Democratization

ISSN: 1351-0347 (Print) 1743-890X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20

Populists in government? Hungary's system of

national cooperation
Agnes Batory
To cite this article: Agnes Batory (2016) Populists in government? Hungary's system of
national cooperation, Democratization, 23:2, 283-303, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2015.1076214
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1076214

Published online: 17 Sep 2015.

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Date: 26 October 2016, At: 11:33

Democratization, 2016
Vol. 23, No. 2, 283 303, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1076214

Populists in government? Hungarys system of national

cooperation
Agnes Batory

School of Public Policy, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary

This article considers Hungarys political system from 2010 to 2014 with
Fidesz in power and domestic and international actors responses to the
challenge of populists-in-government. The article argues that domestic
responses were weakened by Fidesz use of its supermajority for a partisan
redrafting of the countrys constitutional order, but also by its mainstream
competitors failure to offer a contrasting yet positive vision for the
electorate. External actors, and the European Union (EU) in particular, may
therefore have emerged as the main bulwark against the effects of populistsin-government. However, the EU was relatively ill-equipped to deal with
systemic violations of the common values of the Union with respect to its
member states, and arguably even the available measures were not used to
their full potential. The main explanation for this lies in Fidesz origins:
rather than starting its life on the fringes of the electoral space, the party had
been the major, mainstream centre-right alternative. This position in
Hungarys party system had in turn endowed Fidesz with strong
transnational links which outlasted the partys own transformation and
continued to act to dampen EU action.
Keywords: populism; Hungary; European Union; governing parties;
opposition

Introduction
A recent cover of the Hungarian weekly HVG showed Hungary superimposed on
the map of Latin-America a clear indication of the editors opinion of the country
having drifted, if not geographically then certainly politically, to a part of the world
that is notorious for populist regimes. Indeed, the perception that Hungary, once a
frontrunner in democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe, has left the
European mainstream is now widespread in the international press. The precise
nature of Hungarys system of national cooperation, as the Fidesz party calls
the result of the changes it instituted, is however more controversial. This article
considers to what extent and in what way populism has impacted on Hungarys political system from 2010 to 2014 with Fidesz in power, and how domestic and

Email: batorya@ceu.hu

# 2015 Taylor & Francis

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A. Batory

international actors responded to the challenge of populism. Posing these questions

assumes that a range of actors believes that something ought to be done about
populism, because it is detrimental to democracy, or more precisely, liberal democracy a normative standpoint that goes back at least to United States (US) political philosophy of the 1950s, and is now common in the literature.1 The main harm
comes from populists disrespect for, and undermining of, the foundations on
which the notion of limited government and pluralist democracy rests: independent
institutions, constitutional checks and balances and civil rights and liberties for the
protection of minorities.2 Populists may put aside all that constrains them for shortterm political gain, in the name of (their portrayal of) the will of the people. In
this sense, populism is also an antithesis of constitutionalism, that is, the notion
not just of the recognition by those governing of the governed . . . as the ultimate
source of political authority, but also the durability of political institutions within
which governing takes place.3
This latter point also links populism with democratic consolidation, or rather the
absence of it. The dividing line between a regime in transition and a consolidated
democracy is often blurred. Juan Linzs oft-quoted benchmark is the notion that
democracy becomes the only game in town, which is reached behaviourally
when no signicant group tries to (violently) overthrow the regime; attitudinally
when a strong majority . . . holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the appropriate way to govern life in a society . . . and support for antisystem alternatives is quite small; and constitutionally when governing and
nongovernmental forces alike . . . become subject to, and habituated to, the resolution of conict within the specic laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned
by new democratic process.4 A society where a signicant part of the population
buys into the ideas proposed by populists and/or does not reject the anti-system
message inherent in populist ideas fails the attitudinal test. Populists-in-government
who treat existing foundational laws as obstacles to the real rule of the people also
fail the constitutional test. In short, populists-in-government and the notion of consolidated liberal democracy are logically not compatible with each other.
Dening what populism is, rather than what it stands against, is a complicated
task. To avoid devoting the following pages to this already much-debated conceptual question, the article follows Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggarts (in this issue)
strategy in adopting an ideational denition that focuses on the notion that politics
should be about acting in accordance with popular sovereignty at any cost.
Accordingly, as Mudde phrased it, populism is a:
thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the pure people and the corrupt elite, and which
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonte generale (general will) of
the people.5

Populism rests on the premise that virtue resides in the simple people, who are the
overwhelming majority, and in their collective traditions and derives its claim to

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285

legitimacy from it.6 It is important to point out that defending the pure people is
not necessarily the only, or even the main, plank of a populist partys appeal. But, if
the ideational denition is consistently applied, in the absence of such rhetoric a
party should not be considered populist even if it advocates or emulates particular
policies designed purely for attracting popular support, regardless of the
consequences.
Hungary is an interesting country case for an exploration of the impact of populism. As the other examples considered in this special issue show, populists-in-government are not as uncommon as one may expect, even in the EU. For a party that
in ideational terms can be classied as populist to have qualied majority in parliament and then use it for adopting a new constitution and electoral law single-handedly, as Fidesz did in Hungary, is however exceptional in an EU member state.
Fidesz development trajectory is also unusual in that rather than coming in
from the anks of the electoral space or being created ab ovo as a populist party,
it is an erstwhile ideologically mainstream, moderate party that has refashioned
itself into a vote-winning machine based on the claim to champion the interests
of the common people. The origins of the party in turn have important consequences for what might be viable strategies for its competitors and critics in
responding to it.
One important caveat for this case study is that Hungary features an array of
parties that do not qualify as populist in ideational terms but advocate wildly unrealistic (populist) policies, presumably judged to be vote-winners regardless of the
consequences, at least from time to time. However, the focus here is narrowly on
populism in ideational terms as it applies to governing parties and the actual
responses this phenomenon has received in the Hungarian case.
The article starts from a brief introduction of Fidesz development over time,
then moves to a discussion of the Fidesz narrative to establish whether the populist
label in ideational terms indeed applies. The empirical material comes from a
sampling of Viktor Orbans speeches. The subsequent section deals with possible
explanations for Fidesz sweeping electoral victory in 2010 and 2014, including the
demand side of populism: attitudes that made the electorate receptive to the narrative offered by Fidesz. The article then explores responses to the Fidesz phenomenon, rst from domestic actors and second from international actors. As will be
shown, the impact of such interventions was rather limited in the domestic
arena, partly because Fidesz used its supermajority in parliament to weaken constitutional checks and balances and maximize its chances of reelection through
redrawing the electoral system, but also because its mainstream electoral competitors failed to offer a contrasting yet positive vision for the electorate. International
actors stood a better chance of curbing Fidesz excesses in power. However,
Fidesz history as the mainstream centre-right alternative in Hungary and the
strong transnational embeddedness arising from it afforded the party a certain
degree of leeway, particularly vis-a`-vis the EU. A brief concluding section summarizes the argument.

286

A. Batory

The Fidesz story

In order to better understand Fidesz contemporary electoral appeal, it is worth considering its development against the background of party competition in Hungary
since regime change in 1989 1990. The party was founded in 1988, with the name
FIDESZ an acronym for Alliance of Young Democrats. It was a signicant player
in the liberal camp of the democratic opposition and in June 1989 it was Viktor
Orban, already a major gure in the party, who openly demanded the withdrawal
of Soviet troops from Hungarian soil and free elections at the reburial of Imre Nagy,
Hungarys prime minister in 1956 an iconic moment in the countrys democratic
transformation. In 1990, Fidesz was one of six parties that gained representation in
parliament. A poor performance in the elections four years later was a decisive
factor in the strategic decision of the Fidesz leadership to turn the liberal youth
movement into a conservative catch-all party around the mid-1990s. The original
loose association . . . became a hierarchically organised election party (Table 1).7
The strategy clearly worked, in that following the 1998 elections Fidesz formed
a government. In the following decade Hungarian politics was shaped by the
increasingly sharp confrontation of two major electoral alternatives: Fidesz and
its minor Christian-conservative coalition partners on the right and the Socialist
Party with the Free Democrats in the left/liberal camp. Each sought to win elections
with more and more unrealistic promises of increasing welfare spending, and particularly on Fidesz part, with less and less acceptance of the other as legitimate
competitor, thereby effectively preventing any possibility of consensus or even
communication across partisan lines. This bipolar competition between two
arch-enemies, or as another analyst put it, competing populisms,8 also
formed the main divide in ideological terms, with patriotic/nationalistic, Christian-conservative, etatist and (after Hungarys 2004 EU accession) increasingly
Eurosceptic rhetoric on the right, and cosmopolitan, secular, pro-market, and
enthusiastically pro-integration views on the left.
Arguably another electoral defeat in 2002 provided the main impetus for
another step-change within Fidesz:
It came as a shock to the Fidesz leader when . . . the Socialists took over once again.
Orban explained that the nation could not be in opposition and formed civic committees that were to mobilize civil society against the state.9

The Fidesz leader questioned the legitimacy of the socialist government and
demonstratively did not attend parliaments sessions. The increasingly sharp us
vs. them rhetoric, reinforced by yet another defeat at the polls in 2006, paid off
in 2010 and 2014, aided, both times, by the Socialists corruption scandals and
an event in 2006 which, in the eyes of many, irredeemably discredited the
centre-left party. Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany admitted in a speech at a
closed party conference in 2006 that the government had been lying to the electorate about the state of the economy in order to win the parliamentary elections, and
called for his partys backing for austerity measures even at the price of losing the

Table 1.

Elections in Hungary, 19902014 (share of votes and seats; %).

1990

Party

1998

Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes

2002

Seats

Votes

2006

Seats

2010

2014

Votes Seats Votes Seats

Votes

Seats
19.1

10.9

8.5

33.0

54.1

32.9

34.7

42.1

46.1

43.0

49.2

19.3

15.3

25.7

21.4

23.8

19.7

17.9

7.6

6.2

5.6

5.2

6.5

5.2

8.9
6.5

5.4
5.4

7.0
7.0

5.2
5.7

29.5
2.3

38.3
0.0

41.1
3.9

42.5
0.0

42.0

42.2

52.7

68.1

44.9

66.8

24.7

42.7

11.7

9.8

2.8

4.4

6.2

5.0

2.8

2.7

0.0

11.8

11.1

8.8

6.7

13.2

12.4

0.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.6

0.0

5.5

3.6

4.4

0.0

2.2

0.0

0.0

16.7

12.8

20.3

11.6

7.5

4.1

5.4

2.5

0.6

6.3

0.3

2.1

0.0

1.1

0.0

1.1

0.3

3.7

0.0

15.8

2.8

11.2

Democratization

Hungarian Socialist Party

(MSZP)
Alliance of Free Democrats
(SZDSZ)
Fidesz
Christian Dem. Peoples
Party (KDNP)
Hungarian Democratic
Forum (MDF)
Independent Smallholders
Party (FKGP)
Party of Hungarian Justice
and Life (MIEP)
Movement for a Better
Hungary (Jobbik)
Politics Can Be Different
(LMP)
Others

1994

287

The Christian-Democratic Party split in 1997, had some MPs elected for Fidesz in 1998 and 2002, before reuniting and running on a joint list with Fidesz in 2006,
2010, and 2014 (and operating effectively as a faction within Fidesz).

The Democratic Forum ran on a joint list with Fidesz in 2002; and thus won 24 seats.

Jobbik ran with the Party of Hungarian Justice and Life in 2006.

Hungarian Socialist Party ran with a coalition of centre-left parties in 2014.

Source: National Election Ofce (valasztas.hu).

288

A. Batory

upcoming local elections. The speech leaked, provoking violent rioting and peaceful mass demonstrations, but Gyurcsany refused to resign. He:
argued to the media that, in fact, it was not he but the whole political elite that had
been lying, promising prosperity and avoiding reforms, and he was the rst one
who had been brave enough to admit his mistakes.10

The Socialists hung on to power only to come up against the global economic
crisis towards the end of their second term.
For reasons further discussed below, the Fidesz victory in 2010 was so overwhelming that it secured a two-thirds majority in parliament, allowing Viktor
Orban to claim that nothing short of a revolution in the ballot box took place
and also, on a more practical level, the possibility to amend laws of constitutional
standing without the oppositions support. Fidesz used this possibility to its full
potential and with this, arguably, crossed Linzs constitutional threshold of democratic consolidation in the reverse.11 The new, Fidesz-drafted rules of the game
in turn certainly played a part in Fidesz securing a qualied majority for a second
term in 2014, beating the fragmented and disorganized left/liberal camp as well as
the extreme right Jobbik. The bipolar party competition that characterized much of
Hungarys post-communist history was over, with Fidesz remaining in a league of
its own and the other parties to Fidesz left and on the extreme right squabbling for
second place.

Populism in Hungary and the Fidesz narrative

Populism has a long history in Central and Eastern Europe, perhaps most notably in
the sense of peasantism (agrarian populism) in the interwar years.12 Hungarys
interwar period in particular offered ample scope for populism, with the country
having experienced a more complete range of regimes than any of the successor
states [to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy], from democratic republic to Soviet
Republic, right-ring conservative rule and outright Nazi dictatorship, only to fall
under communism for 40 years after World War II.13
As for populism in its current incarnation, whether Fidesz is indeed a populist
party is a thorny issue. In Hungary, analysts are divided largely along partisan
lines.14 In the mainstream international press, the party and its leader have been
characterized in a variety of ways (for example, nationalist-tinged, social conservatism; conservative-populist ruling party; illiberal majoritarianism; [Viktor
Orbans] personally managed semi-authoritarian order; [Viktor Orban] rightwing populist).15 The issue is perhaps easiest to settle by sampling Viktor
Orbans speeches and interviews from 2010 to 2014, available at the ofcial
website of the Prime Ministers Ofce.16 This is a relatively stringent test: speaking
his mind in these sources is a head of government, fully aware of media attention
and possible adverse reactions to his every word uttered in an ofcial context.
Viktor Orban also clearly spoke for Fidesz as a whole. He has been party leader

Democratization

289

since 1993, and his leadership remained unchallenged (at least publicly) for two
decades even in the wake of electoral defeats in 1994, 2002, and 2006 a feat
none of his electoral adversaries came even close to matching.
The main dening elements of populism in ideational terms as quoted above
are, rst, the claim to stand for, and with, the people in their ght against a
corrupt elite and second, the projection of politics (and particular policies, one
may add) as the will of the people. From this follows the populists assertion
that there is no separation between the people, portrayed as a homogenous
group with certain attributes such as honest, hard-working, and genuine, on the
one hand, and the populist political force on the other. Who the people are precisely is opaque, but it is this vagueness of the term that constitutes its usefulness
for politicians who seek to blur established differences, to unite followers across
former party lines, and to spread their appeal as widely as possible, and allows for
the claim that one leader or party can stand above maliciously divisive politics and
represent . . . all.17
This claim builds on the idea that only the populist political force understands
and genuinely represents the people, which is why its voice must be seen as authentic in contrast with that of non-populist domestic and international actors, portrayed as self-serving and uncomprehending. On this basis it is logical to assert
that anyone disagreeing with the populist force be they electoral competitors
or any critic really attacks the people. [T]he populist rhetoric is full of negative, demonizing imagery of pointy-headed intellectuals, bureaucrats, hacks, fat
cats, robber barons, beatniks and plutorcrats.18 In Europe, the EU also joins
this list of typical targets among contemporary populists, as Rovira Kaltwasser
and Taggart argue in this issue.
Orbans speeches and interviews feature numerous examples of this narrative,
where the 2010 election is seen as a revolution when the people nally shook off
the yoke of oppression and the post-2010 era is characterized as the system of
national cooperation. In this narrative the oppressors and opportunists are variously identied as the previous socialist governments, or the EU and foreign capitalists, or an unholy alliance among Hungarys enemies within and without. One
example of the rhetoric about justice being done to the enemy within comes from
Orbans speech on 23 October 2010, the commemoration of the 1956 uprising:
did they all [in 1956] rise up just so that half a century later, even years after the
demise of the world of the comrades uninhibited adventurers can waste the
nations wealth, speculate with the future of ten million people, usurp the lifeblood
of the Hungarians, and live as parasites off our future? [No.] They imagined a different future . . . [and] the revolution of the two-thirds [majority won in 2010] freed us
[from all this].

As for the external enemy, the EU, on 15 March 2011, the national holiday commemorating the 1848 1849 revolution and war of independence against Habsburg
Austria, Orban said:

290

A. Batory

we did not tolerate Vienna dictating to us in [18]48, and we did not tolerate in [19]56
and 1990 that Moscow dictates to us. We wont allow it now either that anyone from
Brussels or anyone else dictates to us.19

In addition to the authorization conferred on the party by its electoral success, the
Fidesz government also claimed a specic mandate for particularly controversial
steps such as the new basic law. The mandate took the form of a national consultation: a letter with a set of generally phrased questions sent to each household
with a message from Viktor Orban. The returned questionnaires allowed the
prime minister to suggest that while the opposition parties input would be desirable their support was not essential since popular endorsement was a given. It
also allowed Orban to fend off international criticism by claiming that his government simply followed public preferences. As he put it in a June 2013 interview
when asked about EU criticism:
the people . . . gave good advice, good command to the Hungarian Parliament [for
adopting the basic law], which it carried out. In this sense, when the Hungarian constitution is criticized, . . . it is not meant for the government but for the Hungarian
people. . . . It is not the government the European Union has a problem with, much
as they want us to believe . . . , the truth is they attack Hungary.20

The countrys external enemies were often portrayed as conspiring with domestic forces wanting to pull back the country to a discredited past. An example
comes from Viktor Orbans state of the country speech on 23 January 2013:
We are building a country where the people do not work for the prot of foreigners. A
country where it is not bankers and foreign bureaucrats who tell us how to live, what
kind of a constitution to have, when we can raise wages or pensions. A country where
no one can force others interests onto the Hungarian people. . . . [but] Those abroad
and at home who for many years or even decade exploited Hungarys weakness politically and economically are not happy. They are getting ready to take Hungary back
to the past. . . . [But] We wont forget that they ruined the country together.

In addition to specic enemies within and outside Hungary, the Fidesz narrative
also identies the other in ideational terms: liberalism and elitism. The system
of national cooperation rests on communitarian values in direct opposition to liberalism, with the latter portrayed not a lasting set of ideals democracies strive for,
but a transient, trendy idea that is unsuited to the mentality of the nation. In
Viktor Orbans words:
the real problem [for critics of the new basic law in the EU], if we look at it on an
ideological level . . . is that this is not a liberal constitution. . . . In Europe the
fashion is that all constitutions are liberal, and this one is not.21

Or even more explicitly in 2014,

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291

We want to organise a work-based society that . . . undertakes the odium of stating that
it is not liberal in character. . . . we must break with liberal principles and methods of
social organisation, and in general with the liberal understanding of society.22

The demand side of populism: what explains Fidesz electoral success?

The Fidesz claim that it represents the people is not unreasonable in the sense of a
landslide election victory, though even in 2010 only approximately 2.7 million of
the eight-million-strong electorate supported the partys list (53% of votes cast,
which together with the single-member districts won by Fidesz delivered 67.8%
of the seats in parliament).23 The claim that these voters gave authorization for a
set of specic policies is less robust. In 2010, Fidesz campaign made no
mention, for instance, of any plans for a new constitution, electoral system, or
any of the large-scale institutional changes Fidesz put in place after the elections.
Instead, it focused on the Socialists record in the previous eight years as incompetent and corrupt. The Socialists, for their part, lost all credibility after two terms in
ofce, the last year of which was dominated by crisis management. A large part of
the explanation for Fidesz sweeping victory in 2010 is anti-incumbent voting, magnied by the electoral system, the long tenure of the left in ofce and the explosive
combination of the global economic crisis with a decade of bipolar electoral competition a combination of factors unlikely to be repeated elsewhere in the region.24
The 2014 Fidesz victory is a somewhat different story. Part of the explanation for
yet another qualied majority for Fidesz comes from the governments adoption of
an electoral system that massively favoured the incumbent (including gerrymandering).25 This resulted in 45% of the votes translating into 66.8% of the mandates, only
little less than four years prior when the party secured 53% of the popular vote.26 The
government and opposition campaigns were also far from evenly matched according to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) election
monitoring mission: the governing party enjoyed an undue advantage because of
restrictive campaign regulations, biased media coverage and campaign activities
that blurred the separation between political party and the State.27
However, the fact remains that Fidesz enjoyed the support of the largest part of
the electorate (although it had lost about a quarter of its support compared to 2010).
This time the voters had a four-year track record to evaluate and despite the controversies surrounding Fidesz rule the relative majority decided it wanted
Viktor Orban to carry on running the country. Arguably the greatest vote-winner
for the government was the promise of further utility-rate cuts for the people
while maintaining special taxes on the banking and telecoms sectors extraprot. In other words, there clearly was electoral demand or at least receptivity
for the narrative and policies Fidesz offered to the Hungarians.
Survey data indicate that since 1990, and particularly since bipolar party competition became the rule, support for democracy and the market economy has
waned. In a 2009 Pew Research Center survey, 72% of respondents thought that
people were worse off economically than under communism the highest proportion among the Central and Eastern European countries in the study. While

292

A. Batory

in 1991 80% approved of the move from a state-controlled economy to a market

economy, in 2009 only 46% did. Competition in the political marketplace also
became less popular: in 1991 74% approved of the transition from one-party
rule to a multi-party system; by 2009 only a slight majority (56%) did. In the
2009 poll, conducted in the seventh year of the Socialist-liberal coalition in
ofce, three in four respondents (77%) in Hungary said they were dissatised
with the way democracy was working, the highest percentage among the countries
in the survey, and unlike in other post-communist countries, the post-1989 generation did not display more positive attitudes than those socialized under communism.28 In a 2011 survey, with Fidesz already at the helm, 29% certainly and 16%
probably would have supported replacing democracy with an authoritarian
system if the change came with rapid economic development.29
The public opinion data indicate that a large part of the population felt nostalgia
for cradle-to-the-grave care from the state, even at the price of limited or no political freedom, and had little condence in the ability, or even suitability, of democracy as experienced in Hungary in the past two decades to deliver it. As Muller put
it: In the eyes of many Hungarians, what unfolded in the twenty years since state
socialism was liberal democracy and it has failed.30 While it is unclear how
widespread this perception was, a sense of impatience with useless political
squabbling and a political class out of touch with the concerns of ordinary
people was certainly common.
The alienation in turn may have a lot to do with the decades-long bipolar competition between Fidesz and the Socialist Party. With intense competition comes
aggressive, negative campaigning, expensive promises spiralling out of control
and, after each election, mounting disappointment when the promised welfare
increases fail to materialize all leading to distrust in political parties.31 From
this widespread distrust in the political elite as a whole, the desire to boot out
the lot of them and receptivity to populism is only one step away. Remarkably,
the party that managed to utilize this receptivity in 2010 had been part of the
system all along, and four years later repeated the feat of successfully shifting
the blame for everything that had gone wrong to the enemies of the people
the shadowy forces that continued to hold on to illegitimate powers populists normally blame32 seeking to defeat or sabotage the system of national cooperation.
Responses to the challenge of populists-in-government
Populism is normally thought of, and is dened by the populists themselves, as an
anti-establishment, anti-elite force. This presents a fundamental paradox to populists: when presented with the responsibility of governing they are forced to
become everything they told the people they hate. As Taggart suggests, the
expectation is therefore that populism, in the long term, either becomes less populist, . . . or becomes riven with internal conict . . . , or simply collapses.33 In other
words, there is no real need to deal with successful populists because the problem
they present to liberal democracy will resolve itself (albeit without removing the

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293

societal causes that give rise to populist parties in the rst place). Conversely, strategies for dealing with populists that remain relatively unsuccessful, that is, do not
gain a governmental role, are likely to aim at prevention, and assume that the major
players in the given party system will devise ways for containing, assimilating, isolating, or educating them into submission.34 Mainstream parties also may respond
to the challenge of right-wing populism by defusing a new issue or adopting the
competitors position with regard to it.35
However, these expectations do not necessarily hold in the case of ruling populist parties. Containment is no longer an option. Moreover, numerous examples
show that populists can remain popular in government without either moderating
their rhetoric or falling apart, and they might well own too many issues to diffuse
or mimic their appeal. Populists-in-government can also use their power to cement
their rule once in ofce, thereby weakening their domestic competitors and opposition in any form to such an extent that there may not remain a viable alternative or
major (non-populist) actor that may contain them in the future, even if they themselves lose popularity over time. As Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart argue (in this
issue), this may still leave external inuences to come to the rescue provided that
external actors have sufcient leverage and are willing to apply pressure. As further
discussed below, these conditions are less likely to apply when the populist force
had always been at the centre of their party systems, such as Fidesz in Hungary,
than in cases of initially marginal, maverick players such as Western European
populists of the radical right.
The Hungarian case serves as an excellent illustration of many of these points.
Fidesz in government married policies and rhetoric that do not normally go
together: scal discipline with increased state intervention in the market and the
creation of state monopolies; neoliberal at tax with nationalizing, and spending
the assets of, private pension funds; cracking down on multinationals and (foreignowned) banks while making the labour market more exible; criticizing Brussels meddling in the countrys affairs while spending EU structural funds. This
unorthodox mix has not only kept the voters and the markets tolerably happy at
the same time, as Krastev comments,36 but also offered a number of partisan
advantages. Keeping the decit under 3% denied the European Commission the
leverage of keeping the country under excessive decit procedures; the creation
of a state monopoly in the tobacco market created an opportunity to reward
party supporters with lucrative concessions; etc.
Viktor Orbans balancing act was aided by a careful assignment of roles to key
members of his cabinet, so that the government need not speak with one voice. In
the best traditions of two-level games, the government also tailored its argumentation and narrative to the audience, as Jenne and Mudde point out, going so far as
providing misleading translations of documents to the EU.37 Since the contradictions between populism and governmental responsibility were, from the partys
point of view, successfully enough managed by Viktor Orban for Fidesz to stay
high in the polls, his leadership of the party remained unchallenged, leaving the
internal conict/disintegration scenario very unlikely. This raises the question:

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A. Batory

what strategies were available to domestic and external actors for responding to the
challenge of populists-in-government?
Domestic responses to Fidesz
Domestically, the actors seeking to contain Fidesz power fell into three categories:
independent institutions and the media; opposition parties; and civil society. Fidesz
dealt with the rst of these in short order with a frontal assault on independent institutions and the press, using its qualied majority in parliament with ruthless efciency. As Scheppele summarizes,
[i]n their rst three years in ofce, they amended the old constitution 12 times to
facilitate the passage of a new constitution. Once they adopted a new constitution,
it, too, was amended frequently. They rammed through more than 700 new laws,
changing everything from the civil code and the criminal code to laws on the judiciary, the constitutional court, national security, the media, elections, data protection,
and more with the votes of only their own party.38

They also elected or appointed active Fidesz politicians or persons associated with
the party to the ofce of the president of the republic, the head of the national audit
agency (the body in charge of overseeing party nancing); the head of judicial
administration; the head of the media authority; and the governor of the central
bank, each with long terms of ofce.
The changes affecting the judiciary were perhaps the most signicant, since
traditionally it had been the countrys well-respected, activist Constitutional
Court that had put a stop to the worst excesses of the government of the day
for the previous two decades. In the new basic law, the courts powers diminished and the possibility for citizens to directly petition the court was abolished.
The government dismissed Andras Baka, the president of the Highest Court, and
lowered the retirement age of judges, thereby removing a large number of senior
judges at one fell swoop. When Bakas ofce as head of the judiciary was abolished, the new post of president of the National Judicial Ofce went to a prominent Fidesz MEPs spouse (a family friend of the Orbans), with sweeping
powers in judicial administration. While the government claimed these measures
were part of its comprehensive reform of the judiciary, to many observers they
looked very much like retaliation for the inconvenience caused by over-active
judges.
Nonetheless, the courts retained inuence, if diminished inuence, since the
new basic law despite being a one-party creation of Fidesz constituted a
legal standard to enforce, at times in ways unanticipated by the laws creators.
The Constitutional Court, even with its wings clipped and many Fidesz-appointed
judges within its ranks, for instance ruled a number of provisions introduced by
Fidesz to their own new basic law unconstitutional. It also banned the Fideszappointed president of the National Judicial Ofce from transferring cases from
one court to another (a measure that would have allowed the ofcial to move

Democratization

295

high-prole cases to sympathetic judges); and pronounced that it would refer

back to its own earlier rulings, thereby clawing back some of its earlier powers
through the use of precedents.
With respect to the media, Fidesz again used its legislative power to constrict
the space for critical public discourse. New media regulation was introduced that
allowed for political pressure put on media outlets particularly through vague
content requirements and the creation of a government-dominated regulatory
body.39 Fidesz loyalists directly or indirectly acquired the ownership of important
media outlets, and government appointees dominated the management of public
service broadcasters, leaving little space for unbiased political discourse. The
issue of the free media was initially the main rallying cry of civil society against
Fidesz. The arguably most signicant new movement, One Million for the
Freedom of the Press (Milla) which had grown out of a Facebook group, organized several large demonstrations, and for some time offered a platform for opposition groupings of various kinds to collaborate and organize themselves. However,
the movement was internally divided over its relationship with the (democratic)
opposition parties: while they had a common cause a desire to replace the
Fidesz government many civil society activists felt that the opposition parties
were part of the problem and wanted to have nothing to do with them. Eventually
popular mobilization zzled out and Milla merged into Gordon Bajnais party
discussed below.
Partisan actors opposing Fidesz were also weakened by the governments
power to rewrite the rules of the game. In particular, Fidesz adopted a new majoritarian electoral system, making it extremely difcult for the fragmented centre-left
to mount an effective challenge. The socialist-liberal camp had been in disarray
since its devastating defeat in 2010 in any case. The classic liberal party Alliance
of Free Democrats was unable to contest the elections of 2010, while, shellshocked after their weakest result since 1990, the Socialist Party disintegrated
early in the 2010 2014 term. This led to the creation of several new formations,
including two led by former Socialist prime ministers, Ferenc Gyurcsany (leader
of the Democratic Coalition) and Gordon Bajnai (leader of Together 2014).
Having spent much of the term vying for positions among themselves, these groupings and the Socialist Party, and forced entirely by the Fidesz-designed electoral
system, nally decided to eld a joint list for the 2014 election. Their message
was perhaps best summarized as out with Fidesz to defend democracy, but
since the parties differed considerably with respect to substantive policies they
failed to put forward a strong enough positive vision to attract voters in sufciently
large numbers.
Perhaps from Fidesz point of view potentially more threatening was the range
of actors created in direct response to, and arguably by, the bipolar competition
between Fidesz and the Socialists. On the left, Politics Can Be Different (Lehet
Mas a Politika; LMP) signalled the partys raison detre, disgust with old politics
and the old political elite, by its very name. LMP focused on environmental issues
and sustainability and called for extensive state intervention in the economy and a

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A. Batory

new kind of base-democracy and participation. These elements of the partys platform make it reminiscent of 1980s new politics parties in Western Europe.40
LMP was highly critical of the Orban government, but also of the old Left.
The majority of the party rejected cooperation with the Socialists, while a
smaller faction with some of the partys leading gures left to pursue a grand
coalition strategy with the other parties of the democratic opposition in order
to maximize the chances of removing Fidesz from power. LMP received 7.5%
in 2010 and 5% in 2014, thus splitting the vote for the democratic opposition in
single-member districts without presenting much of a challenge to Fidesz.
Not so in the case of the far-right Jobbik. Gaining prominence in the 2009
European elections, Jobbik is a new populist party in Taggarts terms, though its
views are so extreme that even Frances Front National claims no afnity with
it.41 Securing 17% of the vote in 2010, it replaced Hungarys old school, and
aging, far-right party (Party of Hungarian Justice and Life) that had hovered
around the 5% threshold. Jobbiks young leadership built the partys appeal on
the radical rejection of what they portrayed as a cozy, corrupt collusion among
mainstream parties, in combination with and this is a qualitative difference
from Fidesz, not merely one of degree an exclusionary rhetoric, in Mudde and
Rovira Kaltwassers terms, mobilizing hatred against foreign (read Jewish) capitalists and above else the Roma minority.42 The issue of gypsy criminality, as
Jobbik called it, in particular offered an ideal platform for tapping into widespread
anti-Roma sentiment while also allowing Jobbik to claim it was straight-talking
about social problems that matter to people that mainstream parties would not
touch. Jobbiks links with a paramilitary organization, the Hungarian Guard,
made its street presence particularly menacing, especially in ethnically mixed
towns in the countryside.
Though Fidesz is sometimes seen as the main bulwark against contagion from
Jobbik, the government was often criticized by the democratic opposition for
failing to isolate Jobbik and actually cooperating with it whenever doing so was
to Fidesz advantage. Fidesz indeed needed to strike a difcult balance in order
to convince centrist voters that it wanted to contain Jobbik while not alienating
potential Fidesz supporters in Jobbiks own camp. This resulted in contradictory
signals at times; for instance shortly after taking ofce, Viktor Orban was reported
to have a jovial exchange with the Jobbik leader while asserting that he would not
consent to Hungary marching out of civilisation, referring to his intention to
effectively ban the Hungarian Guard. The mixed-signal strategy had mixed
results. By 2014, the extreme right party emerged as Fidesz main challenger, collecting 20.5% of the vote (the Left received 5% more, but only collectively as a
coalition of ve parties). On the other hand, the Fidesz-designed electoral
system ensured that this translated into only 12% of the mandates and in this
sense Jobbik was (also) contained for the time being.
Returning to the mainstream parties, the fact that the democratic opposition
had little domestic policy inuence did not mean they were entirely powerless
against Fidesz. The mainstream parties used the parliamentary arena and the

Democratization

297

possibility of petitioning the courts as best they could. Arguably, however, the main
weapon, particularly for the Socialists, was the internationalization of the Fidesz
problem. In line with the logic of venue shopping, and using their strong links
with their fellow social democrats on the EU level, they successfully uploaded
the debate about Fidesz to the European Parliament (EP), rst with respect to
the new media law at the end of 2010.43 Ensuing EP attention reached a climax
in July 2013 when, following an enquiry into the situation of fundamental
rights: standards and practices in Hungary the EP adopted a (non-binding) resolution urging the Hungarian government to reverse many of the legislative changes
in the country, and explicitly mentioning the possibility of invoking Article 7
against the Hungarian government should it fail to do so.44 (Article 7 allows the
suspension of the voting rights of a member state in the Council).
Responses from external actors
Uploading processes and the possibility of sanctions lead us to external responses
in general. As discussed above, the two-thirds majority in parliament essentially
deprived Fidesz partisan opponents of policy inuence at home, and it also
severely curtailed the possibilities for independent control institutions to effectively curb executive power. External actors were not similarly constrained.
Among the intergovernmental organizations, most notably the Council of
Europe considered placing Hungary under a monitoring procedure in 2013, following critical reports by its Venice Commission for Democracy through Law, and
while it nally decided against doing so, the mere possibility was a strong signal
of concern in connection with an EU member state. The US government was
also increasingly critical of events unfolding in Hungary. In 2011, US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton expressed concern about Fidesz actions weakening the
independence of the judiciary and the free press.45 In 2014, the American government took the highly unusual step vis-a`-vis a fellow NATO member of banning six
senior Hungarian government ofcials, including the head of the tax authority,
from entering the US, over their alleged role in corrupt practices.46 The Fidesz government, however, remained deant, simply rejecting the truthfulness of the claims
or hinting at bullying and great-power politics motivating them.
EU action on other occasions was (more) successful in forcing Fidesz to backtrack, but only in a limited number of cases and even then the changes amounted to
the bare minimum of compliance. Why is this the case? After all, a strong linkage
with Western institutions (high-density networks and cross-border ows) and the
many explicit obligations membership carries should afford the EU in particular
with strong leverage vis-a`-vis the Hungarian government.47 However, timing
matters in this respect: the EUs options before and after a countrys accession
differ greatly. Post-accession, the EUs inuence that in the case of candidate
countries membership conditionality (the Copenhagen criteria) offers greatly
diminishes.48 It is commonplace to point out that the EUs existing mechanisms
to address systemic violations of the common values of the Union with

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A. Batory

respect to its member states, notably Article 7, are rather weak or at least difcult
to enforce.49 Therefore, the European Commission was left with soft tools such
as criticism voiced by individual commissioners and with probes into specic
pieces of legislation, the outcome of which did not fundamentally change the realities on the ground or send a sufciently strong message. For instance, the forced
retirement of senior judges was subject to an infringement procedure on age discrimination grounds, not because the measure undermined constitutional checks
and balances. By making small concessions regarding the technicalities, the
Orban government largely neutralized these forms of EU pressure.
This neglects the fact that non-binding resolutions and other symbolic action
not to mention a suspension of EU funds to Hungary could nonetheless have a
lot of bite if particularly the large member states seriously supported the EU institutions in their application of the available measures. However, this is where
Fidesz origins come into play: the partys status as the centre-right alternative
in Hungary meant that prior to coming to power in 2010 it was not seen as a challenge to democracy or the fundamental values of the EU. It also meant that Fidesz
was, and at the time of writing remains, deeply embedded in EU level partisan
structures. As long as the European Peoples Party, of which Fidesz is a
member, does not withdraw its support, any criticism from the EU is likely to
remain muted. This point was illustrated by a controversy around the Hungarian
governments attempts to intimidate non-governmental organizations (NGOs) distributing and receiving European Economic Area grants provided by the Norwegian government. Strong condemnation from Norway was not reinforced by an
equally strong message from Brussels or Berlin, even after the Hungarian authorities raided the premises of an NGO tasked by the Norwegian government to distribute the funds.50 Transnational embeddedness in turn constitutes the major
difference between Fidesz and the classic new populists: partisanship on the European level seems to trump concern over liberal democracy in the EU, thereby
weakening potential responses from the external actor with the greatest leverage
vis-a`-vis the Orban government.
Conclusion
Several features of the Hungarian case make it unique in the EU and unlikely to be
repeated in other (post-communist or old) member states, regardless of possible
demand-side similarities. First and foremost, Fidesz was only able to build its
system of national cooperation because it won a supermajority in parliament
in 2010, which basically rendered existing constitutional guarantees against the
tyranny of the majority powerless. This in turn was preconditioned by the features
of the constitution and electoral system that had not foreseen the possibility of a
single winner, and one without any qualms, at that. The drafters in 1989 anticipated
fragmentation and coalition government, and aimed to create a system that produces stable governments yet allows for constitutional changes as democracy
matures features that served Hungary relatively well until 2010.51 Then,

Democratization

299

however, the perfect storm hit: the long tenure of a scandal- and corruptionridden, extremely unpopular government met the economic conditions created
(or certainly worsened) by the global economic crisis.52 By then, the electorate
was ready for something new, and a large majority gave Fidesz the opportunity
to nally introduce reforms that had been postponed for a decade ironically,
for fear of alienating the public. What Fidesz served up is not necessarily what
its supporters had in mind.
Two more conditions add to the uniqueness of the Hungarian case, having to do
with Fidesz itself. One is that the origins and past history of the party is not typical
for European new populists, in that Fidesz was not a fringe party at worst nally
making it to be a junior coalition partner, but a major, mainstream player in Hungarys party system that is, one of the actors that would normally act to prevent
the breakthrough of populists. Following from this, Fidesz was also well-networked in European conservative/centre-right circles, as its continuing inuence
within the European Peoples Party (EPP) shows. Unlike new maverick players
that are shunned on the EU level, the doors were always open to Fidesz and its
leader, as betting a fellow EU government or government in waiting.
Linkage thus cuts both ways: populists-in-government can also use their own
links as an asset to fend off international criticism. The other unusual feature is
organizational: Fidesz is a highly centralized party with an extremely skillful political operator at the helm. Viktor Orbans control of his party is unquestioned,
which makes Fidesz a highly effective machinery to implement whatever strategic
move the leader deems necessary. This makes a crucial difference from, for
instance, Silvio Berlusconi, a Western European populist Viktor Orban is said to
admire.53 Even with a supermajority no other leader in the EU would have been
likely to muster the party discipline necessary for the controversial, sweeping
changes Orban introduced in his country.
The consequences of the supermajority, combined with a high degree of party
discipline and transnational embeddedness, were the ability for Fidesz to weaken
checks and balances on executive power and deal a blow to its electoral opponents
through redesigning the rules of the game whilst being relatively immune to international pressure. It is worth mentioning that the democratic opposition was
weak even without Orbans assistance: the Hungarian centre-left was stunned
by the scale of its defeat at the polls, fragmented, without any policy inuence
in the domestic arena, and arguably too discredited by its past scandals to be
able to present a credible alternative government. External inuence, particularly
EU pressure, was a more promising avenue for challenging Fidesz grip on
power and, indeed, uploading issues to the EU level in the very least brought
greater international scrutiny of the Orban governments wholesale attack on the
countrys constitutional architecture. But here too, any challenge to populists-ingovernment was weakened by the EUs limited ability to address systemic violations of democratic values in its member states, and by reluctance of the major
member states governments to use existing instruments to their full potential
against a (fellow) EPP member. It is telling that to date no rm, explicit

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A. Batory

condemnation of the Orban governments actions has come from other EU capitals,
notably Berlin.
These unique features mean that the Fidesz story cannot be claimed to disprove
general expectations regarding populists-in-government. Arguably, Fidesz
winning a simple majority, rather than a supermajority, in 2010 alone would
have been sufcient for some of the usual mechanisms, notably the expected moderation in government, to kick in. Nonetheless, a number of lessons can be drawn
from the Hungarian case. First, even in the EU external inuence cannot be
counted on to save liberal democracy (even though the EU could clearly do
more). Second, domestic opposition to populists-in-government needs to be
united to stand a chance. And nally, the demand side cannot be overlooked:
only if condence in liberal democracy is shaken can a political entrepreneur convince the voters that he alone has the solution to all the problems the people face.
Where does this leave Hungary? With the system of national cooperation; or
Frankenstate.54 It is a regime somewhere in the grey zone between liberal
democracy and fully blown authoritarianism: a lot further away from the former
and closer to the latter than prior to 2010. It is, in all probability, not one that
many of Orbans young followers would have foreseen or wished for their
country in the heady days of 1989.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Canovan, Populism; for a review of the literature see Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart,
in this issue.
See for example, Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy.
Preuss, The Political Meaning of Constitutionalism, 12, 24 5.
Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition, 6.
Mudde, The Populist Zeitgeist, 543.
Wiles, A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine, 166.
Balazs and Enyedi, Hungarian Case Studies, 62 3.
Enyedi, Party Politics, 231; Palonen, Political Polarisation.
Muller, The Hungarian Tragedy, 6.
Palonen, Political Polarisation, 326.
Linz, Problems of Democratic Transition, 6.
Ionescu, Eastern Europe.
Lee, European Dictatorships.
This point was made in 2009 by Schopin, Democracy, Populism.
From The Financial Times, 23 July 2010, 26 May 2014, 10 April 2014; The Washington Post, 7 April 2014, 15 March 2013.
The website of the Prime Ministers Ofce; http://www.kormany.hu/hu/aminiszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interjuk. Quotations are the authors translation
from Hungarian.
Canovan, Populism, 261.
Taggart, Populism, 94.

Democratization
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

301

The Fidesz slogan for the 2014 European elections was Our message to Brussels:
respect for the Hungarians.
The Tavares report is a leftwing action, radio interview with Viktor Orban, Kossuth
Radio, 5 July 2013.
Ibid.
Viktor Orbans Speech at the 25th Balvanyos Summer Free University and Student
Camp, 30 July 2014.
Report of the National Election Ofce, accessed 30 June 2014 at http://valasztas.hu/
hu/ovb/content/kozlemeny/ovb_kozlemeny_20100510.pdf
Approximately half the seats were decided in single-member constituencies. Sitter,
Absolute Power?; Batory, Hungarian Parliamentary Elections.
Scheppele, Hungary: An Election in Question. New York Times, 28 February 2014.
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/hungary-an-election-in-question-part4/
National Election Ofce, accessed 30 June 2014 at http://valasztas.hu/hu/ogyv2014/
861/861_0_index.html
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Statement of Preliminary
Findings.
Pew Research, End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations. 2
November 2009, accessed 30 June 2014 at http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/11/02/
end-of-communism-cheered-but-now-with-more-reservations/
News site Origo referring to a survey by the Nezopont Institute, 25 October 2011,
accessed 30 June 2014 at http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20111025-nezopont-azemberek-kozel-harmada-felvaltana-a-demokraciat-a-gyors.html
Muller, The Hungarian Tragedy, 6.
Ceka, The Perils of Political Competition.
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism, 503.
Taggart, Populism, 100.
For a review of the literature see Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart, in this issue.
Bale et al., If You Cant Beat Them.
Ivan Krastev, Orbans European Inuence is Second Only to Merkels; Financial
Times, 10 April 2014.
Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics; Jenne and Mudde, Can Outsiders
Help? 149.
Scheppele, The Rule of Law, 561.
See for example, Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Opinion.
Taggart, Populism, 74.
Ibid.; Le Pen Refuses Alliance with Jobbik [in the European Parliament], Nepszabadsag, 29 May 2014.
Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism.
Batory, Uploading as Political Strategy.
European Parliament Resolution of 3 July 2013.
Clinton Concerned about Democratic Freedoms in Hungary, Reuters, 30 June 2011,
accessed 2 December 2014 at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/06/30/hungaryclinton-idUKN1E75S2AP20110630
Hungarys Tax Chief Says She is On U.S. Travel Ban List. Reuters, 5 November
2014, accessed 2 December 2014 at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/05/ushungary-usa-corruption-idUSKBN0IP10J20141105
Levitsky and Way, Linkage versus Leverage.
See generally Haughton, Half Full but also Half Empty; Epstein and Sedelmeier,
International Inuence.
Dawson and Muir, Enforcing Fundamental Values, 471.

302
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

A. Batory
Norway Condemns Hungary NGO Crack-down, Reuters, 9 September 2014,
accessed at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/09/uk-hungary-norway-idUKKBN
0H41LU20140909
Scheppele, The Rule of Law, 560.
Sitter, Absolute Power?
Muller, The Hungarian Tragedy.
Scheppele, The Rule of Law.

Notes on contributor
Agnes Batory is Professor of Public Policy and convener of the Erasmus Mundus
Masters Program in Public Policy at Central European University.

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