G.R. No.

148372
June 27, 2005
FACTS: Respondent Miclat was employed on a probationary basis as marketing
assistant by petitioner Clarion which is owned by Yutingco.
The EYCO Group of Companies of which CLARION formed part filed with the SEC a
Petition for the Declaration of Suspension of Payment, Formation and Appointment of
Rehabilitation Receiver/ Committee, Approval of Rehabilitation Plan with Alternative
Prayer for Liquidation and Dissolution of Corporation. The SEC issued an Order
approving the creation of an interim receiver for the EYCO Group of Companies.
The Assistant Personnel Manager of CLARION informed Miclat by telephone that her
employment contract had been terminated. No reason was given for the termination.
In her Position Paper filed before the labor arbiter, Miclat claimed that assuming that
her termination was necessary, the manner in which it was carried out was illegal, no
written notice thereof having been served on her, and she merely learned of it only a day
before it became effective.
On the other hand, petitioners claimed that they could not be faulted for retrenching
some of its employees including Miclat, they drawing attention to the EYCO Group of
Companies being placed under receivership, notice of which was sent to its supervisors
and rank and file employees via a Memorandum.
The Labor arbiter found that Miclat was illegally dismissed and directed her
reinstatement. The NLRC affirmed the labor arbiters decision. The CA sustained the
resolutions of the NLRC; it also denied petitioners MR of the decision.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the CA Decision, together (sustaining NLRC) is SET ASIDE and
another rendered declaring the legality of the dismissal of respondent Miclat.
Petitioners are ORDERED, however, to PAY her the following in accordance with the
foregoing discussions: nominal, separation pay; and 13th month pay. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the SEC Hearing Panel charged with the liquidation and
dissolution of petitioner corporation for inclusion, in the list of claims of its creditors,
respondent Miclats claims..
On Miclats termination:
According to P.D. No. 902-A, as amended, the appointment of a receiver or
management committee by the SEC presupposes a finding that, inter alia, a company
possesses sufficient property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of
meeting them when they respectively fall due and there is imminent danger of
dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of assets of other properties or paralization of
business operations.
However, ART. 283 of the Labor Code states:
CLOSURE OF ESTABLISHMENT AND REDUCTION OF PERSONNEL. The
employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of
labor saving devices, redundancy,retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the
worker and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
CLARION [however] failed to comply with the notice requirement provided for in
Article 283 of the Labor Code.

Stated differently, Miclats termination is justified, because of financial difficulties of the

company, but failure to give the required notice by Clarion is sufficient to entitle her to
payment of 13th month pay, separation pay and others.
**
With the appointment of a management receiver, all claims and proceedings against
CLARION, including labor claims, were deemed suspended during the existence of the
receivership. The labor arbiter, the NLRC, as well as the CA should not have proceeded
to resolve respondents complaint for illegal dismissal and should instead have directed
respondent to lodge her claim before the then duly-appointed receiver of CLARION. To
still require respondent, however, at this time to refile her labor claim against CLARION
under the peculiar circumstances of the case that 8 years have lapsed since her
termination and that all the arguments and defenses of both parties were already
ventilated before the labor arbiter, NLRC and the CA; and that CLARION is already in
the course of liquidation this Court deems it most expedient and advantageous for
both parties that CLARIONs liability be determined with finality, instead of still
requiring respondent to lodge her claim at this time before the liquidators of CLARION
which would just entail a mere reiteration of what has been already argued and pleaded.
Furthermore, it would be in the best interest of the other creditors of CLARION that
claims against the company be finally settled and determined so as to further expedite
the liquidation proceedings. For the lesser number of claims to be proved, the sooner
the claims of all creditors of CLARION are processed and settled.
NOTES:
Sections 5 and 6 of P.D. 902-A (reorganization of the SEC with additional powers and
placing said agency under the administrative supervision of the office of the president),
as amended, read:

SEC. 5 In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of THE SECURITIES

AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION over corporations, partnerships and other forms of
associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees, it
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
xxx
(d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations declared in the state of
suspension of payments in cases where the corporation, partnership or association
possesses sufficient property to cover all debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting
them when they respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership,
association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the management
of a Rehabilitation Receiver or Management Committee created pursuant to this Decree.
SEC. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess
the following powers:
xxx
(c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and personal, which is the
subject of the action pending before the Commission in accordance with the provisions
of the Rules of Court in such other cases whenever necessary in order to preserve the
rights of the parties-litigants and/or protect the interest of the investing public and
creditors: Provided, however, That the Commission may in appropriate cases, appoint a
rehabilitation receiver of corporations, partnerships or other associations not supervised
or regulated by other government agencies who shall have, in addition to powers of the
regular receiver under the provisions of the Rules of Court, such functions and powers
as are provided for in the succeeding paragraph (d) hereof: x x x

(d) To create and appoint a management committee, board or body upon petition or
motu propio to undertake the management of corporations, partnership or other
associations not supervised or regulated by other government agencies in appropriate
cases when there is imminent danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of
assets or other properties or paralization of business operations of such corporations or
entities which may be prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders, partieslitigants of the general public: x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC.,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 159230

Present:

versus -

NACHURA, J.,
BRION, Acting Chairperson,
VILLARAMA, JR.,

MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 18, 2010

COURT OF APPEALS and JOVITA

MATIAS,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:

Petitioner B. E. San Diego, Inc. (B.E. San Diego) filed before the Court a petition for
review on certiorari[1] assailing the September 25, 2002 decision [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 50213. The CA decision reversed the June 22, 1995 decision [3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 1421-MN. [4] The RTC in
turn granted the complaint for recovery of possession[5] instituted by B. E. San Diego against
private respondent Jovita Matias (Matias).

THE FACTS
B.E. San Diego alleged that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land (subject property)
located in Hernandez Street, Catmon, Malabon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-134756 of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, and delineated as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13,
with an area of 228 square meters. B. E. San Diego claimed that Matias has been occupying the
subject property for over a year without its authority or consent. As both its oral and written
demands to vacate were left unheeded, B. E. San Diego filed acomplaint for the recovery of
possession of the subject property against Matias on March 15, 1990 before the RTC.[6]
In her answer to the complaint, Matias alleged that she and her family have been living on the
subject property since the 1950s on the basis of a written permit issued by the local government
of Malabon in 1954.[7] Matias stated that she and her family have introduced substantial
improvements on the subject property and have been regularly paying realty taxes thereon. She
further claimed that she is a legitimate beneficiary of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1517[8] and
PD No. 2016,[9] which classified the subject property as part of the Urban Land Reform Zone
(ULRZ) and an Area for Priority Development (APD).
More importantly, she questioned B. E. San Diegos claim over the subject property by
pointing out that the title relied on by B. E. San Diego (TCT No. T-134756) covers a property
located in Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, while the subject property is actually located in
Barrio Catmon, Malabon. Matias thus claimed that the property she is occupying in Barrio
Catmon is different from the property that B. E. San Diego seeks to recover in the possessory
action before the RTC.[10]
The RTC found no issue as to the identity of the property, ruling that the property covered by B.
E. San Diegos TCT No. T-134756, located in Barrio Tinajeros, is the same property being
occupied by Matias, located in Barrio Catmon. The RTC took judicial notice of the fact that
Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros. It found that the Approved Subdivision
Plan and tax declarations showed that the subject property is located in Barrio Catmon,
Malabon. The RTC thus declared that B. E. San Diego sufficiently proved its right to recover
possession of the subject property on the basis of its TCT No. T-134756. As opposed to B. E. San
Diegos clear right, it found Matias claimed of possession over the subject property as a long-time
occupant and as a beneficiary of PD Nos. 1517 and 2016 unfounded.[11]

On appeal, the CA disagreed with the RTCs findings. It considered the discrepancy in the
location significant and declared that this should have prompted the RTC to require an expert
witness from the concerned government agency to explain the matter. Since it was undisputed
that Matias was in actual possession of the subject property at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the CA declared that her possession should have been upheld under Article 538 of the
Civil Code.[12] The CA also upheld Matias possession based on PD Nos. 1517 and 2016. [13]
As its motion for reconsideration of the CAs judgment was denied, [14] B. E. San Diego filed the
present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
B. E. San Diego contends that the CA erred in reversing the RTCs finding on the sole basis of a
discrepancy, which it claims has been explained and controverted by the evidence it presented. It
assails the CA decision for failing to consider the following evidence which adequately show that
the property covered by its TCT No. T-134756 is the same property occupied by Matias:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

TCT No. T-134756 issued in the name of B. E. San Diego, covering a property
delineated as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13;
Approved Subdivision Plan showing Lot No. 3, Block No. 3 is situated in Barrio
Catmon, Malabon;
Tax Declaration No. B-005-00296 issued in the name of B. E. San Diego, referring to a
property covered by TCT No. T-134756;
Testimonial evidence of B. E. San Diegos witness that the property described in TCT
No. T-134756 is the same property occupied by Matias; and
Judicial notice taken by the RTC of Malabon, based on public and common knowledge,
that Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon.

B. E. San Diego also alleges that Matias is estopped from alleging that the property she is
occupying is different from the property covered by its TCT No. T-134756. Matias previously
moved to dismiss its complaint for recovery of possession of the subject property (accion
publiciana), raising res judicata as ground.[15] She alleged that the accion publiciana[16] is barred
by the judgment in an earlier ejectment case,[17] as both involved the same parties,
the same subject matter, and the same cause of action. The ejectment case involved a parcel of
land covered by TCT No. T-134756, located at Hernandez Street, Barrio Catmon, Malabon;
Matias never questioned the identity and location of the property in that case. [18] B. E. San Diego

thus contends that Matias, by raising the ground of res judicata, has impliedly admitted there is
no difference in the subject matter of the two actions and, thus, could no longer question the
identity and location of the subject property.
In controverting B. E. San Diegos petition, Matias relies on the same points that the CA
discussed in its decision.
THE COURTS RULING
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
From the errors raised in the petition, what emerges as a primary issue is the identity of the
subject matter of the case whether the subject property that Matias occupies is the same as
the property covered by B. E. San Diegos title. Our reading of the records discloses that the two
are one and the same.
B. E. San Diegos TCT No. T-134756 refers to a property located in Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon,
but the subject property sought to be recovered from Matias is in Barrio Catmon, Malabon. In
ruling for Matias, the CA declared that this discrepancy should have been explained by an expert
witness, which B. E. San Diego failed to present.
The Court, however, does not find the testimony of an expert witness necessary to explain the
discrepancy. The RTC declared that the discrepancy arose from the fact that Barrio Catmon was
previously part of Barrio Tinajeros. The RTC has authority to declare so because this is a matter
subject of mandatory judicial notice. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court [19] includes
geographical divisions as among matters that courts should take judicial notice of. Given that
Barrio Tinajeros is adjacent to Barrio Catmon, [20] we find it likely that, indeed, the two barrios
previously formed one geographical unit.
Even without considering judicial notice of the geographical divisions within a political unit,
sufficient evidence exists supporting the RTCs finding that the subject property B. E. San Diego
seeks to recover is the Barrio Catmon property in Matias possession. TCT No. T-134756
identifies a property in Barrio Tinajeros as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13. Although B. E. San Diegos
tax declaration refers to a property in Barrio Catmon, it nevertheless identifies it also as Lot No.
3, Block No. 13, covered by the same TCT No. T-134756.Indeed, both title and the tax
declaration share the same boundaries to identify the property. With this evidence, the trial court

judge can very well ascertain the facts to resolve the discrepancy, and dispense with the need for
the testimony of an expert witness.[21]
Additionally, we agree with B. E. San Diego that Matias can no longer question the identity of
the property it seeks to recover when she invoked res judicata as ground to dismiss the accion
publiciana that is the root of the present petition. An allegation of res judicata necessarily
constitutes an admission that the subject matter of the pending suit (theaccion publiciana) is the
same as that in a previous one (the ejectment case). [22] That Matias never raised the discrepancy
in the location stated in B.E. San Diegos title and the actual location of the subject property in
the ejectment suit bars her now from raising the same. Thus, the issue of identity of the subject
matter of the case has been settled by Matias admission and negates the defenses she raised
against B. E. San Diegos complaint.
We then proceed to resolve the core issue of the accion publiciana who between the parties is
entitled possession of the subject property. Notably, the judgment in the ejectment suit that B. E.
San Diego previously filed against Matias is not determinative of this issue and will not
prejudice B. E. San Diegos claim.[23] While there may be identity of parties and subject matter,
there is no identity of cause of action between the two cases; an action for ejectment and accion
publiciana, though both referring to the issue of possession, differ in the following manner:
First, forcible entry should be filed within one year from the unlawful
dispossession of the real property, while accion publiciana is filed a year after the
unlawful dispossession of the real property. Second, forcible entry is concerned
with the issue of the right to the physical possession of the real
property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better right
to possession over the real property. Third, an action for forcible entry is filed in
the municipal trial court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a
plenary action in the RTC.[24]

B. E. San Diego anchors it right to possess based on its ownership of the subject property, as
evidenced by its title. Matias, on the other hand, relies on (1) the 1954 permit she secured from
the local government of Malabon, (2) the Miscellaneous Sales Application, (3) the tax
declarations and realty tax payments she made annually beginning 1974, (4) her standing as
beneficiary of PD Nos. 1517 and 2016, and (5) her long possession of the subject property since
1954 up to the present. Unfortunately for Matias, her evidence does not establish a better right of
possession over B. E. San Diegos ownership.

The settled doctrine in property law is that no title to register land in derogation of that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. [25] Even if the
possession is coupled with payment of realty taxes, we cannot apply in Matias case the rule that
these acts combined constitute proof of the possessors claim of title. [26]Despite her claim of
possession since 1954, Matias began paying realty taxes on the subject property only in 1974
when B. E. San Diego filed an ejectment case against her husband/predecessor, Pedro Matias.
[27]
Considering these circumstances, we find Matias payment of realty taxes suspect.
Matias cannot rely on the Miscellaneous Sales Application and the local government permit
issued in her favor; neither establishes a clear right in favor of Matias over the subject
property. A sales application, in the absence of approval by the Bureau of Lands or the issuance
of a sales patent, remains simply as an application that does not vest title in the applicant. [28] The
local government permit contained only a statement of the local executive that the case between
the local government and B. E. San Diego was decided by a trial court in favor of the former.[29]
The CA erroneously upheld Matias claim of possession based on PD Nos. 1517 and 2016. Matias
is not a qualified beneficiary of these laws. The tenants/occupants who have a right not to be
evicted from urban lands does not include those whose presence on the land is merely
tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit,
or those whose possession is under litigation. [30] At the time of PD 1517s enactment, there was
already a pending ejectment suit between B. E. San Diego and Pedro Matias over the subject
property. Occupants of the land whose presence therein is devoid of any legal authority, or those
whose contracts of lease were already terminated or had already expired, or whose possession is
under litigation, are not considered tenants under the [PD Nos. 1517]. [31] The RTC correctly ruled
that Matias cannot be considered a legitimate tenant who can avail the benefits of these laws no
matter how long her possession of the subject property was.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
September 25, 2002 decision and May 20, 2003 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 50213. The June 22, 1995 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon in Civil Case
No. 1421-MN is REINSTATED. Costs against the respondent.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 209386, December 08, 2014
MEL CARPIZO CANDELARIA, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated January 31, 2013 and
the Resolution3 dated September 3, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.
No. 34470 which affirmed the conviction of petitioner for the crime of Qualified Theft.
The Facts
In the morning of August 23, 2006, Viron Transit Corporation (Viron) ordered 14,000 liters of
diesel fuel (diesel fuel) allegedly worth P497,000.00 from United Oil Petroleum Phils. (Unioil), a
company owned by private complainant Jessielyn Valera Lao (Lao).4 Petitioner Mel Carpizo
Candelaria (Candelaria), a truck driver employed by Lao, was dispatched to deliver the diesel
fuel in Laon Laan, Manila.5
However, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, Viron informed Lao through a
phone call that it had not yet received its order. Upon inquiry, Lao discovered that Candelaria,
together with his helper Mario Romano (Romano), also an employee of Unioil, left the company
premises at 12:50 in the afternoon of the same day on board a lorry truck with plate number
PTA-945 to deliver Virons diesel fuel order. When Lao called Candelaria on his mobile phone,
she did not receive any response.6
Thereafter, or at around 6 oclock in the evening of the same day, Romano returned alone to
Unioils office and reported that Candelaria poked a balisong at him, prompting Lao to report the
incident to the Anti-Carnapping Section of the Manila Police District (MPD), as well as to Camp
Crame.7
After a few days, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents found the abandoned lorry
truck in Calamba, Laguna, emptied of the diesel fuel.8 Under the foregoing premises, Lao filed a
complaint for Qualified Theft against Candelaria, docketed as Crim. Case No. 08-259004.9
Lita Valera (Valera), Laos mother, and Jimmy Magtabo10 Claro (Claro), employed as dispatcher
and driver of Unioil, corroborated Laos allegations on material points. More specifically, Claro
verified that it was Candelaria who was tasked to deliver the diesel fuel to Viron on August 23,
2006, which likewise happened to be Candelarias last trip. 11
In his defense, Candelaria demurred to the prosecutions evidence,12 arguing that there was no
direct evidence that linked him to the commission of the crime, as Lao had no personal

knowledge as to what actually happened to the diesel fuel.13 Moreover, the information relayed
by Romano is considered hearsay due to his untimely demise.14
The RTC Ruling
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (RTC) convicted Candelaria of
Qualified Theft in a Decision15 dated June 21, 2011, having found a confluence of all the
elements constituting the abovesaid crime, to wit: (a) there was a taking of personal property; (b)
said property belonged to another; (c) the taking was done with intent to gain; (d) the taking was
done without the consent of the owner; (e) the taking was accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things; and (f) the theft was committed
by a domestic servant with abuse of confidence.16
In convicting Candelaria, the RTC took the following circumstances into consideration: (a) on
August 23, 2006, Candelaria was the driver of the truck with plate number PTA-945, loaded with
14,000 liters of diesel fuel valued at P497,000.00, for delivery to Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (b)
Viron did not receive the diesel fuel; (c) Lao reported the incident to Camp Crame and the MPD;
and (d) the following day, August 24, 2006, the same truck was found abandoned and emptied of
its load in Calamba, Laguna.17 On the basis of the foregoing, the RTC concluded that Candelaria
was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Consequently, it sentenced Candelaria to suffer the indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered him to indemnify Lao the amount of
P497,000.00 as the value of the stolen diesel fuel, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and the costs.18
Dissatisfied, Candelaria elevated his conviction to the CA.19
The CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated January 31, 2013, the CA affirmed Candelarias conviction, ruling that a
finding of guilt need not always be based on direct evidence, but may also be based on
circumstantial evidence, or evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts
in issue may be established by inference.21 In this regard, and considering that the crime of theft
in this case was qualified due to grave abuse of confidence, as Candelaria took advantage of his
work, knowing that Lao trusted him to deliver the diesel fuel to Viron,22 the CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC. Citing jurisprudence,23 it observed that theft by a truck driver who takes the
load of his truck belonging to his employer is guilty of Qualified Theft.24
However, while the CA affirmed Candelarias conviction as well as the prison sentence imposed
by the RTC, it modified the amount which he was directed to indemnify Lao, fixing the same at
P14,000.00 in the absence of any supporting documents to prove that the diesel fuel was indeed
worth P497,000.00.25
Aggrieved, Candelaria filed a motion for reconsideration26 which was eventually denied in a
Resolution27 dated September 3, 2013, hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The main issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA correctly found Candelaria
guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under Article 31028 in relation to Article 30929 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said
property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without
the owners consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated
in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.30
In this case, there is a confluence of all the foregoing elements. Through the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses, it was sufficiently established that the 14,000 liters of diesel fuel loaded
into the lorry truck with plate number PTA-945 driven by Candelaria for delivery to Viron on
August 23, 2006 was taken by him, without the authority and consent of Lao, the owner of the
diesel fuel, and that Candelaria abused the confidence reposed upon him by Lao, as his employer.
Candelaria maintains that he should be acquitted considering that his conviction was based
merely on circumstantial evidence, as well as on hearsay evidence, i.e., Laos testimony with
regard to the allegation of the deceased helper Romano that Candelaria poked a balisong at him
on August 23, 2006.31
The Court is not convinced.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.32 Circumstantial
evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, at the same time, inconsistent with
any other hypothesis except that of guilt. Corollary thereto, a conviction based on circumstantial
evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence.33
Here, the RTC, as correctly affirmed by the CA, found that the attendant circumstances in this
case, as duly established by the prosecutions evidence, amply justify the conviction of
Candelaria under the evidentiary threshold of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These
circumstances are: (a ) on August 23, 2006, Viron ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel from Laos
Unioil; (b ) as driver of Unioil, Candelaria was given the task of delivering the same to Viron in
Laon Laan, Manila; (c ) Candelaria and his helper Romano left the company premises on the
same day on board the lorry truck bearing plate number PTA-945 containing the diesel fuel; (d )
at around 5 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, Viron informed Lao that its order had not

yet been delivered; (e ) Candelaria failed to reply to Laos phone calls; (f ) later in the day,
Romano returned to the Unioil office sans Candelaria and reported that the latter threatened him
with a weapon; (g ) Lao reported the incident to the MPD and Camp Crame; (h ) the missing
lorry truck was subsequently found in Laguna, devoid of its contents; and (i ) Candelaria had not
reported back to Unioil since then.34
Threading these circumstances together, the Court perceives a congruent picture that the crime of
Qualified Theft had been committed and that Candelaria had perpetrated the same. To be sure,
this determination is not sullied by the fact that Candelarias companion, Romano, had died
before he could testify as to the truth of his allegation that the former had threatened him with a
balisong on August 23, 2006. It is a gaping hole in the defense that the diesel fuel was admittedly
placed under Candelarias custody and remains unaccounted for. Candelaria did not proffer any
persuasive reason to explain the loss of said goods and merely banked on a general denial,
which, as case law holds, is an inherently weak defense due to the ease by which it can be
concocted.35 With these, and, moreover, the tell-tale fact that Candelaria has not returned or
reported back to work at Unioil since the incident, the Court draws no other reasonable inference
other than that which points to his guilt. Verily, while it is true that flight per se is not
synonymous with guilt,36 unexplained flight nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the existence of
a guilty conscience,37 especially when taken together with all the other circumstantial evidence
attendant in this case. Thus, all things considered, Candelarias conviction for the crime of
Qualified Theft stands.
The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified Theft depends upon the value of the thing
stolen. To prove the value of the stolen property for purposes of fixing the imposable penalty
under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, as amended, the Court explained in People v. Anabe38
that the prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated estimate.39 In the absence
of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either apply the
minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the
attendant circumstances of the case.40 In Merida v. People (Merida),41 which applied the
doctrine enunciated in People v. Dator (Dator),42 the Court deemed it improper to take judicial
notice of the selling price of narra at the time of the commission of its theft, as such evidence
would be unreliable and inconclusive considering the lack of independent and competent source
of such information.43
However, in the more recent case of Lozano v. People (Lozano),44 the Court fixed the value of the
stolen magwheels at P12,000.00 as the reasonable allowable limit under the circumstances,45
notwithstanding the uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant therein. Lozano cited,
among others, the case of Francisco v. People46 (Francisco) where the Court ruled that the trial
court can only take judicial notice of the value of goods which are matters of public knowledge
or are capable of unquestionable demonstration,47 further explaining that the value of jewelry,
the stolen items in the said case, is neither a matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of
unquestionable demonstration.48
In this case, Candelaria has been found guilty of stealing diesel fuel. Unlike in Francisco, where
the Court had no reference to ascertain the price of the stolen jewelry, or in Merida and Dator,
where the Court refused to take judicial notice of the selling price of lumber and/or narra for

lack of independent and competent source of the necessary information at the time of the
commission of the theft, the value of diesel fuel in this case may be readily gathered from price
lists published by the Department of Energy (DOE). In this regard, the value of diesel fuel
involved herein may then be considered as a matter of public knowledge which falls within the
purview of the rules on discretionary judicial notice.49 To note, judicial [notice], which is based
on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace[s] evidence since, being equivalent to
proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve.50
While it is true that the prosecution had only presented the uncorroborated testimony of the
private complainant, Lao, to prove that the value of the diesel fuel stolen is P497,000.00, the
Court taking judicial notice of the fact that the pump price of diesel fuel in August 2006 (i.e.,
the time of the commission of the crime) is within the range of P37.60 to P37.86 per liter51
nonetheless remains satisfied that such amount must be sustained. As the value of the goods may
independently and competently be ascertained from the DOEs price publication, adding too that
the defense had not presented any evidence to contradict said finding nor cross-examined Lao
anent her proffered valuation, the Court, notwithstanding the solitary evidence of the
prosecution, makes this determination following the second prong set by case law and that is,
to fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case.
Verily, such circumstances militate against applying the alternative of imposing a minimum
penalty and, more so, the CAs arbitrary valuation of P14,000.00, since the basis for which was
not explained. Therefore, for purposes of fixing the proper penalty for Qualified Theft in this
case, the value of the stolen property amounting to P497,000.00 must be considered.
Conformably with the provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the proper penalty to be
imposed upon Candelaria is reclusion perpetua, 52 without eligibility for parole,53 to conform
with prevailing law and jurisprudence.54
A final word. Courts dealing with theft, as well as estafa cases, would do well to be mindful of
the significance of determining the value of the goods involved, or the amounts embezzled in
said cases as they do not only entail the proper resolution of the accuseds civil liability (if the
civil aspect has been so integrated) but also delimit the proper penalty to be imposed. These
matters, through the trial courts judicious direction, should be sufficiently passed upon during
trial and its finding thereon be amply explained in its verdict. Although an appeal of a criminal
case throws the entire case up for review,55 the ends of justice, both in its criminal and civil
senses, demand nothing less but complete and thorough adjudication in the judicial systems
every level. Truth be told, the peculiar nature of these cases provides a distinctive opportunity for
this ideal to be subserved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2013 and the
Resolution dated September 3, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 34470 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that petitioner Mel Carpizo Candelaria is: (a)
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; and (b)
ordered to indemnify private complainant Jessielyn Valera Lao the amount of ?497,000.00
representing the value of the stolen property.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT"G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
FACTS
Accused-appellant was sentenced to death for the special complex crime
of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim.
Appellant was charged to have h a d c a r n a l k n o w l e d g e
o f a c e r t a i n K a t h yl y n U b a a g a i n s t h e r w i l l , a n d w i t h t h e u s e o f a
bladed weapon, stabbed the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in her
untimely demise.
In the instant case, appellant raises the issue of credibility of
w i t n e s s e s , s p e c i f i c a l l y assigning as error on the part of the trial court,
the latters giving of much weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution
notwithstanding their doubtfulness.
ISSuE 1
Whether appellants contentions as regards the witnesses credibility are meritorious.
HELD: NO.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved
against appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons
are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the
same; the reason being that the former is in a
better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses
and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude. Absent any showing that the trial
judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judges assessment of
credibility deserves the appellate courts highest respect. Where there is nothing to

show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their
testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled
rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is
available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution
to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.
ISSuE 2
Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence
HELD:
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction,
m u s t f o r m a n unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the
crime. To determine whether there is sufficient
circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur:
( 1 ) t h e r e i s m o r e t h a n o n e circumstance; (2) facts on which the
i n f e r e n c e s a r e d e r i v e d a r e p r o v e n ; a n d ( 3 ) t h e combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSuE3
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood
sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right
to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12
and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
Is the contention of appellant tenable?
HELd: NO.
The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion.
The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from
the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object
evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero that although accused-appellant insisted that
hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National
Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted
in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial
compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused
under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting,
photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial
compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde, where immediately after the
incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the

presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against
self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical
examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.