This legal maxim means that, the meaning of an unclear word or phrase should be

determined by the words immediately surrounding it.

Lord Macmillan, explained the maxim as, The meaning of a word is to be judged by the
company it keeps. This maxim can be used in almost any problem of construction, for it applies
wherever a statutory provision contains a word or phrase that is capable of bearing more than one
meaning.
When two or more words susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they are
understood to be used in their cognate sense. The words take their colour from and are quantified
by each other, the meaning of the general words being restricted to a sense analogous to that of
the less general.
Lord Barcon, has aptly said, coupling of word together shows that they are to be
understood in the same sense and where the meaning of particular word is doubtful or obscure or
where a particular expression when taken singly is inoperative, the intention of the party using it
may be ascertained by looking at adjoining words or at expressions occurring at other parts of the
same instrument.
The maxim of Noscitur a Sociis has been explained by the Privy Council in the case of,
Angus Robertson v. George Day [(1879) 5 AC 63] by observing "It is a legitimate rule
of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in
immediate connection with them".
The Apex Court in the case of, Rohit Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd. vs. CCE - [AIR 1991
SC 754] laid down the broad principle with regard to the applicability of the rule of
noscitur a sociis as follows:
(i)
does the term in issue have more than one meaning attributed to it that is, based
on the setting or the context one could apply the narrower or wider meaning;
(ii)
are words or terms used found in a group totally dissimilar or is there a common
thread running through them;
(iii)
the purpose behind insertion of the term.
Following the aforesaid principle laid down by the Apex Court, the Delhi High Court in the case
of, CIT vs. Raj Kumar [(2009) 318 ITR 462 (Del)] held that the word advance which appears in
the company of the word loan could only mean such advance which carries with it an
obligation of repayment. Trade advance which are in the nature of money transacted to give
effect to a commercial transactions would not, in our view, fall within the ambit of the provisions
of section 2( 22 )( e ) of the Act.
Delhi Tribunal in the case of, Parsons Brinckerhoff India (P.) Ltd. vs. Asstt. DIT (Int.
Tax) [(2008) 24 SOT 341 (Del)] applying the rule of Noscitur a Sociis held that, the

words model and design used in clause (i) of Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the
Income tax Act, 1961 have to take colour from the other words surrounding them, such as,
patent, invention, secret formula or process or trade mark, which are all species of
intellectual property. These two words cannot, therefore, refer to drawings and designs
which are sold outright, without the setter retaining any proprietary rights over them. The
model or design, in order to be roped in by the provision, should be a specie of
intellectual property in the same manner as a patent or invention or secret formula or
process or a trade-mark. Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that an outright sale of the
drawings and designs cannot fall under the definition of royalty under Explanation 2 to
section 9(1)(vi).
The principle of Noscitur a Sociis has received approval from Apex Court although its
discriminate application / use has been cautioned. It must be borne in mind that the
principle of Noscitur a Sociis is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in case
where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the
scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the
Legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful, or
otherwise not clear that the rule of Noscitur a Sociis can be usefully applied. Ref.: State
of Bombay vs. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha [AIR 1960 SC 610] It can also be applied
where the meaning of the words of wider meaning import is doubtful; but, where the
object of the Legislature in using wider words is clear and free from ambiguity, the rule
of construction cannot be applied.