Kohler TheEagleandtheHare

The Eagle and the Hare: U.S.
Chinese Relations,
the Wolf Amendment, and the Future of
International Cooperation in Space
HANNAH KOHLER*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1136
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE SPACE PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . .
1137
A.
THE SINOSOVIET ALLIANCE AND THE BALLISTIC ORIGINS OF SPACE

EXPLORATION
B.
....................................
1137
COLD WAR LULL AND THE INITIATIVE TO ACHIEVE MANNED
..............................
1139
................
1142
II. NASACNSA RELATIONS PRIOR TO 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1143
HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT
C.
EMERGENCE OF A NEW SPACE SUPERPOWER
A.
CHINA AND THE TREATIES
...........................
B.
THE HUGHES AND LORAL INTELSAT ACCIDENT AND THE NDAA
1143
..........................................
1146
....................
1147
...........................
1148
III. THE WOLF AMENDMENTS FROM 20112013: A LEGISLATIVE

BARRIER BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . .
1149
1999
C.
THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
D.
SUSPICIONS OF ESPIONAGE
A.
THE BIRTH OF THE WOLF AMENDMENT
...................
1149
B.
INTERPRETATION OF THE WOLF AMENDMENT PRIOR TO 2014
.....
1152
IV. THE NEW WOLF AMENDMENT OF 2014 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION . . . . . . . . . . .
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CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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* Georgetown Law, J.D. expected 2015; B.A. Penn State 2012. 2015, Hannah Kohler. I would like
to extend my sincere gratitude to Steven A. Mirmina, Senior Attorney of International Law for the
NASA Office of the General Counsel and Professor of Space Law at Georgetown University, for his
incredible help and advice with this Note. His tutelage inspired its purpose, and his continuing
assistance has elevated it beyond what I could have hoped.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 20, 1969, the Apollo 11 lunar module, Eagle, landed on the moon,1
definitively ending the space race with the Soviet Union and signaling what was
hoped to be a bright new dawn for humanity. In December 2013, the Chinese
Yutu (Jade Rabbit) lunar rover touched down on the moon, making China only
the third country to successfully land a rover on the lunar surface.2 No longer
are there two clear superpowers in space; the eagle has reigned supreme for
more than four decades, but the hare is catching up.
Today, space is a relatively peaceful place from an international law perspective. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, and the official
end of the Cold War, space exploration has become a global endeavor, with
multiple participating countries and widespread cooperation. Joint achievements
such as the construction of the International Space Station (ISS) exist solely
thanks to this collaboration and could probably never have been completed with
the resources and technologies of one country alone.
As one of the worlds oldest and most active space powers, the United States
has been involved in bilateral and multilateral projects with most other major
spacefaring nations with one notable exception: the Peoples Republic of China
(PRC). The PRC and its national space program, the China National Space
Administration (CNSA), have remained strangely isolated from the rest of the
worlds forays into space. Deep-seated U.S. suspicion against their policies and
the recent enactment of the restrictive Wolf Amendment suggest that this is
unlikely to change in the near future. To examine the impact of this problematic
legislation, this Note will begin by considering the origins and development of
the uniquely isolated Chinese space program in Part I, from the period of
SinoSoviet cooperation after World War II through Chinas first successful
taikonaut3 and on to the Change lunar module and ongoing construction of the
Tiangong space station. In Part II, this Note will examine the modern relationship between the United States and China, with particular focus on incidents
1. Apollo 11 (AS-506), SMITHSONIAN NATL AIR & SPACE MUSEUM, http://airandspace.si.edu/explore-andlearn/topics/apollo/apollo-program/landing-missions/apollo11.cfm (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
2. China Moon Rover Enters Lunar Orbit: Xinhua, SPACE DAILY (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.spacedaily.
com/reports/China_moon_rover_enters_lunar_orbit_Xinhua_999.html [hereinafter China Moon Rover];
Srinivas Laxman, Change-3: China to Launch First Moon Rover in 2013, ASIAN SCIENTIST (Mar. 7,
2012), http://www.asianscientist.com/topnews/chang-e-3-china-first-moon-rover-launch-in-2013; Ian
ONeill, Chinas Rover Rolls! Yutu Begins Moon Mission, DISCOVERY NEWS (Dec. 14, 2013, 5:31 PM),
http://news.discovery.com/space/chinas-rover-rolls-yutu-begins-moon-mission-131214.htm.
3. The term taikonautfrom the Chinese taikong (space) and the Greek naut (traveler)is a
fairly recent addition to the pantheon of space terminology. It entered popular use with the launch of the
first Chinese citizen into space in October 2003 and signifies a permanent addition to the list of
spacefaring nations. Wang Cong, Taikonauts a Sign of Chinas Growing Global Influence, CCTV.COM
(Sept. 25, 2008, 10:02 PM), http://www.cctv.com/english/20080925/108544.shtml. Like the American
astronaut and the Russian cosmonaut, taikonaut is indicative of Chinas position as a leader in
future space endeavors. See MARCIA S. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21641, CHINAS SPACE PROGRAM: AN OVERVIEW 1, 2 & n.2 (2003).
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THE EAGLE AND THE HARE
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that demonstrate the difficulties they face in moving toward a shared future in
space.
The majority of this Notes focus will rest in Parts IIIIV and the Conclusion
with the various iterations of the Wolf Amendment, which has been enacted
with each annual appropriations act since 2011 and severely curtails NASAs
ability to work cooperatively with China. Part III covers the creation, background, and legislative history of the Wolf Amendment and examines its
interpretation prior to 2014. Part IV investigates the slight wording change in
the 2014 version of the Amendment, which has placed even heavier restrictions
on this relationship. If interpreted strictly, the new version could impose an
effective moratorium on interaction between NASA and Chinese citizens, with
potentially devastating repercussions. Finally, the Conclusion offers the recommendation that the Wolf Amendment be relaxed to allow for greater communication between CNSA and NASA, in the interest of maintaining U.S. relevance
and competitiveness in the international space community.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE SPACE PROGRAM
A. THE SINOSOVIET ALLIANCE AND THE BALLISTIC ORIGINS OF SPACE EXPLORATION
The beginnings of the Chinese space program stemmed from the period of
SinoSoviet cooperation in the wake of WWII, with the signing of the Sino
Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in 1950. As the
two major communist superpowers, such a political alliance seemed inevitable;
yet, both nations received less than they had hoped for from the partnership.
Territorial disagreements and transportation disputes strained relations between
the two countries depleted by war and plagued by internal conflict, as did
Chinas unwavering desire for more Soviet nuclear technology than Stalin was
comfortable providing.4
The USSRs launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, was as much a catalyst
for the development of space technology in China as it was in the United States.
Although it is unclear exactly how much the PRC knew of the Soviets ambition
to launch the worlds first man-made satellite into orbit, in 1958 Mao Zedong
declared that we too must build artificial satellites and made that goal a
national priority.5 Here, as with everything else about his political career, the
Chairman was ambitious, uncomfortably so:
4. See BRIAN HARVEY, CHINAS SPACE PROGRAMFROM CONCEPTION TO MANNED SPACEFLIGHT 2427
(2004); Austin Jersild, Sharing the Bomb Among Friends: The Dilemmas of Sino-Soviet Strategic
Cooperation, COLD WAR INTL HIST. PROJECT, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/sharing-the-bombamong-friends-the-dilemmas-sino-soviet-strategic-cooperation (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). For more
information on the circumstances leading to the degradation of SinoSoviet cooperation, see also Notes
on the Sino-Soviet Split, N. VA. COMMUNITY. C., http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/his242/notes/
sinosoviet.html (last updated May 7, 2012).
5. THE SPACE TRANSPORTATION MARKET: EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION? 5557 (M. Rycroft ed., 2000);
HARVEY, supra note 4, at 26.
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If were going to throw [a satellite] up there then throw a big one, one that
weighs two tons. Of course we start throwing small, but with one that is at
least two tons. Something like that chicken egg of the Americans [presumably
referring to the thirty pound Explorer 1 satellite], I wont do it!6
There should be no misconceptions about the purpose of the earliest international forays into space exploration. Sputnik demonstrated to the world that the
USSR had developed heavy-rocket propulsion technology, one step closer to
mastery of intercontinental ballistic missile technology.7 The resulting space
race served as a highly visible display of technological might and military
prowess during the Cold War, staving off armed conflict by making each nation
frighteningly aware of the capabilities of its rival.8 The Chinese government
viewed these desirable effects with envy. Deng Ziaoping, Secretary General of
the Communist Party, stated in 1958:
The Soviet Union has the atom bomb. Where does the significance lie? It lies
in the fact that the imperialists are afraid of it. Are the imperialists afraid of
us? I think they are not . . . The United States stations its troops on Taiwan
because we have no atom bombs or guided missiles.9
Maos ambition to put a satellite into orbit by 1959 was to be realized with
the newly created Project 581. However, the technological capabilities available
6. GREGORY KULACKI & JEFFREY G. LEWIS, AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & SCIS., A PLACE FOR ONES MAT:
CHINAS SPACE PROGRAM, 19562003, at 5 (2009), available at http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/
Publications/PDF/spaceChina.pdf; see Explorer-I and Jupiter-C: The First United States Satellite and
Space Launch Vehicle, NATL AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/expinfo.html
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
7. See Rosita Dellios, Chinas Space Program: A Strategic and Political Analysis, 7 CULTURE
MANDALA 1, 1 (2005), available at http://epublications.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article1093
&contextcm.
8. Id. at 12. Recognizing the shared origins of nuclear technology and space exploration is
necessary to grasp the real stakes involved in Chinas pursuit of a manned space program. See ROGER
HANDBERG & ZHEN LI, CHINESE SPACE POLICY: A STUDY IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 37
(2007) (noting the wholly interdependent relationship between nuclear deterrence and space technology
during the 1950s and 60s). Chinas early ambitions in spacelike those of both the United States and
the USSRlay substantially in intimidation as well as the defensive advantages granted by observation
satellites. As all three nations were aware, [r]ockets to orbit can become missiles sent to targets across
the globe. Id. at 4.
9. STEPHANIE COOKE, IN MORTAL HANDS: A CAUTIONARY HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR AGE 157 (2009); see
HANDBERG & LI, supra note 8, at 37. Handberg and Li theorize that fear has historically driven the
pursuit of both space and atomic technology for the United States, the USSR, and China. HANDBERG &
LI, supra note 8, at 37. China lacked both nuclear weapons and the ability to strike directly at the other
two, and devoted significant resources to nuclear and space technology in order to close that gap. Id. at
5. The Chinese space program was at first essentially the pursuit of ballistic missiles, and then space
launch. Id. Moreover, building ballistic missiles (which are equally effective as space-launch vehicles
and weapons-delivery systems) provided a way to de-escalate direct nuclear conflict in favor of flashy
demonstrations of military capability in the guise of space exploration. Id.; see also KULACKI & LEWIS,
supra note 6, at 45 (describing the impression that the launch of Sputnik made on Chairman Mao
Zedong).
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to the project engineers would probably not have been up to the task even
without the political upheaval of the Great Leap Forward that same year.10 The
ubiquitous participation demanded by Maos campaign and the widespread
resource diversion, coupled with the crippling famine and economic collapse of
the program, resulted in a suspension of the Earth satellite plan in 1959 in favor
of military rocket development under Project 1059. The Chinese Academy of
Sciences concluded that it was necessary to correct the erroneous tendency to
be over-anxious to have artificial satellites in circumstances where the basic
conditions for achieving this were not currently present.11 The withdrawal of
more than one thousand Soviet technicians from China following the collapse of
economic relations in 1960 almost doomed that ambition as well, although the
PRC was able to launch a Soviet R-2 rocket powered by Chinese fuel within a
year.12 The split between the two great communist superpowers deprived China
of the USSRs much greater ballistic expertise for making rockets.13 For a
nation that had been dependent on the technological prowess of its northern
neighbor, China in the 1960s faced a long road toward successful space
exploration.14
B. COLD WAR LULL AND THE INITIATIVE TO ACHIEVE MANNED HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT
During the next decade, while the United States and the USSR applied their
top technological and scientific brainpower to the ultimate goal of a successful
10. See BRIAN HARVEY, CHINA IN SPACE: THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD 3638 (2013). The lag in
technology available to the Chinese resulted in part from the USSRs continuing refusal to provide
ballistic expertise and oversight, a strategic decision that was in part responsible for the eventual
SinoSoviet split.
[D]eep-seated differences over Chinas acquisition of nuclear weapons were central to the
initiation and aggravation of Sino-Soviet discord, though that discord was the product as well
of competing revolutionary strategies, theological pretension, struggle for supreme Communist authority, and fundamental disagreement over whether Stalin should be praised or buried.
Harold P. Ford, The CIA and Double Demonology: Calling the SinoSoviet Split, STUD. INTELLIGENCE,
Winter 19981999, at 57, 60, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/
kent-csi/vol42no5/pdf/v42i5a05p.pdf; see also KULACKI & LEWIS, supra note 6, at 56 (examining the
hopeful nature of Chairman Maos ultimately disastrous 1957 visit to Moscow and Premier Krushchevs accompanying promises of technical aid to the embryonic Chinese space program).
11. HARVEY, supra note 4, at 28.
12. Id. at 35.
13. The split did not, however, significantly delay Chinas pursuit of the atomic bomb. Radio
Moscow in July 1964 reported:
The Chinese leaders have been at great pains to obtain possession of nuclear weapons. They
strenuously triedthis is no secretto get the Soviet Union to give them the atomic bomb.
The CPSU and the Soviet Government naturally could not consider this, since it might have
led to the most serious consequences.
Ford, supra note 10, at 60 (citing Raymond L. Garthoff, SinoSoviet Military Relations, 194566, in
SINOSOVIET MILITARY RELATIONS 82, 90 (Raymond L. Garthoff ed., 1966)). Despite the USSRs
resistance, however, China conducted its first nuclear test in October 1964. See William Burr & Jeffrey
T. Richelson, Whether to Strangle the Baby in the Cradle: The United States and the Chinese
Nuclear Program, 196064, 25 INTL SECURITY 54, 91 (2000).
14. HANDBERG & LI, supra note 8, at 61.
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manned moon landing, China devoted its energy to developing ballistic missile
technology and military rocket defense. These efforts resulted in the creation of
the Dong Feng missiles and the development of research for sounding
rockets. The first launch of a sounding rocket occurred in February 1960, and,
though brief, that first successful flight represented the first rocket that was truly
Chinese in both design and propulsion.15 In anticipation of eventual manned
space missions, tests were conducted throughout the 1960s to monitor the
effects of suborbital flight on mice and dogs aboard sounding rockets.16 Project
714 was planned to put humans into orbit by 1973;17 the proposed capsule,
Shuguang 1 (Dawn), was a two-man craft like NASAs Gemini.18
The year 1970 marked the entrance of China into the international sphere of
space exploration, with the launch of its first satellite, the 380-pound DFH-1
(Dong Fang Hong, The East is Redsurely a chilling name for the West
despite the triumphant flush of Americas ongoing Apollo missions) on one of
its Long March-1 rockets.19 The DFH-1 transmitted for almost a month and
spent its life cheerfully broadcasting the song for which it was named, the
unofficial anthem of the PRC. Although far less ambitious than the initial
designers had dreamed, by the latter half of the 1960s the political priority had
become visibility rather than technological grace. Top officials
wanted to make sure both friends and foes could see that China had been
successful. . . . The satellite was just visible to the naked eye, and designers
gave the third stage of the rocket an observation skirt, a shiny metal ring
that would allow those on the ground to find the orbital track.20
DFH-1 made China the fifth nationafter the USSR in 1957, the United States
in 1958, France in 1965, and Japan earlier in 1970to launch a satellite into
orbit on one of its own rockets (the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada had
successfully orbited spacecraft prior to 1965, but used American rockets to
launch them). However, despite the success of DFH-1, China would not launch
another satellite until 1975.21
Chinas attempts to put a man in orbit were plagued by the same political,
economic, and technological troubles as its endeavor to orbit a satellite.22
15. KULACKI & LEWIS, supra note 6, at 8.

16. HARVEY, supra note 4, at 3746; see Shuguang 1 (Project 714), SINODEFENCE, http://sinodefence.
com/manned-space/early-manned-space-projects/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
17. Phillip C. Saunders, Chinas Space Ambitions, in THE NEXT SPACE AGE 42, 46 (Christopher Mari
ed., 2008).
19. Leonard David, Chinas Space Leadership: Decades in the Making, in THE NEXT SPACE AGE,
supra note 17, at 35, 35.
20. KULACKI & LEWIS, supra note 6, at 13.
21. Id. at 14.
22. Evinced, in part, by the fact that the ambitions of Project 714 to put a Chinese citizen in orbit by
1973 were not realized until 2003. HARVEY, supra note 4, at 23946. Moreover, the details of Project
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Although potential astronauts were sought and tested, the development of the
Shuguang 1 proved more difficult than anticipated, and the political instability
of the PRC spelled doom for the ill-fated Project 714, which was cancelled in
1972.23 1975 saw the first successful launch of a recoverable satellite, one of the
two-ton Fanhui Shi Weixing (FSW) series, after an explosive failed attempt a
year earlier. The FSWs were designed to descend almost vertically from orbit
as a security measure, similar to the Russian habit of outfitting their satellites
with self-destruct capabilities in case they were recovered by another nation.24
China was only the third countryafter the United States and the USSRto
recover a satellite. The FSWs proved to be a great success, with more than
twenty launched in the subsequent decades.25 Two other ambitious programs
the development of a manned spaceplane and a space station like NASAs
Skylabwere announced, but later postponed due to political prioritization.26
The January 1984 launch of the newly developed Long March 3 rocket made
China the third entity to successfully utilize liquid-hydrogen propellant, after
the United States and Europe.27 Although the first Long March test only reached
Low Earth Orbit (LEO)28 rather than the geosynchronous orbit for which it was
designed,29 the rocket represented a major step forward for Chinas rocket
program. Its successor, the Long March 4, was designed to launch satellites into
polar orbit and is Chinas currently operative launch system.30 This capability
made China extremely attractive to global satellite manufacturers, and by 1990
China was conducting commercial launches.31 China in 1992 committed once
again to a manned spaceflight programProject 921although its development was kept quiet by the government to avoid potential embarrassment
should the project prove unfeasible. This program, however, would succeed
where others failed; after a decade of testing spacecraft and training partici-
714, taikonaut selection, and even the existence of a man-in-space initiative were kept secret until 2002,
suggesting that China wanted the freedom to pursue its goal without facing the ridicule of the
international community should it fail. Id.
23. HARVEY, supra note 10, at 26061; see Shuguang 1 (Project 714), supra note 16.
25. Id.
26. Saunders, supra note 17.
27. HARVEY, supra note 10, at 383; HARVEY, supra note 4, at 22025.
28. Low Earth Orbit is broadly defined as any orbit less than 2000 km (or 1240 miles) above the
surface of the Earth. Many significant satellites (such as the International Space Station, the Hubble
telescope, and space shuttle flights) can be found in LEO. Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GSO) refers to
much higher orbital band roughly 36,000 km (or roughly 22,000 miles) above the Earth. GSO is
desirable because satellites placed there can remain in orbit for a much longer period and rotate such
that they return to the same place in the sky every twenty-four hours. See ROGER COCHETTI, MOBILE
SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK 3139 (1995); BRUCE R. ELBERT, INTRODUCTION TO SATELLITE
COMMUNICATION 14 (2008).
31. HARVEY, supra note 4, at 22528; see Saunders, supra note 17. As discussed later in this Note,
this newfound capacity to conduct commercial rocket launches was something of a mixed blessing for
international relations.
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pants, the first taikonaut, 38-year-old Yang Liwei, orbited the Earth fourteen
times aboard the newly designed Shenzhou-5 (Divine Vessel).32 China was the
third country in the history of the world to launch a man into orbit on a rocket of
its own design,33 and its position as a titan in space could no longer be denied.
C. EMERGENCE OF A NEW SPACE SUPERPOWER
Since 2003, China and the CNSA have undertaken a number of ambitious
projects to demonstrate their newfound successes in space. Chinese taikonaut
Zhai Zhigang, aboard the Shenzhou 7, performed Chinas first spacewalk in
2008.34 Chinas first lunar program was approved in 2003, and the 2.5 ton
Change 1 probe (named after a lunar goddess of Chinese legend) was launched
in October 2007 aboard a Long March 3A rocket, reaching the moon through a
series of tricky orbital elisions rather than a direct shot as the Apollo program
had done. Change orbited for more than a year and was intentionally crashed
into the moon in January 2009.35 Change 2 followed in 2010.36
Chinas exclusion from the ISS project (and the rapidly aging Mir) left [the
country] with no option but to build its own station;37 the result was Tiangong,
or Heavenly Palace. Approval for the project was granted as early as 1999,
and the first module, the 497-ton Tiangong 1, was successfully launched in
September 2011.38 The unmanned Shenzhou 8 successfully docked with the
station just over a month later, Chinas first such attempt.39 Two manned
missions, Shenzhou 9 and 10, followed, and Tiangong 1 was de-orbited in 2013
to make ready for Tiangong 2, which is planned for launch in 2015.40
The most recent major development of the Chinese space programand the
most excitingis the successful delivery of the Yutu, or Jade Rabbit moon
32. ERIK SEEDHOUSE, THE NEW SPACE RACE: CHINA VS. THE UNITED STATES 18488 (2010); see HARVEY,
supra note 10, at 28696; see also SMITH, supra note 3.
33. SMITH, supra note 3, at 1.
35. Id. at 31223; Change 1, NATL SPACE SCI. DATA CENTER, http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraft
Display.do?id2007-051A (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
37. Id. at 12. Chinas continuing exclusion from participation on the ISS is discussed in section II.C,
infra.
38. Id. For further discussion of the purpose behind the construction of Tiangong, see Stuart Wiggin,
Tiangong-1, Science or Prestige?, CHINA.ORG.CN (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/201109/29/content_23512436.htm.
39. HARVEY, supra note 10, at 1723; Tiangong 1Spacecraft Information, SPACEFLIGHT 101, http://
www.spaceflight101.com/tiangong-1-info.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Tiangong I].
40. HARVEY, supra note 10, at 2327; Morris Jones, Last Days for Tiangong, SPACE DAILY (Sept. 19,
2013), http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Last_Days_for_Tiangong_999.html; Tiangong 1, supra note
39. For a more complete list of Shenzhou missions through June 2013, see Marcia S. Smith, Chinas
Human Spaceflight Program: Background and List of Crewed and Automated Missions, SPACE POLY
ONLINE (Aug. 17, 2014, 6:39 PM), http://www.spacepolicyonline.com/free-fact-sheets-and-reports/chinashuman-spaceflight-program-background-and-list-of-crewed-and-automated-missions.
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rover (named after the moon goddesss beloved pet),41 which was launched
aboard the Change 3 mission in December 2013.42 With Yutu, China is now the
third country to have landed a rover on the moon and is the first to utilize soft
landing techniques in nearly forty years.43 Although the rover experienced
electrical problems in January 2014 and was put into hibernation, it was able to
power on in February and is still functioning and collecting data, although
unable to move.44 Taken together, the success of these projects is impressive,
considering the rocky beginnings and political pressures that have driven the
Chinese space program since its inception. While NASA and Russias Roscosmos both went through the same stages to reach proficiency in space, they were
working together to complete the ApolloSoyuz Test Project (ASTP) by the
1970s,45 and since the collapse of the Soviet Union, they have been fairly
reliable allies in the realm of space technology. China had no such ally, and still
does not; Russia was always close fisted with its technology, and the United
States has only tightened restrictions against China in recent yearsdespite
their economic codependencysuch that it is unclear if there can be any
cooperation in the near future.
II. NASACNSA RELATIONS PRIOR TO 2011
A. CHINA AND THE TREATIES
For a country that had to claw its way into technological proficiency in space
independently, and which has maintained an isolationist blanket of secrecy over
its space program, perhaps it is surprising to note that Chinas participation in
the fundamental sources of international space law is similar to the United
States. China acceded to the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (better known as the Outer Space Treaty, or OST) in
19831984.46 The OST is considered the primary public international source of
41. China Moon Rover, supra note 2. For further reading about the mythology behind the name, see
LIHUI YANG & DEMING AN, HANDBOOK OF CHINESE MYTHOLOGY 8691 (2005).
42. China Moon Rover, supra note 2; ONeill, supra note 2 .
43. Laxman, supra note 2; ONeill, supra note 2.
44. Chinas Moon Rover, Jade Rabbit, Has Abnormality: State Media, AUSTRALIA BROADCASTING
CORP. (Jan. 25, 2014, 6:15 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-01-25/an-china27s-moon-rover2c-jaderabbit2c-has-27abnormality27/5218986; Euan McKirdy, Down but Not Out: Jade Rabbit Comes Back
from the Dead, CNN (Feb. 13, 2014, 2:44 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/12/world/asia/jade-rabbitresurrection/index.html?hptwo_c2.
45. Eligar Sadeh, International Space Cooperation, in SPACE POLITICS AND POLICY: AN EVOLUTIONARY
PERSPECTIVE 281, 283 (Eligar Sadeh ed., 2002).
46. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Comm. on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm., Status of International Agreements Relating to
Activities in Outer Space as of 1 January 2014, Mar. 24Apr. 4, 2014, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2014/
CRP.7 (Mar. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Status of International Agreements].
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space law and sets forth the fundamental aspirations of space exploration. The
Treaty primarily forbids the placement of nuclear weapons in space and establishes that the moon and other celestial bodies are to be used for peaceful
purposes only.47 China has also ratified or acceded to the 1968 Agreement on
the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (the Rescue Agreement), the 1972 Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the Liability
Convention), and the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Space (the Registration Convention).48
Briefly, the Rescue Agreement constitutes a promise between nations to
rescue and return to their home country foreign astronauts (or space objects)
who land in their territory and to notify the launching authority and the United
Nations (UN) if they learn that astronauts of any nation have suffered an
accident.49 The Liability Convention establishes guidelines for liability in the
event of a collision or accident in space between the assets of different nations,
as well as liability should a space asset of one country crash-land in the
jurisdiction of another.50 The Registration Convention sets forth a system by
which space objects are registered with the UN, in part so that liability can be
established in the event of an accident.51 Although the United States stands
as a depositary nation for the OST, the Rescue Agreement, and the Liability
Conventionand China does not52the public-law international stances of the
two countries regarding the major accepted space treaties are surprisingly
similar.
However, with accelerating developments in commercial space law and the
glimmer of space attainability on the near horizon for multiple nations, the
question of space economics and property rights has loomed, and the current
treaties are arguably unequipped to answer it. Neither China nor the United
States has signed or ratified the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (the Moon Treaty), which
declares the moon and its resources to be the common heritage of mankind
and requires any exploration and use to be carried out for the benefit and in the
interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
47. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 46, arts. IIV, 18 U.S.T. at 241213, 610 U.N.T.S. at 20708. For
an examination of the history of the treatys development, see Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, U.S. DEPT ST., http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/space1.html (last visited Feb.
13, 2015).
48. Status of International Agreements, supra note 46; see also OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS TREATIES AND PRINCIPLES ON OUTER SPACE, RELATED GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS (2006) [hereinafter UN OOSA], available at http://www.oosa.
unvienna.org/pdf/publications/ST_SPACE_061Rev01E.pdf.
49. UN OOSA, supra note 48, at 8.
50. Id. at 11.
51. Id. at 19.
52. Id.
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development under an international regime . . . to govern the exploitation of

the natural resources of the Moon.53 The Moon Treaty is effectively a failed
treaty because no state capable of self-launched manned space exploration
(Russia, China, Japan, India, the United States, and members of the European
Space Agency) has signed or ratified it.54 Although the Outer Space Treaty
arguably55 also forbids commercial exploitation of the moon, failure to sign the
Moon Treaty highlights the major space powers implicit rejection of the
doctrine that the moon is a sacrosanct commons subject to an international
resource-sharing requirement.56
Taken together, Chinas behavior with regard to each of the major space
treaties aligns with that of the international space community. All of the worlds
significant space powers have agreed to the broad-strokes anti-armament vision
of the Outer Space Treaty, the reciprocal respect for foreign astronauts offered
by the Rescue Agreement, and the practical framework of the Liability and
Registration Conventions. Similarly, no major space power is quite willing to
cede the moona problem that will, eventually, have to be confronted.
Despite this consensus in the treaties, the issue of space debris has tainted
Chinas image in the international space community. This concern was catapulted to international attention after a 2007 antisatellite missile (ASAT) test by
Chinathe first of its kindspewed so much dangerous shrapnel that it has
been determined the largest debris-generating event in history.57 The dangers
posed by debris from the blast linger to this day; in 2011, a piece of the
destroyed Chinese satellite came within four miles of the International Space
Station.58 The test also ignited fears about militarization in space (forbidden by
the OST) and Chinas potential ambitions in that area; although China had
previously supported banning weapons in space, the 2007 test seemed to belie
that stance. In the wake of the test, Liu Jianchao, spokesman for the Chinese
Foreign Ministry, insisted that China will not participate in any kind of arms
race in outer space,59 but failed to allay concerns that the ASAT test was
53. Id. at 2327. For further discussion of the potential impact of the Moon Treaty, see FRANCIS
LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 18197 (2009).
54. See Status of the Treaty: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFF., http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/moon
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015); see also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 53, at 19097.
55. In the sense that this issue is an ongoing hot topic in space law, and the debate goes beyond the
scope of this Note.
56. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 46; see also Status of International Agreements, supra note
46.
57. Chinese ASAT Test, CENTER FOR SPACE STANDARDS & INNOVATION, http://www.centerforspace.com/
asat (last visited Feb. 13, 2015); see Joseph Kahn, China Shows Assertiveness in Weapons Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/20/world/asia/20china.html; ISS Crew Take to
Escape Capsules in Space Junk Alert, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2012, 6:46 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/
science-environment-17497766.
58. Kimberly Segal, NASA: Space Junk Passes Less Than 4 Miles from Space Station, CNN (Apr. 5,
2011, 5:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/04/05/space.station.debris/index.html.
59. Kahn, supra note 57; see China Confirms Anti-Satellite Missile Test, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2007,
4:08 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/science/2007/jan/23/spaceexploration.china.
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intended to demonstrate Chinas ability to destroy the satellites of other countries.60 Hostilities and suspicion between the United States and China have
increased in recent years, thanks in part to this incident.
B. THE HUGHES AND LORAL INTELSAT ACCIDENT AND THE NDAA 1999
Following the successful development of the Long March rockets, Chinas

new-found launch capabilities attracted customers who needed a service that
few states in the world could provide. In the wake of the Challenger shuttle
tragedy in 1986and the two-year grounding of the U.S. shuttle fleet
American satellite and telecommunications companies sought cheaper launch
options from countries like Russia and China, who could provide disposable
launch vehicles to carry American-made payloads into orbit. In 1996, two such
companies, Hughes Electronics Corporation and Loral Space and Communications Corporation, negotiated the launch of their Intelsat 708 broadcast satellite
on a Chinese Long March 3B rocket.61 When the rocket exploded only a minute
into its flightkilling six civiliansHughes and Loral sought to improve the
safety and accuracy of subsequent launches. To this end, they sent a team of
experts to teach the Chinese company about ballistics and steering techniques.62
Congress, somewhat understandably, objected to American companies sharing missile-guidance technology with China when the 1998 Report of the Select
Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with
the Peoples Republic of Chinaor Cox Reportbrought the incident to
light.63 Exacerbating the national security concern, China had initially prevented Hughes and Loral from investigating the crash site, andalthough the
remains of the American-built satellite were eventually returned to the parent
companiesa vital navigational chip was missing even though the plastic
casing that housed it was intact.64 The result of this botched attempt at economic pragmatism was a massive suit against Hughes and Loral for violating
the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 197665 by
60. Tim Ross, Holly Watt & Christopher Hope, America Threatened China over Star Wars, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.smh.com.au/world/america-threatened-china-over-star-wars20110203-1affj.html.
61. Chapter 6Satellite Launches in the PRC: Loral, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.
gov/coxreport/body/ch6bod.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Chapter 6]; Juliet Eilperin,
GOP Says U.S. Gave China Nuclear Edge, WASH. POST, May 6, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/politics/special/campfin/stories/cf050698.htm; Roberto Suro & John Mintz, Bureaucracy, Bungled
Report Collide at Loral, WASH. POST, May 31, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/
special/campfin/stories/loral053198.htm.
62. See sources cited supra note 61.
64. Eric Schmitt, A Secret U.S. Device Missing After 96 China Rocket Crash, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/24/us/a-secret-us-device-missing-after-96-china-rocket-crash.
html?srcpm; U.S. Department of State: Daily Press Briefing, FEDN AM. SCIENTISTS (June 24, 1998),
http://fas.org/news/china/1998/980624db.html.
65. International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat.
729 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. ch. 39 (2012)).
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providing China with advanced missile guidance technology.66

In 1999, partially in reaction to this breach of security, Congress amended the
annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to define communications
satellites as military technology, thus subjecting them to the much stricter
exportation regulations of the U.S. State Department (under which the only
element considered in license applications is the potential national security risk)
instead of the U.S. Department of Commerce (under which economic factors
are weighed against the national security concern).67 Although the export
requirements were relaxed in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 to re-classify
communications satellites as nonmilitaryallowing increased global participation by American satellite manufacturersthe new statute notably excluded
North Korea, the PRC, and [a]ny country that is a state sponsor of terrorism
from the more lenient export regime, and continues to forbid launch or exportation of American satellites to these countries.68 This deliberate categorization of
China as a national security threat equal to nuclear wildcard North Korea or a
terrorist state vividly highlighted the longstanding distrust between China and
the United Statesand set the stage for future such restrictions in space.
C. THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
One of the most visible examples of Chinas continuing isolation in the

international space forum is the International Space Station, a triumph of
collaboration and scientific visionand one in which China has never had the
opportunity to participate. Initially, perhaps, this was a result of Chinas selfimposed isolationism with regard to its space program and the widespread
perception of the early ISS as a U.S. station; more recently, however, China
has expressed clear interest in becoming a partner on the space station, and at
least several other countries are amenable to the idea.69 However, NASA may
not have a choice in the matter. When in 2012 the five ISS partners70 expressed
interest in reaching out to other countries (such as China) for ISS participation,71 then-U.S. Congressman Frank Wolf (R-VA) wrote a scathing letter
66. Chapter 6, supra note 61.

67. Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261,
1513, 112 Stat. 1920, 2174 (1998); 144 CONG. REC. 12,889 (1998); Congress Returns Export Control
over Satellites to State Department, ARMS CONTROL ASSN (Oct. 1, 1998), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/
1998_10/satoc98.
68. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, 1261(c)(2),
126 Stat. 1632, 2018.
69. HARVEY, supra note 10, at 12; China Wants Role in Space Station, CNN (Oct. 16, 2007, 3:39
PM), http://web.archive.org/web/20080314104006/http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/space/10/16/china.
space.ap/index.html; see Kimberly OBrien, China and the International Space Station (ISS): Chinas
Distance from the Project, NEWSL. (Intl Inst. for Asian Studies, Leiden, Neth.), Spring 2013, at 10,
available at http://www.iias.nl/sites/default/files/IIAS_NL63_10.pdf.
70. The five space agencies that serve as ISS partners are NASA (United States), Roscosmos
(Russia), JAXA (Japan), ESA (Europe), and CSA (Canada).
71. Vladimir Popovkin, General Director of Roscosmos, stated after a meeting in 2012 that [ISS
members] are not a closed club, our doors are wide open, and expressed hope that China and India
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forbidding it. NASA, Wolf wrote, should make clear that the U.S. will not
accept Chinese participation in any station-related activities because the Chinese civilian space program is directly run by the Peoples [sic] Liberation
Army (PLA), and that I believe that any effort to involve the Chinese in the
space program would be misguided, and not in our national interest.72
Despite Chinas successes with Tiangong, it is tellingand problematic
that one of the most powerful spacefaring countries in the world cannot be
included in a project as triumphant and inherently nonmilitary as the ISS. While
China is growing into its role as a significant entity in space exploration, it
remains a kind of outsider in the international space community, unable to
participate fully in the cooperation that has marked the decades since the end of
the Cold War. Chinas continued isolation in space appears even stranger in
light of the historic political tensions that were put aside to allow the United
States and Russia to cooperate in the ISS project in the early 1990s.73 Only a
few years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissipation of the
threat of nuclear holocaust, the United States was able to cooperate with Russia
in order to successfully launch the first ISS module, the Russian Zarya, in 1998
(largely thanks to mutual budgetary crises).74 Considering the historical significance of the ISS as a beacon of international cooperation that would have been
unimaginable a decade earlier, Chinas exclusion seems even bleaker. What has
made the possibility of peaceful cooperation with China so apparently untenable
to Congress?
D. SUSPICIONS OF ESPIONAGE
A major concernand one that sets China apart from other nations that might
otherwise be considered threateningis the high suspicion of technological
espionage, especially with regard to ballistics, communications, and observation
technology developed by the United States (and by NASA in particular). In
addition to the Hughes and Loral gaffe, Chinese nationals have several times
been accused ofor caughtsmuggling confidential or sensitive information
from NASA out of the country. In one especially vivid recent case, Dr. Bo
might participate in future ISS missions. Peter Rakobowchuk, Space Station Not a Closed Club,
Would Welcome China, India, CHRON. HERALD (Mar. 2, 2012, 6:11 AM), http://thechronicleherald.ca/
canada/69141-space-station-not-closed-club-would-welcome-china-india. Additionally, ESA General Director Jean-Jacques Dordain stated, I am in favor of seeing how we can work together with China. It
will take some steps, but it will come, I am sure. Id.
72. Letter from Frank R. Wolf, U.S. Congressman, to Charles F. Bolden, Jr., Admr, Natl Aeronautics & Space Admin. (Mar. 5, 2012), http://americaspace.com/wp-content/uploads/space_docs/Wolf_
Bolden_Letter_3_5_2012.pdf.
73. For a brief discussion on the history of international cooperation on the ISS, see History of the
ISS Project, JAXA, http://iss.jaxa.jp/iss/history/index_e.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
74. See International Space Station AssemblyPast Flights, NATL AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/iss_assembly.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2015); ISS:
Chronology, RUSSIANSPACEWEB, http://www.russianspaceweb.com/iss_chronology.html (last visited Feb.
14, 2015).
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1149
Jiang, a Chinese citizen and contractor with the National Institute of Aerospace
(NIA) working at NASAs Langley Research Center, was apprehended while
trying to leave the country suddenly on a one-way plane ticket to China.75 On
his person, agents recovered a NASA-issued laptop and other computer equipment.76 Jiang had been working on a new, high-tech observation and mapping
system that NASA had been developing, and he was already under suspicion for
violating the Arms Export Control Act for bringing a NASA laptop to China on
a previous trip.77 His status as a foreign national subjected Dr. Jiang to special
NASA regulations meant to preserve information security, but his supervisors
allegedly waived these to allow him to work more easily.78 Jiang was eventually
released when it was discovered that he had sexually explicit materialbut no
sensitive NASA technologyon his laptop.79 This embarrassingbut sadly not
uniqueevent highlights the strangeness of the modern U.S.China spacepolicy relationship, and grants a glimpse into the suspicion and uncertainty with
which each nation views the other.
III. THE WOLF AMENDMENTS FROM 20112013: A LEGISLATIVE BARRIER BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
A. THE BIRTH OF THE WOLF AMENDMENT
As evinced by the above examples, fear ofand resistance tothe concept

of cooperation with China in space is nothing new. The U.S. governments
continued perception of China as a state that poses a significant technologicalespionage threat indicates the un-confronted cultural and social issues that
create a gulf between the United States and China, which may be, morally or in
the interest of national security, unbridgeable. If American-made communications satellites could not even be launched by a Chinese rocket in 2013, it is
perhaps not surprising that a statutory provision prohibiting bilateral aerospace
cooperation was able to gain traction in Congress.
Such is the nature of the Wolf Amendment included in each annual appropriations act governing the budget of NASA since 2011. Nicknamed for its drafter,
former Congressman of Virginia Frank Wolf, this budgetary stipulation forbids
75. See, e.g., Press Release, Congressman Frank R. Wolf, Wolf Addresses Arrest at Dulles Airport of
Chinese National Potentially Involved in NASA Langley Security Violations (Mar. 18, 2013), http://
spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid40684; Tom Schoenberg, Chinese Spy Suspect Pleads Guilty to
Violating NASA Rules, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 3, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/20
13-05-02/chinese-spy-suspect-pleads-guilty-to-violating-nasa-rules.html.
76. See, e.g., Schoenberg, supra note 75.
77. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 75.
78. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 75.
79. Press Release, Natl Inst. of Aerospace, NIA Statement on the Release of Dr. Bo Jiang (May 3,
2013), http://spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid40689; Tom Schoenberg & Phil Mattingly, U.S.
Finds Porn Not Secrets on Suspected China Spys PC, BLOOMBERG BUS. (May 1, 2013, 8:57 PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-05-01/chinese-nasa-spy-suspect-to-plead-to-breaking-computerrule-1.
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involvement by NASA and the National Science Foundation (NSF) in any

bilateral program or forum with China. These appropriations acts grant funding
to federal programs and regulate the allowable uses for that funding.80 Through
them, Congress has the authority to delegate the annual budget for NASA (in
addition to many other government agencies and programs) and how it can
and cannotbe spent.
The respective appropriations acts governing NASA before 2011 had no
restrictions against China; the few restraints on NASAs use of its funding were
mostly internal to the Agency. For example, Section 422 of the 2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act stipulated that [n]one of the funds made available to
NASA in this Act may be used for voluntary separation incentive payments
unless the Administrator could certify that such payments would not result in
the loss of skills related to the safety of the Space Shuttle or the International
Space Station.81 A 2006 House bill stated that [n]one of the funds provided in
this Act may be used to implement an involuntary reduction in force at any
NASA center during fiscal year 2007, although it was never passed by the
Senate.82 The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 restricted the provision
of foreign assistance and grant money to activities backed by the PLA of China,
but contained no such language applying to NASA.83 In fact, in 2010, Public
Law 111-314 simply required that [t]he Administrator [of NASA] shall certify
to Congress at least 15 days in advance of any cooperative agreement with the
Peoples Republic of China . . . involving spacecraft . . . or scientific or technical information, as long as the agreement would not hurt the United States
space-launch capabilities or improve Chinas missile capabilities.84 This provision strongly suggests that, prior to 2011, space cooperation between NASA and
China was accepted as a necessity, despite the potential national security risks.
This attitude changed with the first iteration of the Wolf Amendment, which
appeared in the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act 2011 (2011 Appropriations Act).85 The law was introduced by Representative Frank Wolf, who held office for seventeen congressional terms and
chaired the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Sci80. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10,
1340(a), 125 Stat. 38, 123; Press Release, Congressman Frank R. Wolf, U.S. Should Not Cooperate
with Peoples Liberation Army to Help Develop Chinas Space Program (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.
spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid35130.
81. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, div. G, tit. IV, 422, 118 Stat. 3,
416.
82. H.R. 5672, 109th Cong. 530 (2006).
83. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, div. F, tit. VII, 7071(g), 123
Stat. 3034, 339091 (2009).
84. Enactment of Title 51National and Commercial Space Programs, Pub. L. No. 111-314,
30701(a)(2), 124 Stat. 3328, 3369 (2010).
85. Under which Act Congress chose to enact appropriations for NASA varied over time, ranging
from the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006 (H.R.
2862) to the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (Public Law
112-10) to the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (Public Law 113-6).
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ence, and Related Agencies (which funds NASA and several other science
agencies as well as the Commerce and Justice Departments) from 20012006
and from 20112015.86 Wolf, a graduate of Penn State University and the
Georgetown University Law Center, is a staunch supporter of continuing American dominance in space, especially with respect to manned spaceflight.87
In his own words, Wolf developed the Amendment to limit new collaboration with China until we see improvements in its human rights record, as well as
a reduction in its well documented cyberattacks and espionage efforts against
the U.S.88 Significantly, Representative Wolf has publicly opposed any involvement of NASA with CNSA on both moral and security grounds. What concerns me most about the Chinese space program is that unlike the U.S., it is
being led by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). There is no reason to believe
that the PLAs space program will be any more benign than the PLAs recent
military posture.89 Direct bilateral cooperation with an agency controlled to at
least some degree by Chinas militarygiven its repressive historycould
tarnish NASAs image and diminish both its ethical high ground as a paragon of
science and exploration, and its credibility as a trustworthy and peaceful
agency.90 To address these concerns, Section 1340(a) of the 2011 Appropriations Act stipulated:
None of the funds made available by this division may be used for [NASA] or
the Office of Science and Technology Policy to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of
any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with
China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically
authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this division.91
86. About: Congressman Frank Wolf, CONGRESSMAN FRANK WOLF: 10TH DISTRICT VIRGINIA, http://wolf.
house.gov/about#.U56QDvldU1Y (last visited June 10, 2014). Congressman Wolf retired in January
2015. See Representative Frank R. Wolf, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/member/frank-wolf/1
238 (last visited Feb. 14, 2015); Rep. Frank Wolf, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/members/
frank_wolf/400435 (last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
88. Press Release, Congressman R. Frank Wolf, Wolf Letter to NASAs Bolden Correcting Record
on Restrictions Involving Chinese Nationals (Oct. 8, 2013), http://spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid
41749.
89. Frank R. Wolf, U.S. Congressman, Statement at U.S.China Commission Hearing on Military
and Civil Space Programs in China (May 14, 2011), http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid3
7024.
90. See id. (The U.S. has no business cooperating with the PLA to help develop its space program.
That is why I included language in the Fiscal Year 2011 Continuing Resolution preventing NASA and
the Office of Science and Technology Policy from using federal funds to develop, design, plan,
promulgate, implement or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to
participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned
company.).
91. Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10,
1340(a), 125 Stat. 38, 123. For a brief statement by Congressman Wolf concerning his reasons for
introducing the Amendment, see Wolf, supra note 89.
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Section 1340(b) provided that [t]he limitation[s] in subsection (a) shall also
apply to any funds used to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at
facilities belonging to or utilized by [NASA].92
The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act 2012 (2012
Appropriations Act) retained the same language as Sections 1340(a) and (b) of
the 2011 Appropriations Act, but reformatted them into Sections 539(a) and (b)
and added exceptions in the form of subsections (c) and (d). Subsection (c)
provides:
The limitations described in subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to activities which NASA or [the Office of Science and Technology Policy] have
certified pose no risk of resulting in the transfer of technology, data, or other
information with national security or economic security implications to China
or a Chinese-owned company.93
Subsection (d) details the specifications for submitting such a certification.94

The provisions of Section 535 of the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act 2013 were nearly identical; the only changes apart from
minor reformatting were the addition of a new requirement to Section 535(c)(2)
requiring NASA or the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to
certify that activities under subsections (a) and (b) will not involve knowing
interactions with officials who have been determined by the United States to
have direct involvement with violations of human rightsand an increase in
the required time for certification from fifteen to thirty days before the planned
activity.95
B. INTERPRETATION OF THE WOLF AMENDMENT PRIOR TO
2014
Unsurprisingly, there was immediate backlash against the restrictions of the

Wolf Amendment, with Presidential Science Advisor and Director of OSTP
John Holdren defying the new statute to participate in the bilateral U.S.China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue in early May 2011. After an investigation by
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) at Congressman Wolfs request,
Holdren was found to have violated Section 1340 of the 2011 Appropriations
Act (that is, the Wolf Amendment) by participating in the conference.96 In
92. 1340(b), 125 Stat. at 123.

93. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, 539(c),
125 Stat. 552, 639 (2011).
94. Id. 539(d).
95. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 535(c)(2),
(d), 127 Stat. 198, 277.
96. See Letter from Lynn H. Gibson, Gen. Counsel, Govt Accountability Office, to Frank R. Wolf,
U.S. Congressman (Oct. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Lynn Gibson to Frank Wolf], http://www.gao.
gov/decisions/appro/321982.pdf; see also Press Release, supra note 80; Adrienne Sponberg, White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy on Chopping Block; GOP Cites Partnerships with
China, CONSORTIUM OF AQUATIC SCI. SOCIETIES (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.aquaticsci.net/?p640; U.S.
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response, Holdren and OSTP argued that the provisions of the Wolf Amendment
prohibiting bilateral activities with China represented an unconstitutional restriction on the Presidents powers to make foreign policy, and that Congress had
overstepped its bounds by using its appropriations power to infringe upon the
Presidents explicit constitutional authority.97 The GAO, however, was not
persuaded. It is not our role nor within our province to opine upon or
adjudicate the constitutionality of duly enacted statutes such as section 1340,
the opinion states, adding that legislation signed by the President after being
passed by Congress is entitled to a heavy presumption in favor of constitutionality.98 As a result, the GAO found the OSTP in violation of Section 1340 and
thus the Antideficiency Act,99 which sets forth conditions and penalties for
misuse of congressional appropriations.100
Almost simultaneously, the Wolf Amendment was used to bar several Chinese journalists from Kennedy Space Center for the May 2011 launch of
STS-134, the final flight of the space shuttle Endeavour and the second-to-last
flight of any shuttle. The journalists were classed as government employees
because they worked for the official Chinese news company Xinhua and thus
could not be hosted under the provisions of the Wolf Amendment. The reporters interest in the story was a painful ironySTS-134 was carrying the $2
billion AMS-02 (Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer) to be attached to the ISS, a
project that was developed in collaboration with Chinese scientists.101
The above incident is not the only time the Wolf Amendment has been
applied to exclude Chinese citizens from participation in NASA activities. In
October 2013, six Chinese graduate students were denied entry to the Second
Kepler Science Conference at the NASA Ames Research Center, which was to
be held in November.102 The conference organizers cited the 20112013 Wolf
Amendment as a moratorium on visits to NASA facilities by citizens of several
nations, including China . . . . crafted by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA) to reflect
national security concerns.103 A memo sent to registrants stated:
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 2011 Outcomes of the Strategic Track, U.S. DEPT ST. (May
10, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/162967.htm.
97. Letter from Lynn Gibson to Frank Wolf, supra note 96, at 4.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 5.
100. Antideficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1341 (2012).
101. Cindy Hao, Chinese Journalists Barred from Shuttle Launch, SCI. MAG. (May 20, 2011, 4:23
PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/space/2011/05/chinese-journalists-barred-shuttle-launch; Sponberg, supra note 96.
102. Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Never Mind. NASA Says Ban on Chinese Students Was a Misunderstanding, SCI. MAG. (Oct. 24, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://news.sciencemag.org/people-events/2013/10/nevermind.-nasa-says-ban-chinese-students-was-misunderstanding; Ian Sample, U.S. Scientists Boycott NASA
Conference over China Ban, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013, 8:09 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/science/20
13/oct/05/us-scientists-boycott-nasa-china-ban.
103. Letter from Scientific Org. Comm. to Second Kepler Sci. Conference Registrants (Oct. 8,
2013), http://spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid44796.
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As members of the [Scientific Organizing Committee], we find the consequences of this law deplorable and strongly object to banning our Chinese
colleagues, or colleagues from any nation, from participation in KSC2 at
NASA/Ames. Had we been aware of this possibility at the onset of planning
KSC2, alternative venues to NASA/Ames would have been pursued.104
However, because the issue arose during the October 2013 federal government
shutdown, communication opportunities and alternative options were limited.105
The news caused an uproar in the scientific community, with other participants threatening to boycott the conference over the restrictions.106 Compounding the problem, the organizers of the conference apparently believed that a
policy NASA Administrator Charles Bolden implemented in March 2013 precluded the potential exceptions set forth in the 2013 Wolf Amendment. Bolden,
in a March 13, 2013 hearing before the House Appropriations Committee,
stated:
Ive ordered a complete review of the access which foreign nationals from
designated countries are granted at NASA facilities, as well as our security
procedures with regard to these individuals more broadly. . . . Second, Ive
closed down the NASA technical reports database107 while we review whether
there is a risk of export-controlled documents being made available on this
Web site. Third, I have ordered a moratorium on granting any new access to
NASA facilities to individuals from specific designated countries, specifically
China, Burma, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan. Fourth, while this review is ongoing, I have also ordered that any
remote-computer access to NASA resources be terminated for those from the
same specific designated countries.108
This reviewand the attached Administrator-imposed cessation on granting

certain foreign nationals access to NASA facilitieswas apparently completed
in July 2013, but the Ames Conference staff was unaware that it no longer
applied.109
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See NASA Vows to Review Ban on Chinese Scientists, HINDU BUS. LINE (Oct. 11, 2013),
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/science/nasa-vows-to-review-ban-on-chinese-scientists/
article5224764.ece; Sample, supra note 102.
107. Note that this database is normally publically accessible on the NASA website at http://data.nasa.
gov.
108. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2014: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Charles F. Bolden, Jr., Admr, Natl Aeronautics & Space
Admin.), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg82907/html/CHRG-113hhrg82907.htm [hereinafter Hearings].
109. Press Release, supra note 88; see NASA Vows to Review Ban on Chinese Scientists, supra note
106; Sample, supra note 102.
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In response to what was quickly becoming a public relations disaster, both

Congressman Wolf and Administrator Bolden insisted that Ames had misinterpreted the restrictions on Chinese nationals and unfairly denied them access. In
a scathing letter to Administrator Bolden, Wolf defended his Amendment,
insisting that it
primarily restricts bilateral, not multilateral, meetings and activities with the
Communist Chinese government or Chinese-owned companies. It places no
restrictions on activities involving individual Chinese nationals unless those
nationals are acting as official representatives of the Chinese government. As
such, the email from NASA Ames mischaracterizes the law and is inaccurate.110
Bolden, in response, criticized the managers at NASA Ames as having acted

without notifying headquarters, although he commended their performance of
the due diligence they believed appropriate.111 In the wake of these testimonies, NASA issued an apology to the Chinese citizens who had been denied
access to the conference, offering to review their applications for attendance.112
Although the treatment of the Amendment prior to 2014 demonstrated widespread confusion among members of the national space community with regard
to its intent and applicability, Congressman Wolfs statements would seem to
settle the question. The Wolf Amendment, as introduced in 2011, was intended
to restrict only bilateral activities, and only Chinese citizens representing the
government were to be excluded from multilateral endeavors. However convenient, this interpretation of the law from the mouth of its creator may no longer
be accurate.
IV. THE NEW WOLF AMENDMENT OF 2014 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION
Although the 20112013 Wolf Amendments severely constricted NASAs
ability to interact with other spacefaring nations (there are so few, after all), at
the very least their application evinced careful consideration of a policy balance
between national security, morality, international cooperation, and practicality.
110. Press Release, supra note 88; see Jeffrey Mervis, Legislator Blasts NASAs Explanation for
Excluding Chinese Students from Meeting, SCI. MAG. (Oct. 8, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://news.sciencemag.
org/people-events/2013/10/legislator-blasts-nasas-explanation-excluding-chinese-students-meeting.
111. E-mail from Charles Bolden, Admr, Natl Aeronautics & Space Admin. to Unknown Recipients (Oct. 10, 2013, 12:20 PM), http://spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid44806; Bhattacharjee, supra note 102.
112. Paul Armstrong & Feng Ke, China: NASA Mistakenly Banned Chinese Researchers from
Conference, CNN (Oct. 20, 2013, 11:03 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/20/world/asia/china-nasadrama; Jeffrey Mervis, NASAs Bolden to Give Banned Chinese Scientists a Second Chance, SCI. MAG.
(Oct. 10, 2013, 4:45 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/people-events/2013/10/nasas-bolden-give-bannedchinese-scientists-second-chance; Ian Sample, NASA Admits Mistake over Chinese Scientists Conference Ban, GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/science/2013/oct/11/nasachinese-scientists-conference-ban.
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That may have changed in 2014. Public Law 113-76, the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2014 (2014 Appropriations Act), was signed by the President in
January 2014113 and contained a slight deviation from the core text of its three
predecessorsa change so seemingly insignificant that it might not seem worth
the effort to mention it. However, the potential repercussions are staggering.
The relevant text in Sections 532(a), (c), and (d) is identical to Sections 535(a),
(c) and (d) in the 2013 Appropriations Act.114 However, the newly amended
Section 532(b) states that [n]one of the funds made available by this Act may
be used to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by NASA.115 Considering that the annual appropriations act
dictates the spending of NASAs entire governmental budget, this change
appears to categorically bar official Chinese visitors from NASA facilities (or
even facilities used by NASA!) where any government-granted money is
involved, whether the forum is a bilateral one or not. This could reasonably be
read to exclude Chinese citizens from all multinational conventions or events
with NASA, unless the events could be certified by the House Appropriations
Committee as posing no national- or economic-security risk; that is, the 2014
Appropriations Act could conceivably be enacting the very restrictions that
Congressman Wolf protested so vehemently in the wake of the 2013 Ames
Conference debacle.
It is reasonable to ask whether the wording change, tiny as it is, was an
accident or oversight by the House Appropriations Committee that introduced
the bill. Though the available legislative history and relevant congressional
reports, debates, and interviews are mute on the issue, the structure of the 2014
Appropriations Act and its predecessors suggest that the change was deliberate.
Significantly, H.R. 4660 (2015 Appropriations Act) currently under consideration retains the amended language, continuing to insist that [n]one of the
funds made available by this Act may be used for the purpose of hosting
official Chinese visitors.116 If the altered phrasing was an oversight, it would
likely have been corrected in the drafting of the 2015 Appropriations Act.
As noted infra, in previous years NASAs appropriations have been constrained with regard to internal management by the prohibitive [n]one of the
funds language now found in the Wolf Amendment of 20142015.117 It can be
understood that Congressby using this categorical languageintended to
forbid NASA from activities that would harm its ongoing projects. Congress did
113. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5.
114. Compare id. 532(a), (c), (d), 128 Stat. at 85, with Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 535(a), (c), (d), 127 Stat. 198, 277.
115. 532(b), 128 Stat. at 85 (emphasis added). Note that the earlier iteration of the text of
subsection (b) merely stated that [t]he limitation[s] in subsection (a) [precluding bilateral coordination] shall also apply to any funds used to effectuate the hosting of official Chinese visitors at facilities
belonging to or utilized by NASA. 535(b), 127 Stat. at 277.
116. See H.R. 4660, 113th Cong. 532(b) (2014).
117. Cf. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, div. G, tit. IV, 422, 118 Stat.
3, 139; H.R. 5672, 109th Cong. 530 (2006).
2015]
1157
not intend to permit NASA to use available nongovernmental funds to harm the
space shuttle or ISS projects; Congress meant to stop the activity from happening at all (subject to exemption if it could be certified harmless). There are
multiple references to limitations on various aspects of funding in the 2014
Appropriations Act, demonstrating that the change cannot have been made to
align the language in Section 532 with the rest of the Act.
However, Sections 709, 718, 719, 720, 736, 744, and numerous others of the
2014 Appropriations Act state that none of the funds in this or any other Act
may be used to pay certain employees or accomplish or prohibit certain
activities.118 Furthermore, Section 723 reads, in uniquely severe language,
[n]one of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Agriculture.119 Thus, the language used in Section 532(b) is not the
most restrictive in the statute; we can presume that the congressional language,
from least to most restrictive, progresses from (1) limitations apply 3 (2)
none of the funds made available by this Act 3 (3) none of the funds
made available by this or any other Act. How best to interpret this, from a
congressional-intent perspective, coming as it did directly on the heels of a
public misunderstanding of the more lenient 20112013 language? If Congressman Wolfs 2013 opinions on the purpose and character of his legislation have
not changed, then perhaps the 2014 Appropriations Act will not affect much at
all; if, indeed, the purpose of the Wolf Amendment is merely to prevent direct
bilateral involvement between NASA and the PLA, then the 2014 Act does not
appear to have significantly changed in measure or scope.
Congressman Wolf himself has not spoken to the wording change, and his
statements on the purpose of the Act apparently conflict. In an April 2014
speech at the Space Policy Institute, Wolf stated:
[O]ur subcommittee has had strong oversight of NASAs security, including a
provision to limit its bilateral cooperation with the Chinese space program,
which is run by the Peoples Liberation Army . . . .
....
. . . [However] it is important to note that the congressional restriction does
provide several venues for the U.S. to maintain its dialogue with Chinese
counterparts as well as opportunities for limited engagement. For instance, the
language only restricts bilateral cooperation, not multilateral venues where
representatives from all countries participate.
....
. . . So there is some flexibility for NASA when it comes to China.120
118. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. A, tit. VII, 709, 719, 744,
div. E, tit. VII, 718, 720, 736, 128 Stat. 5, 3536, 41, 23435, 238, 243 (emphases added).
119. Id. div. A, tit. VII, 723, 128 Stat. at 38 (emphasis added).
120. Press Release, Congressman Frank R. Wolf, Wolf Remarks at Space Policy Institute (Apr. 28,
2014), http://spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid45638. Although the nature of this informal speech
cannot be taken as a statement of official congressional intent, apparently Wolfs feelings on the
purpose of the Amendment have not changed materially. However, by failing to address the new
1158
[Vol. 103:1135
However, in the March 2013 hearing with Administrator Boldenand in

contrast to his (Wolfs) statements to the Space Policy InstituteCongressman
Wolf insinuated that the 2013 Appropriations Act was meant to be strictly
construed. Wolf asked Bolden:
Are you aware of any incidents in which NASA has encouraged an external
entity, as they did down at NASA Langley, to undertake with its own funds a
cooperative activity with China that would be prohibited using NASA funding?
And are you going to be clarifying that with the contractors? Because there
was almost a workaround to get around the subcommittee language.121
Bolden took severe umbrage to the veiled criticism, replying:

I respectfully disagree with the implication of what you just said. . . . Lesa
[Roe, the Director of NASA Langley] and her people are not attempting to use
contractors as a workaround to the rules. . . . As a matter of fact, we really feel
that we have been fully complying with the law, that our processes are
strong.122
Evidently, Wolf and the other members of the House Appropriations Committee
were concerned with the possibility that NASA might use such a workaround
to engage indirectly with the CNSA, and wanted to prohibit such actions. This
seems the most salient explanation for the wording change, and would align
Wolfs continuing insistence that the Amendment is meant to prohibit bilateral
conduct only with the apparent tightening of the congressional noose with
regard to funding allocations.
It seems most likely, then, that the language in Section 532 of the 2014
Appropriations Act (and Section 532 of the 2015 Appropriations Act currently
under deliberation in the Senate) was deliberately amended in order to correct
this perceived security flaw. By forbidding the use of any funds made available
under the 2014 Appropriations Act to facilitate official Chinese visitors, Wolf
might have hoped to strengthen the restrictive language and ensure that the PLA
was not being engagedeven indirectlyby NASA through contracting projects or other such workarounds, although the focus on facility use rather than
cooperative projects is puzzling. The potential implications of the changed
language might even have been inadvertent, as Wolfs continuing insistence that
language in the 2014 Amendment (which had already gone into effect at the time of the above speech),
his remarks raise even more questions about the intent of the legislation and how Congress and NASA
will interpret it after his retirement. Moreover, Wolfs own feeling regarding the effect of the
Amendment are not sufficient to prevent it from exerting undue restrictions on facially neutral
relationships (as demonstrated by the plethora of interpretations of the earlier, more relaxed versions of
the Amendment).
121. Hearings, supra note 108.
122. Id.
2015]
1159
the Act prohibits bilateral collaboration only does not seem consistent with a
plain reading of the 2014 language.
At this point, however, it must be considered that Congressman Wolfs
personal interpretation of the statute no longer controls; the plain language of
Section 532 does restrict multilateral interaction. The widespread confusion and
misapplication of the Amendment between 2011 and 2013 are damning evidence; if the international space community could not parse the wording of the
old legislation, it seems unlikely that they will be any less liberal in applying the
new, stricter language. The heart of the problem lies in the misapplied focus that
Wolf and other members of the House Appropriations Committee have granted
to the Amendment. Congressman Wolf, in many of his statements concerning
the Amendment, emphasizes the bilateral/multilateral nature of a given activity
to determine whether it should be considered prohibited.123 However, this is
not the heart of the issue. Although bilateral coordination is unarguably banned
in both the 2011 and 2014 versions of the Amendment, the true focus has
consistently been on the issue of officialness, not number of parties or even the
nature of the activity.
Since its inception, the Wolf Amendment has restricted the use of funds in
hosting . . . official Chinese visitors.124 It may be that Wolf and the Appropriations Committee have simply considered this limitation enough to prevent abuse
of the provision; Wolf has occasionally suggested as much.125 The problem with
this assumption is that official is never addressed or defined in the Amendment,126 and thus cannot be facially assumed to refer only to citizens representing the Chinese government. Merriam-Webster defines the adjective official
to be of or relating to the job or work of someone in a position of authority.127
Although this covers representatives of the Chinese government, it may also
fairly be said to extend to other prominent members of the scientific community
(in the sense of an official visitor) or members with sufficient standing and
authority in any public organization, even reporters working for an official
Chinese news agency.128 If Congress wishes to curtail broadly restrictive overapplication of the Amendment through reliance on the official language, it
should make this clear by including an internal definition of official in the text
of the 2016 Appropriations Act, making explicit exactly who is being barred
from attending events funded by NASA. Until such a definition is agreed upon,
both the intention and the effects of the 2014 wording change will be frustrat123. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 88; Press Release, supra note 120; Wolf, supra note 89.
124. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 532(b), 128 Stat. 5, 85 (emphasis
added); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, 535(b),
127 Stat. 198, 277 (emphasis added).
125. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 88; see also Press Release, supra note 120.
126. 532(b), 128 Stat. at 85.
127. Official, adj., MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/official (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
128. See supra text accompanying note 101 (discussing the STS-134 shuttle launch and the use of
the 2011 Wolf Amendment to bar Chinese reporters from the event).
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ingly obfuscating, and it is likely that industry leaders will continue to interpret
the provision broadly (that is, restrictively) for fear of crossing Congress and
becoming subject to sanctions under the Antideficiency Act.
For the immediate future, the 2014 and 2015 Wolf Amendments should not
be taken by NASA or its facilities as a moratorium on hosting visitors of
Chinese nationality, but merely on hosting visitors who are acting as official
representatives of the Chinese government or CNSA.129 The official caveat in
Section 532(b) and Wolfs own statements after the Ames Conference and at the
Space Law Institute support this conclusion. Although the plain language of
the Amendment is to be criticized, as a matter of policy, it is unlikely that the
Appropriations Committee would make such a drastic reversal from their
October 2013 view without any comment or clarification. Additionally, there is
a strong public policy argument to be made for restricting workarounds to the
Amendments objectives while ensuring that multilateral forums hosted by
NASA are still accessible to scientific thinkers from all nations. The new Wolf
Amendment is startling, but, most probably, does not represent a serious
deviation from the policy that has been in place since 2011. That said, the
Appropriations Committees purpose in enacting the Wolf Amendment would
be best served in the future by adding an explicit, internal definition of official
to the terms of the Amendment, in order to clarify its applicability and prevent
future public relations debacles like those that have occurred in the wake of its
enactment. Moreover, restructuring the plain language of the Amendment in
order to more fully address Congresss true concerns (that is, security workarounds) would be advisable, as the current language of the Amendment is
demonstrably confusing for NASA and other government agencies to interpret
and places undue focus on venue rather than activity.
CONCLUSION
However the 20142015 Wolf Amendments are interpreted, they will still
have resounding effects for U.S.China space-industry relations. Although a
complete ban of all visitors of Chinese nationality would be an almost unthinkably direct political affront, even the blanket ban on CNSANASA cooperation
that is the facial purpose of the statute will have repercussions. The moratorium
on bi- or multilateral industry communications created by the 2013 Appropriations Act will severely constrain information transfer between both space
agencies, effectively blinding NASA to the Chinese space programs current
endeavors as well as the reverse (although considering how closed-mouthed
CNSA is about even public projects, it is likely that this effect will hit NASA
129. Unfortunately, CNSA, as an official institution of the Chinese government by any definition, is
probably still barred from participation in any NASA-hosted activities, multilateral or not. Organization
and Function, CHINA NATL SPACE ADMIN., http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n62081/n771918/index.html
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
2015]
1161
harder than China). Additionally, such a measure could cause the already
tenuous trust developed with the CNSA to deteriorate.
Blocking the United States and NASA from cooperating with one of the
major space powers of the worlda country with demonstrated ambition and an
increasing capability to achieve dominance in spacemay hobble us beyond
recovery, at least for the next generation of space advancements. Space exploration is no longer the province of individual nations operating alone, and
international cooperation is both widespread and necessary. Just as the international sharing of such sensitive and cutting-edge technology is a valid national
security concern, so too should be rejecting the contributions of a major
developing power, especially considering the relative political stagnation of
space exploration in the United States and the burgeoning enthusiasm for it in
China. Although it is impossible to predict what the future will hold for the
space explorers of tomorrow, it seems fully necessary to initiate cautious, but
optimistic, cooperation with China in space: inviting them as a party to the ISS,
certainly, and potentially opening the door for future jointor even bilateral
projects. The Hughes/Loral debacle limited the U.S. communications-satellite
industry for decades,130 and its consequences have only recently been corrected
in part; Congress must take care not to make the same mistakes with regard to
other U.S. investments in space.
Isolating NASA from a country that is both a space superpower and one of
the largest economies in the world will only hurt the United States in the long
run. China has a long history of self-sufficiency in space, and it is demonstrably
capable of overcoming the challenges posed by having to reinvent the wheel
(or, as it may be, the rocket) because its global neighbors have historically been
too afraid of its military capabilities and ambitions to share what they know.
Would a free flow of technologyif not launching systems or ballistic information, then at least those many nonmilitary elements of space travel, exploration,
and studytruly hurt the United States? Or would it pique the desire of the
Chinese citizens to be free from their repressive government and experience the
freedom of a democratic society? If NASA is truly the pinnacle of American
ingenuity, courage, optimism, and grace, then (sensibly) open communication
between the scientists and engineers in the CNSA can only inspire the latter to
demand better for themselves, their country, and their space program.
130. Prior to the enactment of the NDAA of 1999, U.S. companies held more than an 80% share in
the global market for communications satellites. See Ryan Zelnio, The Effects of Export Control on the
Space Industry, SPACE REV. (Jan. 16, 2006), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/533/1. After the
regulation, the percentage of global contracts awarded to U.S. companies dropped to an all-time low of
less than 20% in 2002, before rebounding slightly to hover around 50%. Id. Although this cannot be
wholly attributed to the change in export regulations, it is still a stark reminder of the economic dangers
of technological isolation. Id. For a brief lay analysis of the impact of the 1999 NDAA, see William J.
Broad, Communications Satellites Made Legal for Export, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/01/04/science/communications-satellites-banned-as-weapons-now-legal-for-export.html.
1162
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The national security and morality concerns expressed by Mr. Wolf and
others are unquestionably valid. Even viewing the future through rose-colored
glasses, it is inevitable that there will be espionage, military developments, and
political statements in any international community, much less one as technologically irresistible as space. If the Wolf Amendment persists beyond its creators
retirement, so be it; but Congress, NASA, and members of the international
space community must be careful in how they construe its provisions. The U.S.
Congress must not permit jingoistic fear to deprive the nation of the opportunity
to connect with China in such a burgeoning and politically hopeful sphere.
For now, the Wolf Amendment seems intended to prohibit official visitors
only, and not to prevent Chinese scientists and researchers who desire true
collaboration from sharing their discoveries with the United States and vice
versa. As the Jade Rabbit rover tweeted on the eve of its first lunar night, Ive
only encountered a little problem while on my own adventure.131 It is hopeful
to believe that the Wolf Amendment, too, is just a little problem on the way to
truly global cooperation in space.
131. Hannah Osborne, Chinas Jade Rabbit Still Alive After Being Hit by Rocks on Moon Surface,
INTL BUS. TIMES (July 21, 2014, 4:20 PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/chinas-jade-rabbit-still-alive-afterbeing-hit-by-rocks-moon-surface-1457626. For an alternate translation of the rovers final words, see
Celia Hatton, Adoring Fans Cheer on Jade Rabbit Moon Rover, BBC NEWS CHINA BLOG (Feb. 13, 2014,
5:53 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-26167671.

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The Eagle and the Hare: U.S.

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE SPACE PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . .

THE SINOSOVIET ALLIANCE AND THE BALLISTIC ORIGINS OF SPACE

COLD WAR LULL AND THE INITIATIVE TO ACHIEVE MANNED

II. NASACNSA RELATIONS PRIOR TO 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

EMERGENCE OF A NEW SPACE SUPERPOWER

CHINA AND THE TREATIES

THE HUGHES AND LORAL INTELSAT ACCIDENT AND THE NDAA

III. THE WOLF AMENDMENTS FROM 20112013: A LEGISLATIVE

THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION

THE BIRTH OF THE WOLF AMENDMENT

INTERPRETATION OF THE WOLF AMENDMENT PRIOR TO 2014

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

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15. KULACKI & LEWIS, supra note 6, at 8.

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development under an international regime . . . to govern the exploitation of

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Following the successful development of the Long March rockets, Chinas

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providing China with advanced missile guidance technology.66

One of the most visible examples of Chinas continuing isolation in the

66. Chapter 6, supra note 61.

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As evinced by the above examples, fear ofand resistance tothe concept

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involvement by NASA and the National Science Foundation (NSF) in any

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Subsection (d) details the specifications for submitting such a certification.94

Unsurprisingly, there was immediate backlash against the restrictions of the

92. 1340(b), 125 Stat. at 123.

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This reviewand the attached Administrator-imposed cessation on granting

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In response to what was quickly becoming a public relations disaster, both

Bolden, in response, criticized the managers at NASA Ames as having acted

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However, in the March 2013 hearing with Administrator Boldenand in

Bolden took severe umbrage to the veiled criticism, replying:

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