THE NINTH ARMORED D I V I S I O N

I N THE EXPLOITAT I O N OF REMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD

A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED

BY

COMMITTEE 13, O F F I C E R S ADVANCED COURSE

THE ARMORED SCHOOL

1949-1950

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT J. C. OSBORNE

MAJOR JOHN W. THROCKMORTON

MAJOR J O H N J. K I L L I A N

M A J O R ROBERT W. CARPENTER

MAJOR WALTER E. REYNOLDS, JR., USMC

CAPTAIN FRANK A. WILLIAMS

CAPTAIN SIDNEY H. YOUNG, JR.

CAPTAIN JOHN H. COBB, JR.

FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY

MARCH 1950

 This report describes the 9th Armored Division in the

EXPLOITATION, from the breakout of the REMAGEN BRIDGEHEAD to the

encirclement of LEIPSIG .
Records and accounts of the planning phase, other than cer-

tain logistical information, are meagre--if not non-existent--and

are purposely omitted from the renort.

Material used in compiling this report consisted of:

1. Reports of higher headquarters.

2. After-Action Reports of the 9th, Combat Command A,

Combat Command B, Reserve Command, the Armored
Infantry and Tank Battalions, and the Division

Armored Engineer Battalion.

3. Letter interviews with 76 officers who partici-

pated in this phase.

4. Personal interviews with Brigadier General

Thomas L. Harrold, Lieutenant Colonel M. K. Goers,

Lieutenant Colonel C. F. Fiore, and CaptainJ. W.

Mitchell.

5. "The Training and Combat of the 19th Tank Bat-

talion" by Captain Edgar A. Terrell.

After-action reports are not comprehensive and are vague.

They served merely as a framework around which to build the report.

Exceptionally good material was obtained from certain letter

interviews. Mre a r e e s p e c i a l l y indebted t o t h e f o l l o w i n g o f f i c e r s

f o r response and t h e i n t e r e s t shown:

Captain John W. S c h a l l e s
Dr. R . W. Pomeroy
Colonel Harry W. Johnson
Major George I. Taylor
Ah jor John P. n e e l e r , Jr .
L i e u t e n a n t Colone 1 J. I!. Tfeyhenneyer , Jr .
These l e t t e r s were a g r e a t h e l p ic v i t a l i z i n g t h e r e ~ o r and
t in

rounding out t h e p i c t u r e w i t h many otherwise unobtainable d e t a i l s .

Major R. B e Crayton, Command and S t a f f Department, The

Armored School, f u r n i s h e d nzmes and a d d r e s s e s , and s u e ~ e s t i o n s

which were v e r y h e l p f u l i n t h e nlanning s t a g e .

The Committee m s q u i t e f o r t u n a t e i n being a b l e t o per-

s o n a l l y i n t e r v i e w General H w r o l d acd o b t a i n a f i r s t h a n d account of

t h e 9 t h 1 s combat e x p e r i e n c e s .

Commanders and p e r s o n a l i t i e s , d a i l y composition and disno-

s i t i o n of u n i t s , and H i s t o r y of t h e 9 t h Armored Division a r e added

i n t h e appendices i n o r d e r t o p r e s e n t a c l e a r , unbroken n a r r a t i v e .

L t Colonel Robert J. C. Osborne

Major John W. Throckmorton
Ilajor John J. K i l l i a n
lla j o r Robert W. Carpenter
Major F a l t e r E. Reynolds, Jr USB4C .,
C a ~ t a i nFrank A. W i l l i m s
C a ~ t a i nSidney H. Young, Jr.
C a u t a i n John H. Cobb, Jr.

iii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

1 INTRODUCTION .................... 1

2 THE ENEMY 5

3 LOGISTICS AND STATISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

4 EXPANDING THE BRIDGEHEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

5 REDUCTION OF LIMBURG 35

6 LIMBURG TO WARBURG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 8

7 WARBURG TO LEIPZIG .62

­

8 I N RETROSPECT 74

APPENDI CES .....................

I
II
..
H i s t o r y of 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n
Commanders and P e r s o n a l i t i e s . . . . . . . . .82

78

III .
Task O r g a n i z a t i o n s and D a i l y D i s p o s i t i o n . . . 85

IV .
O r g a n i z a t i o n s 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n .

Major U n i t s 93

V .
Enemy Order of B a t t l e . . . . . . . . . . . .94

VI. Enemy D i s p o s i t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95

 "You will enter .the continent of Europe and, in conjunction

with the other. Allied nations, undertake operations aimed at the

By
heart of Germany and the destruction of her Armed Forces."1 the

above simple directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to SHAEF,

the second destruction of Germanyas a military power was begun.

The successful assault on the NORMANDY beaches on 6 June 1944 com-

pleted the first requirement of the directive. We had "entered the

continent of Europe." Now, with the seizure

of bridgeheads over

the RHINE complete, we were truly "aimed at the heart of Germany and

the destruction of her Armed Forces." Few people realized that this

was the beginning of the end, or just how near the end was. It was

obviously apparent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to others

experienced in war--to Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, Hodges,

Simpson, Patch, Devers, Clark--to the British Imperial Staff and

its field commanders--and to the leadersof some of our other Allies.

But to the tired and dirty Doughboys and Tankers, there was still a

long road before them. There were, however, many changes, in war

"as they knew it." Instead of hardfought gains of 1,000 to 2,000

yards each day, one was now hard-pressed to keep up. "Thirty miles

today--we got to do forty tomorrovr." There were still nights

without time for enough sleep; rations were still canned and cold.

But suddenly "fuel and lube" were more importnnt than ammunition.
Objectives were suddenly changed from "that hillto your front" to

"the city of LIMBURG, 40 miles from here on the AUTOBAHN." And

instead of the proud, well-trained but fanatical SS Divisions and

Panzer Divisions, the opposition was suddenly made up of a beaten

enemy. There were to be many more killed in action, mare wounded

in action; and more missing in action; but the fact remained that

the German Army, as such, was fast becoming; a group of confused and

bewildered individuals.

At this period of the war, speed

was of the essence,
Capture of terrain was more important than the monping
up of a beaten enemy, Total disruption of the enemy1 s
interior was in order, Onlyconfused and bewildered
enemy organizations were left; fighting everywhere
was by remnant. , . ,

For the ensuing month, 22 March- 21 April, though

some casual pockets of resistance had tc be forced,
the war, for the most part, became a road march. In
fact, at one time on the AUTOBAHN north of FRANKFURT,
two armored and two infantry divisions, using both
sides of the road, were moving north abreast toward
KASSEL: while in the center of the same road, tens
.
cf thousands of German prisoners were moving south
without guard

German reserves were overrun, rear installations

crushed or ignored, and the civilian populstion be-
wildered. Nazi atrocities came to light.2

Crumbling resistance, frequent attacks from march column,

by-passing or enveloping strongpoints,meeting engagements with

groups of enemy reinforcements, objectives deep in the enemy rear,

maximum speed in reaching objectives and mission type crders--all

cf the above characterize one phase of combat--EXPLOITATION, And

this was it. The background of this study is thus laid in the

final stages of the war in Europe.

 This report constitutes an examination of the employment

of the 9th Armored Division fromthe breakout of the REMAGEN

bridgehead to the completion of the encirclement of LEIPZIG. The

period covered is 28 March 1945 to 18 April 1945. Events that

occurred prior to the REMAGEN breakout or subsequent to the encir-

clement of LEIPZIG lie outside the purview of this report and will

not be discussed.

The purposes of the report are fourfold:

1. To study the action involving the exploitation -of a

weak, dispirited, and. disorganized enemy from the preparation and

planning phase through the build-up to final victory.

2. To study the organization

.
for combat and the employment

in combat of the major combat, service, and attached units of the

Division.

3. To examine the adherence to or violation of the present

.. .

doctrine of exploitation in the two decisive phases indicated below:

a. The breakout from REMAGEN and the advance to LIMBURG.

b. The advance to LEIPZIG and its encirclement.

4. To determine the lessons to be learned, the conclusions

to be drawn, the recommendations to bemade on current Armored

.

Division Tables of Organization andEquipment, and recommendations

to be made on the employmentof armored units in the exploitation

phase .
As previously stated, arc' as will be shown in subsequent

chapters, the conditions in Germany during this period (28 March

18 A ~ r i 1l 945) were r i p e f o r 3 c l ? s s i c example of t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n .

Did t h e 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n t a k c e v e r y a d v a n t a ~ eof enemy weak-

ness? Did it r e c e i v e mission-type o r * e r s ? Did it by-pass s t r o n g

p o i n t s t h a t d i d n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h i t s m i s s i o n and reduce t h o s e

that d i d ? Did it accomplish i t s m i s s i o n of s e i z i n g c r i t i c a l

o b j e c t i v e s , deep i n t h e enemy r e a r , which would c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e

s t r a t e g i c success of t h e campaign? I n s h o r t , what d i d it do and

how d i d it perform?

NOTES FOR CF::j.T?n 1

l ~ e ~ o by
r t The Supreme Comcnder t o t h e Combined Chiefs of
S t a f f on t h e Operations i n Europe
------of-t-
3 e A l l i e d Expeditionary Force,
6 J u n e 1944 t o 8 Nsy 1945, R r o p o r t prepared by General of t h e ~ r m f
Dwight D. Eisenhuwer (Waehington: Government P r i n t i n g Off i c e , 1946),
pp V I , V I I .

2 ~ e n e r a lGeorge S. ;atton., Jr., War As I Knew It, ( ~ o u ~ h t o n

and M i f f l i n Co.), p 270.
 CHAPTER 2

THE' ENEMY

" .. .l62. CHATULCTERISTICS uF TFE EXPLCIITATIOW. a . Enemv

--

Situation. When t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n s t a g e has been e n t e r e d , t h e

l o c a l enemy s i t u a t i a n w i l l most c e r t a i n l y be .me > f c a n f u s i o n and

p a r t i a l disorganization." (FK 17-30).

AS a r e s u l t of t h e a h o s t complete d i s o r g a n i z a t i s n of

German f o r c e s immediately preceding t h e c a p i t u l a t i o n , l i t t l e

German s o u r c e m a t e r i a l covering t h i s period i s a v a i l a b l e . Units

did not m a i n t a i n t h e normal reccrrls .?f combat, and t h e German

commanders themselves knsw 1 . i t t l e o r no thin^ of what went on o u t -

s i d e t h e i r own immediate s p h e r e s .

The majar s o u r c e m a t s r i a l airai l a b l e c . ~ n s j s t s3f r e ~ m t s

of i n t e r r n g a t i , - n s of higher Crervan c.?mmsnders. E , ? w e v ~ r ,t h e

r e l j . a b i ? i t y of t h e s e r e p o r t s , i n s o f a r a s c..ncerns s p e c i f jc d e t a j I-,

i s ..ften q u r - s t j onahle, dun t.? t h e time l a g betwean t h r i n t e r r 7-

g a t i o n and t h e actj.?n di.scusse.l, t h ~ !l a c k of German ~ ~ c v l n ~ n t s .

s i t u a t i , ? n maps, and s i m i l a r m a t e r i a l w i t h which t3 refresh the

P'JV's mem.?ry, and t h e n e n t a l a t t i t u d e -f t h e Pin). I n the instance

of t h e PW's mcntal a t t i t u d e , t h e case a f Gensral L i s u t e m n t

F r i t z B a y e r l s i n i s a case i n p o i n t . A prnfessi.ona1 s a l d i e r ?f

t h e .31d Gwrnan s c h n o l and t r a d i t i m , General Bayerleiri, when

i n t e r r . > g a t s d J n 16 A p r i l 1945, could rec.311ect ? n l y vaTuely

s p e c i f i c d s t a i l s ;.f c e r t a i n maj?r e v e n t s i n whjch he, as mmrnander

>f t h e f m ? u s P y p r Lohr 9 i v i s j . m and l a t e r as c.,minan.lor ?f t h e

LIII C.>rps, f i g u r e d . H.)wcver, h i s remembrance .>f p e r s a n a l embar-

rassments was most v i v i d . I

-- B ) w i t h
I n p i c t u r i n g t h e enemy (elements of Army Grmp

which t h e 9 t h Arrn.>red Divisi.?n had trr contend e a s t af t h e RHINE, t h e

f ?1l>wing have been c ~ n s i d e r e d : jrder . ~ fb a t t l e ; disp.>siti..-n;

s t r e n g t h ; supply; m ~ r a l e ;and b a t t l e plans.

N,? c.>mplete,, r e l i a b l e order .?f b a t t l e .>f German f .>rces

e a s t zf t h e RHINE a f t e r t h e peri3d ending 25 Maroh 1945 e x i s t s , due

l a r g e l g t ? t h e almost o.:\mpl+t e brsakd \wn >f Garman c . ~ m u n i c a t i . ~ n s

enil t h e ? i s .-rganizatisn of German f ?rces which made it s i r t u a 1 1 y

i m p ~ s s i b l ef+.r sven t h e Gormans t .* kn?w t h e d i s p * s i t i-n >f German

f jrcos . (See Appenl?ices V and V I . ) American i n t e l l i g e n c e d.?cu-

ments2 s h ~ wt h e f ,311 >wing u n i t opp:>sing elements >f t h e 9 t h Urnx-ed

Divis i ~ as
n iniicate1-i :

DIVIS TCIN ErnIVY

DATE
- ELEIKENT FCiRCE VICINITY

2 6 Mar 45 CCB

KG 89 MU NTA RAUR
KG 167

2 7 Mar 45 CCB

89 EL LIMRURG
I l EL
167th Inf Div
276th Rem Div
6 t h EL SS Div
5 t h Pars. Div
 G lrnl\lrY
Fi!RCE VIC TNTTI

10 Apr 45 CCB vs Armd Brig Ti. BLEICHERODE

KG 26
6 6 l s t Inf Regt
594th Inf Regt

Civ ( - ) vs 166th Inf Reqt SOmER

11 Apr 45 Di v vs 869th Inf Regt HOFGEISMAR

6 6 t h Inf Div

11 Apr 45 Di v vs 593d Inf Re g t BAD

594th Inf Reqt FRAYKENHAUS
26 E L
166 EL

14 Apr 45 Div vs KG SCHUIDT LE IPZ I G

KG SCHLEISER

KG WINDE

409th Adm Div

16 Apr 45 Di v vs 409th Adm Div LETPZIG

Rem Bn (627 E)

The breakout from t h e REIFAGEF RRTDG3FXAF was e n t i r e l y

d i f f e r e n t from t h e breakthrough e a s t of t h e RUiIR. A f t e r
t h e i n i t i a l c r u s t i n t h e REFAG3N BRIDGEEEAn had b e e n pene-
t r a t e d , t h e o n l y o p p o s i t i o n which t h e V C?rps met were
i s ~ l a t e dgroups, AA crews, and s e r v i c e Ir school t r o o p s ,
a 1 1. i n loose l y knot o r g a n i z a t i o n s which never ~ fered f
s e r i q u s
o p p o s i t i o n t o t h a advance .3

German estimates,'g5 made a f t e r t h e c a p i t u l a t i o n (and

ad justerj, where necessary, on t h e b a s i s of more r e l i a b l e a v a i l a b l e

information, by American i n t e l l i g e n c e p e r s o n n e l ) f i x e d t h e German

s t r e n g t h on t h e e a s t bank of t h e RHINE, between KOBLENZ and

DUISBURG (23C k i l o m e t e r s ) , and e x c l u s i v e of t h e REIbUGEN a r e a , as

s i x d i v i s i o n a l Kampf gruppen e q u a l i n 6 an average s t r e n g t h p e r

k i l o m e t e r of 42 men, t w o t o t h r e o p i e c e s of a r t i l l e r y , and .06 AT

guns. The armored r e s e r v e on t h i s f r o n t c o n c i s t e d of 15 t a n k s .

 I n t h e _SGNL!GEN a r e a , 14 d i v i s i o n a l Kmpf qruppen r e s u l t e d

i n a f o r c e c o n f r o n t i n g t h e bridgehead averaging t h e f o i i 6 ~ i f i g

s t r e n g t h per kilometer: 80 men, two p i e c e s ~f a r t i l l e r y , and

0.5 AT guns. Tank s t r e n g t h a t REIviilGEN was e s t i m a t e d a t 50 v e h i c l e s .

I n r e s e r v a were two d i v i s i o n a l Kmpfgruppen, w i t h a t o t a l i n f a n t r v

s t r e n g t h of 600 ~ n e n . ~ , ~

Divis i o n a l Kampf gruppen were a t g r e a t l y reduced s t r e n g t h -

200 t o 300 men each.899 Four panzer d i v i s i o n s , two motorized

b r i g a d e s , and t h r e e a r t i l l e r y corps harl been r e l i e v e ? . from t h e

Army Group B a r e a and s e n t t o t h c E a s t Front.'@ Movement of t h e

1 1 t h Panzer D i v i s i o n t o t h e s o u t h on 23-24 Jdjarch 1945 f o r a t t a c h -

m e ~ t o Army Group G f u r t h e r wenkoned t h e A certain

-
backbone f o r defense was formsd by t h e ilA p n s st i n d u s t r i a l p l a n t s

a l o n g t h e RHINE and a t t h e c r o s s i.ngs ; however, t h e i r value was

l i m i t e d because of t h e i r immobility ana h a l f - c i v i l i a n gun crews. 12

( I t i s af p a r t i c u l a r n.?te t h a t , d e s p i t e t h a s e l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e s e

AB guns gave z formidable account af themselves, b h t h cln t h e RHIIX

and i n t h e v i c i n i t y of LSIPZTG.)

Troops, t o a l a r g e dogree, c ~ n s i s t c - , 3of Volksturm and

stragglers. Behind t h e whole f r o n t wandered a c<>nfusedarmy of

s t r a g g l e r s , a n army which was r e p e a t e d l y gathered and committed

~ n l yt a s l i p away a g a i n and again.13 General B a y e r l e i n t s des-

c r i p t i o n 3f t h e Volksturm z s " t h e l a s t , a l m s s t grotesque, imprqvi-

s n t i ,n 7f t h e p a r t y i n t h e d e s p e r a t e e f f .?rt t o fend .ff t h e s u p e r i ir,

we 11-equipped encmyl'l* i s i n t e r e s t i n g .
 The almost complete breakdown of communications resulted

in an acute shortage of all types of supply in the hands of

troops. True, a great deal of munitions were warehoused east of

the RHINE; however, the speed of the American ground attack and

the virtually complete superiority in the air gained by the American

Air Force made it practically impossible to transport supplies

during daylight. Even at night, rail movement was exceedingly

difficult because of the heavy damages inflicted on roadbeds and

terminals.

The gravest shortage was not in ammunition, but in gasoline.

German LIII Corps lost its entire reserve of gasoline on 16 March

15
when a trainload was destroyed by air attack. An amusing side-

light on the gasoline shortage is related by Captain R. W. Pomeroy,

surgeon of the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion,who was riding in

an ambulance with a wounded German soldier. The PW asked if the

Americans had encountered the new German 50-mantank. Captain

Pomeroy's first reaction was that the PW was trying to impress

his captors. However, he noted a twinkle in the man's eye and

asked for details of this formidable weapon."Yes, Sir ," replied

the PW; "Fifty men - one man to steer it, one man to fire the

16

gun, and forty-eight men to push it!"

Replacement of vehicles was practically non-existent.

Bayerlein considered the loss of 23 tanks in various stages of

17

repair at ALTENKIRCHEN on 24 March 1943 as a major catastrophe,

so weak was the tank strength. At the time of its surrender on

16 Apri l1945, -- over

the oncemighty Panzer Lehr Divisionturned

only a total of 10 tanks and TDs. 18

The belatedattempt at establishing a fortified line east

of the RHINE was seriously handicapped by a sh ortage of even such

primitive tools as picks and shovels. 19
Bayerlein, in commenting on the situati on in Army Group B
as of21 March 1945, had this to say, "But what a front! . . A
state of troop moralevarying from suspicion to callous resigna-

tion. An officer corps which lacked confidence and wondered just

what were the demands of duty. 20

Aside from cells of fanatic SS troops, little of the

will to fight, even to save the Fatherland, remained in the common

sPMEJer. His civilian brothers were eagerly awaiting the "con-

queror
to come and end those unbearable nights of bombing and had

at handy reach white cloths to
greet him.21 His supply had failed

him, and more importantly, and quite obviously ,

his leaders had

failed him. Such orders as that promulgated by Hitler to the

effect that the REMAGEN
BRIDGEHEAD would be destroyed by V-2 bombs

regardless of the resulting toll in German civilians and German

troops 22 had a most dilatory effect on him (actually, several

V-2 bombs did fall within the Bridgehead). Sabotaging their own

vehicles to avoid combat was a common practice among the tank

crews.23

That morale in the officer corps, even at high level, was

low is reflected in the bickering, disobedience of orders, and

"passing the buck" for failures which were rife. The execution

of five officers for dereliction of duty in failing to destroy

24
the LUDENDORF BRIDGE made an impression - but not the kind of

impression necessary to buck up an already demoralized group. The

impossible orders handed down by Hitler, the realization by officers

in the higher echelons that total defeat was inevitable, had its

effect. Bayerlein relates of being tempted to surrender to the

Americans on 25 March 1945 as the result of being humiliated in

25

the presence of subordinates by a tongue-lashing from Model.

He also tells of being ordered by Model on 3 April 1945 to attack

WINTERBERG. Feeling the futility of such action, he simply failed

to order the attack; and, on 4 April, reported that the attack had

26
been made, but had failed. That these two commanders, Model and

Bayerlein, were bitterly opposed is evident. Since they were both

key commanders in the battles east of the RHINE, their differences

(which neither bothered to conceal) had a very unfavorable effect

on the overall conduct of the defense. Bayerlein describes Model's

headquarters at OLPE on 29 March 1945 as a mad-house with contra-

27
dictory orders issuing and Model at the battle. On the other

side, Model severely censured Bayerlein for failures, blaming his

28

lack of leadership.
The hoped-for battle plans of Army Group B were at direct

variance with those ordered by the High Command (Hitler). Where

Hitler had ordered defense in the truest sense - a defense to the

last man - the generals in the field envisioned a delaying action

11

i n ~ r 2 c . rt ? p r 31-jng t h e f i n a l l-lecisi jn u n t i l , perhaps, t h e summer

->f 1945 and t h e r e b y give t h e p \ l i t i g a l l e a d e r s time t- arrive a t

new d e c i s i -3s. Parad ? x i c a l l y , alth.?ugh H i t l e r -rr.lere? defense, he

f.,rbade t r > m p s 2f Army G r >up B t. c r .>ss t., t h e e a s t bank .?f t h e

RHITB f .r t h e purpase af a - g a n i z i n g d e f e n s i v e p a s i t i 3ns u n t i 1

1 March 1945 .29

Base6 .?n a n e s t i m a t e a s .>f 29 March 1945 t.?t h e e f f e c t

t h a t t h e RHINE d e f e n s e c ~ u l dbe c-nsidcrerl b r \ken and t h a t

f u r t h e r attempts t 3 defend were absurd, Army G r w p B asked OB

West f ~ a r new m i s s i ? n , Hawever, I n t h e n i g h t nf 29/30 March,

. \ r d c r s f ' 3 r t h e defense were r e a f f irnerl by OB West and t h e i m p . x s i b l e

t a s k was c,ntinued ,30

. By t h i s time c ~mrnunicatitns wers d i s r u p t e d a l m x i t e n t i r e l y .

The whereab.?uts 3f army an.! czrps s t a f f s were unkn?wn. In the

end, t h e b a t t l e :Tn t h e German s i d e was r e s t r i c t e d t.3 the b l x k i n g

.>f v i l l a g e s , b r i d g e s , and imp.>rtant r \ a d s . The cmmand was n-?

l a n g e r i n a p x i t i m t.?d i r e c t b a t t l e and m , ~ v e m e n t s . ~ ' Disrupted

railr,mcl.s and b r i d g e s r e q u i r e d wide ~ J e t . ~ u and

r s resulterl i n the

piecemeal ct>mmitment af u n i t s i n what c,3?rdinated a t t a c k s were

made .32

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2

Iff1 n t e r r ?gati.?n :jf General Lieutenant F r i t z Bayerlein,"

The Armx-ed S c h . 2 ~ 1L i b r a r y (850.88), p 1, Annex 111.

2 w C
~ , ~ r p sOperati:,ns i n t h e ETO, 6 Jan 42 - 9 May 45,"
pp 409, 411, 425, 427, 429.
 4 " ~ e p o r tof t h e Chief of S t a f f , Army Group B," General
Major Carl Wagener , The Armared School L i b r a r y (850.3), pp 2 , 3.

50P c i t , " I n t e r r o g a t i o n of General Lieutenant F r i t z

Bayerlein," p 9.

60p c i t , "Report of t h e Chief of S t a f f , Army Group B," pp 2,3.

7 ~ cp i t , " I n t e r r o g a t i o n of General Lieutenant F r i t z Bayer-

lein," p 9.

c i t , "Report of t h e Chief of S t a f f , Army Group B," pp 2,3.

'bp c i t , " I n t e r r o g a t i o n of General Lieutenant F r i t z Bayer-

lein," p 9.

r t t h e Chief of S t a f f , Army Group B,"

l l ~ p c i t , " ~ e ~ o of p 7.

140p c i t , " I n t e r r o g a t i o n of General L i e u t e n a n t F r i t z Bayer-

lein," p 33.-.

16personal L e t t e r , Doctor R. W. Pomeroy.

l70p c i t , " I n t e r r o g a t i o n 3f General Lieutenant F r i t z Bayer-

l e i n , " p 25,

c i t , "Report of t h e Chief of S t a f f , Army Group B ," p 3.

2 0 ~ pc i t , " I n t e r r o g a t i o n of General Lieutenant F r i t z Bayer-

l e i n , " p 51.

2 1 ~ p c i t , "Report of t h e Chief of S t a f f , Army Group 8," p 3.

2 2 ~ pc i t , " I n t e r r o g a t i o n of General Lieutenant F r i t z Bayer-

l e i n , " p 24.
 -
281bid,' p 26.

290p .it, "Report of the Chief of S t a f f , Army Group 8," p 12.

32Gp c i t , " Intorrogation of General L i e u t e n a n t F'ritt Bayer-

lein."
 CHAPTER 3

LOGISTICS AND STATISTICS

The p e r i o d covered by t h i s r e p o r t probably was t h e b u s i e s t

p e r i o d t h e supply p e r s o n n e l of t h e 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n had i n

t h e i r e n t i r e operations. The c o n s t a n t r a p i d forward movement of

t h e D i v i s i o n was r e f l e c t e d d i r e c t l y i n c o n s t a n t changes of s u p p l y

installations . The n e c e s s i t y of keeping s u p p l y p o i n t s withi\ con-

v e n i e n t r e a c h of advancing combat c ~ m a n d sr e s u l t e d i n c o n s t a n t l y

changing l a c a t i o n s .
Likewise d u r i n g t h i s sane p e r i o d , supply agencies .,f t h e

F i r s t Army were e x p e r i e n c i n g t h e b u s i e s t time i n t h e i r h i s t m y .

The concerted A l l i e d d r i v e s deep i n t o t h e h e a r t of Germany

made it necessary t a s h i f t t h e l a c a t i c n s af u n i t s and i n s t a l l a -
t i ~ n sc o n s t a n t l y s.) that t h e y cauld b e t t e r s e r v e t h e r a p i d l y
advancing t r a o p s .
R a i l d e l i v e r y a f s u p p l i e s t o the Army depot c ~ n t i n u e d
i r r e g u l a r l y , and a t times t h e s t a c k a g e i n t h dep:rt ~ neared
a c r i t i c a l l e v e l . This s i t u a t i o n c ~ n t i n u e dbecause .3f t h e
s i n g l e t r a c k r a i l r a s d which served t h e ? s p a t .
The b u l k of t h e s u p p l i e s was t r a n s f e r r e d by t r u c k from
t h e dep.lt t o f 2rward d i s t r i b u t i n g p o i n t s . During t h i s p e r i A ,
t h e s e d i s t ~ n c e swere extremely g r e 3 t and n e c e s s i t a t e d Advance
S e c t i o n C >mmunicati.~nsZane f u r n i s h i n g many helvy t r u c k c.?m-
panies t~ augment Army t r a n s p ~rtati.311. S :me Class I and I11
s u p p l i e s were d e l i v e r e d by a i r , being placed -mil f ~ r w a r ?.,f
t h e d e p . ~ t . These a i r d e l i v e r i e s g r e a t 1 r e l i e v e d t h e c r i t i c a l
s i t u a t i i n .r\f supply and t r a m p z \ r t a t i > n .9
Alth;\ugh t h e Arny depL!ts f o r Classes I, 11, 111, and IVm%aved

a t l e a s t m c e d u r i n g t h i s p e r i . > d , a l l e x c e p t t h e dep.)t f.-!r Class I T 1

s t a y e d e a s t 3f t h e RHINE River beczuse .?f t h e i n a b i l i t y ~ f t h e

Arivance S e c t i ' m ' ~ . x u n u n i c a t i ~ >

Z.?ne
n t c ~s u p p l y F i r s t Army u n i t s a c r , s s
 the river. This imm,.rbilizxti .n rf t h e d e p - t , while c mbat u n i t s

c;lntinue.l tcl m.ve e a s t , r e q u i r e d t h e t r u c k ct3mpanios t.?t r a v e l a s

f a r a s 400 miles r , ~ u n dt r i p d e l i v e r i n g s u p p l i e s . This was causing

s e r i ~ u sc 3 m p l i c a t i . ~ n si n t h e a m i l l b i l i t y ?f t r u c k t r n n s p ~ r t a t .n.
i

I n e a r l y A p r i l , small dumps f d r Classes I, 11, and I V were lclcated

i n t h e v i c i n i t y .*f IZNDERKICH and WEISSENTHURM, and l a t e r a t s ?me

forward 3ump a t USSEL, VoLN~RSEN, and WRBURG.

L L t h i s t h e , p r i ~ r i t ywas switched fr:m

~ ammunitic.n t .r

gas ~ l i n c ;and c a n s t a n t e f f ~ r was

t e x e r t e d t, i n s u r e t h a t gas . l i n e

supply waulr! keep up w i t h t h e advancing arrn'x-ed ? i v i s i ? n s and

~ t h e r s . Since t r u c k s cauld n,.rt keep up t h e pace an? r a i l r o a d s

were stopped a t t h e RHIIa River, it wzs necessary t o e s t a b l i s h a

s i x - i n c h c r o s s - r i v e r pipe l i n e . "Delivery a t t h e western end was

by t a n k t r u c k c r r a i l t a n k c a r , 2nd g n s l l i n e was pumped tb?

st.-rage

tanks s e t up J n t h e e a s t s i d e zf t h e r i v e r . . . .TJ t i e i n with

t h e pipe l i n e , a decanting p a i n t was mdved t a t h e v i c i n i t y >f

GIESSEN."~
4
Salvage c o l l e c t i n g , maintenance r e p a i r s , and &her f u n c t i s > n s

f e l l f a r belaw what was expected. The f a c t ~ rbehind t h e l i m i t i n g

f u n c t i a n s was t h e l a c k .,f t r a n ~ p ~ ~ r t satvia~i l~a bnl e t a m,me m a t e r i a l

t o the depsts. Thraughaut t h i s period, t r u c k s hauling Class I

s u p p l i e s forward were l ~ a d e dw i t h p r i s m e r s of war a r salvage f.,r

the return t r i p s .

A f t e r lopking a t t h e c o n d i t i s n s af supply agencies i n t h e

cammunicati?n zane, l e t us ~ n c eagain t u r n t o t h e 9th Armzred

Division.

Following c a p t u r e of t h e REMAGEN Bridge, t h e r e was a

g r e a t f l o w of v e h i c u l a r t r a f f i c through t h e Division a r e a
moving e a s t . The road n e t , of n e c e s s i t y being l i m i t e d by
a v a i l a b i l i t y of bridge c r o s s i n g , couple? w i t h limited per-
sonnel a v a i l a b l e and urgency of r a p i d movement, imposed a
g r e a t problem of t r a f f i c c o n t r o l during t h i s c r i t i c a l period.
The D i v i s i o n formulated and executed a t r a f f i c c i r c u l a t i o n
p l a n t o permit t h e smoothest flow p o s s i b l e of movement over
t h e RHINE ~ i v e r . 3

By 26 March, t h e o u t e r c r e s t of enemy r e s i s t a n c e c o n t a i n i n g

t h e bridgehead kad been broken, and t h e 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n was

r o l l i n g eastward. With t h i s , t h e p r i o r i t y m s switched from amrnu-

n i t i o n t o g a s o l i n e , and e v e r y e f f o r t p o s s i b l e was e x e r t e d t o keep

t h a t gasoline supply up w i t h t h e advance.

The r a p i d movement and t h e g r e a t d i s t a n c e covered by t h e

D i v i s i o n a f t e r c r o s s i n g the MINE River made necessary un-
u s u a l l y long turn-around t r i p s f o r resupply. The D i v i s i o n
u t i l i z e d a l l a v a i l a b l e t r u c k s t o e s t a b l i s h and operate gaso-
l i n e truckheads s s c l o s e a s p o s s i b l e t o r e p l e n i s h t h e l a r g e
amounts of gasoline expended .4

During t h i s p e r i o d , of t h e 37 t r u c k companies under Corps

c o n t r o l , two were a t t a c h e d t o t h e 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n t o h e l p

expedite t h e handling of gasoline. However, by t h e end af March,

one of t h e s e c m p a n i e s was t a k e n away f ram Division. Thus t h e l o s s

during t h i s p e r i o d , when supply l i n e s were extended and l a r g e quan-

t i t i e s of gasoline were quickly requirerl , made resupply ? i f f i c u l t .

Only by t i r e l a s s and continuous e f f o r t af x g a n i c u n i t s and t h e

a t t a c h e d Quartermaster t r u c k s was t h i s s u c c e s s f u l l y accomplished;

it was of m a t e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e i n e n a b l i n g t h e D i v i s i o n t o a t t a i n

i t s objective ,
 Class I an.1 V I s u p p l i e s werc almast t h e sane as Class 111;

u s u a l l y t h e convoys were made up w i t h Classes I , 111, a n j V sup-

p l i e s , while Classes 11 aria I V were d e l i v e r e d only a s r e q u e s t s ,

u s u a l l y weekly.

Statistics

During t h i s p e r i d , . t h e D i v i s i ~ nevacuated only 606

c a s u a l t i e s ; expended a p p r a x i m t e l y 303,876 r3unds of 105-mm h ~ w i t -

zer ammunitian and. 900 t a n s . ~ f

a m u n i t i ~ n;.ther t h a n 105-mm; c.?n-

s u e d 1,000,000 g a l l a n s of g a s o l i n e , 32,000 gallzns of engine lil,

18,000 p ~ u n - ' s zf gear l u b r i c a n t , and 2 1,000 poun3s ;.f mis ce l l a n e >us

grease. A l s ~d u r i n g t h i s r a p i d advance, t h e y captured 16,770

p r i s < ~ n e r sf war, I n a d a i t i a n , the Divisian sustained the f . 3 1 1 ~ ~ -

ing lasses :

Killed i n acti.?n
Wsunded i n a c t i a n
Missing i n a c t i a n

M a t e r i a l Destroyed :.

Tanks 22
SP Guns 1
Half -Tracks 14
Trucks ( a l l t y p e s ) 44

NuTES FOR CEiPTER 3

' ~ e ~ ~ f> r Operations,

t F i r s t U. S. i'irmy,. 23 Februlry - 8 May
1945, p 63.
3 After-Action Report, 9th ArmoredDivis ion,March 1945,
G-4 Comments.
4 After-Action Report, 9th Armored Division, April 1945.
 CHAPTER 4

EXPAXDING THE BRIDGEHEAD

The 9 t h Armcred D i v i s i ~ n ,having perf xmed t h e mnst

remarkable s i n g l e f e a t i n m.-vqern m i l i t a r y h i s t.?r;y--that 3f c r -ss-

i n g t h e RHINE River a l m ~ s tun>pp..-se"-f ?und i t s e l f r e c r g a n i z i n g .n

20 March 1345 i n assembly a r e a s . C;lmbat C?mmana B was c -ncentrate?

a t LINZ,' n t.m Jn t h e e a s t bank s f t h e RHINE River t h r e e k i l . > -

meters s m t h ~ f t h e bridge t h e y ha4 captured seven days bef -re.

Combat elements attached were:

27th Armored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n
52d Armored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n
60th Armsxed I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n
1 4 t h Tank B a t t a l i o n
1 6 t h Armored F i e l d A r t i l l e r y B a t t a l i o n
Company C , 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron
Company B, 9 t h Armored Engineer B a t t a l i o n
Ccmpany C., 656th Tank Destroyer B a t t a l i s n
Company B, 2d Armored Medical B a t t a l i a n
Company C , 1 3 1 s t Ordnance Maintenance B a t t a l i o n

The remainder of t h e d i v i s i a n , w i t h t h e 4828 A n t i a i r c r a f t

A r t i l l e r y (AW) B a t t a l i r n , t h e 656th Tank Destrcyer Battali,-.ln ( - ) ,

and t h e 3458th and 3600th Quartermaster Truck C-mpanies a t t a c h e d ,

were s t i l l *?nt h e west s i d e ~ f t h o r i v e r .

Passing f'ram c o n t r d l ~ f I11 Corps t o V C.?rps a t t h i s time,

t h e d i v i s i o n was ordered t o a t t z c k s o u t h along t h e e a s t bank of

t h e RHINE, u s i n g only t h e d i v i s i a n a l t r o a p s a l r e a d y e a s t of t h e

river. The remainder af t h e d i v i s i ~ nwas t c ? c r ~ s scn t h e V C . ~ r p s

treadway b r i d g e a t HCINNINGEN, s i x k i l m e t e r s s t ~ u t hc.f LINZ.2

 Late i n t h e aftern?.?n ~ f 2 0 March, C.~mbatC,mmand B r e -

ceived zriiers fram d i v i s i a n t o r e l i e v e elements >-f t h e . 394th

I n f a n t r y Regiment (99th I n f a n t r y D i v i s i ~ n )s . m t h .:f HGNNINGEN,

and t a be prepared t o a t t a c k s s u t h taward EHRENBREITSTEIN,~ a t a m

a c r c s s t h e WINE f r . m COBLENZ sJme 30 kilameters s c u t h . This a s -

signment cauld have been t h e b a s i s f a r t r u e "missi.m type :rders ,"

b u t , a s s h a l l be s e e n l a t e r s n , t h i s d r i v e t~ t h e s.-uth evclved

i n t o a s e r i e s of l i m i t e d a b j e c t i v e a t t a c k s which d e f i n i t e l y

s l ~ w e dt h e pr.>gress cf t h e ~ i v i s i . : n . ~

Task o r g a n i z a t i m f L ? rt h i s a t t a c k was as f .r\ll?ws:5

Combat C.mand A

, Cclmbat Ccmmand A

Headquarters C~mpany

Attached

1 9 t h Tank B a t t a l i L m

Campany A , p l u s m e plat,.cn )f Campany C and me

p l a t o m ~ f Campany F, 89th Cavalry Recannaissance
Squadron
Company A , 9 t h Armored Engineer B a t t a l i a n
Company A , 2d Armxed Medical B a t t a l i o n

Support

C.jmpany A, 131st Orrlnance Maintenance B a t t a 1 i . m

Combat C . m a n d B

Headquarters Csmpany, Combat Camnand B

Attached

27th Armsred I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n
60th Armored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i ~ n
1 4 t h Tank B a t t a l i a n
C;mpany C ( -
m e p l a t o m ) , plus one p l a t . v n ?f
C >mpany E and m e p l a t x n .3f C:mpany F, 89th
Cavalry Recannais s ance Squadron
 C Jmpany B, 9th Arm~rcc!Engineer B a t t a l i a n
Company B, 2d Armdred Medical B a t t a l i ~ n
Battery B, 482d A n t i a i r c r a f t Battalim
Company C , 656th Tank Destroyer B a t t a l i a n

16th Armxed Field A r t i l l e t y B a t t a l i c n

Company C, 131 s t Ordnance .Maintenance B a t t a l i z n

Combat- C~mmandR

Headquarters Campany, C~mbatCcmmand R

Attached

52d Armxed Infantry B n t t a l i ?n

2d Tank 0 a t t a l i . m

The 27th Armxed Infantry B a t t a l i o n mmed t c HHONNINGEN

during t h e night ~ f 20-21 March and s h o r t l y a f t e r ni.,Jn .-f t h e 21st

had taken mer the a r s a ~ c c u p i e dby t h e 18th Cavalry Squadrzn and

t h e 3d Battali.?n, 394th Infantry Regiment, e a s t and s > u t h e a s t f

HAMMERSTEIN. The 60th Armored Infantry B a t t a l i ' m , prepared t-J

fl~llow
up t h e advance sf t h e 27th, moved t o t h e v i c i n i t y - ~ f

H ~ M M E R S T E I N a~ long with other elements df t h e command.

Orders were received l a t e i n t h e a f t e r n j o n af 21 March t c

a t t a c k a t 0700 t h e f ~ l l ~ w i nm,~rning,
g advance t o t h e WEID River,

e s t a b l i s h a bridgehead and await f u r t h e r ~ r d e r s . Plans were

c m r d i m t e d with t h e 38th Infantry Regiment (2d Infantry Divisi.>n)

attacking Jn t h e l e f t .7

Whilo these plans were i n pragress, C~mbatCm~nandB 1v.t

i t s c~mmandinggeneral, William M. H>>ge,t h r m g h h i s t r a n s f e r frsm

the 9th ti? t h e 4 t h Armored D i v i s i m . C.l~nel Harry W. Jchnsm

suoceeded h h a s C.>mbat Command Cornrpander .8 Because of t h i s change,

Canbat C.>mmanr!A was ardererl t o move e a s t . ~ tf h e RHINE River ~ ? n

22 March, assume command of Cambat Csmmand B t r . x ? p s , and c a r r y

out t h e i r mission. The change'mer was n,>t e f f ecte-!, h?wever, u n t i l

1000 h..>urs, 23 March.

The a t t a c k jumped off as planned, and t h e C.mbat Clmnand

. . b j e c t i v e , NEUWEID, was a t t a i n e d by 2300 h.:urs an t h e 2213. Typical

delaying a c t i >n t a c t i c s h a d been met. H a s t i l y emplaced mines

sl.?wea t h e Fr,>gress of t h e tanks a t s e v e r a l p yints . B l , , w n brirlges

an.! mined approaches i n t h e i r sect..>r f l ~ r c e A

t h e 60th Arm,?reJ In-

f a n t r y Batta1ii.n and Clampany B, 14th Tank B a t t a l i % . n , t.?use a

brie!ge i n t h e 2d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i . ~ nsect,:r t . t~
h e n ~ r t h . The 27th

Armxed I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i J n , .,n t h e r i g h t .:f t h e 6Wh, made a s s a u l t

c r a s s i n g s :f t h e WEID River m e r f . ~ > t b r i d g e si n t h e i r sect,.r under

heavy f i r e f r ~ m20 and 40 m i l l i m e t e r a n t i a i r c r a f t guns. Enemy

defenses, stubb:rn when f i r s t encountered, faded away a t each

s u c c e s s i v e p ~ i st i m b e f m e ca.>rdimted a t t a c k s . A t y p i c a l example

accurred a t NEWYEID, which had been s t r o n g l y defended u n t i l t h e

27th Armxed I n f a n t r y Batta1i.m mdunted a c o ~ r d i n a t e da t t a c k

supported by i n t e n s e a r t i l l e r y c o n c e n t r a t i a n s , The a r t i l l e r y

p r e p a r a t i a n e v i d e n t l y canvinced t h e defenders, f.->rt h e B a t t a l i o n

r e p ~ r t s"the town was cleaned out w i t h l i t t l e r e s i s t a n c e , rr 10

On t h e 23d, p a t r ~ l sf r . ~ mboth t h e 27th and 60th Arm-red

I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i . ~ n sr e p x t e a no enemy c m t a c t t~ t h e f r n n t f ~ r

1500 y a r d s . On t h e 24th, b.?th b a t t a l i c n s mL-verl f ~ r w a r ds.3me

2G00 y a r d s a g a i n s t l i g h t , s c a t t e r e d r e s i s t a n c e , expatldinp; t h e i r

b r i d g e h e a d o v e r t h e T'JEID t o t h e sou-t'n and e a s t . T r o o p s engaged

w e r e now a t t a c h e d t o Combat Command A . Combat Command B had moved

b a c k t o LEXTTE3DORF w h e r e t h e s t a f f w a s employed t o f i t i d a r e a s f o r

ar1.d c o o r d i n a t e ~ o v e r n e n ta c r o s s t h e RHINE of t h e r e m a i n i n g e l e m e n t s

of t h e D i v i s i o n . . 11

A t 0500 h o u r s on 2 5 March, Combat Command A c o n t i n u e d t h e

a t t a c k s o u t h t o s e c u r e a b r i d g e h e a d o v e r t h e LOTTR R i v e r i n t h e

v i c i n i t y of VALLL:JDiiR, The 2 7 t h Armored I t f a n t r y Battalion cleared

ENGERS w h i l e t h e 6 0 t h Armored I n f a n t r y E a t t a l i o n r e d u c e d BEWORF

against halfhearted resistance. A p p r o x i m t i t e l y 150 enemy s o l d i e r s

surrendered without m c h f ighti:lg. A ~ t i t a n km i n e s w h i c h h a d b e e n

h a s t i l y l a i d i n t h e s t r e e t s b y t h e e n e x y w e r e removed b y c i v i l i a n s

b e f o r e our t r o o p s e n t e r e d .

As s o o n as t h e 6 0 t h Armored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n e n t e r e d

BEYDGRF, it was o r d e r e d t o move s o u t h , b y p a s s t h e t m n of VIEITERS-

ETRZ and a t t a c k VliLIJE DAR w h i c h s a t a s t r i d e t h e LO:f,9 R i v e r a t i t s

j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e RVI:JE. The B a t t a l i o n Cozmander o r d e r e d Company A

t o f o l l m t h e R a t t a l i o n t o a p o i n t i n t h e v i c i n i t y of IfiJEITmSBSTRG,

send a p l a t o o n t o occupy t h e t o w n , a n d a w a i t f u r t h e r o r d e r s . The

p l a t o o n a c c o m p l i s h e d i t s missi.on, t a k i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y 4 0 FVds.

COP-pany F w a s g i v e n t h e m i s s i o n of c l e a r i n g BENDORF, a f t e r

w h i c h i t w a s t o r e l i e v e t h e p l a t o o n i n WEITERSBURG a n d r e v e r t t o

b a t t a l i o n reserve.12 The n e t r e s u l t of t h e b a t t a l i o n commander I s

a c t i o n h e r e was t o t i e down C o n p a n i e s A and E i n and n e a r

I'iEITERSWRG, a town he had b e e n t o l d t o b y p a s s .

Both t h e 2 7 t h and 6 0 t h krmored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n s j o i n e d

i n t h e a t t a c k on VALUNDAR. P r o g r e s s was a l m o s t c o m p l e t e l y s t o p p e d

on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s d u r i n g t h e a f t e r n o o n by t e r r i f i c b a r r a g e s

f r o m 20 and 4 0 m i l l i m e t e r a n t i a i r c r a f t guns l o c a t e d on t h e h i g h

ground s m t h of t h e town. The town was enveloped f r o m t h e e a s t by

Company A, 6 0 t h krmored I n f a n t r y F a t t a l i o n , and by 04CO h o u r s on

t h e 2 6 t h , VALLENDAR had b e e n c l e a r e d and t h e h i c h ground t o t h e

s o u t h , w h i c h was t h e f i n a l o b j e c t i v e , had b e e n occupied.

I n d i s c u s s i n g t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y phase of t h i s d r i v e

s o u t h from t h e REMAGEN Bridgehead t o VhLLEi4JlkR, N a j o r ( t h e n c a p t a i n )

George I . T a y l o r , who commanded B a t t e r y C , 3d Armored F i e l d A r t i l l e r y

Battalion, stated :

A p l a t o o n of t h e .UA's was always a t t a c h e d t o t h e 3d and

w e r e h e l d i n h i g h r e g a r d . S i n c e t h e Luxembourg days i n
November, t h e &&-FA c o o p e r a t i o n l e f t n o t h i ~ gt o be d e s i r e d .
They w e r e a l w a y s on t h e job. Task o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e Combat
Command v a r i e d s l i g h t l y f r o m day t o day, b u t i n g e n e r a l t h e
3d was i n s u p p o r t of t h r e e r e i n f o r c e d b a t t a l i o n s who w e r e
v e r y o f t e n a s s i g n e d or changed m i s s i o n s i n a m a t t e r of
m i n u t e s . I t was i n t e r e s t i n g and c a l l e d f o r a l e r t a r t i l l e r y ,
b u t t h e d r a i n of f o u r l i a i s o n s e c t i o n s and s i x o b s e r v e r
s e c t i o n s u s i n g t a n k s , h a l f - t r a c k s , and peeps was a heavy
one. I t was r e g r e t t a b l e t h a t t h e e x p e r t s who d e s i g n e d t h e
t a b l e s of o r g a n i z a t i o n w e r e n o t made t o f i g h t . t h e i r own
paper u n i t s . The b a t t a l i o n wos always u n d e r s t r e n g t h i n
o f f i c e r s , men. and v e h i c l e s . 13

D u r i n s t h i s f our-day a c t i o n (22-25 arch) t h e D i v i s i o n had

d r i v e n some 20 k i l o m e t e r s u p s t r e a m p a r a l l e l t o t h e REfIiJE i n c o u n t r y

a s u n s u i t e d t o t h e employment of armor a s c o u l d be e n c o u n t e r e d .

I n a narrow zone b e t w e e n t h e r i v e r and t h e mountainous b l u f f s which

r i s o heycnd i t s narrow v a l l e y , t h e 9t:i had s x ~ a . : ~ d e.the
d 2EXASEX

Bridgehead s u f f i c i e n t l y f o r t h e opening of e. d r i v e d e e p i n t o

c e n t r a l .?ermany.

The f i g h t i n p ; on t h e 2 5 t h of hTarch f o r t h e h i c h ground

below TTALL!VDAR had b e e n b i t t e r , and t h e advance c o n s i d e r a b l y

hampered b y t h e rugged c o u n t r y and b y t h e dogged r e s i s t a n c e of

t r o o p s from a German a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y t r a i n i n g c e n t e r . The

f i r e from enemy m l t i p l c i a : . ~ t i a i r c r a f tmounts was d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t

our t r o o p s t h r o u g h o u t t h e 2 5 t h and ~ l dlu r i n g thc: n i g h t of t h e

25th-26th. k t t i m c s t h i s f i r e r e n d e r e d t h e main s u p p l y road

5c;tween ViiLLEI\JDkR and BElKIORF i m p a s s a b l e . Over 500 p r i s o n e r s were

c a p t u r e d d u r i n g t h e f o u r - d a y p e r i o d . 14

hiain r o u t e s were a v o i d e d d u r i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n , wherever

possible. T h i r d and f o u r t h c l a s s r o a d s and e v e n t r a i l s vlere u s e d

i n a n endeavor t o b y p a s s enemy p o i n t s of r e s i s t a n c e , know-I t o b e

a l o n c t h 6 m;>in r o u t e s . of advance. Task f o r c e s w i t h i n t h e Combat

Somniand w e r e , s o f a r a s p r a c t i c c b l s , r o t a t e d p e r i o d i c a l l y . 15

The D r i v e t o Limburg
--
The 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n was o r d e r c d by V Corps t o a t t x c k

t o t h e e a s t on 26 F.'arch w i t h tsvo combat comrnands a b r e a s t , p a s s i n g

t h r o u g h t h e 2d I n f a n t r y Divi.sion i n t h e v i c i n i t y of Gi?EXZY!USEN,

and s e c u r e b r i d g e h e a d s a c r c s s t h e LAFIB R i v c r a t DIEZ and L I ? G Z R G . .

These tojvns w e r e t o bc s e c u r c d and h e l d u n t i l t h e a r r i w . 1 of T h i r d

Army t r o o p s , f o l l a v j . a g which t h e D i v i s i o n was t o c o n t i n u e

t h e advance t o t h e e a s t and s e c u r e t h e LIiT3N R i v e r l i n e i n t h e

dofps s e c t o r . F o r t h i s d r i v e , t h e 3 8 t h I n f a n t r y Regiment (2d

I n f a n t r y ~ i vs i on) was a t t a c h e d t o t h e 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n ; a n d ,

i n t u r n , t h e 2d i 3 a t t a l i o n t o Combat Command A; and t h e Regiment ( - )

t o Combet Command B. 16

Combat Command k was p l a c e d on t h e r i g h t ( s o u t h ) f l a n k

w i t h DIEZ i t s o b j e c t i v e ; Combat Command B was t o advance on t h e

l e f t ( n o r t h ) f l a n k , moving on LIMWJRG.
17
Task o r g a n i z a t i o n was a s f o l l o w s :

Combat Command A

H e a d q u a r t e r s Company, Combat Command A

6 0 t h Armored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n
1 4 t h Tank B a t t a l i o n
3d Armored F i e l d i i r t i l l e r y E a t t a l i o n
2d F a t t a l i o n , 3 8 t h I n f a n t r y Begiment
Company C , p l u s one p l a t o o n of Company E and one
p l a t o o n of Company F, 8 9 t h C a v a l r y Reconnaissance
Squadron
Company '-,9 t h Armored Z n g i n e e r B a t t s l i o n
"ompany B , 2d i r m o r e d Medical B a t t a l i o n
B a t t e r y A, 482d A n t i a i r c r a f t ( i ! )F a t t a l i o n
Compnny ?, 6 5 6 t h Tank D e s t r o y e r E a t t a l i o n

Support

Company C , 1 3 1 s t Ordnance Maintenance R a t t a l i o n

"ombat Command B

Y e a d q u a r t e r s Company, Combnt Command E

Attached

, 52d Armored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n
1 9 t h Tank F a t t a l i o n
1 6 t h Armored F i e l d ~ i r t i l l e r yE a t t a l i o n
 3 8 t h Jrzfantry R c g i m n t ( - )
Compc.ny i:, p l u s one p l a t o o n of Compr.ny E r'.nd one
p l ~ t o o nof Company F , 8 9 t h C c v a l r y R ~ c o n n a i s s a n c e
Squadron
Company E, 9 t h Armored F n g i n e e r B a t t c l i o n
Company i,, 2d l ~ r m o r o dMedical B a t t a l i o n
B a t t e r y D , 482d b L n t i a i r c r n f t (!a)B a t t a l i o n
Company A , 6 5 6 t h Tank D e s t r o y e r B a t t a l i o n

Support

Company A, 1 3 1 s t Ordnancc ?d7aintcnance B a t t a l i o n

Combat Command R

H e a d q u a r t e r s Company, Combat Command R

Attached

2 ? t h Armored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n
Zd Tank B a t t a l i o n
8 9 t h Cavalry Recontmissnnce Squadron ( - )
B a t t e r y B , 482d A n t i a i r c r a f t (AK) B a t t a l i o n

Combat Cormand B marched a t 0800 on t h o 2 6 t h w i t h t h e

rcconnaissonce t r o o p leading. A f t e r a n a l m o s t u n o p ~ o s e dcdvcince,

t h e y r e a c h e d LIMBURG l c t e i n t h e a f t e r n o o n . . The move had b e e n

r e s t r i c t e d o n l y hy p a s s a g e t h r o u ~ ht h e 2d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n l i n e s ,

a blown o v e r p a s s , and one r o a d c r a t e r . The advcnce on LIMBURG

t u r n e d out t o be a q u e s - t i o n of moving a s f a s t a s p o s s i b l e .

At one p o i n t i n t h e a d v a n c c , however, i n t h e woods w e s t

of FPONTABAUR, a German r a z d b l o c k s u p p o r t e d by a r t i l l e r y h e l d u p

t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e t r o o p which w c s t o o l i g h t t o remove t h e r c s i s -

tance, The t r o o p was s i d e s t e p p e d t o t h e r i g h t and g i v e n t h e

m i s s i o n of m a i n t a i n i n g c o n t a c t w i t h Combat Command k u n d e r C o l o n e l

Harrold. The l e a d i n g r e i n f o r c e d b a t t a l i o n was g i v e n t h e m i s s i o n

of l e a d i n g t h e a d v a n c e . S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , Combat Comrnnnd B
c r u s h e d i t s way t h r o u p h t h e o p p o s i t i o n .

F u r t h e r c o m p l i c n t i o n s dcvcloped when t h e l e a d b e t t a l i o n ,

d i s c o v e r i n g t h a t a b r i d g e was blown on t h e AUTOBAHN e a s t of

MONTABtUR, d e t o u r e d t h r a u g h t h a t town. F o l l o w i n g e l e m e n t s missed

t h i s d e t o u r 2nd moved on t o t h e IJJTOBAHN, n e c e s s i t n t i n g t h e column's

d o u b l i n g b a c k on T h i s mishap, which l e f t o g a p i n t h e

column of a b o u t 1 0 m i l e s , l a t e r had c o n s i d e r c b l e e f f e c t i n t h e a t t a c k

on LIMBURG..

Upon r e a c h i n g t h e IIUTOBAHN a t I\TO?!Ti,Bi,UR, Combat Cormand E

e n c o u n t e r e d a combat command of t h e 7 t h Armored D i v i s i o n u n d e r

Coloncl T r i p p l e t t . t c o n f e r e n c e between Colonel H a r r y W. Johnson

(commanding Combat Commcnd B ) and Colonel T r i p p l e t t i n d i c a t e d t h a t

t h e r e was a p p s r e n t l y a t i e - u p i n o r d e r s f r o m Corps, i n a s m c h a s

h i s o b j e c t i v e was a l s o LIbWRG. I n v e s t i g a t i o n r e v e ~ l e dt h a t h i s

o r d e r s had b e e n changed b u t h e had n o t b e e n informed. 1 9

\while messages w e n t b a c k t h r o u g h command c h a n n e l s t o

c o r r e c t t h i s e r r o r , t h e columns k e p t moving. For a b o u t a n h o u r

b o t h combat commands w e r e r a c i n g a b r e a s t :!om t h e PJJTOBJIHN f o r

LIhrIBURG. Peeps were f o r c e d t o t r a v e l 35 mph t o k e e p u p w i t h t h e

t a n k s i n t h e column. O r d e r s were f i n a l l y changed f o r C o l o n e l

T r i p p l e t t , however., and h i s column t u r n e d n o r t h and e a s t , w h i l e

Colonel J o h n s o n ' s combat command c o n t i n u e d t h e i r d r i v e t o

LIMBJRG.~~

Meanwhile, i n t h e Combat Command A s e c t o r , p o s i t i o n s had

b e e n c o n s o l i d a t e d n l o n g t h e h i g h ground s o u t h of VALLENDAR b y e a r l y
r o r n i n g of t h e 2 6 t h ; and u t 1130 h o u r s , t h e cormand was r e l i e v e d

of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e a r e a b y t h e 2 7 t h .rmored I n f a n t r y Bat-

t a l i o n u n d e r Combat Command R.

Combzt Comrr,and h launched i t s a t t a c k t o t h e e a s t a t 1500

h o u r s on t h e 2 6 t h w i t h DfEZ a s i t s o b j e c t i v e . Movemont on HILL-

SCHEID was made i n one column where l i g h t r e s i s t a n c e was e l i m i n a t e d

by a r t i l l e r y f i r e . Company B , 6 0 t h Armored Infantry B a t t a l i o n

d e l a y e d i t s advance l o n g e n m g h t o check HILLSCHEID t h o r o u g h l y .

The r e m a i n d e r of t h e combat command s e p a r a t e d i n t o two c o l u m n s

and c o n t i n u e d e a s t w a r d .

S t a n d i n g b e s i d e h i s peep, Colonel H a r r o l d h e a r d t h e d i v i -

s i o n commander announce over t h e r a d i o t h a t Combat Command B,

r a c i n g dawn t h e AUTOWHN a t 3 5 mph i n d w b l e columns, had r e a c h e d

LIMBURG, t h e i r o b j e c t i v e f o r t h e n e x t day. A t t h e t i m e , no one

r e a l i z e d t h a t t h i s was t h e s t a r t i n g s i g n a l f o r t h e r a c e of t h e

armored d i v i s i o n s a c r o s s Germany. I t was t o b e t h e F i r s t , T h i r d ,

and Ninth American Armies competing d a i l y f o r p u b l i c i t y and

mileage. Once a g a i n , armor was i n t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n .

Combat Command A r e a c h e d t h e w e s t bank of t h e LAHN R i v e r

o p p o s i t e DIE2 a t 1950 t h a t n i g h t . Lead e l e m e n t s of t h e 6 0 t h

Armored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n , whose o b j e c t i v e i n c l u d e d t h e e s t a b -

l i s h m e n t of a b r i d g e h e a d over t h e r i v e r , met t h e i r f i r s t o r g a n i z e d

r e s i s t a n c e of t h e d a y from a g r o u p of s t u b b o r n enemy dug i n on t h e

e a s t bank.

A l l b r i d g e s o v e r t h e r i v e r i n t h e b a t t a l i o n ' s s e c t o r had
b e e n blown; and L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l C o l l i n s , t h e b a t t a l i o n commander,

ordered t h e a t t a c h e d Engineer Platoon t o c o n s t r u c t n f o o t bridge.

F u t b e c a u s e of t h e w i d t h , d e p t h , and s w i f t c u r r e n t of t h e r i v e r ,

s u c h a b r i d g e c o u l d b e c o n s t r u c t e d o n l y a t p o i n t s w e l l covered b y

observed enemy small arms f i r e w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e e n g i n e e r

21
m i s s i o n c o u l d n o t b e accomplished.

A t t e m p t s t o f,ord t h e r i v e r f a i l e d , and p a t r o l s were u n a b l e

t o f i n d c r o s s i n g p o i n t s on e i t h e r f l a n k of t h e combat c o n ~ a n d

sector. Company B, 1 4 t h Tank B a t t a l i o n , was t h e n o r d e r e d i n t o

f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s on t h e w e s t bank of t h e r i v e r and p u l v e r i z e d t h e

b u i l d i n g s and p o s s i b l e enemy f i r i n g p o s i t i o n s on t h e e a s t bank.

A t d a y l i g h t t h e n e x t morning, Companies B and C , .Goth Armored

I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n , were s e n t n o r t h t o t h e v i c i n i t y of LIMEWRG,

where a c r o s s i n g hod b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d b y Combat Command B, w i t h

t h e m i s s i o n of c r o s s i n g t h e r i v e r and a t t a c k i n g DIEZ f r o m t h e

n o r t h and e a s t .

m i l e t h i s maneuver was i n p r o g r e s s , a n u n i d e n t i f i e d

e n g i n e e r s o l d i e r swam t o t h e e a s t bank of . t h e r i v e r a t t h e s o u t h

edge of DIEZ and u n t i e d n l o n g b a r g e anchored t h e r e . Since t h e

b a r g e was l o n g e r t h a n t h e r i v e r was wide a t t h a t p o i n t , t h e b a r g e

was p u l l e d d i a g o n a l l y a c r o s s t h e r i v e r , forming a f o o t b r i d g e

over which Company li, 6 0 t h hrmored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n , passed. 22

P s y c h o l o g i c a l w a r p a r e p l a y e d a minor b u t y e t i m p o r t a n t

r o l e a t t h i s s t a g e of t h e o p e r a t i o n s . h powerful p u b l i c a d d r e s s

s y s t e m had b e e n made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e 6 0 t h Armored I n f a n t r y

B a t t a l i o n , and t h i s w a s s e t u p on t h e w e s t bank of t h e LAHN R i v e r .

K a r n i n g s were b r o a d c a s t t o t h e c i v i l i a n s and s o l d i e r s on t h e o t h e r

s i d e w h i l e Company A c l e a r e d t h e c i t y . Due t o t h e e f f e c t s of t h e

t a n k s f i r i n g d u r i n g t h e n i g h t , t h e speedy c r o s s i n g of Company A ,

and t h e w a r n i n g s b r o a d c a s t t o t h e p e o p l e and s o l d i e r s , t h e d u g - i n

enemy on t h e e a s t bank of t h e r i v e r and t h o s e i n p o s i t i o n i n t h e

town of DIEZ s u r r e n d e r e d w i t h o u t f u r t h e r r e s i s t a n c e . 23 several

o f f i c e r s end over 200 e n l i s t e d men vrerc t a k e n p r i s o n e r . The t m r n

was q u i c k l y checked and o u t p o s t e d ,

During t h i s f i v e - d a y p e r i o d (22-27 Narch) t h e 9 t h Armored

D i v i s i o n had advanced t h e f r o n t l i n e s some 68 m i l e s , c a p t u r e d

2,518 p r i s o n e r s , and e s t a b l i s h e d c o n t a c t w i t h t h e T h i r d .Army n o r t h

1. Although t h e D i v i s i o n had b e e n g i v e n " m i s s i o n t y p e t '

o r d e r s f o r i t s i n i t i a l b r e a k o u t f r o m t h e RELYLGEN Bridgehead, it

f a i l e d t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of t h e s e o r d e r s and of t h e r a p i d l y

weakening German s i t u a t i o n , and caused i t s combat commands t o

make l i m i t e d o b j e c t i v e a t t a c k s which d e f i n i t e l y slowed t h e p r o -

g r e s s of t h e D i v i s i o n .

2. World War 11 t a b l e s of o r g e . n i z a t i o n and equipment,

p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r t h e 105 m i l l i m e t e r h m r i t z e r f i e l d a r t i l l e r y

u n i t s , were d e m o n s t r a t e d t o have b e e n e x t r e m e l y weak i n manpower

and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f o r t h e d u t i e s of l i a i s o n and f o r w a r d observa-

tion. T h i s shortcoming has been c o r r e c t e d i n present-day t a b l e s

of o r g a n i z a t i o n .

3. One phase of p s y c h o l o g i ~ c e lw a r f a r e proved i t s p r a c t i c a l

v a l u e i n comb&t d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d covered b y t h i s c h a p t e r .

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

l ~ f t e r - ~ c t i oRne p o r t , Combat Command B, 9 t h Armored

D i v i s i o n , hfarch 1945,. p 11.

-
' ~ f t e r - ~ c t i o nR e p o r t , . 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n , Blarch 1945,
p 22.

' ~ f t e r - h e t i o n R e p o r t , Combat Command B , 9 t h Armored

D i v i s i o n , March 1945, p 11.

4 ~ f t e r - ~ c t i oRne p o r t , 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n , March 1945,

p 22.

' ~ f t e r - ~ c t i o nR e p o r t , Combat Command F, 9 t h krmored

D i v i s i o n , March 1945, p 11.

' A f t e r - ~ c t i o n R e p o r t , Combat Command A , 9 t h Armored

D i v i s i o n , March 1945, p 17.

1 0 k f t e r - ~ c t i o n R e p o r t , 2 7 t h hrmorcd I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n ,
March 1945, p 8.

l l ~ f t c r - ~ c t i o nR e p o r t , Combat Command B , 9 t h IIrmored

D i v i s i o n , March 1945, p 12. .

1 2 [ L f t e r - ~ c t i o nR e p o r t , 6 0 t h Armored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n ,
h5arch 1945, p 9.

13b1a j o r George I. T a y l o r , L e t t e r I n t e r v i e w .

n e p o r t , Combat Coinmand A , 9 t h Armored

l 4 ~ f ' t e r - ~ c t i oR
D i v i s i o n , Blarch 1945, .p 19.
 16i,fter-dction Report, 9th ;&rmored D i v i s i o n , March 1945,
p 22.

1 8 ~ o l o n e Harry
l W. Johnson, L e t t e r I n t e r v i e w .

20,1f'ter -taction ~ e ~ o rCombat

t,' Command B , 9th Armored
D i v i s i o n , March 1945, p 1 2 .

2 1 ~ f t e r - k c t i o n Report, 60th ~ r m o r e ' dI n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n ,

March '1945, p 10.

2 4 ~ f t e r - ~ c t i oRne p o r t , 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n , l a r c h 1945 ;

passim.

 CHAPTER 5

THE REDUCTION OF LIMBURG

Operating under Letter of Instructions, V ('orps, 26 March

1945, the 9th Armored Division launched its attack on LIMBURG--a

key communication center, the capture of which was vital to future

operations to the north and east. Vlbile Combat Command A was

seeking a crossing of the LiLT-IN River (canal) in the vicinity of

DIEZ, Combat Command B had run into a two-pronged problem at

LIMBURG. The reduction of LIMBURG included not only a river

crossing in the face of hostile resistance, but also the reduction

of a built-up area.

The Combat COITllllf.lnd B task organization during this period

is indicated below:

Combat Command B

Colonel Harry VI!. Johnson, Commanding

Headquarters Company, Combat Command B

19th Tank Battalion
52d Armored Infantry Battalion
16th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
38th Infantry Regiment ( - 2d Battalion)
Company C - one platoon, Company E - one platoon,
Company F, 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron
Company B, 9th Armored Engineer Battalion
Battery D, 482d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion
Company f~, 2d Armored Medical Battalion
Company A, 656th Tank Destroyer Battalion
Company A, l3lst Armored Ordnance Maintenance Battalion

"During the day, 26 March 1945. Company C, 52d il.rmored

Infantry Battalion, was attached to the 19th Tank Battalion which

was leading the Combat Command B column. Only light opposition

35
w~s met o.s the column approached LIMBURG from thE; north. ,,1 Near

the LiI.HN River (canal), it was suddenly noted by the leading ele-

ments that the main bridge was still intact. The lead tanks made

a run for it--four succeeded in crossing the bridge before it waS

blown by the enemy. Separated from the infantry and the remainder

of the battalion,' these four tanks were soon immobilized. Fortun-

ately the tank crews were not all casualties. Although they could

not maneuver, the tanks continued to fire with their guns.

Company C, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion, attached to the

19th Tank Battalion, was given the mission of finding an entrance

to the city. This it succeeded in doing by repairing the railroad

bridge into the city to the extent that infantry could cross dis-

mounted. Soon after entering the city, Company C initiated the

reduction against moderate to stiff resistance. This infantry

company progressed favorably until 261730 March, at which time

the reduction of the city was assigned to the 52d Armored Infantry

Battalion. Company C was relieved from its attachment to the 19th

Tank Battalion and reverted to the control of its parent unit. It

will be noted here that the Company had been engaged in this fight

wi th none of its share of the battalion supporting weapons. All

of these weapons were under battalion control for the advance to

LIMBURG. 2

Upon the assignment of the reduction mission to the 52d

Armored Infantry Battalion, Companies A and B were rushed into the

city. Company A was moved into the line on the left of Company C

36

and was given the mission of advancing throo/!:h the center of the

city and seizing the high ground to the sruth and southeast.

At 2200, Company B was moved across the river to take up

a posi ti on on the left of C:olfipany A. At thi s time, the 52d's

suppo~ting weapons were attached to the assault companies to pro-

vide close mortar and machine gun support during the reduction;

however, the machine gun platoon attached to Company A did not

succeed in locating the company until daylight 27 March. The

Commanding Officer"," Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 52d

Armored Infantry Battalion, stated that although LIMBURG was not

a large city, it was one of the most confusing he had ever seen.

Due to the irregularity of the streets and the darkness, it was

almost impossible to find anything.3

With the three rifle companies abreast, C on the right, A

in the center, and supported by attached machi ne guns, the Battali on

advanced through the city to the southeastern sector. The Bat-

talion mortars furnished support from positions just behind the

assault companies. They were held under battalion control. None

but the first four tanks had succeeded in crossing the river and

entering the city.

Upon reaching the southeastern sector of the city, the

entire Battalion was held up by heavy small arms fire from the

high ground just outside the city to the southeast. Failure to

advance any farther during darkness indicated that a coordinated

daylight attack would have to be made in order to dislodge or

37
cJOGtroy the enemy. Plans for this attack wore made; however, at

dawn on 27 1,~arch, a heavy ground fog reduced visibility to the

extent that any type of ground operations against the enemy was

virtually impossible. It was not until 1200 on the 27th of March

that a coordinated attack with infantry and tanks reduced the

pocket. During the night 26/27 March and during the early morning

of 27 March, the 9th Armored Engineer Battalion had thrown a pon-

toon treadway bridge across the canal. This bridge permitted the

passage of the tanks which joined in the successful attack.

During the reduction of LIMBURG, 125 of the enemy were

killed, 150 wounded, and 1,800 taken prisoner .. wr casualties

were light to moderate--the exact figures for the reduction of

LHffiURG were not rec orded as such. t'The 52d Armored Infantry

Batta.lion did, however, record three officers killed in action--

two of them being company commanders. This constituted a serious

loss tc a battalion. It is interesting to note that a P-47 airplane

was taken intact and undamaged. ,,4 Company C, 52d :\.rmorcd Infantry

Battalion, did not participate in the coordinated attack on 27

March. At 0645 that day, Company C was withdrawn from the line to

form the Battalion reserve. Part of the Company was assigned the

mission of securing the bridge at DEHRN. The bridge was intact

at that time. This detachment waS withdrawn at 1230 hours when

it Was discovered that the enemy had just blown the bridge.

At 271330 March, the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion was

notified that Combat Command R would pass through the Battalion

38

zone using the pontoon bridge across the LAHN River. At the same

time, the Battalion was given the mission of clearing its zone as

soon as Combat Command R had passed. Companies Band C accomplished

the clearing mission and out posted the southern part of the sector

to the south and southeast of the city.

At 281445 March, the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion was

ordered to move to OFFHEIM upon completion of its relief by ele-

ments of the 2d infantry Division. This relief waS accomplished

at 1600,and the Battalion closed at OFFHEH~ at 1845 hours 28 March.

The reducti on of LHmtJRG was successfully completed. and this phase

of the battle was over.

With the reconstruction of the tactical phase of the opera-

ti.on completE:;, attention rm.J.st be directed to one other phase--the

liberation, treatment, and evo.cuation of the Allied Prisoners of

War found i.n three hospitals in LIHEURG. This recount is included

in this report because it is believed to be an outstanding example

of the many large and small problems that confront the commander

of an exploiting force. It is further believed to be essential

that such contingencies as are described below be considered in

planning an exploitation.

The medics sat at the rear of the column during the early
afternoon attack (26 March). Between 1600 and 1700 hours
(after taking care of one of our enlisted men who had been
shot while searching a Prisoner of War and who later died),
I went to the command post on the outskirts of the city and
was there told that a Bri ti sh Major General who was a Prisoner
of War in the hospital down the road wanted to see the medical
officer.
I didn't get to see him until after dark, but then went to

39
thu hospit~l (the new one N. of the river) and w~s greeted
most graciously (!) by the German Medical Officer in charge.
One of the Sisters guided me to the General's room and there
after confusing the dressed aide for the undressed General
we had a most delightful chat: The M.G. in his long under-
wear and I in a very dirty and unkept outfit considering its
one day's use. Major General Fortune was most informative.
He had been a Prisoner of War since 1940. Being the ranking
British P.W. he had been allowed liberties of the German
Prisons and hospitals and had been very influential in keeping
things "in order." He said there were two hospitals on the
other side of the river, in the city proper, which had many
Allied P.W.'s. One, the larger of the two, was not in such
bad shape. The smaller, however, he said we shoulrl see first,
for there the conditions were deplorable. We spent a most
pleasant hour as he gave me the information and when I left
full arrangements were made for housing our Hedics in the
hospital. The Jerry and his "Sisters" really dashed out to
give us service, clearing out a couple of rooms for all of us
and cur meager medical set-up and for the first night in some
time we not only slept in a hospital, but between sheets.
The following morning March 27 I went down to the river
early and run across one of our Infantry officers there. Vie
poled our way across the stream in a boat (the pontoon or new
bridge being uncompleted as yet) and went into the town. Fol-
lowing the Hajor General's direction we went up the hill,
stopped in the cathedral mid the stares of the belligerent
and curious krauts, then on down toward the R.R. tracks to
the church alongside of which Was the frame barracks building
used as their hospital. As we approached the church we saw a
black haired G.I. standing in front watching us. Somewhat
surprised at seeing him (for there were none of our men there
as far as we knew) we asked him if he was a "G.I." "You're
damned right," he answered, "and are we glad to see youl"
Briefly the conditions were sad indeed. All told there
were probably only 50 to 75 in this hospital (although I
learned later there were more in the other and larger h'ospi tal
in the other part of town) but these men were in the worst
ima~in':l.ble condition. We were the first fresh "Americans
they had seen for months or years" and their expressions and
feelings were unlimited. Anybody would have thought we walked
there from Paris all alone! Many were nothing but skin and
bonesj (one later made Life Magazine and syndicated papers in
this country); all had infected wounds and or pneumonia or
on0 of its allies. Post-surgicals, freshly wounded, belly
wounds-, cachectic, pneumoniaj French, British, Italians were
all mixed together. Mainly if not entirely officers, I never
learned their rank. Part of them were huddled in the frame
building, but most and the saddest cases had been taken to the

40
basement of the church for protection frolf. ~rt; llery anJ
bombs (allied) and were bedded down on the cru.J0st of beds,
even one on the concrete mortorium slab, in the cold, dark,
damp basement. Our guide (the above mentioned dark haired
lad from Brooklyn) guided us by flashlight, with silent
Germans following us. Russians, Serbs, Italians, Amcrico.ns,
British, etc., officers and enlisted men alike were there in
this basement. Tears of joy were plentiful. I walked from
room to rOOm utterly stun~ed for it was my first contact with
such conditions. In ooe room perhaps 10 by 10 where the men
were more numerous than the cubic feet, I hailed them asking
if there were any Americans. A loud chorus of "Hey Joe."
"Any.from the 9th Armored?" I asked. A weak answer from the
corner, "Here, sir!" I walked over there to shine my light
in the face of a bearded unrecognizable creature. He asked
me. what outfit I was with and when I told him he called me by
name. Hy heart welled up in my throat, and I could say nothing
sensible, for here WaS a chap I couldn't name who remembered
me from early Sblte days and had been "lost" in the Bulge. I
saw him several times later that day and each time he spoke to
me and thanked me as if I had anything to do with it.
But these men had been taken from their ward, the barracks
outside, which was nothing but a vermine infested building,
stacked with straw ticks, many of which were split spilling
their dirty contents allover the floor. Those that had been
able to walk got their meals and had to clean the place. The
others were dependent upoo tho able, and our guide, to feed
them. The bed-rid~en were just out of luck, unless somebody
happened to thin..l( of them. And the one that thought of them
the most waS Terry (wish I knew his last name) the dark
haired Brooklyn lad, a Battalion aid man who had been cap-
tured uninjured at Metz. He had really done a fine job.
All the men and officers fairly loved him for his heart was
true. He was more than an orderly, apparently, for he gave
the men spirit and life which they said they would have lost
long ago but for him. He was telling me about it: "You know,
Captai n," he said, "I'm a Jew, and when I was co.ptured I told
them that. The guard warned me and said I should say I was
Protestant. I did and was glad, for they treated me better.
I speak Jewish," and he flirted his head, "yet these people
think I have learned a lot of German in the past 6 months.
Really what I am speaking to them is Jewish!" He was wounded
in our air attacks and (is) going back to have some shrapnel
removed from his leg. He said the Germans paid him 41 Marks
a month ($4.00)--which he used as toilet paper. Terry
practically ran the hospital--it was Terry this and Terry
that espeCially as we spent the remainder of the day evacuating
these men across the newly constructed bridge. Even the Jerry
hospital personnel came to our Peep to say good-bye as we

41
 pulled out behind the last ambulunce to return to "our side"
of the river.
Perhaps I have gone into too nuch detail here. Colonel,
but this was a most impressive incident to me. and may be of
some value to you. These men were all evaouated by noon to
our Medical tin which had moved up in the early morning and
were set up in the hosp~tal where we had slept (incidentally
where the photographs were t~ken, while we were busy evacuat-
ing the ~roup) and all was under good control. Aside from
Maj. Gen. Fortune in the original and best hospital. I have
a few names of those we tOQk out--officers who were -of great
service to us in this and were most interested in getting
some type of commendation for Terry: Capt. John E. Bridgman.
Maj. Richard Kirby. Capt. Paul Van Dugucht. 5

Evaluation

Evaluation of a specific battle or phase of a campaign is

a particularly treacherous undertaking--especially when the evalua-

tion is made five years after the action and when the units were

s·o small that histories are incomplete or non-existent. Completely

unrecorded in all but dimming memory are the many variables that

influence the commander's decision--awareness of the battlefield,

condition of troops and units, condition and completeness of equip-

ment t and pressure from higher headquarters. In many historical

records of small unit.s~ such important considerations o.s weather

. and terrain are completely unmentioned. All of the above omis-

sions are pertinent to the re.duction of LIMEURG with the exception

of one cryptic statement conc.crning the ,presence of ground fog on

the morning of 27 ~ar?h.

From the information availo.ble to this committee. it is

believed that the reduction of LU::BURG wa.s not a classic example

of the proper reduction of 0. strong PQint impeding an exploiting

42
force. In arriving at the above conclusion', th(-~ follovdnl!, pertinent

factors were consid6red:

1. Combat Command B was ordered to march on LIMBURG and to

reduce that strongpoint.

2. !n the advance on LIMBURG, the Combat Command B column

became separated. A gap of approximately ten miles between elements

of Combat Command 13 resulted. (This event was reported in the pre-

ceding; chn.ph:r.)

3. LIMBURG hud long bvon recognized as a key cOIllIJllnication

center in the zone.

4. Combat Command B entered LIMBURG with a tank hea.vy team

leading in spite of the fact that a sizeable river had to be cros-

sed--probably forced and a sizeable city had to be reduced--pro-

bably by building-to-building reduction.

5. Supporting engineers and supporting weapons were not

well forflard in the column.

6. An unreconnoitered night attack was made.

7. The night attack was piecemec.l and without detailed

pl3.nning.

8. LIMBURG was reduced in less than 24 hours.

It is believed that individual discussion of each of the

above factors would result in placing ~ false value on them. This

is due to the interrelation of all factors in combat. Again, from

the inform~tion av::.ilable I Combat Command B was ordered to advance

on LIMBURG and to reduce that city as a strongpoint impeding an

43
exploiting force. This mission was begun on 26 N.nrch. A tank

heavy team, the .l9th Medium Tank Battalion with Company A_ 52d

Armored Infantry Ba.tta.lion attached, led this phase. This em-

ployment was in ~trict adherence to the present doctrine of the

employment of armor in the exploitation a.s outlined in Field

Manuat 17-~OO, As described in the preceding chapter, the

Combat COlJlIll!lnd B column became separated when it turned off the

AUTOBAHN to avoid a blwln bridge. This separation could only

hQve been due to (1) incomplete orders or a lack of orders;

(2) too much interval in the column; (3) improper route marking;

or (4) a combination of the above three. Vihutever the cause, the

result was a ten-mile gap in the Combat Command B column. This

gap" in all probability, had considerable influence in the com-

mander's use of troops for the attack of LIMBURG.

The city of LIMBURG had early been recognized as a key

communication center in this sector of Germany. This alone

should have been adequate evidence that the city would be

defended to the maxinum possible to include the blONing of

bridges over the LAHN River, or ut least their preparation for

demoli tion.

Thus, faced with the possibility of having to force a

river crossing, coupled with the possible task of a building-to-

building reduction of a si2eable town, it is believed that Combat

Command B should have entered LIMBURG with an infantry-heavy team

or at the very l~ast a balanced tank~infantry team. It is further

believed that with armored infantry in the lead in this case,

there was a chance, probably a very good chance, that r.ombat

Command B could ha"e seized the bridge and thus have prevented

its demolition. Four tanks and much time would have been saved~

With tanks in the lead, there was little or no chance of pre-

venting the demolition of the bridge. One could only trust to

luck that it had not been mined.

In a similar manner J it is believed that hud a coordinated

attack been made with the 52d Armored Infantry Battulion, heavily

supported by tanks and artillery, LIMBURG could and probably would

hav8 been reduced during the £~ternoon or early evening of 26

March. In this event, 12 to 18 hours could have been saved, in

addition to the risk of a night attack in an unrecnnnoitered city.

As a result of some o~ all of the above-mentioned factors

and contingencies, Combat Co~~nd B assigned the reduction of the

city of LIMBURG to the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion at 261730

March 1945. This battalion was ordered to continue its efforts

to reduce the city throughout the night 26/27 March. At the late

hour of 1730 and during the month of March, there was time for

little or no daylight reconnuissance by the Battalion less Company

C. (Attention is invited to the fact that Com~any C arrived at

LIMBURG earlier with the 19th Medium Tank Battalion und crossed

into the city via the blown railroad bridge".) In addition to the

lack of reconnaissance, the "Battalion was committed piecemeal to

the attack. Company C was committed shortly after it arrived

45

with the 19th Tank Battalion, while Companies A and B were com-

mitted after 1730 hours. Objectives assigned, if any, were not

recorded, nor were boundaries, zonElS of action. or support. Like-

wise. the progress made by the assault companies throogh the night

was not recorded. The After-Aotion Report of the 52d Armored

Infantry Battalion doos indicutc. however. that the reduotion was

not accomplished until after 271200 March, .when a coordinated

attack by the Battalion. supported by tanks and artillery. suc-

ceeded in destroying the enemy on the high ground to tho southeast

of tho city. I'n view of whut is known now. the gains :~chieved

through the night a.ttack were not worth the calculated risk taken •

••. It was shown conclusively on two occasions during this

period that a unit ordered to make a night attack mst be
allowed ample time for daylight reconnaissance. for-detailed
pbnning. and for a thorrugh briefing of offioers and en-
listed men. To neglect these things is to court failure.
A properly coordinated and closely supervised Infantry-
Tank-Artillery team proved, during this period, to be the
combination necessary to gain victory.6

To the credit of Combat Command B must be added its aggres-

siveness ~nd perseverance. LIMBURG was reduced in less than 24

hoors and in a very workmanlike manner.

The follO\'ring: principles in the employment of armor in the

exploitation were adhered to:

1. A t'1nk-heavy team led the exploitation.

2. The strong point of LIMBURG. impeding the exploiting

force, w~s reduced quickly.

3. The bridge at LIMBURG was seized promptly.

46
 The followi ng principle s wer(;; violuted:

1. Infc.ntry was not used to perform the following tasks,

usually consi~ered infantry tasks:

a. Leading a river crossing thnt may have to be

forced.

b. The reduction of a city.

2. A piecemeal attack waS made.

3. A dangerous and unnecessary night uttack waS made wi th

little planning and little or no reconnaissance.

4. Although the bridge at LI~~RG waS seized, it was not

examined for demolition.

NOTES FOR CBAPTER 5

lAfter~Action Report, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion,

March 1945, p 6.

2personnl Interview, Captain J. W. ~(itchell, Commander,

Headquarters Company, 52d Armored Infantry Battalion.

40p cit~ After-Action Report, pp 6 and 7.

5Letter, Dr. R. W. Pomeroy" former Battalion Surgeon,

52d Armored Infantry Bnttalion.

60p cit, After-Action Report, Section IV, Battalion

Commander's Comments.

47

 CHAPTER 6

LIMBURG TO W.ARBURG

27 March - 2 Apri 1 1945

With the obstacle of the LAHN River behind, the elements

of the 9th ~rmored Division were again free to continue their

race ucross Germany. During this period (27 March - 2 April 1945)

the task organization of the 9th Armored Division was as follows:

9th Armored Division

Major General John W. Leonard

Combat Command A - Brigadier General Thomas L. Harrold

60th Armored Infantry Battalion (attached Company B, 14th

Tank Battalion, one platoon, Company A, 9th Armored
Engineer Battalion)
14th Tank Battalion (-) (+ attached one platoon Company A,
9th Armored Engineer Battalion. Company C, 656th Tank
Destroyer Battalion)
2d Battalion,. 38th Infantry Regiment (+ Company C, 14th
Tank Battalion and one platoon. Company A. 9th Armored
Engineer Battalion)
Company C. 89th CavC'.lry Reconnaissance Squa..on (+ one
platoon, Company E. and one platoon, Company F, 89th
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron)
Company A (-) 9th Armored Engineer Battalion
Company B. 2d Medical Battalion
3d Armored Field Artillery Battalion
Battery A, 482d Antiaircraft Battalion
Company C" 131st Ordnance Mnintenance Battalion

Combat COI'IUnand 'B- Colonol Harry W. Johnson

J

52d Armored Infantry Battalion

19th Tank Battalion
16th Armored Field Artillery Battalion
Company C, 9th Armored Engineer Battalion
Company A. 2:1 Medical Battalion
Company A, 131st Ordnance Maintenance Battalion
Battery 13, D• 482d Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion (SP)
Company A, 656th Tank Destroyer Battalion (SP)

48

 Resorve Commund - Lieutenant Colonel Churles Wesner

, (

27th Armored Infantry Battalion

2d Tank Battalion
3d Battalion. 38th Infantry Regiment
Company C. 9th Armored Engineer Battalion
Battery B. 482d Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons
Battalion (SP)
73d Armored Field Artillery Battalion
89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron ( - A, C, D, and two
platoons E and F).
Company C, 2d Medical Battalion
Company C, 656th Tank Destroyer Battalion
Company B, 13lst Ordnance Maintenance Battalion l

Once the LAHN River had been crossed, the Division axis of

advance w~s changed from east to north. The scattered elements of

the Division were ordered to assemble in the vicinity of .\MENAU.

All elements of the Division were thus assembled by 28 March 1945. 2

In the assembly area at AMENAU, one order was issued direct-

ing the Division to attack in its zone with two combat commands

abreast, Combat Command A on the right. Combat Command A was to

seize GIESSIDf •. Shortly after receipt of the above orders, elements

of the Division were ordered to change their objectives; now ele-

ments of the Division would go into a march bivouac in the vicinity

of GIESSEN and be prepared on order to seiz.e or construct crossings

over the EDER River in zone and continue the advance.

The attack was launched at 290600 March,. with an east-west

road through AMENAU as the line of departure. The order of march

for Combst Command A for this advance was as follows:

14th Tank Battalion

Company C, 89th Reconnaissance Squadron (to cross line
of departur6 behind 14th Tank Battalion and move to
east to protect Combat Command A right flank)

49
 Headquarters and Headquarters Comb3.t Commr.tnd A to follow
14th Tank Battalion
Company A_ 9th Armored Engineer Battalion
3d Armored Field Artillery Battalion
2d Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment
60th Armored Infantry Battalion
Battery A, 482d Antiuircro.ft AutomCltic Weapons
Battalion (SP)
Company B. 2d Medical Battalion
Combat Command A Trains
. ~
Company B, 656th Tank Destroyer Battal~on~

The order of march of Combat Command B and the Reserve

Command for this advance is not recorded. Combat Command B was

to adv~nce on the left of Combat Command A. while the Reserve

Command was to advance on the Combat Command A axis; Combat Com-

mand B departed WEILBURG at 290800 March and rrt 1200 hours was

just short of GIES3EN. In the city, Combat Command P found ele-

ments of the 7th ArGored Division moving north on the only road. 4

These conflicting plans resulted in no movement for Combat Command

B until after 291400 March. 5 Once the 7th Armored Division was

out of the way, Combat Command B lost no time in its advance. The

road net in the zone wc.s very poor. All roads had been used ex-

tensively by the heavy 'Jerman vehicles in their retreat. 6 As a

general rule, secondary roads were the best.

AS to resistance from the enemy, suffice it to srry that

during 11 hours of the period, Combat Command A advanced 70.8 miles •

.....hile Combat Command B advanced 67 miles in 16 hours. There was

sporudic fire at points a19ng the advance, but nothing short of

major resistance was allovved to slow the columns.

At the end of the period 29 March, Combat Command A was

50
at KIRTOHF, Combat Comm2-nd Bat SCHNEINB1TRG, ~nd the Reserve

Command in an assembly area at ROCRELSHEIM.

On 3C March at 0600 hours, the advance continued with

Combo.t Commr-::.nd A o.nd Comba.t Command B abreast, with Combat Command

A on the right. rhe Reserve Command continued along the Comb:::.t

Command A axis. Orders for the continuation of the attack named

the WARBURG area as the final objective, with crossings over the

EDER River in the FRITZLAR-BAD WILUJ~GEN area as intermediate

· .....
ob .lec , 7
'Jl IfE;.

By 301200 March, the 19th Tank Battalion of Combat Command

B was on the high ground east of PAD WILIJUNGEN. It had located

three intact bridges over the EDER. 0'18 bridge northwest of BAD

WILIXJNGE'\J had been seized by the 7th Armored Division which had

been Qdv~ncing parallel to the 9th on the left. Early in the

afternoon of 30 March, the 19th Tank Battalion crossed the EDER

at WEGA, moved west along the river, and seized the bridge at

BERGREBL Vilhile the 52d Armored Infantry Battalion occupied BAD

WILlJJIJGEN, the 1st Battalion, 38th Infclntry Regiment, moved

through B.lill WILDUNGEN and crossed the EDER on the bridge held

by the 7th Armored Division.

On the right, the attack advancerl Combat Command A to

FRITZLAR, where it met the first organized resist~nce since the

8
crossing of the LARN. As the Combat Command A column neared

the city, the 60th Armored Infantry Batt~lion, leading the column,

discovered that the main bridge across the EDER had been blown.

51
(A sep?.rztc s ~ c t i o i iw i l l be dcvotc,.' t o t h e red~:cf,ior, of ;'?TTZI,iR
cnd t h e s e i z u r e of c r o s s i n g s ovcr t h e EDER a t t n ~ pt o i n t . )

FRI T ZLAR

Upon r e c e i p t of t h e 9 t h i~rrnored b i v i s i o n o r d e r f o r t h e

advance, Cornbet Command A i s s u e d a l e t t e r of i n s t r u c t i o n s , d a t e d

29 Mcrch 1S45, f u r t h c r a s s i g n i n g t h e i n t e r m e c l i a t e o b j e c t i v e of
Y
the EDER R i v e r c r o s s i n g s t o t h e 6 0 t h Armcred I n f a n t r y E a t t . ~ l i o n .

Tihe 60th Armorecl I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n , a l s o known a s TnSI' FORCE

COLLI?ZS, v ~ i so r g a n i z e d a s f 0 1 1 0 ~:s

6 0 t h Armored
- Infantry Battalion

L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l K . W. C o l l i n s

Company A , 6 0 t h Armored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n +
Platoon,
Company R , 1 4 t h Tank B a t t a l i o n
Company E , 1 4 t h Tank 2 a t t l l i o n ( - )
Sompany Ec, 6 0 t h ;,rmored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n
C o ~ p a n yC , 6 0 t h Armored I n f a n t r y B a t t a l i o n
H e z d q u a r t e r s and S e r v i c e C o ~ p a n y , 6 0 t h Armored I n f a n t r y
Battalion
One tat-&:, 7 3 8 t h Tank B a t t a l i o n , w i t h p u b l i c a d d r e s s
system. 1 0

Ccrcpany A, t h e l e c d company, mountcc! one p l a t o o n of i n f a n -

t r y on i t s t a n k s .

As t h e column approached FRITZLAR, and a b o u t f o u r k i l o m e t e r s

f r o m t h e c i t y , it was c o n t a c t e d by t a c t i c a l a i r . The f i g h t e r squad-

r o n reporte,? 2 l o t of' a n t i n i r c r e f t f i r e fro^ t h e c i t y . This report

was l a t e r v e r i f i e d b y t h e p r e s e n c e of 8 8 ' s .

A t TREYSA, two 2nd one-half k i l o m e t e r s f r o m t h e c i t y , a t

1320 t h e column was h e l d u p one and one-half h o u r s b y s n i p e r f i r s .

Farther on, the lead tanks fired a fow roun:ls nt [~, Getman large

calibre anti t'lnk gun.. The crew promptly surr()nJercd. AS the

column udv::l. 'lceel, Company B was ordered to le'lvo thE. column to

secure the bridge at WEG.ii five miles west of FRITZLrJL The company

WaS heid up by fire) when it did arrive at ~iEGA, Combat Comma,nd B

heid the bridge. In spite of this, the Compuny was orjereri to

remain at WEGA. It din not participate in the reduction of FRITZ-

Lill.

Compo.~ A_ speecing down the road to the airfield (time,

1530) completely surprised the enemy forces there. One plane took

off. As it became airborne, the gunner in the lead tank knocked

its tail off in one shot. He was a true sportsman in that he

waited until the pl:me soared aloft rather than shoot it on the

ground. This occurrence is a further testimonial of the flexi-

bili ty of armor.

The airfield waS secured readily. Captain John W. Schalles,

Commander of Company A, then sent a platoon to the bridge which

spanned the EDER from the field to the city proper, As the platoon

neared the br.idge. it was literally blown up in their faces. The

Germans shelled the south approach to the brid~o so heavily that

the plat,Don vms forced to retire. The fire was so intense that the

recovery of the bodj.cs of tv'lO m!:'n killed on the approach han to

be postponed until nightfall.

Pecause of artillery and small arms fire# it was impossi-

ble to ford the river, , At 1630. Colonel Collins ordered Company A

53

to consolichtc their position ,'And sfint Comp--.ny C along the riven"

to cross ov€;r another bric1ge 8ast of tho city" The COmFCl''1Y was

then to attack FRITZLAR from the northe9.st.

By dc-rk, Company C, under comIr.and of Lieutenant McCarthy,

had penetratd the northeast edge of the city. The two assaulting

platoons had lost contact and had become separated. At 0230, the

Germans counterattacked and surrounded the company.

Upon hearing heavy firing, Captain Schal1es rusheo. two

platoons acrOss the river at a wading point. These platoons

worked their way around the east side of town with the mission of

gaining contact with and relieving C!ompc.ny C.

Approximately halfway up the east side of FRITZLAR, an

enemy light tank fired pointblank into the platoons. The men

scattered, and it took one hour to reorganize the force and

resume the advance. In the meantime, the tank had retired into

the city.

The force then came under rifle fire and was pinned down.

Sch~lles and Lieutenant Parks debated whether this fire was Com.

pany CIS or the enemy's. They decided it was Compan~ CIS. This

was a correct assumption. They held up and waited for dawn.

Before daylight, a runner from McCarthy reached Schalles

for the purpose of leading him to the Company C Commann Post. The

Command Post was in a house about two blocks &way. Schalles

reached the Command Post anci stated that "je[.lrJ were strewn all

over the area.,'ill

54
 At daylight, tht two companies reorganized.

,it dawn, an intense firefight broke out back at the blown

I

bridge. i]-ern;an tanks were heard t1H.Ving out of town on the north.

The enemy resumed thoir shelling of tho bridgo and o.lso began

shellin~ the Battalion Cormnand Post.

Companies A <And C were then ordered to clear the town and

move back to the area of the airfiel'~.

The 27th Armored Infantry Battalion was ordered into

FRITZL'~ to relieve the 60th. By 1515, the relief waS complete.

At 1635, the 27th had their mortar platoon lay a fast concentration

into the city.12 This concentration convinced the inhabitants and

the defenders that they were being subjected to an artillery bar-

rage (confirmed by the burgomeister). The mortar fire blew up an

oil dump an:] drove the artillery observers from their observation

posts. The 27th cleared the town by 1230 the follaNing day. This

mortar fire eliminated the enemy's will to fight.

With FRITZLAR behincl, Combat Command A was ready on 31

March to advance with Combat Command B to the WARBURG area.

v'ihile Combat Command A went into WARBURG, Combat Command B's ob-

jecti'Te WaS OSSENDORF just to the west of WARIURG. By nightfall

cn 31 !·!:arch, both Combat CommanrJs were on their objectives. Only

light resistance served so much as to delay the aclv3.nce. Combat

Cornrnand A waS at YiARBURG, Combat B 3.t OSSENDORF, and e16ments of

the 38th Infantry were f~nned out occupying RIMBECK, NORDE, and

MENNE. All 81ements were prepared to resume the attack on 1 April.

55

The:' Res,;rve Ccmma!1d was <tssignerl the mission r)f s';cur'inr- the

Corps' right flnnk to the south as far as FRITZLAR.

On 31 March 1945~ the 9th Armored Division vms holding a

sh~,llow bri~gehead Gver the DIEI-:'EL River in the vicinity of WARBURG.

It ha.1 just completed a three-day 125-milG drive across Germany.13

In this o.r..ivunce, the Division had formed the right flank of the

~1rivG frcm the south that closed the RUHR pocket. On 31 ~~arch,

the Division was ordere~ to expand the bri~gehead to include

V,ILLEBADESSEH, PEC}~ELS!!EIY, anG BOGENTREICH. In addition, the

Division was orckrc'J to continuEl the protection of tho V Corps'

flanks (on the right to FRI TZLliR and on the left south of RUffiECK

until cont:lct with VII Corps cculd be establisheJ).14 Upon receipt

of this order, the 9th Armored Division ordE:red Combat Command A

and Combat Command P to crmtinu8 the attack 010700 April. Task

orgo.nizG.tions f0r both Comba.t Comrno.nds remainec] the sc.me. This

advancE; was completed, and the Combat Commands h:ld each outposted

their respElctive zcnes of responsibility by the night of 1 April.

11.ls G on 1 April, the Reserve Commctnd was r(;lieved in FRITZLA..'q by

elements of the l02d Cav>l.lry Grcup. In a,jdition,elements of the

69th I~fantry Division relievEd the Reserve COInrnan= of the mission

of pre,vi-Eng ri.:;ht flank security feT the Corps frcm FRITZLAR tc

OB:GRLISTENGEN. Except fur lc:cal atbcks by the enemy on 2 !l.pril,

the v{ARBURG area. WEl,S secure.

EV::llu3.tion

~Vith three noteworthy cxceptions~ the Qcticn for this

56
pt.::~ioc1 can be cOrlsolldated into an l)valuu.til-,n of' thr; rer'uction of

FRITZL·I.R. These points, aside from the FRITZLAR evu.luution, are

1. Althc"'.1f.h little opposition wus enccu:J.tered during the

rericd, the practice of having two combat teams advancing on two

parallel axes worked particularly well. Such employment permits

one cornmanr:! to continue the advance when the other is held up.

Ths crossing of the EDER River exemplified this.

2. The ordsr of march of Combat C'Jmmancl A was particularly

good ,-juring the perio'l. The :;offilTk.1.nd Group, thl, artillery, and the

8:J.ginGcrs were well forward in the column. This was in strict

accord with the principles e.s Gutliuvrl in Field IILnual 17-100 and

as taught at The :\.rmored School.

3. From the information o.vailable to this cc)mmittee, it

seoms that coordin~tion affected by V Corps left a lot to he

desired. On two occasions, either objectivos or routes of the 7th

Armored Division and the 9th {I.rmored Division were in conflict.

One conflict was tho cbjocti ve of LIL'IBURG on 26 March, and the

other w:.s t~1C use by both divisions of on8 road north from GIESSEN.

EV'lluRtion of the Reduction of Fri tzlar

The nduction of FRITZLj\.R f\.lrnishes an enlightening study

CAn the sidelights of four major cons}serations for an exploiting

force. The feu!, arE s.s follows:

1. Reductio1: of a city.

57
 2. F()rcing 8. river crossing.

3, Byp3.ssing an impe(!iment to an t;;xploi ting force.

4. Night uttuck in a city.

Upon receipt of Division orders to seize FRITZLAR anj to

secure crossings over the EDER River in the FRITZUiR area, the

r:ommundinr.; Gener~l, CombCtt Command A, orgClniz8'1 his Combat Command

w'ith an infantry heavy team in the lead. This was done because of

the infantry jobs thnt lay ahep..d: (1) the reduction of a city;

(2) the probable f(.Jrcinf~ of a river line. This was in strict

accord with the principles of the employment of armor as they are

known today.

In this case, however, the infantry failed to accomplish

its missiun in spite of the good start given it by Ccmbat ComInand

A. At the time the 60th Armured Infantry Battalion was ordered

i ate FRITZLAR, it was not known that Combat CO!l1Il1:1.nd B had already

secured bridges over the EDER to the west of FRITZL.ill in the WEGA

arCl-:. Almost from the beginning, it seems that the 60th was cJ oomed

to failure in this venture. First, 80mpany B was sent to the WEGA

area to secure a brLlge that was alrearly in the hands of Combat

Command B. In spite of this, Ccmpany B was ordered to remain in

that area rather thD.n to rejoin the Battalion. Thus, one entire

ccmpany vms lost to the Batt£',li on for the peri od. Secondly J

Company A permitted itself to be diverted from its primary mission

of seizing the bridge ever the EDER. The lucrative target of the

Liesserschmidts and the airfielc proved too alluring. Since the

58

att~ck ~n the airfield achieved c8mpletc surprise t it is reasonable

to believe that an attack en the brUge couLl have been equally

successful. Although the unit after-acti on report mc.:.kes no menticn

of artillery support. the Ccmmc.nJinf!: GGnerul, Combat Command A,

Brigc,"i0r General Thomas L. Harrold. St'ltCG that artillery was

literally pourec1 into tho city during the after!loon and night.l 5

The t~~n defenses were manned with an estimated 500 Hitler Jugend

supported by Clrtillcry Cln,1 tanks. The defenders had no intenticn

(jf qui ttinr; ,'1S lonz as they could c1eny the river cr()ssi.~g.

The 60th Armored Infantry Battalion made a night attack

in the city without detailed plB."lni ng or detfliled reconnaissance,

according to information 3.vailable. The unit after-action report

for the period does state, hswE:vur, that ccnsiderahle mD.neuver was

involved, Objectives, if designated, were not recorded. Reasons

fcr the night attack ure n0t readily apparent, a"ld it is believed

th'3.t such action is contrary to the principles as outliner] in Fiel:1

Manual 17-100 '.lnc1 as taught i~ The Armored Scheol. The outcome WQS

that Companie s ;~ and C b8cQT'lt: engrJ.ged in u firefight with each

c;thEOr. The mission of s(3curing the city and the river crossings

still had not bEOcn &cccmplisheri. From the aVD.il~ble evidence,

it is believecJ that two companies wcre net sufficient strength for

the undertrlking. If the attQ.ck were tc have been launched at all,

it should hQve bE-en em a narrc,w frent with definite but limited

cbjectives. Wide maneuvers such us tho cne executed by Cr'mpany C

are unnecessary and extremely hazardous. They ShOll 1'] be D.ve'ided.

59

tc,r: ccnfusing during darkness. In ac1 r Htion, such a rr:aneuv~r ren-

jers propE:r sllPF~·rt virtually impossible.

The less~ns to be learned from this peri'.'c1 are indicatej

belc:w:

1. The practice of advancing with two cOI'lbat cOIT:manJs

abreast works well when enemy resistance I thd rond nct, and the

terrain permit.

2. Hethods of control should be ordered by higher head-

. quurters and should be closely supervised to prevent interference

between columns.

3. A d,;..ngerous and unnecessary night attack was made.

a. Night ~ttacks require dE:tailed planning and

rec annai sSa.!1ce.

b. An 'ldequ,'lte. force mu st be used.

c. The principles of the night attack must be

adhered to.

4. U ni ts rru st not be lured from their primary missio'1s.

5. The armored divisions,. as organized, had insufficient

or~2.nic infantry. In this period, partial compens:;,tion W'lS made

by the attachncnt of the 38th Infantry Reg;iment.

NOTES FOR C-:bPTER 6

1After -Jlcti on Report, 9th Armored Di vi si on, !,:io.rch 1945,

P 12.

60
 2~~fter-,~ctiot'1 R~port, CCl!., 9th 11.rmored Division; r·:arch
1945 i P 2l.

3 Ibid , P 23.
4!1.ft8r-c~ction Report, CC1:l, 9th ll.rmorl'd Di 1Jision, F::::.rch
19<1-5, P 13.
5 b d
~, P 13.
T O

6 Ibid , P 13.

7~, P 14.

8 0p cit, eCA, p 26.

9A fter-Action Report, 60th Armored I nf:;.:ntry Buttuli oni

Farch 1945, p 32.

10Ibid, P 32.
-,-­
11Lettcr, C::..ptain John V;. Scha11es, former Commanding
Officer, Company A, 60th Armored Infc1ntry BattCtlion.

12 i ,fter-Action Report, 27th Armored Infantry Battulion,

:r,"arch 1945, p 13.

l3 0p cit, 9th Armored Division, p 26.

l5persona1 Interview with Brigadier General Thorru..1.s L.

Burrola, formerly COl1'.rnundin~ General, Cf;A, 9th Armored Division.

61

 CfIAPTCP, 7

VV'ARWJRS TO LEIPZIG

:n A p r i l 1945, t h e 9t'n Rraored D i v i s i o n t o o k p a r t i n one

more- i n p o r t e n t a c t i o n , TBE RtlCE FOR THE ELBE RIVER. The R u s s i a n

front I ~ o~n l Sy 3 0 0 m i l c s t o t h c e a s t . T i n e w2s s h o r t ; speed was

e s s ~ n t l c t l . U n i t commanders f e l t t h u i t h e y vrcre b e i n g pushed. 1

? ~ tit m ~ s bt e b o r n e i n mird t h a t n s s3on a s t h e G n i t e d S t a t e s and

Red a r m i e s vrsre t o meet, t h e Gcrman nrm'cs cou1.d b u t c o l l z p s o .

bring t h 3 rr.0nt.h cf A p r i l lS45, t h e 9 t h Armorsd Divisi-on

w a s a t t a c k i n g n i n e d a y s , d u r i z g which t i m e i t a d i ~ ~ n c otdh e V Corps

f r o n t 295 miles.' T h i s was accomplished a t a. c c s t of 650 c a s u a l -

t i e s , w h i l e 12,696 K s were c , ~ < p t u r e d .

O n 9 A p r i l , t h e D i v i s l o n received t h e V Corps' order t o

a t t a c k t o s e c u r c a b r i d g e h e z d over t h e ELBE ~ i v e r . Eut

~ the 9th

k r ~ o r s dD i v i s i o n was d e s t i n e d n e v c r t o r s 2 c h t h e ELBE, f o r i t was

o r d e r e d t o t u r n n o r t h and b l o c k t h e e x i t s of t h e c i t y of LEIPZIG

t o t h e s o u t h and e n s t .

T h i s p e r i o d m y be d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e p h a s e s :

1. K-ISSEL t o HALLE.

2. The &LA 9 e l t .

5. f l o c k i ~ gLEIPZIG.

- KASS31, t o BjLLE
1. - (5-12 i l p r i l 1945)

The t i t l e , , "8i:SSEL t o H~LLLE;" m a y be a l i s l c a t i i n g , f o r t h e s s

towns were n o t occupied by t h e 9 t h ,irrnored D i v i s i o n . However,

t h e s e a r e t h e n o s t i m p o r t a n t towns of t h e r e g i o n .

On 5 A p r i l 1945, t h e 9 t h Arrnored D i v i s i o n r e c e i v e d the: V

Corps' L e t t e r of I n s t r u c t i o n s g i v i n g t h e p l a n of a t t v c l c t o t h e

east. The 9 t h was t o be r e l i e v e d i n t h e zooe n o r t h of XARWJRG b y

t h e 1 0 4 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n and w a s t o p r e p a r e t o p a s s t h r m g h

tine 2d and 6 9 t h T n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n s and a t t a c k t o t h e e a s t on Corps

order. On 6 A p r i l , t h e Combat Cormnnds were r e l i e v e d b y elerrients

of t h e V I I Corps and w e n t i n t o assembly a r e a s . On 8 A p r i l , t h o

9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n moved t o n new assembly a r e a n e a r WiDEN e a s t

of t h e XESSA R i v e r . 5

On 9 A p r i l 1945, t h e 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n r c c e i v e d t h e V

Corps' o r d e r t o a t t a c k e a r l y i n t h e morning of 1 0 A p r , i l , p a s s i n g

t h r o u g h t h e 2d and 6 9 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n s t o s e c u r e a b r i d g e h e a d

over t h e ELEE R i v e r , b y p a s s i n g LEIPZIG t o t h e s o u t h . 6

F o r t h i s t r e k t o t h e ELRE R i v e r , t h e 9 t h Armored D i v i s i o n

omployed t h r e e c o ~ b a tcom,ands z i b r e a s t , f r o m t h e l e f t : CCF, CCA,

and CCR. 7

The enemy opposed w i t h no major u n i t s , b u t h a s t i l y assem-

b l e d r e p l a c e m e n t u n i t s , s c h o o l t r o o p s , home guard b a t t a l i o n s ,

Volksturm-er, and many a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l c r y b a t t a l i o n s , 2nd

b l o c k e d t h e approach of t h e 9 t h D i v i s i o n . There w a s no e ~ r i d e n c e

of c o n t r o l b y h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s . 8

A slirnpsc, would show t h a t i n i t i a l l y t h o Combat Commsnds

went s t r e n n i n g down t h e highways. The we:l+,her was c o o l and c l e 3 r

w i t h o n l y a n o c c a s i o n a l s p r i n g shower; ~ u w
d ~ i sno problern; and
d u s t carl.ed above t h e column^.^ The 1:100,000 maps wer:; being

u s a d , and t h o s e were i n s h o r t supply.1c Psychologicnl l a r f a r e

r n ~ n t e dloud s p e a k e r s i n a tank of t h e 1 4 t h Tunk Z a t t n l i o n and

.I1
w c r e s u c c e s s f u l i n t a l k i n g some of t h e towns i ~ t os u r r e n d e r i n g .

For t h e n o n t h of A p r i l 1945, t h e 1 9 t h Tnnk F a t t a l i o n u s e d 450,'000

r o u n d s of c a l i b e r 3 0 ammunition, due t o t h e r a p i d a d ~ a i ? c eand t h e

e x t e n s i v e u s e of r e c o n n a i s s a n c e b y f i r e . 12

No one was e l l o w e d t i m e f o r r e c o n n a i s s a n c e . They were

b e i n g pushed t o o h::rd f r o = t h s renr.13 The q u e s t i o n i n s of c i v i l i a n s

a s t o whtlt l a y ahead hnd t o be s t o p p e d , f o r it slowed down t h e

column t o o m c h . 1 4 Tho ;;ir Corps f l u s h e d t h e r o a d s ~ h e o dof t h e

columns and allowed a l m o s t ctn u n i n t e r r u p t e d 2dvancs b c t w e e n t h e

c i t i e s o r v i l l a g e s . l5 A p r o d y on t h e mine-warnir,g s i g n s c a r l i e r

s e e n i n NORIkibDY appeared - "20,J)S CLEiLEIED OF i<FU..TS T O TTTE DITCXES

Small i s c l a t e d u n i t s f o u g h t f u r i c u s l y , b u t t h e v i l l a g e s

surrendcrrd I n t h e r o o d s n o r t h c i s t of SCTERB318G, 2.p-

p r o x i n a t e l y 100 H i t l ~ rY cuth were e n c o u n t e r e d . They w e r e w e l l

du? i.1 a n d 5rned u r l t h s m l l I r m s , r a c h i n e hwns, "P:inzerfaust," and

m o r t ~ r s . These young t r o o p s picre f a n a t i c i n t h e i r d c ; f t n s s of t h e

woods and would l o t surrender s a s i l y . I t w a s n t , c e s s a r y t o st;;ld

t h e advancc ~ ~ 3 irn tdo t h e woods t o k i l l t h e younr enemy o r b r i n g

them a u t a s Fds. 1 8

Thc 6 0 t h iLrnored I n f a n t r y E a t t z l i c n r;?s fo l l m i n r t h e 3d

krrnorcd F i e l d A r t i l l e r y R a t t z l i o n i n t h e CC;! c c l u ~ n . About t h o

~ i d d l eof t h e n f t c r n o o n , T.'LSK FOXCE E!!JGET:,N, l e - d i n ? the CC!;i

column, met s t i f f enemy r e s i s t a n c e a t EEELEBEN. iiithout hssita-

t i o n , G e n e r a l IIarr o l d ( t h e n c o l o n e l ) , C onibat Commander, ordered

TASK FOACE COLLI'TS t o d o u b l e t h e column t o TOBA; and t h e r e , i n d e -

pondcnt of t h e r e m a i n d e r of CCA, t o b y p a s s t h e r e s i s t a n c e .I9 The

A i r Corps and t h e a r t i l l e r y worked over t h e town f o r t h r e e and one-

h n l f h o u r s ; t h e n TASK FORCE ENGEFUiX noved on t h r o u g h t h e r u i n s . 2 0

I n U U C H A , t h e Rurgomeister s u r r e n d e r e d t h e town t o t h e

5 t h Armored v e h i c l e s a s t h e y w e n t t h r o u g h t h e town. 2 u t once t h e y

had p a s s e d , t h e w h i t e f l a g s w e r e t a k e n dmin. Then t h e American

f i g h t e r - b o m b e r s a t t a c k e d t h e town. The w h i t e f l a g s popped o u t t h e

windows once more. The t m n s f o l k b e a t u p t h e h r g o m e i s t e r f o r

s p o i l i n g t h e i r town. 2 1

T h i s r a p i d advance, h m e v e r , was d i f f i c u l t t o m a i n t a i n .

A f t e r s e v e r a l m i l e s of good p r o g r e s s a t h i g h s p e e d , n sudden b u r s t

of a r t i l l e r y f i r e would cause t h e t r o o p s t o s e e k s h e l t e r . I t was

h a r d t o g e t them t o u n d e r s t a n d t h a t s a f e t y l a y i n moving ahead. 22

Most o f t h e r e s i s t a n c e w;?.s met i n t h e v i l l a g e o u t s k i r t s .

An armored i n f s n t r y c o n ~ a n d e rr e l a t e s t h a t t h e y would a t t a c k w i t h

a r i f l e p l a t o o n , . w i t h t a n k s c o v e r i n g by f i r e . I f t h e f i r s t platoon

were h e l d up, t h e y would s h o o t a second p l a t o o n around one f l a n k

o r t h e o t h e r . When t h e e n v e l o p i n g u n i t g o t t h e f i g h t b u i l t u p t o

where t h e enemy became alarmed,. t h e f i r s t p l a t o o n would " r u s h t f t h e

v i l l a g e , and t h e r e s i s t a n c e would c e a s e . 2 3

On 1 2 A p r i l 1945, t h e o r d e r was. r e c e i v e d a t CCA t o "keep

g o i n g njL&htand day t o t h e ELRE. CC.4 wris rit t h e c d ~ eof

WEISQENFELS, tine o n l y h o t s p o t t h e y had e n c o u n t e r e d t h u s f a r i n

t h i s move. -
The enemy,. e l e m e n t s of t h e 2 6 t h and 1 6 6 t h D i v i s i o n s ,

t r a i n i n g b a t t a l i o n s , H i t l e r Y o u t n , Volksturmer , and a n t i a i r c r a f t
.

25,26
b u t t n l i o n s , numbered f r o m 1 6 , 0 0 0 t o 18,000. Farther t o t h e

s o u t h , CCH had c a p t u r e d a b r i d g e a c r o s s the'ShkLE R i v e r i n t h e

v i c i n i t y of MAGDEBERG. So CCii and B w e r e o r d e r e d t o s i d e s l i p t o

t h e s o u t h i n t o t h e CCR a r e a . CCB h e l d a l o n g t h e SMLE R i v e r , w h i l e

e l c m e n t s of t h e 6 9 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n c l e a n e d o u t FiEISSENFELS.

CCA y s h e d on t o t h e e a s t . 27

Going n i g h t and d a y proved t o be d i f f i c u l t . 28 The 2d Tank

B a t t a l i o n p u l l e d i n t o t h e town cf TJDCHEiUT a t 1830 h w r s and moved

cut i n rt n i g h t a t t a c k at 2220 h o u r s 12 A p r i l 1945.. The n i g h t was

v e r y d a r k and p r o g r e s s \vas slow; r e c o n n a i s s ~ n c e e l e m e n t s had d i f f i -

c u l t y s t a y i n g on t h e r o u t s of march. The column b r o k e t h r e e t i m c s

b e c a u s e of l o s s of c o n t a c t . A t 0530 h o u r s 13 A p r i l , a f t e r moving

o n l y s e v e n m i l e s a l l n i g h t , t h e r e c o n r a n i n t o enemy i n t h e tawn

of ZhITHENWJRG. The l e a d i n g e l e m e n t s b e g a n t o draw f i r e from s m a l l

arrris, "Panzerf a u s t ," and 88-mm a s d a y l i g h t approached. Yy dawn, t h e

e n t i r e t a s k f o r c e w s s u n d e r i n t e n s e 88-mm f i r e . 2 9

The H i s t o r y of t h e 9 t h Armwed D i v i s i o n , w r i t t e n a s a n

a f t e r - a c t i o n r e p o r t , comments: " A t t a c k by a l l combat commands on

t h e l o t h , l l t ' n , .and 1 2 t h of A p r i l a g a i n s t moderate t o h e a v y r e s i s -

t a n c e i n t h e n o r t h and l i g h t i n t h e s c u t h . "
 2. The AAA B e l t (13-14 A p r i l 1945) --
B e s i d e s f u r n i s h i n g a s t r o n g d e f e n s e f o r LEIPZIG, t h e a n t i -

a i r c r a f t b a t t e r i e s s e r v e d a s a p a r t of t h e l a r g e o u t e r r i n g of

a n t i a i r c r a f t d e f e n s e f o r BERLIN i t s e l f . Some of t h e p o s i t i o n s i n -

cluded 1 8 t o 36 guns i n one g e n e r a l l o c a t i o n . Commanding l e v e l ,

open ground, t h e y r a i n e d f l a k on t h e h e a d s of t h e a t t a c k i n g Ameri-

c a n t r o o p s a t p o i n t b l a n k range.30 Because t h e y extended a c r o s s t h e

whole V Corps f r o n t , and b e c a u s e of t h e d e p t h of t h e b e l t , it was

n o t p o s s i b l e t o b y p a s s them. LEIPZIG was e e n e r s l l y known t o con-

t a i n one of t h e h e a v i e s t f l a k c o n c e n t r a t i o n s i n Germany, b u t "our

f o r c e s were unaware of t h e s e d e f e n s e s u n t i l t h e y were w e l l w i t h i n

t h e b e l t on 1 3 A p r i l 45. . .Urgent c a l l s t o Higher H e a d q u a r t e r s

y i e l d e d f a i r l y complete i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e s e i n s t a l l a t i o n s

on 15 A p r i l 4 5 . ~ ~ ~

Because of t h e v a s t f l a t , open t e r r a i n n o r t h of H A I N C H E N ,

t h e gun p o s i t i o n s had a l e v e l c l e a r f i e l d of f i r e f o r hundreds of

yards i n a l l directions. The t h r e e b a t t e r i e s of 12 88-mm guns

e a c h had such w e l l dug-in p o s i t i o n s t h a t a l l t h e a r t i l l e r y and

d i r e c t f i r e h3d l i t t l e e f f e c t . The guns w i t h i n e a c h b a t t e r y were

placed t o g i v e a l l - a r o u n d p r o t e c t i o n f o r t h e p o s i t i o n . The t h r e e

b a t t e r i e s were a p p r o x i m a t e l y 150 y a r d s a p a r t . The f i r e of t h e

88-m gun was supplemented b y t h a t of a few 40-mm and 20-mm f l a k

guns w i t h i n t h e p o s i t i o n s . These guns c m l d l a y a b e l t of f i r e

around t h e combined p o s i t j o n s which made i t s u i c i d a l t o a t t e m p t

a dismounted a t t a c k . 32
 r::omr_ ny D, lStll Tunk Eatt; lion, lost seven tanks, with the

company CO and one other officer being wounded. As they came over

the slope in front of SCHOTTERY, they were met with heavy direct

fir from 88's nd 120-mm guns. Some of the guns were as close as

3
200 YClrds. 3 On this flat ground, it waS necessary to adopt "naval"

cV::1sivc tactics. Moving to right or left after a few rounds of

llrtillery came in prevented the uncunny accuracy of the antiaircraft

guns from really telling. The fire was from flak guns using time

fuses to burst over the column. Eight 88·mm and 120-mm guns in

concrete-covered positions were so cleverly camouflaged that the

attacking tanks and i nfuntry on the tanks never Saw them. They

34
suffered heavy casualties.

But by attacking after darkness, the 9th Armored Division

"5
w s able to advance. The observation of the Germans was curtailed.v

Another method of advancing was to surround the position und then

send in Ct committee of civilians to convince the di8.hards that the

36
game waS up.

3. Blocking LEIPZIG ( 15-21 April 1945)

On 14 April 1945, the 9th Armored Division sont word to

.'3.11 combat commands that the mission was no longer to reach the

ELBE River, but to take positions along the 1 LDE River and to

37
block the roads from LEIPZIG to the south and east. No diffi-

culty was experienced in capturing large quantities of PWs and

vehicles. "Hine times out of ten we would actually ambush them

and lower the boom before they knew they were in trouble. ,,38·

68
 Gn., l,I2G Dr;ilTic\ndcr knocked ou t a complete convoy of 23

German truc k s and light a r mor e d vehicles in less than 30 minUtBs.

e pi c ke d off tho first two or three and the last few I then

plustercd the whoh; column.39 A i?:r oup of fifty soldiers tried to

pass through the Compnny B outposts: "6 killGd. 3 wounded, and

twe nty ni ne PIi' s. ,,40

The battle around LE IPZ I G was a crazy one, The infantry

was still fighting in l ar g e , towns 35 miles west of the MJLDE River

while CCR had ['. six-mile front along the NULDE River 20 miles

south of LEIPZIG. The urcCl. bet\'Veen waS "no man's lc,nd." Roads

b8ing used by armored supply columns were dangerous for individual

lC 1 8S. 41
ve h·

On 17 April 1 945, CCR passed through the CCA area, swung

on to the north, and blockf:d off the last of the roads O'Jt of

LEIPZIG. The VII Corps was on its way down from the north to

42
f' . h the l'Ink -up.
lnlS

On 21 April 1945, the 9th Armored Division was assigned

to V Corps reserve. E18me lts of the 69th Infantry took over the

road blocks. It was a great disappointment to have COme so close

to a meeting with the Red Army and th8n not to be permitted to

cross the last river and march the last few mil(;s. Someone else

was to have that honor, even though the 9th Armored Division had

ear ned it. 43

69
 Conclusions

Par 100, Departm6nt of the Army Field anual 17-100, states:

" [].rmore Division in the line in the 6xploitation .• • . . the

mission may . . • require the arrival of elements of the division on

the objoctive in the quickest possible time . • • a formation of three

major commands abreast. . .when it is necessary to approach o.n ob­

jective on as wide a front as possible • • • against sporadic and weak

resi stance." The 9th Armored Division was ordered by V Corps to

adopt a formation of three combat commnnds abreast. Their rapi d

rate of advance and small number of casualties indico.te that the

resistance was weak.

Small unit commanders had to slight troop leading proce­

dures. Reconml.issance by fire: and attack from column formation

met the requirements for speed.

In the 9th Armored Division History, G-2 says, "Advance

photo coverage of the LEIPZIG Aiill belt would hCive been of ines­

timable value but was not received." War Department Field Manual

30-5, in Par 36, p 74, states: "Idlitary intelligence is of no

value unless it reaches the individuals or units concerned in time

to serve their purposes."

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7

Personal Letter, Schalles. John W., dated circa 15 Decem­

ber 1949.

2
9th Armored Division History, 1-30 April 1945, p 17.

70
 2 .• ftcr"Attion Report) 2d iit'th(l}-I&d !.kdic'11 'Bat.talion, 1-30
Apr il 194 5 I P 12,

4
History of OPNS in ETO, V Corp s, 6 January 1942 - 9 Ma y
1945, p 424.

5
9th ilrmorcd Division History, 1 ... 30 April 1945, p 13.

6 , P 14.

7; fter-.il.ction Report, 2d Tank Battalion, 1-30 April 1945,

P 3.

8
9th Armored Division History, 1 ... 30 April 1945, P 19.

g
After-Action Report 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron
Pbchanized, 1-30 April 1945, p 36.

10il.fter-Action Report, 2d " rmored Medic'-J.l Battalion, 1-30

April 1945, p 6.

l1After-Action Report, 14th Tank Battalion, 1-30 April 1945,

P 6.

12
"The Training and r:ombat History of CompJ.ny D, 19th Tank
Battalion, May 43 - July 45," Captain E. A. Terrell, Jr., p 64.

13
persona1 Lettor, Sche.l1es, John W., circa 15 December 1949.

14
" fter-Action Report, 2 th Armored Infantry Battalion,
7
1-30 April 1945 P 15.

15
, P 13.

16
personal Letter, Taylor, Major George I., 9 December 1949.

1
7History of OPNS in ETO, V Corps, 6 January 1942 - 9 May
1945, p 426.

18
After-Action Report, 60th Armored Infantry Battalion,
1-30 April 1945, P 4.

19
Ibid, P 4.

20After-Action Report, 14th Tank Battalion, 1-30 April

19L 5, P 5.

21History of OPNS in ETO, V Corps, 6 Jaruary 1942 - 9 Mny

1945 P 426.

71
 22:.ftnr-il.ction Report, 27th "rJ11ored Info.ntr:,r Butt:dion,
1-30 April 19· 5, p 15.

23
personal Letter, Schal1es, John W., circa 15 December 1949.
24personal Letter, Taylor, Major George 1., 9 December 1949.

25 Ibid.

26Aftcr-A ction Report, 27th Armored Infantry Battalion,

1-30 Ar--ri1 1945, p 12.
27 9th Armored Division History, 1-30 pril 1945, p 14.
28,\.ftor-Action Report, 27th l\.rmored Infantry Battalion,
1-30 Lpril 19/ 5, p 12.

29After -i\.ction Report, 2d Tank Battalion, 1-30 :.pril 1945,

P 5.

30History of OPNS in ETO, 6 January 1942 - 9 May 1945, p 426.

319th il.rmorE;d Division History, 1-3 0 l pril 1945, p 19.

32
After-Action Report, 60th Armored Infantry Battalion,
1 -30 April 19·15, p 7.
33
After-Action Report, 19th Tank Battalion, 1-30 April
1945. P 9.
34
"The Training and Combat History of Company D, 19th Tank
Eattalion, May 43 - July 45," Captain E. fl.. Terrell, Jr., p 72.
35History of OPNS in ETO, V Corps, 6 January 1942 - 9 May
1945, p 42 8.
36i\.fter-Action Report, 60th Armored Infantry Battalion,
1-30 April 1945 , p 7.
37 9th Armored Division History, 1-30 April 19 5, p 14.
4
3BPerso al Letter, \ eeler, Captain John P. Jr., 9 Decem­
ber 1949.
39
Ibid•

40 After -Action Report. 19th Tank Battalion, 1-30 "i.pril 1945,

P 11.

72
 1;1H:istory of OPNS in ETO, V Corps (3 January 1942 ... 9 1hy
1945, P 430.

429th Atmored Division History 1-30 April 1945) p 14.

43persona1 Lotter, Taylor, Major George I. circa 15 Decem­

ber 1949.

73
 CT-LPTER 8

IN RETROSPECT

General Clarence L. Huebner's verbal instructions were,

":"-"ove fast and let me know where you ;).rc."

The 9th moved so fast thJ.t in every letter received from

company grade officers, their only complaint was, "',rie were pu shed

too hard." After the turn to the east at BENDORF, the 9th trav81­

led 628 miles in 21 days. Eight of these days were spe

' nt at WAR­

BURG awaiting orders. The exploitation is characterized by at­

tacki ng night and day to thE) limit of endurance of men and

machines. The enemy was never able to mo.ss a force of any size

to block the Division.

At times all three commands att.::.cked abreo.st, each com­

mand h::wing tv,o to three columns. Resistance was either by-passed

or overrun until the objectives were attained. SE)condo.ry ro&ds

and even tro.ils were used to by-pass. Engineers and artillery

were well fonmrd in the columns. If one command was held up,

the others sped on, thus causing resistance to collapse. Attacks

from march column with single and double envelopments were routine.

i\.dvances, such as 70 miles in 11 hours and 68 miles in 16 hours,

were commonplace. Speed was the essence.

Two deficienci(;s in the organization of the armored divi­

sion existed. One was the lack of organic liaison officers and

74
fonvllr-d observers in the , rtillGry; the second was all inudequate

strength in armored infantry. Both deficiencies have been cor­

rected in the present tables of orgQnization, in th t each battalion

of 105-mm howitzers now has three liaison officers per battalion

and three forward observers per battery, and that the armored divi­

sion now has four armored infantry battalions.

The lack of organic liaison officers and forward observers

resulted in a serious drain on officer personnel within the artil­

lery.

Infantry were attached from infantry divisions and were

generally without transportation. The det ils of obtaining trans­

portation were time-consuming. The infantry were not tre.ined to

work with an armored division; the transportQtion obtained for

thorn consisted of cnrgo trucks, which afforded far less protection

than would armored personnel carriers. This protection for infan­

try is vital in the exploitation.

On the high level intelligence side, two interesting

examples were brought to light. In one, high level intelligence

materially aided the division; in the other, it failed comp10tely

to get vital intellihcnce down to the division. II. discussion of

these examples follows in the succeediClg paragraphs.

On the 26th of March, the Division was ordered to change

direction and drive east to secure crossings on the URN River in

the vicinity of DIEZ and LIrEEURG. As stated in Chapter 4, the

Div:l.sion had encountered stiff opposition in advancing south along

75
the RlfLJE. Brif<.ldier GE:.nerlll HarrGld s.tates tha t this order came

as a su r prise and attributed it t o hig h level in te l li g ence plan­

ni ng:. U pan cha n g i ng directLm, little or no o p p o s i ti on was en­

ce/untereo un ti l rea chi ng tht:: c·bjectives 70 mil e s to the east.. The

attack seuth and the subsequent shirt to the east c a ug ht the enemy

unaware, as he h d pl a c e d his forces to the south to block the

adva nc e along the RHINE.

The second example is almost unbelievable. The 9th Armored

did not have any k n ,)wl e dg e of the existence of the a ntiairc ra f t

defenses of LEIPZIG until the combat teams ra n i n t o t hem, bu t

these defenses wer.:; so well known in Air Corps circles that they

had :lcquired the ni c k na me of "FLJt¥ ALLEY. II They extended across

the whole Corps front and consisted of groups of 18 to 36 guns, the

distance between groups be i n g frum one-half to three miles. Briga­

dier General Harrold states that the first k n owl edge he had of the

defenses was when he saw the beams of the sear chl ig hts .

This lack of i nt ell i ge n ce necessi tated :l hurried c hange

of plans. I n s te ad of executi ng a double envelopmen t ar ound

LEIPZIG, the DivisiDn hE,d to swing deep to the scuth to e ncircle

LEIPZIG on the east. This r es ul ted in a l os s cf t im e and a further

stra i n on the a l re a d y extended supply li nes.

This comi
m ttee recommen::1s that the sc op e of this paper

would be a fruitful field for further research in small uni t

a cti o :1 s, . Su ch a study wc:uld Rntail considerable time and effort,

as letter interviews WGuld have to be augmented by considerable

76
•

c 'rr';si,, -4,n ':: v: th each i:1divirluul Ita the 2ctioh uhfolded.•

Specific, not general, questions would have to be asked. It is

out' experience that company gr ad e officers' memories" even after

five yeo.rs, arc quito clear on the details of the small unit
,

actions in which the y participated.

Our g e nera l conclusion is that the 9th Armored exploi ted

the breakout from tho REMAGEN Bridgehead to the fullest, and that

this exploitation waS exem91ified by SPEED, FLEXIBILITY, and SHOCK

ACTI ON.

77
 APPENDIX I

HISTORY OF THE 9TH ARMORED DIVISION

15 truly 1942 - 13 Oct ob e r 1945

The 9th Armored Division was activ'lted at FORT RILEY, K;iNSAS.

0" the 15th of July, 1942. The units comprising the Division were

the 14th Armored Regiment and the 2d Ar m ore d Rep:iment, formed from

personnel of the deactivated 14th Cavalry Regiment and the 2d Cav-

aIry Regiment.

The Divi s i o n vms commanded by It:ajor General Geoffrey Keyes

from activation tc September 194:2. From October 1942 to inactiva-

tion. the Division Commander was Major General John W. Leom.rd.

It cannot be said that the cha nge from horse to the

Armored l\' odel liT" of those day s was accomplished without

protest or anguish on the part of thE.: c''lvulry whose leve

for horses nearly uutdated the _ rmy itself. But in time

the wail died to a mere

muttering and the ever adaptable

soldier settled down to learn his new steed.l

The years frura July 1942 to July 1944 were spent in the

ardu;,us task of moldi ng a first-class fighting machine. The

Division underwent desert training at CAl!!?' YWNG. CALIFORNL , in

thE: summer of 1943. In tho fall cf 1943, the Division partici-

pated in the LruISL NA J'oTaneuvers.

On 9 Octob er 1943, the Division was r e org ani z e d . The

reg;imental cqc;anization had prev

· ad inflexible and was abandoned

in favor or scparo.te batte.lic'1s This p e rm itte d the grouping of

combined armS teams cf infantry, tanks. artillery, and s upporting

78
units to meet varying situc,tions.

On the 20th of August, the 9th boarde d the Queen Mary

and sailed for E rGLil.1T]J

\ .

Th mcnth of September was spe nt in preparation for move­

ment to FRANCE, modifying tanks, .and re viewing gunne ry training,

On 30 September, the Division boarded LST's and sailed

for UT;lli BEACH. After debarking,. the 9th went into bivc.uac at

STE Yu'LRIE VJ 1J;ONT. NORMANDY,. Demonstrations and classes w e re held

on abo.ndoned German e quipment.

The Division moved out of STE MARIE DU r-WNT on the 13th

of September [u1d clos ed at MENSCH, WXEr@aJRG, on the 18th. MENSCH

was located approximately 20 miles from the front lines.

The 9th was placed in VIII Corps reserve, .. and its first

combat mission was to prepare plans for counterattacks within the

Corps se ctor.

General Leonard obtained authority to coordimte with the

2d, Bth, and 83d Infantry Divisions to re place units of those

divisions on the front with units of the 9th on a te mporary basis.

The first units went into the line on the 23d of October. This

re lief gave the men and staffs e xperience in actuo.l ope rations in

CO!1t::.ct with the enemy in a comparr,ti vely quie t se ctor.

Yfuen thE:; Ge rmans launched their ARDENNES winter offensive,

the 9th, with no real combat experience, found itself e ngaged in

heavy fighting. The Division parti ipated in its sBve rest actions

o.t ST. VITH, ECHTERNACH, and BASTOGlJE, its units fighting in

79
wid ly separated are as .

Combat Command 3, on 16 December, moved to ST. V1TH and

engaged in six days of heavy fight ing in d efending that city; the

overall mission waS to build up a defense line along the northern

edge of the BULGE. For 36 hours, Combat Command B engaged the

62d Volkes Grenadier Division and elements of the 1st SS Panzer

Division alone without support.

Combat Command A, on the 26th. was given the m ission by

the 4th Armored Division to which it wo.s attached, of attacking

along the r03.d between NEUFCHATEAU and BASTOGNE. The purpose was

to relieve the lOlst Airborne Division which was surrounded at

BASTOGNE. On the 28th, Combo.t Commo.nd A had effected contact with

the lOlst. The seige of BLSTOGNE ended.

Combat Command R Was committed by VIII Corps to defend

BASTOGNE from the southwest. Its stand at B}.STOGNE held off the

Germans long enough to enable the lOlst to dig in for defense of

the city.

The Divi sion casualties during the ARDENNES totalled

2,265 officers and men killed, captured. or wounded in action.

After a r st period in January and February of 1945, the

Division participated in the RHINELAND offensive. The offensive

was launched on 28 Februo.ry; and on 9 .'Iarch, the 9th had smashed

across the ROER to RHEINBACH and had sent patrols into REMAGEN.

The UJDENDORFF Bridge at REMAGEN was found intact and WElS

seized by elements of the 9th Armored minutes before demolition

80.
 This seizure resulted in the est8.blishment of 8. bridge-

head from which the great encirclement of the RUHR was launched.

The 9t!l pc.rticipated in the encirclement of the RUHR, and

upon re'1.ching WARBURG. was ordered to encircle LEIPZIG and effect

0.. .iuncture with the REd I..rmy. On 19 April, this mission was accom-

plished. The war was over. IJew duties consisted of policing a

defeated Germany.

The 9th Armored Division WQS returned to the United states

in September 19 5.

The Division was inactivated at CA}W PATRICK HENRY. VIR-

GIHIII., on 13 October 194-5.

BATTLE CREDITS - ARDENNES, RHI''fBLAIID, CENTRiI.L ED ROPE •

NOTES FOR APPKIDIX I

l
captain Ldgar A. Terrell, Jr., Training and Comblt History
of Com I- 3. ny D.
' 19th T Battalion, (German:y: Unknown), p 9.

81
 COL':Jt,1ANDERS Aim PERSON"l.LITIES

Commanders

Supreme Eeanquo.rters, General of the Army,

Allied Expedi tionary Forces Dvfight D. Eisen hower

:First United Statos j,rmy General Courtney H. Hodges

V Corps ?,Iaj Gen Claren ce L. Huebner

9th nrmoreo Division Lbj Gcn John W. Leon,ud

Combat CommElnd A Col Thomas L. Harrold

Combat Comman:::; B Brig Gen Harry W. Joh son

Combat Comrr,Qnd R Lt Col C harlie Wesner

9th Armd Div Artillery Col Joseph W. West

9th ;,rm'i Di v Trai ns Col James T. Roberts

q Co, 9th Armd Div 1st Lt Charles C. C hewning

Hq Co, CCA 1st Lt Raymonct C. Colwell

Hq Co, CCB Capt James Y. Brewer

149th Armd Sig Co Capt J. Melvin Soisson

89th Cav Rcn Sq, ],1ec z Lt Col Caesar F. Fiore

9th Arm(! Engr Bn Lt Col Seurs Y. Coker

27th Armel Inf En I,'aj or Hurray Deevers

52= Arme] Inf Bn Lt Col William R. Prince

60th Armd Inf En Lt Col Kenneth V;. Collins

2d T:mk Ba tta li on Eaj or Oliver W. Schant z

14th Tank Battalion Lt Col Leonard E. Engeman

82
 Lt Col Burton V;. Kal" steter

Hq Btry. Div Arty bapt lack stockton

3'1 Armd FA Bn Lt Col George Ruhlen

16th Armd FA Bn Uajor Dwight s. Hu l l

73d l lrm ::l

' F_l. Bn Lt C ol John J. MacFarland

2d Esa En, Arm':: Lt Col Ezra L. Evans, Jr .

131st Ord rffaint Bn Lt Col Ashley L. Rice

Atb.ched Units

482 _A..AA AW Bn (SF) Lt C ol Vincent F. Lupinacci

656th TD Bn (SF) Lt Col John C. Meador

3 600th Q�,'T Trk Co 1st Lt Edwart Y. Levie

3458th QM Trk Co Capt Thomas L. Craig

Personaliti e s

1 9th Tank Battalion Capt Joseph J. Ba ratt u.

19th Tank Battalion 1st Lt Hich�l'; 1 Kruich

19th T9. '1:1< Batt.o.lior'. Cilpt Robert B. Cra yt o n

19th Tank Battalion 1st Lt John P. Wheeler

19th Tank Battalion C apt Edgar i"l. • Terrell, Jr .

19th Tank Battali on 1st Lt Edward L. Mlrphy

656th T ank Destroyer Bn C a pt David V. Cleary

656th T an k D estro yer Bn 1st Lt Wesley D. Tollett

19th T a nk Eattali on C pt John F. Sicks

19th TD.nk Battalion 2d Lt Herbert D. Caney

52c Armd Inf Bn Capt Joseph Vi. Mitchell, Jr.

83
 52] hrrrJd Inf Pn 1st Lt Edward Bills

52d ArmrJ I nf Pn 1st Lt Eugene Biondi

52d Armd Inf Rn 2d Lt Donald G Thorn

'
52'1 J1.rm\J'" I!1f En
1st Lt Billie L. Barber

52d Arwl lni' 3n 1st Lt Richard R. Ridell

52d f.rm l Inf Bn 1st Lt Charles E. Keor

52d Armd Tnf Bn 1st Lt Maurice Deal

52d f._rmd Inf En 2d Lt Erving J. Newman

52d j"rmc Inf Bn 1st Lt Norman Tucker

52cl Armd Inf Bn

Capt Samuel S. Wortham

53J _.rm,
", ._J
Inf 13n Capt Raymond 1[>/. V,'arner

52d Armd Inf Bn Capt Arthur E. Stanze

52d Armd I!1f Bn 1st Lt Willi3.m J. McCurrJy

60th .Armd Inf Bn

1st Lt Leo J. Graham

60th Armd Inf En

Capt John Vii. Hall

60th Armel Inf En

Capt John V,-. Schalles

60th Armel I n f Fn
Capt Floyd Harder

60th J rrn(l I fl.£' Bn

Capt Clifford E. Penrose

60th Armd Inf Pn

1st Lt Vincent P. McCarthy

60th Armel Ini' Bn

Capt Louis Gelling

60th Armel Inf Pn

Capt Stephen E. Gates

60th Armd Inf E n

1st Lt John R. Potter

60 th Armd Inf Bn
C apt Frank A. Cellar, Jr .

9th Armd Eng:r Bn

Capt Ellison ("
'J. Fee
9th J.rmd Engr Bn
1st Lt John O Trump
9th 'lrmd Engr Bn
Capt Sta:J.ley D. ErQuss

84
 APPEND IX III

TASY ORGANIZATIONS AND DAILY DISPOSITIONS

24 March 1945 Saturday

Cell. CCB

Hq Co, CCA Hq Co, CCB

Attached Attached
60th Armd Inf Bn 52d Armd Inf Bn
27th Armd Inf Bn
14th Tk Bn CCR
Co C, P 1 us 1 pIa tE and 1 plat F,
89th Cav Rcn Sq Mecz Attached
Co B, 9th Armd Engr Bn 19th Tk Bn
Co B, 2d Med Bn Armd 2d Tk Bn
Co A, 9th Armd Engr En
Support Co i., 2d Med Bn, Armd
Co C, 131 st Ord Mai nt Bn Support
Co A, 131st Ord r·JIai nt Bn

Div Arty
3d Armd FA En Div Trains
16th l1.rmd FI.. Bn
73d Armd FA Bn Hg Co, Div Trains
2d Med Bn, il.rmd ( - A&:B)
131 st Ord Maint Bn
Div Control
Hg Co, 9th "\.rmd Div Attached
9th il.rmd Engr B':l 3458th QM Truck Co
89th Cav Rcn Sg Mecz ( - C, 1 3600th QM· Truck Co
plat E, and 1 plat F)
482d flAil. AW Bn (SF) ( - B)
Support
149th Armd Sig Co
Btry C, 482d AAA AW
656th TD En ( - C)
Bn (SF')

The 9th Armored Division, under orders from V Corps, was attacking
south out of the REliIAGEN Bridgehead in a series of limited objective
attacks, and by evening had reached BENDORF, NIDWEID, HULLENBERG,
and NEDDERSDORF.

85

25 Jiarch 1945 Sun:h:.ty

Task organi zations changed R.S follows:

ceB CCR

Co Ii. , 9th Armd 19th Tk B n attached 19th Tk Bn relieved

Engr Bn attached Co A, 2d Med Bn Co A, 9th Ar md Engr Bn
attached relieved
Co A. l3 1st Ord Maint Co A, 2d Med Bn
Bn support r e l i ev ed
Co A, 131st Ord :laint
Bn relieved support

The Division continued its attacks, and by nightfa ll had occupied

WE1TERSBURG a nd ENGERS.

2 6 March 1945 I/!onday

CCl\. CCB
Irq Co, CCA Hq Co, CCB

Attached Attached
60th Armd I nf Bn 52d Armd Inf Bn
14th Tk Bn 19th Tk Bn
3d. rmd FL Bn 1 6 th Armd F.\ Bn
2d ['1, 38th Inf Regt (2d 1nf Div) 38th Inf Regt ( - 2d En)
r.; plus 1 pht E and 1 plat F, (2d Inf Div)
89th Cav Rcn Sq, 1,:ecz J. plus 1 plat E and 1
Co 1i, 9th Armd Engr Bn plat F, 89th Cav Rcn
Co P, 2d ;-ed Bn Sq, Eecz
Etry A, 482d AAA At;: Bn (SF) Btry D, 482-:3 AI'>.A AW
Co C, 65 6 th TD Bn (SF) Bn (SF)
Co A, 6 5 6 th TD Bn (SF)
Su ppor t Co A. 2d i1ed Bn
Co C, 131st Ord Naint Bn
Support
Co A, 1 3 1 st Ord Maint Bn
CCR
li.ttached Diy Control
27th Armd Inf En
2d Tk Pn Hq Co, 9th Armd Div
89th Cav Rcn Sq, I cz ( - A,C, 2 149th Armd Sig Co
plats E, and 2 plats F) 9th Armd Engr Bn ( - A&R)
E try B, 482d lulA AW Bn (SF) 482d ;.'U 'i AV'i En ( - B&D)
6 5 6 th TD En ( - A&C)

86
/

213 Jfarch conti'1ued

Div Arty Div Trains

Hq Btry, Div Ar ty Hq Co, Div Train s
73d Armd FA En 2d Med Bn, Armd ( - A&B)
131st Ord ¥ai nt Bn
Support
Btry A, 482d AAA AW Bn (SF) Attached
3458th QIVi Truck Co
3600th Q Truck C o

Support
Btry C, 482d .V AW
Bn (SF)

The Division attacked to seize bridgeheads over the Lii'INE River in

the vi.ci n ity of DIEZ and LH1RURG. CCB attacked toward LIMBURG a nd
by 2400 had cleared most of the town. CC; attacked toward DIEZ
and had reached the Iine of the LAH ilE by 2130. CCR marched at
262140, closing in OFFHEIM at 271150.

27 March 1945 Tue sday

CCA CCB CCR

Co C, 656t D Fn relieved Co B,9th Armd 73d Armd FA Bn
Engr Bn Co C I 2d Med Bn Armd

3d Bn, 38th Co )3, 9th Armd Engr En

lnr Regt 3d Bn, 38th Inf Reg t

Co E, 656th T D all of above relieved

Pn (SF)
all of above Su pport
relieved Co P, 131st Ord Main t
Bn

CCA captured DIEZ, CCE completed the carture of LIMBURG, and CCR
was given the mission of advancing: south etlong the AUTOBiiHN to
:-HEDER?llilI.USEN to ilwait contact with eloments of the Third "irmy.
CCR r e n ch ed its objective at 1700.

------_. ------- ------ -----

28 March 1945 Wedne sday

CCA CCE r;CR

No "'Change Co C, 9th Armd Engr Bn :,0 chanre
attached

87
28 'ttrch continued

Tho Div i s i onWQS relieved by followinp; units "nd assembled in the

vicinity o f ALTENDIEZ, LIMBURG, and VILII1I.R.

----_ ....
_--- -- ------'-

29 :':J.rch 1945 Thursday

CCA CCB
Hq (;0, ceA Hq C o, CCB

.tt:..cchcd ll.ttached
60t h arrnd Inf Bn 52d Armd Inf Bn
14th Tk Pn 19th Tk Bn
3d il.rmd FA fn 16th l\.rlJ1d Fl1. Bn
2d Bn, 38th InfRegt 38th 1nf Regt - 2d &
C plus I plut E and 1 pla t F, 3d Bns)
89th Cay Rcn Sq , Hecz A plus 1 pla t E and 1
':0 " . th ""\.rmd Engr Bn pla t 17
- , 89th Cav Ren
Co B, ?d :[,ed En Sq, Eeez

ptry A, 4-82d liiV� AW Bn (SF') Co C, 9th Armd Engr Bn

Co B, 656th TD Bn (SP) Co A, 2d I'Ied Bn

Btr y D, 482d AAA AW Pn (Sp)

Su p por t
Co ; , 656th TD Bn (Sp)
So C, l3lst Ord Muint En

S u ppo rt
Co A, l3lst Ord IEaint Bn
CCR -----------------------

Ll.ttaehed
27th il.rmd Inf Battalion Di v Trains
2d Tunk Battalion Hq Co, Div T rains
73d Armd F! Bn 2d l;ed Bn ( - ;;',13,& C Cos )
3d Bn, 3,8th Inf Regt
l3lst Ord ?r:aint Bn
89th Cuv Ren Sq J'tecz ( - A, C,

D, 2 plats E, and 2 plats F) A ttac he d

Co B, 9th l rmd Engr Bn 3458th QM Truck Co
':0 C, 2d Eed Bn 3600th QM Truck Co
Btry B, 482d AMi AW Bn (Sp) 656th TD Bn ( - .\&B )

Support Sup po rt
Co :2, l3lst Ord l, aint I'll Btry C, 482d ilAA AW En ( Sp )

Div Arty Div Control

Hq Btry, Div Arty Hq Co, 9th ,\.rmd Div
9th il.rmd Engr Bn (-A,B,c:C;
; tt2chHd 482d il.liA Av- Bn (SP)(-il.,'2,&D)
l86th F:i. En l49th Armd Sig Co
D Tr, 89th Cav Rcn Sq, I'.'Ieez

88

29 Hc.. rch tontirtUed

The 9th ;irmd Division athtcked east and northeast on the morning
of 29 Harch. The advance was rapid., and by nightfall the Division
h( d scized a bridgehead over the GLEEN River.

30 March 1945 Friday

"liTO change in task organizations.

The Division continued its attack toward WARBlJRG and reached FRITZ­
Ln.R , lJ'iEGA, und BE..t{GHEIM before closing for the night.

31 i;l1rch 1945 Saturday

No change i:.) task organizations.

The fl.tt"ck st:Lrted ::l.i"ain in the morning, and by evening the Div _sion
h d seized a small bridgoho'ld in the vicinity of WlI.RRURG. This
completed the Division's part in closing tho RUHR pocket.

1 .,pril 1945 Sunday

"TO change in tcwk org "li zatj. ons.

On 1 li.pril. the 9th llormored Division WaS holding a sm9.ll bridgehead

across the DIEl:1EL neClr V:,IRBURG. Units of the Division continued
the A.ttacks to expand the bridgehe'3.d to include WILLEBii.DESSEN,
PECKELS:fEH'!, and BOGEl'TTREICH.

2 il.prH 1945 fonday

CCA ceB CCR

1 plat Co P, 656th TD En 'ITo Change 1 plat 27th Armd Inf Bn
rf;; li0ved attachment and rel ieved a ttachment and
placed under Div control placed under Div control

Units of the Division stopped several small counterattacks by

German units attempting to break out of the RUHR pocket. Tho re­
mainder of the dCly vias spent in mopping up is olated pockets of
ro si stance.

89
3 April 1945 Tuesday

3d Armd FA Bn - relieved attachment eCA and placed in support.

16th Armd FA Bn - relieved attachment CCB and placed in support.
73d Armd F! Dn - relieved attachnent CCR and placed in support.
1st Bn, 23d lnf Regt with 38th FA Bn attached placed under
operational control of CCB.

From 3 April to 10 April the units of the 9th Armd Division per­
formed maintenance of vehicles and equipment.

10 April 1945 Tuesday

eCA CCB
Hq Co, CCA Hg Co, CeB

Attached
60th Armd Inf '"'n
14th Tk En
2d Bn, 273d Tnf plus 1 plat Tks
and 1 plat TDs (69th Tnf Div)
C plus 1 plat E and 1 plat F,
89th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz
Co A. 9th 11.rmd Engr Bn
Co B, 2d Med Bn
Co B ( - 1 plat),656th TD Bn(SF)
Attached
52d Armd Tnf Pn
3d Bn, 3,lth Inf Regt plus 1 plat TDs
19th Tk En ( - 1 plat)
A plus 1 plat E and 1 plat F,
89th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz
Co C, 9th Armd Engr Bn
Co A, 2d Med Bn
Co A ( - 1 plat), 656th TD En (SF)
Support

Support A, 131st Ord Maint Bn

Co
Co C, 131st Ord Maint Bn 16th Armd Fj Bn

3d Armd FA Pn
Div Trains
CCR Hq Div Trains
Co,
Attached 2d Med R n (- A t B &- C)
27th Armd Inf Bn 131st Ord Maint Bn
3d Fn, 273d lnf Regt plus 1 Attached
plat Tks and 1 plat TDs 3458th QM Truck Co
2d Tk En ( - 1 plat D) 3600th QN� Truck Co
B plus 1 plat E and 1 plat F, 1 plat Co D , 14th Tk En
89th Cav Rcn Sq, Mecz 1 plat Co D, 19th Tk Bn
Co B, 9th ,l.rmd Engr Bn 1 plat Co C, 656th TD Bn (SP)
r. 0 C, 2d Med Bn
Co C, ( - 1 plat) 656th TD Bn Support
C and D Btrys, 482d AAA, AW Bn(SP)
Support
Co B, 131 s t Ord Ma int Bn Div Control

73d Armd Fli Bn Hq Co, 9th Armd Div

12th Armd Gp

90
1 O ,lpri 1 1 S45 (cont; nued)

Div Arty Div Contro i (cont)

Hq Btry, Div Arty 9th Armd Engr Bn (-A,B"&C).
3d il.rmd FA En 8 9th Cav Ren Sq, Mecz ( A,
-

1 6 th ii-rmd FA Bn B, C, 3 plats E, an d 3 plats F)

73d li.rmd rA Bn 482d AliA ;""W B n (SF')
656th TD Bn ( - A, B le ss 1 plat,
iittached C less 1 plat; plus 1 plat
186th Armd FA Bn Co D, 2d Tk Bn attach e d )
987th Armd FA Bn 149th rmd Sig Co
Co B, 89th Cml Mort Bn

Su pp ort
A B Btrys, 482d J';.,.'iA AW Bn (SP)

After marching to an assembly area east of the WESSA Ri ve r on

8 April, the 9th Armd Division passed through the 2 d and 69th Inf
Divisions with the final objecti"';'e of seizing bridgeheads over the
ELBE River. By evening of the 10th, all th ree combat commands
tr aveling abreast had reach6d the initial Corps objective along
the g e n era l line Fll.IN, THULFBRA, ALLMENlLi.USEN.

11 apri l 1945 ,;ednesaay

lO changes in task or ga ni z ation .

The Div ision cont i ru e d its littack to the east, They reached a li ne
throu h RINGLEPEN', KAI "\. VURF, B, CHRi...

---�- .-------- -------�--.-

12 :lpril 1945 Thur sday

Tlla cha nges in task organization •.

The TJ i v i s ion 3.dv nced to the line of the Sil ll.LE River and the outer
..

d e f e nse s of LEIPZIG.

1.3 April 1945 Friday

·Jo change.

CCi and CeB s ide sl ipped southward during the night of 12/13 April
to make use of a bridge over the Si ALE R i ve r at NAUMBERG captu re d
•.

91
13 i'l.pril 1945 (continued)

by CCR. By evening, the Division hud reached the lim, Grt;..NSCHUTZ,

PEGAU, BEER3DORF.

---------_._----_._--

14 April 1945 Saturday

No change.

The D ivi si o n started its encirclement of LEIPZIG t o prt;vent the

escape of the troops the re and oc cu pi e d the general line RJ.J,':SDORF,
.
NEUKI ERI T ZSCH, BORNA.

15 ilpri 1 1945 Su nday

CCR drove through to the MJLDE River, c u pturc d several bridges and
e stabli sh e d bridgeheads !J.cross th e river. CCll continued its advance
toward the ,ULDE River, and by the morning of the 16th h&d reached
the river; CCB followed behind CCA.

16 April 1945 Monday

CCR sent a task force to COLDITZ where it liberated an estimated

1800 Allied Pr j soners of War. It also continued mopping up in its
zone o.nd set up defensive positions around the bridgeheads. CCA
attackE.. d north along the MJLDE [l,1d took up dcfensive positions.
CeB continued to follow CCit.

17 April 1945 Tuesday

CCE att-.cked north (md wcst to complete the encirclement of LEIPZIG

on three sides and then took up defensive p osi t i ons . The 9th lirmd
Division remo.ined in its defensive positions until 21 i>.pril when
they wore relievod by el ments of the 69th Inf Division.

92