to have the cargo unloaded, and to require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the P6,000. On the morning
of November 16, 1929, Natividad told Samson that Uy Se Tieng already had the papers ready to withdraw the cases
marked "U.L.H." from the customhouse. Samson then told Natividad it would be better for Uy Se Tieng to go to his
house to have a talk with him. Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house that night and was told that he must pay over
the P6,000 before taking the opium out of the customhouse. Uy Se Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading and on
leaving said: "I will tell the owner, and we see whether we can take the money to you tomorrow." The following day
Samson informed Colonel Francisco of the Constabulary, of all that had taken place, and the said colonel instructed
the provincial commander, Captain Buenconsejo, to discuss the capture of the opium owners with Samson.
Buenconsejo and Samson agreed to meet at the latter's house that same night. That afternoon Samson went to the
office of the provincial fiscal, reported the case to the fiscal, and asked for a stenographer to take down the
conversation he would have with Uy Se Tieng that night in the presence of Captain Buenconsejo. As the fiscal did
not have a good stenographer available, Samson got one Jumapao, of the law firm of Rodriguez & Zacarias, on the
recommendation of the court stenographer. On the evening of December 17, 1929, as agreed, Captain
Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando; and the stenographer went to Samson's house and concealed themselves
behind a curtain made of strips of wood which hung from the window overlooking the entrance to the house on the
ground floor. As soon as the accused Uy Se Tieng arrived, Samson asked him if he had brought the money. He
replied that he had not, saying that the owner of the opium, who was Lua Chu, was afraid of him. Samson then hold
him to tell Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that he might come to Samson's house. After pointing out to Uy Se Tieng a
back door entrance into the garden, he asked him where the opium was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in
the cases numbered 11 to 18, and that there were 3,252 tins. Uy Se Tieng returned at about 10 o'clock that night
accompanied by his codefendant Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole owner of the opium, but that a man from
Manila, named Tan, and another in Amoy were also owners. Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get

the opium, and the latter answered that Uy Se Tieng would take charge of that. On being asked if he had brought
the P6,000, Lua Chu answered, no, but promised to deliver it when the opium was in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse.
After this conversation, which was taken down in shorthand, Samson took the accused Lua Chu aside and asked
him: "I say, old fellow, why didn't you tell me about this before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu answered:
"Impossible, sir; you were not here, you were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by Samson how he had come
to bring in the opium, Lua Chu answered: "I was in a cockpit one Sunday when the collector called me aside and
said there was good business, because opium brought a good price, and he needed money." All this conversation
was overheard by Captain Buenconsejo. It was then agreed that Uy Se Tieng should take the papers with him at 10
o'clock next morning. At the appointed hour, Uy Se Tieng and one Uy Ay arrived at Samson's house, and as Uy Se
Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who had been hiding,
appeared and arrested the two Chinamen, taking the aforementioned papers, which consisted of bills of lading
(Exhibits B and B-1), and in invoice written in Chinese characters, and relating to the articles described in Exhibit B.
After having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to the Constabulary headquarters, and notified the fiscal, Captain
Buenconsejo and Samson went to Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest him. In the pocket of a coat hanging on a
wall, which Lua Chu said belonged to him, they found five letters written in Chinese characters relating to the opium
(Exhibits G to K). Captain Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to the Constabulary headquarters, and then
went to the customhouse to examine the cases marked "U.L.H." In the cases marked Nos. 11 to 18, they found
3,252 opium tins hidden away in a quantity to dry fish. The value of the opium confiscated amounted to P50,000.
In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached Lua Chu and asked him to tell the truth
as to who was the owner of the opium. Lua Chu answered as follows: "Captain, it is useless to ask me any
questions, for I am not going to answer to them. The only thing I will say is that whoever the owner of this
contraband may be, he is not such a fool as to bring it in here without the knowledge of those " pointing towards
the customhouse.
The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a loan of P200 from Uy Se Tieng, he induced
him to order the opium from Hongkong saying that it only cost from P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from
P18 to P20, and that he could make a good deal of money by bringing in a shipment of that drug; that Samson told
Uy Se Tieng, furthermore, that there would be no danger, because he and the collector of customs would protect
him; that Uy Se Tieng went to see Natividad, who told him he had no objection, if Samson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng
then wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after he had ordered it, Samson went to Uy
Se Tieng's store, in the name of Natividad, and demanded the payment of P6,000; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to
his Hongkong correspondent cancelling the order, but the latter answered that the opium had already been loaded
and the captain of the Kolambugan refused to let him unload it; that when the opium arrived, Samson insisted upon
the payment of the P6,000; that as Uy Se Tieng did not have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on the night of
December 14th, and proposed that he participate; that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy Se Tieng's
proposition, but he finally agreed to pay P6,000 when the opium had passed the customhouse; that Lua Chu went to
Samson's house on the night of December 17th, because Samson at last agreed to deliver the opium without first
receiving the P6,000, provided Lua Chu personally promised to pay him that amount.
The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the trial court in its judgment. Some refer to the
refusal of the trial judge to permit the presentation of certain documentary evidence, and to the exclusion of Juan
Samson, the principal witness for the Government, from the court room during the hearing; others refer to the
admission of the alleged statements of the accused taken in shorthand; and the others to the sufficiency of the
evidence of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.
With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative proceedings against Joaquin Natividad, collector
of customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, who were dismissed
from the service, the trial court did not err in not permitting it, for, whatever the result of those proceedings, they
cannot serve to impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it is not one of the means prescribed in section 342 of the
Code of Civil Procedure to that end.
With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal witness of the
Government, from the court room during the hearing, it is within the power of said judge to do so or not, and it does
not appear that he has abused his discretion (16 Corpus Juris, 842).
Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the transcript of stenographic notes of the defendants'
statements, since they contain admissions made by themselves, and the person who took them in shorthand

attested at the trial that they were faithfully taken down. Besides the contents are corroborated by unimpeached
witnesses who heard the statements.
As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts alleged in the information, we find that the
testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution should be believed, because the officers of the Constabulary
and the chief of the customs secret service, who gave it, only did their duty. Aside from this, the defendants do not
deny their participation in the illegal importation of the opium, though the accused Lua Chu pretends that he was
only a guarantor to secure the payment of the gratuity which the former collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad, had
asked of him for Juan Samson and certain customs employees. This assertion, however, is contradicted by his own
statement made to Juan Samson and overheard by Captain Buenconsejo, that he was one of the owners of the
opium that had been unlawfully imported.
But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to import the opium in question.
Juan Samson denies this, and his conduct in connection with the introduction of the prohibited drug into the port of
Cebu, bears him out. A public official who induces a person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not take
the steps necessary to seize the instruments of the crime and to arrest the offender, before having obtained the
profit he had in mind. It is true that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug, but
that was after the accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug, leaving only its introduction
into the country through the Cebu customhouse to be managed, and he did not do so to help them carry their plan
to a successful issue, but rather to assure the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.
The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to commit crime, as laid down by the courts of
the United States, are summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88, section 57, as follows:
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into
crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as
distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent
the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a
crime that facilitates for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done
at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in
the act were present and apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases
where the offense is one of a kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a
course of conduct. Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed
by him free from the influence or the instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as
supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original
design was formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his
confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the
thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no defense
to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired
informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.
As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-appellants to import the opium
in question, as the latter contend, but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin
Natividad who had promised them that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so far as
the customhouse was concerned not to gain the P2,000 intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the
better to assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is certainly
nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the Government from prosecuting and
punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to
prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to catch a criminal.
Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of the customs secret service pretended
to agree a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the
seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter.
By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellants. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y

BOLADO, and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accusedappellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @
"Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972.[1] The information reads:
"Thatonoraboutthe5thdayofDecember,1995intheCityofMandaluyong,Philippines,aplacewithinthejurisdictionofthis
HonorableCourt,theabovenamedaccused,conspiring,confederatingandmutuallyhelpingandaidingoneanotherandwithout
havingbeenauthorizedbylaw,did,thenandtherewillfully,unlawfullyandfeloniouslysell,administer,deliverandgiveawayto
anothereleven(11)plasticbagsofsuspectedmarijuanafruitingtopsweighing7,641.08gramsinviolationoftheabovecitedlaw.
CONTRARYTOLAW."[2]

The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members of the North
Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information
from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City.
The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a
meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in
Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning,
Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp.
Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as
members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and
the rest of the team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan
District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit
set aside P1,600.00-- a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills [3]-- as money for the buy-bust
operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with
his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter.[4] The team rode in two cars and headed for the
target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying
one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worthP1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3
Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from
his associate.[5] An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of
the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did
not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his
associate named "Neneth."[6] "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.

The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his
associate.[7] SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house.
Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's
flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents
appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered
"Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks
of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth." [8] The
policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked
bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun"
is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana
leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the
PNP Crime Laboratory.[9] The bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of
various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams.[10]
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio
Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at the gate of
his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There
were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were strangers, accused-appellant denied
knowing any "Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in
their community. When accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside and ordered
him to point out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he
gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later identified as PO3
Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked around the house for about
three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door. The policemen came out of the house and
they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he
was not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding them. When Violeta entered her
house, three men were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of the men
say that they found a carton box. Turning towards them, Doria saw a box on top of the table. The box was open
and had something inside. PO3 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car.
They were brought to police headquarters where they were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his
acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the neighborhood
store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.[11]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995, she was
at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5) children,
namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged 3. That day,
accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's breakfast. Her
husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke her children and bathed
them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son, Jayson,
and accompanied Arjay to school. She left the twins at home leaving the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she
and Jayson remained standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they
headed for home. Along the way, they passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping water when a
man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her and
took her to her house. She found out later that the man was PO3 Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a box on top
of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece of green

straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not know anything about the box
and its contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her
husband, and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan.She denied the charge
against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person.[12]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. The trial
court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to
death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE,theguiltofaccused,FLORENCIODORIAyBOLADO@"Jun"andVIOLETAGADDAOyCATAMA@
"Neneth"havingbeenestablishedbeyondreasonabledoubt,theyarebothCONVICTEDofthepresentchargeagainstthem.
AccordingtotheamendatoryprovisionsofSec.13ofRepublicActNo.7659whichcoverviolationsofSec.4ofRepublicActNo.
6425andwhichwasexhaustivelydiscussedinPeoplev.Simon,234SCRA555,thepenaltyimposableinthiscaseisreclusion
perpetuatodeathandafinerangingfromfivehundredthousandpesostotenmillionpesos.Takingintoconsideration,however,the
provisionsofSec.23,alsoofRepublicActNo.7659whichexplicitlystatethat:
'Themaximumpenaltyshallbeimposediftheoffensewascommittedbyanypersonwhobelongstoanorganized/syndicatedcrime
group.
Anorganized/syndicatedcrimegroupmeansagroupoftwoormorepersonscollaborating,confederatingormutuallyhelpingone
anotherforpurposesofgaininthecommissionofanycrime.'
theCourtisherebyconstrainedtosentence(herebysentences)saidFLORENCIODORIAyBOLADO@"Jun"andVIOLETA
GADDAOyCATAMA@"Neneth"toDEATHandtopayafineofFiveHundredThousandPesos(P500,000.00)eachwithout
subsidiaryimprisonmentincaseofinsolvencyandtopaythecosts.
Theconfiscatedmarijuanabricks(7,641.08grams)shallbeturnedovertotheDangerousDrugsBoard,NBIfordestructionin
accordancewithlaw.
LetaCommitmentOrderbeissuedforthetransferofaccusedDORIAfromtheMandaluyongCityJailtotheNewBilibidPrisons,
MuntinlupaCityandalsoforaccusedGADDAOforhertransfertotheCorrectionalInstituteforWomen,MandaluyongCity.
LettheentirerecordsofthiscasebeforwardedimmediatelytotheSupremeCourtformandatoryreview.
SOORDERED."[13]

Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:

"I
THECOURTAQUOGRAVELYERREDINGIVINGWEIGHTTOTHETESTIMONYOFTHEWITNESSESFORTHE
PROSECUTIONWHENTHEIRTESTIMONIESWERESHOTWITHDISCREPANCIES,INCONSISTENCIESANDTHATTHE
CORPUSDELICTIOFTHEMARIJUANAALLEGEDLYTAKENFROMAPPELLANTWASNOTPOSITIVELYIDENTIFIED
BYTHEPOSEURBUYER.
II
THECOURTAQUOGRAVELYERREDINADMITTINGASEVIDENCETHEMARIJUANAFRUITINGSFOUNDINSIDE
THECARTONBOXASTHESEWEREOBTAINEDTHROUGHAWARRANTLESSSEARCHANDDOESNOTCOME
WITHINTHEPLAINVIEWDOCTRINE."[14]

Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:

"I

THELOWERCOURTERREDINFINDINGAPPELLANTGUILTYDESPITETHEINCREDIBILITYOFTHEPOLICE
VERSIONOFTHEMANNERTHEALLEGEDBUYBUSTASCONDUCTED.
II
THEPNPOFFICERS'VERSIONSASTOWHERETHEBUYBUSTMONEYCAMEFROMAREINCONSISTENTWITHONE
ANOTHERANDALSOREEKSWITHINCREDIBILITY.
III
THELOWERCOURTERREDINFINDINGAPPELLANTGUILTYANDSENTENCINGHERTODEATHDESPITETHE
MANIFESTLYIRRECONCILABLEINCONSISTENCIESINTHEVERSIONSOFTHEPOLICEASTOHOWANDBYWHOM
THEALLEGEDBUYBUSTMONEYWASRECOVEREDFROMHER,WHICHINCONSEQUENCERESULTSINTHE
EVIDENCE,OFRETRIEVALFROMHEROFTHESAME,NEBULOUS,ATBEST,NIL,ATWORST.
IV
THELOWERCOURTERREDINUPHOLDINGTHEVALIDITYOFTHEWARRANTLESSSEARCHLEADINGTOTHE
SEIZUREOFTHEMARIJUANAALLEGEDLYFOUNDINSIDETHEHOUSEOFACCUSEDAPPELLANT."[15]

The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the
apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant
Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the
commission of an offense.[16] Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards.[17]
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine
that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes, particularly
liquor and narcotics offenses.[18] Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the
formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law. [19] It also took off from a
spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons
into lapses that they might otherwise resist.[20]
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is
understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of
instituting a criminal prosecution against him.[21] The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by
Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,[22] the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept:
"Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission
by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer ."[23] It
consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion, trickery, or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or
the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the
government officials rather than that of the innocent defendant, such that the crime is the product of the creative
activity of the law enforcement officer.[24]
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the
persons violating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law
forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a
criminal career.[25] Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is
lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no
conviction may be had.[26] Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the
criminal offense is completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished
the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the commission of the

crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must
be convicted.[27] The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense[28] that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the nature of
a confession and avoidance.[29] It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the burden of providing sufficient
evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense. Once established, the burden shifts to the
government to show otherwise.[30] When entrapment is raised as a defense, American federal courts and a
majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United States[31] to
determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to
commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.
[32]
All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness
in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime. [33] The
predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's
misconduct[34] and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the
unwary criminal."[35] If the accused was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any
favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive
inducement.[36] Some states, however, have adopted the "objective" test.[37] This test was first authoritatively laid
down in the case of Grossman v. State[38] rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have
subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the nature of
the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. [39] The inquiry is focused on the inducements
used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the
crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct.[40] The test of entrapment is whether the
conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is
ready and willing, to commit the offense;[41] for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person
would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act
unlawfully.[42] Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but overbearing conduct,
such as badgering, cajoling or importuning,[43] or appeals to sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or
pleas of desperate illness, are not. [44] Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an
entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has
been established, the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be
countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that the courts should not become tainted by condoning
law enforcement improprieties.[45]Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the
accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's inducements, the gravity of the
crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are considered in judging what the effect of
the officer's conduct would be on a normal person.[46]
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is claimed that the
"subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e., if the court determines that an accused was predisposed to
commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed
impermissible.[47] Delving into the accused's character and predisposition obscures the more important task of
judging police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the possibility that no matter what
his past crimes and general disposition were, the accused might not have committed the particular crime unless
confronted with inordinate inducements.[48] On the other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely
the need for considering a particular accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police,
may have an important bearing upon the question of whether the conduct of the police and their agents was
proper.[49] The undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd
and active member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy.[50]
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the United States
now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" tests.[51] In Cruz v. State,[52] the Florida Supreme Court
declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. If this objective test is satisfied, then
the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime. [53] In Baca v. State,[54] the New
Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may

successfully assert a defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for
which he is charged, or, that the police exceeded the standards of proper investigation. [55] The hybrid approaches
combine and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the accused
caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps,[56] we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking
opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime
in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension came after he overheard
Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's testimony was disregarded. We
accorded significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look
for an opium den where both of them could smoke this drug. [57] The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as
"most reprehensible."[58] In People v. Abella,[59] we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after
examining the testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer
offered "a tempting price, xxx a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there
was inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there
was no evidence sufficient to convict the accused.[60] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng,[61] we convicted the
accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We stated that the
Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the
accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer did
not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with
the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the
surreptitious importers.[62]
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng [63] we first laid down the distinction
between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,[64]we held:
"ENTRAPMENTANDINSTIGATION.Whileithasbeensaidthatthepracticeofentrappingpersonsintocrimeforthepurposeof
institutingcriminalprosecutionsistobedeplored,andwhileinstigation,asdistinguishedfrommereentrapment,hasoftenbeen
condemnedandhassometimesbeenheldtopreventtheactfrombeingcriminalorpunishable,thegeneralruleisthatitisnodefense
totheperpetratorofacrimethatfacilitiesforitscommissionwerepurposelyplacedinhisway,orthatthecriminalactwasdoneatthe
'decoysolicitation'ofpersonsseekingtoexposethecriminal,orthatdetectivesfeigningcomplicityintheactwerepresentand
apparentlyassistinginitscommission.Especiallyisthistrueinthatclassofcaseswheretheoffenseisoneofakindhabitually
committed,andthesolicitationmerelyfurnishesevidenceofacourseofconduct.Meredeceptionbythedetectivewillnotshield
defendant,iftheoffensewascommittedbyhim,freefromtheinfluenceorinstigationofthedetective.Thefactthatanagentofan
owneractsasasupposedconfederateofathiefisnodefensetothelatterinaprosecutionforlarceny,providedtheoriginaldesignwas
formedindependentlyofsuchagent;andwhereapersonapproachedbythethiefashisconfederatenotifiestheownerorthepublic
authorities,and,beingauthorisedbythemtodoso,assiststhethiefincarryingouttheplan,thelarcenyisneverthelesscommitted.It
isgenerallyheldthatitisnodefensetoaprosecutionforanillegalsaleofliquorthatthepurchasewasmadebya'spotter,'detective,
orhiredinformer;buttherearecasesholdingthecontrary."[65]

The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v. Galicia,
[66]
the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation." The
instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a
co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan.[67] In People v. Tan Tiong,[68] the Court of Appeals
further declared that "entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker."[69]
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v.
Tiu Ua.[70] Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed contrary
to public policy and illegal.[71]
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or
inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the
accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause. [72] To determine whether there is
entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers, not the

predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The "objective" test first applied in United States v.
Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases. [73] Nevertheless, adopting the "objective" approach has not
precluded us from likewise applying the "subjective" test. In People v. Boholst,[74] we applied both tests by
examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and admitting evidence of the accused's
membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous
convictions of other crimes[75] and held that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang
strengthened the state's evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence that the accused did not sell or smoke
marijuana and did not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc[76] thereby sustaining
his defense that led to his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics
operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in
buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like
anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes.[77] They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly
regulation of the affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita.[78] They are not the
traditional type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with crimes mala in
se or those inherently wrongful and immoral.[79] Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior
directed, not against particular individuals, but against public order.[80] Violation is deemed a wrong against
society as a whole and is generally unattended with any particular harm to a definite person. [81] These offenses
are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for
any member of the public, no matter how furiously he condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in
the enforcement of the law. It is necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and punishing violations of
these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own
officials. This means that the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an
undercover capacity or through informants, spies or stool pigeons.[82]
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential informant system
breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the police in the apprehension of
drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these persons who deceive the police. The informant
himself may be a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty criminal. For whatever noble purpose it serves,
the spectacle that government is secretly mated with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help
maintain law and order is not an inspiring one.[83] Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with
unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law enforcers. Like the informant, unscrupulous law enforcers'
motivations are legion-- harassment, extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to
their superiors. This Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases [84] where we
observed that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons,
particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks.[85] The use of shady underworld characters as informants, the relative
ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the
imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding
drug cases.[86] Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the
police officer, become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful search. As
well put by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Barraza,[87]
"[E]ntrapmentisafacetofabroaderproblem.Alongwithillegalsearchandseizures,wiretapping,falsearrest,illegaldetentionand
thethirddegree,itisatypeoflawlessenforcement.Theyallspringfromcommonmotivations.Eachisasubstituteforskillfuland
scientificinvestigation.Eachiscondonedbythesinistersophismthattheend,whendealingwithknowncriminalsofthe'criminal
classes,'justifiestheemploymentofillegalmeans."[88]

It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official duty by law
enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint.This presumption should
not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the
individual.[89] It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the

criminal law through lawless enforcement.[90] Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of
abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.[91]
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported
transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseurbuyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation
of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. [92] The manner by which the initial contact was
made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust"
money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an
offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the
police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is
overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be
considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense
in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted
accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who
posed as the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as
advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later
returned and handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straighforward and categorical manner and his credibility
was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, PO3 Manlangit's testimony was
corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up security. The non-presentation of the
confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not presented in court because of
the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. [93] It is well-settled that except
when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the arresting officers, [94] or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to
testify falsely against the appellant, [95] or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed
the entire transaction,[96] the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative
of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.[97] There is no need to present the informant in court where
the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses.[98]
The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers'
testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. The source
of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that the prosecution
proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and delivered the
marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit was
actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After appellants' apprehension, the Narcom
agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it
together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This is why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana
when brought before the trial court. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10)
bricks, however, were identified and marked in court. Thus:
"ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how were you able to identify that box?
A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces of marijuana brick
we confiscated from the suspect, sir.
Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.
PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box...

ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:

Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now dealing with eleven items
when the question posed to the witness was what was handed to him by Jun?
COURT So be it.
ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out item after item from the box showed to him
and brought in front of him.
COURT Noted.
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven bricks?

x x x.
A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.
Q Point to the court, where are those markings?
A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.
PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature.
Q Whose signature is that?
ATTY VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to what was handed to
him by the accused Jun, your Honor?
PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your Honor, despite reconsideration.
COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done to the court.
ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.
A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.
COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?"
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What makes you so sure?
A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I brought it to the
PCCL, your Honor.
Q What are you sure of?
A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.
Q What makes you so sure?
A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before we brought it to the
PCCL, your Honor.

x x x.
PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be marked as Exhibit
"D?"
COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."
Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures on this plastic?
A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this Exhibit "A."
Q How about this one?
A I don't know who made this marking, sir.

PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.
Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made these markings, sir.
PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed...
ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D-394-95, also Exhibit
"A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I want to make it of record that there are other entries
included in the enclosure.
COURT Noted. The court saw it.
Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a newspaper wrapping with a piece of
paper inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams SSL" be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?"
COURT Tag it. Mark it.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?

x x x.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the money which I
gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.

x x x."[99]
The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at the
corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping were
marked as Exhibits "D," "D-1," and "D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams.[100]
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that PO3 Manlangit and his team waited for almost one
hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid"P1,600.00 strains
credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case at bar
did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. There is no rule of law which requires that in "buybust" operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between
the poseur-buyer and the pusher.[101] Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from
the accused-appellant.[102]
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are
allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to
wit:
"Sec.5.Arrestwithoutwarrant;whenlawful.Apeaceofficeroraprivatepersonmay,withoutawarrant,arrestaperson:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.

x x x."[103]
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of
committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation,
the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.[104]
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the
box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained
without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. [105] The rule is, however, not absolute.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in
the following instances:[106] (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; [107] (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; [108] (3)
search in violation of customs laws;[109] (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; [110] (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[111]
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and
seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed,
however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was
an incident to her lawful arrest.
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances
enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The direct
testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows otherwise:
"ATTY VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
COURT There is. Answer.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the money which I gave
him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the house of Neneth, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.
Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?
A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money, sir.
Q You mentioned "him?"
A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money which Jun gave her, sir.
Q And what happened?
A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money, sir.

x x x."[112]

SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:

Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?
A To arrest her, sir.
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth was there?
A Yes, sir.
Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?
A I saw her outside, sir.
Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?
A She was `sa bandang poso.'
Q Carrying a baby?
A No, sir.
Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside the house, she was
not committing any crime, she was just outside the house?
A No, sir.
Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing her daily chores. Am I
correct?
A I just saw her outside, sir.
Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1 Manlangit approached her?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit approached her?
A Yes, sir.
Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking place, you were just in
the side lines?
A I was just watching, sir.
Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because precisely according to you your role in this
buy-bust operation was as a back-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q Manlangit got the marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the money from Aling Neneth?
A I don't know, sir.
Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?
PROSECUTOR:
There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there's no testimony on that.

ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.
PROSECUTOR:
No basis.
COURT:
Sustained.
Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According to the records, the amount of P1,600.00
was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. That's right?
A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.
Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the one who retrieved the money
from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?
A I saw it, sir.
Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?
A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.
Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling Neneth. Is that what you are trying to tell
the Court?
A No, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ: I am through with this witness, your Honor."[113]

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her
arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial
court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot
pursuit."[114] In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal
knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable
cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." [115] The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. [116] A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.[117]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her coaccused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused
in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was.[118] Appellant Doria did not point
to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked
bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her
co-accused in pushing drugs.Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house ,[119] with or without her
knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no
reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who
effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the
perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.[120]
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her
person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an
incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of
marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. [121]The "plain view" doctrine
applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery
of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. [122] The law enforcement
officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view
the area.[123] In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused.[124] The object must be open to eye and hand[125] and its discovery inadvertent.[126]
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises
when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object
itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims
its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. [127] In other words, if the package is such that an
experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view.[128] It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[129]
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as follows:
"ATTY. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q This carton, according to you was under a table?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?
A Yes, sir.
Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?
A It was open, sir. Not like that.
COURT
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.
A Like this, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Can we describe it?
ATTY. VALDEZ
Yes.
PROSECUTOR

One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible.
COURT
Noted.
Q At this juncture, you went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q And got hold of this carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?
A I asked her, what's this...
Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton?
A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he asked "Sa iyo galing ang
marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.
Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet frisked, is it not [sic]?
A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.
Q Who got hold of this?
A I was the one, sir.
Q You were the one who got this?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was already retrieved by Badua?
A Yes, sir.
Q You went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not have any search warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs. Gadao was in possession of
the buy-bust money because according to you, you did not know whether Badua already retrieved the buy-bust
money from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far was this from the door?
A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.
Q Under the table according to you?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q Somewhere here?
A It's far, sir.
PROSECUTOR

May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?

A Here, sir.
Q What you see is a carton?
A Yes, sir, with plastic.
Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?"
A Yes, sir.
Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is all that you saw?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
For the record, your Honor...
Q You were only able to verify according to you...
PROSECUTOR
Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By reading it...
ATTY. VALDEZ
That's a piece of plastic.
PROSECUTOR
By reading it, it will connote... this is not a piece of plastic.
ATTY. VALDEZ
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?
PROSECUTOR
With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A piece of plastic may be big or a small
one, for record purposes.
COURT
Leave that to the court.
PROSECUTOR
Leave that to the court.
Q The only reason according to you, you were able to... Look at this, no even Superman... I withdraw that. Not
even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. And according to the Court, it could be
"tikoy," is it not [sic]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Siopao?
A Yes, sir.
Q Canned goods?
A Yes, sir.
Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?

A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may ...

Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you what it could possibly be.
A It's the same plastic, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ
I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. Let the prosecutor do
that for you.
COURT
Continue. Next question.

x x x."[130]
PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there by appellant
Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria
named her and led them to her.[131] Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house, PO3 Manlangit had a view
of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton
box. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana
because he himself checked and marked the said contents.[132] On cross-examination, however, he admitted that
he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust
marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as
to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was
individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color.
[133]
PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items
other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant
Gaddao about its contents.[134] It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the
box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant
was in violation of the law and the Constitution. [135] It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been
excluded and never considered by the trial court.[136]
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana [137] was found in the house of accusedappellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.[138] Apropos is our
ruling in People v. Aminnudin,[139] viz:
"TheCourtstronglysupportsthecampaignofthegovernmentagainstdrugaddictionandcommendstheeffortsofourlaw
enforcementofficersagainstthosewhowouldinflictthismaledictionuponourpeople,especiallythesusceptibleyouth.Butas
demandingasthiscampaignmaybe,itcannotbemoresothanthecompulsionsoftheBillofRightsfortheprotectionofthelibertyof
everyindividualintherealm,includingthebasestofcriminals.TheConstitutioncoverswiththemantleofitsprotectiontheinnocent
andtheguiltyalikeagainstanymannerofhighhandednessfromtheauthorities,howeverpraiseworthytheirintentions.
Thosewhoaresupposedtoenforcethelawarenotjustifiedindisregardingtherightoftheindividualinthenameoforder.Orderis
toohighapriceforthelossofliberty.AsJusticeHolmes,again,said,'Ithinkitalessevilthatsomecriminalsshouldescapethanthat
thegovernmentshouldplayanignoblepart.'Itissimplynotallowedinthefreesocietytoviolatealawtoenforceanother,especially
ifthelawviolatedistheConstitutionitself."[140]

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of a
prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10
million, to wit:
"Sec.4.Sale,Administration,Delivery,DistributionandTransportationofProhibitedDrugs.Thepenaltyofreclusionperpetuato
death,andafinerangingfromfivehundredthousandpesostotenmillionpesosshallbeimposeduponanypersonwho,unless

authorizedbylaw,shallsell,administer,deliver,giveawaytoanother,distribute,dispatchintransitortransportanyprohibiteddrug,
orshallactasabrokerinanyofsuchtransactions.

x x x."
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the sale
took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus
delicti, as evidence in court.[141] The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration
of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams
of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accusedappellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed.[142]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a
Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., please see concurring opinion.

THIRD DIVISION
INTESTATE ESTATE OF G.R. No. 181409
MANOLITA GONZALES VDA.
DE CARUNGCONG, represented
by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, Present:
as Administratrix,
Petitioner, CORONA, J., Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
- v e r s u s - PERALTA and
MENDOZA, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and WILLIAM SATO,
Respondents. Promulgated:
February 11, 2010

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No criminal, but only civil
liability shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the
deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of
another; and
3.
Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sistersin-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers
participating in the commission of the crime. (emphasis supplied)

For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the relationship by affinity created between the
husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her
husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the marriage which created such
relationship by affinity? Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification?
Mediatrix G. Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix [1] of petitioner
intestate estate of her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong, filed a complaintaffidavit[2] for estafa against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. Her complaintaffidavit read:

I, MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG Y GONZALE[S], Filipino, of legal age, single,

and resident of Unit 1111, Prince Gregory Condominium, 105 12 th Avenue, Cubao,
Quezon City, after being duly sworn, depose and state that:
1. I am the duly appointed Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], docketed as Spec. Procs. No. [Q]-95-23621[,] Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, being one (1) of her surviving daughters. Copy of the
Letters of Administration dated June 22, 1995 is hereto attached as Annex A to form an
integral part hereof.
2. As such Administratrix, I am duty bound not only to preserve the properties of
the Intestate Estate of Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], but also to recover such funds
and/or properties as property belonging to the estate but are presently in the possession
or control of other parties.
3. After my appointment as Administratrix, I was able to confer with some of the
children of my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato[,] who predeceased our mother Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzales, having died in Japan in 1991.
4. In my conference with my nieces Karen Rose Sato and Wendy Mitsuko Sato,
age[d] 27 and 24 respectively, I was able to learn that prior to the death of my mother
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s], [s]pecifically on o[r] about November 24, 1992,
their father William Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was able to secure the
signature and thumbmark of my mother on a Special Power of Attorney whereby my
niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato, who was then only twenty (20) years old, was made her
attorney-in-fact, to sell and dispose four (4) valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City.
Said Special Power of Attorney, copy of which is attached as ANNEX A of the Affidavit
of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, was signed and thumbmark[ed] by my mother because William
Sato told her that the documents she was being made to sign involved her taxes. At that
time, my mother was completely blind, having gone blind almost ten (10) years prior to
November, 1992.
5. The aforesaid Special Power of Attorney was signed by my mother in the
presence of Wendy, my other niece Belinda Kiku Sato, our maid Mana Tingzon, and
Governor Josephine Ramirez who later became the second wife of my sisters widower
William Sato.
6. Wendy Mitsuko Sato attests to the fact that my mother signed the document in
the belief that they were in connection with her taxes, not knowing, since she was blind,
that the same was in fact a Special Power of Attorney to sell her Tagaytay properties.
7. On the basis of the aforesaid Special Power of Attorney, William Sato found
buyers for the property and made my niece Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign three (3) deeds of
absolute sale in favor of (a) Anita Ng (Doc. 2194, Page No. 41, Book No. V, Series of
1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio), (b) Anita Ng (Doc. No. 2331, Page No. 68,
Book No. V, Series of 1992 of Notary Public Vicente B. Custodio) and (c) Ruby Lee
Tsai (Doc. No. II, Page No. 65, Book No. II, Series of 1993 of Notary Public Toribio D.
Labid). x x x

8. Per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, the considerations appearing on

the deeds of absolute sale were not the true and actual considerations received by her
father William Sato from the buyers of her grandmothers properties. She attests that
Anita Ng actually paid P7,000,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3148
and P7,034,000.00 for the property covered by TCT No. 3149. All the aforesaid
proceeds were turned over to William Sato who undertook to make the proper
accounting thereof to my mother, Manolita Carungcong Gonzale[s].
9. Again, per the statement of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, Ruby Lee Tsai
paid P8,000,000.00 for the property covered by Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0735, and
the proceeds thereof were likewise turned over to William Sato.
10. The considerations appearing on the deeds of sale were falsified as Wendy
Mitsuko C. Sato has actual knowledge of the true amounts paid by the buyers, as stated
in her Affidavit, since she was the signatory thereto as the attorney-in-fact of Manolita
Carungcong Y Gonzale[s].
11. Wendy was only 20 years old at the time and was not in any position to
oppose or to refuse her fathers orders.
12. After receiving the total considerations for the properties sold under the
power of attorney fraudulently secured from my mother, which total P22,034,000.00,
William Sato failed to account for the same and never delivered the proceeds to
Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] until the latter died on June 8, 1994.
13. Demands have been made for William Sato to make an accounting and to
deliver the proceeds of the sales to me as Administratrix of my mothers estate, but he
refused and failed, and continues to refuse and to fail to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of the estate of the deceased Manolita Carungcong Y Gonzale[s] and of the
heirs which include his six (6) children with my sister Zenaida Carungcong Sato. x x x[3]

Wendy Mitsuko Satos supporting affidavit and the special power of attorney allegedly issued by the
deceased Manolita Gonzales vda. de Carungcong in favor of Wendy were attached to the complaintaffidavit of Mediatrix.
In a resolution dated March 25, 1997, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the
complaint.[4] On appeal, however, the Secretary of Justice reversed and set aside the resolution dated
March 25, 1997 and directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to file an Information against Sato for
violation of Article 315, paragraph 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code. [5] Thus, the following Information
was filed against Sato in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87:[6]
INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses WILLIAM SATO of the crime of ESTAFA under Article 315[,]
par. 3(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, by means of deceit, did, then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused induced said Manolita Gonzales Vda. De
Carungcong[,] who was already then blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a
special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato,
daughter of said accused, making her believe that said document involved only her taxes,
accused knowing fully well that said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, then a
minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of to any person or entity of her
properties all located at Tagaytay City, as follows:
1. One Thousand Eight Hundred Seven(ty) One (1,871) square meters more or less
and covered by T.C.T. No. 3147;
2. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No.
3148 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0722, Cadastral Lot No. 7106;
3. Five Hundred Forty (540) square meters more or less and covered by T.C.T. No.
3149 with Tax Declaration No. GR-016-0721, Cadastral Lot No. 7104;
4. Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (888) square meters more or less with Tax
Declaration No. GR-016-1735, Cadastral Lot No. 7062;
registered in the name of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, and once in the
possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents, said
accused made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale covering
Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 3148 for P250,000.00, [TCT] No. 3149
for P250,000.00 and [Tax Declaration] GR-016-0735 for P650,000.00 and once in
possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused, misapplied,
misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong who died
in 1994.
Contrary to law.[7]

Subsequently, the prosecution moved for the amendment of the Information so as to increase the
amount of damages from P1,150,000, the total amount stated in the deeds of sale, to P22,034,000, the
actual amount received by Sato.

Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code, his relationship to the person allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-inlaw, was an exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Satos motion in an opposition dated March 29, 2006.
In an order dated April 17, 2006, [8] the trial court granted Satos motion and ordered the dismissal of the
criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutors contention is that the death of the wife of the accused
severed the relationship of affinity between accused and his mother-in-law. Therefore, the
mantle of protection provided to the accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.
A judicious and thorough examination of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
convinces this Court of the correctness of the contention of the [d]efense. While it is true
that the death of Zenaida Carungcong-Sato has extinguished the marriage of accused with
her, it does not erase the fact that accused and Zenaidas mother, herein complainant, are
still son[-in-law] and mother-in-law and they remained son[-in-law] and mother-in-law
even beyond the death of Zenaida.
Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, is very explicit and states no proviso. No
criminal, but only civil liability[,] shall result from the commission of the crime of theft,
swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by xxx 1) spouses,
ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line.
Article 332, according to Aquino, in his Commentaries [to] Revised Penal Code,
preserves family harmony and obviates scandal, hence even in cases of theft and
malicious mischief, where the crime is committed by a stepfather against his stepson, by
a grandson against his grandfather, by a son against his mother, no criminal liability is
incurred by the accused only civil (Vicente Alavare, 52 Phil. 65; Adame, CA 40 OG
12th Supp. 63; Cristobal, 84 Phil. 473).
Such exempting circumstance is applicable herein.
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Quash Original Information meritorious, the same
is GRANTED and, as prayed for, case is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[9] (underlining supplied in the original)

The prosecutions motion for reconsideration[10] was denied in an order dated June 2, 2006.[11]

Dissatisfied with the trial courts rulings, the intestate estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals[12] which, however, in a decision[13] dated August 9,
2007, dismissed it. It ruled:
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida did not
extinguish the relationship by affinity between her husband, private respondent Sato, and
her mother Manolita, and does not bar the application of the exempting circumstance
under Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
We further agree with the submission of the [Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG)] that nothing in the law and/or existing jurisprudence supports the argument of
petitioner that the fact of death of Zenaida dissolved the relationship by affinity between
Manolita and private respondent Sato, and thus removed the protective mantle of Article
332 of the Revised Penal Code from said private respondent; and that notwithstanding
the death of Zenaida, private respondent Sato remains to be the son-in-law of Manolita,
and a brother-in-law of petitioner administratrix. As further pointed out by the OSG, the
filing of the criminal case for estafa against private respondent Sato already created
havoc among members of the Carungcong and Sato families as private respondents
daughter Wendy Mitsuko Sato joined cause with her aunt [Mediatrix] Carungcong y
Gonzales, while two (2) other children of private respondent, William Francis and
Belinda Sato, took the side of their father.
There is a dearth of jurisprudence and/or commentaries elaborating on the
provision of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. However, from the plain language
of the law, it is clear that the exemption from criminal liability for the crime of swindling
(estafa) under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code applies to private respondent Sato,
as son-in-law of Manolita, they being relatives by affinity in the same line under Article
332(1) of the same Code. We cannot draw the distinction that following the death of
Zenaida in 1991, private respondent Sato is no longer the son-in-law of Manolita, so as
to exclude the former from the exempting circumstance provided for in Article 332 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
There should be no distinction in the application of law where none is indicated. The
courts could only distinguish where there are facts or circumstances showing that the
lawgiver intended a distinction or qualification. In such a case, the courts would merely
give effect to the lawgivers intent. The solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret
and apply the law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law what is
not written therein.
Further, it is an established principle of statutory construction that penal laws are
strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Any reasonable
doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of Article
332 (1) of the Revised Penal Codes simple language is most favorable to Sato. [14]

The appellate court denied reconsideration.[15] Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the orders of the trial court. It cites
the commentary of Justice Luis B. Reyes in his book on criminal law that the rationale of Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code exempting the persons mentioned therein from criminal liability is that the law
recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the property between the offender and the offended
party. Here, the properties subject of the estafa case were owned by Manolita whose daughter, Zenaida
Carungcong-Sato (Satos wife), died on January 28, 1991. Hence, Zenaida never became a co-owner
because, under the law, her right to the three parcels of land could have arisen only after her
mothers death. Since Zenaida predeceased her mother, Manolita, no such right came about and
the mantle of protection provided to Sato by the relationship no longer existed.
Sato counters that Article 332 makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of
death of the spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, while the death of Zenaida
extinguished her marriage with Sato, it did not dissolve the son-in-law and mother-in-law relationship
between Sato and Zenaidas mother, Manolita.
For his part, the Solicitor General maintains that Sato is covered by the exemption from criminal
liability provided under Article 332. Nothing in the law and jurisprudence supports petitioners claim
that Zenaidas death dissolved the relationship by affinity between Sato and Manolita. As it is, the
criminal case against Sato created havoc among the members of the Carungcong and Sato families, a
situation sought to be particularly avoided by Article 332s provision exempting a family member
committing theft, estafa or malicious mischief from criminal liability and reducing his/her liability to
the civil aspect only.
The petition has merit.
The resolution of this case rests on the interpretation of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In
particular, it calls for the determination of the following: (1) the effect of death on the relationship by
affinity created between a surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse and (2) the
extent of the coverage of Article 332.

EFFECT OF DEATH ON RELATIONSHIP

BY AFFINITY AS ABSOLUTORY CAUSE

Article 332 provides for an absolutory cause[16] in the

crimes of theft, estafa (or swindling) and malicious mischief. It limits the responsibility of the offender
to civil liability and frees him from criminal liability by virtue of his relationship to the offended party.
In connection with the relatives mentioned in the first paragraph, it has been held that included in the
exemptions are parents-in-law, stepparents and adopted children. [17] By virtue thereof, no criminal
liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious mischief against his stepson; [18] by the
stepmother who commits theft against her stepson; [19] by the stepfather who steals something from his
stepson;[20] by the grandson who steals from his grandfather; [21] by the accused who swindles his sisterin-law living with him;[22] and by the son who steals a ring from his mother.[23]
Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a
relationship by marriage or
a familial relation resulting from marriage.[24] It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in
connection with the institution of marriage and family relations.
If marriage gives rise to ones relationship by affinity to the blood relatives of ones spouse, does
the extinguishment of marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?
Philippine jurisprudence has no previous encounter with the issue that confronts us in this case.
That is why the trial and appellate courts acknowledged the dearth of jurisprudence and/or
commentaries on the matter. In contrast, in the American legal system, there are two views on the
subject. As one Filipino author observed:
In case a marriage is terminated by the death of one of the spouses, there are conflicting
views. There are some who believe that relationship by affinity is not terminated
whether there are children or not in the marriage (Carman vs. Newell, N.Y. 1 [Denio] 25,
26). However, the better view supported by most judicial authorities in other
jurisdictions is that, if the spouses have no living issues or children and one of the
spouses dies, the relationship by affinity is dissolved. It follows the rule that relationship
by affinity ceases with the dissolution of the marriage which produces it (Kelly v. Neely,
12 Ark. 657, 659, 56 Am Dec. 288). On the other hand, the relationship by affinity is

continued despite the death of one of the spouses where there are living issues or
children of the marriage in whose veins the blood of the parties are commingled, since
the relationship of affinity was continued through the medium of the issue of the
marriage (Paddock vs. Wells, 2 Barb. Ch. 331, 333).[25]
The first view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the
dissolution of the marriage either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity
between the parties.[26] Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent
with the marriage that produced it. Its duration is indispensably and necessarily determined by the
marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as the marriage subsists, such that the death of a
spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving spouse to the deceased spouses
blood relatives.
The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one
spouse when there is a surviving issue. [27] The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because
of the living issue of the marriage in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled. [28]
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the
surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased
spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not. [29] Under this view, the
relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of
the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have
indicated an intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the tie of affinity between these people and their
relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.
[30]

After due consideration and evaluation of the relative merits of the two views, we hold that the second
view is more consistent with the language and spirit of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
First, the terminated affinity view is generally applied in cases of jury disqualification and incest. [31] On
the other hand, the continuing affinity view has been applied in the interpretation of laws that intend to
benefit step-relatives or in-laws. Since the purpose of the absolutory cause in Article 332(1) is meant to

be beneficial to relatives by affinity within the degree covered under the said provision, the continuing
affinity view is more appropriate.
Second, the language of Article 332(1) which speaks of relatives by affinity in the same line is couched
in general language. The legislative intent to make no distinction between the spouse of ones living
child and the surviving spouse of ones deceased child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter-in-law with
respect to his or her parents-in-law)[32] can be drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code
without doing violence to its language.
Third, the Constitution declares that the protection and strengthening of the family as a basic
autonomous social institution are policies of the State and that it is the duty of the State to strengthen
the solidarity of the family.[33] Congress has also affirmed as a State and national policy that courts shall
preserve the solidarity of the family.[34] In this connection, the spirit of Article 332 is to preserve family
harmony and obviate scandal.[35] The view that relationship by affinity is not affected by the death of
one of the parties to the marriage that created it is more in accord with family solidarity and harmony.

Fourth, the fundamental principle in applying and in interpreting criminal laws is to resolve all
doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused. [36] This is in
consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused shall be presumed innocent unless and
until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.[37]

Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity.[38] The rule applies when
the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the
accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which
is more lenient to the accused.

Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose
of Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to preserve family harmony by providing an absolutory cause.
Since the goal of Article 332(1) is to benefit the accused, the Court should adopt an application or

interpretation that is more favorable to the accused. In this case, that interpretation is the continuing
affinity view.
Thus, for purposes of Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code, we hold that the relationship by
affinity created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the deceased spouse survives
the death of either party to the marriage which created the affinity. (The same principle applies to the
justifying circumstance of defense of ones relatives under Article 11[2] of the Revised Penal Code, the
mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of grave offense committed against ones relatives
under Article 13[5] of the same Code and the absolutory cause of relationship in favor of accessories
under Article 20 also of the same Code.)
SCOPE OF ARTICLE 332 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE

The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the criminal
responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace, the
State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private offended party
with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The
plain, categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the
simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes
mentioned under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or
estafa through falsification.[39]
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is
determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not by the designation of the offense. [40] What
controls is not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in
the Information.[41] In other words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the
nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the Information. [42] It is the

exclusive province of the court to say what the crime is or what it is named. [43] The determination by
the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is merely an opinion which is not
binding on the court.[44]
A reading of the facts alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being charged not with
simple estafa but with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. In
particular, the Information states that Sato, by means of deceit, intentionally defrauded Manolita
committed as follows:
(a) Sato presented a document to Manolita (who was already blind at that time) and induced her
to sign and thumbmark the same;
(b) he made Manolita believe that the said document was in connection with her taxes when it
was in fact a special power of attorney (SPA) authorizing his minor daughter Wendy to
sell, assign, transfer or otherwise dispose of Manolitas properties in Tagaytay City;
(c) relying on Satos inducement and representation, Manolita signed and thumbmarked the SPA
in favor of Wendy Mitsuko Sato, daughter of Sato;
(d) using the document, he sold the properties to third parties but he neither delivered the
proceeds to Manolita nor accounted for the same and
(d) despite repeated demands, he failed and refused to deliver the proceeds, to the damage and
prejudice of the estate of Manolita.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was committed by attributing to
Manolita (who participated in the execution of the document) statements other than those in fact made
by her. Manolitas acts of signing the SPA and affixing her thumbmark to that document were the very
expression of her specific intention that something be done about her taxes. Her signature and
thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such intention as she only signed and
thumbmarked the SPA (a document which she could not have read) because of Satos representation that
the document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the document, Manolita showed that
she believed and adopted the representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e., that it
involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore, served as her conformity to Satos proposal
that she execute a document to settle her taxes.

Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that Manolita granted his
daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or
otherwise disposing of Manolitas Tagaytay properties when the fact was that Manolita signed and
thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the
document itself, the SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to Manolita when she
was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) once in the possession of the said special power of attorney and other pertinent documents,
[Sato] made Wendy Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale and
(2) once in possession of the proceeds of the sale of the above properties, said accused,
misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to his own personal use and benefit

raise the presumption that Sato, as the possessor of the falsified document and the one who benefited
therefrom, was the author thereof.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the prosecution moved for the amendment of the
Information so as to increase the amount of damages from P1,150,000 toP22,034,000. This was granted
by the trial court and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on certiorari. This meant that the amended
Information would now state that, while the total amount of consideration stated in the deeds of
absolute sale was only P1,150,000, Sato actually received the total amount of P22,034,000 as proceeds
of the sale of Manolitas properties.[45] This also meant that the deeds of sale (which were public
documents) were also falsified by making untruthful statements as to the amounts of consideration
stated in the deeds.
Therefore, the allegations in the Information essentially charged a crime that was not simple
estafa. Sato resorted to falsification of public documents (particularly, the special power of attorney and
the deeds of sale) as a necessary means to commit the estafa.

Since the crime with which respondent was charged was not simple estafa but the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory
cause provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code in his favor.

EFFECT OF ABSOLUTORY CAUSE UNDER

ARTICLE 332 ON CRIMINAL LIABILITY
FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA
THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS

The question may be asked: if the accused may not be held criminally liable for simple estafa by
virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, should he not be absolved
also from criminal liability for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents?
No.
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa and falsification of public
document is required for a proper conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People.[46] It means that the prosecution must
establish that the accused resorted to the falsification of a public document as a necessary means to
commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code and of the nature of a complex crime would negate exemption from criminal liability for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, simply because the accused may not
be held criminally liable for simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific crimes against property,
namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether
simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision. To

apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component
crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime is to unduly
expand the scope of Article 332. In other words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the crime of estafa as a separate
simple crime, not as the component crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the
indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public document, not as a single charge for
the single (complex) crime of estafa through falsification of public document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender
criminally liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the
violation of the juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain family members as
a private matter and therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the
violation of the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a
breach of the public interest in the integrity and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the
latter instance, what is involved is no longer simply the property right of a family relation but a
paramount public interest.
The purpose of Article 332 is to preserve family harmony and obviate scandal. [47] Thus, the
action provided under the said provision simply concerns the private relations of the parties as family
members and is limited to the civil aspect between the offender and the offended party. When estafa is
committed through falsification of a public document, however, the matter acquires a very serious
public dimension and goes beyond the respective rights and liabilities of family members among
themselves. Effectively, when the offender resorts to an act that breaches public interest in the integrity
of public documents as a means to violate the property rights of a family member, he is removed from
the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
In considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately from each
other. While there may be two component crimes (estafa and falsification of documents), both
felonies are animated by and result from one and the same criminal intent for which there is only one

criminal liability.[48] That is the concept of a complex crime. In other words, while there are two
crimes, they are treated only as one, subject to a single criminal liability.
As opposed to a simple crime where only one juridical right or interest is violated (e.g.,
homicide which violates the right to life, theft which violates the right to property), [49] a complex crime
constitutes a violation of diverse juridical rights or interests by means of diverse acts, each of which is
a simple crime in itself.[50] Since only a single criminal intent underlies the diverse acts, however, the
component crimes are considered as elements of a single crime, the complex crime. This is the correct
interpretation of a complex crime as treated under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of a complex crime, therefore, there is a formal (or ideal) plurality of crimes where
the same criminal intent results in two or more component crimes constituting a complex crime for
which there is only one criminal liability.[51] (The complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public document falls under this category.) This is different from a material (or real) plurality of crimes
where different criminal intents result in two or more crimes, for each of which the accused incurs
criminal liability.[52] The latter category is covered neither by the concept of complex crimes nor by
Article 48.

Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the formal plurality of crimes (concursus
delictuorum or concurso de delitos) gives rise to a single criminal liability and requires the imposition
of a single penalty:
Although [a] complex crime quantitatively consists of two or more crimes, it is
only one crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed and the two or more crimes
constituting the same are more conveniently termed as component crimes. [53] (emphasis
supplied)

In [a] complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they
constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the
offender. The offender has only one criminal intent. Even in the case where an offense is
a necessary means for committing the other, the evil intent of the offender is only one. [54]

For this reason, while a conviction for estafa through falsification of public document requires
that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability for
estafa may be determined and considered independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of
estafa and falsification of public documents are not separate crimes but component crimes of the
single complex crime of estafa and falsification of public documents.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to claim that, to be criminally liable for the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of public document, the liability for estafa should be considered separately
from the liability for falsification of public document. Such approach would disregard the nature of a
complex crime and contradict the letter and spirit of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It would
wrongly disregard the distinction between formal plurality and material plurality, as it improperly treats
the plurality of crimes in the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document as a
mere material plurality where the felonies are considered as separate crimes to be punished
individually.
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE
A NECESSARY MEANS FOR COMMITTING ESTAFA
EVEN UNDER ARTICLE 315 (3[A])

The elements of the offense of estafa punished under Article 315 (3[a]) of the Revised Penal
Code are as follows:
(1) the offender induced the offended party to sign a document;
(2) deceit was employed to make the offended party sign the document;
(3) the offended party personally signed the document and
(4) prejudice is caused to the offended party.

While in estafa under Article 315(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the law does not require that the
document be falsified for the consummation thereof, it does not mean that the falsification of the
document cannot be considered as a necessary means to commit the estafa under that provision.

The phrase necessary means does not connote indispensable means for if it did, then the offense
as a necessary means to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be
an ingredient thereof.[55] In People v. Salvilla,[56] the phrase necessary means merely signifies that one
crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other. [57] In this case, the crime of
falsification of public document, the SPA, was such a necessary means as it was resorted to by Sato to
facilitate and carry out more effectively his evil design to swindle his mother-in-law. In particular, he
used the SPA to sell the Tagaytay properties of Manolita to unsuspecting third persons.
When the offender commits in a public document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another crime, like estafa, theft
or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime under Article 48 of the same Code. [58] The
falsification of a public, official or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa
because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element
of the crime of falsification of a public, official or commercial document. [59] In other words, the crime
of falsification was committed prior to the consummation of the crime of estafa. [60] Actually utilizing
the falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. [61] The damage to
another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. [62]
Applying the above principles to this case, the allegations in the Information show that the
falsification of public document was consummated when Sato presented a ready-made SPA to Manolita
who signed the same as a statement of her intention in connection with her taxes. While the
falsification was consummated upon the execution of the SPA, the consummation of the estafa occurred
only when Sato later utilized the SPA. He did so particularly when he had the properties sold and
thereafter pocketed the proceeds of the sale. Damage or prejudice to Manolita was caused not by the
falsification of the SPA (as no damage was yet caused to the property rights of Manolita at the time she
was made to sign the document) but by the subsequent use of the said document. That is why the
falsification of the public document was used to facilitate and ensure (that is, as a necessary means for)
the commission of the estafa.

The situation would have been different if Sato, using the same inducement, had made Manolita
sign a deed of sale of the properties either in his favor or in favor of third parties. In that case, the
damage would have been caused by, and at exactly the same time as, the execution of the document,
not prior thereto. Therefore, the crime committed would only have been the simple crime of estafa.
[63]

On the other hand, absent any inducement (such as if Manolita herself had been the one who asked

that a document pertaining to her taxes be prepared for her signature, but what was presented to her for
her signature was an SPA), the crime would have only been the simple crime of falsification.[64]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 9, 2007 and the
resolution dated January 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 95260
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court which is directed to try the
accused with dispatch for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents.
SO ORDERED.

Justifying and Exempting Circumstances

attyrcd / January 28, 2010

Justifying circumstances are those wherein the acts of the actor are in accordance
with law and, hence, he incurs no criminal and civil liability. The justifying circumstances
by subject are as follows:
1. Self-defense
Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights. (Art. 11, Par. 1) The scope included
self-defense not only of life, but also of rights like those of chastity, property and honor. It
has also been applied to the crime of libel. (People v Chua Chiong, 51 OG 1932)
Its elements are:
a. Unlawful aggression
Aggression is considered unlawful when it is unprovoked or unjustified. There must be
real danger to life or personal safety. An imminent danger of aggression, and not merely
imaginary, is sufficient. A slap on the face is actual unlawful aggression. (Dec., Sup. Ct.
of Spain, March 8, 1887)
There is no unlawful aggression exists in a case of an agreed fight. To constitute an
agreement to fight, the challenge must be accepted. (People v. Del Pilar, 44 OG 596)
Unlawful aggression may no longer exist if the aggressor ran away after the attack.
(People v. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366) If the aggression has ceased, the one defending himself
has no right to inflict any further injury to his assailant. (Q11, 1993 Bar)
Mere oral threat to kill, unaccompanied by any unequivocal act clearly indicative of the
intent to carry out the threat, does not amount to unlawful aggression. (People v.
Binondo, 97227, Oct. 20, 1992) The mere cocking of an M-14 rifle by the victim, without
aiming the firearm at any particular person is not sufficient to conclude that the life of
the person (Vice-Governor) whom the accused was allegedly protecting, was under
actual threat or attack from the victim. There is no unlawful aggression. (Almeda v. CA,
March 13, 1997)
b. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
The rule stand ground when in the right applies when a person is unlawfully assaulted
and if the aggressor is armed with a weapon. (US v. Domen, 37 Phils. 57) Whether the
means employed is reasonable or not it will depend upon the kind of weapon of the
aggressor, his physical condition, character, size and other circumstances as well as
those of the person attacked and the time and place of the attack. (People v. Padua, 40
OG 998) The instinct of self-preservation more often than not is the moving power in
mans action in defending himself. (People v. Artuz, 71 SCRA 116)
c. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
A person may be justified in causing injury to another in defense of his property (fencing
off the house of the accused) even if there was no attack against his person. To hold
otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of circumstance No. 1 which recognizes

the right of an individual to defend his rights, one of which is to own and enjoy his
property. (People v. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389) Even assuming that the victim was scaling
the wall of the factory compound to commit the crime inside the same, shooting him is
never justifiable, even admitting that such act is considered unlawful aggression on the
property rights. In the instant case, the second element is absent considering that the
victim was unarmed. There is therefore an incomplete self-defense. (Q6, 1996 Bar; Q4,
1990 Bar)
To be entitled to a complete self-defense of chastity, there must be an attempt to rape.
(People v. Jaurigue, 76 Phil. 174)
When a person is libeled, he may hit back with another libel, which, if adequate, will be
justified. Once the aspersion is cast, its sting clings and the one thus defamed may avail
himself of all necessary means to shake it off. (People v. Chua Hong, 51 OG 1932)
2. Defense of Relative
Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouses, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in
the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, and in case
the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had
no part therein. (Art. 11, Par. 2)
Even if two persons agreed to fight, and at the moment when one was about to stab the
other, the brother of the latter arrived and shot him, defense of relative is present as
long as there is an honest belief that the relative being defended was a victim of an
unlawful aggression, and the relative defending had no knowledge of the agreement to
fight. (US v. Esmedia 17 Phil. 280)
3. Defense of Stranger.
Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger and that the person
defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. (Art. 11, Par. 3)
A person who struggled with the husband who was attacking his wife with a bolo for the
possession of the bolo and in the course of the struggle, wounded the husband, was held
to have acted in defense of a stranger. (People v. Valdez, 58 Phil. 31)
4. State of Necessity
Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to
another. (Art. 11, Par. 4)
Its requisites are:
a. The evil sought to be avoided actually exists.
b. The injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it.

c. There be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

This is the only justifying circumstances wherein civil liability may arise but this is borne
by the person benefited by his act. The state of necessity exists when there is a clash
between two unequal rights, the lesser right giving way to the greater right.
An accused was acquitted of the crime of slander by deed, when she eloped with another
man after all wedding preparations with the offended party were made, since there was
a necessity on the part of the accused to avoid a loveless marriage with the offended
party. (People v. Hernandez, 55 OG 8465)
In a case when in saving the life of the mother, the doctor sacrificed the life of the
unborn child, is the attending physician criminally liable? No, because his acts are
justified under this Article (State of necessity). However, in mercy killing where the
doctor deliberately turned off the life support system costing the life of the patient, the
doctor is criminally liable. Euthanasia is not a justifying circumstance in our jurisdiction.
(Q3, 1990 Bar)
5. Fulfillment of duty
Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office. (Art. 11, Par. 5) The injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such right or office.
The killing by a policeman of an escaping detention prisoner is presumed to be
committed in the performance of his official duties. But shooting a thief who refused to
stop inspite of the order of the accused will make him liable as he exceeded fulfillment of
his duty. (People v. Bentres, 49 OG 4919) Also, under the doctrine of self-help, the law
justifies the act of the owner as lawful possessor of a thing in using such force as is
reasonably necessary for the protection of his proprietary or possessory right. (Art. 429,
Civil Code)
With respect to the wounding of the stranger during the commission of crime of death
under exceptional circumstances (Art. 247), the defense of lawful exercise of a right is a
justifying circumstance. (Q14, 1991 Bar)
6. Obedience to superior order
Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose. (Art. 11, Par. 6)
It is required that the order in itself must be lawful; that it is for a lawful purpose; and
that the person carrying out the order must also act within the law. But even if the order
is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the
subordinate is not liable. (Nassif v. People, 78 Phil. 67) This is due to a mistake of fact
committed in good faith. Even if the order is illegal, the subordinate may still invoke the
exempting circumstances of compulsion of irresistible force or acting under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.

Exempting circumstances are those wherein there is an absence in the agent of the
crime of all the condition that would make an act voluntary and, hence, although there is
no criminal liability, there is civil liability. In exempting, the crime is committed but there
is absent in the person of the offender any element of voluntariness, and so he is not
criminally liable but is civilly liable except in the exempting circumstances
of accident and lawful or insuperable cause.
1. Imbecility and the insanity.
An imbecile is one who may be advanced in years, but has a mental development
comparable only to children between 2 and 7 years of age. An insane is one who suffers
from a mental disorder in such degree as to deprive him of reason. The insane person
may be held criminally liable if he acted during a lucidinterval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a
felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without
first obtaining the permission of the same court. (Art. 12, Par. 1)
The test of imbecility or insanity is complete deprivation of intelligence in the
commission of the act, that is, that the accused acted without the least discernment.
(People v. Aldemeta, 55033, Nov. 13, 1986) The evidence regarding insanity must refer
to the very moment of its execution and must be proven by clear and positive evidence.
(People v. Basco, 44 Phil. 204)
Even if the offender is not an imbecile nor insane, if he is completely deprived of the
consciousness of his acts when he commits the crime, he is entitled to exemption for a
cause analogous to imbecility or insanity. So, one committing a crime while dreaming
during his sleep (People v. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255) or in a state of somnambulism or sleep
walking (People v. Gimena, 55 Phil. 604) is not criminally liable as the acts are embraced
within the plea of insanity.
2. Minority
A person under nine (9) years of age. (Art. 12, Par. 2) In this case, the minor is
completely devoid of discernment and are irresponsible.
A persons over nine (9) years of age but under fifteen (15), unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with
the provisions of Art. 80 [Repealed by PD 603]. (Art. 12, Par. 3)
Discernment is the mental capacity to determine not merely the difference between
right or wrong, but is also involves the capacity to comprehend the nature of the act and
its consequences.
The age of the minor is computed up to the time of the commission of the crime
charged, not up to the date of trial.(People v. Navarro, 51 OG 409) If the minor is exempt
from criminal liability, he shall be committed to the care of his or her father or mother or

nearest relative or family friend in the discretion of the court and subject to its
supervision. (Art. 189, PD 603, as amended)
Minority is always a privileged mitigating circumstance under the RPC and lowers the
prescribe penalty by one or two degrees in accordance with Article 68 of the Code. But
like any modifying circumstance, it is not availing to those accused of crimes mala
prohibita. (People v. Mangusan, 189 SCRA 624) However, this privileged mitigating
circumstance may be appreciated in violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act (RA 6425),
the penalty to be imposed should not be lower than prision correccional. (People v.
Simon, 93128, July 29, 1994)
3. Accident
Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. (Art. 12, Par. 4)
Its requisites are:
a. The offender must be performing a lawful act.
b. With due care.
c. Causes injury to another by mere accident.
d. Without fault or intent of causing it.
An accident is any happening beyond the control of a person the consequences of which
are not foreseeable. If foreseeable, there is fault or culpa. An accidental shooting due to
legitimate self-defense is exempting. (People v. Trinidad, 49 OG 4889) In performing a
lawful act with due care by snatching away the balisong in defense of stranger, the
balisong flew with force that it hit another person who was seriously injured, Tommy is
exempted from criminal liability because of mere accident. (Q2, 1992 Bar)
Under this exempting circumstance, there is no civil liability.
4. Compulsion of irresistible force.
Any person who acts under the compulsion of irresistible force. (Art. 12, Par. 5)
The force referred to here must be a physical force, irresistible and compelling and must
come from a third person. It cannot spring primarily from the offender himself. (People v.
Fernando, 33 SCRA 149) Thus, if a person was struck with the butts of the guns of those
who killed another to compel him to bury their victim, he is not liable as an accessory
because he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force. (US v. Caballeros, 4 Phil.
850)
The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only
without will, but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,

imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a well grounded

apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future
injury is not enough. The compulsion must be one of such a character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. (People v.
Nalipanat, 145 SCRA 483)
5. Impulse of uncontrollable fear
Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater
injury. (Art. 12, Par. 6)
Uncontrollable fear is an impulse coming from within the person of the actor himself. The
actor acts not against his will but because he is engendered by the fear. The threat
producing the insuperable fear must be grave, actual, serious and such kind that the
majority of men would have succumbed to such moral compulsion. (Feria and Gregorio,
Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 224) Thus, if one is compelled under fear of death to join the
rebels, he is not liable for rebellion because he acted under the impulse of uncontrollable
fear of an equal or greater injury. (US v. Exaltacion, 3 Phil. 339)
6. Insuperable or lawful cause.
Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful
insuperable cause. (Art. 12, Par. 7)
This is a felony by omission. The failure of a policeman to deliver the prisoner lawfully
arrested to the judicial authorities within the prescribed period because it was not
possible to do so with practicable dispatch as the prisoner was arrested in a distant place
would constitute a non-performance of duty to an insuperable cause. (US v. Vicentillo, 19
Phil. 118)
7. Absolutory causes.
These are instances which actually constitute a crime but by reason of public policy and
sentiment, it is considered to be without liability and no penalty is imposed, like:
a. Spontaneous desistance at the attempted stage of a felony. (Art. 6, Par. 3)
b. Accessories exempt from criminal liability. (Art. 20)
c. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances.`(Art. 247)
d. Enter a dwelling for the purpose of preventing serious harm or service to humanity.
(Art. 280)
e. Exempt from theft, swindling or malicious mischief by relationships. (Art. 332)
f. Marriage of the offended party in seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape.
(Art. 244)

g. Instigation takes place when a peace officer induces a person to commit a crime.
Without the inducement, the crime would not be committed. Hence, it is exempting by
reason of public policy. The person instigating must not be a private person as he will be
liable as a principal by inducement. (Art. 17, Par. 2) In this case, the criminal intent
(mens rea) originates in the mind of the instigator and the accused is lured into the
commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. However, entrapment is
the employment of such ways and means devised by a peace officer for the purpose of
trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. With or without the entrapment, the crime has been
committed already. Hence, entrapment is neither exempting or mitigating. The idea to
commit the crime originated from the accused, thus the actor is criminally liable.
The difference between entrapment and instigation lies in the origin of the criminal
intent. In entrapment mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and
resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the
commission of the crime and suggests it to the accused, who adopts the idea and carries
it into execution. (Araneta v. CA, 46638, July 9, 1986)
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officer to trap and
catch a malefactorin flagrante delicto, commonly involving dangerous drugs. (People v.
Del Pilar, 188 SCRA 37) Where a person had a ready supply of dangerous drugs for sale
to anyone willing to pay the price asked for, although he might not have the drug with
him at the time of the initial transaction, the situation supports an entrapment, not an
instigation. The fact that the accused returned with the drugs shortly after the
transaction was entered into, shows that he had ready contacts with the supplier from
whom he could readily get the drug. If the accused were merely instigated to look for the
drug, it would have taken him a considerable length of time to look for a source. (People
v. Estevan, 196 SCRA 34) (Q8, 1992 Bar)

An example of instigation is given in Q9, 1995 Bar as follows: Suspecting that Juan was a
drug pusher, SPO2 Mercado gave Juan a P 100-bill and asked him to buy some marijuana
cigarettes. Desirous of pleasing SPO2 Mercado, Juan went inside the shopping mall while
the officer waited at the corner of the mall. After 15 minutes, Juan returned with ten
sticks of marijuana cigarettes which gave to SPO2 Mercado who thereupon placed Juan
under arrest and charged him with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law by selling
marijuana. Is Juan guilty of any offense? Juan cannot be charged of any offense
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Although Juan is a suspected drug pusher,
he cannot be charged on the basis of a mere suspicion. By providing the money with
which to buy marijuana cigarettes, SPO2 Mercado practically induced and prodded Juan
to commit the offense of illegal possession of marijuana. Set against the facts, instigation
is a valid defense available to Juan.