Contents List

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Army Code No. 71611

Infantry Tactical Doctrine

Volume 1
The Infantry Company Group

Pamphlet No. 1

The Infantry Company Group

The Fundamentals

1998
This pamphlet supersedes Infantry Training Volume IX, Infantry Tactics,
Pamphlet No. 45 Part 1, The Infantry Platoon (General), 1987 (Army Code No.
71236), which should now be destroyed.

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COPYRIGHT
This work is Crown copyright and the intellectual property rights for this publication
belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). No material or information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form outside MOD establishments except as authorized by both the sponsor
and the MOD where appropriate.

SECURITY
This document is issued for the information of such persons who need to know its contents in the course of their official duties. Any person finding this document should hand
it into a British Forces unit or to a British police station for its safe return to the MINISTRY
OF DEFENCE, D MOD SY, LONDON SW1A 2HB, with particulars of how and where
found. THE UNAUTHORIZED RETENTION OR DESTRUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT
COULD BE AN OFFENCE UNDER THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS OF 19111989.

AUTHORITY
This publication is issued under the overall direction of the CGS. It is an MOD Approved
Code of Practice (ACOP). Where issues of health and safety are concerned it takes into
account the provisions of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.

STATUS
The contents provide clear military information concerning the most up to date experience and best practice available for commanders and troops to use in their operations
and training. If you are prosecuted for a breach of health and safety law, and it is proved
that you have not followed the relevant provisions of the ACOP, a court may find you
criminally liable unless you can show that you have complied with the requirements of
health and safety legislation since it is a breach of this legislation which renders a person criminally liable. Breaches or omissions of the ACOP could result in disciplinary

AMENDMENTS
Amdt No.

Date

Amdt No.

Date

Amdt No.

Date

DISTRIBUTION
(See page vi)

FOR THE ATTENTION OF ALL SCALE HOLDERS

Units requiring an increase or decrease to their scale should apply to DGD&D,
Publications who will arrange for a revised distribution. Any request to exceed the scale
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ii

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Army Code No. 71611

D/HQT/18/28/136

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Infantry Tactical Doctrine Volume 1

The Infantry Company Group
Pamphlet No. 1

The Infantry Company Group

The Fundamentals

Prepared under the direction

of the Chief of the General Staff
Ministry of Defence
April 1998
Crown Copyright Reserved

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1998

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The Infantry Mission is

to close with and engage the enemy in all operational

theatres and environments, in order to bring about his
defeat.

iv

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FOREWORD

1. The development of doctrine is a continuous process and the information contained in the series of Infantry Doctrine Publications will naturally be subject to
change. This change will either be driven from higher level developments or from
field experience. Any person wishing to propose amendments to the pamphlets in
Volume 1 is strongly encouraged to write to SO2 TD, Force Development Branch,
Headquarters Infantry, Warminster Training Centre, Warminster, Wiltshire, BA12
0DJ. All proposals will be considered for submission to the Infantry Doctrine
Working Group. Other queries should be made to Infantry Publications (same
address), ATN Warminster Mil ext 2325/2452.
2. Infantry Doctrine forms part of a coherent hierarchy of doctrine publications.
Associated publications are: British Defence Doctrine; The British Military Doctrine;
ADP Volume 1 Operations; ADP Volume 2 Command; AFM Volume 1 Part 2
Battlegroup Tactics; Army Unit SOPs, and the Tactical Aide Memoire. British Army
Review, Army Training and Doctrine News and The Infantryman provide current
thought and discussion on doctrine matters.
3. Individuals should first read the Introduction on page xi which explains the aim,
layout and scope of this pamphlet as well as the structure and breakdown of Infantry
Tactical Doctrine Publications.
4. This pamphlet supersedes Infantry Training Volume IX, Infantry Tactics,
Pamphlet No. 45 Part 1, The Infantry Platoon (General), 1987 (Army Code No.
71236), which should now be destroyed.

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2. Specific. Scaling of this pamphlet for Infantry Battalions/Companies allows
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command with spares for Training Wing.

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CONTENTS
Page
Foreword .....................................................................................................
Distribution ..................................................................................................
Contents ......................................................................................................
List of Illustrations .......................................................................................
Introduction .................................................................................................

v
vi
vii
ix
xi

CHAPTER 1. PRINCIPLES AND OPERATIONAL ART

Section
Section
Section
Section

1.
2.
3.
4.

The Principles of War ........................................................

The Manoeuvrist Approach ...............................................
Mission Command .............................................................
Land Operations ................................................................

11
13
17
110

CHAPTER 2. LEADERSHIP IN WAR

Section
Section
Section
Section

1.
2.
3.
4.

General ..............................................................................
The Environment of War ....................................................
Courage and Morale ..........................................................
Leadership in Battle ...........................................................

21
21
23
24

CHAPTER 3. THE INFANTRY BATTALION

Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Annex A
Annex B
Annex C

Introduction ........................................................................
Types of Infantry Battalion .................................................
The Tasks and Employment of Infantry .............................
Battalion HQ and HQ Company ........................................
The Rifle Company ............................................................
Supporting Elements .........................................................
Task Organization and Regrouping ...................................

31
32
34
36
311
320
325

Infantry Battalion ORBATs .................................................

Infantry Weapon Characteristics .......................................
Distribution of Loads ..........................................................

3A1
3B1
3C1

CHAPTER 4. BATTLE PROCEDURE AND ORDERS

Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.

General ..............................................................................
Functional Grouping ..........................................................
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield ..........................

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41
41
44

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Page
Section 4.
Section 5.
Section 6.

Estimates ...........................................................................
Commanders Battle Procedure ........................................
Orders ................................................................................

45
48
418

Annex A
Annex B

Extraction of Orders ...........................................................

Combat Estimate ................................................................
Appendix 1. Aide-Memoire Combat Estimate..............

4A1
4B1
4B11

CHAPTER 5. COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES

Section
Section
Section
Section

1.
2.
3.
4.

Introduction ........................................................................
Combat Forces ..................................................................
Combat Support Fire Support Forces ..........................
Combat Support Operational Assistance Forces .........

51
52
58
511

Annex
Annex
Annex
Annex

A
B
C
D

AFV Weapon Characteristics ............................................

Artillery Weapon Characteristics for Fire Planning ............
Support Helicopters ...........................................................
Close Air Support ..............................................................

5A1
5B1
5C1
5D1

CHAPTER 6. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Section
Section
Section
Section

1.
2.
3.
4.

Annex A

Introduction ........................................................................
The Major Services ...........................................................
The Logistic Support System ............................................
Operational Administration at Company Group Level .......

Battlegroup CSS Systems .................................................

61
63
64
67
6A1

CHAPTER 7. TRAINING FOR WAR

Section
Section
Section
Section
Section

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Annex A

viii

Introduction ........................................................................
Direction of Training ...........................................................
Preparation ........................................................................
Planning Training ...............................................................
Training in the Company and Platoon ...............................

Activity Checklist in Chronological Order for Planning a

Company Exercise .............................................................

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71
72
74
75
79
7A1

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ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure No
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Page
The Infantry Battalion Basic Organization ..........................
The Infantry Rifle Company ....................................................
The Rifle Platoon ....................................................................
Balanced Fire Teams Normal Grouping .............................
Unbalanced Fire Teams Assault and Fire Support Teams .
The Format for the Quick Estimate .........................................
The Decision Making Cycle .....................................................
The Armoured Squadron ........................................................
Battlegroup CSS Systems .......................................................
The Systems Approach to Training .........................................

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37
311
315
319
319
47
4B3
53
6A1
77

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INFANTRY TACTICAL DOCTRINE

VOLUME 1
THE INFANTRY COMPANY GROUP
Pamphlet No. 1
THE INFANTRY COMPANY GROUP
THE FUNDAMENTALS
INTRODUCTION
Contents

Aim

1. The aim of Pamphlet 1 is to describe CHAPTER 1. PRINCIPLES AND

the fundamental matters that underpin all OPERATIONAL ART
infantry operations and to provide the doc- CHAPTER 2. LEADERSHIP IN WAR
trinal foundation for the other pamphlets in CHAPTER 3. THE INFANTRY BATTALION
the Infantry Tactical Doctrine series. CHAPTER 4. BATTLE PROCEDURE AND
ORDERS
Notwithstanding its title, it is designed to be
CHAPTER 5. COMBAT AND COMBAT
a reference document not just for the com- SUPPORT FORCES
pany commander but for commanders at all CHAPTER 6. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
levels within the rifle company. Although CHAPTER 7. TRAINING FOR WAR
Pamphlet 1 is generally theoretical in
nature, there are two key practical chapters which are of particular importance. In this
respect, the readers attention is drawn to Chapter 4. Battle Procedure and Orders
and Chapter 6. Combat Service Support.
2. Although the pamphlets in Volume 1 concentrate on infantry tactics, the Infantrys
battle will rarely be a unique, stand alone business and the combined arms approach
to the conduct of warfare is now a doctrinal rule. The doctrine, wherever pertinent,
therefore describes the employment of other combat and combat support arms within
that battle.
3. The organizational setting for the tactical doctrine is the light role company group.
The light role company has been chosen as its practices and procedures provide the
tactical default setting for the Infantry and have general applicability. The company
group is defined as a rifle company, or part of a company, with its headquarters and
one or more combat attachments to its normal establishment. A company group
could, therefore, range in size from a company with a MFC to a company supported by
the full range of combat and combat support assets. The tactical doctrine described

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does not assume a task organization and considers the employment of the company
and its likely combat support assets in high intensity warfare.
Structure of Infantry Tactical Doctrine Publications
4. The Doctrine Hierarchy. The Doctrine Hierarchy ensures that Army doctrine
cascades from policy and principles to practical applications and procedures. There
are three elements to the hierarchy:
a. Principles. Principles are the guiding doctrine that is concerned with
operational art and the British outlook on operations is contained in British
Defence Doctrine (JWP 001). From this overarching publication is derived
British Military Doctrine (BMD), Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs) and various
Joint publications. Allied publications, such as ATP35(B), also describe principles.
b. Practices. The practical application of tactical doctrine for field commanders at formation and battlegroup level are contained in Army Field Manuals
(AFMs). The Infantry tactical doctrine contained in this new series of pamphlets
lies between practices and procedures.
c. Procedures. Procedures are the mechanics that ensure the success of
operations. At Army level procedures are detailed in publications such as
AFSOPs, AUSOPs and TAM. Infantry procedures are detailed in a new range
of pamphlets called Infantry Tactical Publications.
5. Infantry Doctrine Development. The Director of Infantry is charged by the
Chief of the General Staff with the development of Infantry tactical doctrine at company level and below. Development of this doctrine is the responsibility of the Infantry
Force Development Committee (IFDC) whose aim is to integrate the five functional
areas of Infantry Fighting Power: doctrine, equipment, structures, training and manpower and logistics. Each of these functional areas is represented by a Working
Group whose aim is to provide advice and guidance to the IFDC in their area, in conjunction with the Force Development branch of Headquarters Infantry.
6. Infantry Tactical Doctrine. Infantry tactical doctrine has been defined as tactical doctrine to provide guidance to company commanders by detailing Tactics,
Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) appropriate to their level of tactical command.
7. Publications. The structure of Infantry tactical doctrine and training publications has been rationalized and will now be broken down into two parts Infantry
Tactical Doctrine and Infantry Training each divided into a number of volumes further sub-divided into pamphlets.

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a. Infantry Tactical Doctrine. Infantry tactical doctrine will consist of two volumes: Volume 1 The Infantry Company Group; Volume 2 The Tactical
Employment of Infantry Weapons and Systems.
b. Infantry Training Publications. Infantry training publications will consist of
a number of volumes concerning skill at arms, ranges, support weapons, signals training and vehicles and vehicle mounted weapon systems.
Breakdown of Infantry Tactical Doctrine Publications
8.

9.

Infantry tactical doctrine is contained in two volumes:

a.

Volume 1 The Infantry Company Group.

b.

Volume 2 The Tactical Employment of Infantry Weapons and Systems.

The detailed breakdown of the pamphlets is as follows:

a.

b.

Volume 1 The Infantry Company Group.

Pamphlet
No

Title

The Infantry Company Group The Fundamentals

Infantry Company Group Tactics

Infantry Platoon Tactics

Armoured Infantry Company Group Tactics

Infantry Company Group Jungle Tactics

Volume 2 The Tactical Employment of Infantry Weapons and Systems.

Pamphlet
No

Title

Infantry Tactical Doctrine Notes

The Medium Mortar 81 mm L16

Anti-Tank Guided Weapons MILAN

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xiv

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Chapter 1
PRINCIPLES AND OPERATIONAL ART
SECTION 1. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
0101. At company level the principles of
Contents
war provide a guide for the planning and
conduct of activity on the battlefield. They
are based on past experience where their SECTION 1. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
application with judgement has led to victory. SECTION 2. THE MANOEUVRIST
They are not rules, yet blatant disregard for APPROACH
them involves risk and could result in failure. SECTION 3. MISSION COMMAND
They should be read and understood in the SECTION 4. LAND OPERATIONS
light of the Manoeuvrist Approach and
Mission Command described below in Sections 2 and 3.

Page
11
13
17
110

0102. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. In every operation it is essential

to select and define the aim clearly and the selection of the aim is one of the commanders most important duties. The aim must not only be unambiguous and direct
but it must also be attainable with the forces available and must be adhered to
throughout the operation. Unity of effort is a vital component of Mission Command
(see Section 3) and is achieved, inter alia, by a clear lead and sense of purpose being
given by the commander. The commanders aim will be expressed as his Intent and
subordinates must understand the intentions of commanders two levels up if unity of
effort is to be further enhanced.
0103. Maintenance of Morale. The maintenance of morale is probably the most
important factor in war for the company commander. High morale fosters an aggressive spirit and the determination to win must be engendered throughout the company.
High morale is the quality which makes men keep going in the most difficult conditions or show outstanding courage in times of fatigue and danger. It is based on confidence, discipline, professional skill, physical conditioning and self-respect. These
must be instilled by realistic and demanding and imaginative training and by intelligent and sound administration. Above all, morale is enhanced by comradeship and
a sense of group loyalty which the commander must foster in the companys esprit de
corps.
0104. Offensive Action. In all combat operations, even those in which initially
the enemy has freedom of action, commanders must seek every opportunity to retain
or seize the initiative and strike the enemy. In the final analysis success in battle
depends directly upon the determination of the force, individually or collectively, to
close with the enemy and to destroy his will to fight. Frequently, opportunities for victory in battle will be built upon the exploitation of opportunities created by subordinate
commanders who recognize and seize a favourable situation.

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0105. Surprise. Surprise is a fundamental aim of the manoeuvrist approach.

Surprise will depend largely upon the successful collection of information on the
enemy and the ability to exploit that information. Physical surprise can be achieved
by manoeuvre appearing and attacking at unexpected places and times and by
fire mobility striking the enemy without warning. Surprise is more easily achieved
when drills and procedures are well known allowing rapid transition from one activity
to another. These same qualities will help prevent collapse in the event of the enemy
achieving surprise.
0106. Concentration of Force. It will be impossible to be strong and secure
everywhere and decisions must be made on where to place the Main Effort. Success
will normally result from the concentration of force at the decisive time and place
against the enemys centre of gravity. Concentration neither implies that there should
never be dispersion nor that forces should be massed, but rather having them so
deployed as to be able to deliver the decisive blow when and where required.
0107. Economy of Effort. A commander must allocate his forces to essential
tasks. It is not possible to be strong everywhere and if decisive strength is to be concentrated at the critical point there must be no wasteful dispersal of resources or
expenditure of effort. Economy of effort can be achieved by thorough training, knowledge of drills and understanding of doctrine at all levels.
0108. Security. At company level security implies constant alertness. The denial
to the enemy of information on own forces and intentions entails unceasing vigilance
to prevent infiltration. Concealment is essential to prevent detection from enemy
observation, air reconnaissance and sensors.
0109. Flexibility. Commanders must keep their forces well-balanced so that they
can switch quickly from one course to another with the minimum of regrouping. The
ability to react rapidly depends on mental qualities such as elasticity of mind to discern a new situation, rapidity of decision to alter the plan in time and determination
to pursue the aim to a successful conclusion. It also depends on good training, sound
organization and reliable communications. Simplicity will be essential in all planning
as complicated plans will not survive the stress of combat or be readily modified to
meet the unexpected. An uncommitted reserve is an essential element in maintaining flexibility; once committed a fresh reserve must be created.
0110. Cooperation. Cooperation is based on team spirit and training, and entails
the coordination of all activities to achieve the optimum combined effort. Three elements are essential: goodwill, a common aim and a clear division of responsibilities.
0111. Sustainability. No tactical plan can succeed unless it can be administratively sustained at a level commensurate with the aim of the operation. Good administration will depend upon the use of resources efficiently and economically.
Administration must be flexible and designed so that the commander has maximum
freedom of action.
0112 0113.
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SECTION 2. THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH

0114. British tactical doctrine at the company level stems from the classical
manoeuvrist approach which is examined in detail in BMD and ADP Volume 1
Operations and Volume 2 Command. Despite these documents being written at a
much higher level, the ethos and tenets of the manoeuvrist approach must be reflected down to the lowest level of tactical doctrine. The manoeuvrist approach is defined
as an approach to operations in which shattering the enemys overall cohesion and
will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected,
using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to
succeed. Success can be brought about by making it impossible for the enemy to
fight effectively by:
a. Attacking His Will. Attacking the enemys will can be achieved by preemption. At company level this is the thinking which inspires the opportunist
hasty attack and the application of shock action on a stunned enemy. Such
responses are only possible with full mastery of drills and the ability to transition from one task to another without delay. If preemption is not possible then
the manoeuvrist seeks to dislocate the enemy by avoiding his strengths or by
so fixing them that they cannot be used effectively. If the enemy cannot be
defeated by preemption or dislocation then the manoeuvrist commander will
endeavour to disrupt the enemy by destroying or neutralizing his centre of
gravity his critical weakness preferably by attacking a point of vulnerability in strength. Dislocation and disruption are dependent for success on good
intelligence.
b. Attacking His Cohesion. It is preferable to make the enemy incapable of
resisting, or continuing the fight, by shattering his moral and physical cohesion
than to seek his wholesale destruction. This shattering effect will be greatly
enhanced by achieving surprise. The probability of surprising the enemy is
greatly increased if we can generate higher rates of tempo than the enemy.
Tempo is, therefore, the key to shattering the enemys cohesion. The components for attacking cohesion are as follows:
(1) Tempo. Tempo is the rhythm or rate of activity relative to the
enemy. It has three elements:

(2)

(a)

Speed of decision.

(b)

Speed of execution.

(c)

Speed of transition from one activity to another.

Surprise.

(3) Simultaneity. Simultaneity aims to overload the enemys C2 systems by attacking from different directions and in different ways at the
same time.
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(4) Firepower. The effects of firepower, which destroys, neutralizes,

suppresses and demoralizes, will be greatly enhanced by a high rate of
tempo.
0115. On the battlefield the elements of attrition and manoeuvre exist simultaneously. Attrition must occur in manoeuvre warfare just as manoeuvre often occurs in
the deadliest war of attrition. At company level attrition, to a greater or lesser extent,
will remain the more likely method of contributing to the defeat of the enemy. War
fighting at this level will continue to be characterized by a combination of killing and
moving and will remain a bloody business. Moderation will not feature and General
Guderians phrase Boot em, dont spatter em! will be particularly apposite.
Functions in Combat
0116. General. Although success in combat will stem from the appropriate interpretation and application of the Principles of War described in Section1, the
Principles do not in themselves amount to practical conceptual tools that can be used
by commanders. However, it is possible to deduce from the Principles a number of
such tools and these are known as the Functions in Combat. They are as follows:
a.

Command.

b.

Manoeuvre.

c.

Firepower.

d.

Protection.

e.

Information and Intelligence.

f.

Combat Service Support.

0117. Path from Principles to Action. By considering these Functions commanders may ensure that they are adhering to the Principles of War in their planning
for, and conduct of, operations. While each Functions relative importance may vary
according to the purpose of an operation, together they form a coherent whole the
basis of a balanced force. The practical expression of the Functions is combat power
the physical capabilities of a force. When doctrine and the moral component are
added to combat power, the result is fighting power the ability to fight. For fighting
power to be successfully maximized, the Core Functions of Find, Fix and Strike must
be integrated in the framework of the Deep, Close and Rear operations (see
Integration of Operations at end of this Section).
0118. Command. Command is the exercise of military authority by a designated
commander for the planning, direction, coordination and control of a military force.
Control is a supporting means by which command is exercised and regulated.
Successful command requires positive leadership and teamwork and the adaptive
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application of Mission Command (see Section 3) to a given situation. Commanders

must acquire and communicate information, assess the situation and determine the
actions required, in a timely manner. Thus sound intelligence, robust communications
and an efficient planning and decision-making organization are essential. The subsequent direction and tasking of subordinates rests on delegation of responsibility
together with the necessary allocation of resources to achieve their missions.
0119. Manoeuvre. To manoeuvre is to seek to get into a position of advantage in
respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened or applied. Manoeuvre has
application in both time and space which can be exploited to keep the enemy off balance. The use of time and space generates a faster operational tempo than the
enemy forcing him to become reactive; this gives us the initiative and provides freedom of action. By manoeuvre we can concentrate threat at decisive times and places
to achieve surprise, shock action, physical momentum and moral dominance. While
manoeuvre and firepower have a close relationship, firepower can rarely substitute
satisfactorily for manoeuvre.
0120. Firepower. Firepower destroys, neutralizes, suppresses and demoralizes.
It is essential in defeating an enemys ability and will to fight. The application of firepower should be judged solely by the effect required on the enemy. This prompts consideration for the weight of fire, the duration and lethality of fire and the precision and
range of the munitions. The appropriate mix of weapons systems can then be chosen to achieve the desired effect. At company level most if not all firepower will be
used to destroy.
0121. Protection. Protection preserves the fighting potential of a force so that it
can be applied at a decisive time and place. It is not necessarily a passive concept
and could involve destroying an enemy before he can attack effectively, thereby providing protection to the force. Some specific protection functions include: air defence,
NBC measures, obstacles and field defences.
0122. Information and Intelligence. Accurate and timely intelligence is fundamental to the success of all operations. Intelligence is the product of information that
has been gathered, analyzed and then distributed. The company group commander
will be required to play his part in the battalion information collection plan.
0123. Combat Service Support (CSS). CSS sustains the force. It concerns the
ability of the force to maintain the necessary combat power for the duration required
to achieve its objectives. It concerns the sustenance and moral wellbeing of the men,
the maintenance of materiel, the provision of combat supplies and the replacement
of casualties. It must be an integral part of operational planning.
Core Functions
0124. In its simplest form, a manoeuvrist approach involves using a part of ones
force to find, then fix or contain the enemy, while the remainder of the force attacks

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his weakest point. The goal is to mass sufficient combat power at the critical place
and time to defeat the enemy or threaten him with destruction, while preserving ones
own freedom for future action. This approach applies at every level of command.
There are, therefore, three core functions: find, fix and strike.
a. Find. Finding the enemy is a basic function which endures throughout an
operation. In simple terms it requires someone to be able to get to the right
place to observe and then to report what they have seen so that the information can be assessed. At company level it will primarily involve patrols (mobile
and static) and OPs using observation devices. The companys effort to find the
enemy will form part of the battlegroup commanders STA plan. Once the
enemy is found, contact must be maintained if at all possible and weaknesses
probed for. Accurate location of enemy positions and weapon systems will be
pivotal to successful strike.
b. Fix. To gain freedom of action, we have to deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve his goals and put him in a reactive frame of mind. It also
depends on distracting the enemy and fixing him, thereby reducing his ability to
interfere with our operations. The aim is to throw the enemy off-balance and at
company level the principal means are surprise, denying the enemy information
and use of firepower. To allow maximum availability for strike, company commanders will need to ensure that resources allocated to fixing are the minimum
needed.
c. Strike. Strike is the primary function of the infantry company and consists
of two complementary functions: manoeuvre and striking the enemy.
(1) Manoeuvre. Manoeuvre is the ability to adopt a position of advantage in relation to the enemy from which force can be threatened or
applied; it is a combination of movement and fire potential. Companies
will use stealth, camouflage and dispersion to close with the enemy by
skilful use of terrain and all available fire or fire potential to support movement. Companies will take advantage of their ability to move across difficult terrain in any weather to surprise the enemy. Commanders will
employ the indirect approach by avoiding enemy strength, moving
through gaps or weaknesses or around his flanks to reach the decisive
points.
(2) Striking the Enemy. Manoeuvre allows weapon systems to reach
a position of advantage where their fire will be most effective while firepower supports manoeuvre by suppressing the enemy. It is the effect of
our fire that matters a few weapons firing accurately from a direction
that surprises the enemy has greater effect than a large volume of less
accurate fire from a predictable direction. Accurate fire directed at critical
targets will destroy the enemy and his will to fight. Fire must be integrated and controlled to achieve the greatest effect and commanders must
have a sound understanding of the capabilities of weapon systems allo1-6

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cated to them. For the infantry company it will often be necessary to

assault the enemy in order to strike. This will require manoeuvre in the
face of the enemy, both to establish a position from which to assault, and
during the assault itself. The ability to suppress the enemys fire will be
fundamental to this process.
Integration of Operations
0125. The enemys cohesion will be attacked by combining firepower, tempo, simultaneity and surprise. The target is his decision making processes and operations
must be mounted which will give him too many threats at the same time therefore
overloading these processes. To achieve this, manoeuvre will need to be conducted
simultaneously, be closely integrated and mounted within a framework of deep, close
and rear operations. The terms deep, close and rear are used to describe how
operations relate to each other primarily by function (i.e., what they are to achieve)
and by geography (where they are to achieve it). The deep battle sets the conditions
for the close. Integration of operations finds full expression at formation level.
0126 0127.

Reserved.

SECTION 3. MISSION COMMAND

The principles on which I planned all operations were:

The ultimate intention must be an offensive one.

The main idea on which the plan was based must be simple.

That idea must be held in view throughout and everything else must give
way to it.

The plan must have an element of surprise.

Field Marshal Slim

0128. The philosophy of mission command has three enduring tenets: timely decision-making, the importance of understanding a superior commanders intention and,
by applying ones own actions, a clear responsibility to fulfil that intention. The underlying requirement is the fundamental responsibility to act (or, in certain circumstances, to decide not to act) within the framework of the commanders intentions
which, at battlegroup level, will be expressed as a concept of operations and associated mission statements. Together, this requires a style of command which promotes
decentralized command, freedom and speed of action and initiative at all levels.
0129. Mission command is designed to promote a robust system of command and
to achieve unity of effort at all levels; it is dependent on decentralization and is applic-

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able as much in peace as in war. Historically, the approach has proved to be the most
appropriate to contend with the demands, uncertainties and friction of command in
war. It requires the development of trust and mutual understanding between commanders and subordinates throughout the chain of command, and timely and effective decision-making, together with initiative at all levels: the keys to getting inside the
enemys decision-action cycle. Ultimately, commanders must have a manoeuvrist
attitude of mind and apply it to every problem and task. This approach requires an
attitude of mind which says, Im going to use my initiative and go for the unexpected.
Im going to do everything possible to be original and be absolutely ruthless in my
determination to succeed. Success of Mission Command will depend on thorough
training, particularly in drills and decision-making skills. Slick execution in both areas
will contribute markedly to tempo.
0130. Application of Mission Command. Mission Command applies at all levels of command and has the following key elements:
a. A commander gives his orders in a manner that ensures that his subordinates understand his intentions, their own missions and the context of those
missions.
b. Subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why
it needs to be achieved.
c. Subordinates are allocated the appropriate resources to carry out their
missions.
d. A commander uses the minimum of control measures so as not to limit
unnecessarily the freedom of action of his subordinates.
e. Subordinates then decide within their delegated freedom of action how
best to achieve their missions.
0131. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort comes from a clear lead and sense of purpose being given by the higher commander and provides a focus for separate but
coordinated actions by subordinates. Failure to achieve unity of effort will, at its best,
lead to confusion and missed opportunities; at its worst, the effects can be catastrophic. Unity of effort is enhanced by:
a. Main Effort. Unity of effort is enhanced through selection and maintenance of the aim and concentration of force, the latter through the use of the
identification of the Main Effort. The Main Effort is defined as a concentration
of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring
about a decision. It provides a focus for the activity which the commander considers crucial to the success of his current mission. Clearly the commander
must keep closely in touch with developments at the point of Main Effort; this

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will have implications for his positioning. It is mandatory to support the commanders Main Effort.
b. Higher Intent. Before embarking on any operation a commander must
understand the concept of operations of his superior commanders one and two
up so that he can contrive to act purposefully despite the chaos and friction of
battle. He then develops his own concept of operations. The concept of operations consists of the commanders intent, his scheme of manoeuvre and his
Main Effort.
0132. Decentralization. Troops once engaged are beyond the control of the
higher commander, and interference on his part is therefore impossible on active service . . . no superior officer ought to fall into the mistake of wishing to direct the
course of an engagement upon the lines of his own choosing. Col von Spohn The
Art of Command (1907). Although a commander may have to impose a centralized
style of command in order to concentrate force and to synchronize combat support,
decentralized command allows subordinates to use their initiative within their delegated freedom of action and provides them with a greater sense of involvement and
commitment. Decision levels should, therefore, be set as low as possible. This sets
the conditions for appropriate decisions to be made swiftly in the confusion and
uncertainty of battle. It also reduces the need for all but essential information to be
passed up and down the chain of command and ensures that decisions are taken by
the local commander with the most up-to-date information. Provided junior commanders are clearly working toward achieving the mission and are not doing something
patently senseless, the company group commander must be sufficiently flexible to
allow them to continue with their actions even if they are not conducting them in precisely the way he himself would have done.
0133. Trust. Trust is one of the corner-stones of leadership and command; like
respect, it must be earned. There are few short-cuts to gaining the trust of others, but
is based on a number of qualities including professional competence, personal example and integrity. Trust, often so slowly gained, can be lost quickly, particularly under
the extreme conditions of war. Once established, and if sustained, trust brings its own
rewards for commanders and subordinates alike. It is a vital constituent of the maintenance of morale and is a prerequisite of command at all levels. Soldiers must not
only feel that they can trust their immediate superiors, but must also have confidence
in the ability of commanders higher up the chain of command.
0134. Mutual Understanding. Like trust, mutual understanding takes time to
become established. With experience, commanders should be in a position to understand the issues and concerns facing their subordinates. Professional knowledge
and study will give subordinates, in turn, an insight into command at levels higher
than their own. Thus a good commander ensures that he understands his subordinates and they understand him. Only then can they together conduct operations in a
cohesive and effective way. A common doctrine and philosophy of command further
bonds commanders and subordinates. Fluency in the language of command is a vital
component.
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0135. Timely and Effective Decision-Making. Mission Command requires

timely and effective decisions at all levels. Much of the art of command consists of
timely recognition of the circumstances and moment demanding a new decision. This
is dependent on good judgement and initiative. Commanders must aim to reach a
timely decision in relation to an opponents decision-action process. This will require
the ability to know if a decision is required, and if it is, when it must be taken. Although
a commander may have to delay making a decision if he has insufficient information
or he is dependent on other decisions yet to be made, fleeting opportunities should
not be missed on the basis of lack of timely or complete information.
0136 0137.

Reserved.

SECTION 4. LAND OPERATIONS

0138. The primary land operations of war are offence and defence although a third
operation, delay, is also recognized. These primary operations are linked by transitional phases during operations in which the force is disengaging or seeking to reestablish contact. These are: advance to contact, meeting engagement, link-up operations, withdrawal and relief of troops in combat. The transitional phases are only a
means to achieve the ends in the primary operations. The tactical doctrine for land
operations at the company and platoon levels is described in Pamphlets 2 and 3.
0139. Reconnaissance and Security Operations. In addition to the primary
and transitional phases of war there are two constants which are common to all tactical operations: reconnaissance and security operations. The functions of reconnaissance and security are usually carried out by a covering force comprising screen
and/or guard forces.A screens primary task is to observe, identify and report information and is normally a close reconnaissance platoon task. A guards primary task
is to protect the main force by fighting to gain time, primarily through destruction of
enemy reconnaissance, while also observing and reporting. A company group is
unlikely to be involved in screen operations but could be deployed as part of a guard
force.
Offensive Operations
0140. The purpose of offensive operations is to defeat the enemy by imposing our
will on him by the concentration of force at his centre of gravity. It is the decisive operation of war and has a role in all three of the core functions of finding, fixing and striking the enemy. The attacker seeks to create the conditions for freedom of movement
and manoeuvre, to break enemy cohesion and defeat his forces selectively, thus creating irresistible momentum. Inflicting physical damage is, however, only a means to
success and the real damage to the enemys will is caused by destroying his coherence of his defence, fragmenting and isolating his combat power. There are three
forms of offensive operations: attack, exploitation and pursuit.

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0141. Types of Offensive Action. In addition to the three forms of offensive

operations companies could be required to take part in any of the following specific
types of offensive action: reconnaissance in force, feint and demonstration, counter
attack and spoiling attack, raid, deliberate attack and hasty attack.
Defensive Operations
0142. The immediate purpose of defensive operations is to defeat or deter a threat
in order to provide the right circumstances for offensive action. Defensive operations
may be needed to gain time or to create favourable circumstances for offensive action
in one area by holding ground in another. The objective will be to force the enemy
into action that narrows his options, reduces his fighting power and exposes him to
decisive counter offensive.
0143. Types of Defensive Action. Defensive operations can be divided into two
broad categories: mobile and area. The categories are not mutually exclusive in that
area defence can take place within a framework of a mobile defence and vice versa.
Both categories can then be further sub-divided into deliberate or hasty. The fundamental difference between mobile and area defence is that mobile defence seeks to
defeat the enemys attack by attacking his cohesion whereas area defence seeks to
defeat the enemy by denial.
Delay Operations
0144. Delay operations are those in which a force being pressed by the enemy
trades time for space by slowing down its opponents momentum and inflicting damage to the enemy without itself becoming decisively committed. Delay operations
may be conducted to slow the enemys advance in order to gain time and reduce his
fighting power, as a means of gathering information about enemy intentions in order
to protect friendly deployments, and as a means of shaping the battlefield in preparation for later offensive action.
Transitional Phases
0145.

Transitional phases link the primary operations of war. They are as follows:
a. Advance to Contact. The advance to contact seeks to regain contact with
the enemy under the most favourable conditions.
b. Meeting Engagement.
two moving forces.

A meeting engagement involves action between

c. Link-Up Operations. The aim of a link-up operation is to establish contact

between two or more friendly units which may have the same or differing missions. They normally occur in enemy controlled territory.
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d. Withdrawal. A withdrawal occurs when a force disengages from an enemy

force in accordance with the will of its commander.
e. Relief of Troops in Combat. Relief of troops in combat occurs when combat activities are taken over by one force from another (relief in place and forward and rearward passage of lines)
Operations in Specific Environments
0146. In addition to the primary land operations of war with their linking transitional
phases, there are a number of other operations which require their own tactical doctrine due to the specific nature of the environment in which the operations take place.
The environment can be: terrain specific, for instance forests or built-up areas; climate specific such as desert or arctic regions; or a combination of the two, such as
mountainous regions. For these operations, there is no change to the employment of
the fundamental principles of warfare and the manoeuvrist approach remains wholly
relevant. There are nine types of operations in specific environments:

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a.

Crossing and breaching of obstacles.

b.

Operations in built-up areas (OBUA).

c.

Operations in forests.

d.

Operations in conditions of limited visibility.

e.

Riverine operations.

f.

Operations in mountains.

g.

Operations in arctic and cold weather conditions.

h.

Defence of coastal areas.

i.

Operations in deserts and extremely hot conditions.

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Chapter 2
LEADERSHIP IN WAR
SECTION 1. GENERAL
Leadership is that mixture of example, persuasion and compulsion which makes men
do what you want them to do. If I were asked to define leadership, I should say it is
the Projection of Personality. It is the most intensely personal thing in the world,
because it is just plain you.
Field Marshal Slim
Contents
0201. The outcome of most battles
depends on leadership notably the leadPage
ership of company and platoon commanSECTION 1. GENERAL
21
ders. The leader in battle has to make things SECTION 2. THE ENVIRONMENT OF
happen, where otherwise there would be WAR
21
inertia of a highly dangerous and conta- SECTION 3. COURAGE AND MORALE
23
gious kind. Field Marshal Slim described the SECTION 4. LEADERSHIP IN BATTLE
24
feeling well: When times are bad . . .
there will come a sudden pause when your men stop and look at you. No one will
speak; they will just look at you and expect leadership. Their courage is ebbing; you
must force it to flow back and it is not easy. You will never have felt more alone in your
life.

0202. The qualities of character which will lift a leader out of the ruck of other men
will always be founded upon his willpower, his wit, or initiative, and probably above
all, upon his unselfishness. This is the final stamp of great and enduring leadership.
It is not, however, the intention in this chapter to discuss the various leadership qualities but rather to highlight a number of leadership areas which are particularly pertinent in war.
0203 0204.

Reserved.

SECTION 2. THE ENVIRONMENT OF WAR

0205. General. Field Marshal Earl Wavell wrote to Sir Basil Liddell Hart: If I had
time and anything like your ability to study war, I think I should concentrate almost
entirely on the actualities of war the effects of tiredness, hunger, fear, lack of
sleep, weather . . . The principles of strategy and tactics and the logistics of war
are really absurdly simple: it is the actualities that make war so complicated and so
difficult . . . Leaders must use their imagination in the reading of military history to
understand the actualities of war in which leadership has to be exercised. Thus they
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will come to realize that the apparently obvious qualities and characteristics of a good
leader tend to be rarer on the battlefield than in peacetime, since the practice of leadership in war is so much more difficult than on exercise. Leaders should try to introduce elements of the environment of war into their training, so far as this is possible.
0206. Chaos. Gentlemen, despite your excellent training, preparation and
orders, do not be daunted if chaos reigns. It undoubtedly will. This famous remark by
Brigadier James Hill to 3rd Parachute Brigade just before the D Day landings in June
1944 has proved true again and again during operations. Leaders must expect misfortune and adversity as the normal currency of things, even when an operation may
actually be succeeding in its aim. This chaos factor underlines all too clearly the
importance of willpower and an unequivocal understanding of higher commanders
intent. Without these two factors unswerving execution will falter in the face of chaos.
0207. Friction. Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is very
difficult. . . . Countless minor incidents the kind you can never really foresee
combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short
of the intended goal. . . . The military machine . . . is basically very simple and
very easy to manage. But we should bear in mind that none of its components is of
one piece; each part is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains his
potential of friction. . . . A battalion is made up of individuals, the least important of
whom may chance to delay things and sometimes make them go wrong. Thus
Clausewitz described friction, which may be neatly summed up as Murphys Law. Do
not expect precision in war, mistakes will multiply often due to external factors and
factors outside your control, such as the weather.
0208. Uncertainty. The atmosphere of uncertainty is all pervading, and men
learn to live very much from day to day not caring to think too much about the future.
Proper and regular briefing obviously becomes crucial to morale in such an atmosphere, so that men can be reassured when things constantly seem to be slipping out
of control a feeling that can be particularly disconcerting to leaders, and one they
must learn to overcome. A particular element of uncertainty is the enemy himself
how is his morale, his will, his fighting capacity? These are harder questions to
answer than the location of his positions. Clausewitz described uncertainty thus:
War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war
is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgement is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.
0209. Loneliness and Comradeship. In war the individual shrinks to nothing.
He has no right of an opinion only the Regiment matters, wrote Lord Moran in the
Anatomy of Courage. Men feel death to be impersonal, commonplace, and often
wasteful, in the sense that it may be the result of an accident which does not seem
to assist tactical success in any way. The battlefield itself can feel a lonely place. The
American Brigadier Marshall described it as follows: The battlefield is cold. It is a
lonesome place which men share together. The battlefield is a unique and alien land
with a logic, rules and values all of its own. In such an environment the tight fraternity

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of comrades with whom each soldier identifies himself, in terms of both his selfrespect and needs, becomes of heightened importance. Lord Moran observed that,
in battle, you may draw a circle round a soldier, including within it only those persons
and objects which he sees or which he believes will influence his immediate fortunes.
These primarily will determine whether he rallies or fails, advances or falls back.
Comradeship, and the mutual confidence implicit in it, is fundamental to the soldiers
psychological survival in war, as well as to their tactical success.
0210. Fatigue and Confidence. Brigadier Marshall observed, in battle, whatever
wears out the muscles reacts on the mind and whatever impairs the mind drains
physical strength. Tired men take flight more easily. The arrest of fear is as essential
to the recovery of physical vigour as is rest to the body. . . . We are therefore dealing with a chain reaction. Half of control during battle comes of the commanders
avoiding useless expenditure of the physical resources of his men while taking action
to break the hold of fear. The other half comes from sensible preparation beforehand.
War is immensely tiring and leaders continually have to balance the fatigue of their
men against the tactical imperatives that lie ahead. Mutual confidence between the
leader and the led is the bedrock of success and can only be built up in peacetime.
Men must be brought out of the line whenever possible for rest even if only for a
few hours if they are to survive sustained operations. Beware overworking soldiers
with particular flair all have their limit.
0211. Fear. In 1804 Robert Jackson stated that, on the battlefield the real enemy
is fear and not the bayonet or bullet. The vast majority of soldiers experience fear
during or before battle. The variables of fear are: its physical manifestations, its
nature and intensity, the threat it induces and the way in which it is managed. While
there are undoubtedly benefits in leaders ruthlessly repressing their own fear, this is
likely to be done at the risk of psychiatric injury. Although fear can be partially overcome by hard work and offensive operations, preparation before battle is vital and
there is sound anecdotal evidence to show that clear briefings about fear and its
symptoms will reduce psychiatric casualties and the likelihood of panic. Accurate
knowledge of the enemys tactics and weapon systems will also help to dispel fear
while the failure of ones own can do much to induce it.
0212 0213.

Reserved.

SECTION 3. COURAGE AND MORALE

Courage
0214. Leaders must have courage. Clausewitz wrote, War is the realm of danger;
therefore courage is the soldiers first requirement. Courage is of two kinds: courage
in the face of personal danger, and courage to accept responsibility, either before the
tribunal of some outside power or before the court of ones own conscience. In war
some men will fail completely not so much by running away, as by giving false
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reports after a patrol, or by getting out of the front line with exposure when it fact
perfectly fit. This type of failure should not be confused with battle shock, a temporary condition which should be treated as a wound, if possible without evacuation. It
is a subject all leaders should study. Others a large number will be unwilling to
take extraordinary risks, and will not aspire to a heros role. But they will be equally
unwilling that they should be considered the least worthy among those present. Then
there will be what CE Bean, the Australian journalist at Gallipoli, described as the
Stickers those who go into action with minds made up to stick (he put these at
10%), who make up the minds of others (90%). A few men, writes Lord Moran, had
the stuff of leadership in them. They were like rafts, to which the rest of humanity
clung for support and hope. Among these men will be a few who actually thrive in
war, and it is these stickers and thrivers who are essential to success. Obviously,
therefore, it is these men who must be selected and trained as such in peacetime
and picking them out takes wisdom and experience. It can thus be seen how indivisible is courage from leadership. Leaders must be prepared to do more than is asked
of them, to act always, to be bold, to be opportunistic and to show by example what
needs to be done. Much on the battlefield is decided by example, by men who make
things happen, and courage, like fear, is infectious.
Morale
0215. Napoleon said that, the morale is to the physical as three is to one. If it is
the ultimate aim of battle to kill the enemys courage as Clausewitz identified, then
that means killing his will to fight. Battles are largely won or lost in the hearts of men.
The will to win, which is the manifestation of high morale, can only be generated by
the disciplines and the challenges of peacetime training. It is too late to inculcate
comradeship, team cohesion, professional pride and self-confidence when battle is
joined. To achieve these goals training must be demanding and some weaker men
may be found wanting in the process. Better during training, than on the battlefield
when the lives of others will also be forfeit by such weakness.
0216 0217.

Resrved.

SECTION 4. LEADERSHIP IN BATTLE

Preparation
0218. The foundation of leadership in battle should be laid long before operations
begin. The leader who has trained his men well and imposed the stamp of his character upon them, will be well-rewarded with their trust and their confidence in his
leadership under all conditions. Rigorous and realistic training will also help reduce
psychiatric casualties. Two historical insights into the fundamental requirement for
preparation underline the point:

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a. Nelson. In the aura of glory surrounding Nelsons victories, the mundane

aspect of his outstanding ability as a trainer is often forgotten. How meticulous
he was, writes Professor Geoffrey Matthews of Oxford University, about the
minutiae of training. How planned were all the great actions he fought. It is quite
clear that his victories derived chiefly from a plan of battle which he and his subordinates understood perfectly. There was nothing magical about Nelsons victories. They were gained by hard work and preparation long before the actual
battles.
b. Clausewitz. Compare this with Clausewitzs verdict: The more the leader
is in the habit of demanding from his troops, the surer he will be that his
demands will be answered. The soldier is as proud of overcoming toil as he is
of surmounting danger. Therefore, it is only in the soil of incessant activity and
exertion that the germ will thrive. Once it has become a strong tree, it will stand
against the fiercest storms of misfortune and defeat.
Drills and Skills
0219. Individual skills and drills from fire team to company level, instilled by constant and thorough practice, are fundamental to survival in battle and to overcoming
inertia and inaction. In battle, leaders will be totally reliant on the standards they have
achieved in training. Whatever edge one side possesses over another, in tactical
skills, can be attributed in large part to their superior performance. The people who
really count in battle are the commanders and trainers at battalion level and below.
Tactical decisions taken at higher level may lose a battle, but they can never win it. It
is the combat power generated by drills, skills and procedures at battlegroup, company, platoon, section and fire team level that breaks the enemys will to fight on. The
requirement for thorough, realistic and demanding training is a recurrent theme
throughout Chapters 1 and 2 of this pamphlet. The Manoeuvrist Approach and
Mission Command require high standards of training for full effect and success in battle will be dependent on it. Commanders at all levels must therefore place the highest priority on peacetime training.
Position of Commanders
0220. It is a fundamental truth that a leader will only succeed in battle if he is to be
prepared to lead from the front and risk the penalties and dangers of so doing. This
need to lead from the front is as relevant to unpleasant tasks off the battlefield as to
dangerous ones on it. The positioning of leaders has been recognized over the centuries as these two examples bear out:
a. Xenophons account of Clearchuss command of the rear guard, with its
lumbering wagons, during the retreat from Cunaxa in 401 BC sets the image
perfectly: He had his spear in his left hand and a stick in his right, and whenever he thought that any of the men . . . was shirking, he would pick out the

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right man and deal him a blow, while at the same time he would get into the
mud and lend a hand himself; the result was that everyone was ashamed not
to match his energy.
b. Caesars description of his own behaviour in a battle against the Nervii in
57 BC reinforces the need for the leader to be seen at the front: I recognized
that this was a crisis; there were no reserves available. I had no shield with me
but I snatched one from a soldier in the rear ranks and went forward with the
front line. Once there, I called out to the Centurions by name and shouted
encouragement to the rest of the men. I ordered them to advance and to open
out their ranks so that they could use their swords more effectively. My arrival
gave the troops fresh hope, their determination was restored because, with the
Commander-in-Chief looking on, each man was eager to do his best whatever
the risk to himself.
0221. There is of course a balance to be struck. A commander will need to judge
when his presence is required and whether moving forward will result in getting himself killed or wounded for no benefit. The primary requirement will be for the commander to keep closely in touch with events at his Main Effort. His position must allow
him to feel the ebb and flow of battle so that he can identify the fleeting opportunity
or the sudden appearance of an enemy weakness and thus know when and where
to commit his echelon or reserve to best effect. He should not, therefore, allow himself to become physically embroiled in his subordinates battles.
0222. Commanders must conceal the identity of their command groups if they are
to avoid being targeted by enemy snipers and indirect fire controllers. Concentrations
of command vehicles and signallers are clear indicators of such groups as are binoculars and map cases.
Orders, Command and Control
0223. Commanders will have been taught the procedure for orders, and the principles of effective command and control, in their training. Having had this grounding
they should then start to use their imagination and their own experience in developing their personal style of command.
a. Orders. Leaders should develop the adroitness and skill to cover the
essential points in their orders, in relation to time available and the situation
confronting them. To confine orders to the essentials takes practice and confidence and is, of course, a much harder skill than going through every heading
in an aide-memoire. But in every situation, and particularly in fast moving
armoured operations, it is a skill essential to successful command.
b. Commanders Intentions. It is also most important that subordinates
understand their higher commanders intentions, so that their own mission and
tasks can be interpreted in the light of those intentions. All must understand the

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framework within which a particular sub-unit is required to execute its task.

Without this understanding, resourcefulness, versatility and initiative can
become more of a liability than an asset.
c. Unswerving Execution. One of the greatest problems for a commander
is to train his subordinates to close the circuit. All may be loyal, but all will not
be sufficiently self disciplined to see a task through to its proper finish. It is not
so much in the taking of a decision, as in its unswerving execution, that the chief
difficulties lie, wrote Von Manstein. Leaders who are soft on the business of
unswerving execution, will fail their superiors. Here is a typical example, an
incident during the Battle of the Bulge in 1944. The next day, December 23, the
main body of 2nd Panzer Division had hardly began to advance, when the leading Kampfgruppe came to a halt. The Commander reported a roadblock heavily defended. Doubting the report, von Luttwitz went forward himself and found
only a light barricade. He relieved the commander on the spot, and at last, in
mid-afternoon, the advance began. . . .
Information
0224. Leadership in war goes beyond technical expertise and personal bravery.
Naturally enough, soldiers fight with greater determination when they have confidence in their leaders and are convinced that everything possible has been done to
make the operation a success and the risks to their lives minimised. But they also
demand to be taken into their leaders confidence and given as much information as
possible. We come from an information-hungry society where the media provides a
constant flow of information and soldiers will expect to be kept fully briefed. Failure to
do so is likely to damage morale. Leaders should understand that awareness of what
is going on, even if only at the lowest level, and the actualities of command are
advantages not available to the soldier. Shai, an Israeli infantry officer in the Six Day
War, summed this up thus: One of the things that solves an officers problems is simply the fact of being in command. The need to set an example, the very fact that
youre responsible for the men and their lives. It relieves you completely of the need
to pretend.
The Will to Win
0225. The task of all leaders in war is to ensure that men are made to forget their
natural instincts, sublimating the desire to escape beneath a veneer of courage,
cohesiveness and corporate strength, for if this can be achieved the chance of victory increases. Xenophon recognized this potential in the 4th Century BC: You know,
I am sure, that not numbers or strength bring victory in war; but whichever army goes
into battle stronger in soul, their enemies cannot withstand them. Today strength of
soul would be defined as morale, but its intangible nature remains. It is not something which can be imposed; it is a feeling which must come from the soldiers themselves, manifested in a desire to win and a will to withstand the pressure of war. High

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morale, as Field Marshal Slim said, means that every individual in a group will work
or fight and, if needed, will give his last ounce of effort in its service.
Boldness and Caution
0226. There are times in battle when caution and thought is required, and moments
when supreme boldness is the key to success. Judging these moments is one of the
most difficult yet important skills for a commander to develop. I doubt if there is anything harder to judge or to learn, wrote von Manstein, than to sense the time when
a slackening of the enemys resistance offers the attacker his decisive chance. This
is the reality of winning the fire fight, and, more important, the exploitation of such
fire. The shock effect of fire direct or indirect on the enemy, has to be followed
up at once, or its impact is lost, the enemy has recovered and the potential advantage thrown away.
After the Battle
0227. The hours following a battle will demand sound reorganization, possibly
resistance to counter-attack, perhaps exploitation. They will almost certainly produce
a heavy volume of indirect fire from the enemy. Yet mental and physical exhaustion
will have overcome those who have come through the battle. They may be bewildered by the terrible experience of battle, depressed and angry by the loss of friends,
numbed and shocked by enemy fire. It is a time for strong leadership, when men must
be rallied, and kept active and alert. Those showing signs of battle shock should be
kept within their group, unless they have actually become dangerous liabilities. There
is a balance to be struck between humanitarian concern and dangerous weakness
under these circumstances.

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Chapter 3
THE INFANTRY BATTALION
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
Infantry is the least spectacular arm of the Army, yet without them you cannot win a
battle. Indeed, without them you can do nothing. Nothing at all.
Field Marshal Montgomery
0301. The requirement for an army to have
Infantry has remained constant throughout
history despite changes in tactics, advances
in technology and the appearance of different threats.
0302. The aim of this chapter is to provide
an overview of the organization of the
infantry battalion. Although the chapter does
not describe the detail of each battalion
type, where significant differences exist
these are highlighted.

Contents
Page
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

31

SECTION 2. TYPES OF INFANTRY

BATTALION

32

SECTION 3. THE TASKS AND

EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY

34

SECTION 4. BATTALION HQ AND HQ

COMPANY

36

SECTION 5. THE RIFLE COMPANY

311

SECTION 6. SUPPORTING ELEMENTS

320

SECTION 7. TASK ORGANIZATION AND

REGROUPING

325

Annexes:

Mission and Role of the Infantry

A. Infantry Battalion ORBATs

0303. The Infantrys Mission. The B. Infantry Weapon Characteristics

Infantrys mission is to close with and engage C. Distribution of Loads
the enemy, in all operational theatres and
environments, in order to bring about his defeat
0304. Analysis of the Mission Statement. To close with emphasises the
Infantrys need to manoeuvre to meet the enemy and the essential closeness of the
way in which it fights. Closeness is, of course, relative and for the Infantry it will cover
ranges extending from the point of the bayonet to the 5.6 km of the 81 mm mortar firing on Charge 6. Engage is used in a general rather than specific (i.e., engagement
by weaponry) sense and can therefore include a very broad spectrum of activity
stretching from the vehicle check point to the synchronized employment of all
weaponry in the Infantrys inventory. In order to bring about his defeat is the unifying purpose which explains why we close with and engage the enemy. However,
defeat is used also in the general rather than specific as the enemys defeat might
not necessarily be by attrition but rather by manoeuvre and the shattering of his will
and cohesion.

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0305. Although there are different types of infantry battalion they all share one common role: close combat. The Infantry are able to operate continuously over all types
of terrain and in all climatic conditions, either independently or as part of a combined
arms group or joint force and can be delivered by land, sea and air. The in-theatre
mobility of the infantry make it employable in the deep, close and rear battles. The
basic infantry battalion structure is designed to be tactically self-sufficient in that it
has its own integral reconnaissance, direct and indirect fire, mobility and counter
mobility and combat service support. However, in order to generate its full potential
infantry will usually operate in close cooperation with other arms. The Infantry is the
primary ground holding arm.
0306 0307.

Reserved.

SECTION 2. TYPES OF INFANTRY BATTALION

0308. Background. Although infantry battalions can have markedly different
equipment, organization and capabilities they all have the same role: close combat.
Since 1945 there have been a series of changes to the size and shape of the Infantry
and there is now a much greater diversity of infantry battalion ORBAT than at any
other time. Battalions are rotated through these ORBATs in order to maintain flexibility, versatility, variety and a broad experience of all types of operations. The principal
ORBATs are at Annex A.
0309. The Armoured Infantry (AI) Battalion. Armoured infantry battalions
equipped with Warrior will fight in intimate support of armour. They provide close protection for the armour and lead in close terrain and conditions of limited visibility.
Warrior allows the AI company group to operate in concert with, and at a similar
tempo to armour. AI company group tactics are described in Pamphlet 4 of this volume.
0310. The Mechanized Infantry Battalion. Battalions in the mechanized
infantry role are equipped with Saxon. These battalions fight in concert with armour
and armoured infantry by providing a pivot around which the armoured force can
manoeuvre. Saxon is not a fighting vehicle but provides partially protected movement
of infantry and has a limited cross-country capability. It should not get involved in
close combat. The battalion has a MILAN platoon of twenty-four firing posts.
0311. The Light Role Infantry Battalion. The light role infantry battalion is the
most basic infantry battalion ORBAT. The battalion has a standard strength MILAN
platoon (six firing posts), has no armoured vehicles and has wheeled transport offering an unprotected unit lift. The battalions lightness makes it well-suited to rapid
strategic mobility and allows it to be used to demonstrate political resolve while heavier forces are assembled and moved. The tactics of the light role battalion are the
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default setting for all types of infantry battalion and are fully described in Pamphlets
2 and 3 of this volume.
0312. The Airmobile Infantry Battalion. Battalions in the airmobile role are
equipped with wheeled transport and train in close cooperation with RAF support
helicopter squadrons. They are optimized for the anti-tank role and are equipped with
forty-two MILAN firing posts in order to allow them to conduct anti-armour and penetration blocking operations.
0313. The Airborne Battalion. Infantry battalions from the Parachute Regiment
are capable of and equipped for airborne operations by airdrop or airlanding. They
are uniquely organized and trained for this role and have twenty-four MILAN firing
posts. They are being equipped with a range of heavy weapons, such as .50 calibre
machine guns. Their capability to sustain operations after the initial assault is governed by the rate of aerial resupply, or the ability to seize an entry point or to link up
with friendly ground forces. Thus, whilst they have great strategic range prior to
deployment, they have extremely limited tactical range once deployed. Although not
airdroppable, there are two light role battalions trained in tactical airland operations
(TALO) in the ORBAT of the airborne brigade.
The reader should be aware that
0314. Other Types of Infantry Battalion.
there are other types of infantry battalion, including the AMF(L) battalion, the Royal
Marine Commandos, Gurkha battalions, R IRISH Home Service (HS) battalions and
TA light role and fire support battalions.
The Infantry Battlegroup
0315. Battlegroups are the basic unit of tactical manoeuvre within a formation and
are normally grouped under the command of a brigade headquarters. A battlegroup
is a combined arms manoeuvre group based on the headquarters of a combat or
combat support arms unit, task organized for a specific mission.

Composition.

0316.
a.

An infantry battlegroup will normally comprise:

Battlegroup Tactical (Tac), Main and Step-up headquarters.

b. Between three and five manoeuvre sub-unit groups normally made up of

infantry, armour or aviation.
c. Close reconnaissance platoon supplemented where necessary with specialist reconnaissance assets (e.g., engineer).
d.

Support weapons MILAN, mortars and GPMG(SF).

e.

Engineer assets up to squadron size.

f.

Artillery Tactical Group of BC and FOOs.

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g.

A close air defence troop or fire unit (6 x HVM).

h.

Logistic elements from:

(1) Headquarters company comprising A1, A2 and B echelons, RAP
and LAD.
(2) A logistic slice from the parent unit of each combat arm grouped with
the battalion.
(3) A Logistic Support Detachment (formerly known as an Immediate
Replenishment Group).

(4)

A Field Ambulance section.

(5)

A Forward Repair Team (FRT).

0317 0318.

Reserved.

SECTION 3. THE TASKS AND EMPLOYMENT OF INFANTRY

0319. It will be normal for infantry to operate as part of a combined arms (or joint)
grouping, but it may also operate as a purely infantry force. The lesson of history is
that infantry must be able to operate with minimal combat support, and plan and train
accordingly.
0320. As already stated, the primary mission of infantry is to close with and defeat
the enemy and its key fighting characteristic is close combat. Destruction of the
enemy in the offence will normally be achieved on foot and at close range through
skilful use of fire and movement and ground. In defence the holding of ground and
the destruction of an attacking enemy will normally be achieved by fighting from well
sited and constructed defensive positions.
Tasks
0321. The following table shows the generic task capabilities of infantry. The table
is organized to show task capabilities against the types of battalion described in
Section 2.

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Ser

Battalion Type

Task Capability

(a)

(b)

(c)

1.

All battalions must be

able to:

Seize, control and hold ground.

Breach and cross obstacles and establish
bridgeheads.
Fight in built up areas and in woods and forests.
Observe and patrol the battlefield, especially in
conditions of poor visibility and at night.
Destroy armoured vehicles.
Provide flank protection.
Provide integral direct and indirect fire support.
Protect vital installations, routes and communications centres.
Provide demolition guards.
Counter heli/airborne assaults in rear areas.
Operate in NBC conditions.
Conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict.

2.

Armoured Infantry
Battalions

As serial 1 plus:
Intimate support of armour.

3.

Mechanized
Battalions

As serial 1 plus:
Fight in concert with armour and armoured
Infantry.

4.

Light Role Infantry

Battalions

As serial 1 plus:
Capable of delivery by (external) heli/airborne
assets or by (integral) wheeled vehicles.

5.

Airmobile Battalions

As Serial 1 plus:
Conduct heliborne operations. In particular:
Atk defence; blocking, counter-desant;
security of LD/flanks for C Mov.
Capable of delivery by (external) heli/airborne
assets or by (integral) wheeled vehicles.

6.

Airborne Battalions

As serial 1 plus:
Delivery by airdrop or airlanding.

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Employment of Infantry
0322. The basic fighting unit is the company which should, whenever possible, be
kept as an entity; it will fight better together and its organization and command structure are designed for this.
a. Finding. The integral reconnaissance platoon provides the ability to
acquire information by close reconnaissance within the battalions area of operations. This is supplemented by a range of surveillance and target acquisition
devices within the rifle companies and support platoons. The ability to acquire
information by stealth is a significant capability although this can be a lengthy
procedure.
b. Fixing. The infantry fixes the enemy by denying him freedom of manoeuvre by controlling and holding ground. This is supplemented by the use of direct
and indirect fire assets.
c. Strike. Regardless of the way in which they deploy to battle (e.g., helicopter, Saxon or parachute) the majority of types of battalion generate strike by
infantrymen fighting on their feet in close combat with the enemy. The one
exception is the armoured infantry battalion which can generate combat power
both on its feet and by integrating the Warrior IFVs firepower and manoeuvre
potential into the infantry and combined arms battle. The infantrymans war will
continue to be characterized by a combination of killing and moving and will
remain a bloody and gruelling business. Although set within a manoeuvre
framework the infantry battle will continue to be largely one of attrition. Striking
the enemy in the offence will normally be achieved on foot and at close range
through skilful use of fire and movement and ground. In defence, the holding of
ground and the destruction of an attacking enemy will normally be achieved by
fighting from well-sited and well-constructed mutually supporting defensive
positions. Infantry weapon capabilities are shown at Annex B.
0323 0324.

Reserved.

SECTION 4. BATTALION HQ AND HQ COMPANY

Battalion Organization
0325. The basic organization of an infantry battalion is shown at Fig 1. Infantry battalions consist of the following component parts:

3-6

a.

Battalion HQ.

b.

Three rifle companies.

c.

A fire support company.

d.

A headquarter company.
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Bn HQ

HQ Coy

Fire Sp Coy

HQ

Rifle Coy

Rifle Coy

Rifle Coy

HQ

Recce Pl

ATk Pl

HQ

GPMG(SF) Pl

Mor Pl

Pl

Pl

Pl

Bn HQ Pl

Sig Pl QM Pl MT Pl Catering Pl RAO Trg Wg Def Pl (War only)

Int

Pro

Med

Fig 1. The Infantry Battalion Basic Organization

0326. It should be noted that AI battalions do not have an assault pioneer platoon
nor a GPMG(SF) platoon but they do have a substantial LAD. The size of anti-tank
platoons varies markedly according to battalion type. It is an aspiration that there
should be four rifle companies as manoeuvre elements so that the battalion simultaneously can provide fixing, striking, echelon and reserve forces.
Battalion HQ in the Field
0327.

Battalion HQ consists of the CO and his immediate staff:

a.

Battalion 2IC.

b.

Adjutant.

c.

Operations Officer.

d.

Intelligence Officer.

e.

Regimental Sergeant Major.

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0328. The CO and his immediate staff are supported by other battalion personnel
such as the anti-tank, mortar and signals officers and officers from other combat
arms, such as the battery commander, and combat support forces, such as an engineer troop commander.
0329. Organization. The precise organization of battalion HQ will differ according to the type of battalion, the resources available, the tactical situation and the personalities involved. Nevertheless, the basic, functional organization will be based on
three elements:
a. Rover (R) Group/Tac HQ. The constitution of the R group/Tac HQ will
vary according to theatre and operation of war. Normally the CO will be accompanied by his operations officer, his anti-tank officer and the battery commander (BC). The composition can, however, be tuned according to the operation.
The R group will be mounted or on foot and will need a close protection element and must have good communications.
b. Battlegroup Main. The primary task of battlegroup main is to ensure that
the COs intentions are carried out via the main command post (CP). Main will
normally be commanded by the battalion 2IC and will consist of a number of
functional cells and may be located in Warrior, Saxon, Land Rovers, helicopters, mexi-shelters, trenches and buildings and cellars. The 2IC supervises
the running of Main and is responsible for the coordination and synchronization
of current and future plans. The main CP is based around the following vehicles and functions:
(1)

CV1.

The primary control vehicle which the adjutant commands.

(2) CV2. Assimilates and utilizes intelligence reports and gives NBC
advice. Commanded by the IO.
(3) Fire Planning Cell (FPC). Coordinates all types of fire support
including direct and indirect fire, aviation (AAC) and air (RAF). Supervised
by the BC in conjunction with OC fire support company. Fire support representatives can either be present in the cell or linked to it by landline. The
FPC is responsible for updating the STAP through the adjutant.
(4)

Plans.

Provides facilities for planning operations and moves.

(5) Signals. The signals centre will be responsible for ensuring communications under all circumstances.
(6) Other Elements. Other elements which may be found at battlegroup main are: Battlegroup Logistics Officer (usually OC HQ Coy), liaison officers (LOs), battalion support element representatives (e.g.,
assault pioneer, OC GPMG(SF) platoon), defence platoon/provost, regimental aid post (RAP) and the light aid detachment (LAD).

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c. Step-Up. Step-up will mirror the elements of main as far as possible with
the 2nd XI so that it can assume control in emergencies or for limited periods
such as when main moves. When deployed, it will normally be commanded by
the RSO although the Bn 2IC can command it if not deployed in Main. Battalion
HQ will rarely have enough officers to man Step-up on a permanent basis.
When a move is imminent, the RSO and other appropriate personnel will
deploy in the Step-up vehicle.
Headquarter Company
0330. This consists of a company headquarters and the Command and Logistic
Group consisting of:
a.

Battalion Headquarters Platoon.

b.

Signal Platoon.

c.

Quartermasters Platoon.

d.

Catering Platoon.

e.

MT Platoon.

f.

Assault Pioneer Platoon (light role battalions only).

g.

Regimental Admin Office.

h.

LAD (AI and mechanized battalions only).

Command and Logistic Group

0331. Battalion Headquarters Platoon. This consists of the intelligence section,
orderly room staff, provost and medical sections.

The Signal Platoon.

0332.

The platoon tasks are:

a. To provide signallers and certain driver/operators to man battalion headquarters and echelon radio stations.
b. To provide and maintain communications equipment for battalion headquarters and echelons.
c. To give advice and assistance to companies on signal training and on the
employment and maintenance of signal equipment.
d.

To provide signal training for HQ company.

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0333. Assault Pioneers. A light role battalion has an assault pioneer platoon as
part of HQ company. In other regular battalions the assault pioneers form sections in
the three rifle companies. Assault pioneers are trained to undertake all combat engineer tasks. However, whilst they have a comprehensive range of tools and equipment, they have no plant or bridge kits. The principal roles of assault pioneers are:
a.

To deny mobility to the enemy by:

(1)

Laying protective minefields and nuisance mining.

(2)

Construction of wire obstacles.

(3)

Booby trapping.

(4)

Cratering roads and tracks.

(5)

Demolitions.

b. To enhance the mobility of our own troops by clearance of enemy obstacles and mining.
c. To assist with the construction of field defences and defences in built-up
areas by:
(1)

Assisting with trench revetting and overhead protection.

(2)

Explosive digging.

(3)

Sandbagging.

(4)

Reinforcing of buildings.

d. To assist in improving or providing basic camp structures and water facilities.

0334. Logistic Group. This is commanded by the HQ company commander and
includes the two quartermasters, the quartermasters platoon, MT platoon, catering
platoon and the regimental admin office.
0335. Transport. The battalion transport is sufficient to take into battle any
essential equipment and stores and those whose duties require them to be transported during battle.
0336. REME Support. In armoured and mechanized battalions a light aid
detachment (LAD) REME is permanently under command. It contains all the REME
tradesmen necessary for first line repair and maintenance of the battalions weapons,
equipment and vehicles. In the field, each company headquarters is allocated a fitter
section from the LAD. Each is mounted in appropriate vehicles for the unit role. In a

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non-mechanized battalion, REME personnel are included in the MT and quartermasters platoons.
0337 0338.

Reserved.

SECTION 5. THE RIFLE COMPANY

General
0339. The Infantry Rifle Company. The infantry rifle company (Fig 2) is the
basic infantry manoeuvre unit within a battlegroup. It should, where possible, be kept
together as an entity; it will fight better together and its organization and command
structure are designed for this. The company group is defined as a rifle company with
attachments to its normal establishment. The attachments to company HQ are: a signal detachment, a medical orderly, a clerk and a REME fitter section for AI companies; while combat attachments could be: armour, a FOO, a MFC party, a MILAN or
a GPMG(SF) section. The company is also the smallest grouping which can be combined arms, in that (depending on role) it is able to apply direct and indirect fire from
a number of arms onto the enemy. It has a logistics detachment, allowing it to operate independently for limited periods, although this would be the exception rather
than the norm. AI companies have larger establishments to include the Warrior warrant officer, platoon gunnery sergeants, and drivers and gunners for all vehicles.
Coy HQ
OC

2IC

CSM

CQMS

Storeman

Storeman

2 x Drivers

(plus attachments)

Rifle Platoon

Maj
Capt
WO2
CSgt
Cpl
LCpl
Pte

Rifle Platoon

Section

Rifle Platoon

Section
Fire Team C

Section
Fire Team D

Fig 2. The Infantry Rifle Company

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0340. Task Organization. Task Organization (Task Org) is the tailoring of forces
to achieve particular tasks. An Infantry Company Group Commander will find that his
Task Org, decided by the Battlegroup CO varies from time to time or from operation
to operation. His Task Org, however, is likely to be a combination of some or all of the
following assets under a variety of states of command:
a.

A headquarters.

b.

A number of rifle platoons, normally three.

c.

A Forward Observation Officer (FOO).

d.

A Mortar Fire Controller (MFC) Party.

e.

A Forward Air Controller (FAC).

f.

A section or detachment of MILAN.

g.

One or more troops of tanks.

h.

A section of GPMG (SF).

i.

Snipers.

j.

A section of assault pioneers.

k.

Engineer assets.

Company HQ
0341. Responsibilities and Duties Within Company HQ.
in company HQ are as follows:

Responsibilities with-

a. The Company Commander. The company commander is responsible to

the commanding officer for the training, operation, discipline, administration and
welfare of his company. In general, his responsibilities are as follows:
(1) Ensuring that missions are successfully carried out within the commanders intent.
(2) Acquiring and communicating information and orders while assessing the situation and determining actions required in a timely manner.
(3)

Allocating resources to achieve platoon missions.

(4) Having a thorough knowledge of company level tactics and administration.

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(5)

Ensuring that the company is well trained.

(6) Knowing everything about his officers, SNCOs and JNCOs, particularly their individual strengths and weaknesses and any personal problems. He should have a working insight of every private soldier.
(7)

Ensuring that he and his company are combat fit.

b. The Company 2IC. The company 2IC must be conversant with all the
duties and tactical responsibilities of the company commander so that he can
command the company effectively in the absence of the company commander.
His responsibilities are as follows:
(1) Ensuring that information is comprehensive and passed in a swift
and accurate manner to the platoons and battlegroup HQ.
(2) Producing accurate reports and returns to battlegroup HQ in accordance with AUSOPs and TAM.
(3) Ensuring that CSS demands are sufficiently well anticipated, and
the CSS elements are correctly briefed and positioned.
(4) Briefing all new attachments to the company group on the tactical
situation. This includes the provision of a CEI, maps, company SOPs and
ensuring that the attachments administrative requirements are taken care
of.
(5) Commanding the company main HQ and ensuring that the log is
correctly maintained.
c. The Company Sergeant Major (CSM). In addition to his pivotal administrative role within the company, the CSM needs to be able to command company HQ in the absence of the company commander and the 2IC. He is also
an invaluable source of advice to the company commander. He is responsible
for:
(1)

The defence of company HQ.

(2) Establishing and maintaining routines in the company HQ/echelon

area.
(3) The control and distribution of ammunition, casevac and PW handling.
(4) Acting as a watchkeeper and submitting reports and returns as
required.

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(5) Maintaining morale and efficiency by making regular visits to all the
company positions, advising NCOs and checking individual administration.
d. The Company Quartermaster Sergeant (CQMS). The CQMS is responsible for the provision and maintenance of his companys entitlements of clothing, rations and all categories of stores and equipment. On operations he will
normally be located at A1 echelon. He should be fully conversant with the role
and responsibilities of the CSM so that he can deputise if necessary.
0342. Company HQ is broken down into two parts when on operations: Tac and
Main HQs. Described below are the main G3 operational functions of the two HQs
and the personalities within them:
a. Tac HQ. Tac HQ will consist of the company group commander, the FOO,
the A MFC and their respective signallers. The size of Tac HQ should be kept
as small as possible to prevent it becoming unwieldy and a target. The positioning of the FOO will need to be negotiated with the battery commander as
the FOO must be positioned where he can best direct fire; this may conflict with
the positioning of the company commander. Should the company commander
be unable to command, it is normal for the FOO to hold the ring until the arrival
of the company 2IC. Company commanders must ensure that they are not obvious to enemy snipers and fire controllers; maps and binoculars should be kept
concealed.
b. Main HQ. Main is controlled by the company group 2IC. A properly functioning Main must actively work to support Tac and not merely be reactive. As
the 2ICs role is to under-study his commander he should shadow all orders
received and be prepared to assume command immediately his commander
becomes a casualty. This may not be apparent for some time and the 2IC must
have the confidence to take over command if he thinks it is necessary. In contact, the commander and his 2IC should only be collocated when it is absolutely
necessary. The other key member of Main is the CSM.
Logistic Support Elements
0343. Full details on the logistic support of the company group are contained in
Chapter 6.
The Rifle Platoon
0344. The rifle platoon (Fig 3) is the smallest grouping that can deploy a reserve.
It is normally organized into a headquarters and three sections. The platoon is organized as follows, although an AI platoon will include gunners and drivers, and a
mechanized platoon drivers.

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Platoon HQ
Platoon Commander
Platoon Sergeant
Radio Operator
51 mm Mortar No 1
51 mm Mortar No 2

Section

Fire Team C

Subaltern
Sgt
Pte
LCpl
Pte

(Light Role Battalions only)

Section

Fire Team D

Section

Fire Team C

Fire Team C
Cpl
2 x Riflemen
LSW gunner

Fire Team D

Fire Team D
LCpl
2 x Riflemen
LSW gunner

Fig 3. The Rifle Platoon

0345. Platoon Strength. In practice, both on exercise and on operations, the

number of soldiers in a platoon will, for a variety of reasons, be less than the number
of men authorized in the establishment. It may, therefore, be necessary to amalgamate or otherwise reorganize some platoons and sections. At platoon level a strength
below 19 men may necessitate reorganization. However, the acceptable strength of
platoons is a matter for the commanding officer to decide. He may well order amalgamation or reorganization at any time when the fighting strength of a platoon falls
below a certain level.
0346. Responsibilities and Duties Within the Platoon.
duties within the platoon are as follows:

Responsibilities and

a. The Platoon Commander. The platoon commander is responsible to the

company commander for the training, operation, discipline, administration and
welfare of his platoon. A detailed job specification for the infantry platoon commander is laid out in the Infantry Employment Volume (IEV) 1 Rifle Platoon,
Part 5 but in general terms it is his duty to ensure that:
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(1)

All tasks allotted to his platoon are properly carried out.

(2) He has a thorough knowledge of, and can implement, platoon training techniques, tactics and administration.
(3)

He has a thorough knowledge of platoon battle procedure.

(4)

His platoon is well trained.

(5)

A high standard of discipline and morale is maintained.

(6) He knows everything about each of his men, particularly their individual strengths and weaknesses, and has an understanding of their personal problems.
(7)

He and his men keep combat fit.

(8) A high standard of both collective and personal hygiene is maintained.

(9) He inspects his men regularly to see that they are properly clothed
and equipped, their weapons and equipment are kept clean and in good
working order and that they are not carrying impeding injuries (for example, blisters, chafing, etc.).
(10) A proper balance is maintained between work and rest periods.
b. The Platoon Sergeant. The platoon sergeant is the platoon 2IC and as
such must be conversant with all the duties of the platoon commander. In the
absence of the platoon commander he will command the platoon. He is also
responsible to the platoon commander for the day to day administration of the
platoon. The detailed job specification for the platoon sergeant is in IEV 1, Part
4 but generally his duties include:
(1)

Maintenance of the platoon roll book and duty rosters.

(2) Assisting the platoon commander in maintaining a high standard of

discipline and morale within the platoon.
(3)

Supervising the training done by section commanders.

(4) The collection and distribution to sections of ammunition, rations,

water and other stores and supplies.
(5) In war, organizes and supervises the evacuation of casualties and
Prisoners of War (PW).
c.

The Radio Operator.

(1)

3-16

The radio operator will:

Carry and operate the radio.

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(2)

Maintain the radio in perfect order at all times.

(3)

Carry out duties similar to a rifleman.

(4) If the platoon commander is fully occupied with his own duties, look
after his kit and ensure that his meals are prepared.
d.

The No 1 on the 51 mm Mortar.

(1)

The No 1 will:

Carry the 51 mm mortar and bombs as ordered.

(2) Fire the mortar to provide smoke, illumination or fire support as

ordered.
(3)

Act as a rifleman or runner when the mortar is not required.

Note:

Where a No 2 exists he will assist the No 1.

e. The Runner. The platoon runner is no longer on establishment although

in many operations there is a very important role for him. If a runner is required
he must come from one of the rifle sections or if the 51 mm mortar is not being
carried, he can be the No 1 (or No 2). His duties are:
(1) To carry messages (verbal or written) from the platoon headquarters
to company headquarters, adjacent platoons or to the sections.
(2)

To act as a relief radio operator.

(3)

To carry out duties similar to a rifleman.

(4) If the platoon commander is fully occupied with his own duties, to
look after his kit and ensure that his meals are prepared.
The Rifle Section
0347. The rifle section is the basic building block of the Infantry Company Group. It
will normally consist of two fire teams, but may be task organized for a specific mission. It is the lowest level to which a separate mission will normally cascade. The section is able to conduct basic manoeuvre by combining movement and direct fire. The
section commanders immediate proximity to the battle gives him, among all commanders, the most direct perspective of the ebb and flow of the fighting. It is the section commander who is likely to be the first to identify the fleeting opportunity to
exploit an enemy weakness and he is therefore key to the companys success in battle. Well-trained, aggressive section commanders who know that they have the confidence of their commanders and understand their intent are more likely to make battle-winning decisions and to take the appropriate action in a timely fashion without
recourse to higher authority.

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0348. The Fire Team. Although a fire team is a flexible grouping and can comprise any combination of men and weapons from within an infantry section, it will normally consist of an NCO and three men. In the standard fire team the commander
will be the section commander or the section 2IC and the fire team will be equipped
with three IWs and one LSW. This balanced organization means that either of the two
fire teams in a section can move into the assault or provide supporting fire. If greater
fire support is required, an option is to form a support fire team based on the two
LSWs commanded by the section 2IC. Examples of fire teams are shown at Figs 4
and 5. No matter what the configuration of groups within the section they are still
called fire teams and are always designated Charlie or Delta fire team respectively.
0349.

Responsibilities and Duties Within the Rifle Section.

a. The Section Commander. The section commander has similar responsibilities to his section as the platoon commander has to his platoon. The detailed
job specification for the section commander is in IEV 1, Part 3. When the section is operating as two fire teams he will command the Charlie fire team.
Generally it is his duty to ensure that:
(1)

All tasks allotted to his section are carried out efficiently.

(2) He has a thorough knowledge of section battle procedure and

infantry skills.
(3)

His section is well-trained.

(4)

The highest standard of discipline is maintained within his section.

(5) He knows the strength and weaknesses of each of his men and he
has an understanding of their personal problems.
(6) His section maintains arms, ammunition, clothing and equipment in
good order.
(7)

His men observe all orders on health and hygiene.

(8)

The section duty roster is properly kept and carried out.

b. The Section 2IC. The 2IC will understudy the section commander in all
duties; he will be responsible for administering the section when the section
commander is occupied with other tasks. He commands the second Delta fire
team of the section. The section 2ICs job specification can be found in IEV 1,
Part 2.
c. The LSW Gunners.
weapon. They will:
(1)
3-18

The LSW gunners will carry a LSW as a personal

Ensure that their LSW is kept in perfect order.

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Fig 4. Balanced Fire Teams Normal Grouping

Fig 5. Unbalanced Fire Teams Assault and Fire Support Teams

KEY
Charlie Fire Team
Delta Fire Team
LSW Gunner

Notes:
1.

No LAW are shown. However each rifleman could carry one.

2. In Fig 5, the one rifleman in the Delta fire team could move into the Charlie fire
team.
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(2)

Engage targets as ordered.

(3) Keep their commander continually informed of their ammunition

state.
d. The Rifleman. The riflemans job specification is laid out in IEV 1, Part 1
(Infantry Soldier). Amongst other things he should be able:
(1)

To carry out all tasks allotted to him.

(2)

To be proficient at:

(a)

Weapon handling and marksmanship.

(b)

Fieldcraft.

(c)

First aid.

(3)

To keep his arms and ammunition clean and in good working order.

(4)

To see that his clothing and equipment are clean and in good repair.

(5)

If so detailed, to carry and operate any other platoon weapons.

Weapons and Equipment

0350. The characteristics of current infantry weapons are at Annex B.
Commanders at all levels must make a conscious effort to limit the load to be carried
by their soldiers to the minimum required for the operation or task. There is a natural
tendency for commanders and individuals to add extra equipment and ammunition as
a precautionary measure. The basic equipment for assault, combat and marching
order is listed at Annex C.
0351 0352.

Reserved.

SECTION 6. SUPPORTING ELEMENTS

0353. Fire Support Company. Fire support company consists of a headquarters
and the mortar, anti-tank and reconnaissance platoons. The GPMG(SF) and assault
pioneer platoons can be found in this company or HQ company. The headquarters is
organized in the same way as a rifle company HQ and provides the administrative
and training support for the company. On operations the company commander is
responsible for the coordination of all traces in battlegroup headquarters and can act
as the headquarters chief of staff. Alternatively, the HQ can be given specific tasks
such as control of a reserved demolition or a breaching operation or supplement the
FPC.
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0354. The Reconnaissance Platoon. The reconnaissance platoon is the eyes

and ears of the infantry battlegroup. Battlegroup operations will be driven by reconnaissance pull as opposed to command push. Reconnaissance needs to be
deployed early and use full initiative to send back details. This will save time allowing
commanders to increase their tempo and get inside the enemy decision cycle. The
platoons role is close reconnaissance, both mounted in vehicles and dismounted. It
will be commanded by the reconnaissance platoon commander, who will be tasked
by the BG CO and will work to BG HQ. Information gathered will be processed by the
Intelligence Cell in order to allow the tasking of other BG assets. Organization and
vehicles will vary from role to role. Specific tasks may include:
a.

Providing a screen in front or on the flanks of the main body.

b. Securing and marking a Forming Up Place (FUP) and Line of Departure

(LD).
c. In defence, covering likely enemy approaches and gaps between companies.
d.

Provision of a control organization for BG moves.

e.

Protection and escort duties.

f.

Surveillance.

g.

NBC reconnaissance.

h.

Siting and securing a chemical decontamination area for the BG.

0355. The Fire Planning Cell. The FPC, located in BG HQ, will coordinate BG
level direct fire (such as MILAN, GPMG (SF) and .50 inch HMG), indirect fire, air support and air defence resources in support of the BG COs plan. In short, it will coordinate all combat support assets, integral or otherwise, to achieve maximum effect. It
will also be responsible for the coordination of the Decision Support Overlay, the various plans (anti-armour, obstacle, STAP), the synchronization matrix and OPSEC. It
will normally be commanded by the Royal Artillery Close Support Battery
Commander (BC) or Fire Support Company (FSp Coy) Commander, assisted by the
Mortar Officer or his second in command.
0356.

Mortar Platoon.
a. General. The mortar platoon provides integral and guaranteed indirect
fire support. The platoon will be commanded at battlegroup level by the mortar
officer, coordinated with the BC and FPC and controlled by one of a number of
MFC parties which will normally be attached to the company groups. The
range, flexibility, rate of fire and lethality of the mortar make it a powerful
weapon able to provide support by day and night. The mortars high trajectory
enables it to fire from behind cover, engage targets behind cover, in dead
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ground, or defiladed from all other weapons, and to give overhead fire. The
mortar can fire white phosphorous (WP), high explosive (HE) and is the only
source of parachute illuminating rounds. In an AI battalion the mortar platoon is
equipped with FV 432. While this vehicle has adequate cross-country performance, it is unable to keep up with Challenger 2 and Warrior with the consequence that the COs only guaranteed indirect fire support is in danger of being
unavailable. In all other battalions mortars are fired in the dismounted role. A
mount has been produced for the mortar to be fired from a BV 206 trailer for the
AMF(L) battalion.
b. Organization. The mortar platoon usually consists of a headquarters and
three sections. Each section has three mortars and the total strength of the platoon is 1 + 59.
(1) Mortar Officer. The mortar officer operates with battlegroup headquarters and is responsible for advising the BG commander and battery
commander on the employment and capabilities of the mortar platoon. In
addition he is responsible for coordinating mortar tasks with the battery
commander and assisting in the coordination of indirect fire in BG main
and tactical HQs. He is equipped with a Sultan CVR(T) in AI battalions.
(2) MFCs. The platoon has three MFC parties (four under War
Establishment) consisting of three men: a senior or A MFC, a junior or
B MFC and a driver. MFC parties are equipped with Spartan CVR(T)s in
AI battalions. Each party can communicate with their supported company, the FPC and the platoons mortar lines. The MFC parties carry two
radios, a laser range finder and a TI Spyglass to aid in target acquisition
and engagement and general observation. MFCs normally move with and
rely on the protection of the company they are supporting. For limited
periods and generally in the attack they can be split within the company
to allow one to be positioned well forward, usually the B MFC, and one
with the company group commander where he is in a position to advise
on indirect fire support. The A MFC is trained to write a company fire
plan and control mortar fire while the B MFC can only control fire. MFCs
are also responsible for:

(a) Assisting with the selection of targets and the preparation of

fire plans. Provision of technical advice to the company commander.
(b) Maintaining a close liaison with the FOO when attached to the
company.
(c) Advising commanders at all levels in the company on operational safety procedures.

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(d) Reporting to the Mortar Officer/FPC battlefield information

including enemy dispositions, movement, shelling, mortaring,
bombing and details of enemy jamming and NBC activities.
(e)
0357.

Participating in the STAP.

The Anti-Tank Platoon.

a. General. The Anti-Tank Platoon provides an integral medium range direct
fire anti-armour capability. The current medium range anti-tank guided weapon
(MRATGW) is MILAN, which is due to be replaced by MR TRIGAT in 2001. The
platoon is organized with varying numbers of sections and detachments
depending on type of parent battalion. Anti-tank assets are commanded at battlegroup level and the anti-armour plan will be fully integrated into the overall
battlegroup fire plan in the FPC. Company group commanders will site their
LAW to complement MILAN and to cover gaps caused by MILANs minimum
range restrictions. MILAN is carried in Warrior in AI battalions.
b. Organization. As stated above, the number of MILAN sections and
detachments within sections will vary according to battalion type. However,
regardless of battalion type a detachment will always consist of two firing posts:
(1) Platoon Commander. The anti-tank platoon commander is responsible for the BG anti-armour plan. He is a member of battlegroup headquarters and is the COs principal adviser on anti-armour matters. While
his sections may be subordinated he remains responsible to the CO for
the command and control of ATGW weapons at BG level.
(2) Section Commander. When MILAN sections are attached to company groups, the MILAN section commander is responsible for:

(a) Giving advice to the OC on anti-armour matters and the

deployment of the companys organic anti-armour weapons.
(b) The precise siting of each MILAN position to cover given killing
areas, having taken into account the siting considerations.
(c) Giving advice on deception measures to conceal MILAN positions.
(d) Command of the MILAN section and overall control of engagements by line, radio or physical presence.
(e) Resupply of MILAN ammunition, air bottles and batteries and
coordination of other combat service support requirements.
(f)

Coordination of moves to alternative or secondary positions.

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(3) Detachment Commander. When MILAN sections are attached to

company groups, the MILAN detachment commander (DC) is responsible
for:

(a)

Immediate command and control of his firing posts.

(b)

Implementation of fire control measures.

(c) Implementing deception measures to conceal MILAN positions.

(d)

Monitoring ammunition expenditure.

(e)

Coordinating the local protection of his position.

0358. The GPMG(SF) Platoon. The GPMG in the SF role is an invaluable support
weapon. It can be used in either the direct or indirect role. Most infantry establishments now include a GPMG(SF) platoon as part of fire support company. The platoon
may be employed as a unit, or assets may be dispersed to companies. It is likely to
be commanded at BG level, but command may be delegated to a lower level if
deemed appropriate. If commanded at BG level its fire will be coordinated with other
assets in the FPC. GPMG(SF) platoons are not established for AI battalions due to
the Warriors firepower.
0359. Snipers. Accurate, deadly sniper fire creates uncertainty amongst the
enemy and on any occasion will greatly slow movement. It is rightly one of the most
feared weapons on the battlefield. The infantry battalion is not established for a permanent sniper section, and snipers may be held as the CO sees fit. The establishment in each battalion is for 8 x L96 sniper rifles, and each battalion is to have a minimum of eight pairs of snipers, probably overseen by a qualified sniper instructor.
Ideally snipers should operate in pairs, one acting as an observer and protection for
the other doing the shooting. Command and control of snipers will normally be coordinated by the FPC to ensure that the weapon is properly integrated with other support weapons into the battlegroup fire plan. Snipers may be attached to company
groups for specific operations in the same way that other support weapons are.
Snipers are trained to achieve a first round kill up to a range of 600 metres and provide accurate harassing fire up to 1000 metres. The sniper may be employed in all
phases of war by day and by night in the following principal roles:

3-24

a.

To kill selected enemy (i.e., commanders).

b.

To harass the enemy.

c.

To observe and report.

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Battalion Combat Service Support (CSS) Organization

0360. Full details of CSS are contained in Chapter 6. For CSS purposes the battalion is divided into four elements:
a. F Echelon. F Echelon comprises all fighting elements of the battalion
including all the headquarters and sub-unit logistic assets such as ambulances
and fitter sections.
b. A1 Echelon. A1 Echelon is composed of the personnel and vehicles
required to provide an immediate or emergency resupply of fuel and ammunition for the battalion at any stage of operations. It may also include the
Regimental Aid Post (RAP), if not grouped with F Echelon. It will normally operate centrally under battalion control, but may be placed under sub-unit command when the battalion is operating on a wide frontage.
c. A2 Echelon. Although A2 Echelon will frequently be under brigade command for movement and local defence and will be located with the Brigade
Support Group, it will be under the logistic command of the battalion. It consists
of:
(1) The remainder of the battalions combat supply transport and
stocks.
(2)

Technical stores.

(3)

Repair and recovery resources to augment sub-unit fitter sections.

d. B Echelon. B Echelon consists of the Quartermasters Department, the

Regimental Administration Office and any other elements left out of battle,
including battle casualty replacements. It will be located with the Brigade or
Divisional Support Groups.
0361 0362.

Reserved.

SECTION 7. TASK ORGANIZATION AND REGROUPING

Task Organization
0363. The capability of an infantry battlegroup is determined not simply by its leadership or equipment but by its task organization (grouping). Based on his estimate
and subsequent plan, the formation commander will task organize his battlegroups
by cross-attaching sub-units. The task organization should be the best available to
carry out the allotted mission. It should be constructed so that the battlegroup commander and his sub-unit commanders are able to fight the deep, close and rear battles as well as provide reconnaissance and security functions. The battlegroup comRESTRICTED

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mander will, in turn, task organize his sub-units for each separate mission. Any subunit or battlegroup organization should comprise the ability to:
a.

Find and fix.

b.

Manoeuvre strike.

c.

Echelon momentum.

d.

Reserve uncommitted.

This is known as the rule of four.

Regrouping
0364. Regrouping to or within a battlegroup may occur prior to, or during, an operation. Deliberate or pre-planned regrouping should be notified in the warning order
and at the start of orders as part of the Task Organization. Although regrouping should
be avoided if possible during battle, historically it has always happened and may be
unavoidable due to changing circumstances and battle losses. Regrouping requires
practice and training if it is to be a smooth process. Successful regrouping requires
basic, simple drills based on anticipation and pre-planning.
0365.

A company being regrouped must:

a.

Arrive in time to receive up to date information.

b.

Receive clear orders for its new deployment and tasks.

c. Have immediate access to communications and CSS of the receiving battlegroup.

d. Ensure that it moves with first line scales of ammunition, rations for 48
hours and full fuel tanks.

Actions by a Joining Company.

0366.
must:
a.

A company joining another battlegroup

Before Change of Command.

(1)

Acknowledge the regrouping orders.

(2) Send a COMBATREP, PERSREP and any other additional information required through battlegroup HQ to the receiving HQ.
(3) Take under command the CSS slice that is to be taken with the company on regrouping.

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(4) Company group commander moves to the RV to meet the LO from

the receiving HQ. Here he changes to the receiving unit net.
b. On Change of Command.
is to:

On effective change of command the company

(1)

Change frequency to the receiving units net.

(2)

Ensure that sufficient CEIs have been received and distributed.

(3) Confirm the future location and movement details of the receiving
unit.
(4) Send any special administrative details to the receiving unit. This
might include amendments to the PERSREP.

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3-27

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3-28

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Int
(1 + 4)

Signals Pl
(1 + 31)
1 x Warrior (Comd)
4 x FV 432 (Comd)
4 x Spartan

Med
Pro
(2 + 15)
(0 + 5)
2 x FV 432
1 x FV 432
(Amb & RMO)

Bn HQ Pl
(3 + 24)
1 x TUM FFR
1 x TUM GS

Det
1 x Warrior (TRIGAT)
2 x MILAN

Det
1 x Warrior (TRIGAT)
2 x MILAN

MT Pl (1 + 27)
1 x TUL FFR
1 x TUM GS
23 x 8t

Sect
(0 + 6)
2 x Scimitar/
Sabre

Sect
(0 + 12)

Catering Pl
(0 + 31)

Armd Inf Coy

(7 + 122)

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Def Pl
(1 + 28)
4 x FV 432

Trg Wing
(0 + 5)
1 x Spartan

Det

SUMMARY

Sect
(0 + 10)
1 x Warrior

Pl HQ
(1 & 5)
1 x Warrior

Armd Inf Pl
(1 + 35)

Sect
(0 + 10)
1 x Warrior

LAD Sect
(0 + 12)
1 x Warrior
(Recovery)
1 x Warrior
(Repair)

726

45

11

30

Sldrs Scimitar/ Spartan Sultan Warrior Warrior FV 432

Sabre
(TRIGAT)

Sect
(0 + 10)
1 x Warrior

Armd Inf

HQ LAD (7)
(1 + 28)
1 x TUM & Tlr
1 x TUL & Tlr
1 x FV 434
1 x Warrior
(Recovery)

8t
23

Offrs
1

LAD

74

Sldrs

68

21

19

20

620

56

Warrior Samson LSW GPMG GPMG GPMG Lt MILAN 94 mm Chain

(Rec)
SF
Pintle
L37 Mor
LAW
gun

48

Offrs

Total

Total

Unit

Total

Unit

4 x MFC
(0 + 3)
4 x Spartan

OP Sect (4)
(0 + 12)

Armd Inf Pl

Coy HQ
(4 + 17)
2 x Warrior (Comd)
2 x FV 432 (Amb)
1 x FV 432 (CSM)
2 x TUM FFR
1 x TUL GS

Armd Inf Coy

(7 + 122)

One pl in the Bn is the Drums Pl/Bugle Pl.

One sect in each pl is trained as Asslt Pnrs.
4th MFC party and 1 x Spartan on WE.
16 soldiers may be trained as snipers.
A separate estb gives an increment of pipers, tailors and drill instructors to Guards, Scottish and R IRISH bns.
LAD is on a separate establishment.

RAO
(AGC Fd Det)
(2 + 19)

Det

Sect HQ
(0 + 3)

Sect
(0 + 12)

LAD Sect
(0 + 10)
1 x FV 434
1 x FV 432
1 x Samson
2 x Uty Lt GS

Armd Inf Coy

(7 + 122)

Det
(0 + 3)
1 x FV 432
1 x 81 mm Mor

Sect
(0 + 12)

Mor Pl
(1 + 53)
Pl HQ
(1 + 5)
2 x Sultan

Notes:
1.
WE increment consists of:
a.
6 x Capts as LOs/watchkeepers.
b.
4 Subs as Coy LOs.
c.
1 x Capt/Lt Col RAMC.
d.
1 x Sgt & 3 x Cpl RAMC.
e.
Def pl of 1 + 28, 6 x RMA, 3 x 81 mm men,
1 x Dvr, 1 x Sig, 4 x Dvr/Op, 8 x Rfn.

QM Pl
(2 + 19)
1 x TUL FFR
1 x TUM FFR

Sect
(0 +6)
2 x Scimitar/
Sabre

Recce Pl
(1 + 23)
Pl HQ
(1 + 5)
2 x Scimitar/Sabre

Sect
(0 + 6)
Sect (0 + 21) Sect (0 + 21)
2 x Scimitar/
Sabre
Det
Sect (0 + 21)
2 x Warrior (TRIGAT)
2 x MILAN

Atk Pl
(1 + 73)
Pl HQ
(1 + 10)
2 x Warrior (TRIGAT)
2 x MILAN

Fire Sp Coy
(7 + 164)
Coy HQ
(4 + 15)
2 x Warrior (Comd)
1 x FV 432 (Amb)
1 x Spartan
2 x TUM FFR
1 x TUL GS

14

74

81 mm RARDEN
Mor
30 mm

TUL TUM

1.

HQ Coy
(13 + 190)
Coy HQ
(3 + 6)
1 x TUL FFR
2 x TUM FFR

48 + 726 = 774 (1) (7)

Bn HQ
7+6

INF BN ARMD (WE)

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ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 3

INFANTRY BATTALION ORBATS

AI Battalion.

3A-1

3A-2

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GPMG
SF

LSW

68

Med
(1 + 12)

Bn HQ Pl
(2 + 21)

69

GPMG
Pintle

Pro
(0 + 5)

GPMG
L37

Lt
Mor

Int
(1 + 4)

Sig Pl
(1 + 25)
5 x TUL FFR
3 x TUM FFR

Det (0 + 4)
1 x TUH
1 x 81 mm Mor

Det (0 + 4)
1 x TUH
1 x 81 mm Mor

HQ (0 + 3)

Sect (0 + 15)

81 mm
Mor

24

MILAN

QM Pl
(2 + 11)

Det (0 + 4)
1 x TUH
1 x 81 mm Mor

Sect
(0 + 15)

Chain
gun
8

Sect
(0 + 9)

Sect
(1 + 5)

Def Pl (2)
(1 + 28)
1 x Saxon (Comd)
3 x Saxon

Op Sec (0 + 12) (7)

4 x MFC Parties (0 + 3)
4 x Saxon (Comd)

Catering Pl
(0 + 31)

RARDEN
30 mm

Sect
(0 + 15)

Sect
(0 + 9)

Pl HQ
(0 + 2)
1 x TUL GS

Pl HQ
(1 + 5)
2 x TUL FFR

Sect
(0 + 9)
2 x TUM GS

MG Pl (4)
(0 + 29)

Mor Pl
(1 + 62)

Coy HQ
(4 + 10)
1 x TUM FFR
1 x TUM GS
1 x TUM (Amb)
1 x 4 Ton

Fire Sp Coy
(8 + 190)

Sect

Sect

MT Pl
(1 + 22)
2 x TUL GS
4 x TUM GS
7 x 4 Ton
2 x UBRE
6 x 8 Tonne
1 x Uty Med
(Amb)

Sect

Sect
Sect
(0 + 6)
2 x Sabre

Recce Pl
(1 + 23)
Rifle Pl

Inf Bn
Mech
(24
MILAN)

Rifle Pl

Sldrs

736

48

15

TUL

Det
(1 + 2)

Sect

28

TUM

Trg Wing
(0 + 4)

Det

Sect
(0 + 10)
1 x Saxon

TUH

15

4 Ton

Sabre

69

Rec
Veh
Wh

Sect
(0 + 10)
1 x Saxon

Saxon 8 Tonne Samson

inc
REME

REME Det
(0 + 36)
5 x Saxon (Maint)
1 x Recovery Veh
1 x Samson
1 x TUM FFR
2 x 4 Ton
SUMMARY

Det

Sect
(0 + 10)
1 x Saxon

Cargo
Fuel

1.
10 Offrs join at WE as Watchkeepers/LOs.
2.
WE only.
3.
One sect in each Rifle Coy to be Asslt Pnrs.
4.
MG Pl is Drums/Pipes Bugles.
5.
Total attached is 4 + 84.
6.
A separate estb gives an increment of pipers,
tailors and drill instructors for Guards, Scottish and
R IRISH bns.
7.
4th MFC pty in war, with Saxon (Comd).

Notes:

Rifle Coy (3)

(7 + 113)

Det (0 + 3)
1 x MILAN
1 x TUM FFR

Mob Sect
(1 + 11)

Pl HQ
(1 + 4)
1 x Saxon (Comd)

Rifle Pl
(1 + 34)

Coy HQ
(4 + 11)
1 x Uty Med FFR
1 x Uty Med GS
1 x Uty Med (Amb)
1 x Saxon (Comd)
1 x 4 Ton

Rifle Coy (3)

(7 + 113)

Offrs

RAO (AGC Fd Det)

(2 + 19)

Sect
(0 + 13)
5 x MILAN
1 x Saxon
(Comd)
2 x Saxon

Pl HQ
(1 + 3)
2 x Saxon

Atk Pl
(2 + 66)

Rifle Coy (3)

(7 + 113)

2.

Coy HQ (3 + 6)

HQ Coy (12 + 203)

(48 + 736 = 784) (1)

Bn HQ
(7 + 4)

INF BN MECH (WE)

RESTRICTED

Mechanized Infantry Battalion.

Sect
(0 + 15)
Sect HQ
(0 + 3)

Mor Pl
(1 + 62)
Pl HQ
(1 + 5)
2 x TUL FFR

RESTRICTED

Int
(1 + 4)

Bn HQ Pl
(2 + 21)
2 x TUM GS
1 x Amb 4 x 4

Det
(0 + 4)

Sect

Pro
(0 + 5)

Med
(1 + 12)

QM Pl
(2 + 22)

Det
(0 + 3)
1 x MILAN
1 x TUM GS

Sect

(0 + 3)
(MG)

Sect
(0 + 9)

Det
(0 + 3)
1 x MILAN
1 x TUM GS

(0 + 3)
(MG)

Sect

Sgt

Rifle Pl
1 x 4 Ton

Cpl

Def Pl (5)
(1 + 28)

GPMG SF
9

71

697

Sldrs

30

4 Ton

81 mm Mor

38

TUM

MILAN

TUH

1.
9 Offrs at WE as Watchkeepers x 4, LOs x 4, Asst
Ajdt x 1.
2.
Total attached = 3 + 55.
3.
2 men to each section in war.
4.
Fourth MFC Party war only.
5.
Def Pl of 1 & 28 war only.
6.
16 soldiers to be trained as Snipers.
7.
MG Pl will be trained as Bugle Pipes & Drums.
8.
A separate estb gives an increment of pipers,
tailors and drill instructors to Guards, Scottish and
R IRISH bns.

Lt Mor

20

TUL

SUMMARY

Rifle Coy
(6 + 114)

LSW

45

Offrs

Notes:

Inf Bn Lt
(6 MILAN)

Sect (3)
(0 + 10)

1 x TUM GS

WO2

1 x TUM GS
Comd WO
Pte Rad Op

Sect
Sect
(0 + 8)
1 x 4 Ton GS

Trg Wng
(0 + 4)

Sgt

Sect
(0 + 10)

Pl HQ
(1 + 4)

Rifle Pl
(1 + 34)
1 x 4 Ton

Coy HQ
(3 + 12)
1 x TUM FFR
1 x TUM GS
1 x 4 Ton
1 x Med Amb

Rifle Coy
(6 + 114)

Asslt Pnrs
(0 + 26)

Sect
(0 + 10)

Rifle Pl
1 x 4 Ton

Sect
1 x TUM GS
2 x TUL GS

RAO
(AGC Fd Det)
(2 + 19)
1 x Civ Typist

(0 + 3)
(MG)

Sect

Pl HQ
(0 + 2)
1 x TUL GS

MG Pl (7)
(0 + 29)

Rifle Coy
(6 + 114)

MT Pl
(1 + 19)
2 x TUM FFR
3 x TUM GS
15 x 4 Ton (2 w/w 2 UBRE)
1 x Staff Car

Sect Comd
Dvr Op
1 x TUL GS

Sect
(0 + 8)

Pl HQ
(1 + 3)
2 x TUL FFR

Atk Pl
(1 + 27)

Catering Pl
(0 + 31)

Sgt MFC A
Cpl MFC B
Pte Dvr
x 4 parties
each with
1 x TUL GS

OP Sect
(0 + 12)(4)

Sect

Sect
Sect
OP Sect
(1 + 7)
(0 + 8)
(0 + 8)
6 x TUM FFR (ST)

Recce Pl
(1 + 23)

Fire Sp Coy
(6 + 153)
Coy HQ
(3 + 12)
1 x TUM FFR
1 x TUL GS
1 x TUM GS
1 x Med Amb
2 x 4 Ton

Sig Pl
(1 + 22)
2 x TUL FFR
4 x TUM FFR (4T)
2 x TUM GS
1 x TUL GS

Det
Det
(0 + 4)
1 x 81 mm Mor
1 x TUH GS

Sect

Coy
(2 + 6)
1 x TUL FFR
1 x TUM GS

HQ Coy
(11 + 198)

3.

Bn HQ
(10 and 4)

(45 + 697 = 742)

INF BN LT (WE)

RESTRICTED

Light Role Battalion.

3A-3

3A-4

RESTRICTED

GPMG SF

71

47

LSW

Inf Bn
Airmob
(42 MILAN)

Offrs

23

42

MILAN

43

TUM

Lt Mor

20

4 Ton

81 mm Mor

15

TUM HD

18

MG .5

23

Sniper L96

30

13

ATMP

Med Sect
(1 + 12)
1 x TUM GS
1 x Amb

Sects x 2
(0 + 12)
(5 x FP)
1 x 4 ton GR

Pl HQ
(1 + 1)
1 x TUL FFR
Sect
(0 + 10)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Sect
(0 + 10)

Pl
(1 + 34)
1 x TUM GS
1 x 4 Ton GS w/w

11 Offrs as Watchkeepers/LOs at WE.

Part of HQ Coy.
One Pl to be trained as Drums/Pipes/Bugles.
16 sldrs to be trained as snipers.
One sect in each Rifle Coy to be Asslt Pnrs.
Total attached is 4 + 72.
4th MFC pty in war.

Notes:

Sect
(0 + 10)

Pl
(1 + 34)
1 x 4 Ton GS
1 x TUM GS
Pl HQ
(1 + 4)

Coy HQ
(3 + 11)
1 x ATMP
1 x TUL FFR
1 x TUM FFR
1 x TUM GS
1 x TUL GS
1 x Amb
1 x 8 Tonne
2 x m/c

Rifle Coy
(7 + 138)

Atk Pl
Pl
(1 + 25)
(1 + 34)
10 x MILAN FP 1 x 4 Ton GS
1 x TUM GS

8 Tonne GMWP

Int Sect
(1 + 4)
1 x TUM FFR

Bn HQ Pl
(2 x 21)

Def Pl
(1 + 28)
1 x 4 ton GS

MT Pl
(1 + 30)
1 x Car Saloon
1 x TUL GS
3 x TUM GS
16 x 8 Ton 4 x 4
2 x 8 Ton CALM
1 x 4 Ton 4 x 4 w/w
2 x 4 Ton UBRE
2 x MHE Flt
1 x Car Uty Small

SUMMARY

Pro Sect
(0 + 5)
1 x TUL FFR

TUL

GPMG VM

750

Sldrs

Cat Pl
(0 + 31)

Rifle Coy
(7 + 138)

REME Sect
(0 + 24)
1 x Rec Veh GS 6 x 6
1 x TUM FFR
2 x TUM GS
1 x 4 Ton GS w/w
1 x 8 Tonne 4 x 4

QM Pl
(2 + 17)
1 x TUM FFR
1 x TUL FFR

RAO
(AG Fd Det)
(2 + 19)
1 x TUM GS
1 x 8 Ton

Sig Pl
(1 + 22)
2 x TUL FFR
5 x TUM FFR
3 x m/c
5 x TUM GS

Trg Wing
(0 + 4)
1 x TUM GS

Coy HQ
(3 + 8)
3 x ATMP

HQ Coy
(21 + 209)

Rifle Coy
(7 + 138)

Fire Sp Coy (3)

(5 + 127)

Det
(0 + 6)
2 x FP
1 x TUM HD

Sect
(0 + 16)

Mor
(0 + 4)

Sect
(0 + 17)

Mor
(0 + 4)

Sect
(0 + 17)

Recce Pl
(1 + 23)
6 x TUM FFR (Soft Top)
6 x GMWP
6 x GPMG

Det
(0 + 5)

Mor
(0 + 4)
1 x 81 mm Mor
1 x TUM HD

Det
(0 + 5)

Sect
(0+ 16)

Pl HQ
(1 + 2)
1 x TUL FFR

Atk Mob Pl
(1 + 34)
12 x MILAN FP
10 x GMWP

MFC Party (7)

(0 + 3)
1 x TUL GS

Sect HQ
(0 + 2)

Sect
(0 + 17)

Pl HQ
(1 + 5)
2 x TUL FFR

Mor Pl
(1 + 59)
9 x 81 mm Mor
5 x ATMP

Coy HQ
(2 + 11)
1 x ATMP
1 x TUL FFR
1 x TUM FFR
1 x TUM GS
1 x Amb
1 x 8 Tonne
2 x m/c

Airmobile Battalion.

BN HQ
(9 + 5) (2)
1 x ATMP

(47 + 750 = 797) (1) (6)

4.

INF BN AIRMOB (WE)

RESTRICTED

Weapon

(b)

Grenade Smoke,
Screening, Red
Phosphorus, L84A1

Grenade Hand
HE L2A2

Grenade Rifle,
HE APERS, L85A1

Pistol Automatic,
9 mm, L9A1

Sniper Rifle L96A1

Rifle L85A1

Machine Gun Light

Support L86A1

GPMG
(Sustained Fire
Role)

GPMG
(Turret Mount)
L37

Ser

(a)

40 mm

(d)

Calibre

RESTRICTED

5.56
mm

5.56
mm

7.62
mm

7.62
mm

Pintle

Turret

GPMG (SF) 7.62

mm

LSW

Rifle

Sniper Rifle 7.62

mm

9 mm Pistol 9 mm

Rifle
Grenade

Grenade

Red
Phosphorus

(c)

Common
Name

Gun: 10.9 kg
(incl barrel: 3.0 kg)

SF conversion kit:
36.66 kg

LSW: 5.6 kg
SUSAT: 0.7 kg
Full Mag: 0.48 kg

Rifle: 3.8 kg
SUSAT: 0.7 kg
Full Mag: 0.48 kg

Rifle: 5.5 kg
Sight: 0.53 kg

With full magazine:

1.105 kg

0.47 kg

0.45 kg

0.38 kg

(e)

Weight

(g)

Normal

150

2535

200 rpm

200 rpm

200 rpm

Up to 60 rpm

100 rpm

100 rpm

100 rpm

30 rpm single
shot
or
bursts of 23 rds

Up to 30 rpm
10 rpm
or
automatic burst of
23 rds

Deliberate shooting only

1800
(when strike
observed)

800

1800
(when strike
observed)

800

600

a. Mansize tgt
900.
b. Harassing
fire out to 1000.

(h)

Maximum
Effective
Range
(metres)

2535

A single shot recoil weapon rpm as 45

required

Deliberate firing only

(f)

Rapid

Service Rate
of fire

Dependent on unit
role

9 per inf bn

2 per rifle section

All

8 per bn

Normal scale is 6
per bn

162 sights issued

to Reg Bns only,
less Cyprus and
Brunei

1 or 2 per rfn

Min 4 per section

(i)

Scale of
Issue

Continued overleaf

a. Effective range greatly reduced when

firing on the move.
b. Min range on level ground 80 m (L37).
c. Ammo 1B/1T
d. SAXON DISA mount is primarily for
AAAD.
e. Tracer burn-out 1100 m.

a. Belts of 200 rds 4B/1T.

b. Kit incl 2 extra barrels, C2 dial sight
and bipod.
c. Bursts of 2025 rds.
d. Tracer burn-out 1100 m.

a. Rapid single shots at longer ranges.

Burst fire at 300 m or less.
b. Mags of 4B/1T.

Automatic fire only used at close ranges or

in emergency.

a. 13 round magazine.
b. The pistol can be issued in several
versions.

a. Max sight setting 150 m.

b. Indirect fire to 300 m.
c. Lethal radius 5 m.
d. Penetrates up to 15 mm RHA.

Bursting radius up to 190 m.

a. 20 m burst. Fragments to 30 m.
b. Casualty producing effect in addition to
smoke capability.

(j)

Remarks

RESTRICTED

ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 3

INFANTRY WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS

3B-1

3B-2

Light Mortar 51 mm

Rocket System 94
mm HEAT (LAW)

Mortar 81 mm,
L16A2

Medium Range Anti- MILAN

Tank Guided
Weapon (MRATGW)

Gun 30 mm
Rarden L21 A1/A2

12

13

14

15

16

(d)

.50 inch

7.62 mm

RESTRICTED

Rarden

Medium
Mortar

94 mm
LAW

30 mm

115 mm
Warhead

81 mm

94 mm

Light Mortar 51 mm

L111A1 HMG .5 inch .50 HMG

QCB

(c)

Chain Gun

11

(b)

Vehicle Mounted
Chain Gun L94A1

10

(a)

Firing Post: 18 kg
Missile: 12 kg

Barrel: 12.7 kg
Bipod: 12.25 kg
Baseplate: 11.57 kg
Sight: 4.99 kg
Case of 2 rounds: 11.8
kg

10.5 kg

Barrel with sight and

Baseplate: 5.75 kg
Bombs:
HE: .92 kg
Smk: .90 kg
Illum: .80 kg

(excl sights)
Gun: 38 kg
M3 Tripod: 20 kg
Soft Mount: 26 kg

(e)

(f)

40rpm

90rpm

(g)

Deliberate firing only

a. Rate 112 as required (rds per

mor per min).
b. Up to 20 rpm possible in exceptional situations for short period only.

Deliberate firing only

34 rpm or as required

100 rpm

120 rpm

(h)

(i)
1 per Warrior
1 per Sabre

1500
(dependent on
ammo nature)

1950

Mk 4 Ammo
HE: 5675
Illum: 4800
Smk: 5675

Mk 2 Ammo
HE: 5660
Illum: 4050
Smk: 5660

K Kill: 300
M Kill: 500

800

(j)

a. HE lethal over 40 m radius.

b. Illum over 400 m radius.
c. Wartime safety distances.
(1) Tgts up to 3000 m: 250 m.
(2) Tgts over 3000 m: 300 m.
(3) (1) and (2) above reduce by 150
m for troops in AFVs or dug in.

a. Case discarded after firing.

b. Incorporates 9 mm spotting rifle with 5
rd magazine.

a. Bombs: (1) HE lethal over 11 m.

(2) Smk-emission type.
(3) Illum area 200 m radius.
b. Incorporates sight for accuracy.
c. Wartime safety distance: 50 m.

a. Each gun has 2 Quick Change Barrels

and a Soft Mount.
b. Sights aval:
(1) Iron.
(2) Modified SUSAT.
(3) Maxikite.
(4) C2.
(5) RC25c Reflex.

a. Coaxial MG on Warrior and Sabre.

b. Electrically operated.
c. Ammo 1B/1T.
d. Rate of fire constant with electrical
power.
e. Tracer burn-out 1100 m.

Mounted on
Scimitar, Warrior
and Sabre

Ammo: APDS, APSE, HE, DSRR and

PRAC.

Varies according to a. Time of flight to max range 12.5 secs.

role from 4 FPs per b. TI sight (MIRA).
bn up to 42 FPs
c. Warhead arms at 20 m.
d. Minimum planning range is 400 m but
can be fired at lesser ranges in emergencies.

A1 and Mech Inf: 9

Lt Role bn:
9
Lt Role ND/NI: 6
TA Fire Sp bn: 18

8 per rifle section

1 per pl

Dependent on
Issued only to
ammo and tgt
JRDF units and
type as a guide: FIRIC
Anti-LAV: 1200
Anti-Pers (without
body armour):
1850
AAAD: 2600
(1000 rec)
Indirect: 4500

1800
(when strike
observed)

RESTRICTED

INFANTRY WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS (CONTINUED)

RESTRICTED

ANNEX C TO
CHAPTER 3

DISTRIBUTION OF LOADS

1. The Army Personnel Research Establishment (APRE) has conducted trials which
concluded that the most economical load for a fit combat soldier is approximately 30%
of his body weight and that the maximum marching load is approximately 45%. The
average soldier weighs 71 kg. Combat order, therefore, should not weigh more than
21 kg and marching order not more than 32 kg.
2. It is the responsibility of all commanders to ensure that their men only carry into
battle, loads commensurate with the task. Although fit men can carry more than these
weights there will be severe penalties if men carry too much equipment. Commanders
must ensure that their men are fit enough to carry heavy loads. This will only be
achieved by a progressive fitness programme culminating in exercises where realistic
loads are carried. Unless men train with heavy loads they will be unable to fight
carrying them in war.
3. The Infantry Trials and Development Unit (ITDU) conducted trials with the
Personal Load Carrying Equipment (PLCE). They divided PLCE into three orders of
dress:
a.

Assault Order.

b.

Combat Order.

c.

Marching Order.

4. The exact division of items between these different orders of dress will vary with a
units role and task at hand. For instance, the amount of ammunition carried in assault
order by men of an armoured infantry battalion may be less than that carried by non
mechanized infantry as the former not only have their vehicles integral firepower to
assist them, but they can also choose to leave some ammunition in the vehicle.
Similarly, troops operating in the jungle or desert will have to carry more than the one
water bottle shown.
5. The concern of all commanders must be to ensure that their men do not go into
battle overloaded with unnecessary stores and equipment.
Assault Order
6. This consists of the essentials ammunition, waterbottle, entrenching tool hand
(ETH), helmet and NBC clothing (if required but not worn) for operations and patrols of
only short duration. Breakdown:
RESTRICTED

3C-1

RESTRICTED

a.

Ammunition:

6 magazines of 30 rounds
2 grenades (1 x L2A1; 1 x L84)
150 rounds (bandolier)

b.

Weapon cleaning roll.

c. NBC clothing and equipment. To be carried in one of the detachable side

pouches of the rucksack. The respirator is carried in its own haversack.
d.
7.

Waterbottle, cup and ETH.

Individual Weights.

Item
L85 Rifle less magazine
Helmet
Bandolier containing 150 rds
Respirator S10
Spare canister
DKP No 1 Mk 1
3 x Autoject (combopen)
Waterbottle 58 Pattern full
Canteen cup
ETH
ETH case
ETH carrier
L85 cleaning roll
L85 Bayonet
Bayonet scabbard
Yoke
Left hand ammunition pouch + 4 full mags
Right hand ammunition pouch + 2 full mags and 1 x L2 Gren + 1 x
L84 Gren
Respirator carrier empty
Waterbottle carrier empty
Utility pouch empty
Waist belt
Rucksack side pouch empty
Side pouch utility straps
NBC Smock

3C-2

RESTRICTED

Weight
4.41 kg
1.35 kg
2.02 kg
915 g
225 g
105 g
100 g
1.250 kg
175 g
1.075 kg
237 g
060 g
280 g
410 g
200 g
240 g
2.13 kg
2.24 kg
305 g
225 g
200 g
195 g
250 g
100 g
560 g

RESTRICTED

Item

Weight

NBC Trousers
NBC Gloves Inner
NBC Gloves Outer
NBC Overboots

445 g
035 g
150 g
870 g

Total weight carried

20.757 kg
(46 lbs)

Note: Not shown are radios, command equipment (binoculars, etc.), platoon
ammunition, e.g., 51 mm mortar rounds, rifle grenades, 94 mm LAW.
Combat Order
8. This is assault order with the means of stowage for rations and personal
equipment to enable a soldier to live and fight for 24 hours. In addition to assault order,
the following is carried inside the second side pouch of the rucksack:
a. Two meals from the 24 hour ration pack contained in one mess tin,
hexamine cooker, knife fork and spoon (KFS).
b. A pair of socks, headover, gloves, washing and shaving kit, foot powder and
other minor items.
c.
9.

One extra layer of clothing for the top half of the body.

Individual Weights.

Item
Assault order complete
Rucksack side pouch empty
2 x meals from 24 hr ration pack
Hexamine cooker
Headover
Pair combat gloves
Waterproof jacket
Mess tins and KFS

Weight
20.757 kg
250 g
780 g
255 g
065 g
100 g
820 g
370 g

RESTRICTED

3C-3

RESTRICTED

Item
Washing and shaving kit
Spare socks
Foot powder
Insect repellent
Cold weather cap

Weight
565 g
100 g
115 g
075 g
150 g

Total weight carried

24.402 kg
(54 lbs)

Marching Order
10. This is combat order plus rucksack and is a load which will be required for an
operation of up to two weeks duration without resupply except for ammunition, rations
and water.
11.

Individual Weights.
Item

Weight

Combat order complete

Rucksack and utility straps less side pouches empty
Waterproof trousers PVC type
Sleeping bag
Pullover
Pair boots
GS shirt
2 x Pairs under pants (short)
CW vest (long sleeved)
2 x Pair socks
CW Liner and trouser liners
Towel
Remainder of 24 hr ration pack
Mess tins
Housewife
Sleeping mat
Boot cleaning brush (small)
Tin boot polish (small)

24.402 kg
2.097 g
495 g
2.615 kg
660 g
1.080 kg
325 g
075 g
150 g
200 g
680 g
265 g
505 g
195 g
100 g
550 g
075 g
090 g

Total weight carried

34.559 kg
(76 lbs)

3C-4

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

Chapter 4
BATTLE PROCEDURE AND ORDERS
SECTION 1. GENERAL
Aim

Contents

0401. The aim of battle procedure is to

ensure that a soldier is sent into battle without waste of time and with the minimum
fuss, knowing exactly what he has to do,
how he is going to do it and what fire support he is going to be given.
0402. Good battle procedure ensures that
a commander commits his force to battle
with the maximum preparation having taken
place in the minimum time.

Page
SECTION 1. GENERAL

41

SECTION 2. FUNCTIONAL GROUPING

41

SECTION 3. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION

OF THE BATTLEFIELD

44

SECTION 4. ESTIMATES

45

SECTION 5. COMMANDERS BATTLE

PROCEDURE

48

SECTION 6. ORDERS

418

Annexes:
A. Extraction of Orders
B. Combat Estimate

0403. Good battle procedure is achieved

by observing the following principles:
a. Anticipation. Commanders at all levels must think and plan ahead
beyond their immediate tasks.
b. Efficient Drills. Well practised drills based on good SOPs for movement
make quick reaction possible.
c. Concurrent Activity. Concurrent activity must happen at all levels and
should be initiated by a Warning Order. It ensures that the best use of time is
made and that soldiers start the battle rested and as fresh as possible.
d. A Thorough Knowledge of the Grouping System. Everyone in a company
and platoon must know who is involved in the reconnaissance of future tasks
and who will receive the orders for them.
0404 0405.

Reserved.

SECTION 2. FUNCTIONAL GROUPING

0406. In preparation for an operation a company is divided into functional groups.
These are as follows:
a.

Rover Group (R Group).

RESTRICTED

4-1

RESTRICTED

b.

Orders Group (O Group).

c.

Harbour and Rear Reconnaissance Parties.

d.

The Main Body.

The R Group
0407. The R group is a group which provides a commander with advice, communications and protection. Its composition varies at every level but numbers should be
kept to a minimum to aid concealment. A rifle company R group would consist of:
a.

The company commander.

b.

A forward observation officer (FOO), when attached.

c.

A protection party.

d.

A radio operator.

e. Other supporting arms or detachment commanders may also be included,

i.e., a mortar fire controller (MFC), engineer representative, MILAN section
commander etc.
0408. At platoon level the R group consists of the platoon commander, a runner for
protection and the section commanders if required or allowed. Representatives of
support platoons attached to the platoon may be included to give specialist advice.
There is usually no requirement to take a platoon radio operator as, almost certainly,
a platoon R group will be part of a larger group, i.e., company O group, and communications will be provided by the company commanders operator. The platoon commander does have his own PRC 349 enabling him to contact his platoon if he is within 1.5 km of its location.
0409. At section level it is unlikely that there will be a section R group although section commanders may find themselves part of a platoon R group. If a section is to
undertake a patrol, and there is time for a look at the ground from an OP, the section
commander should take a good rifleman with him but not his 2IC.
The Orders Group
0410. The O group includes all those who must directly receive the commanders
orders. When speed is essential, the O group does not assemble but receives orders
by radio. Secure Orders Cards (SOCs) may be used to ensure low level communications security.
0411.

4-2

The company O group will normally consist of the company R group plus:

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

a.

The company 2IC.

b.

The platoon commanders.

c.

The company sergeant major.

d.

The company quartermaster sergeant (if available).

e.

The company signals detachment commander.

f.

Other supporting arms or support weapons detachment commanders.

0412.

The platoon O group will normally consist of the platoon R group plus:
a.

The section commanders.

b.

The platoon sergeant (if available).

c.

The No 1 on the 51 mm mortar.

d.

The radio operator.

e.

Any attached personnel, i.e., MFC.

0413. Whenever possible the platoon sergeant should attend but his duties may
prohibit this. If he does not attend he must be given orders later.
0414. At section level the O group should comprise the whole section but men may
be away on fatigues or sentry. If so they must be given orders on their return.
Harbour and Rear Reconnaissance Parties
0415. These parties are formed when required to reconnoitre for and receive the
main body in new harbour areas or defensive positions.
0416. A company rear reconnaissance party would normally consist of the company
2IC, platoon sergeants, platoon guides and support weapons platoon representatives.
Main Body
0417.

The remainder of the company or platoon required for the operation.

0418 0419.

Reserved.

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SECTION 3. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE

BATTLEFIELD
General
0420. The IPB process is designed to help commanders at all levels identify possible enemy courses of action, suitable killing areas, surveillance targets and OP locations and decision points. It is a systematic approach which requires the production
of a series of graphic overlays, depicting basic data on weather, terrain and enemy
deployment; the latter being based on no more than an assessment of his doctrine.
It is a dynamic process in that data can be added or adjusted at any time before or
during combat. It is fundamental to the production of the surveillance and target
acquisition plan (STAP).
0421. Although the IPB is a part of the estimate process it has applications
throughout the levels of command. Indeed the rifleman will conduct an IPB when he
prepares a range card and annotates significant landmarks and likely enemy
approaches. The purpose of the IPB is to produce graphical assessments of both the
enemy and the overall environment with the intention of identifying the critical decision making points. The IPB does not run in isolation of the estimate process but in
parallel with it.
0422. To conduct the full IPB process, trained staff, time and a wide spectrum of
data is necessary. Whilst this is a practical exercise at divisional level it may not be
possible to complete the process at brigade level and below. At company level and
below, commanders IPB will consist of their own map study and any product produced by their battlegroup HQ staff. However, the process should not be disregarded completely. IPB is a logical, systematic method of looking at the enemy. There
may be occasions when a company or platoon commander is required to operate
independently or with considerable freedom of action; at such times the IPB process
should prove to be an invaluable tool.
IPB Process
0423. Step 1. Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE). The BAE is a comprehensive ground appreciation. The evaluation will produce a number of deductions on factors such as likely mobility corridors, avenues of approach and key terrain as well as
how the weather may affect our own and enemy surveillance devices. Of particular
interest will be the no go and slow go areas.
0424. Step 2. Threat Evaluation. The second template will depict the most
likely enemy course of action using his own doctrine. The depiction will be irrespective of specific terrain or weather restraints and is purely an assessment of enemy
capabilities and possible courses of action.

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0425. Step 3. Threat Integration. Threat integration has three components

and is the part of the process where we attempt to get inside the enemy commanders mind. At the end of this step it should be possible to assess his likely centre of
gravity and possible decision points.
a. Situation Template. The Situation Template shows the enemy options
with Steps 1 and 2 combined. The implications of weather, terrain and his doctrine are therefore pulled together.
b. Event Template. From the Situation Template an Event Template is created which is designed to illustrate possible enemy options in time and space.
This allows us to deduce what we want to look for, where and when. These
areas, known as Named Areas of Interest (NAIs), will prompt the allocation of
RISTA assets to support the Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan (STAP).
c. Decision Support Template. The Decision Support Template records
Target Areas of Interest (TAIs) and Decision Points:
(1) TAIs. TAIs represent areas where a commander might significantly
affect the course of the battle by timely action.
(2) Decision Points. Decision Points are points on the ground at which
a commander must make decisions if he is to effect results in TAIs.
Examples could be the point at which artillery will need to be queued or
the point at which a move to a secondary position must be ordered.
Company Group Level Application
0426. The company group commander will be particularly interested in the product
of Step 3. Threat Integration will indicate in broad terms how the enemy is likely to
operate in the company groups area of operations and the TAIs and Decision Points
will indicate where his BG commanders main effort will lie. Clearly the company
group commanders combat estimate and planning will need to reflect the Decision
Support Template
0427 0428.

Reserved.

SECTION 4. ESTIMATES
General
0429. Below company level it is rarely necessary to complete a comprehensive
estimate, unless mounting an independent operation. At this level commanders are
following orders and there is limited requirement to deduce courses of action.
However, as a minimum they will need to consider the ground and the enemy and
draw deductions from them that are relevant to their level of command and its part in
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the operation. Time and space may also need to be considered. Regardless of how
much or how little of the estimate process is used, mission analysis process must
always be conducted. Not only is mission analysis fundamental to effective mission
command but it also concentrates commanders on those matters which are essential to their operations. Mission analysis is considered in more detail in Section 5.
There are two types of estimate:
a. Combat Estimate. The combat estimate is primarily used at company
level and above for deciding a course of action for more complex operations.
The combat estimate is considered in Annex B.
b. Quick Estimate (QE). The QE has been developed to provide junior commanders with an easily employed format for use either intuitively in contact or
more deliberately when time and circumstances permit. Intuitive use will only
come from frequent employment in training. The QE follows the format of the
combat estimate but is abbreviated and contains tactical prompts.
Quick Estimate
0430. The QE is an abbreviated form of the combat estimate and can be used in
contact or when conducting independent operations. It does not replace the combat
estimate, which remains authoritative, but it provides junior commanders with a more
appropriate estimate for the tactical problems that they will face. Similar to the combat estimate it is generic and is applicable to all phases of war. It is essentially a training tool and commanders should aim for the process to become intuitive through frequent use. It is not envisaged that every detail of the QE must be considered by every
level of command within the company. For example, due to the differing complexity of
the tactical problems they will face, section commanders will have different estimate
requirements to the company commander. Military judgement and common sense
must, therefore, be applied in training to tune the QE to the needs of the level of command. The format of the QE is at Fig 6. The key factors of enemy and ground are
always to be considered. Further explanations of key points are:
a. Time Analysis. If the QE is being conducted as part of pre-H hour battle
procedure, then time analysis will already have been triggered by the Wng O.
b.

Mission Analysis.

c.

Factors.

See Section 5.

(1) Ground/Enemy. Commanders with access to the product of the

IPB will be able to find the answers to the factors listed here.
Commanders without this access will need to conduct a detailed map
study (see Section 5 Reconnaissance) and combine this study with
their knowledge of the enemy.

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Time Analysis
Fixed timings:
Earliest/latest H Hour:
Movement:
Time available:
1
3, 23 allocation:
Mission Analysis
Mission: To . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . in order to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Q1. What is intention of commanders 1 and 2 up and what is my role in their plans?
Q2. What must I do to accomplish my mission and what are all other tasks (specified and implied) that I need to carry out to complete mission? Can I identify my likely Main Effort?
Q3. What limitations (time, space and resources) are there on my freedom of action? What can I not do and when do I need
to decide?
Q4. Sit change? Yes: Plan still valid continue or
Mission feasible but amend plan or
Mission no longer valid:
Consult superior or
Act on own initiative to support Main Effort
Factors
Ground/Enemy
FUPs
Approaches (Go/slow go/no go)
(left/centre/right/other)
Killing areas
Obstacles (natural/man-made)
Cover (view/fire)
Routes through
Vital/dominating ground
En type and intentions
En locations (wpns/eqpt/C2)
En strengths (avoid)
En weaknesses (exploit)
En COAs/worst COA

Friendly Forces:
Assets available
Ech/res
Fire support
Direct
Indirect (DFs)
Smoke/illum
Flanks
STAP
CSS (C sups, ES, med, replen;
Demand, Distance, Duration)
Relative Strengths:
Compare combat power : own
and enemy strengths,
weaknesses, dispositions of:
Infantry
Armour
Indirect fire
A/Armr
Surprise & Security
Surprise
Security (OPSEC, CSCMs)
Protection (flanks/rear)
Deception
Time and Space
Movement
Rate of advance
Moonstate/first & last light
Summary of Possible Tasks
Task
Task 1

Deductions

Tasks/Constraints

Combat Power Required

Deductions

Advantages

Disadvantages

Task 2 ...
Courses of Action
COA

COA 1
COA 2...
Select Course
Who (forces involved) Why (intent) What When Where

Fig 6. The Format for the Quick Estimate

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(2) Friendly Forces. The prompts require the commander to consider

the main considerations only.
(3) Relative Strengths. Compare strengths and deficiencies to
deduce how your combat power should be packaged.
(4) Surprise and Security. Although deception is difficult to achieve at
the company level, commanders should always seek ways of deceiving
the enemy to achieve surprise. The feint or demonstration are ways in
which a degree of surprise could be generated.
(5) Time and Space. Tactical options which are quicker to mount and
execute will increase tempo and are therefore generally preferable to
slower options.
(6) Summary of Possible Tasks. Here the commander lists all those
tasks revealed by his mission analysis and allocates to them the assets
necessary. Invariably the list will be longer than the assets he has available to him and he will be forced to compromise.
(7) Courses of Action. At company level and below the courses of
action will usually be restricted to a maximum of two or three. Those
courses which are quickest to implement will have greater merit than others. Commanders must also be able to recognize when they have no
choice about their course of action, i.e., when they have been directed to
pursue one course and given no latitude. In this case they must simply
consider the best way to pursue that course. In other instances, they may
have a choice of courses, which is when they begin to consider advantages/disadvantages before deciding on the best way to pursue the chosen course.
(8) Select Course. In answering the five questions (Who Why
What When Where) the commander will have covered the main elements of his subsequent plan.
0431 0432.

Reserved.

SECTION 5. COMMANDERS BATTLE PROCEDURE

General
0433. Battle procedure consists of those procedures to be followed when preparing for tactical operations. The object of battle procedure is to ensure, by concurrent
activity, that the time available to prepare for battle is used efficiently so that troops
are properly prepared and briefed.
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0434. There is no set sequence to battle procedure as it will adapt to existing circumstances. However, the keys to successful battle procedure are maximum concurrent activity, initiative at all levels and good passage of information. Concurrent
activity is the great time saver which contributes significantly to achieving high tempo
of operations. There are two parts to battle procedure: preparation of the commander and preparation of the fighting unit itself. While preparation of the commander is
considered in this chapter, preparation of the fighting unit is considered in Pamphlets
2 and 3.
0435. There are five critical stages to the preparation of commanders which flow
chronologically as follows:
a. Stage 1.
mander.

Receipt of a timely warning order (Wng O) from a superior com-

b.

Stage 2.

Time analysis.

c.

Stage 3.

Mission analysis.

d.

Stage 4.

Issue own Wng O.

e. Stage 5. Receipt of superiors orders, preparation and delivery of own

orders. If the mission has changed since the Wng O was received it will be necessary to conduct a second mission analysis in Stage 5. An estimate can also
be conducted in Stage 5 and reconnaissance should be conducted whenever
possible. Marrying up with attachments to the company group will take place in
this stage.
Stage 1 Receipt of Superiors Warning Order (Wng O)
0436. The Wng O is fundamental to efficient battle procedure and effective application of mission command. It is the trigger for mission analysis and it allows commanders at all levels to gain early insight into their superiors intentions, thereby
achieving unity of effort at the outset. It is therefore vital that Wng Os are issued as
soon as possible and must not be delayed in order to make them more comprehensive better incomplete information early than fuller information late. If necessary,
more detailed Wng Os can be issued later to back up the initial one.
0437.

The Wng O (mnemonic SPOTOCA) will include:

a. Situation, including commanders intentions one and two levels up, ground
and enemy.
b.

Probable mission and probable missions for subordinates.

c.

Own Main Effort if known/applicable.

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d. Timings, e.g., No move before . . . hours or Be at . . . minutes notice

to move. This avoids keeping men in an unnecessary state of tension and
enables them to prepare their weapons and to get food and rest.
e.

O group RV and time.

f.

CSS essential matters only.

g.

Acknowledge.

0438.

Wng Os might also include the following:

a.

Orders for preliminary operations, reconnaissance, regrouping or moves.

b.

Locations of assembly areas.

c.

RV and timings for advance and harbour parties.

d.

Reconnaissance tasking (BG level only).

e. Limitations on reconnaissance, movement and use of transport including

helicopters.
f.

Command and signal instructions.

0439. Although a full Wng O is not issued until Stage 4, the immediate issue by the
subordinate commander of an initial Wng O in Stage 1 can help battle procedure if
time is short. This Wng O should not attempt to follow the format described in Stage
4 but should only contain essential information; further details can then follow in the
Stage 4 Wng O. An example of a company level initial Wng O is as follows:

Wng O. B Coy to mount attack ni 27/28 Sep as part of BG op. 4 and 5 Pls in
asslt; 6 Pl res. Cfm Wng O to fol.
Stage 2 Time Analysis
0440. Commanders will have to extract information from the Wng O to conduct
Stage 2. A time analysis helps a commander to allocate time in a sensible manner
and in correct proportion to what has to be done. An accurate analysis of the available time is essential to good battle procedure and is carried out:

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a.

After receiving a Wng O.

b.

During the conduct of an estimate.

c.

When planning a reconnaissance.

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0441. Commanders at all levels must ensure that they complete their plans and
issue orders in sufficient time to allow their subordinate commanders to do the same.
Although some functions of battle procedure, such as reconnaissance, can be conducted concurrently at a number of levels, each commander will need his own time
for preparation and orders groups. Immediately on receipt of Wng Os and prior to
conducting their mission analysis, commanders must ensure that they thoroughly
analyse the time available and calculate the one third/two thirds allocation, whereby
the commander takes only one third of the time remaining before an operation starts
(including preliminary moves) for planning and the issue of orders. The time analysis
will answer some of the time constraint questions which will emerge during mission
analysis.
0442.
sis:

The following timings and actions will need to be considered in a time analya.

b.

Actions.
(1)

Movement (both by commander and preliminary tactical).

(2)

Planning.

(3)

Reconnaissance.

(4)

Writing and issuing of orders.

(5)

Administration.

(6)

Rehearsals.

(7)

Regrouping.

(8)

Briefings.

(9)

Fudge factor or buffer time.

Timings.
(1) Time constraints e.g., no move before, mission to be completed
by, H Hour.
(2)

Natural last and first light, moon rise.

(3)

Notice to move.

0443. There are two possible methods of analysing the time available, depending
on the nature of the time deadline. The following examples are illustrative and by no
means comprehensive. The timings allowed depend entirely on the circumstances.

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a.

Working Forward Method.

(1) The company commander is ordered to destroy the enemy in a particular position as soon as possible in order to . . .. He wants to establish his earliest HHour. Time now is 1400 hours.

(a)

Conduct time and mission analysis . . . . . . . . .

5 mins.

(b)

Write and issue Wng O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 mins.

(c)

Move to OP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 mins.

(d)

Reconnaissance, quick estimate/plan . . . . . . .

15 mins.

(e)

Move to O group RV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5 mins.

(f)

Prepare/give orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15 mins.

(g) Subordinate commanders preparation

and orders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60 mins.

(h)

Move to FUP/LD

......................

20 mins.

(i)

Buffer time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20 mins.

Total Time

150 mins.

(2) Platoon commanders reconnaissance should take place with the

company commander to achieve concurrent activity.
(3) A model can be made or schematic drawn for an O group for a commander as a concurrent activity.

b.

(4)

The earliest possible HHour will be at 1630 hours.

(5)

Timings will obviously vary with the circumstances.

Working Backwards Method.

(1) The company commander is ordered to destroy the enemy in a particular position at 1130 hours in order to . . . . He wants to establish
how much time he has available for his own planning and orders and how
much time he can afford to give himself for his own planning and orders
and how much time he must give to his subordinates for their planning
and orders before any preliminary moves take place. HHour is at 1130
hours; the time now is 0905:

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(a)

Buffer time ........................................................

10 mins.

(b)

Move to FUP/LD ...............................................

15 mins.

(Therefore time available for battle procedure ..........

3 hours).

(c) Time allocated for subordinates planning and

and orders .................................................................

2 hours.

(d)

Give orders .......................................................

20 mins.

(e)

Prepare orders/model .......................................

10 mins.

(f)

Move to O Group RV ........................................

5 mins.

(g)

Reconnaissance, quick estimate/plan ..............

10 mins.

(h)

Move to OP .......................................................

5 mins.

(i)

Write and issue Wng O......................................

5 mins.

(j)

Conduct time and mission analysis ...................

5 mins.

Total Time

205 mins.

(2) As the timings in this example suggest there may well be more time
available if the mission states a time for HHour.
0444. In general it is easier and less confusing to allocate a period of time to an
action rather than to plan each element beginning at a particular time (i.e., as above
rather than: HHour 1200 hours, move to LD 1140 hours, etc.).
0445. It will often be the case with either method that more time is ideally required
than is available. In such cases, small differences can be resolved by erosion of the
buffer time. With large differences, the commander must carefully re-examine his
allocation of time to see if he has allowed the luxury of too much time for certain
actions, or even if certain stages can be dispensed with as non-essential luxuries.
0446. In principle, commanders should avoid reducing the time allowed for reconnaissance and giving of orders. They should save time in their own stages of the battle procedure before reducing the time allocated to their subordinates.
Stage 3 Mission Analysis
0447. For mission command to be effective, the correct identification and complete
understanding of the mission by subordinate commanders is of fundamental importance. The process by which this is achieved is called mission analysis and is triggered by receipt of the Wng O. Mission analysis is a logical process for extracting and
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deducing from a superiors orders the tasks necessary to fulfil a mission. It places in
context what effect is to be achieved in the overall design for operations. The subordinate commander establishes what constraints apply and determines, as the operation continues, whether further decisions are required. It is, therefore, a dynamic
process.
0448. While mission analysis is most effectively conducted once a confirmed mission has been received from the superiors orders in Stage 5, mission analysis can
also be very usefully conducted earlier in the battle procedure stages. The effectiveness of early mission analysis will depend on the receipt of a sufficiently comprehensive Wng O. By conducting mission analysis early the commander gains a timely
grasp of his higher commanders intents, his probable tasks and implied tasks and
limiting factors. This aids unity of effort, gives purpose and definition to his Wng O
which he will issue in Stage 4 and prepares the commander mentally for the receipt
of orders in Stage 5. The overall effect is improved battle procedure.
0449. There are four questions which the commander asks himself during mission
analysis:
a. Question 1. What is the intention of my commanders one and two
levels up and what is my role in their plans? The subordinate commander establishes what effect he has to achieve in his immediate superiors concept of operations. This requires an understanding of his superiors End-State
and his Main Effort. He also needs to understand the intent of his superior two
levels up in order to put his part in the battle in the fullest context possible.
Within the company, a platoon commander for instance must therefore have a
thorough understanding of the company commanders concept of operations
and a good grasp of the COs overall plan.
b. Question 2. What must I do to accomplish my mission and what
are all the other tasks that I need to carry out to complete this mission?
Although the mission statement will clearly specify the main task, there are likely
to be other unstated but implied tasks. These implied tasks are other activities
that must be carried out in order to achieve the mission. A logical check of the
operation should reveal these tasks. A comparison of the specified and implied
tasks with the superior commanders intent should lead to an initial deduction
of the critical activity and therefore the Main Effort.
c. Question 3. What limitations are there on my freedom of action?
What can I not do? When do I need to decide? Commanders will invariably find various constraints which will curtail their freedom of action. These
constraints can either by laid down by superiors or be natural, such as difficult
terrain or first and last light. The most common constraint is time (e.g., to capture the position by last light); the detail of time constraints should already have
been revealed by the time analysis conducted at Stage 2. Other constraints are
space, resources including combat service support and political restrictions such as ROE.
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d. Question 4. Has the tactical situation changed and do I need to

take another decision? Question 4 cannot be answered at this stage of
battle procedure and is most likely to come into play once in contact. Thereafter
the commander must continually be asking himself this question to determine
whether the situation has changed sufficiently to warrant a review of his concept of operations as plans seldom survive contact. Using the first three questions of mission analysis, as the situation develops he reassesses the progress
of his operation against his mission, applying Question 4 on a continuous basis.
There are three possible responses:
(1)

Yes the situation has changed but my plan is still valid.

(2) Yes the situation has changed; my original mission is still

feasible but I need to amend my plan.
(3) Yes the situation has changed and my original mission is no
longer valid. In this case, the commander should consult his superior but
if for whatever reason he cannot, he will act on his own initiative to support his superior commanders Main Effort, in keeping with that commanders original intent. He will also keep in mind the commanders intent two
levels up.
0450. Mission analysis is, therefore, not only a battle procedure process for preparing commanders prior to operations but it also allows a commander, without waiting
for further orders, to exercise personal initiative in battle and exploit a situation in a
way which his superior would intend.
0451. Mission Analysis at Section Level. Mission analysis will have limited utility at section level. Although it is not envisaged that Questions 2 and 3 will have much
relevance at section level, section commanders will still need to consider Questions
1 and 4 so that they achieve unity of effort and are responsive to changing tactical
situations.
Stage 4 Wng O
0452. Having completed his mission analysis the commander is able to issue his
own Wng O to his subordinates using the format described under Stage 1 earlier in
this Section or in TAM.
0453. The following is an example of a warning order produced by a company commander:

Wng O. En coy in def posn farm complex Grid XY383324. A Coy to destroy en
in bldgs at Grid XY384325 in order to support ME attack by B and C Coys.
Probable left flanking attack, 1 Pl left, 2 Pl right, 3 Pl res. Main Effort capture
of barn containing enemy HQ. Timings no move before 1200 hours. Earliest

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HHour 1250 hours. O gp RV School, Grid XY397284 1100 hrs. Every man to
carry extra 150 rds and 2 addl grenades. Acknowledge.
Stage 5 Orders, Quick Estimate (QE), Reconnaissance and Marrying Up
0454. Orders. Following the Stage 4 despatch of a Wng O to his subordinates
the commander will subsequently receive orders from his superior. From these
orders he then extracts the details that are relevant to his level of command and completes the fifth and final stage in his battle procedure the production and delivery
of his own orders. Full details on orders are covered in Section 4. It may well be necessary to carry out a second mission analysis after the receipt of orders. A second
mission analysis must be carried out if the mission has changed from the Wng O
received in Stage 1.
0455. QE.
orders.

If necessary, a QE can be completed in Stage 5 after the receipt of

0456. Reconnaissance. It is likely in Stage 5 that the commander will conduct

some form of reconnaissance of the ground over which the forthcoming operation is
to take place. Reconnaissance is a vital part of commanders battle procedure and,
within the limits of security and transport limitations, should always be conducted by
as many commanders as possible. Time will always be short and a reconnaissance
must be planned and structured if best use if to be made of the available time. The
following factors will need to be taken into account in planning a reconnaissance:
a.

Aim.

Aim of the reconnaissance.

b. Time and Space Appreciation. A time and space appreciation must be

conducted to determine how much time can be spent on the ground. This will
have consequences for method of movement and the number of viewing points
to be visited. The two main considerations are:
(1)

Time available derived from Time Analysis in Stage 2.

(2)

Time to get to reconnaissance area and back.

c. Map/Air Photograph Appreciation. Prior to the reconnaissance, commanders must study the map and air photographs to extract as much information as possible about the ground. The product of the IPB will also be a key
ingredient for effective reconnaissance and commanders at all levels should
seek to see this material. Use of the mnemonic GROUND will assist in the logical interpretation of the map or air photograph and indicate the best viewpoints
which should be visited on the reconnaissance:
G General pattern of the landscape or the grain of the land. Mark on
the map with arrows which way the grain runs. Highlight a prominent contour line to throw the grain into more relief.
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R Ridges and re-entrants. Mark the bottom of re-entrants with a dotted line; this will reveal routes which offer dead ground approaches. High
ground can be marked with a red line.
O Observation points. Look for areas of ground which look as though
they offer good views of surrounding areas. This will give the points the
reconnaissance will need to visit.
U Undergrowth and cover. Shade in green.
N No-go areas. Any areas which you think may be impassable should
be marked in brown shading. This will highlight the mobility corridors. It
should be remembered that ground non-passable to vehicles may not be
to soldiers on foot.
D Distance. Distance between viewing points will enable a further
time and space appreciation to be conducted and the subsequent production of a reconnaissance plan based on visiting the maximum viewing
points in the time available.
d.

Decisions for Reconnaissance.

The commander will have to decide:

(1)

What has to be looked for/at.

(2)

Where from.

(3)

Route to reconnaissance area and between points.

(4)

How to get there and return.

(5)

Degree of concealment and protection required.

(6)

Communications to be taken.

(7) Who needs to be informed of the intended presence of the reconnaissance.

e. Restrictions on Reconnaissance. There will inevitably be restrictions placed
on a reconnaissance in addition to the time limits. Limitations are as follows:
(1)

Forward limit of movement.

(2) Method of movement foot, vehicle or helicopter (or combination

thereof).
(3)

CSCMs in force.

(4)

Size of party.

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(5)

Restricted access to viewpoints due to enemy overwatch.

(6)

Requirement to maintain surprise/security.

0457. Marrying-Up. Marrying-up is a vital part of battle procedure; it particularly applies to armour and infantry. Company, platoon and section commanders
meet their opposite numbers to confirm the plan, where time permits carry out
rehearsals and agree such particulars as:
a.

Reference points.

b.

Routes.

c.

Radio frequencies, BATCO settings etc.

0458 0459.

Reserved.

SECTION 6. ORDERS
Types
0460.

The main types of tactical orders at company level are:

These are orders providing early warning of future
a. Warning Orders.
intentions issued to allow timely preparation for the future task (see paragraphs
for Stage 1 in Section 5 to this Chapter).
b. Formal Orders. These are given personally by the commander and give
him the opportunity to put his wishes to all his subordinates at once and deal
with their questions immediately.
c. Quick Battle Orders (QBOs). QBOs are issued when very immediate
action is required. They are most likely to be used at section and platoon level.
They comprise hasty attack and hasty defence orders.
d. Radio Orders. These are brief orders given over the radio. SOCs can be
used, but are better suited to armoured operations.
e. Operation Orders. These are detailed, comprehensive orders usually
issued either in writing, as a signal, as a map overlay or using the Grid Line
Trace system.

0461. The formal orders for the occupation of a defensive position are normally
given in two parts:
a. Preliminary Orders. Designed to begin the preparation of the position as
quickly as possible, whilst avoiding the need to resite positions after digging has
started.
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b. Confirmatory Orders. To confirm or modify preliminary orders after

detailed liaison and to expand on the coordinating instructions after more
detailed planning.
0462. Finally there are orders which are given to an entire sub-unit. Held in a
secure area, these are normally given at platoon level or higher. They enable a commander to talk to all his men and can save much time. Subordinate commanders will
still need to extract the details relevant to them and subsequently to issue their own
orders to their subordinates.
The Sequence of Orders
0463. Orders are always given in a standard sequence and whenever possible with
the aid of a model or a schematic. This standard format helps everyone to understand because the pattern is familiar. It also helps to prevent important matters being
forgotten and aids subordinates in their extraction of orders.
0464.

The main headings for formal orders are:

TASK ORG
)
GROUND
) Not mandatory
SITUATION
MISSION
EXECUTION
SERVICE SUPPORT
COMMAND AND SIGNAL

The Orders Process

0465.

A commander has to:

a.

Receive orders himself.

b.

Extract from them the details that are relevant to his own command.

c.

If on independent operations complete an estimate and make a plan.

d.

Prepare orders for his own subordinates.

e.

Issue orders to his subordinates.

Receiving Orders
0466.

Before receiving orders a commander should:

a.

Study the Wng O from his superior HQ.

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b.

Complete his time and mission analyses and a map study.

c.

Issue own Wng O.

d. Arrive early at his superiors O group to study traces, air photographs and
models of the ground, and to mark his own maps.
e.

He must take with him to the O group:

(1)

A map.

(2) A notebook (prepared with standard orders headings for the forthcoming operation), pencil and chinagraph.
(3)

His Tactical Aide Memoire.

(4)

His binoculars and compass.

(5)

A torch (if applicable).

(6) Communications radio and/or a runner. It is recommended that

the RSDC accompanies the company commander so that he can be
given the signal plan by the RSWO.
0467. While receiving orders, as much detail as possible should be marked directly
onto the map and notes taken only on matters affecting the commanders own subunit. The remainder of the orders must be listened to carefully and understood.
Extraction of Orders
0468. Commanders at all levels have to extract the information that is relevant to
them from the orders they receive from their superior commanders. These orders
should follow the normal orders format and include details that are specific to that
sub-unit. A diagrammatic representation of the extraction process is at Annex A.
Issuing Orders
0469. No plan survives contact with the enemy, so said Field Marshal Count
Helmuth von Moltke. Orders must be capable of being understood by tired and battle-fatigued commanders. The need for conciseness, clarity and simplicity in the
issue of orders is, therefore, paramount. If procedures and drills are well known, the
need for detailed instructions covering such matters as grouping, order of march,
assaulting formation and actions on can be largely eliminated, with only variations to
normal procedures being given as necessary.
0470.

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The following points should be remembered when issuing orders:

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a.

Protection.

b.

Distractions.

The need to post a sentry.

The need to keep away from vehicles and radios.

c. Concealment. Particular care is required if maps are to be spread out, or

if it is dark and lights are required.
d. Comfort.
ble.

Some form of shelter and warmth is required whenever possi-

e. Brevity. Remember, the longer commanders are concentrated together

the more vulnerable they are.
f.

Do not give detailed instructions covering every possible contingency.

Method of Delivery
0471. An indifferent plan sold to subordinates with enthusiasm, commitment and
confidence stands as much chance of success as a tactically flawless plan indifferently delivered. The selling of the plan to subordinates is, therefore, a vital skill and
one which must be practised.
0472. Orders should be delivered clearly and fluently. The delivery should not be
too fast and should be in a logical sequence, following the standard format. The commander may have to adjust his manner to take account of the following factors:
a.

The standard of training of his subordinate commanders.

b.

How well he knows them.

c.

How long they have worked with him as a team.

d.

How tired his men are.

Preliminaries
0473. Before issuing formal orders a commander must ensure that certain preliminaries are carried out. It is recommended that his O group is seated in the formation
required for the task. He should also issue map coordinates so that maps may be
folded correctly and issue any air photographs that are available. If a model or
schematic are used he must describe them and give the scale and the direction of
North. He should then issue any relevant meteorological information such as first and
last light timings, moonstate etc.

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Task Organization
0474. The task organization of the sub-unit should be given by the commander,
including any attachments and detachments.
Ground
0475. Ideally, the commander should try to point out the main features of the
ground from an OP, though in most operations this will be impossible and he will have
to rely on a model or a schematic. The ground should be described in relation to the
operation about to be carried out. Prominent objects and features to which reference
will be made in the orders should be pointed out. All reference points must be named
with the reason for their significance, e.g., Hill Wood (Grid 123456) our assembly
area.
Situation
0476.

The following must be included:

a. Enemy Forces. The enemy should be described in detail and at a level
appropriate to the sub-unit receiving orders. The detail in this paragraph should
be drawn heavily from the deductions derived from the consideration of the
enemy and ground in the estimate process. Known or estimated enemy dispositions and strength and tactics which might affect the completion of the subunit mission should be described in as much detail as possible. The assessment should also include a prediction of the enemys future actions and the
effect these may have on the sub-units operations. During the description of
the enemy, care must be taken to differentiate between fact and assessment.
b. Friendly Forces. The primary purpose of the Friendly Forces sub-paragraph is to set the context for the commanders mission. This should include the
intent of the commander two levels up followed by the mission and concept of
operations of the commanders own superior in detail (including his Main
Effort). In addition, the role of flanking sub-units, supporting arms, support
weapons and the concept of fire support may be covered here.
c. Attachments and Detachments. If a commander has not included a Task
Org then he may include Attachments and Detachments in his orders. However,
Task Orgs should be used in preference to the Atts and Dets sub-paragraph.

Mission
0477. The mission stated by a commander in his orders is that given to him by his
superior. A sub-unit commander would not normally seek to modify the mission state-

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ment given to him by his superior and must not do so without his commanders
express permission. The mission must include a unifying purpose starting with the
phrase . . . in order to . . ..
Execution
0478.

The following headings should be included in the execution paragraph:

a. Concept of Operations. The Concept of Operations represents the most
important element of orders after the Mission. It is an account of how the commander intends to carry out his plan and the situation he wishes to prevail once
the mission is accomplished. This sub-paragraph must contain a graphic account
of how he intends to fight the battle and how his subordinates fit into his plan.
Specifically, within the Concept of Operations, the commander must:
(1) State his Intent (what overall effect he intends to achieve and why).
It should normally be focused on the enemy.
(2) Give a succinct summary of his Scheme of Manoeuvre: what,
where, when and how his command will achieve its purpose in relation to
the enemy. The expression Scheme of Manoeuvre is not mandatory
below company level and may be discounted in favour of a clear description of how the commander intends to fight the battle. At the end of this
section his subordinates must, however, have a clear idea of the role they
have to play in the operation. At company level and below it would be
unusual for a commander to describe his Scheme of Manoeuvre in terms
of phases as these may impose unwanted breaks in the tempo of operations. Only if they are required to synchronize the actions of the complete
sub-unit to allow force to be concentrated at the correct time and place
may they legitimately be used.
(3) State his Main Effort. The Main Effort is expressed as the activity
which the commander considers crucial to the success of his mission at
that time. The Main Effort allocated by the company group commander
must be harnessed to his own mission and not that of his superior. It is
mandatory for subordinate commanders to support the Main Effort. A
Main Effort will probably still be appropriate at platoon level but is not
required at section level.
In addition, the commander may include key timings (e.g., HHour), priorities
for fire and other combat support and an outline of other supporting plans he
deems critical to his Concept of Operations (such as reserve options or deception).
b. Missions to Subordinates. A commander must assign a mission with a
unifying purpose to each of his subordinate sub-units. A mission is defined as
a clear, concise statement of the command and its purpose.
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(1) There are broadly three types of mission statement: single task and
unifying purpose, multiple task and unifying purpose and a list of tasks
with the purpose contained in the concept of operations (usually used for
reserves). Only those tasks vital to the completion of his mission should
be given to a subordinate; others, such as liaison tasks, should be included
in Coordinating Instructions. Although a commander should strive to give
the minimum of tasks to each subordinate, single task mission statements
will normally be the preserve of companies and platoons at the very highest states of training. Any possible subsequent tasks should be covered
in the Concept of Operations and any tasks not related directly to the purpose of the mission statement given in Coordinating Instructions.
(2) Formulation of Missions. In formulating mission statements, maximum use should be made of defined doctrinal terms to afford consistency
in approach and to avoid misunderstanding. For example, when appropriate, the mission to subordinates should include verbs that reflect the
end states that they are to achieve (clear, hold, destroy). The purpose
within a mission statement should be quite clear and consistent with the
concept of operations. At platoon level the phrasing of the mission statement should reflect the character of the audience and should make use
of aggressive terminology which reflects the ultimate requirement to close
with and kill the enemy.
(3) Clarifying Tasks. The nature of conflict at company level and below
is often confusing. In order to minimize the problems that this can cause
mission statements should be accompanied by a list of clarifying tasks.
Tasks should be kept to a minimum and should take the form of short,
pithy statements which allocate the tasks that a subordinate must do in
order to achieve his mission. Any possible future tasks can also be listed
and introduced by the phrase be prepared to. A completed company
level mission statement for a platoon could be:

(a) 1 Platoon Mission. 1 Platoon is to destroy the enemy in the

area of Grid 445679 in order to allow the company to defeat the
enemy on objective BLACK.
(b)

Tasks.
i.

Clear two paths through the wire obstacle.

ii. Be prepared to provide suppressive fire to allow 2 Platoon

to destroy the enemy on the right of the objective.
(4) Missions for Reserves. A sub-unit held wholly in reserve to exploit
unexpected success or unforeseen setbacks will normally be given planning tasks (options) rather than a mission (e.g., be prepared to conduct
A, B or C). Before being committed, such a reserve should be given a

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specific mission. Once committed it is no longer a reserve but becomes

an echelon.
(5) Fire Support Concept. An effective technique during company
orders is to invite the FOO/MFC to brief the O Group on the fire support
concept after the company commander has given mission statements to
his subordinates and before Coordinating Instructions are issued. This
brief could include:

(a)

Allocation and priority of fire.

(b)

Restrictions/limitations on fire(FSCM, ammunition, etc.).

(c)

Mortar tasks and priorities.

(d)

Offensive air support (air and aviation).

(e)

Air defence.

c. Coordinating Instructions. The purpose of Coordinating Instructions is to

set out control measures which are necessary for the execution of the mission
and to detail solutions to problems that could or may arise. Maximum use of
SOPs and drills should be made in a determined effort to reduce the amount of
detail in this sub-paragraph. Some examples are:
(1) Timings. These must be listed chronologically from the beginning
of the operation.
(2) Fire Plan. The detailed fire plan must be given in Coordinating
Instructions if not covered earlier.
(3)

Limit of Exploitation.

(4)

Boundaries.

d. Summary of Execution (if needed). A summary of execution may be

given at the end of Coordinating Instructions if the commander wishes to
emphasize any critical areas. It is not a substitute for a detailed Concept of
Operations.
Service Support
0479. The Service Support paragraph gives the administrative arrangements
required to ensure the accomplishment of the mission. Standard items covered are:
a.

Dress.

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b.

Equipment and tools.

c.

Weapons.

d.

Ammunition.

e.

Rations and water.

f.

Medical arrangements, including location of aid posts.

g.

Prisoners of War (PW).

h.

Transport location, loading, release point.

Note:

These headings can be remembered by the mnemonic DEWARMPT.

Command and Signal

0480. The purpose of the Command and Signal paragraph is to explain how the
exercise of command is to be maintained. The locations of headquarters are listed,
an alternate commander nominated and liaison arrangements, if appropriate, are
specified. EMCON and counter surveillance measures will be listed (using AUSOP
602) as will all necessary radio information, i.e., frequencies, additional callsigns on
the net, codewords etc., plus any other signals to be used, i.e., lights and whistle
blasts. Finally the passwords that will be in force during the period of the operation
will be given.
Synchronization of Watches
0481. Before an O group disperses all watches must be synchronized to gunner
time, thus ensuring accurate coordination with the supporting indirect fire assets.
Questions
0482. After issuing orders, time must be given for consideration, then each member of the O group must be allowed to ask questions in his turn. Finally, questions
from the commander will ensure that individuals have correctly understood their
orders. For a complicated operation, such as a patrol, it is often better to give the
opportunity for questions at the end of each section.
Back-Brief
0483. Following orders, if time and circumstances permit, subordinate commanders can brief their superior commander and fellow commanders on their own plans.
This session, known as a back-brief, is not designed to seek approval for a plan but
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rather to increase mutual knowledge in, and understanding of, each others plans. A
back-brief must not be allowed to develop into a conference but provides a useful
forum for commanders and subordinates to discuss future operations in a less formal
atmosphere than the O Group. It is probably more applicable to the company rather
than platoon level.
Quick Battle Orders
0484. There will be many occasions in battle when very immediate action is
demanded and it will be necessary to issue quick orders that contain essential information only. For example, a platoon commander can limit his orders for a hasty dismounted attack to:
a.

Task Org (any alteration to original task org).

b.

Situation; enemy/ground, friendly forces.

c.

Mission.

d.

Left or right flanking.

e.

Route to FUP. (Possibly just Follow me).

) Only if variations

f.

Order of march.

) to standard battle

g.

Assault tasks.

) drills.

h.

Details of fire and movement.

i.

Tasks for light mortar.

j.

Limit of exploitation.

k.

Fire plan.

l.

HHour.

Formats
0485. The format for Quick Battle Orders covering the hasty attack and hasty
defence can be found in the Immediate Use TAM. Other formats are to be found in
the Reference TAM and the PAM Infantry Insert.

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ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 4

EXTRACTION OF ORDERS

BG Comds Os

Coy GP Comds Os

Pl Comds Os

Sect Comds Os

Prelims
Task Org + C/S
Ground (1) (incl maps):
Bde area in general
BG area in detail

Prelims
Task Org + C/S
Ground (1) (incl maps):
Bde area in general
Coy GP area in detail

Prelims
Task Org + C/S
Ground (1) (incl maps):
Coy Gp area in general
Pl area in detail

Prelims

1.
a.
b.
(1)
(2)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

1.
a.
b.
(1)
(2)
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

1.
a.
b.
(1)
(2)
(a)
(b)
(c)

1.
a.
b.
(1)
(2)
(a)
(b)
(c)

SITUATION
En Forces (IPB)
Friendly Forces:
Div Intent
Bde Concept of Ops (2):
Intent
Scheme of Manoeuvre (3)
ME
Outline Offensive Sp Plan (4)

SITUATION
En Forces (IPB)
Friendly Forces:
Bde Intent
BG Concept of Ops (2):
Intent
Scheme of Manoeuvre (3)
ME
Outline Fire Sp Plan (4)

SITUATION
En Forces (IPB)
Friendly Forces:
BG Intent
Coy Gp Concept of Ops (2):
Intent
Scheme of Manoeuvre (3)
ME

Ground (1) (incl maps):

Pl area in general
Sect area in detail
SITUATION
En Forces
Friendly Forces:
Coy Gp Intent
Pl Concept of Ops (2):
Intent
Method
ME (4)

2. MISSION

2. MISSION

2. MISSION

2. MISSION

3.
a.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
b.
c.
d.

EXECUTION
BG Comds Concept of Ops:
Intent
Scheme of Manoeuvre (3)
ME
Outline Fire Sp Plan (4)
Sqn/Coy Gp Msn
Sqn/Coy Gp Msn etc.
Recce Msn

3.
a.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
b.
c.
d.

EXECUTION
Coy GP Comds Concept of Ops:
Intent
Scheme of Manoeuvre (3)
ME
Outline Fire Sp Plan (4)
Tp/PI Msn & Tasks
Tp/PI Msn etc.
Recce Msn (4)

3.
a.
(1)
(2)
(3)

EXECUTION
Pl Comds Concept of Ops:
Intent
Method
ME (4)

3.
a.
(1)
(2)

EXECUTION
Sect Comds Concept of Ops:
Intent
Method

b.
c.
d.

Sect Msn & Tasks

Sect Msn etc.
Recce Msn (4)

e.
f.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
g.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
h.

Sp Wpns Msn (if not gp to Coy Gps)

Combat Sp Arms
Arty incl AD pri
Engr pri
Avn
Air etc.
Coord Instrs:
Timings
Fire Sp Plan (BC)
AD Wpn Con Status
STAP etc.
Summary of Execution

e.
f.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
g.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
h.

Sp Wpns Msn (4)

Combat Sp Arms
Arty incl AD pri
Engr pri
Avn
Air etc.
Coord Instrs:
Timings
Fire Plan (FOO)
AD Wpn Con Status
STAP etc.
Summary of Execution

b.
c.
d.
(1)
(2)
(3)
e.

Fire Team Msn & Tasks

Fire Team Msn etc.
Coord Instrs:
Timings
Fire Plan
STAP etc.
Summary of Execution

e. Sp Wpns Msn (4)

f. Combat Sp Arms (4)

g.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
h.

Coord Instrs:
Timings
Fire Plan
AD Wpn Con Status
STAP etc.
Summary of Execution

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. Combat Svc Sp pri

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. Combat Svc Sp pri

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. Combat Svc Sp pri

4. SERVICE SUPPORT
a. Combat Svc Sp pri

5.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

5.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

5.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

5.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Bde HQs locs
BG HQs locs
Altn Comd
CEI incl Card 12
C Surv Con Measures(5)
Password
Synchronize watches (BG)

Questions
Briefback (time Permititing)

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

BG HQs locs
Coy Gp HQs locs
Altn Comd
CEI incl Card 12
C Surv Con Measures(5)
Password
Synchronize watches (FOO)

Questions
Briefback (time Permititing)

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Coy Gp HQs locs
Pl HQs locs
Altn Comd
CEI incl Card 12
C Surv Con Measures(5)
Password
Synchronize watches

Questions
Briefback (time Permititing)

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

Pl HQs loc
CEI incl Card 12
C Surv Con Measures
Password
Synchronize watches (BG)

Questions
Briefback (time Permititing)

NOTES:
(1) Incl weather.
(2) Msn of superior comd (one up) to be incl in the Concept of Ops.
(3) Scheme of Manoevre is more applicable at the higher levels, especially fmn where clearly there is increased potential for maneouvre. Plan for battle or
Method may be officially adopted in the future as an adequate description at the lower tac levels.
(4) If applicable.
(5) C Surv Con Measures. Alternatively can appear in Coord Instrs.

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4A-2

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ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 4

COMBAT ESTIMATE
Introduction
1. Each time an individual makes a decision about anything at all he unconsciously
goes through an estimate of some sort. A good example is buying a car during which
the following process would be carried out:
a.

Question.

b.

Consideration of Factors.

What car should be bought?

(1)

Purchase price and running costs.

(2)

Type, e.g., Estate, Sports or Saloon.

(3)

Reliability.

(4)

Prestige value.

(5)

Suitability, larger engine capacity for towing caravan, etc.

c. Consideration of Alternatives. New car (more reliable but also more

expensive, etc.) versus a second hand car (cheaper though probably less reliable and greater running costs, etc.).
d.

Selection of Best Alternative.

e. Plan. Next month after pay arrives, speak to Bank Manager and arrange
loan. Once loan is secured, order car from dealer.
2. This example of decision making shows how simple and natural the process of
making an estimate is in everyday life. It is no more complicated within a military context; the principal difference being that the task has normally been given, the problem is to determine how best to accomplish it. The basic structure of a military estimate is the same as the car purchase example: set the problem, examine the factors
to be taken into account, look at the sensible alternatives, decide which solution is
best and make a plan to implement the chosen solution. In the military estimate there
is a need to constantly reassess the decision as the tactical situation changes. This
is known as the decision making cycle, and is a continuous process.
3.

There are three types of estimate:

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a. Formal Estimate. The formal estimate is used when there is sufficient

time to complete a thorough assessment of the situation. It suits well the planning of deliberate operations. The formal estimate is covered in detail in ADP
Volume 2 Command.
b. Combat Estimate. The combat estimate is primarily used when time for
planning is short and information is incomplete and is an abbreviated form of
the formal estimate. A tabulated format for the combat estimate is shown in the
Tactical Aide Memoire (TAM).
c. Quick Estimate (QE). The QE will normally be the most appropriate type
of estimate at company level and below. It is for use in contact or when conducting an independent operation and will usually be completed in mental or
note form by the commander alone. The QE is described in Section 4 to this
chapter and is shown in TAM.
4. Aim. The aim of this annex is to explain the combat estimate process and to
demonstrate the tabular format.
5. The decision making cycle is shown diagrammatically at Fig 7 and has the following four stages:
a.

Stage 1. Mission Analysis.

b.

Stage 2. Evaluation of Factors.

c.

Stage 3. Consideration of Courses of Action (COA).

d.

Stage 4. The Commanders Decision.

Stage 1 Mission Analysis

6. Mission Analysis is the first and most important element of the estimate. It helps
to clear the mind at the beginning of the estimate in order to ensure that plans are
timely and that they will further the superior commanders concept and intent. It also
allows a commander, without waiting for further orders, to exercise personal initiative
and exploit a situation in a way his superior would intend. The product of Mission
Analysis is a start point for further consideration of the situation by the commander.
Mission Analysis is described in this chapter.
Stage 2. Evaluation of Factors
7.

In an estimate there are five mandatory factors:

a.

4B-2

Enemy

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Orders from Superior Commander

(Task)

Stage 1
MISSION ANALYSIS
&
SUBSEQUENT
REVIEW

Stage 4
COMDS
DECISION

INFORMATION

Stage 2
EVALUATION
OF FACTORS

Stage 3
CONSIDERATION
OF
COURSES OF ACTION
Summary:
1.
2.

Remember the bigger picture.

Grasp the opportunity as it occurs but keep superiors informed.

Fig 7. The Decision Making Cycle

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b.

Environment.

c.

Friendly Forces (including Combat Service Support).

d.

Surprise and Security.

e.

Time.

8. Estimates have a wide application and it may be considered that other factors
are relevant to a particular operation.
9. Just as Mission Analysis considers tasks and constraints, so should the evaluation of factors lead to the deduction of tasks and constraints. Tasks come principally
from Enemy, Environment, Friendly Forces and Surprise and Security. Constraints
are derived largely from consideration of Security and Time.
10. During a combat estimate it would be normal to concentrate on Enemy and
Ground, along with Friendly Forces and Surprise and Security. Time would be
checked as required and additional factors added as necessary.
Enemy
11. In completing a combat estimate it is important to concentrate on the enemys
vulnerabilities and intentions as this will allow a commander to grasp fleeting opportunities. When examining Enemy factors, all or some of the following should be considered:
a. Intentions/Aim. An assessment of the enemys overall intentions at this
stage is useful although it may be considered under Enemy likely courses of
action in more detail.
b. Tactics. Enemy tactics which are relevant both to the enemys intentions
and the commanders plan should be considered.
c. Dispositions/Organisation. Enemy strengths and dispositions must be
analysed. Dispositions must be carefully examined and weapon arcs considered, as well as the location of trenches. These should be closely examined in
relation to dead ground and, as a result, deductions can be made regarding the
amount of fire that can be brought to bear on own troops during the assault.
d. Equipment. Any equipment the enemy may have which affects the
achievement of the aim should be considered. For example, the enemys scale
of night fighting equipment might be a factor in deciding whether to attack by
day or by night.
e. Reserves. The strength, location, possible tasks and reaction time of any
enemy reserves should be considered.

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f. Enemys Most Likely Course/Worst Case Course. There will generally

not be sufficient time for all the enemys courses of action to be considered,
therefore his most likely and the worst case should be considered.
Environment
12. Environmental factors embrace terrain, weather, the local population and the
likely influence of the media. Terrain and weather are often grouped together under
Ground.
13. An examination of the Ground helps in the identification, not only of key terrain,
but also of own or enemy avenues of approach (depending on whether an attack or
a defence is being planned). The tendency to divide the ground into left, centre and
right approaches is too simplistic. Whilst this is a good expedient for the experienced,
it can lead to stereotyped thinking and an incomplete assessment of the ground. A
tabular format (see below), which can be made into a simple aide memoire, provides
a simple graphic method of displaying the information required.
Approach

Etc

Assembly Area
Suitable Fire Support Position
Route to FUP (covered?)
Suitable FUP?
Suitable LD?
Length of Assault/Cover
Obstacles including Enemy DFs
Dead Ground
Armoured Approach
Infantry Approach
Day Approach
Night Approach
Rating
14. Each approach can be scored by a simple 1 to 5 points system. The total
points will indicate approaches in order of preference. Any approach which is considered unrealistic can be discounted at this stage. The best approach from the point
of view of ground should be the first deduction (though it must always be remembered that it will probably also be the most obvious). Other deductions might include:
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a.

The need for smoke to cover open approaches.

b.

Identification of the best armoured approach.

c.

Identification of the need for special equipment or troops to clear obstacles.

d.

The longest and shortest approaches.

e.

The best day and night approaches.

f.

Other deductions as appropriate.

15. It may be possible to disregard one or more approaches at this stage, or at the
end of the analysis of each factor. However, the temptation to select immediately the
most promising approach must be avoided as it may prove unsatisfactory when other
factors, particularly time, are considered. As a rule of thumb the only approaches that
should be disregarded at this stage are those that are totally unsuitable.
Friendly Forces
16. An examination of own forces will help a sub-unit commander to determine the
ability of his sub-unit to complete any tasks allocated to it. In addition, an evaluation
of friendly forces, including those on the flanks may not only lead to constraints, but
more importantly, other opportunities for seizing the initiative, including offensive
action. The evaluation of Friendly Forces should include consideration of:
a. Air Situation. Operations are bound to be influenced by the prevailing air
situation. If air superiority cannot be achieved, the implications for the sub-unit
must be thoroughly examined.
b. Flanking, Forward or Depth Units. When planning an operation a commander should always keep the intentions of flanking sub-units in mind as
these may restrict or enhance his own courses of action (COA).
c. Capability. Before Courses of Action can be developed, the status and
capability of own troops must be accurately determined, if not already known.
This will normally entail confirmation of:
(1) Organization and Equipment. The organization of the sub-unit
before an operation takes place and the state of its equipment.
(2)

Dispositions and Availability.

(3) Restrictions on Employment. Restrictions include, for example,

any limitations imposed by the command states of the forces involved.
d. Combat Service Support (CSS). CSS must always be considered under
Friendly Forces. Logistic constraints will always be a vital factor which may
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modify or exclude tasks. Some tasks may be sustainable, others may be logistically unsustainable and thus should be eliminated. The following should be
considered:
(1) Demand. What is the current state of my combat supplies? Are
reserve levels sufficient to cope with this and subsequent operations?
(2)

Duration.

How long will the operation last?

(3) Distance. How far from resupply will I have to fight? Will resupply
be possible over such a distance?
(4)

Destination.

To where do I need the supplies delivered?

17. Relative Strengths. The assessment of friendly forces is concluded with a

comparison of the relative strengths of the enemys and ones own forces. In comparing Relative Strengths, a commander compares the strength of each component
of his force to that of his enemy to ensure that he is employing all of his assets to
maximum advantage throughout an operation. For example, a commander may
decide that a threat exists to his flank prior to and during the occupation of a FUP and
as a result he will require a flank protection force. However, he may also assess that
because of the friendly troops to his flanks and the nature of the engagement, the
threat ceases to exist after H-Hour. From this he should deduce that an asset will be
freed for subsequent tasking after the line of departure has been crossed.
Own Forces
Required

En Threat
H

H+

Deductions

H+

Objective 1
Objective 2
Objective 3
Objective 4
Fire Support
Flank Threat

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Surprise and Security

18. Surprise concerns gaining or wresting the initiative from the enemy. Security
involves maintaining the initiative and enhancing freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and threats. The goal should be to gain absolute surprise in order to disrupt or paralyse the enemy commanders will and decision making ability. If this cannot be achieved, the lesser objective of operational surprise,
whereby the enemy knows that something is going to happen but determines too late
what is happening and therefore is powerless to react, can prove effective. In order
to effect surprise and security, it is mandatory that deception of the enemy, operational security (OPSEC) and protection of own troops are considered. The key questions to be answered are as follows:
a.

How can I deceive the enemy?

b.

How can I seize and maintain the initiative?

c.

How do I protect my plans and forces?

d.

How do I stop the enemy exploiting my key vulnerabilities?

e.

How do I conceal my intentions from him?

Time
19. A commander must identify fixed timings (i.e., first/last light) and assess the timing of each task identified so far in the estimate. Timing includes the duration of each
task, as far as this can realistically be assessed before contact with the enemy. A tabular format is a simple, yet effective way of considering relevant timings. An example
for an attack is as follows:
Approach

Move to FUP
Time in FUP
Asslt
Fight Through
Reorg
Resupply
Option Viable

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Etc

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20. Deductions from the Time Factor.

include:

Deductions from the Time factor could

a.

The earliest and latest HHour.

b.

The quickest approach.

c.

The slowest approach.

d.

The times for completion of each approach.

Other Factors
21. Other factors may impinge on the mandatory factors outlined above (e.g., Rules
of Engagement, legal constraints, etc.). Although no additional tasks may be
deduced from these factors they may have a significant effect on an operation or battle and should be included as necessary.
22. Preliminary Assessment of Tasks. At this stage, the estimate will have
identified a list of tasks necessary to the mission. The straightforward approach is to
list all the tasks and to quantify the total combat power required. A example table for
the Assessment of Tasks for an attack is as follows:
TASK

COMBAT POWER REQUIRED

ARMR

INF

MILAN

GPMG(SF)

DEDUCTIONS
Etc

Secure FUP/LD
Fire Sp Gp
Asslt
Flank Protection
Res
Deception
Stage 3. Consideration of Courses of Action
23. Whether a number of COA can be developed and compared rests on the extent
to which the options have been narrowed down during the Estimate process.
Occasionally, there may be only one workable COA and the only decision left to the
commander is to allocate combat power to tasks. It is important that common elements of a number of separate COA be identified as early as possible as this will
save time prior to the commanders decision.
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24. The advantages and disadvantages of each COA are considered in relation to
the mission and likely enemy COA, taking into account his likely reactions to own
courses. Each COA should be re-checked against Questions 1 and 2 of Mission
Analysis in order to confirm whether they meet the Superior Commanders Intent
(Question 1), will support his main effort and will accomplish the mission. If any do
not, then they should be discounted. Once this initial weeding has taken place, the
practicality of each COA can be checked and compared using the principles applicable to the operation about to be undertaken (e.g., principles of defence, attack, etc.)
or the Functions in Combat. This comparison can be effected in tabular format.
Stage 4. Commanders Decision
25. The Commanders Decision is the final step in the estimate process. The commander considers the COAs open to him in order to accomplish his mission and then
selects the one that he considers will have the greatest chance of success.
Development of the Plan
26. Having selected a COA the commander produces his plan identifying the following:
a.

The sub-units involved (Who?).

b.

The commanders intention (Why?).

c.

A broad outline of the intended operation (What? Where? When?).

He then writes his orders.

Role of Intuition
27. Intuition has an important role in decision making. In many circumstances the
experienced commander will be able to apply his knowledge of the situation and eye
for the ground to compress his combat estimate, making a series of intuitive judgements which lead to a quick and appropriate decision. This approach is to be encouraged and developed on training. The basis of this ability, however, remains a complete understanding of, and practise in, the more analytical approach to the estimate
process.
Aide Memoire
28.

An estimate aide memoire is given at Appendix 1 to this Annex.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 4

AIDE-MEMOIRE COMBAT ESTIMATE

Apply the 1/3 2/3 rule before starting your estimate.
MISSION. The task(s) given to you and the purpose, against which all factors are
considered.
STEP 1. MISSION ANALYSIS
QUESTION

CONSIDERATION

1. INTENT (Why?)

How must my action

directly sp my immediate
superior, taking into
account his Intent?

2. TASKS (What?)

What task(s) must I complete to fulfil my Msn?

Specified
Implied

3. CONSTRAINTS
(What Not?)

What limitations are there

on my freedom of action?

(When?)
4. REVIEW

5. CONFIRMATORY
CHECK

TASKS/CONSTRAINTS

By when do I need to
decide? 1/3 2/3 Rule)
Has the sit changed since
orders were received or
the estimate completed?
Nothing changed.
Minor change.
Significant change.
Major change.

What has to be decided?

No change Msn Cfm.

Same Msn. Same Plan.
Same Msn. New Plan.
Possibly New Msn and
New Plan. Refer to superior comd or, if not possible,
act in sp of his Main
Effort, taking into account
his Intent.
(For example, combat
power required and axis
of attack)

ISSUE WNG O!
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STEP 2. EVALUATE FACTORS

POSSIBLE
FACTOR
DEDUCTIONS
ENEMY AND ENVIROMENT
(Ground)
(Time permitting consider in detail)

TASKS/
CONSTRAINTS

a. Enemy.
En Intentions
Air/Hel Threat
Known Disposns & Strs
Wpns & Eqpt
Key Vulnerabilities
Morale
Likely Course of Action
Worst En Course of Action
b. Ground.
Mobility Corridors (En & Own)
Key Terrain/Vital Ground
Killing Areas
Objs
Going
Obs
Visibility
Distance

FRIENDLY FORCES
Air & Flanking Forces
Disposns
CSS Demand. Current state of
C Sups?
Replen req?
Distance. How far fighting
from resup?
Duration. How long will op
last?
Destination. Where are
supplies req?
Fighting Power
Str, Org, Eqpt, Morale.
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RELATIVE STRS
(Comparison of En & Own strs and capabiltiies,
determined on aval of fighting power for employment)
TIME
H Hr
H+
H+

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ENEMY

OWN

FORCE RATIO

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STEP 2 (Continued)
POSSIBLE
DEDUCTIONS

FACTOR

TASKS/
CONSTRAINTS

SURPRISE & SECURITY

Deception How can I deceive the
en?
Surprise How can I seize and
maint initiative?
OPSEC
How can I prevent the
en discovering my
plan?
Protection How can I protect my
forces and plans?
TIME
What timings are fixed?
Time req for each task ident so far?
Sequence and length of tasks?
Concurrent or consecutive tasks?
How long for Os?
How long for movs?
NTM?
OTHER FACTORS
e.g.
(Mandatory in Ops Other Than War)
PRELIM ASSESSMENT OF TASKS

P Info
HNS
ROE
TASK

COMBAT POWER
REQUIRED

STEPS 3 and 4 Continued overleaf

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STEP 3. CONSIDER COURSES OF ACTION (COA) (1)

COA

ADVANTAGES

DISADVANTAGES

COA 1

COA 2

COA 3

of COA
STEP Selection
4. COMDS
DECISION
Who?

Sub units involved

Why?

Comds Intent Incl vision of

desired end-state

What? Where?
When?

Concept of Ops

Outline of intended op incl Main

Effort (if applicable)

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN AND ORDERS

Note:
(1) The advantages, disadvantages of each COA may be considered against the
functions in combat: Comd, Int, Manoeuvre, Firepower, Protection, CSS. They may
also be considered against the principles applicable to the operation being undertaken, e.g., attack, defence,ambush, etc.

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Chapter 5
COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
General

Contents
Page

0501. The combat and combat support

51
forces are key components of combat SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
52
power, defined in NATO as the total means SECTION 2. COMBAT FORCES
of destruction and/or disruptive force which SECTION 3. COMBAT SUPPORT FIRE
SUPPORT FORCES
58
a military unit or formation can apply against SECTION 4. COMBAT SUPPORT
an opponent at a given time. Combat forces OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE FORCES
511
are those forces which use manoeuvre to Annexes:
engage the enemy with direct fire weapon
systems and are therefore the armour, A. AFV Weapon Characteristics
infantry and aviation. Combat support B. Artillery Weapon Characteristics for Fire Planning
forces provide fire support and operational C. Support Helicopters
assistance to the combat elements and are D. Close Air Support
therefore essential to the conduct of operations. Combat forces are, generally, not able to operate effectively without such support which must be coordinated with, and integral to, the operational plan.
0502. An infantry battalion can be tactically self-sufficient for certain operations as
it has its own reconnaissance, engineer (assault pioneers), indirect fire (mortars) and
direct fire (MILAN, GPMG (SF) and snipers) assets within its establishment, and
these elements are described fully in Chapter 3. However, to develop its full manoeuvre potential it will be normal for it to operate in close cooperation with other combat
and combat support forces.
0503. The allocation of these forces is made at formation level and will be influenced by the commanders main effort, the type of operation, the terrain and the
availability of resources. It is, therefore, normal for combat and combat support elements to be allocated both at battalion and company level for specific operations and
for specified periods. In this chapter only those forces which might directly support an
infantry company or be found within its area of operations will be described.
0504 0505.

Reserved.

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SECTION 2. COMBAT FORCES

0506.

There are three combat arms: armour, infantry and aviation.

Armour
0507. Introduction. An armoured squadron is the smallest self-administering
element of an armoured regiment. It is also the main tactical sub-unit of a regiment
and, where possible, should fight complete and not be given independent troop tasks.
Where a complete squadron is grouped with a rifle company it is called a company/squadron group.

Roles of Armour.

0508.

The roles of armour are:

a. The destruction of enemy armour by aggressive mobile action. This is best

achieved using surprise against an enemy who is unprepared and by using
concentration of force and mobility.
b. To fight in close combat in conjunction with infantry in destroying enemy
armour and strong points.
c.

To form a mobile reserve.

d.

Shock action.

0509. Characteristics. Exploitation to the full of the four characteristics listed

below produces shock action:
a. Firepower. Firepower is generated by the tanks 120 mm main armament
and 7.62 mm co-axial machine gun. AFV weapon characteristics are at Annex
A.
b. Protection. The tanks armour provides protection against direct and indirect fire and collective protection against the effects of nuclear and chemical
weapons. Protection allows armour to manoeuvre on the battlefield to an extent
not available to other arms.
c.

Mobility.

Good cross-country mobility.

d. Flexibility. The tanks mobility, combined with its armament, protection

and communications generate flexibility by enabling commanders to concentrate and switch direct firepower rapidly.
0510. Armoured Squadron Organization.
armoured squadron is given at Fig 8.

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The outline organization of an

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SHQ
3 x MBT
2 x Spartan
1 x TUM FFR
(5 + 15 RAC)

Armd Tps x 3
3 x MBT
(1 + 11 RAC)

Med
1 x Samaritan
1 x FV 432
(0 + 5 RAC)
(0 + 1 RAMC)

Replen
2 x TUM FFR
4 x 8 Ton
2 x 4 Ton
(0 + 16 RAC)
(0 + 2 RLC)

Fitters
2 x FV 432
1 x ARRV
1 x Warrior Rep
1 x TUM GS
(0 + 18 REME)

Fig 8. The Armoured Squadron

0511. Employment of Armour. The primary role of armour is the destruction of
the enemy by offensive action. Even in defence, tanks must be allowed to exploit their
firepower and mobility and any temptation to use them as static pillboxes or to
penny-packet them throughout the force must be avoided at all costs. The shattering effect of armour against an enemy is maximized when tanks are concentrated
against a decisive point, usually in support of the commanders main effort. It follows
that commanders engaged in planning armoured operations should allocate sufficient manoeuvre space in order to allow the tank commanders to use the ground to
best effect, thus enhancing surprise and protection for the armoured force. Key considerations for the employment of armour within the spectrum of operations will
include:
a.

Finding.
(1) Tanks, tasked to provide overwatch or immediate protection, can be
employed within a reconnaissance force in order to allow the less well
protected reconnaissance assets to collect the appropriate information
and intelligence.
(2) Where the acquisition of vital information or intelligence about the
enemy cannot be obtained by stealthy means, tanks can be tasked to
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acquire it through combat. This may also involve including tanks within
the task organization of the reconnaissance force. This is a high-risk
activity and commanders must consider carefully the potential risk to their
subsequent plans should they choose to use scarce armour resources in
this way.
(3) The all-weather, day or night surveillance and target acquisition systems integral within the tank can offer the force commander significant
potential when effecting the STAP plan. The Challenger thermal observation gunnery sight (TOGs) provides an ability to detect targets at ranges
of up to 3500 metres in most weather conditions, although heavy rain will
attenuate the sights performance.
b.

Fixing.
(1) Fire Support Group. The fire support group suppresses and fixes
the enemy in position. The main and co-axial armament of the tank provide substantial, accurate firepower for fixing and/or destroying enemy
positions. The ability of the tank to fire on the move, or to change position
rapidly, provides a degree of security and flexibility that is not present in
other systems. The short into action time for armour, whether static or on
the move, assists the force commander in seizing the initiative and in the
maintenance of tempo.
(2) Concentration. The effectiveness of the tanks fixing function is
dependent upon the ability of the commander to concentrate the fire from
at least a half squadron of armour at the same time. As above, sufficient
manoeuvre space in order to make best use of ground (unexpected direction and defilade positions) will maximize the effect of the fire.
(3) Command and Control. When armour operates in conjunction with
other systems during the fixing process, coordinated fire control between
all the elements of the fixing force is vital and this is best achieved by
appointing one commander for the fire support group. The armoured
commander is ideally suited for the task of coordinating all firebase
assets.

c.

Striking.
(1) Intimate Support. Intimate support tanks provide direct fire support onto the enemy positions for the accompanying infantry. Careful
coordination between the armoured commander and his infantry counterpart will be vital for success and this should be rehearsed previously
where possible. When tanks support dismounted infantry in this role, the
tanks must be able to use their manoeuvreability and weapon range to
best effect in close cooperation with the infantry without relying solely on
their physical presence on or near the objective.

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(2) Assault Tanks. Assault tanks strike the enemy in advance of the
infantry and intimate support tanks. The assault tanks will subsequently
attempt to isolate the enemy position from external reinforcement and
mutual support by providing a ring of steel. Once the position is successfully neutralized, they are joined by the armoured assets from the fire
support group and the advance continues.
0512. Limitations of Armour. Most of the tactical limitations of armour can be
overcome with the aid of other arms. In close country the tank is vulnerable to short
range anti-tank weapons and protection by infantry is required. Armour alone cannot
hold ground and it must work in conjunction with infantry, who will form the basis of
a defensive position. The size and weight of the tank makes it vulnerable to soft going
and both natural and man-made obstacles; engineer assistance will be required to
reduce these difficulties. The movement capabilities of the tank are reduced at night
and in poor visibility conditions.
0513. Squadron Headquarters. Similar to a company headquarters the
squadron headquarters is capable of operating for 24 hours a day over sustained
periods. It usually has attached to it a FV 432 ambulance and REME vehicles from
the fitter section. The headquarters can act as a fourth troop if required.
0514. The Tank Troop. The tank troop consists of three main battle tanks commanded by a subaltern or staff sergeant. A sergeant and corporal command the
other tanks of the troop. When a squadron or less is working with a company, close
cooperation will be essential between the commanders at all levels. All commanders
must be able to recognize their supporting tanks and be able to communicate with
them and direct their fire.
0515. Combat Service Support. The armoured squadron will be grouped with
its integral combat service support consisting of a medical section, a replenishment
section and a fitter section.
Aviation
0516. Introduction. Aviation capabilities cover the spectrum of RISTA, combat
and combat support. Aviation can gather visual, thermal and electronic information
quickly over large areas; it can react to this information and concentrate rapidly to
attack with its own direct fire weapons, while coordinating both indirect fire and close
air support (CAS). Aviation will enhance the surveillance of an area of interest and
extend the area of influence with direct or indirect fire.

Roles of Aviation.

0517.

The roles of aviation are:

a.

To provide a quick reaction anti-armour force.

b.

To carry out airborne observation, reconnaissance and direction of fire.

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c. To assist other arms to carry out their roles more effectively by assisting in
C2 and by the limited movement of men and material.
0518. Characteristics. Aviation, unlike the other combat arms, is not irrevocably
committed once engaged but retains its freedom of action. Its flexibility enables combat power to be quickly applied across the whole battle area and targets can be
attacked by day and by night, and in most weather conditions. Aviation has the following characteristics:
a. Firepower. Lynx/TITOW is a reliable, accurate and powerful ATGW system with a high hit probability out to 3750 metres, although the lethality of TOW
diminishes at greater distances.
b. Mobility. The helicopters mobility far exceeds any other Army weapon
platform. Mobility creates a wide range of possibilities such as: the ability to
reinforce or manoeuvre across boundaries; the ability, regardless of going, to
counter a threat; and the ability to deploy rapidly over great distances.
c. Flexibility. The inherent flexibility of aviation allows it to: deploy to dispersed locations in the vicinity of the close battle; operate throughout the deep,
close and rear areas; disengage cleanly from contact and to generate rapid
changes in tempo; adjust weapon loads and procedures; and switch roles with
little or no warning.
d. Agility. Aviation can, by virtue of its speed and agility, take evasive action
against a variety of threats.
e. Night Operations. Aviation can conduct deliberate night attacks using
NVG and TITOW against a wide range of targets.
f. Communications. Army helicopters are provided with up to three radios
(more in a commanders airborne CP) allowing communications with ground
troops, control agencies and other aircraft.
g. Loiter Capability. Lynx/TITOW can remain airborne for two hours with a
full weapon load. This allows anti-tank units to loiter and manoeuvre close to a
developing threat and to re-attack a target from an unexpected direction.
0519. Organization. Aviation will rarely operate on the battlefield as single helicopters. Occasionally aircraft may appear in pairs but normally they will be grouped
as follows:
a. Aviation Reconnaissance Patrols (ARPs). Standard ARPs consist of two
Gazelles and one Lynx/TITOW but can be any mix. The important point is that
the ARP should contain both types of helicopter. They complement each other
as follows:

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(1) The Lynx has an excellent TOW sight giving visual and thermal surveillance and the ability to kill all vehicles up to and including tanks.
(2) The Gazelles have no TI sight but are useful reconnaissance platforms and their presence increases the ARPs coverage. They will normally assume the roles of airborne FAC and airborne OP.
(3) Both types are fitted with radar warning receivers (RWR) which can
be used offensively to locate and destroy enemy air defences and defensively for tracking and missile evasion.
b. Aviation Fighting Patrols. Fighting patrols consist of a mix of Lynx/TITOW
and Gazelle and can be up to a squadron in strength.
c. Aviation Squadrons. Squadrons have six helicopters of each type and
are the lowest level of aviation unit which can find, fix and strike from within its
own resources an enemy larger than a combat reconnaissance patrol (CRP).
0520. Employment of Aviation. Aviation tactics, like armoured tactics, are
essentially offensive. Any aviation mission will result in either offensive manoeuvre or
a tactical security operation, such as a screen or guard. Aviation can attack alone,
with support if available from artillery or close air support, or manoeuvre in concert
with the other combat arms.
a. Find. An ARP is used to find the enemy. ARPs can perform a multitude
of tasks and often more than one ARP may be airborne at a time. Once the
ARP has found the enemy it will send a sighting or contact report and, depending on the mission and the enemy strength, it will start to fix using TOW missiles, artillery or CAS.
b. Fix. An ARP has the combat power, with its eight TOW, to fix an enemy
up to CRP in strength. Anything larger will require the ARP to have access to
other resources, namely artillery and air. Likewise, an aviation fighting patrol
has the combat power to fix a vanguard company.
c. Strike. To strike the enemy an aviation squadron or regiment will be used
in a hasty or deliberate attack. Often this will be coordinated into a Joint Air
Attack Team (JAAT) which is a synchronized combination of aviation, air and
artillery. JAATs are most commonly used in the deep battle and would only be
used in support of the close battle on the brigade Main Effort.
0521.

Limitations of Aviation.

The following limitations should be noted:

a. Sustainability. Helicopters consume considerable quantities of fuel and

continuous deployment will be costly in resources.
b. Communications. Lack of appropriate CEIs, BATCO and crypto can limit
cooperation with other arms.
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c. Weather. Severe weather will limit operations especially if the visibility is

below 500 metres and winds are in excess of 50 knots.
d. Vulnerability. Current Army helicopters are soft-skinned and thus vulnerable to all types of fire.
0522. Combat Service Support. The provision of fuel and missiles and the positioning of Forward Arming and Refuelling Points (FARPs) is critical to successful aviation operations. The defence of a FARP may be a task given to an infantry company.
0523 0524.

Reserved.

SECTION 3. COMBAT SUPPORT FIRE SUPPORT FORCES

Close Support Artillery
0525. Introduction. The neutralizing, suppressing, destructive and morale effect
of indirect fire will be a vital factor in any operation and is usually seriously under-estimated in peace. However, the only indirect fire guaranteed to an infantry battalion is
that provided by the mortar platoon and it is unlikely that artillery resources will be sufficient to allocate a close support battery to every battalion involved in an operation.
0526. Role of Close Support Artillery. The primary role of close support
artillery is to deliver concentrated, effective indirect fire as an integral part of an operation. When a battery tactical group is placed OPCON to a battle group the battery
commander (BC), his fire planning cell and observation parties join the battalion and
rifle companies. Fire is called for by the FOO to the FPC. If the FPC has batteries
allocated it will allot them to the FOO; if not, it will refer the call to the Fire Direction
Centre (FDC) of the artillery regiment. Current doctrine advocates the use of at least
three batteries on a target.
0527. Characteristics. Artillery weapon characteristics are at Annex B. The principal characteristics of indirect fire support available to a company are:
a. Flexibility. Artillery can deliver a heavy weight of fire on a target quickly
and accurately, by day and by night and in all weathers. It can be switched
rapidly from target to target without having to move.
b. Concentration. The range and flexibility of artillery allows fire to be concentrated on selected targets without the need to concentrate the guns themselves.
c. Surprise. The sudden and unexpected arrival of tons of high explosive on
an unsuspecting target can have a devastating effect on equipment, men and,
above all, on morale.

5-8

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0528. Employment of Artillery. The effect of indirect fire should never be underestimated and full use must be made of such fire whenever appropriate. Its effectiveness can be enhanced by:
a. The Selection of Appropriate Targets. The characteristics and limitations
of artillery, mortars and direct fire weapons should be used to complement
each other. Mortars should be used against dismounted infantry and for illumination and smokescreening tasks, whereas artillery should primarily be used
against protected targets. Frontages and safe distances are listed at Annex B.
b. Shock Effect. The fire of a large number of guns in a short, concentrated
burst against successive targets will have more effect than the simultaneous
engagement of several targets by fewer guns.
c. Flexibility. Fire plans should be flexible; a simple timed programme may
contribute to flexibility, but complicated or rigid timings are inappropriate for
some operations.
d. Surprise. Indirect fire should be used to contribute to, rather than prejudice, surprise. Company commanders must avoid stereotyped fire plans, balance the relative merits of adjusted and predicted fire in each situation and
seek ways in which their artillery may help to deceive the enemy.
0529. Command and Control. Artillery should be commanded at the highest
level and controlled at the lowest. Field artillery and mortars should be fully integrated
as a single indirect fire team controlled by the BC. By this integration:
a. The most appropriate indirect fire weapon can be employed against each
target.
b. One weapon can substitute for another which is already engaging when
fire is requested.
c.

Indirect fire should be integrated with and complement the direct fire plan.

d. The artillery net provides a useful additional source of battlefield information which should be tapped when necessary.
0530. Forward Observation Officers (FOO) and MFCs must be positioned well forward, but protected by infantry and armour if available, where they can advise the
company commander, assist with fire plans and quickly engage opportunity targets.
They must be prepared for rapid regrouping as fresh companies pass through or
reserves are committed. The availability of FOOs and MFCs cannot be guaranteed
and each must be prepared to substitute for the other and other fire direction sources
used such as air OPs.
0531.

Limitations.

The following limitations should be noted:

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5-9

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a. The possible non-availability of artillery due to higher priority targets elsewhere.

b. The reduced effect of artillery on dispersed and moving targets, especially
armour.
c.

The limited quantities of smoke ammunition available.

Close Air Support (CAS)

0532. Introduction. CAS missions are those which are in close proximity to
friendly forces and which require the detailed integration of each air mission with the
fire and movement of those forces. CAS may provide the majority of fire support if
there is a shortage of artillery. CAS can be included as part of a fire plan and may be
used against targets which cannot be reached or effectively neutralized by other
available forms of fire support.

Types of CAS.

0533.

There are two categories of CAS mission:

a. Pre-planned. These are missions which can be foreseen as part of a fire

plan for a future operation.
b. Immediate. Immediate CAS missions are those for which there is urgent
need during the course of a battle.

Characteristics.

0534.

CAS has the following characteristics:

a. Flexibility. CAS is very flexible. Weapon loads can be varied depending

on target type and, if necessary, sorties can be diverted in-flight from one task
to another of higher priority, thus giving very rapid reaction.
b. Weight of Fire. A great weight of explosives can be delivered in a very
short time. One Jaguar aircraft bomb-load is equivalent, in explosive weights, to
1000 x 105 mm shells. CAS aircraft weapon loads and targets are at Annex D.
c.

Surprise.

Enemy troops receive very little warning, if any, of attack.

0535. Control of Aircraft. A forward air controller (FAC) either on the ground or
in a helicopter is required to control the aircraft. The FAC will guide aircraft onto the
target which will be marked by a laser target marker.
0536. Action During CAS. It is vital that the safety of the aircraft and troops on
the ground is safeguarded during a CAS mission. Coordination and action will be as
follows:
a. Air Defence (AD). A message will be sent from formation to battalion HQ
that aircraft are on mission. The fire planning cell at battalion HQ will give the
check fire orders to stop the aircraft being engaged by own troops.
5-10

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b. FLOT. The position of forward troops may need to be marked by fluorescent panels, coloured smoke or lights.
c. Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). The FSCL is a line used to coordinate supporting fire, which may affect current tactical operations by forces not
under control of the formation commander. It is established by the land commander and should be a short distance ahead of the line beyond which troops
will not operate. Aircraft are not permitted to attack ground targets short of the
FSCL without prior coordination with the ground forces concerned.

Limitations.

0537.
a.

Some limitations which affect CAS at battalion level are:

The need for good visibility, by day and night, for visually aimed weapons.

b. Response times for immediate mission requests may be too slow to affect
the battle.
c.

Aircraft may be diverted to higher priority tasks without warning.

0538 0539.

Reserved.

SECTION 4. COMBAT SUPPORT OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE

FORCES
Engineers
0540. Introduction. A battalion will not always have engineers under command
or in support as there are rarely enough engineers. However, all infantrymen should
be trained to carry out simple combat engineer tasks under supervision and they can
supplement the battalions own assault pioneers who are trained to undertake all
combat engineer tasks likely to be needed within a company area of operations, less
plant operation.

Roles.

0541.

The principal roles of combat engineers are to:

a.

Deny mobility counter-mobility.

b.

Enhance mobility of own forces.

c.

Assist construction of field defences.

Tasks.

0542.

The main tasks of combat engineers in support of the company are:

a.

The construction of minefields and anti-tank ditches.

b.

The improvement of natural obstacles.

c.

Demolitions, booby traps and route denial.

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d.

Advice on and construction of field defences.

e.

Assistance with tactical deception.

f.

Breaches of minefields and wire.

g.

River and obstacle crossing.

h.

Route clearance.

i.

Route maintenance and reconnaissance.

0543. Tactical Employment. Tactical factors such as the need for silence and no
illumination will often be in conflict with the technical requirements of combat engineers to complete their task. Commanders must make a judgement to strike a balance between the two. Artillery fire can cover the noise. Engineers are particularly
vulnerable when working, and tasks will take far longer if they are required to provide
their own protection. Protection parties will therefore need to be provided when tactically necessary, although this does not absolve engineers from responsibility for
camouflage and security.
Close Air Defence
0544. Introduction. A close air defence section provides a battalion with a limited,
low level, close air defence capability to supplement any area air defence coverage
and the all arms air defence. Air defence weapon characteristics are at Annex B.
0545. Tactical Employment. The section is best employed on the point defence
of defiles, headquarters or concentrated company locations such as FUPs or hides.
Ideally the full section should be deployed to cover a single point against a single
threat enabling multiple targets to be engaged most effectively. The section may nevertheless be split to cover two tasks, but with much reduced effectiveness. The section has only limited communications and is vulnerable to enemy ground forces; the
battalion must keep it informed of the enemy threat and protect it as necessary.

Limitations.

0546.

The principal limitations are:

a. Fixed wing aircraft can only be engaged if they pass over or within 500
metres of the launcher and then only, realistically, when head-on. Helicopters
can be engaged at all angles of approach and departure out to maximum
weapon range.

5-12

b.

No poor visibility or multiple target capability.

c.

Total dependence on battalion administration.

d.

No early warning capability.

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Support Helicopters
0547. Introduction. Support helicopters (SH) provide tactical and logistic flexibility for infantry. All infantry battalions should be able to move by SH although this ability does not mean that they can undertake the full range of airmobile operations.
Nevertheless, SH provide much needed mobility in many types of operation.
0548. Characteristics.
because they can:

SH confer tactical and logistic flexibility for infantry

a. Carry troops, support weapons (including 105 mm light gun) and supplies
at speed, avoiding the enemy and natural and artificial obstacles. Troops arrive
at their destination fresh and can be landed on most forms of terrain. SH characteristics are listed at Annex C.
b. Be landed in tactical formation, with very short into action times and with
some vehicles if necessary.

0549.

c.

Be switched rapidly between tactical and logistical tasks.

d.

Provide mobility which gives potential for surprise.

Limitations.

SH have the following limitations:

a. Vulnerability. SH are vulnerable to enemy aircraft particularly attack

helicopters small arms fire and AD systems. Air superiority, or at least parity,
is required and routes need to be clear of enemy ground forces.
b. Payload and Performance. The payload to be carried reduces rapidly
over increased distances. Climatic conditions and altitude have a similar effect
on performance.
c. Weather. Poor weather may stop SH flying and therefore plans should
not be dependent on their guaranteed support.
d. Navigation. Tactical flying, particularly in poor visibility and at night,
makes precise navigation to drop off points difficult. Commanders should
always check that they have been dropped off at the right place before releasing the SH.
e. Night. Pilots who are not equipped with, or trained in the use of, night
vision goggles (NVG) will be limited on dark nights by an inability to fly close to
the ground, the problems of formation flying and the need for prepositioned
landing aids.
f. Underslung Load Equipment (ULE). ULE is only held on a permanent
basis by airmobile and TALO battalions. While other battalions can indent for
ULE, they are unlikely to have the personnel trained to operate it.
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5-14

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(b)

Challenger 1 & 2

Scimitar
Warrior
Sabre

Striker

(a)

1.

2.

3.
7.62 mm GPMG

1,100 (3)

4,000 (5)

HEAT

Swingfire

1,500
1,500

1,100 (3)

2,000
1,500 (2)
8,000

(e)

Ranges (m) (1)

1,100 (3)

APDS
HE

APFSDS
HESH
Smk

(d)

Ammo

7.62 mm GPMG (4)

30 mm

7.62 mm GPMG (L8 AND L37)

120 mm

(c)

Wpn

1. These figures are a general guide to battle ranges.

2. Can be fired up to 8,000 metres against area target.
3. Normal engagement range is limited to 1,100 metres due to tracer burn out. Range may be extended to 1,800
metres if strike can be seen.
4. Warrior and Sabre have a 7.62 mm chain gun. Scimitar has an L8.
5. Minimum range under ideal conditions is 140 metres when firing from vehicle and 275 metres when control is
separated from the vehicle. For planning purposes use 500 metres and 1,000 metres respectively. Time of flight to
4,000 metres is 26 seconds.

Notes:

AFV

Ser

AFV WEAPONS

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ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 5

AFV WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS

5A-1

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5A-2

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Lt Gun
L118
L119

FH 70
L121

M270 MLRS

2.

3.

4.

General Sp

General Sp

Close Sp

Close Sp

Principal
Role

39,000
(30,000)

SCATMIN
(1 rkt = 28
minelets)
Min dist:
11,500

32,000
(25,000)

24,700
(19,500)
24,700
(19,500)
24,200
(19,500)
17,800
(15,000)

17,200
(15,000)

17,200
(15,000)
17,200
(15,000)
15,700

24,700
(19,500)
24,700
(19,500)
24,200
(19,500)
17,800
(15,000)
24,700
(19,500)

Max Range
(metres)
(Planning)

Bomblet (3)
(1 rkt = 644
bomblets)

Bomblet

Illum

Smk

HE

Marker

Illum

Smk

HE

Marker

Bomblet (1)

Illum

Smk

HE

Ammo Aval

Bomblet
100 x 115

Sustained
2 rds/min for 1 hr

Reload time:
Day 35 mins
Ni 45 mins

1 rkt every 5 secs.

12 rkt (2 rkt Pod
Containers) standard
msn from each launcher.

Sustained
1 rd/min for 1 hr

Burst
3rds/15 secs

Sustained
3 rds/min

Bomblet
1 rkt
400 diameter
1 launcher
600 diameter
SCATMIN
1 km of eff
minefd per 3
launchers

As for Ser 1

Air Burst
50

Ground Burst
40

Air Burst
85

Intense
6 rds for 3 mins

Intense
6 rds/min

Ground Burst
55

Lethal
Coverage for
one HE shell
(metres)

Burst
3rds/10 secs

Rates of Fire

Notes:
(1) Min Range 4,400 m.
(2) Adjusted fire figs (less MLRS). For predicted fire add 50 m.
(3) Min range 11,500 m.

How Sp
L131 AS90

Eqpt

1.

Ser

1000
n/a

n/a

400

250

600

400

Unprotected

HE

600

200

125

200

200

Protected

n/a

n/a

250

200

250

Protected

n/a

n/a

500

400

500

Unprotected

HE Prox

Safe Splinter Distance from Own Tps (metres) (2)

SURFACE TO SURFACE ARTILLERY

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ANNEX B TO
CHAPTER 5

ARTILLERY WEAPON CHARACTERISTICS FOR FIRE PLANNING

5B-1

5B-2

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Javelin S15

4.

Rapier FSC

2.

HVM

Rapier FSB2

1.

3.

Eqpt

Ser

Close AD

Close AD

Low Level AD

Low Level AD

Primary Role

3,000 m

3,000 m

3,000 m

Eff Ceiling:

3,000 m

Engagement Range:
FGA 4.5 km
Hel 5.5 km

Eff Ceiling:

Engagement Range:

Eff Ceiling:

Engagement Range:

Eff Ceiling:

Engagement Range:
Mk 1 6.8 km
Mk 2 7.2 km

Eqpt Details

5.5 km

8 km

Impact/Proximity

Impact

As for Ser 1

Mk 1 Impact
Mk 2a Impact
Mk 2b Proximity

Warhead

SALOS beam rider

(Laser)

SALOS beam rider

(Laser)

As for Ser 1

ACLOS
(Guidance Command)

Guidance

AIR DEFENCE (AD) ARTILLERY

Route Def:
10.5 km (6 dets)

VP Def:
Min 6 dets

Gen:
Within 500 m of task

Route Def:
13 km (6 dets) or 6.5 km all round def

VP Def:
Min 6 dets

Gen:
Within 800 m of task

Best employed in Area Def

Route Def:
30 km (8 Fire Units)

VP Def:
2 4 km from VP (4 Fire Units)

Area Def:
17 x 16 km (8 Fire Units)

Best employed in Area Def

Route Def:
30 km (10 Fire Units)

VP Def:
2 4 km from VP (5 Fire Units)

Area Def:
15 x 15 km (10 Fire Units)

Employment Guidelines

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Chinook HC
Mk 2 RAF (7)
(Peacetime)

Chinook HC
Mk 2 (RAF) (7)
(Wartime)

Sea King 4
(RN)

3.

4.

5.

(c)

2,086

11,100

9,300

1,600

1,182

1,542

10,000

8,200

1,100

955

(d)

Radius of
Action
100 nm (3)

External Payload (kg)

Radius of
Action
50 nm (3)

650 (normal
tks, 3 crew)

1,040 (ferry tks)

Max payload
1,400 kg
although space
is ltd

920 (ferry tks)

Max payload
900 kg
although space
is ltd

328 (2 ferry tks)

476 (4 tks
No space aval)

260 (No ferry

tks aval)

(e)

Ferry Range
(nm)

2,720
external

11,300
external

10,300
external

1,950

1,318

(f)

Max Payload
(kg) with fuel
for 15 nm
Crane
Operation

100

135
(95 with
external
load)

120
(90 with
external
load)

100

(g)

Cruise
Speed
(kt)

16 in full eqpt
27 min eqpt

40 (8)

12 in full eqpt
16 min eqpt

8 with
Bergens 10 in
light order

(h)

Max Tps

6 plus 6 sitting
patients and
one attendant

24 TAC 10
on floor or 6 on
floor plus 12 sitting patients

6 in stretcher fit
with 4 sitting.
TAC 2 on floor
plus 8 sitting

8 in stretcher fit
with 3 sitting.
TAC 2 on floor

(i)

Stretchers (4)

Roping (Swarming). Only 2 on a

rope using hand over hand
method. One fast rope att to
either heave O bracket or
winch hook. When O bracket is
used a max of 3 on a rope for
trg and 2 when rope is att to
winch hook. For abseiling one
att to winch hook and heave O
bracket.

For fast roping there are 2 att

pts on ramp, 1 pt over centre
hatch, 1 pt over stbd front door.
For abseiling, there are 3 att pts
on rear ramp.

For Fast Roping and Roping

there are 2 att pts. For abseiling
there are 4 att pts.

For Abseiling, Fast Roping and

Roping there is one att pt by
cabin door.

(j)

Fast Roping, Abseiling and

Roping (Swarming (5)

Notes:
1. Data is shown for temperate climatic conditions assuming fuel is immediately available without tactical considerations.
2. Full data and drills for UK helicopters is contained in ALP49(A) USE OF HELICOPTERS IN LAND OPERATIONS UK SUPPLEMENT 1.
3. Radius of action varies according to airspeed and environment. It is assumed that aircraft with external loads will fly at 90 kt unless otherwise indicated, returning empty
as best range speed.
4. Puma, Wessex, Sea King and Chinook aeromed fit is impractical. The loading of full stretcher fit is time-consuming and is normally carried out with aircraft shut-down.
5. Fast roping is restricted to specialist units whose instructors have attended a formal course at JATE.
6. For operational tasks, Puma HC Mk 2 is cleared to operate at a maximum take-off weight of 7,400 kg, therefore quoted weights can be increased by 400 kg.
7. The Chinook HC KM 2 is currently limited in peacetime to a maximum take-off weight of 22,700 kg. In wartime, the limit could be raised to 24,500 kg if operationally necessary.
8. Chinook is normally fitted with side seats for 26 and 14 seat belts on floor (total 40) but there are other options in conjunction with internal/external freight loading. During
ops, up to 80 pax may be carried standing.

Puma HC
Mk 1 RAF (6)

2.

(b)

Wessex HC
Mk 2 RAF

(a)

1.

Ac Type (2)

Ser

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ANNEX C TO
CHAPTER 5

SUPPORT HELICOPTERS (1)

5C-1

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5C-2

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(b)

Harrier
GR7 (RAF) (3)

Jaguar
(RAF) (3)

A10
(US)

F16
(US/NL)

F18
(USMC)

Alphajet
(GE) (4)

(a)

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

4 x CBU
1 x 27 mm cannon
(optional)

20 mm cannon
4 x Maverick or
4 x 2000 lb bombs or
8 x CBUs or
CRV7 rocket pods

20 mm cannon
4 CBU or
6 x 500 lb bombs or
2 x 2000 lb bombs

4 x Maverick GW
plus various bombs/CBU
plus 30 mm cannon

4 or 6 CBU
4 x 1000 lb HE
2 x 30 mm cannon
CRV7 rockets

6 x CBU
2 x 25 mm cannon

(c)

Wpn Load (2)

Tks, APCs, softskinned vehs

Tks, APCs, softskinned vehs

Tks, APCs, softskinned vehs

Tks, APCs

Tks, APCs, softskinned vehs

Tks, APCs, softskinned vehs

(d)

Tgt

Single-pass attack to release all wpns. Coverage from 4

CBU (each holding 147 bomblets) is 2 football pitches
long by 12 pitch wide

USMC specialise in CAS role. Ni capable

Multi-role ac with CAS capability. Daylt only

Multiple attacks, staying outside ZSU 23/4 range and

avoiding overflt of en posns. Maverick usually TV-guided
(with shaped charge warhead), but could be IR

Single-pass attack to release all wpns. Jaguar can carry

recce pod to give tac recce capability

Coverage from 6 CBU is 200 x 50 m. GR7 is ni capable.

Recce pod can be carried for Tac Recce.

(e)

Remarks

Notes:
1. Close Air Support (CAS) may be provided by almost any aircraft capable of dropping a bomb or firing a gun. CAS is a role requiring
considerable training and expertise from both aircrew and FACs if it is to be effective. Not all aircraft possess the appropriate performance
in terms of manoeuvrability, weapon systems and sortie rate capability. The aircraft that specialize in the role are shown. For tasks against
troop concentrations Tornado GR1, F16s or F18s could also be used. More specifically:
a. Requires control by FAC (usually heliborne). Laser Target Marker Operator (LTMO) is a bonus, and can be used by Harrier, Jaguar,
A10, F16D, Tornado GR1, F18 (USMC).
b. Aircraft operate in multiples of two or four.
c. Aircraft carry chaff, flares and EW equipment for self-defence.
3. Both Harrier and Jaguar can carry laser guided bombs.
4. Alphajet remains until decision made on replacement.

Ac Type

Ser

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ANNEX D TO
CHAPTER 5

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (1)

5D-1

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5D-2

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Chapter 6
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
The first essential condition for an army to be able to stand the strain of battle is an
adequate stock of weapons, petrol and ammunition. In fact the battle is fought and
decided by the quartermasters before the shooting begins. The bravest men can do
nothing without guns, the guns nothing without plenty of ammunition; and neither
guns nor ammunition are of much use in mobile warfare unless there are vehicles
with sufficient petrol to haul them around. Maintenance must also approximate in
quality and quantity to that of the enemy.
F M Erwin Rommel The Rommel Papers
Contents

Aim

Page

0601. The aim of this chapter is to explain

the administration of an infantry company
group on operations.
Definitions and Glossary1
0602. Administration.
defined as:

Administration is

SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

61

SECTION 2. THE MAJOR SERVICES

63

SECTION 3. THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT

SYSTEM

64

SECTION 4. OPERATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AT COMPANY LEVEL

67

Annex:
A. Battlegroup CSS Systems

The management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and
strategy; primarily in the fields of logistics and personnel management. (AAP6)
0603. Backloading. The rearward movement of equipment, casualties and
materiel within a theatre. (JSP 110)
0604. Combat Service Support (CSS). The support provided to combat forces,
primarily in the fields of administration and logistics. (AAP6)

Combat Supplies (C sups).

0605.
a.

C sups include:

Conventional ammunition, mines, explosives and guided weapons.

Source documents for definitions are AAP6, NATO Glossary of Terms and
Definitions and JSP 110, Joint Service Glossary. Tactical definitions are taken from
The Staff Officers Handbook and ATP35 (B), Land Force Tactical Doctrine.

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b.

All liquid fuels, lubricants and anti-freeze collectively known as POL.

c. Rations including forage, hexamine cookers, disinfectants and water purification chemicals.
d.

Water.

0606. Equipment Support (ES). Achieving the optimum level of maintenance

and availability of equipment in peace and war.
0607. Logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and
maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, logistics covers those
aspects of military operations which deal with:
a. Design and development, acquisition, storage, transport, distribution,
maintenance, evacuation and disposition of materiel.
b.

Transport of personnel.

c. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities.

d.

Acquisition of furnishing services.

e.

Medical and health service support. (AAP6)

0608. Logistic Support. That element of CSS provided by the Royal Logistic
Corps (RLC). It is complementary to ES and provides for the support of the soldier,
unit and formation, including the distribution of C sups, general materiel, Postal and
Courier Services (PCS) and labour resources.
0609. Materiel.
(JSP 110)

A generic term covering equipment, stores, supplies and spares.

0610. Rehabilitation. The processing, usually in a quiet area, of units or individuals recently withdrawn from combat or arduous duty, during which units are made
ready for employment in future operations through rest, replacement of personnel,
supplies and equipment, and training. In the British Army the term refurbishment is
generally used for this activity. (AAP6)
0611. Replenish.
(JSP 110)

Re-fill or restock to a predetermined level, pressure or quantity.

0612. Resupply. The act of replenishing stocks in order to maintain required levels of supply. (AAP6)
0613. Unit Mobile Stocks(UMS). That element of First Line (i.e., unit level)
stocks that can be carried on unit transport.

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0614. Unit Repair Scale(URS). A scaling of spares which are in frequent

demand for repairs being carried out by unit or attached repair tradesmen.
Principles2
0615.

The principles of CSS are:

a.

Foresight.

Sound planning and anticipation.

b. Economy. CSS resources will seldom be plentiful. It is essential that economic and efficient use is made of all available manpower, material and movement facilities.
c. Flexibility. The ability to conform to tactical plans which will almost
inevitably be subject to frequent change.
d. Simplicity. A simple plan is easy to understand and easy to adapt to
changing circumstances.
e. Cooperation.
and platoons.
0616 0617.

This is most important both within and between companies

Reserved.

SECTION 2. THE MAJOR SERVICES

0618. It is necessary for company commanders to be aware of the major services,
their functions and responsibilities. This section covers the major services, in outline
only.

RLC.

0619.

The RLC is responsible for:

a.

Provision of transport support in its various forms, other than BG transport.

b.

Distribution of C sups down to BG level.

c.

Provision of movement control facilities.

d.

Supply of all army materiel, less engineer and special medical stores.

e.

Aspects of equipment management.

f. Inspection and repair of ammunition and certain general equipment.

Inspection of POL and rations.
2

ADP Volume 3 Logistics.

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g. Provision of a wide range of specialist services, such a Explosive

Ordnance Disposal (EOD), printing and photography.

Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC).

0620.

The RAMC is responsible for:

a.

Collection, treatment and evacuation of sick and wounded.

b.

Promotion of health and hygiene.

c.

Supply of medical and dental equipment.

0621. Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME).

responsible for:

The REME is

a.

Inspection, necessary repair and modification of equipment.

b.

Provision of engineering advice on matters of REME concern.

c.

Fostering the reliability of, and ease of maintenance of equipment.

d.

Equipment management

0622 0623.

Reserved.

SECTION 3 THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT SYSTEM

General
0624. The logistic support system provides for the needs of the fighting units in battle. It is important that combat units should be able to concentrate on the fighting without having to worry about their logistic support. Inevitably, however, their ability to
fight will depend to a large extent upon the logistic support which they receive.
0625. Tactics govern the expenditure of commodities and therefore the required
rate of replenishment. The location of logistic units and the way they operate are also
subject to tactical considerations. This serves to re-emphasize the interdependence
of tactics and logistics and underlies the need for an effective battlefield link between
fighting and supporting troops.
0626. The British Armys logistic support system has evolved over many years of
active service in many parts of the world. Although conditions and circumstances are
seldom the same for these operations, a basic system is operated which can be modified to meet different requirements.
0627. Although the logistic support system has been evolved with a NBC threat as
a principal consideration, the system must strike a balance between two conflicting
principles:
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a. Concentration. Resources are more conveniently controlled and distributed when centralised.
b. Dispersion. By dispersing resources the system can withstand the loss
of some logistic units and stocks, yet still continue to function.
Lines of Support
0628. In the British Army there are four Lines of Support which describe the boundaries of a specific element of a CSS function:
a. Fourth Line Support. Fourth Line Support, also known as Base Support,
is found within the UK Base.
b. Third Line Support. Third Line Support covers those CSS assets normally found behind the divisional rear boundary and forward of the Point of
Entry (POE).
c. Second Line Support. Second Line Support is that provided by CSS
units integral to the formation, usually the division but sometimes the brigade.
d. First Line. First Line Support is that CSS which is integral to the unit.
Within units CSS is delivered within the framework of three echelons: F, A and
B Echelons.
The Battlegroup Echelon System
0629. Battlegroup Logistic Officer (BGLO). The role of the BGLO is to act as
the CSS focus within the battlegroup HQ working alongside the battlegroup 2IC. The
appointment is normally held by OC HQ company working in battlegroup main. The
responsibilities of the BGLO are:
a. Coordination of the CSS input into the estimate process, under the heading Friendly Forces.
b.

Devising the CSS plan in conjunction with the tactical plan.

c. Delivery of the CSS content of orders including the CSS concept of operations and a CSS Main Effort in support of the commanders plan.
d. Monitoring the development of the CSS plan including tracking critical
assets and stores.
e.

Forward planning including anticipation of future requirements.

f. Coordination of CSS led activities such as reconstitution, regeneration and

rehabilitation.
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0630. F Echelon. This is made up of the squadron and company groups and
includes their fighting vehicles, weapons, fitter sections and ambulances. It also
includes the battlegroup HQ which could be the HQ of an armoured regiment,
infantry battalion or sometimes an armoured reconnaissance regiment.
0631. A1 Echelon. This consists of those elements of the battlegroup administrative resources that are required for immediate support and replenishment of F
Echelon. If possible it is sited out of direct fire range behind the squadron/companies
and consists of:
a.

MTO or RSM.

b.

CQMS HQ Coy

c.

CQMS or SQMS from each sub-unit.

d.

C sups carried on vehicles.

e.

REME support depending on the task.

0632. A2 Echelon. The remaining battlegroup administrative troops and vehicles

that are still required close at hand in the battle area are contained in A2 Echelon. A2
Echelons will normally be brigaded within the brigade support group (BSG) under the
control of HQ BSG to ease command and control, and consist of:
a.

QM Tech.

b.

Parent unit technical stores.

c.

Remainder of REME support.

d. Logistic support detachment (LSD) from the brigade support squadron

RLC.
0633. B Echelon. This consists of unit administrative resources of a non-urgent
nature, including reserves of clothing and general stores and pay staff. It is a small
group of men and vehicles, usually commanded by the parent unit QM. It is normally
located in the divisional support area (DSA) and close to the divisional RV.
0634. A diagram of the echelon system including elements of the major services at
BG level is at Fig 9, Annex A.
0635 0636.

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SECTION 4. OPERATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AT

COMPANY GROUP LEVEL
General
0637. Although the company group commander has specific responsibility for the
administration and morale of his sub-unit at all times the 2IC is the focus of administration in war. He is supported by the CSM and CQMS.
0638.

Responsibilities.
a. Company Group Commander. The company group commander ensures
that CSS operations sustain his companys combat power. He integrates the
CSS activities into the tactical plan and provides guidance to the company CSS
operators.
b. Company 2IC. The company 2IC coordinates and supervises the companys CSS effort supported by the CSM and CQMS. The company 2IC is
responsible for:
(1) The collection, collation and submission of all CSS reports and
returns including attachments3.
(2)

The coordination of replenishment to the company group.

(3)

The coordination of CASEVAC.

(4) The coordination of the movement of PW to the unit PW collection

point.
(5)

The monitoring of equipment states.

c. CSM. In addition to his tactical responsibilities the CSM is the primary

CSS operator for the company group and he assists the 2IC to execute the CSS
plan by:
(1)

Maintaining the company office in the field.

(2) Assigning replacements to platoons in accordance with the company

group commanders guidance.
(3)

Directing the redistribution of ammunition within the company group.

See AUSOPs Army Code No. 71363.

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d.

(4)

Supervising CASEVAC and the handling of PW.

(5)

Supervising the replenishment of the company group.

CQMS.

The CQMS is responsible for:

(1) The collection, preparation and delivery of C sups, materiel, pay and
mail to the company group.
(2) The backloading of unserviceable equipment from the company
group.
(3) The maintenance and management of the company G1098 stores
and any miscellaneous stores held by him.
(4)

Liaison with HQ A2 Echelon and A2 Echelon departments.

Personnel Service Support

0639. The Company Office. The routine of the company office will continue in
war. The CSM should ensure that the company clerk packs the following documents
and publications:
a.

PAMPAS printouts for each soldier. These will be superseded by P20 (Fd).

b.

AF B120 Company Conduct Sheets.

c.

AF B6851 NOK cards or copies if held by BG headquarters.

d.

AF B252 Charge Sheets.

e.

Manual of Military Law (MML).

f.

Queens Regulations (QRs).

g. The Rights of a Soldier Charged with an Offence under the Army Act 1955
Army Code No. 12730.
h.

A copy of the Duties of an Accuseds Adviser from AGAIs.

i.

Company interview and discipline books.

j.

Nominal rolls which also show ZAP numbers and weapon allocations.

0640. Platoon Records. It is essential that platoon commanders maintain personal records containing detailed information of every soldier in their platoons. A similar record must be kept for company HQ personnel by the CSM. The record should
be in two parts:
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a.

Part One.

A small book containing the bare essentials for use in action:

(1)

Number, Rank, Name and Initials.

(2)

Date of Birth.

(3)

Religion.

(4)

Blood Group.

(5)

Next of Kin including address.

(6)

Specialist Training.

(7)

Weapon Number.

(8)

Radiation Dosage.

b. Part Two. A book containing personal details of each man, including his
military career, qualifications and any confidential facts and opinions.

Individual Documents.

0641.

Each soldier must carry the following documents:

a.

MOD Form 90.

b.

Metal ID Disc x 2.

c.

Medical warning tag (if necessary).

d. F/Ident 189 and cover F/Ident 189A (Geneva Convention ID Card). Carried
by all personnel except those at sub-paragraphs e. and f. below.
e. F/Ident 106 (Geneva Convention ID Card) . Carried by all regimental medical personnel (excluding regimental bandsmen).
f. F/Ident 107 (Geneva Convention ID Card). Carried by members of RAChD,
RAMC, RADC, QARANC and personnel of any arm on the war establishment
of a medical unit (including regimental bandsmen).
0642. Manning. Daily parade states will continue to be required in war so that the
company group commander is aware of his basic combat power. The strength of the
company group is formally reported to BG headquarters and A2 Echelon daily by
PERSREP (AUSOP 109). It is important to include all attachments which are under
any form of command. This return not only triggers reinforcement demands (RFTDEM AUSOP 109) but also ensures that the company group is supplied with sufficient rations and ammunition.
0643.

Reinforcements.

There are two types of reinforcements:

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a. Formed Bodies. Formed Regular or TA units and newly formed reservist

units to complete the ORBAT of a force.
b. Individual Reinforcements (IRs). In general, the allocation of IRs as WER
will take a higher priority than that of ITRs.
(1) War Establishment Reinforcements (WERs). WERs take HQs and
units from their peace establishment (PE) up to their war establishment
(WE).
(2) In-Theatre Reserves (ITRs). ITRs are held centrally to provide a
reserve of manpower from which battle casualties may be replaced. ITRs
will be allocated by BG headquarters and brought forward from A2
Echelon. They will need to be met, given an operational brief and allocated to platoons. Platoon commanders must assimilate ITRs fully into their
platoons as quickly as possible. They must brief them fully on the battle
picture. They must appreciate that it will be as difficult for ITRs to fit into
a new platoon as it is for the resident members of that platoon to accept
them. Platoon commanders should note their personal details, their kit
should be checked and C sups, etc., issued. Standards of training of ITRs
will vary and this must be considered.

Stragglers.

0644.
a.

There are four types of stragglers:

(1) Men who have genuinely lost their way and are attempting to rejoin
their company group.
(2) Men who, by reason of their mental and/or physical condition, cannot be held responsible for their actions.
(3)

Men running away through fear.

(4) Men who, through no fault of their own, have become separated
from their company group and are attempting to rejoin them.
b. A company group commander should always try to locate any stragglers
from his sub-unit, subject to the battle situation. It will have an important effect
on the other soldiers. He must decide each case on its merits and deal with it
accordingly. BG HQ should be kept fully informed of the straggler situation.
0645.

Prisoners of War (PW).

a. PW are a useful source of information and should be moved back to BG
HQ as soon as possible. They will otherwise become both a tactical and logistic burden, as well as less useful to interrogators. Furthermore it is a require-

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ment of international law that PW should be moved out of danger as soon as

possible, providing that their medical state permits.
b.

After capture the following action is to be taken:

(1) PW are to disarmed and searched for items of intelligence value.
Only women are permitted to search women PW. Unit identification
should be passed to BG HQ as soon as possible. All items of intelligence
value should be labelled, using AF W 3003, placed in a container and
clearly identified as belonging to a particular PW. The following must not
be removed:

(a) Uniform, including badges of rank and identity tokens, e.g.,

discs and cards.
(b)

Helmets, respirators and ground sheets.

(c)

Pay books.

(d) Private property unless it is of escape use or of intelligence

value. All sums of money should be handed over to a field cashier
and a receipt given to the PW.
(2) Officers, NCOs and men must be segregated and a capture report,
giving a short brief on the circumstances of capture, completed for each
PW.
(3) PW should then be evacuated under escort to the BG collecting
point together with any documents or equipment found in their possession and the capture reports. Maps and documents are then handed over
to the IO or the BGs Tactical Questioners (TQs).
(4) Wounded PW are backloaded down the CASEVAC chain. Depending
on the severity of the wound they may also need guarding.
0646. ID Cards. Company group commanders should be aware that all soldiers
are required to carry an ID card which complies with the Geneva Convention. The
British ID Card is the F/IDENT 189. If captured, one half is given to the holding power
so that next of kin can be informed. These ID cards are only issued for operations but
they should be annotated correctly and stored ready for instant issue if necessary.
0647.

Refugees.
a. The control, movement and administration of refugees is the responsibility
of local authorities and only as a last resort, and then possibly as a result of a
request from the host nation, will military forces attempt to control refugees.
Refugees can cause great problems and commanders will need to use both
discipline and compassion when dealing with them.
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b. It is likely that the movement of refugees will cause major problems to company groups during a withdrawal. They should if possible be deflected into
areas where they must remain until their movement ceases to interfere with
operations. At all times company group commanders must remember that the
care and guidance afforded to displaced, frightened people should be a source
of national and professional pride.
0648.

Pay.
a. Although a soldiers requirement for money in battle may be limited, he
should be paid in cash at reasonable intervals if at all possible for the purchase
of necessities such as soap and toothpaste. Pay will normally come forward
with the CQMS. Pay books may well be re-introduced in war so the payment of
soldiers should be made easier. This applies if soldiers end up attached to
other units or if they become PW.
b. Company group commanders should ensure that soldiers make adequate
provision for any dependants before deploying on operations. It may be necessary subsequently to reassure soldiers that payment of allowances, allotments
and remittances to their dependants is being carried out promptly. The company 2IC should give guidance on this matter, having consulted with BG pay staff.

0649. Insurance. Soldiers, especially those that are married, should be advised
to take out life insurance from a reputable broker.
0650. Wills. Soldiers should be advised to make out a will before deployment.
This should be held in a secure place by the rear party
0651.

Welfare and Amenities.

a. Company group and platoon commanders are responsible for their soldiers welfare and it is their duty to make themselves accessible to discuss, help
and advise where necessary. Help may consist of authority for leave in urgent
cases, correspondence on the soldiers behalf or the arrangement of interviews
with the CO or a qualified welfare representative.
b. Field Marshal Lord Wavell once remarked that War consists of short periods of intense fear followed by long periods of intense boredom. Whenever the
operational situation permits, newspapers, reading material, radios, television,
cards and other games should be provided. This will allow the soldier not in
action or engaged in training, to relax without getting bored and will help to
maintain morale.

0652. Mail. The importance to morale of an efficient mail service cannot be over
emphasised. Mail will normally be brought up with C sups and may well be more
eagerly awaited. CQMS should sort the mail by platoons and detachments for ease

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of distribution. Any mail for soldiers temporarily away should be retained by the company clerk. Mail for soldiers who have left the company should be readdressed and
forwarded. This action will be noticed by the others. A lack of mail can rapidly lower
morale therefore platoon commanders should monitor the amount of mail soldiers
receive. Outgoing mail should be efficiently collected and given to the CQMS for
despatch.
Medical Support
0653. General. Essential to high morale is faith in the system for dealing with
casualties. A soldier must know that if he is wounded or injured, he will be treated
promptly and properly and evacuated quickly to hospital. In war the infantry company
group will receive a Regimental Medical Assistant (RMA) from the BGs medical section who will be responsible for setting up the Company Aid Post (CAP). In contact
the CAP will treat and prioritise casualties for evacuation. Out of contact the CAP
should conduct daily sick parades. Casualties should where possible be estimated in
advance and the field ambulance section, RAP and unit ambulances deployed
accordingly.
0654. Health and Hygiene. Historically casualties due to sickness and disease
far outnumber battle casualties. Good hygiene is the greatest single contributor to a
high standard of health in peace and war. A good working knowledge of the various
aids to good hygiene in the field and an inexorable will to insist that they are scrupulously followed by all ranks at all times can bring most dramatic and rewarding results
in a very short time. The Regimental Medical Officer (RMO) must be the constant
advisor to the company group commander in these matters. The physical and mental health of a soldier is reflected in his enthusiasm, determination and ability to fight.
His health is dependent on:
a. Health Education. Soldiers must be made aware of the health hazards to
which they may be exposed and taught the measures which they can take personally to reduce them, e.g., protection against bites of disease carrying
insects, skin protection in tropical or cold weather, oral hygiene, water discipline
and acceptance of vaccination.
b. Platoon Hygiene. Responsibility for basic hygiene measures in the field
rests with platoon commanders. Attention must be paid to personal hygiene,
food hygiene, the provision of safe drinking water, waste disposal, prevention of
insect and rodent infestation, laundry and bath facilities and protection against
extremes of heat and cold.
c. Other Methods of Protection. In certain areas drugs act as a protection
against specific diseases which happen to be prevalent. Company group commanders must ensure that soldiers take drugs prescribed by medical staffs.

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d. Battle Casualties. The knowledge that, should he be wounded, his commanders are sufficiently well trained to care for him is an important psychological factor in maintaining a soldiers morale. A company group commander
therefore, must ensure that all his soldiers are trained in first aid to ATD 5 standard as a minimum and in particular the treatment of battle casualties.

Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC).

0655.

a. For the best chance of survival and recovery the casualty should reach the
RMO within one hour of wounding and a surgeon within six hours. It is important for a soldier to know that, if he becomes a casualty, he will be effectively
treated and quickly evacuated thus a simple and practical medical plan must be
implemented for every operation. At the CAP the RMA renders first aid to casualties before arranging for their evacuation to the Regimental Aid Post (RAP).
The location of the CAP must be known to all troops and accessible to vehicles.
The CAP must also have communications with company HQ which coordinates
all CASEVAC (see CASEVAC REQ in AUSOP 109). Should immediate evacuation not be possible, care must be taken to protect casualties from further
injury by enemy action or being run over by tanks or by other vehicles.
b.

Responsibility for collection and evacuation is from rear to front:

(1) Forward of CAP. By company stretcher/company ambulance/ any
company vehicle to CAP. It may be necessary to detail additional soldiers
for this task. An effective procedure, especially in the attack, is to task
organise a logistics team under the CSM who can move ammunition forward and evacuate casualties to the CAP from platoon collection points.
(2) Rear of CAP. By battlegroup ambulance/bearers to the RAP. Due
to the lack of transport in Light Role Battalions company vehicles may
have to CASEVAC to the RAP. Any vehicle moving rearwards should be
used (including those for repair).

c. Walking wounded will be directed to the RAP or to a collecting post on the

battlegroup axis. Lightly wounded personnel may either be returned to their platoons after treatment or used for escorting other walking wounded, or PW.
d. At the RAP, which may be located at Battalion HQ or A1 Echelon, the RMO
will carry out the following procedure:
(1) He will assess the condition of all casualties and gives the appropriate treatment, either enabling the individual to return to duty or preparing
him for evacuation. Priorities for evacuation to the field ambulance are
allotted by the RMO.
(2) He will initiate a field medical card (F Med 26), which is fastened to
the casualty and on which is recorded the diagnosis and treatment given
at each stage of evacuation.
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(3) He will arrange for the supporting field ambulances to evacuate

casualties from the RAP.
e. All BG equipment (e.g., binoculars and watches), less personal weapons
and webbing, are removed from casualties at the RAP and returned to the BG.
Wounded soldiers who are capable of firing weapons will retain them for use in
the event of an ambush etc, on the way back to the field ambulance or dressing station. Personal weapons and webbing are removed at the field ambulance
or dressing station, and handed over to the nearest logistic company.
0656. Medical Section. As the RAP is small, it is unable to cope with a large
number of casualties, and it cannot split to provide medical support during mobile
phases of the battle. It is therefore usual to reinforce the RAP with a field ambulance
section (called a medical section). This section can:
a.

Reinforce the RAP to increase its casualty handling capability.

b. Communicate directly with the Field Ambulance HQ collecting squadron to

call forward ambulances or medical supplies.
c. Act as an alternative when the RAP is on the move, or when the tactical
situation requires two RAPs to operate simultaneously.
d.

Replace an RAP which has been destroyed.

e. In armoured or mechanised units provide an ambulance exchange point at

the rear of the BG where casualties are transferred from armoured to soft
skinned ambulances.
0657. Emergency War Burials (see AUSOP 904). The dead should be buried
with due ceremony, in clearly marked graves, without delay and preferably in a central burial ground. This type of burial should be carried out in accordance with the following rules:
a. Whenever possible the body is to be enclosed in a pouch (for human
remains), poncho, blanket or waterproof material and buried at least one metre
deep.
b.

One identity disc must be buried with the body.

c. An improvised marker or cross, high enough to be readily seen, will be

erected. At its base, a bottle, can or other suitable container holding a paper on
which the personal details of the dead are written will be half buried, open end
downwards.
d. When casualties are heavy, a common grave will be necessary (trench burial) in which individual remains are placed side by side and grouped by nationalities. Markers with the words trench burial clearly inscribed, are to be placed
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at each end of the trench, together with lists of the dead enclosed in suitable
containers. The distances of the individual remains from the markers are to be
shown against relevant entries in the lists. All other procedures should, as far
as possible, be similar to those for individual burials.
e. When unsegregated and unidentifiable remains are to be buried (group
burials) the number of bodies buried must be recorded with the names of the
known but unidentifiable dead listed and the words common grave inscribed
on the marker. All other procedures should, as far as possible, be similar to
those for individual burials.
f. Unidentified dead will be buried and reported in the same way as others
except that the word unknown will be entered in place of the name. Particular
care must be taken to list all information which may assist later identification.
g. A burial return (R/CAS/735) will normally be completed by the chaplain or
officer in charge of the burial party. One copy is sent to Field Records and a
second is retained by the battalion. Field Records is responsible for sending
copies to the Army War Graves Service and to the appropriate NATO headquarters for Allied dead.
h. The personal effects of British and Allied dead, and enemy foreign nations
except for United States personnel will be listed on AF W 3190, then labelled
with AF W 3004 and forwarded with a second identity disc to Field Records for
onward transmission to the appropriate authorities. The personal effects of
United States personnel will be buried with the remains.
i. The details of an emergency burial should then be passed to A2 Echelon
as an EMBUREP (AUSOP 109).
Logistic Support
0658. General. Logistic matters at company group and platoon level consist in
the main of the supply, maintenance, movement and quartering of soldiers.
0659. Replenishment. An efficient replenishment system means that the company group is always topped up with C sups and materiel for the current or next operation. The method of demanding a replenishment is contained in AUSOPS. The general logistic state of the company group is reported to battlegroup HQ and A2
Echelon daily in a UNILOGSITREP. Requirements are demanded by platoons to
company HQ as a REPLENDEM PL (416) and by the company to A2 Echelon as a
REPLENDEM COY (415). There are three types of replenishment:
a. Routine Replenishment. This usually takes place after dark at least once
every 24 hours and may coincide with the delivery of a meal. A concealed RV
should be selected with a secure route. A guide may be required for the CQMS

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party and battlefield discipline must be maintained especially light and noise.
Depending on the situation it is usual for platoons to move to the RV in tactical
groups or send collection parties to collect their resupply. In mechanised and
armoured infantry battalions a running or rolling replenishment is used more
frequently whereby company groups drive through a temporary replenishment
point and C sups and materiel are cross-loaded from the supply vehicle to the
AFV. The drills and layout for this type of replenishment are contained in
AUSOP 912. If possible replenishment should be arranged to occur after a long
move and before deploying into battle positions or hides. The requirements of
attachments especially armour (fuel, ammunition, vehicle spares) will need to
be taken into account.
b. Battle Replenishment. Battle replenishment may occur during or in
between contacts at any time of day or night and usually consists of fuel and
ammunition. The same drills as for routine replenishment should be applied
except that the CQMS party will have to move further forward to RV with the
CSMs party or individual platoons. Any fighting vehicles that are part of the
infantry company group should only withdraw a short distance from their primary position to a replenishment point.
c. Hide Replenishment. If elements of the company group, especially those
with vehicles, are in a hide then the replenishment vehicles should RV behind
the hide and move forward to replenish vehicles individually. Sub-units are not
to leave hides
0660. C sups. The quantity of C sups to be held by the battalion is determined
by the staff and planning is based on the Day of Supply (DOS) required for the operation. The DOS is the amount of supplies required by the battalion on operations in
its primary role for one day at normal rates. Units hold as their first line stocks a number of days of DOS. The stocks that a unit can carry on its own vehicles are known
as Unit Mobile Stocks (UMS).
a. Ammunition. The resupply of ammunition will be a major problem in war.
Scales will be forgotten and platoon commanders will have to obtain whatever
ammunition they can find. It will be vital that soldiers produce an accurate declaration of their ammunition holdings so that the company group commander
may be confident of quantities and distribution before every operation. Within
platoons the platoon sergeants should control the distribution of ammunition. It
is a most difficult task and section commanders must play their full part.
Demands for ammunition should be passed promptly to company HQ. The
CSM is responsible for ammunition distribution within the company. Reserves
of ammunition can be carried in the OCs landrover, in bergens and by stretcher
bearers. Ammunition must never be wasted and must be removed from the
dead. Mines and explosives are supplied in the same way as small arms
ammunition but they may be controlled by engineers.

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b. Rations. Rations will either be fresh, composite (compo) or 24 hour

packs. Fresh rations are only likely to be issued in recognised rest or concentration areas where centralised cooking facilities can be set up in safety and
where the concentration of soldiers presents no hazard. Compo in the shape of
four or 10 man packs is the most likely ration to be issued. It could well be augmented with tinned additions such as fruit, and fresh bread may also be issued.
Twenty-four hour packs are expensive to produce and are only likely to be
issued for compelling operational reasons or when no other rations are available. Experienced troops for whom the novelty of cooking their own food has
worn off usually prefer a properly constituted hot meal brought up to them
which they can eat in peace and quiet. This is cooked under BG or company
group arrangements and is brought up by the CQMS. Company group cooking
is preferred as it remains under company control, is probably more recently
cooked and very often includes additional goodies, e.g., fresh fruit, local eggs
and fruit accumulated by the CQMS. Compo, however, is an excellent ration
although troops should not be kept on it for too long. Twenty-four hour ration
packs which are normally designed to be eaten hot or cold are nutritious but
can pall after a few days if only one menu is available. However, the aim, whatever the circumstances, should be to produce two hot meals per day and a midday snack. Meals may have to be prepared or delivered before first light or after
last light depending on the tactical situation. Hot drinks at any time are good for
morale and tea containers should be brought forward with meals and left with
platoons. Company group and platoon commanders should be aware that,
apart from reverses in battle and the late or non-arrival of mail, the major factor affecting the morale of soldiers is problems with rations. Every effort should
be made to ensure that soldiers eat well and regularly.
c. Water. If there is no local source of drinkable water then it must be
brought up by the CQMS in jerrycans or in a bowser. Each man requires at
least five litres of water a day and this will increase depending on workrate, climate and NBC dress state.
d. POL. POL requirements in an infantry company group are not as
demanding as in mechanised or armoured units but must not be overlooked for
in addition to soft-skinned vehicles there may be generators, cookers and
lamps to consider. Packed fuel may be brought up in jerrycans by the CQMS or
vehicles may be sent to an UBRE at a POL point. Drivers should get in the habit
of refuelling at every opportunity.
0661.

Materiel.
a. Clothing and Equipment. Clothing and equipment includes everything
worn and used by soldiers. Company group and platoon commanders will have
to remain constantly alert for worn clothing and equipment which will not last
the next battle. The CQMS should carry a small range of items for immediate
replacement or exchange. Additional items should be demanded through, and

6-18

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collected from, the CQMS when he comes forward. This process can be left to
platoon sergeants but the company group officers must be constantly aware of
the situation. Initiative and resourcefulness will also have to be used to good
effect in order to retain high standards of clothing and equipment.
b. G1098 Stores. The CQMS should carry all G1098 and miscellaneous
stores not on issue on his 4 ton cargo truck. The loading and layout of stores
will require practising in peacetime and on exercise.
c. Weapons. In war all platoon weapons must be maintained to the highest
standard. The BG armourers should be called if weapons cease to function but
this may not always be possible. Platoon commanders therefore must oversee
the cannibalisation of weapons and their recovery from the dead. The possibility of a weapon explosion must always be borne in mind but it is a lesser risk than
being unarmed in the face of the enemy.
d. MT and Technical Stores. A spares pack consisting of a small range of
fast moving MT and technical stores is held by a fitter section if deployed.
Additional items are held in A2 Echelon by the QM(T). This holding is known as
the Unit Repair Scale (URS) and equates to 30 days stock of frequently
demanded items. Replenishment of these stores and demands for items not
held are made to the Brigade Support Squadron via the LSD.
0662. Transport and Movement. Transport may be allocated to company HQ for
certain operations. Its supervision and administration will be a company group problem and the CSM together with the platoon sergeants should be given this responsibility. Ammunition may have to be issued to the drivers and trucks camouflaged and
concealed, as well as serviced and maintained regularly. Refuelling must also be
considered. Other forms of movement such as rail, aircraft, helicopters or boats may
be used. The organisation of loads/sticks and equipment will have to be addressed.
0663. Quartering. Company groups will not always be in the front line. It is the
responsibility of company group HQ to allocate accommodation. This task is best
done by the CQMS or perhaps the Coy 2IC as part of a company group rear reconnaissance party. Protection and concealment are most important, particularly to
avoid detection from the ground or air. Sentries must be posted, alarm signals must
be clearly understood and there must be a properly rehearsed plan of action in case
of enemy attack. Normal in-barracks hygiene must be observed and adequate ablutions and sanitary arrangements must be made.
Equipment Support (ES)
0664. At unit level, first line ES is provided by a Light Aid Detachment (LAD). The
role of the LAD is to effect level 2 repairs and provide first line recovery. Level 3
repairs will require backloading via an equipment collection point. Equipment which
is deemed to be operationally vital by the G3 staff will be subject to forward repair by
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a Forward Repair Team (FRT) from the CS Company REME. In mechanized and
armoured battalions each company will have a fitter section attached to it. Recovery
is usually located at A1 Echelon and the remainder of the LAD is at A2 Echelon.
0665. The ES effort available to a company group is minimal therefore the preferred
method is to exchange defective weapons and equipment rather than repair them.
However, the following procedures will improve the level of maintenance:
a. Monitoring the state of critical equipments (weapons, vehicles, radios,
night fighting aids etc.) in company HQ by regular reports and a states board.
This task is made easier if a simple fault reporting system is introduced.
b. Insisting that vehicles and equipments are maintained in accordance with
servicing schedules and checked daily.
c.

The CQMS carrying a supply of weapons spares.

d.

The RSDC is trained on Clansman repair.

e.

All soldiers are educated in equipment husbandry.

References
0666. Administration in War (Army Code No. 71342). This pamphlet is issued
down to platoon commander level and it describes the responsibilities of the administrative staff and services and the available organisation to meet these responsibilities on operations. Chapter 4 deals with administration within the unit.
0667.

The Army Field Manual Volume I Part 2.

Battlegroup Tactics to follow.

0668. Army Doctrine Publications(ADP) Volume 3 Logistics ( Army Code

No. 71566).
0669.

The Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 6 CSS (Provisional).

0670. AUSOPs (Army Code No. 71363). This contains details of unit CSS
SOPs, reports and returns and standard loads.

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12-25km

MED
SECT
A1

FWD
SQN

RAP

AMB
XP

CAP

MED

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PC
DET

DP

RV

LSD

A2

BSG

BDE
SP SQN CS

Fig 9. Battlegroup CSS Systems

XP

ACP

A1

LOG SP

ECP

A2

FWD
PL

LAD (-)

REC

FITTER
SECT

ES

FRT(A)

FWD
REPAIR

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ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 6

6A-1

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6A-2

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Chapter 7
TRAINING FOR WAR
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
The object of all training is success in battle.
Field Marshal Montgomery
0701. Training for war is the most important activity of the Army when not engaged
upon operations. The term training covers
every aspect of military activity designed to
increase a soldiers knowledge of his military skills, his self confidence and his physical and mental fitness for war. When not
engaged on operations it is the duty of all
commanders to ensure that their men are
ready and trained for war.

Contents
Page
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

71

SECTION 2. DIRECTION OF TRAINING

72

SECTION 3. PREPARATION

74

SECTION 4. PLANNING TRAINING

75

SECTION 5. TRAINING IN THE COMPANY

AND PLATOON

79

Annex:
A. Activity Checklist in Chronological Order for

0702. Success in war depends not only Planning a Company Exercise

upon leadership but also upon the soldiers
confidence in his leader in training as well as in battle. Every officer and NCO must
have the knowledge, skill and imagination to teach, as well as the courage and determination to lead. In particular, he must be able to pass on to his soldiers the lessons
gained from his own experience. These lessons are often amongst the most valuable
assets he has to offer.
0703. Training must always be well prepared and imaginative. Badly prepared training is a recipe for disaster, not only because it leads to bad lessons being taught but
also because it creates a lack of confidence in the commanders responsible. Training
must always be relevant, demanding, imaginative and realistic. General (later Field
Marshal) Wavell, speaking in 1933, described his yardstick for a successful exercise
as: If the exercise is subsequently discussed in the Officers mess, it was probably
worthwhile; if there is argument over it in the Sergeants mess it was a good exercise;
while, if it should be mentioned in the Corporals room, it was an undoubted success.
0704. Time and resources for training will always be limited. Not only will the wide
range of commitments which the Regular Army must fulfil impose severe limitations
on training but the sheer cost of training a modern army and the ever increasing difficulties in providing adequate training areas and ranges make it essential that all
training should be carefully planned with a clear and achieveable aim if the available
time and resources are to be fully utilized.

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0705 0706.

Reserved.

SECTION 2. DIRECTION OF TRAINING

Direction of Army Training
0707. The development of doctrine, training strategy and collective training for the
Regular and Reserve Armies at home and abroad is the responsibility of the two star
Director General Development and Doctrine. The delivery of individual training
Phases 13 is the responsibility of the two star Director General of the Army Training
and Recruiting Agency.
0708.

Army training policy is promulgated through:

a. General Staff Training Publications (GSTPs). Details of GSTPs are contained in the Compendium of Official Military Publications (Army Code No.
71608). The following publications should be noted:
(1) ADP Training (Army Code No. 71621). Interprets and expands on
the training elements of BMD in order to guide commanders and staffs in
the planning and conduct of training.
(2) AFM Training for Operations (Army Code No. 71630). Provides a
practical guide for those involved in the planning and conduct of training
at formation, unit and sub-unit level.
(3) Compendium of Unit Collective Training Tasks (Army Code No.
71538). The compendium provides details of the collective training a
unit is expected to achieve annually.
(4) Army Training Directives (ATDs) (Army Code No. 71209). ATDs
give guidance to commanding officers on specific areas of individual
training and the mandatory instruction and testing to be conducted in the
unit annually.
(5) Army Doctrine and Training News (ADTN) (Army Code No. 71145).
ADTN is a bi-annual publication covering current points of interest.
b. Army General and Administrative Instructions (AGAI). AGAIs deal with
subjects of permanent application not falling appropriately within the scope of
any other publication.
c. Defence Council Instructions (DCIs). DCIs deal with subjects of TriService application (DCI(G)), (DCI(JS)); of Army application (DCI(A)) and of
MOD Civilian application (DCI(Civ)).

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d. MOD Letters. MOD letters deal with individual policy matters such as the
Schedule of Overseas Exercises and Common User Training Ammunition
Scales.
e. Videos.
Catalogue.

Details of training videos are contained in the SSVC Film

f. Land Commands Observations from Training. This is an annual publication covering the key points emerging from exercises run by CATC, TSC(G) and
BATUS.
Direction of Infantry Training
0709. The primary source for the direction of Infantry training is the Director of
Infantry. He is responsible for the development and promulgation of Infantry tactical
doctrine at company level and below and Infantry training publications, and the policy
for Infantry individual career training beyond Phase 1. The first responsibility is
described in the Introduction to this pamphlet. Actioning the policy for career training
is the responsibility of the Infantry Training Development Team who write and update
job specifications and course training objectives. Their work is promulgated through
the Directive for Infantry Employments (DIE) and the Infantry Employment Volumes
(IEV) and is executed by units and by the three Infantry Training Centres.
a. DIE (Army Code No. 71490). The DIE details the standards and conduct
of individual training throughout the Infantry. It includes: an explanation of the
structure of employment within the Infantry and its application to individual
training standards, including the skills required for each level and type of training; and an explanation of testing procedures.
b.

IEVs.

There are two types of IEV:

(1) Job Specifications. These volumes give an outline job description

and a comprehensive list of tasks which a soldier or officer could be
called upon to carry out in a given appointment. Infantry commanders at
all levels are responsible for ensuring that they and their subordinates see
and are familiar with their job specifications.
(2) Training Objectives. These volumes show in detail the skills to be
taught on courses and cover basic training, Infantry Training Centre
courses and certain unit cadres.
Field Training
0710. Below MOD level, responsibility for the implementation of tactical training
policy and the direction, coordination and supervision of field training, rests with the
formation commander assisted by his G3 training staff. Most formation commanders
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make their views and requirements known to commanding officers through training
directives, which are usually issued once a year, and supplementary training instructions. The ultimate responsibility for the conduct and standard of both individual and
collective training at battalion level lies with the commanding officer.
0711 0712.

Reserved.

SECTION 3. PREPARATION
0713. Training is a function of command. The responsibility for the achievement of
the highest standards of professional competence plus physical and mental fitness
therefore lies with commanders at every level, since responsibility for command and
training cannot be separated. Every officer, warrant officer and non-commissioned
officer must be not only a leader but also a trainer. It should always be remembered
that the greatest contribution that a nations armed forces can make to peace, is to
provide tangible evidence of their readiness and ability to meet the demands of war.
0714. Training is a continuous process. The costs and complexities of new training
equipment, reductions in manpower and training ammunition scales, as well as the
availability of training areas, require the best possible management of training
resources by commanders at all levels. This is not easy to achieve and compromises
invariably have to be made, but only by careful planning will the best use be made of
limited resources.
0715. Aim of Training. The primary aim of training is to produce a self confident
and disciplined soldier who is skilled in the use of his weapons, in fieldcraft and in
battlefield survival. He must be physically and mentally prepared to meet the
demands of war under all conditions of weather and terrain for protracted periods.
This primary aim must be met to provide collective training with a solid foundation.
The proper maintenance of basic military skills must never be overlooked or neglected
as it is quite possible for a battalion or company to be over-exercised but undertrained.
0716. Design of Training. Training must be specifically designed to ensure that
the company is prepared for the fact that uncertainty will play a major part in any
future war. The company commander must understand the effects that this will have
upon morale, the planning and decision making process and, therefore, the significance of quick reaction to the unexpected. It is thus important to create realism and
friction in training. Once section, platoon and company drills have been mastered,
what happens on exercise must, from a player point of view, be totally unpredictable.
It is essential that all members of the company are placed under stress and their flexibility tested and developed. For officers and NCOs, new factors must be introduced
so that plans have to be changed. Training must always be well prepared and imaginative. Badly prepared training is counter productive and a recipe for disaster.

7-4

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0717. Use of Time and Resources. Time and resources for training will always
be limited. The wide range of routine demands on a companys time, such as guards
and duties, eat into the time available for a company to train, which in turn must be
dovetailed into the overall battalion programme. Coupled with the sheer cost of training a modern army, and the ever increasing difficulties in providing adequate ranges
and training areas, it is essential that the best possible use is made of the time and
resources that are available. All training should be carefully planned with a clear and
achieveable aim if the available time and resources are not to be wasted or used to
their maximum effect.
0718. The Company Commander. By the very nature of infantry operations, the
infantryman will undergo extremes of both physical and mental pressures. The
enemy is often engaged at close quarters and inevitably casualties will sometimes be
high. The personal influence and leadership of the company commander are of paramount importance and the effectiveness, unity and morale of a company depend on
his personality and professional ability. Both in training and in war, his presence must
be felt throughout the company in all its activities.
0719 0720.

Reserved.

SECTION 4. PLANNING TRAINING

0721. The Process. Training is a continuous process. The costs and complexities of new training equipment, reductions in manpower and training ammunition
scales, as well as the availability of training areas, require the best possible management of training resources by commanders at all levels. This is not easy to
achieve and compromises invariably have to be made, but only by careful planning
will the best use be made of limited resources. In working out what training should be
done and how it is to be programmed, a logical process to follow is:
a.

Determining training priorities.

b.

Establishing the time frame to be covered.

c.

Assessing commitments and training requirements.

d. Assessing assistance required to carry out the training and major limiting
factors.
e.

Detailed programming.

0722. Systems Approach to Training (SAT). SAT is a logical approach to training which ensures that training is developed in an entirely logical way in concert with
the efficient, effective and economic use of resources. Although it finds fullest application in training establishments, SAT still has general applicability for planning and
running sub-unit training. However, it cannot replace experience, imagination and
innovation and the officer responsible for training must still exercise his judgement.
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The SAT loop is shown at Fig 10. Full details of SAT can be found in the seven
Systems Approach to Training pamphlets (Army Code No. 70670).
0723. The Time Factor. Where possible, training should be planned well in
advance. However, useful planning cannot start until certain essential information
(e.g., outside commitments and availability of ranges) is available. There is an
inevitable conflict between, on the one hand, trying to plan ahead and, on the other,
lacking sufficient information to do so. When a change of station is pending or some
uncertainty exists over an operational commitment, the period of training being
planned may have to be extended or curtailed. It will often be necessary to start planning before some important details can be confirmed. Although subsequent changes
may be necessary, this ensures that adequate time is available for preparation of
training. It also ensures that the commanding officer is aware of the plans, and is
therefore likely to endeavour to assist in their preparation, and also by leaving the
company untouched from extra commitments over the period in question.
0724. Occasionally short notice opportunities for training of all types sometimes
occur, and company commanders should always have training plans up their
sleeves which can be put into operation at short notice to take advantage of the
opportunity.
0725. Training Requirements of the Company. Training requirements of the
company will vary considerably, depending on its recent experience, its current and
future roles and the personal views of the company commander. However, after
allowing for any specific training for pending operational commitments, it is likely that
the company commander would concern himself with:
a.

Any training as directed by the commanding officer.

b. Training at individual level to ensure that basic skills are maintained and
improved.
c.

Upgrading training.

d.

Education of NCOs and preparation for promotion.

e. Training at individual, section, platoon and company level to correct any

weaknesses or deficiencies associated with the units role.
f.

Training required for any specific commitment.

0726. Other Commitments. There are a variety of other commitments and

events that a company may have to undertake. Some will have training value, others
will not; some will be mandatory, others with a regimental flavour may be voluntary.
Examples include:
a.

7-6

Provision of enemy for exercise.

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Write
Training
Objectives
Determine
Training
Content

Prepare Job
Specification

Analyse
the
Task

Selection &
Allocation of
Trainees

Design
Training

Equipment
Development

Evaluate, then Modify

or Update Training
as necessary

Conduct
Training
Validate
Training

Fig 10. The Systems Approach to Training

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b.

Assistance to TA and cadet units.

c. Regular Army Assistance Table (RAAT) (e.g., equipment trials, providing

infrastructure for a support weapons concentration).
d.

Garrison duties.

e.

Keeping the Army in the Public Eye (KAPE) tours.

f.

Regimental activities.

0727. Establishing Priorities. When the extent and nature of all the commitments have been established, the time required to accomplish each one has to be
assessed. Invariably there is insufficient time to do everything. The company commander must then put the commitments that are within his control into a short and
long term order of priority. This is important for programming purposes, and ensures
that a commander is not caught off balance when a cancellation of a commitment
occurs and additional programme time becomes available, or (more often) an
unavoidable extra commitment is received at short notice. The company commander
must at all times be aware of his commanding officers requirements, set out in his
training directive, and should clear his plans with him before embarking on detailed
planning.
0728. Assessment of Limiting Factors and Assistance Required. Once a
decision has been made on what training needs to be carried out, account must be
taken of factors likely to restrict that training, such as the availability of training areas.
A preliminary assessment must be made of the assistance and facilities required to
carry out the training, such as availability of instructors, training areas and ammunition. It is also important to bear in mind, particularly at this stage, the need to allow
periods for leave and administration throughout the year.
0729. Programming. The basis of the companys programme must fit into the
overall framework of the battalion programme, which in itself should be part of a logical cycle. The cycle, which is designed to enable all levels of training to be covered
in the course of its period and in a progressive sequence, is normally as follows:
a. Individual Training.
including:

This covers numerous aspects of a battalions activity,

(1)

Refresher training in basic skills.

(2)

Upgrading training, NCO cadres.

(3) Specialist cadres for training replacements or for initial training on

new equipment.

7-8

(4)

Study periods.

(5)

Officer training.
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b. Battalion Training. This is broken down into company training, which is

conducted first at platoon level and then at company level and battalion training, which involves the whole battalion, including administrative elements.
Ideally, some of the training should be conducted on an all arms basis. During
the period, Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTs) might be held and battalion exercises can be organized as a lead into formation training.
c. Formation Training.
the training cycle.

Formation training will normally be the culmination of

0730. Once detailed planning starts, considerable coordination is required and

adjustments frequently have to be made to reconcile problems over such things as
the availability of instructors, ranges and training areas, equipment, accommodation
and transport. Rarely can all problems be overcome. Most of them can be avoided
by planning and consulting well ahead and they are the most important points to
remember when programming training.
0731. Safety. Safety in training as in any other aspect of military life is the overall responsibility of the commanding officer. Although this responsibility cannot be
delegated, commanders at all levels must ensure that safety is considered when
planning and conducting training. All exercises, whether involving live firing of
weapons or not, must be supported by a written instruction which reflects the commanders risk assessment. Crown Immunity no longer exists and company commanders should be familiar with the safety criteria laid down in the following publications:
a. Queens Regulations. Chapter 5 Parts IV and V lay down safety precautions concerning firearms and ammunition, and the safety of troops during
training.
b.

AGAIs.

Chapter 16. Safety on Training Ranges.

c. Infantry Training Volume IV. Pamphlet No. 21. Regulations for the Safe
Planning, Conduct and Supervision of Firing (Infantry Weapons), Army Code
No. 71080.
0732 0733.

Reserved.

SECTION 5. TRAINING IN THE COMPANY AND PLATOON

Company
0734. For the manoeuvrist approach to be successful in battle, training in peace
must incorporate its tenets. The effective employment of mission command will in
particular depend on thorough training in drills and decision-making skills. Training
should therefore be designed to encourage initiative within a system of decentralized

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command and maximum opportunity should be made to develop offensive manoeuvre, even with a defence exercise. Mistakes will be made and junior commanders
should be encouraged to experiment. Company commanders must subsequently
ensure that appropriate lessons are learned, although any attempt to be prescriptive
must be avoided and the old adage of tactics being the opinion of the senior officer
present never allowed to creep in. Despite there never being a right answer to a
peacetime tactical problem, as the critical component of the enemy is missing,
assessment of training can nonetheless be based on how well current doctrine and
drills have been applied. The 18th Century Russian General Suvorov said, Hard in
training easy in battle. Train hard fight easy should therefore be the maxim, since
it is the will to win, reinforced by the toughest approach, both in mind and body, which
will guarantee victory in time of war.

Exercise Planning.

0735.

An exercise planning check list is at Annex A.

Platoon
0736. The platoon is the basic offensive and manoeuvre unit within the battalion.
Battles are won and lost at this level. It is fundamental therefore that the very highest
standards of training are achieved and maintained here. Most platoon training will
take place within the framework of the company training programme. It follows therefore that platoon commanders must keep their company commander fully informed at
all times of the state of training within their platoons and where more or less emphasis should be placed in order to achieve the required standard. Time is the most precious commodity, and compromises will invariably have to be made and priorities
allocated. Platoon commanders should always be in a position to analyse training in
order to cut down on unnecessary repetition which leads to boredom. Having said
that, there are mandatory standards which must be achieved annually, in physical fitness, fieldcraft, NBC and skill at arms in particular. The excellent trainer will stand out
from the rest in the very manner in which he achieves these standards. The extent to
which training is made both effective and fun is constrained only by the limits of imagination and initiative shown by commanders at all levels.
0737. Training must be progressive if it is to be effective. A well tried and successful method of progressive training is as follows:
a.

Perusal of source publications (see Section 2).

b. Presentation, demonstration and video, if available, to set a standard for

future conduct.

7-10

c.

Discussion, including cloth model exercises.

d.

TEWTs.

e.

Field exercises.

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Summary
0738.

Some additional points on training are as follows:

a. Regardless of level, great emphasis must always be placed upon the
development of leadership qualities.
b. The key to high morale in war is the confidence of the soldier in his leaders and training forged through realistic and demanding training.
c. The value of training will be greatly influenced by the time, care and imagination devoted to its preparation.
d. Training is the time for making and learning from mistakes. Mistakes made
in training must never, however, go by default and lessons learned must be
recorded and explained to the participants.
e. All training must be as closely allied to reality as safety and other circumstances will permit.
f. The logistic demands of warfare must never be neglected on exercise, nor
must the operating difficulties imposed by EW warfare or NBC be sacrificed to
expediency.
g. Training must not only be worthwhile but also enjoyable if interest is to be
sustained.
h.

Skills learned must be exercised regularly if readiness is to be maintained.

i. When planning training, first study the lessons of experience and then
apply them to the requirements of the exercise.
j. As equipment becomes increasingly complex so must the standard of individual training be raised. While new technology will increase the ability of the
individual to contribute to the successful outcome of each operation, so will the
consequence of failure, born of inadequate training, bring ever increasing
penalties.

To win in battle, highly trained and well disciplined soldiers are the vital factor; soldiers who have been conditioned by thorough training to react by habit when confronted with the harsh conditions of battle. The habits learned in training good or
bad are the same habits the soldiers will use in combat. Commanders at all levels
must therefore ensure that each of their soldiers is well trained and that reactions are
so deeply ingrained through correct teaching and intensive practice that under the
strain of battle each soldier will automatically do what is right.
Field Marshal The Earl Wavell

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7-12

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ANNEX A TO
CHAPTER 7

ACTIVITY CHECKLIST IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER FOR

PLANNING A COMPANY EXERCISE
Ser

Primary Task

Secondary Tasks

1.

Check aim, scope, timing and

duration of exercise with Bn
2IC.
Brief CO and seek approval as
nec

Read trg area handbooks and assess

limitations and utility of areas. Issue wng
O on wide bn distr to get ex into diaries

2.

Select trg area. Book area

and facilities as early as possible

3.

Write Trg Objectives

Make full use of publications listed in

Section 2. If field firing, check whether
participants at AOSP Stage 5 standard.

4.

Conduct recce

G3 recce Meet Trg Area Comdt and

staff, recce area and facilities, other
users? Range orders
Coy 2IC/CQMS recce accn and
messes, armouries, catering and water,
GD/civ staff reqs, ammo bunkers,
pay/post, off-duty facilities, gd and sy
reqs, POL, med, shared facilities

5.

Discuss support requirements

Bn 2IC external or internal sp (e.g.,

SH, sp wpns, addl cse qual personnel
for instruction or as range safety staff,
SASC TAG)
Other OCs addl manpower,
Permanent Range Team (PRT)
Trg Wing maps, air photos, targetry,
trg stores; cadre for authorization of fd
firing safety staff
RSO radios, FFRs, CEI
QM(A) ammo, rats and civ staff sp
QM(T) armrs, VMs
MTO tpt, dvrs, POL, VMs, mov to and
from
RMO med cover
RAO pay, docs, granting of fd condtns
Adjt visits

Continued overleaf
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Ser

Primary Task

Secondary Tasks

6.

Issue Written Instr (1)

7.

G3 Recce

Range offrs

8.

Adv Ptys

G3 Range offrs and PRTs, liaise with

Trg Area staff and other users.
CQMS Party T/O accn, estab camp.

9.

Conduct Trg

10.

Post exercise actions:

a. Stores and eqpt, cleanliness and accounting.
b. Brief CO and 2IC on ex.
c. Write PXR.
d. Letters of thanks.

Note:
1.

The Written Instr must reflect the comds Risk Assessment.

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