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Column 062110 Brewer

Monday, June 21, 2010

Mexico’s Police Strategies Must Shift to a Terrorism Model

By Jerry Brewer

Those that are diligently following the massive violence and

escalating carnage in Mexico may have difficulty explaining
how something so horrific can occur within their homeland, but
accurately defining it may hold promise and strategic
relevance.

We are inundated by the world media coverage ad nauseam

with explanations of drug trafficking organizations versus rival
organized elements and their turf wars for control of drug
routes and the demand for drugs. Reports touting “an
explosion of drug violence in Mexico” are a common theme.

President Felipe Calderon says he won’t relent on the “drug

fight,” and blames the United States for its insatiable “addicted”
demand for drugs. However, before hate groups begin to burn
the President in effigy it is critically important to see the
credible tactical gains of the military with many genuine
security improvements, and the capture of many individuals of
high value.

There certainly was no alternative of resource other than a

well-armed military to combat these narcoterrorists. The police
were never a formidable opponent nor did they possess the
skills or physical resources to interdict this enemy that has
morphed into a plain and simple terrorist.

The effectiveness against the drug trafficking organizations

(DTOs), as with terrorists, cannot be measured in the numbers
of those combatants killed or captured, but by the ability to
counter the psychological impact and political effects of the
battle.

We must all understand the true definition of terrorism and a

terrorist. There are a myriad of ideologies, contraband,
causes, and rationales for terrorism and the subsequent terror
that ensues from this mindset. Terror groups are not of a
random rise and stand symbol alone. They must have an
intent, motive, and common agenda that unite their members
to action. Supplying a demand that brings massive revenue,
wealth, and power is not enough to earn the terrorist label.

The DTOs have graduated towards achieving political aims

and motives using a psychological warfare agenda to instill
massive fear and far-reaching psychological effects beyond
the usual rival targets and related victims. The terror is in the
indiscriminate brutality, cruelness, and associated evil of their
violent actions. As with terrorists, these non-state combatants
attack legitimate governments and seek to destroy and
undermine a political system, its enforcement arm, and a
homeland’s way of life.

Helping to analyze the facts conducive to Mexico’s terrorist

model is the current killing spree that has spread throughout
Mexico, this irrespective of drug routes, DTO turf, and routine
rival confrontations. One of their common agendas is in fact
the interdiction itself, and all of those perceived to be in
support of President Calderon’s “drug war.” Routine and direct
ambushes against military and police are becoming common
operational acts. The narcoterrorists can match the firefight
with paramilitary types of armaments, as well as supersede the
enforcement cadre’s weapons in many instances.

Twelve federal officers were killed in an ambush in mid-June.

Armed confrontations against police officers and others
claimed several hundred lives last week alone. In another
strange incident, 19 drug addicts were murdered in a
rehabilitation clinic. A newspaper report claimed 96 people
were killed in seven Mexican states. Terrorist modi operandi
(signatures) are also becoming common practice as there are
an increased number of victims of unusual torture,
beheadings, and evisceration.

This enemy that is contained within no special boundary,

border, or jurisdiction is on a full scale rampage, and is not
only more than capable of the violent and murderous
onslaught, but is highly motivated and resourced to do so.
Police interdiction and related tactics and strategies are of no
moment to this terror model.

Terrorist interdiction requires the analysis of patterns, trends,

the evolving modus operandi and signatures, as well as the
intelligence and determinations of their vulnerabilities. Much
like al Qaeda and other Middle Eastern terror groups, they will
not respect symbols of authority such as badges, laws, threats
to incarcerate and other police enforcement methodology.
They are war-like, battle hardened, transnational, and have
adopted violent extremism and irregular warfare as their battle
plans.

Despite Mexico’s successes and U.S. cooperation in training,

equipment, and other expertise, the effort continues to fall
short and significant challenges remain. Too, the U.S.
homeland will continue to face great risk and a persistent
threat to its citizens as these terrorists boldly move to confront
any obstacles impeding their agenda. While immigration
border issues remain a common topic, neither the Mexican nor
U.S. government can ignore nor afford not to keep a vigilant
eye on the ball — which is the high potential for fluid and
random attacks.

——————————
Jerry Brewer is C.E.O. of Criminal Justice International
Associates, a global risk mitigation firm headquartered in
Northern Virginia.. His website is located at www.cjiausa.org.
jbrewer@cjiausa.org