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Case Digest: DJUMANTAN vs. HON. ANDREA D.

DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE


BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION
Facts

Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract


worker.He then embraced and was converted to Islam.

He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to
the Philippines. Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the
guests of Banez. The latter made it appear that he was just a friend of the family
of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability extended to him during his
stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an Affidavit of Guaranty and Support, for his
guests. As guests, petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors.
Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She
filed a complaint for concubinage, however, subsequently dismissed for lack of
merit. Immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that
of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Banez eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently referred to CID.
Petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell. Petitioner moved for the dismissal
of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a Filipino
citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent
Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. They
revoked the visa previously granted to her.

Issue

Whether or not the Djumantans admission and change of immigration status from
temporary to permanent resident legal.

Ruling

There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioners entry
into the country and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to

permanent
resident.
All
such
privileges
were
obtained
through
misinterpretation.Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the
immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitors visa and for
permanent residency.

Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is
deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to
prohibit and prevent their entry into the country. This right is based on the fact that
since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a
matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the
part of the government to permit them to stay.

There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be


admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.The fact of
marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the
immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an
alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and
does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon the expiration
of her extended stay here as an alien. It is not mandatory for the CID to admit any
alien who applies for a visitors visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has
no right to an indefinite stay. an alien allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a
change of status and may be admitted as a permanent resident. Among those
considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife or husband of a
Philippine citizen. The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as
immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married to Filipino
citizens.

Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985)

Air France v. Saks

No. 83-1785

Argued January 15, 1985

Decided March 4, 1985

470 U.S. 392

Syllabus

Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention makes air carriers liable for injuries sustained
by a passenger

"if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking."

Respondent, while a passenger on petitioner's jetliner as it descended to land in Los


Angeles on a trip from Paris, felt severe pressure and pain in her left ear, and the
pain continued after the jetliner landed. Shortly thereafter, respondent consulted a
doctor, who concluded that she had become permanently deaf in her left ear. She
then filed suit in a California state court, alleging that her hearing loss was caused
by negligent maintenance and operation of the jetliner's pressurization system.
After the case was removed to Federal District Court, petitioner moved for summary
judgment on the ground that respondent could not prove that her injury was caused
by an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17, the evidence indicating that the
pressurization system had operated in a normal manner. Relying on precedent that
defines the term "accident" in Article 17 as an "unusual or unexpected" happening,
the District Court granted summary judgment to petitioner. The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the language, history, and policy of the Warsaw Convention
and the Montreal Agreement (a private agreement among airlines that has been
approved by the Federal Government) impose absolute liability on airlines for
injuries proximately caused by the risks inherent in air travel; and that normal cabin
pressure changes qualify as an "accident" within the definition contained in Annex
13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation as meaning "an occurrence
associated with the operation of an aircraft."

Held: Liability under Article 17 arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an


unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger, and

not where the injury results from the passenger's own internal reaction to the usual,
normal, and expected operation of the aircraft, in which case it has not been caused
by an accident under Article 17. Pp. 470 U. S. 396-408.

(a) The text of the Warsaw Convention suggests that the passenger's injury must be
so caused. The difference in the language of Article 17, imposing liability for injuries
to passengers caused by an "accident" and

Page 470 U. S. 393

Article 18, imposing liability for destruction or loss of baggage by an "occurrence,"


implies that the drafters of the Convention understood the word "accident" to mean
something different than the word "occurrence." Moreover, Article 17 refers to an
accident which caused the passenger's injury, and not to an accident which is the
passenger's injury. The text thus implies that, however "accident" is defined, it is
the cause of the injury that must satisfy the definition, rather than the occurrence of
the injury alone. And, since the Warsaw Convention was drafted in French by
continental jurists, further guidance is furnished by the French legal meaning of
"accident" -- when used to describe a cause of injury, rather than the event of injury
-- as being a fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or unintended event. Pp. 397-400.

(b) The above interpretation of Article 17 is consistent with the negotiating history
of the Warsaw Convention, the conduct of the parties thereto, and the weight of
precedent in foreign and American courts. Pp. 470 U. S. 400-405.

(c) While any standard requiring courts to distinguish causes that are "accidents"
from causes that are "occurrences" requires drawing a line that may be subject to
differences as to where it should fall, an injured passenger is only required to prove
that some link in the chain of causes was an unusual or unexpected event external
to the passenger. Enforcement of Article 17's "accident" requirement cannot be
circumvented by reference to the Montreal Agreement. That Agreement, while
requiring airlines to waive "due care" defenses under Article 20(1) of the Warsaw
Convention, did not waive Article 17's "accident" requirement. Nor can enforcement
of Article 17 be escaped by reference to the equation of "accident" with
"occurrence" in Annex 13, which, with its corresponding Convention, expressly
applies to aircraft accident investigations, and not to principles of liability to
passengers under the Warsaw Convention. Pp. 470 U. S. 405-408.

724 F.2d 1383, reversed and remanded.

Nicaragua v. United States


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Nicaragua v. United States
Seal of the International Court of Justice.png
Court International Court of Justice
Full case name
Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)[1]
Decided

June 27, 1986

Citation(s)

1986 I.C.J. 14

Case opinions
Separate Opinion: Nagendra Singh
Separate Opinion: Manfred Lachs
Separate Opinion: Jos Mara Ruda
Separate Opinion: Taslim Olawale Elias
Separate Opinion: Roberto Ago
Separate Opinion: Jos Sette-Camara
Separate Opinion: Ni Zhengyu

Dissent: Shigeru Oda


Dissent: Stephen Schwebel
Dissent: Robert Jennings
Court membership
Judges sitting
Nagendra Singh, Guy Ledreit de Lacharrire, Roberto Ago,
Mohammed Bedjaoui, Taslim Olawale Elias, Manfred Lachs, Kba Mbaye, Ni

Zhengyu, Shigeru Oda, Jos Mara Ruda, Stephen Schwebel, Jos Sette-Camara,
Robert Jennings, Claude-Albert Colliard (ad hoc)
The Republic of Nicaragua v. The United States of America (1986) ICJ 1 is a public
international law case decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The ICJ
ruled in favor of Nicaragua and against the United States and awarded reparations
to Nicaragua. The ICJ held that the U.S. had violated international law by supporting
the Contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan government and by mining
Nicaragua's harbors. The United States refused to participate in the proceedings
after the Court rejected its argument that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to hear the
case. The U.S. also blocked enforcement of the judgment by the United Nations
Security Council and thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any
compensation.[2] Nicaragua, under the later, post-FSLN government of Violeta
Chamorro, withdrew the complaint from the court in September 1992 following a
repeal of the law which had required the country to seek compensation.[3]

The Court found in its verdict that the United States was "in breach of its obligations
under customary international law not to use force against another State", "not to
intervene in its affairs", "not to violate its sovereignty", "not to interrupt peaceful
maritime commerce", and "in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on
21 January 1956."

The Court had 16 final decisions upon which it voted. In Statement 9, the Court
stated that while the U.S. encouraged human rights violations by the Contras by the
manual entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, this did not make
such acts attributable to the U.S.[4]