CANON 9

G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR
UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO
TENAZASpetitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN
MUNINGrespondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent
Quintin Muning.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services
rendered? This is the issue presented in this petition for review
of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution,
dated 8 December 1964, of the Court of Industrial Relations,
in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin
Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services
in the said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No.
72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela
Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations
rendered a decision, on 29 March 1961, ordering the
reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila
and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18
October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record
for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien
equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22 November
1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a
reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas on 3
December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their nonobjection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their
backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a
"Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to
20% of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge
was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio
Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and
appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first
by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin
Muning.

On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded

25% of the backwages as compensation for professional
services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid &
Associates ............................................. 10%
Quintin
Muning ..........................................................
............... 10%
Atty. Atanacio
Pacis ..............................................................
... 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer
according to the order, is sought to be voided in the present
petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the
present petition on the ground of late filing but his motion was
overruled on 20 January 1965. 1 He asked for reconsideration,
but, considering that the motion contained averments that go
into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered
the motion for reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's
answer to the petitioner for review. 2 The case was considered
submitted for decision without respondent's brief. 3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated
in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968, 4 that an
agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees,
whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in
said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal
Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a
court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a
contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that
In the proceeding before the Court or
Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall
not be required to be represented by legal
counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the
party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is
not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section
adds that
it shall be the duty and obligation of the
Court or Hearing Officer to examine and
cross examine witnesses on behalf of the

parties and to assist in the orderly

presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be
exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or
appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant
does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for
such representation. For Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of
Court, providing
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's
agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client
no more than a reasonable compensation for
his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a
condition to the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in
court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he
cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique
Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot,
therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy
demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant
should be entrusted only to those possessing tested
qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the
ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the
public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is
persuasive. There, it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes
have now been enacted prohibiting persons
not licensed or admitted to the bar from
practising law, and under statutes of this
kind, the great weight of authority is to the
effect that compensation for legal services
cannot be recovered by one who has not
been admitted to practice before the court or
in the jurisdiction the services were
rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation
for services as an attorney at law unless he
has been duly admitted to practice ... and is
an attorney in good standing at the time. 6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should
not be violated; 7 that acting as an attorney with authority
constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or

imprisonment or both, 8 and the law will not assist a person to

reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of
law; 9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would
leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult
in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic
condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not
amenable to disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring
to non-recovery of attorney's fees by nonlawyers) cannot be circumvented when the
services were purely legal, by seeking to
recover as an "agent" and not as an
attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer
may not be awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the
possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the
Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the ground
that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special
jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot
justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may
appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from
the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because
it was the union PAFLU, alone, that moved for an extension of
time to file the present petition for review; union members
Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were
included as petitioners in the present petition that was
subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila
and Tenazas), their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners
was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may
appeal an award of attorney's fees which are deductible from
the backpay of its members because such union or labor
organization is permitted to institute an action in the industrial
court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was
organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social
and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is
disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an
appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section 6, Republic Act
875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice
cases Appeals. Any person aggrieved
by any order of the Court may appeal to the
Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a
position to bear the financial burden of litigations.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the

habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial
Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to
practice, registering their appearances as "representatives" and
appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious
situation demanding corrective action that respondent court
should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that
purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before
the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case.
Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the
persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside
insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's
fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed
in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ. concur.

G.R. No. L-23467

March 27, 1968

AMALGAMATED LABORERS' ASSOCIATION and/or

FELISBERTO M. JAVIER for himself and as General
President,
ATTY. JOSEUR. CARBONELL, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND
ATTY. LEONARDO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Jose Ur. Carbonell for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Leonardo C. Fernandez for and in his own behalf as
respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services
rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu.
The background facts are as follows:
On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others
together with their union, Amalgamated Laborers' Association,
and/or Felisberto Javier, general president of said union,
lodged a complaint 1 in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR),
for unfair labor practices specified in Sec. 4(a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of
the Industrial Peace Act. Made respondents were their former
employer, Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc. (Biscom),
Rafael Jalandoni, its president and general manager; Gonzalo
Guillen, its chief engineer and general factory superintendent;
and Fraternal Labor Organization and/or Roberto Poli, its
president.
Failing in their attempts to dismiss the complaint
(motions to dismiss dated June 30, 1956 and July 6,
1956), 2respondents Biscom, Jalandoni, and Guillen, on July 9,
1957, answered and counterclaimed. Respondents Fraternal
Labor Union and Poli also filed their answer dated July 12,
1957.
With the issues joined, the case on the merits was heard
before a trial commissioner.
At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight complainant
laborers appeared and testified. Two of these ten were
permanent (regular) employees of respondent company; the
remaining eight were seasonal workers. The regular
employees were Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. Seasonal
workers were Catalino Bangoy, Juan Fernandez, Jose Garlitos,
Dionisio Pido, Santiago Talagtag, Dominador Tangente,
Felimon Villaluna and Brigido Casas.

On November 13, 1962, CIR, thru Associate Judge

Arsenio I. Martinez, rendered judgment, which provides, inter
alia, that the two regular employees (Reyes and Magtubo) be
reinstated "to their former positions, without loss of seniority
and other benefits which should have accrued to them had
they not been illegally dismissed, with full back wages from
the time of their said dismissals up to the time of their actual
reinstatements, minus what they have earned elsewhere in the
meantime" and that the eight seasonal workers "be readmitted
to their positions as seasonal workers of respondent company
(Biscom), with back wages as seasonal workers from the time
they were not rehired at the start of the 1955-1956 milling
season on October 1, 1955 up to the time they are actually
reinstated, less the amount earned elsewhere during the period
of their lay-off."
Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and Guillen appealed
direct to this Court. 3 On March 28, 1963, this Court dismissed
the appeal, without costs. Ground: Petitioners therein did not
seek reconsideration of CIR's decision of November 13, 1962.
The judgment became final.
Upon the ten complainants' motion to name an official
computer to determine the actual money due them, CIR, on
June 4, 1963, directed the Chief Examiner of its Examining
Division to go to the premises of Biscom and compute the
back wages due the ten complainants.
On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner reported that the
total net back wages due the ten complainants were
P79,755.22. Biscom and the complainants moved for
reconsideration: Biscom on August 17, 1963; complainants on
September 24, 1963.
In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a
respondent herein) filed on July 15, 1963 in the same case
CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu a "Notice of Attorney's Lien."
He alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for
the laborers in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu "since the
inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the
Supreme Court on appeal, as chief counsel thereof"; that he
"had actually rendered legal services to the laborers who are
subject of this present litigation [CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu]
since the year 1956, more or less"; that the laborers "have
voluntarily agreed to give [him], representing his attorney's
fees on contingent basis such amounts equivalent to 25%
thereof which agreement is evidenced by a Note"; and that the
25% attorney's fee so contracted is "reasonable and proper
taking into consideration the length of services he rendered
and the nature of the work actually performed by him."
On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez filed an
"Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien," which in part reads:

3. That the laborers, subject of this present litigation,

sometime on February 3, 1956, had initially
voluntarily agreed to give Undersigned Counsel
herein, representing his Attorney's fees on contingent
basis, such amounts as equivalent to Thirty Per Cent
(30%) of whatever money claims that may be
adjudicated by this Honorable Court, copy of said
Agreement, in the local Visayan dialect and a
translation of the same in the English language are
hereto attached as annexes "A" "A-1" hereof;
4. That subsequently thereafter, when the aboveentitled Case was already decided in their favor,
Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of his co-laborers who are
also Complainants in this Case begged from the
Undersigned Counsel herein that he reduce his
attorney's fees to Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) only
for the reason that they have to share and satisfy also
Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of
Five Per Cent (5%) although the latter's actual
services rendered was so insignificant thereof;
5. That because of the pleadings of said Arsenio
Reyes, who is the President of said Union, the
Undersigned Counsel herein finally agreed and
consented that his attorney's fees be reduced to only
Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) instead of Thirty Per
Cent (30%) as originally agreed upon in 1956.
On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell (a
petitioner herein) filed in court a document labelled
"Discharge" informing CIR of the discharge, release and
dismissal thru a union board resolution (attached thereto as
Annex A thereof) of Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez as one of
the lawyers of the complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULPCebu, effective February 28, 1963.
On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez replied. He
averred that the grounds for his discharge specified in the
board resolution were "malicious and motivated by greed and
ungratefulness" and that the unjustifiable discharge did not
affect the already stipulated contract for attorneys' fees.

(d) The amount representing attorney's fees to

be deposited by the respondent company is hereby
awarded and granted to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez,
and he may collect the same from the Cashier of the
Court upon the finality of this order, subject to
existing auditing procedures; ....
Biscom complied with the order of deposit. 4
On April 10, 1964, Atty. Carbonell moved to reconsider
the March 19, 1964 order with respect to the award of
attorneys' fees. Amongst his grounds are that CIR has no
jurisdiction to determine the matter in question, and that the
award of 25% as attorneys' fees to Atty. Fernandez is
excessive, unfair and illegal. This motion was denied on April
28, 1964 by CIR en banc.
On June 9, 1964, a motion for reconsideration of the
April 28, 1964 resolution was filed by Atty. Carbonell. This
was amplified by a similar motion filed on June 11, 1964.
On June 25, 1964, two things happened: First. CIR en
banc denied the motion of June 11, 1964. Second. On Atty.
Fernandez' motion, Judge Martinez authorized the Cashier of
the court to disburse to Fernandez the amount of P19,938.81
representing attorneys' fees and deducting therefrom all legal
fees incident to such deposit.
Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell, Amalgamated
Laborers' Association, and the ten employees, appealed from
the June 25, 1964 resolution of CIR, direct to this Court.
1. Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is
bereft of authority to adjudicate contractual disputes over
attorneys' fees. Their reasons: (1) a dispute arising from
contracts for attorneys' fees is not a labor dispute and is not
one among the cases ruled to be within CIR's authority; and
(2) to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case
over which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to
disregard the special and limited nature of said court's
jurisdiction.
These arguments are devoid of merit.

On March 19, 1964, CIR Judge Arsenio I. Martinez

resolved Biscom's and complainants' motions for
resonsideration objecting to the Chief Examiner's Report and
also respondent Fernandez' Amended Notice of Attorney's
Lien. Judge Martinez' order reads in part:
(b) Respondent company is further directed to
deposit the amount representing 25% of P79,755.22
with the Cashier of this Court, as attorney's fees;
xxx

xxx

xxx

The present controversy over attorneys' fees is but an

epilogue or a tail-end feature of the main case, CIR No. 70ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction.
And, it has been held that "once the Court of Industrial
Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a case under the law
of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction until the case is
completely decided, including all the incidents related
thereto." 5 Expressive of the rule on this point is this
4. It is well settled that:

A grant of jurisdiction implies the

necessary and usual incidental powers
essential to effectuate it, and every regularly
constituted court has power to do all things
reasonably necessary for the administration
of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction,
and for the enforcement of its judgments and
mandates, even though the court may thus
be called upon to decide matters which
would not be within its cognizance as
original causes of action.
While a court may be expressly
granted the incidental powers necessary to
effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of
jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive
legislation, implies the necessary and usual
incidental powers essential to effectuate it
(In re Stinger's Estate, 201 P. 693), and,
subject to existing laws and constitutional
provisions, every regularly constituted court
has power to do all things that are
reasonably necessary for the administration
of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction,
and for the enforcement of its judgments and
mandates. So demands, matters, or
questions ancillary or incidental to, or
growing out of, the main action, and coming
within the above principles, may be taken
cognizance of by the court and determined,
since such jurisdiction is in aid of its
authority over the principal matter, even
though the Court may thus be, called on to
consider and decide matters, which as
original causes of action, would not be
within its cognizance (Bartholomew vs.
Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S. pp. 136138.)
Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber
Co., L-11945, August 18, 1958, and Serrano vs.
Serrano, L-19562, May 23, 1964, we held that the
court having jurisdiction over the main cause of
action, may grant the relief incidental thereto, even if
they would otherwise, be outside its competence. 6
To direct that the present dispute be lodged in another
court as petitioners advocate would only result in multiplicity
of suits, 7 a situation abhorred by the rules. Thus it is, that
usually the application to fix the attorneys' fees is made before
the court which renders the judgment. 8 And, it has been
observed that "[a]n approved procedure, where a charging lien
has attached to a judgment or where money has been paid into
court, is for the attorney to file an intervening petition and

have the amount and extent of his lien judicially

determined." 9 Appropriately to be recalled at this point, is the
recent ruling in Martinez vs. Union de Maquinistas, 1967A
Phild. 142, 144, January 30, 1967, where, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Arsenio P. Dizon, explicit pronouncement was made by
this Court that: "We are of the opinion that since the Court of
Industrial Relations obviously had jurisdiction over the main
cases, ... it likewise had full jurisdiction to consider and decide
all matters collateral thereto, such as claims for attorney's
feesmade by the members of the bar who appeared therein." 10
2. The parties herein join hands in one point - the ten
(10) successful complainants in C.I.R Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu
should pay as attorneys' fees 30% of the amount adjudicated
by the court in the latter's favor (P79,755.22).
They are at odds, however, on how to split the fees.
Respondent Atty. Fernandez claims twenty-five per cent
(25%) of the 30% attorneys' fees. He explains that upon the
plea of Arsenio Reyes, union president and one of the 10
successful complainants, he had to reduce his fees to 25%
since "they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur.
Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%)."
Atty. Fernandez exhibited a contract purportedly dated
February 3, 1956 before the 48 employees have even filed
their complaint in CIR. The stipulated fee is 30% of whatever
amount the ten might recover. Strange enough, this contract
was signed only by 8 of the 10 winning claimants. What
happened to the others? Why did not the union intervene in the
signing of this contract? Petitioners dispute said contract. They
say that Atty. Fernandez required the ten to sign the contract
only after the receipt of the decision.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the verbal
agreement entered into by the union and its officers thru its
President Javier and said two lawyers, Atty. Carbonell and
Atty. Fernandez, is that the 30% attorneys' fees, shall be
divided equally ("share and share alike") amongst Atty.
Carbonell, Atty. Fernandez and Felisberto Javier, the union
president.
After hearing, CIR Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez
awarded 25% attorneys' fees to respondent Atty. Fernandez.
CIR noted that "the active conduct and prosecution of the
above-entitled case was done by Atty. Fernandez up to the
appeal in the Supreme Court," and that petitioner Atty.
Carbonell manifested that "Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez was
the counsel mainly responsible for the conduct of the case." It
noted, too, that petitioner Atty. Carbonell did not file any
notice of Attorney's Lien.
3. We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the
union president should share in the attorneys' fees. Canon 34

of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and

explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal services is
proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of
service or responsibility." The union president is not the
attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as
such president. An agreement whereby a union president is
allowed to share in attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a contract
we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified.
4. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of
recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit "should be
reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including
the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should
always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness." 11
Lately, we said: 12
The principle that courts should reduce
stipulated attorney's fees whenever it is found under
the circumstances of the case that the same is
unreasonable, is now deeply rooted in this
jurisdiction....
xxx

xxx

xxx

Since then this Court has invariably fixed

counsel fees on a quantum meruit basis whenever the
fees stipulated appear excessive, unconscionable, or
unreasonable, because a lawyer is primarily a court
officer charged with the duty of assisting the court in
administering impartial justice between the parties,
and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial
control. Nor should it be ignored that sound public
policy demands that courts disregard stipulations for
counsel fees, whenever they appear to be a source of
speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or
mortgagor. See, Gorospe, et al. v. Gochangco, L12735, October 30, 1959. And it is not material that
the present action is between the debtor and the
creditor, and not between attorney and client. As
courts have power to fix the fee as between attorney
and client, it must necessarily have the right to say
whether a stipulation like this, inserted in a mortgage
contract, is valid. Bachrach v. Golingco, 39 Phil. 138.
In the instant case, the stipulated 30% attorneys' fee is
excessive and unconscionable. With the exception of Arsenio
Reyes who receives a monthly salary of P175, the other
successful complainants were mere wage earners paid a daily
rate of P4.20 to P5.00. 13 Considering the long period of time
that they were illegally and arbitrarily deprived of their just
pay, these laborers looked up to the favorable money judgment
as a serum to their pitiful economic malaise. A thirty per cent

(30%) slice therefrom immensely dilutes the palliative

ingredient of this judicial antidote.
The ten complainants involved herein are mere laborers.
It is not far-fetched to assume that they have not reached an
educational attainment comparable to that of petitioner
Carbonell or respondent Fernandez who, on the other hand,
are lawyers. Because of the inequality of the situation between
laborers and lawyers, courts should go slow in awarding huge
sums by way of attorneys' fees based solely on
contracts. 14 For, as in the present case, the real objective of the
CIR judgment in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu is to benefit the
complaint laborers who were unjustifiedly dismissed from the
service. While it is true that laborers should not be allowed to
develop that atavistic proclivity to bite the hands that fed
them, still lawyers should not be permitted to get a lion's share
of the benefits due by reason of a worker's labor. What is to be
paid to the laborers is not windfall but a product of the sweat
of their brow. Contracts for legal services between laborer and
attorney should then be zealously scrutinized to the end that a
fair share of the benefits be not denied the former.
5. An examination of the record of the case will readily
show that an award of twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys'
fees reasonably compensates the whole of the legal services
rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu. This fee must be
shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and respondent Atty.
Fernandez. For, after all, they are the counsel of record of the
complainants. Respondent Atty. Fernandez cannot deny this
fact. The pleadings filed even at the early stages of the
proceedings reveal the existence of an association between
said attorneys. The pleadings were filed under the name of
"Fernandez & Carbonell." This imports a common effort of
the two. It cannot be denied though that most of those
pleadings up to judgment were signed for Fernandez &
Carbonell by respondent Fernandez.
We note that a break-up in the professional tie-up
between Attorneys Fernandez and Carbonell began when
petitioner Atty. Carbonell, on November 26, 1962, complained
to CIR that respondent Atty. Fernandez "failed to
communicate with him nor to inform him about the incidents
of this case." He there requested that he be furnished
"separately copies of the decision of the court and other
pleadings and subsequent orders as well as motions in
connection with the case."
Subsequent pleadings filed in the case unmistakably
show the widening rift in their professional relationship. Thus,
on May 23, 1963, a "Motion to Name and Authorize Official
Computer" was filed with CIR. On the same day, a "Motion to
Issue Writ of Execution" was also registered in the same court.
Although filed under the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez,"

these pleadings were signed solely by petitioner Atty.

Carbonell.
On September 16, 1963, an "Opposition to respondent
Biscom's Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by petitioner
Atty. Carbonell. On September 24, 1963, he filed a "Motion
for Clarification" of the November 13, 1962 judgment of CIR
regarding the basic pay of Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo.
On September 24, 1963, he also filed a "Motion to Reconsider
Report of Chief Examiner." These, and other pleadings that
were filed later were signed solely by petitioner Atty.
Carbonell, not in the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez." While
it was correctly observed by CIR that a good portion of the
court battle was fought by respondent Atty. Fernandez, yet
CIR cannot close its eyes to the legal services also rendered by
Atty. Carbonell. For, important and numerous, too, were his
services. And, they are not negligible. The conclusion is
inevitable that petitioner Atty. Carbonell must have a share in
the twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees awarded herein.
As to how much, this is a function pertaining to CIR.
6. We note that CIR's cashier was authorized on June 25,
1964 to disburse to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez the sum of
P19,938.81 which is 25% of the amount recovered. In the
event payment actually was made, he should be required to
return whatever is in excess of the amount to which he is
entitled in line with the opinion expressed herein. 15
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty
five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees solely to respondent Atty.
Fernandez contained in CIR's order of March 19, 1964 and
affirmed by said court's en banc resolutions of April 28, 1964
and June 25, 1964, is hereby set aside; and the case is hereby
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations with instructions
to conduct a hearing on, and determine, the respective shares
of Attorney Leonardo C. Fernandez and Attorney Jose Ur.
Carbonell in the amount of P19,938.81 herein awarded as
attorneys' fees or both. No costs. So ordered.

[A.C. No. 1261. December 29, 1983.]

TAN TEK BENG, Complainant, v. TIMOTEO A.
DAVID, Respondent.
Basilio Lanoria for complainant.
Timoteo A. David for and in his own behalf.

The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be

taken against lawyer Timoteo A. David (admitted to the bar in
1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer (alleged
missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-half of the
attorneys fees received by David from the clients supplied by
Tan Tek Beng. Their agreement reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"December 3, 1970
"Mr. Tan Tek Beng
"Manila

SYLLABUS

"Dear Mr. Tan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. LEGAL ETHICS; MEMBER OF THE BAR; SOLICITING

CASES AT LAW FOR THE PURPOSE OF GAIN;
CONSTITUTES MALPRACTICE. Where in the
agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of
his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent
but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients,
the Court held that the said agreement is void because it was
tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers" (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of
Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or
dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a
special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act
No. 2828, amending Sec. 21 of Act No. 190). That meaning is
in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of
law is a profession, not a business. "The lawyer may not seek
or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do
so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re
Tagorda, 33 Phil. 37, 42).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; CAUSE
FOR CENSURE. The commercialization of law practice is
condemned in certain canons of professional ethics adopted by
the American Bar Association. "Unprofessional conduct in an
attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his
profession or which is unbecoming a member of that
profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743). We censure lawyer David
for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical
agreement. We discountenance his conduct, not because of the
complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal ethics)
but because David should have known better.

In compliance with your request, I am now putting into

writing our agreement which must be followed in connection
with the accounts that you will entrust to me for collection.
Our terms and conditions shall be as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. On all commission or attorneys fees that we shall receive
from our clients by virtue of the collection that we shall be
able to effect on their accounts, we shall divide fifty-fifty.
Likewise you are entitled to commission, 50/50 from
domestic, inheritance and commercial from our said clients or
in any criminal cases where they are involved.
"2. I shall not deal directly with our clients without your
consent.
"3. You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as
advances for expenses for the cases referred to us by our
clients and careful in safeguarding our interest.
"4. It is understood that legal expenses that we shall recover
from the debtors shall be turned over to our clients. Other
clients who directly or indirectly have been approached or
related (sic) to you as a result of your labor are your clients.
"I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father,
that I will be sincere, honest and fair with you in connection
with our transactions with our clients. Likewise you must be
sincere, honest and fair with me.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Illegible
TIMOTEO A. DAVID
"P.S.

DECISION

I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our

clients.
(Sgd.) Initial
AQUINO, J.:

"CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate my

sincerity to Atty. David as stated in the last paragraph of this
letter.

(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng

MR. TAN TEK BENG"
The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated August
5, 1969. Note that in said agreement lawyer David not only
agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an
intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself
not to deal directly with the clients.
The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng
did not last. There were mutual accusations of doublecross.
For allegedly not living up to the agreement, Tan Tek Beng in
1973 denounced David to Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B.
Zamora, to the Office of Civil Relations at Camp Crame and
to this Court. He did not file any civil action to enforce the
agreement.
In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was
composed of himself as manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant
manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and financier.
When Jacinto became ill and the costs of office maintenance
mounted, David suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also
invest some money or shoulder a part of the business expenses
but Tan Tek Beng refused.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
This case was referred to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were
scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It was proposed that respondent
should submit a stipulation of facts but that did not materialize
because the scheduled hearings were not held due to the
nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and his counsel.

"35. Intermediaries. The professional services of a lawyer

should not be controlled or exploited by any law agency,
personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer. A lawyers responsibilities and qualifications are
individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the
performance of his duties by or in the interest of such
intermediary. A lawyers relation to his client should be
personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the
client. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
"38. Compensation, Commissions and Rebates. A lawyer
should accept no compensation, commissions, rebates or other
advantages from others without the knowledge and consent of
his client after full disclosure." (Appendix, Malcolm, Legal
Ethics).
We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon
such void and unethical agreement. We discountenance his
conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who
did not know legal ethics) but because David should have
known better.chanrobles law library
"Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates
the rules or ethical code of his profession or which is
unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S.
743).
WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of
malpractice. A copy of this decision should be attached to his
record in the Bar Confidants office.
SO ORDERED.

On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the Philippine

Union Colleges Compound, Baesa, Caloocan City but it was
only in the manifestation of his counsel dated August 10, 1981
that the Solicitor Generals Office was informed of that fact. A
report on this case dated March 21, 1983 was submitted by the
Solicitor General to this Court.
We hold that the said agreement is void because it was
tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers" Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of
Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or
dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a
special and technical meaning to the term "malpractice" (Act
No. 2828, amending sec. 21 of Act No. 190).
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that
the practice of law is a profession, not a business. "The lawyer
may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through
others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097
cited in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme v.
Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce v. Philippine National Bank, 62
Phil. 569). The commercialization of law practice is
condemned in certain canons of professional ethics adopted by
the American Bar Association:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"34. Division of Fees. No division of fees for legal services
is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of
service or responsibility."cralaw virtua1aw library

G.R. No. L-24864 April 30, l985

FORTUNATO HALILI, doing business under the name
and style HALILI TRANSIT (substituted by EMILIA DE
VERA DE HALILI), petitioner
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and HALILI
BUS DRIVERS and CONDUCTORS UNION
(PTGWO),respondents.
G.R. No. L-27773 April 30, l985
EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and HALILI
BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNION
(PTGWO),respondents.
G.R. No. L-38655 April 30, l985
FELICIDAD M. TOLENTINO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, et
al., respondents.
G.R. No. L-30110 April 30, l985
EMILIA DE VERA VDA. DE HALILI petitioner,
vs.
HALILI BUS DRIVERS AND CONDUCTORS UNIONPTGWO and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS,respondents.
RESOLUTION

MAKASIAR, J.:
Before Us for resolution is the urgent motion to cite Atty.
Benjamin C. Pineda, Ricardo Capuno and Manila Bank
(Cubao Branch) in contempt for the alleged continued failure
of aforenamed parties to comply with the temporary
mandatory restraining order issued by this Court on September
1, 1983 and with the resolution dated September 13, 1983
which again directed Atty. Pineda and union administrator
Capuno to comply with the aforesaid mandatory restraining
order and which ordered the Manila Bank to transfer the funds
allocated for the workers to the NLRC (p. 376, L-24864, rec.;
p. 301, L027773 rec.).

The issuance of the temporary mandatory restraining order

stemmed from the questioned orders of September 23, 1982
and February 9, 1983 issued by Labor Arbiter Raymundo
Valenzuela in Case No. 1099-V before the NLRC which
orders respectively allowed the sale of the property awarded to
satisfy or answer for the claims of the union members in these
four cases and authorized the distribution of the proceeds of
the purchase.
For a better appreciation of the aforesaid motion for contempt,
We must recall certain prefatory facts which the Solicitor
General has so aptly summed up. Thus:
The above-entitled cases involve disputes
regarding claims for overtime of more than
five hundred bus drivers and conductors of
Halili Transit. Litigation initially
commenced with the filing of a complaint
for overtime with the defunct Court of
Industrial Relations on August 20, 1958
docketed as CIR Case No. 1099-V. The
disputes were eventually settled when the
contending parties reached an Agreement on
December 23, 1974, the pertinent portions of
which are as follows:
WHEREAS, in the face of this strong urging
on the part of the Supreme Court Justices
upon the parties to put an immediate end to
this case by amicable settlement, the parties
repeatedly came to conference,
conscientiously explored all avenues of
settlement, and finally arrived at the
tentative agreement (tentative because of the
condition that the same be sanctioned by the
court in the estate case) whereby the
Administratrix would transfer to the
employees title to that tract of land, covered
by TCT No. 36389, containing an area of
approximately 33,952 square meters,
situated in the Barrio of San Bartolome,
Municipality of Caloocan, Province of
Rizal, and pay in addition the cash amount
of P25,000.00 in full and final satisfaction of
all the claims and causes of action of all of
the employees against the estate of
Fortunato F. Halili subject of CIR Case No.
1099-V.
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in
consideration of the foregoing and of the

covenants, stipulations and undertakings

hereinafter contained, the parties have
agreed as follows:

complete settlement and satisfaction of the

award in CIR Case No. 1099-V and all
incidents thereto.

l. The UNION, its officers and membersclaimants relative to CIR Case No. 1099-V,
shall withdraw and dismiss with prejudice
Case No. 1099-V filed by the UNION in
behalf of its members-claimants before the
Court of Industrial Relations and all its
incidents thereto.

4. The UNION and its undersigned officers

hereby warrant that the UNION is a duly
registered labor organization and that in a
special meeting called for the purpose they
were duly authorized on December 22,
1974, by all the members- claimants in CIR
Case No. 1099-V to sign this Memorandum
of Agreement with Release and Quitclaim
which was unanimously approved and
ratified by said members-claimants as
evidenced by a Resolution dated December
22, 1974, a copy of which is attached hereto
and made a part hereof as Annex "B", and
hereby jointly and severally hold the estate
and heirs of Fortunato F. Halili free and
harness from, and undertake to indemnify
them for, any and all liability for any claims
by members of the UNION, their heirs,
assigns and agents relating to CIR Case No.
1099-V or attorneys' liens in connection
therewith (69 SCRA 509-510).

2. The ESTATE shall deliver or cause to be

delivered, to the UNION the following:
(a) Deed of Transfer of a parcel of land
situated in Barrio San Bartolome, Caloocan
City, containing an area of THIRTY-THREE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTYTWO (33,952) Square Meters, more or less,
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 35389 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal,
to be made, upon authority and approval
granted by the Court of First of Rizal,
Branch IV, at Quezon City, in Proc. No. Q10852 in the name of the Halili Bus Drivers
& Conductors Union (PTGWO), free from
any and all liens encumbrances, and any and
all claims whatsoever.
(b) Negotiable Check for TWENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS in the
name of Domingo D. Cabading, President of
the UNION.
3. The transfer of the above-described parcel
of land and receipt of the amount of
P25,000.00 constitute the full and final
satisfaction of the claims and award in said
CIR Case No. 1099-V, as well as any and all
attorney's liens in said case, for and in
consideration of which the UNION
members-claimants in CIR Case No. 1099-V
by these present now and forever release and
quitclaim Halili Enterprises, Halili Transit,
Fortunato F. Halili his estate, heirs and
successors by reason of CIR Case No. 1099V, it being their intention that they be
absolutely, completely and finally absolved
and released from any and all liability in
said case, including attorneys' liens the
transfer of the property and payment of the
amount hereinabove stated constituting for
all intents and purposes a full, final and

On January 6, 1975, pursuant to the

Agreement, the administratrix of the estate
of Fortunato F, Halili executed a Deed of
Conveyance of Real Property, transferring
the aforementioned parcel of land to the
Halili Bus and Conductors Union (PTGWO)
in trust for the members of the union
claimants. The parcel of land was eventually
registered in the name of the Union on
February 14, 1975. Hence, on February 10,
1976, the contending parties moved for the
dismissal of G.R. No. L-30110 and G.R. No.
L-38655, which this Honorable Court
granted on February 27, 1976 (69 SCRA
505). The two other cases, G.R. No. L24864 and G.R. No. L- 27773, were
previously disposed of on February 26, 1968
and December 28, 1970, respectively (22
SCRA 785. and 36 SCRA 522).
On August 9, 1982, the Union, through Atty.
Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an urgent motion
with the Ministry of Labor and Employment
(MOLE) requesting for authority to sell and
dispose of the property. The motion was
granted in an order dated September 23,
1982. A prospective buyer, the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, inc. expressed its

misgivings on the authority of the Union to

sell the property in view of sec. 66 of PD
1529 which requires no less than an order
from a court of competent jurisdiction as
authority to sell property in trust. So, Atty.
Pineda filed a motion with the Supreme
Court on December 1, 1982 requesting for
authority to sell the property, This
Honorable Court, however, merely noted the
motion in a resolution dated December 8,
1982.
Nevertheless, Atty. Pineda, without authority
from the Supreme Court but relying on the
earlier authority given him by the Ministry
of Labor, filed another urgent motion with
the latter, praying that the Union be
authorized to sell the lot to the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. and to make
arrangements with it such that payment will
be advanced for the real estate taxes
inclusive of penalties, attorney's lien which
is equivalent to a thirty-five percent (35%)
of the total purchase price, and home
developer's fee of P69,000.00. Apparently,
the prospective purchaser had decided to
withdraw its objection regarding the Union's
authority to sell. In an Order dated February
9, 1983, Labor Arbiter Raymundo R.
Valenzuela granted the motion. So, the sale
was finally consummated on June 7, 1983,
resulting in the execution of an escrow
agreement on June 8, 1983 wherein the
purchase price was deposited under escrow
with the Manila Bank-Cubao Branch. The
Bank then released the amounts due the
claimants in accordance with the escrow
agreement" (pp. 352- 356, L-24864 rec.).
The dispositive portion in L-24864 is re-stated hereunder:
WHEREFORE, the appealed order and
resolution en banc are hereby affirmed and
the Court of Industrial Relations is hereby
enjoined to make a judicial determination of
the union membership of the claimants,
while the Examining Division of said court
shall proceed with its computation of the
compensable hours of work rendered by, and
the corresponding compensation payable to,
the drivers and conductors admitted by both
parties to be union members since October
1, 1956 and those contended by the union to
be such members but disputed by the

employer. No costs. So ordered (p. 186, L24864 rec.).

When Atty. Jose C. Espinas (herein movant and alleged
original counsel for the Union) learned of the sale and
apportionment of the proceeds from past Union president
Amado Lopez, he requested Labor Arbiter Raymundo
Valenzuela to allow him to look into the records of Case No.
1099-V. The latter, however, told him that the records of the
aforecited case were missing. Thereupon, Atty. Espinas
requested Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC to locate the
records (p. 356, L24864 rec.).
Hence, Atty. Espinas filed the urgent motion with prayer for a
temporary mandatory restraining order on August 26, 1983
and the supplement thereto on August 29, 1983 (pp. 215, 227,
L-24864 rec.).
On August 30, 1983, the records of Case No. 1099-V were
finally found and Atty. Espinas was dully informed of the
development,
The above two motions question the legality of the orders
dated September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983 issued by
Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela in Case No. 1099-V
before the NLRC which authorized the sale of the awarded
property and the distribution of the proceeds from such
purchase.
Movants Union and counsel Espinas upon filing of the
motions urgently pray of thisourt to:
1. Require Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda to deposit with the NLRC
the amount of P712,992.00 paid to him or deposited to his
account at Manila Bank, Cubao Branch,allegedly representing
35% attorney's fees on the sale of 33,952 square meters of the
lot registered in the name of the Union;
2. Require the Halili Drivers and Conductors Union through
Domingo Cabading or any of his representatives to deposit
with the NIRC the 6% alleged union expenses paid to them or
similarly deposited to their account;
3. Implead with leave of court this Manila Bank Cubao Branch
to require the said bank to prevent further withdrawals of
amount deposited in the name of Atty. Pineda and/or the Halili
Drivers and Conductors Union or any of its officers and to
turn over any remaining deposits to the NLRC for proper
disposition;
4. Should Atty. Pineda and the Union officers have already
withdrawn the deposits or parts thereof, require them to post a
bond in the equivalent amounts of 35% (attorney's fee), 6%
(union expenses), and 5% (broker's fee) respectively of the

total proceeds of the sale of the property, solidarity (p. 219, L24864 rec.; p. 160, L-27773 rec.).
Likewise, and after due consideration of the merits, movants
prayed that
1. the order of Arbiter Valenzuela dated February 9, 983 be
nullified insofar as it allows Atty. Pineda 35% attorney's fees;
2. the NLRC be directed to locate the records of Case No.
1099-V or reconstitute the same and thereafter to equitably
dispose 20% as fees to all lawyers who participated in the
proceedings and any excess amounts to be again distributed to
the workers; and
3. these cases be remanded to the NLRC with instructions as
above-stated and that the proper penalty be imposed on those
involved and who have acted fraudulently and illegally (p.
220, L-24864 rec.; p. 165, L-27773 rec.).
The succeeding pleadings and developments which are
common to all these cases are now presented chronologically.
On August 29, 1983, Atty. Espinas, for himself and members
of the respondent Union, filed a supplement to urgent motion
stating that the prayers in the urgent motion of August 26,
1983 are reiterated and praying for the nullification of Arbiter
Valenzuela's order not only on the award of attorney's fees but
also on the allowance of payment of "union obligations" not
previously authorized nor approved by the NLRC (p. 227, L24864, rec.; p. 176, L-27773 rec.).
In its resolution dated September 1, 1983, this Court
impleaded the Manila Bank, Cubao Branch as party
respondent and directed the issuance of a temporary
mandatory restraining order (p. 234, L-24864 rec. & p. 187, L27773 rec.). This Court correspondingly issued a temporary
mandatory restraining order on the same date which enjoined
Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda or his agents or any person acting in
his stead to deposit with the NLRC the amount of P712,992.00
paid to him or deposited in his account at Manila Bank, Cubao
Branch allegedly representing 35% attorney's fees on the sale
of 33,952 square meters of the lot registered in the name of
Halili Drivers and Conductors Union; directed the Union thru
Domingo Cabading or his agents to deposit with the NLRC
6% alleged union expenses paid to the Union or similarly
deposited to its account; and ordered the NLRC and Manila
Bank, Cubao Branch, or their agents or persons in their stead
not to allow withdrawals of amounts deposited in the name of
Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda and/or the Union or any of its
officers (P. 235, L-24864; p. 188, L-27773 rec.).
On September 6, 1983, respondent Union, thru Atty. Pineda,
filed its comment, in compliance with the resolution of

September 1, 1983, on the urgent motion and the supplement

thereto both filed by counsel Espinas, alleging therein that the
subject matter sought to be enjoined or mandated by the
restraining order ceased to exist rendering the same moot and
academic, and thus praying for the dismissal of the said
motion and the supplement thereto (p. 237, L-24864 rec.; p.
191, L-27773 rec.).
On September 7, 1983, Atty. Pedro Lopez, an original
associate of Atty. Espinas, filed his motion for leave to
intervene, with the submission that the lawyers involved
should only divide 20% fees as per the workers' contract and
the rest refunded by Atty. Pineda and the alleged "union
officers" for redistribution to the members (p. 265, L-24864,
rec.; p. 219. L-27773 rec.).
Atty. Espinas, in behalf of the workers, filed a manifestation
and motion to require Atty, Pineda and the union to comply
with the temporary mandatory restraining order on September
9, 1983, with prayer that the Manila Bank be ordered to
transfer the funds allocated for the workers to the NLRC,
which should be instructed to pay the workers upon proper
Identification (without prejudice to additional shares) or to
mail such amounts by money order or manager's check to the
workers' addresses as furnished to the NLRC (p. 274, L24864, rec.; p. 231, L-27773 rec.).
On September 12, 1983, petitioner filed a manifestation in
compliance with the resolution of September 2, 1983 stating,
among other things, that its liability had been completely
extinguished with the approval of the Memorandum of
Agreement with Release and Quitclaim in L-38655 and L30110; that said agreement operated as an absolute and
complete release of petitioner from any liability to the Union;
and that petitioner had not been given any notice of any
proceedings respecting cases subsequent to the promulgation
of the decisions aforestated (p. 281, L-24864, rec.; p. 237, L27773 rec.).
Counsel Espinas (for the workers involved) filed his reply to
comments of respondent Union on September 14, 1983
praying for this Court to:
1. nullify the order of February 9, 1983 issued by Arbiter
Raymundo Valenzuela in CIR Case No. 1099-V and others
connected therewith regarding the distribution of proceeds of
the sale of the land belonging to the members-claimants for
lack of due process and for being contrary to law;
2. nullify the 35% attorney's fees of Atty. Benjamin Pineda as
illegal and unconscionable and in disregard of other lawyers in
the case;

3. require reimbursement to the members-from the Union

P101,856.00 allocated without their consent as Union
expenses; P101,856 unreceipted brokers' fees less P4,020.40
expenses for the transfer of title; to refund the 1 % of the net
proceeds, P9,596.18, for named claimants; and to secure a
refund of P308,000.00 from the P712,992.00 fees of Atty.
Pineda (the excess of 20% fees for all lawyers);
4. subject the balance of P404,992.00 of the remainder of Atty.
Pineda's 35% fees for distribution among the three lawyers as
may be determined by the NLRC; and
5. should this Court so decides, fix the fees (p. 285, L- 24864
rec.; p. 240, L-27773 rec.).
On September 13, 1983, the Solicitor General filed his
comment on the urgent motion and the supplement thereto
dated August 25, 1983 and August 29, 1983, respectively with
the recommendations that (1) the orders of Arbiter Valenzuela
dated September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983 be nullified
for having been issued without due process; (2) the case must
be remanded to the NLRC for further proceedings; and (3) the
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on September
1, 1983 be maintained, pending final resolution by the NLRC
(p. 351, L-24864 rec.).
The Solicitor General, on October 6, 1983, filed his
manifestation and motion in lieu of comment on the motion of
Atty. Pedro Lopez for leave to intervene in L-24864 and L27773 (p. 360, L-24864 rec.; p. 289, L-27773 rec.).
On October 6, 1983, counsel Espinas filed his comment on the
intervention of Atty. Pedro Lopez wherein he offers no
objection to the latter's intervention and states that said
counsel is also entitled to attorney's fees in accordance with
his participation (p. 364, L-24864 rec.; p. 292, L-27773 rec.).
Atty. Pineda filed his comment and manifestation on October
7, 1983, in compliance with the resolution of September 13,
1983, alleging therein that as per Retainer's Contract dated
January 1, 1967, he handled Case No. 1099-V before the
Court of Industrial Relations alone. On the mandatory
restraining order, Atty. Pineda claims that as of October 4,
1983, he had a balance of P2,022.70 in his account with the
Manila Bank (p. 370, L-24864 rec.; p. 295, L-27773 rec.).
In its resolution dated October 18, 1983, this Court (1) set,
aside as null and void the orders of September 23, 1982 and
February 9, 1983 of Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela; (2)
allowed the intervention of Atty. Pedro Lopez; (3) directed the
Manila Bank (Cubao Branch), Atty. Benjamin Pineda, and the
Halili Drivers and Conductors Union through Domingo
Cabading or any of his representatives, to comply with the
temporary mandatory restraining order issued on September 1,

1983 and the resolution dated September 13, 1983, within ten
[10] days from receipt thereof; and (4) remanded these cases
to the NLRC for further proceedings (p. 374, L-24864 rec.; p.
299, L-27773 rec.).
The day before or on October 17, 1983, Sergio de Pedro, as
representative of the workers and assisted by Atty. Espinas,
thus fided the urgent motion to cite Atty. Pineda, Ricardo
Capuilo and Manila Bank (Cubao Branch) in contempt,
alleging therein that after two letters dated October 6 and
October l4, l983 to the NLRC which inquired as to whether or
not compliant, with the restraining order had been made, the
Commission certified that as of October 14, 1983, no deposits
had been effected by the parties so (directed (p. 376, L-24864
rec.; p. 301, L-27773 rec.).
In its manifestation and motion filed on November 2, 1983,
respondent Manila Banking Corporation (Rustan-Cubao
Branch), in compliance with this Court's resolution of
September 13, 1983, stated that it transmitted or paid to the
NLRC the amount of P417,380.64 under Cashier's Check No.
34084190 for the account of the Union and P2,022.70 under
Cashier's Check No. 34084191 for the account of Atty. Pineda
and thus prayed therein that the aforesaid transmittals be
deemed as sufficient compliance with the aforecited resolution
and that the urgent motion to cite respondents in contempt
dated October 17, 1983 be considered moot and academic (p.
390, L-24864 rec.).
On November 8, 1983, respondent Atty. Pineda filed his
manifestation and motion in lieu of comment in compliance
with this Court's resolution of October 20, 1983, stating that
he and respondent Union thereby adopt the aforecited
manifestation and motion of respondent Manila Banking
Corporation and thus prayed that since they have complied
with this Court's resolution of September 13, 1983, the urgent
motion to cite them for contempt be considered moot and
academic (p. 394, L-24864 rec.; p. 310, L-27773 rec.).
On November 10, 1983, respondent Manila Banking
Corporation filed another manifestation and motion in lieu of
commence, by way of compliance with the Court's resolution
of October 20, 1983 with prayer that its previous
manifestation and motion dated October 28, 1983 and filed on
November 2, 1983 be considered as sufficient compliance
with the resolution of September 13, 1983 which would render
the urgent motion to cite respondents in contempt moot and
academic (p. 396, L-24864 rec. p. 312, L-27773 rec.).
On the foregoing manifestations and motions, representative
Sergio de Pedro, with the assistance of Atty. Espinas, filed a
comment on November 16,1983 wherein he alleged that out of
the P2,037,120.00 purchase price, only Pl,940,127.29 was
deposited with the Manila Bank; that Atty. Pineda has yet to

return the balance of P710,969,30; and that the Union has still
to account for P111,452.18 (p. 399, L- 24864 rec.; p. 315, L27773 rec.).
December 14, 1983, respondent Union filed its reply to Mr. de
Pedro's above unsigned comment therein stating among other
things that the alleged missing amount of P96.992.71 was used
for the payment of outstanding real estate taxes on real
property of said Union covered by TCT No. 205755 and that
the amount of P2,022.70 only was remitted by Manila Bank to
the NLRC for the account of Atty. Pineda (p. 323, L-27773
rec.)
On December 20, 1983, Mr. de Pedro and Atty. Espinas, for
the workers involved, filed their rejoinder to the comment of
Atty. Pineda and Mr. Capuno reiterating therein their plea to
declare Atty. Pineda and Mr. Capuno in contempt of court and
to mete out the proper penalty (p. 328, L-27773 rec.).
The Manila Banking Corporation filed its compliance with the
Court resolution of November 22, 1983 on February 3, 1984,
praying that its report to the NLRC on the amount of
withdrawals be considered as sufficient compliance with the
said resolution (p. 343, L-27773 rec.).
Atty. Espinas filed his comment and motion on March 15,
1984, stating among other things that as per report of the
Manila Bank to the NLRC, Atty. Pineda has not yet complied
with the said order. He thus moved that Atty. Pineda be
required to post a bond on the undeposited balance in the
amounts of P710,969.30 and that Mr. Capuno be also required
to post a bond before the NLRC on the undeposited balance of
P52,236.04 during the pendency of the motion for contempt
(p. 373, L-27773 rec.).
On April 4, 1984, Mr. Sergio de Pedro filed his reply to the
aforesaid comment of the Union administrator and Atty.
Pineda stating therein that there are still questions to be
resolved on the merits before the NLRC and hence, prays that
Arbiter Antonio Tirona be required to continue hearing the
merits of the case pending in the said Commission (p. 377, L27773 rec.).
Before We resolve the motion for contempt, certain crucial
facts which have surfaced and which precipitated Our issuance
of the resolution of October 18, 1983 declaring the two
questioned orders of Arbiter Valenzuela as null and void, must
be retraced.
Then Union President Amado Lopez, in a letter dated August
21, 1958, informed J.C. Espinas and Associates that the
general membership of the said Union had authorized a 20%
contingent fee for the law firm based on whatever amount
would be awarded the Union (p. 267, L-24864 rec.).

Atty. Jose C. Espinas, the original counsel, established the

award of 897 workers' claim in the main cases before the
defunct CIR and the Supreme Court. In L-24864, the Notice of
Judgment of this Court dated February 26, 1968 was served on
Messrs. J.C. Espinas & Associates (p. 188, L-24864 rec.). In
L-27773, the Notice of Judgment dated December 29, 1970
was sent to Atty. B.C. Pineda & Associates under same
address-716 Puyat Bldg., Suit 404 at Escolta, Manila (p. 147,
L-27773 rec.) Note that this is the same address of Atty. J.C.
Espinas & Associates.
When Atty. 'Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases, still
an associate of the law firm, his appearance carried the firm
name B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the impression that
he was the principal lawyer in these cases.
Atty. Pineda joined the law firm of Atty. Espinas in 1965 when
these cases were pending resolution. He always held office in
the firm's place at Puyat Building, Escolta until 1974, except
in 1966 to 1967 when he transferred to the Lakas ng
Manggagawa Offices. During this one-year stint at the latter
office, Atty. Pineda continued handling the case with the
arrangement that he would report the developments to the
Espinas firm. When he rejoined the law firm in 1968, he
continued working on these cases and using the Puyat
Building office as his address in the pleadings.
When Atty. Pineda rejoined the Espinas firm in 1968, he did
not reveal to his partners (he was made the most senior
partner) that he had a retainer's contract entered into on
January 1, 1967 which allegedly took effect in 1966. He
stayed with the law firm until 1974 and still did not divulge
the 1967 retainer's contract. Only the officers of the Union
knew of the contract.
The alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda and the
Union appears anomalous and even illegal as well as unethical
considering that1. The contract was executed only between Atty. Pineda and
the officers of the Union chosen by about 125 members only.
It was not a contract with the general membership, Only 14%
of the total membership of 897 was represented. This violates
Article 242 (d) of the Labor Code which provides:
The members shall determine by secret
ballot, after due deliberation, any question
of major policy affecting the entire
membership of the organization, unless the
nature of the organization or force
majeure renders such secret ballot
impractical, in which case the board of
directors of the organization may make the

decision in behalf of the general

membership (emphasis supplied).
2. The contingent fee of 30% for those who were still working
with Halili Transit and the 45% fee for those who were no
longer working worked to the prejudice of the latter group
who should and were entitled to more benefits. Thus, too,
when the alleged retainer's contract was executed in 1967, the
Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro Manila.
By then, Atty. Pineda knew that all the workers would be out
of work which would mean that the 45% contingent fee would
apply to all.
3. The contract which retroactively took effect on January 1,
1966, was executed when Atty. Espinas was still handling the
appeal of Halili Transit in the main case before the Supreme
Court. Atty. Pineda would have but did not substitute himself
in place of Atty. Espinas or the law firm on the basis of such
contract.
4. When Atty. Pineda filed his motion for approval of his
attorney's lien with Arbiter Valenzuela on February 8, 1983, he
did not attach the retainer's contract.
5. The retainer's contract was not even notarized (p. 248, L24864 rec.).
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., as the prospective
buyer, initially expresses its misgivings over the authority of
the Union to sell subject property conformably with Section
66 of P.D. No. 1529, which requires an order from a court of
competent jurisdiction authorizing the sale of a property in
trust. The pertinent portion of Section 66 provides:
No instruments which transfers or
mortgages or in any way deals with
registered land in trust shall be registered,
unless the enabling power thereto is
expressly conferred in the trust instrument,
or unless a final judgment or order of a court
of competent jurisdiction has construed the
instrument in favor of the power, in which
case a certified copy of such judgment or
order may be registered.
The decision of aforenamed purchaser to stop questioning the
Union's authority to sell and the expeditious manner by which
Arbiter Valenzuela granted Atty. Pineda's motion for such
authority to sell the property make the entire transaction
dubious and irregular.
Thus, without notice to the other lawyers and parties, Atty.
Pineda commenced the proceeds before the NLRC with the
filing of a motion and manifestation on August 9, 1982 with

Arbiter Valenzuela of the NLRC Office of the Labor Ministry

wherein he asked for authority to sell the property. On
September 23, 1983 or just over a month, Arbiter Valenzuela
approved the motion per order of the same date. Notably, only
Atty. Pineda and the lawyers of the purchaser were informed
of such order.
On February 4, 1983, again without notice to Atty. Espinas
and Atty. Lopez, Atty. Pineda filed a motion with Arbiter
Valenzuela wherein he asked for authority to distribute the
proceeds of the sale of the property. This distribution would
include his attorney's fee which was allegedly the subject of a
retainer contract entered into between him and the alleged
Union officers, On February 9, 1983, or barely five days from
the day the motion was filed, Arbiter Valenzuela, without
informing the other lawyers and relying exclusively on the
unverified motion of Atty. Pineda (the records of the case were
not on hand), approved the said motion which authorized the
appointment.
This Court, as earlier stated, nullified said orders dated
September 23, 1982 and February 9, 1983 of Labor Arbiter
Valenzuela as violative of the due process clause. It is a settled
rule that in administrative proceedings, or cases coming before
administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers, due
process requires not only notice and hearing, but also the
consideration by the administrative tribunal of the evidence
presented; the existence of evidence to support the decision;
its substantiality a decision based thereon or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties; such decision by the
administrative tribunal resting on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy; and such
decision acquainting the parties with the various issued
involved and the reasons therefore (Ang Tibay vs. Court, 69
Phil. 635, cited on p. 84, Philippine Constitutional Law,
Fernando, 1984 ed.)
Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion with this
Court on December 1, 1982 praying for authority to sell was
by itself an admission on his part that he did not possess the
authority to sell the property and that this Court was the proper
body which had the power to grant such authority. He could
not and did not even wait for such valid authority but instead
previously obtained the same from the labor arbiter whom he
knew was not empowered to so authorize. Under Article 224
(a) of the Labor Code, only final decisions or awards of the
NLRC, the Labor Arbiter, or compulsory or voluntary
arbitrators may be implemented or may be the subject of
implementing orders by aforenamed body or officers.
When Atty. Espinas discovered the sale of the property, he
went to Arbiter Valenzuela to look into the transaction who
told him that the records of CIR Case No. 1099-V were

missing. It took director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC to locate

the records.
The 45% attorney's lien on the award of those union members
who were no longer working and the 30% lien on the benefits
of those who were still working as provided for in the alleged
retainer's contract are very exorbitant and unconscionable in
view of Section 11, Rule VIII of Book III which explicitly
provides:
Sec. 11. Attorney's feesAttorney's fees on
any judicial or administrative proceedings
for the recovery of wages shall not exceed
10% of the amount awarded. The fees may
be deducted from the total amount due the
winning party.
The amount of P101,856.00 which Atty. Pineda donated to the
Union and which actually corresponds to 5% of the total 35%
attorney's fees taken from the proceeds (p. 263, L-24864, rec.)
appears improper since it amounts to a rebate or commission.
This amount was subsequently treated as union miscellaneous
operating expenses without the consent of the general
membership.
Thus, in the case of Amalgamated Laborers' Association vs.
Court of Industrial Relations (L-23467, 22 SCRA 1267
[March 27, 1968]), We declared:
We strike down the alleged oral agreement
that the union president should share in the
attorney's fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics
condemns this arrangement in terms clear
and explicit. It says: 'No division of fees for
legal services is proper, except with another
lawyer, based upon a division of service or
responsibility.' The union president is not the
attorney for the laborers. He may seek
compensation only as such president. An
agreement whereby a union president is
allowed to share in attorney's fees is
immoral. Such a contract we emphatically
reject. It cannot be justified.
A contingent fee contract specifying the
percentage of recovery an attorney is to
receive in a suit 'should be reasonable under
all the circumstances of the case, including
the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject
to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness. (emphasis supplied).

A deeper scrutiny of the pleadings in L-24864 notably

indicates a fraudulent or deceitful pattern in the actuations of
Atty. Pineda. Thus, in his motion for execution of judgment
filed on September 18, 1965 in this case, he signed for and in
behalf of "J.C. Espinas & Associates" (p. 323, rec.). In his
manifestation dated December 10, 1968, he signed as "B.C.
Pineda," lone counsel for petitioner (p. 327, rec.); and yet, he
carried the address of Espinas & Associates at 716 G. Puyat
Building, Escolta.
However, in the October 29, 1968 resolution of this Court, a
copy thereof was served on "Messrs. J.C. Espinas, B.C Pineda,
J.J. dela Rosa & Associates" at Puyat Building, Escolta (p.
324, rec.). In the notice of judgment dated December 29, 1970,
this Court addressed the said pleading to "Attys. B.C. Pineda
& Associates with the same Puyat Building address (p. 325,
rec.). Notably also, then Union President Amado Lopez
addressed his letter dated August 21, 1958 to J.C. Espinas &
Associates" wherein he informed the latter that the general
membership of the Union had authorized them a 20%,
contingent fee on whatever award would be given the workers
(p. 267, rec.).
The Manila Banking Corporation (Cubao Branch) has
manifested that it turned over to the NLRC the amount of
P417,380.64 for the Union's account, which appears to be the
balance of P950,021.76 corresponding to the net proceeds for
distribution to the workers after deducting P525,480.40, the
total payments to claimants. The amount of P417,380.64
appears lacking, since accurately computed, the balance
should be P424,541,36.
However, the Union has yet to account for P101,856.00, the
5% donation or share from Atty. Pineda's attorney's fee of
35%.
For the account of Atty. Pineda, the Manila Banking
Corporation has remitted to the NLRC the amount of
P2,022.70 only. This means that Atty. Pineda is still
accountable for the amount of P710,969.30. He is directed to
return the amount of P712,992.00 representing the 35%
attorney's fees he unlawfully received.
In view of Our resolution of October 18, 1983, which set aside
as null and void the questioned orders dated September 23,
1982 and February 9, 1983 issued by Arbiter Raymundo
Valenzuela, the sale of the Union property and the distribution
of the proceeds therefrom had been effected without authority
and, therefore, illegal Consequently. Atty. Pineda and Arbiter
Valenzuela become liable for their unauthorized acts,
Atty. Pineda should be cited for indirect contempt under
paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court, The said paragraphs read thus:

Sec. 3. indirect contempts to be punished

after charge and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, judgment, or company
court, or injunction granted by a court or
judge, including the act of a person who,
after being dispossessed or ejected from any
real property by the judgment or process of
any court of competent jurisdiction, enters
or attempts or induces another to enter into
or upon such real property, for the purpose
of executing acts of ownership or
possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to
be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any interference with the
process or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under section 1
of this rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly
or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice.
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or
dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses
during litigation (12 Am. jur. 389, cited in 14 SCRA 813).
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by
acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
court's orders, but such conduct as tends to bring the authority
of 'the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in
some manner to impede the due administration of justice (17
C.J.S. 4).
This Court has thus repeatedly declared that the power to
punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to
the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court,
and consequently, to the due administration of justice (Slade
Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271; In re Kelly, 35
Phil. 944; Commissioner of Immigration vs. Cloribel, 20
SCRA 1241; Montalban vs. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1).
In the matter of exercising the power to punish contempts, this
Court enunciated in the Slade Perkins case that "the exercise
of the power to punish contempts has a twofold aspect, namely

(1) the proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect
to the court or its order; and (2) to compel his performance of
some act or duty required of him by the court which he refuses
to perform. Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the
power to punish them, contempts are classified as civil or
criminal. A civil contempt is the failure to do something
ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the
opposing party therein; and a criminal contempt, is conduct
directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a
judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority
or dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden
act. Where the punishment imposed, whether against a party to
a suit or a stranger, is wholly or primarily to protect or
vindicate the dignity and power of the court, either by fine
payable to the government or by imprisonment, or both, it is
deemed a judgment in a criminal case. Where the punishment
is by fine directed to be paid to a party in the nature of
damages for the wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment as a
coercive measure to enforce the performance of some act for
the benefit of the party or in aid of the final judgment or
decree rendered in his behalf, the contempt judgment will, if
made before final decree, be treated as in the nature of an
interlocutory order, or, if made after final decree, as remedial
in nature, and may be reviewed only on appeal from the final
decree, or in such other mode as is appropriate to the review of
judgments in civil cases. ... The question of whether the
contempt committed is civil or criminal, does not affect the
jurisdiction or the power of a court to punish the same. ... (58
Phil. 271, 272).
For civil contempt, Section 7, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of
Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 7, Rule 71. Imprisonment until order
obeyed. When the contempt consists in the
omission to do an act which is yet in the
power of the accused to perform, he may be
imprisoned by order of a superior court until
he performs it.
Thus, in the case of Harden vs. Director of Prisons (L-2349,
81 Phil. 741 [Oct. 22, 1948]), where petitioner was confined in
prison for contempt of court, this Court, in denying the
petition and resolving the question of petitioner's indefinite
confinement, had the occasion to apply and clarify the
aforequoted provision in the following tenor:
The penalty complained of is neither cruel
unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler
136 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme
Court said that 'punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death, but
the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the

constitution. It implies there something

inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the extinguishment of life.
The punishment meted out to the petitioner
is not excessive. It is suitable and adapted to
its objective; and it accords with section 7,
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which
provides that "when the contempt consists in
the omission to do an act which is yet in the
power of the accused to perform, he may be
imprisoned by order of a superior court until
he performs it."
If the term of imprisonment in this case is
indefinite and might last through the natural
life of the petitioner, yet by the terms of the
sentence the way is left open for him to
avoid serving any part of it by complying
with the orders of the court, and in this
manner put an end to his incarceration. In
these circumstances, the judgment cannot be
said to be excessive or unjust. (Davis vs.
Murphy [1947], 188 P., 229- 231.) As stated
in a more recent case (De Wees [1948], 210
S.W., 2d, 145-147), 'to order that one be
imprisoned for an indefinite period in a civil
contempt is purely a remedial measure. Its
purpose is to coerce the contemner to do an
act within his or her power to perform. He
must have the means by which he may purge
himself of the contempt . The latter decision
cites Staley vs. South Jersey Realty Co., 83
N.J. Eq., 300, 90 A., 1042, 1043, in which
the theory is expressed in this language:
In a "civil contempt" the
proceeding is remedial, it
is a step in the case the
object of which is to
coerce one party for the
benefit of the other party
to do or to refrain from
doing some act specified
in the order of the court.
Hence, if imprisonment be
ordered, it is remedial in
purpose and coercive in
character, and to that end
must relate to something
to be done by the
defendant by the doing of
which he may discharge
himself. As quaintly

expressed, the imprisoned

man carries the keys to his
prison in his own pocket
(pp. 747-748).
Likewise. American courts had long enunciated these rulings:
The commitment of one found in contempt
of a court order only until the contemnor
shall have purged himself of such contempt
by complying with the order is a decisive
characteristic of civil contempt. Maggio v.
Zeitz, 333 US 56, 92 L. ed. 476, 68 S Ct
401.
Civil or quasi-criminal contempt is
contemplated by a statute providing that if
any person refused to obey or perform any
rule, order, or judgment of court, such court
shall have power to fine and imprison such
person until the rule, order, or judgment
shall be complied with. Evans v. Evans, 193
Miss 468, 9 So 2d. 641. (17 Am. Jur. 2d.)
The reason for the inherent power of courts to punish for
contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability
of the judicial institution. Without such guarantee said
institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation
(Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; Cornejo vs. Tan, 85
Phil. 722),
Likewise, Atty. Pineda should be subject to disbarment
proceedings under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds.A
member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corrupt or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on

his part showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust
which characterize the attorney and client relations, and the
practice of law before the courts, or showing such a lack of
personal honesty or of good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence (7 C.J.S. 733).
It is a well-settled rule that the statutory grounds for
disbarment or suspension are not to be taken as a limitation on
the general power of the courts in this respect. The inherent
powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted (In re
Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567).
Finally, Atty. Pineda could be prosecuted for betrayal of trust
by an attorney under Article 209 of the Revised Penal Code.
Said article provides:
Art. 209. Betrayal of must by an attorney or
solicitor. Revelation of secrets.In addition
of the proper administrative action , the
penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200
to 1,000 pesos, or both shall be imposed
upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor
(procurador judicial) who, by any malicious
breach of professional duty or inexcusable
negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his
client, or reveal any of the secrets of the
latter learned by him in his professional
capacity (emphasis supplied).
The aforequoted criminal sanction for unprofessional conduct
of an attorney is without prejudice to proper administrative
action, such as disbarment or suspension of attorneys (p. 503,
Criminal Law Annotated, Padilla, 1972 Ed.).
Labor Arbiter Raymundo Valenzuela should be made to
answer for having acted without or beyond his authority in
proper administrative charges. He could also be prosecuted
before the Tanodbayan under the provisions of the Anti-Graft
Law. Independently of his liabilities as a government officer,
he could be the subject of disbarment proceedings under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Atty. Benjamin Pineda could also be held liable under Section
4(b) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
which makes it unlawful for any person knowingly to induce
or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses
defined in Section 3 of said act. Section 3 enumerates the
corrupt practices which public officers may be prosecuted for.
Atty. Pineda knowingly induced or caused Labor Arbiter
Valenzuela to issue the questioned orders without or beyond
the latter's authority and to which orders the former was not

entitled, considering that he was not the sole and proper

representative.
The Manila Banking Corporation (Cubao Branch) per
manifestation and motion dated October 28, 1983 and
reiterated on November 10, 1983, had transmitted to the
NLRC the remaining balance of P417,380.64 and P2,022.70
for the account of the Union and Atty. Pineda, respectively.
This turnover of the aforecited amounts is a sufficient
compliance with Our restraining order and resolution of
September 13, 1983 and hence, the Manila Banking
Corporation can no longer be liable for contempt of court.
Very recently, on August 23, 1984, respondent Union, thru
Acting Administrator Ricardo Capuno, filed its motion to drop
Halili Bus Drivers and Conductors Union from the contempt
charge in view of these reasons:
1. The Manila Bank has already turned over to the NLRC the
amount of P59,716.14 which represents the remaining balance
of 5% earmarked for Union expenses incurred in the case
aside from the amounts deposited in escrow for the workers.
The amount of P42,140.00 was spent legitimately by the
Union for administration purposes relative to the subject
property. The Union asserts that it is ready and willing to
account for all expenses and withdrawals from the bank before
the NLRC.
2. The alleged 5% donation of Atty. Pineda to the Union taken
from the 35% attorneys' fees was given to and received by
then President Domingo Cabading alone, who thereafter left
for the United States.
3. The 1% allocated for unknown claimants or those not
previously listed in the amount of P9,596.18 can easily be
accounted for by the Union before the NLRC.
In the same motion, Mr. Capuno clarifies that with regard to
attorneys' fees, Atty. Pineda made the Union officers believe
that he would be the one to pay the fees of Attys. Espinas and
Lopez for which reason, the 35% increased fees was approved
by the Union's board in good faith. The Union likewise
confirms that Atty. Pineda came into the picture only when he
was assigned by Atty. Espinas in, 1965 to execute the CIR
decision which, thru Atty. Espinas handling, was upheld by
this Court in L-24864 in 1968. The Union officers were aware
that Atty. Espinas was the principal counsel even after Atty.
Pineda's assignment. They also knew of the original contract
for 20% attorney's fees which was increased to 35% by Atty.
Pineda upon the arrangement that with the increase, he would
answer for the payment of Attys. Espinas and Lopez' fees and
for necessary representation expenses (p. 450, L-24864 rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid motion, this Court in its resolution of

August 28, 1964, dropped the Union and its officers from the
within contempt charge (p. 455, L-24864 rec.).
WHEREFORE, ATTY. BENJAMIN PINEDA IS HEREBY
FOUND GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT
FOR WHICH HE IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO
IMPRISONMENT IN THE MANILA CITY JAIL UNTIL
THE ORDERS OF THIS COURT DATED SEPTEMBER 1
AND SEPTEMBER 13, 1983 ARE COMPLIED WITH.
ATTY. BENJAMIN PINEDA IS ALSO DIRECTED TO
SHOW CAUSE WHY HE SHOULD NOT BE DISBARRED
UNDER RULE 138 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
LET COPIES OF THIS RESOLUTION AND THE
RESOLUTION OF OCTOBER 18, 1983 BE FURNISHED
THE MINISTRY OF LABOR AND THE TANODBAYAN
FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 10
[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
NATASHA
HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant,
vs.ATTY.
JAMES
BENEDICT
C.
FLORIDO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of
respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual
removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his
oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and using a
spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order.[1]
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. HeysuwanFlorido averred that she is the legitimate spouse of respondent
Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged
and living separately from each other. They have two children
namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James
Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are in
complainants custody. Complainant filed a case for the
annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil
Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the
complaint for annulment of marriage which is pending before
the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235
entitled, James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio
Abarientos, et al.
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent
went to complainants residence in Tanjay City, Negros
Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor
children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a
photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of
Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary
child custody.[2] Complainant called up her lawyer but the
latter informed her that he had not received any motion for
temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of
the alleged resolution of the Court of Appeals, but respondent
failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the
resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November
12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss,
she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while
complainant was with her children in the ABC Learning
Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed
men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him

the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take

them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed
to be agents of the National Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance
of the Tanjay City Police. The responding policemen
subsequently escorted her to the police station where the
matter could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police
station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a
statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally
served on complainant the appellate courts resolution/order.
[3]
In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow
the children to sleep with respondent for one night on
condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay City.
This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay
City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator
Roger Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant
received information that a van arrived at the hotel where
respondent and the children were staying to take them to
Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the
children to another room, where they stayed until later in the
morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified
petition[4] for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting
his right to custody of the children on the basis of the alleged
Court of Appeals resolution. In the meantime, complainant
verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a
certification dated January 18, 2002[5] from the Court of
Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant
to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been
issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on
January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear. Consequently,
the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging
that respondent violated his attorneys oath by manufacturing,
flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in
and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused
and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme
Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was
referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline for
investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of three years with a warning that another
offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. [6] On June
23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved

the Report and recommendation of the Commission with the

modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six
years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent
can be held administratively liable for his reliance on and
attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he
acted in good faith in invoking the Court of Appeals
Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This,
however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the
spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the
Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was
presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as
Special Proc. Case No. 3898,[7] which he filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he
sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from
complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious
Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its
fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The
burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could
not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time
that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of
allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due
recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost
zeal in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the
expense of the truth.[8] Thus, the Code of professional
Responsibility states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood;
nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper, the language or
the argument of an opposing
counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as a
law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or

amendment, or assert as a fact that

which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used
offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant
and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but
dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and
in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. [9] The
lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be gracious
to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such
words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to
another.[10] By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth
as well as a vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly
measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the
legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and the
sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefore.- A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with
the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law.
However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh a
penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years,
which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is
hereby imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty.
James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal
record of respondent as a member of the Bar and furnished the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the
country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 123698. August 5, 1998]

ETERNAL
GARDENS
MEMORIAL
PARK
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. COURT
OF
APPEALS and SPS. LILIA SEVILLA and JOSE
SEELIN, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, A.M., J.:
This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park Corporation has come to this Court assailing
the execution of the judgment dated August 24, 1989, rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City in Civil Case
No. C-9297. Apparently, hope springs eternal for petitioner,
considering that the issues raised in this second petition for
review are but mere reiterations of previously settled issues
which have already attained finality. We now write finis to this
controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17) years,
for as we ruled in Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 15,
Ozamis City:[1]
x x x litigations must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, it being essential to the effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits
of the verdict. Hence, courts must guard themselves against
any scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they
are to put an end to controversies, they should frown upon any
attempt to prolong it. Public policy and sound practice demand
that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by
law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium.

Dismissing counterclaim of defendant without pronouncement

as to costs."
The
aforesaid
decision
was
affirmed[3] by
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 25989 on
June 25, 1991 and eventually upheld by this Court in G.R. No.
L-101819 on November 25, 1991. Said dismissal became final
on March 5, 1992.[4]
The RTC decision, having become final and executory,
private respondents moved for execution which was granted
by the lower court.Accordingly, a writ of execution of the
decision was issued.
Subsequently, private respondents filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for an Immediate Writ of
Possession/Break Open Order.The motion was opposed by
herein petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation
contending that it is not submitting to the jurisdiction of the
trial court; that it is completely unaware of the suit between
private respondents and Central Dyeing; that it is the true and
registered owner of the lot having bought the same from
Central Dyeing; and that it was a buyer in good faith.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court granted private
respondents motion. Another Order was issued on August 18,
1992 by the trial court holding that the judgment was binding
on petitioner, being the successor-in-interest of defendant
Central Dyeing pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for
certiorari. On September 30, 1992 the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment dismissing the petition, excerpts of which
read:

The facts:
The case started on May 18, 1981 when private respondentspouses Jose Seelin and Lilia Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint
against Central Dyeing & Finishing Corporation (Central
Dyeing for brevity) for quieting of title and for declaration of
nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT No. 205942)
issued in the name of said corporation, docketed as Civil Case
No. C-9297, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
On August 24, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment,[2] the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring the defendant's Certificate of Title No. 205942 null
and void.

We reviewed carefully the assailed orders and find no

compelling reason to disturb the same.
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from
Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil
Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered
therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a
transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or
impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment
because the action or suit may be continued for or against the
original party or the transferor and still be binding on the
transferee[5]
The motion for reconsideration was also denied by the
Court of Appeals on February 18, 1993.[6]

On further appeal to this Court, petitioners petition for

review on certiorari, docketed as G. R. No. 109076, was
denied in a resolution dated August 2, 1993. [7] Upon finality of
said resolution, this Court issued Entry of Judgment dated
October 21, 1993.[8]
Thereafter, private respondents filed another motion for
the issuance of a second writ of execution before the trial court
which was granted in the Order of July 20, 1994.
Not willing to give up, petitioner sought a
reconsideration.Petitioners motion was initially granted [9] on
August 29, 1994 by the trial court thru Judge Arturo
Romero. However, upon motion of private respondents, the
said order was reconsidered on December 19, 1994[10] by
Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., who succeeded Judge Romero.
Forthwith, alias writs of execution were issued.
Desperately needing a favorable judgment, petitioner, for
the second time, filed a petition for certiorari [11] with
respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
36591), arguing inter alia: that the judgment cannot be
executed against it because it was not a party to Civil Case No.
C-9297; that the decision of the trial court in said case never
mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of the property
to the private respondents; that certain facts and circumstances
which occurred after the finality of the judgment will render
the execution highly unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the
issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates the lot
buyers freedom of religion and worship; and that private
respondents title is being questioned in another case.
On September 29, 1995, the respondent court rendered
judgment[12] dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground
that the lower court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long
become final and executory. It ruled, thus:
"This Court needs (sic) not belabor the fact that the respondent
Court's decision in Civil Case No. 9297 had long become final
and executory. The respondent court's writs of execution and
possession could have been implemented a long time ago if
not for the series of legal maneuvers of petitioner Eternal
Gardens. x x x x Petitioner Eternal Gardens cannot anymore
stop the execution of a final judgment by raising issues
which actually have been ruled upon by this Court in its
earlier case with Us in CA-G.R. SP No. 28797. To Our mind,
the instant petition is a mere continuation of petitioner's
dilatory tactics so that plaintiffs, although prevailing party,
will not benefit at all from a final judgment in their favor.
Thus, the instant petition is obviously, frivolous and dilatory
warranting the assessment of double costs of this suit against
petitioner Sec. 3, Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court).

Moreover, as manifested by the plaintiffs, herein private

respondents, the instant petition has already become moot
and academic as the property in question was already turned
over by the Deputy Sheriff to the plaintiffs, and the writs of
execution and possession fully satisfied. Thus, hopefully,
putting the legal battle of this case to rest." (Emphasis ours.)
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
January 30, 1996.[13]
Petitioner once again seeks this Court's intervention
reiterating in essence the same line of arguments espoused in
their petition before the respondent Court of Appeals.
The petition must fail.
It is a settled rule that once a court renders a final
judgment, all the issues between or among the parties before it
are deemed resolved and its judicial functions with respect to
any matter related to the controversy litigated come to an end.
Petitioners argument that the trial court cannot order it
and the one hundred (100) memorial lot owners to surrender
and/or deliver possession of the property in dispute on the
ground that they were never parties to the case between
private respondents and Central Dyeing, has long been
resolved by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
28797 when it ruled:
Indeed, since petitioner admits that it bought the property from
Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation, defendant in Civil
Case No. C-9297, petitioner is bound by the decision rendered
therein by respondent Judge.
Under Section 20, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court, a
transferee pendente lite does not have to be included or
impleaded by name in order to be bound by the judgment
because the action or suit may be continued for or against the
original party or the transferor and still be binding on the
transferee.[14]
The aforesaid decision was affirmed by this Court in
G.R. No. 109076 and attained finality on October 21, 1993.
There is, therefore, no need for us to belabor the same issue
here.
Further, petitioners contention that a determination of the
issue of possession should first be resolved before the issuance
of a writ of possession is untenable.
Placing private respondents in possession of the land in
question is the necessary and logical effect or consequence of
the decision in Civil Case No. C-9297 declaring them as the
rightful owners of the property.As correctly argued by the

private respondents, they do not have to institute another

action for the purpose of taking possession of the subject
realty.
Petitioner likewise asserts that certain facts and
circumstances transpired after the finality of judgment in Civil
Case No. C-9297 which will render the execution of the said
judgment unjust and illegal. It points to the pendency of Civil
Case No. C-11337 before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City filed by the Republic of the Philippines against
private respondents for nullification of 22 titles which include
the title to the subject property. Petitioner argues that the
pendency of the said case provides a reasonable justification
why execution of the aforesaid judgment and delivery of
possession of the subject property should be permanently
stayed or at least held in abeyance until after the final
resolution of the case.
We do not agree.
The pendency of Civil Case No. C-11337 for annulment
of titles filed by the Republic against private respondents will
not justify the suspension of the execution of the judgment in
Civil Case No. C-9297. This is so because the petitioners title
which originated from Central Dyeing (TCT No. 205942) was
already annulled in the judgment sought to be executed, and
which judgment had long been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and by this Court. Thus, even if, in the remote
possibility, the trial court will nullify the said private
respondents title in Civil Case No. C-11337, as argued by
petitioner, the supposed adverse decision cannot validate TCT
No. 205942 and make petitioner the rightful owner of the
subject land. Clearly, the present petition was instituted merely
to delay the execution of the judgment.
Finally, petitioners fear that the grave lots will be
disturbed, desecrated and destroyed once the execution of the
judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A perusal of
the Orders of the trial court with regard to the execution of the
judgment reveals that the interests of said burial lot owners
have been taken into account by the trial court when it took
steps and made suggestions as to how their rights could be
amply protected. In its Order dated February 13, 1995, the trial
court, through Judge Emilio L. Leachon, Jr., stated:
"The defendant-petitioner are (sic) however not completely
without recourse or remedy because they can still go after the
original party-defendant or transferor of the property in
question which is Central Dyeing and Finishing Corporation
pursuant to Section 20, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. And
should it be difficult or nay impossible for plaintiffrespondents to be placed in possession of the subject property,
due to defendant-petitioners' arguments that the same have
already been sold to burial lot buyers, then it should be

incumbent for the defendant-petitioners to negotiate with the

plaintiff-respondents for payment in cash of the property
subject of their complaint to avoid demolition or desecration
since they benefited from the sale of the burial lots."[15]
In another order dated May 4, 1995, the following
directive was given, to wit:
"The court directs and orders the defendant to give access to
the plaintiffs and as proposed by the plaintiffs, they are
given authority to destroy a small portion of the fence so that
they can have access to the property. But as to the demolition
of the burial lots, negotiation could be made by the defendant
with the former owner so that cash payment or cash settlement
be made."[16]
Even the former Presiding Judge Arturo A. Romero, in
his Order dated July 20, 1994, imposed the following
limitation on the writ of execution, as follows:
"Moreover, considering the manifestation that large areas
within the Eternal Gardens have been sold to so many persons
who now have buried their beloved ones in the grave lots
adjoining the lot in question, it is therefore, in the interest of
justice and equity, that the enforcement of the writ of
possession and break open order should be applied only to the
gate of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern side
nearest to the parcel of land in question where the factory of
the defendant is located, in order to avoid disturbing the peace
of the resting souls over the graves spread over the parcels of
land within the said memorial park."[17]
From the above-mentioned orders, it can be seen that the
issue as to the status of the burial lot owners has been properly
addressed.
Be that as it may, the petition has been rendered moot
and academic in view of the fact that the questioned Alias Writ
of Possession dated December 27, 1994 and the Alias Writ of
Execution dated December 27, 1994 have already been
implemented by the Sheriff as shown by the Sheriffs Return,
[18]
dated March 31, 1995, with the attached Turn Over
Premises[19] indicating therein that private respondents took
possession of the subject property.
A note of caution. This case has again delayed the
execution of a final judgment for seventeen (17) years to the
prejudice of the private respondents. In the meantime that
petitioner has thwarted execution, interment on the disputed
lot has long been going on, so that by the time this case is
finally terminated, the whole lot shall have already been filled
with tombstones, leaving nothing for private respondents, the
real owners of the property. This is a mockery of justice.

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the

interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's
right, they should not forget that they are officers of the court,
bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. They should not,
therefore, misuse the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of
justice or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse court processes.[20] In Banogan et. al. vs.
Cerna, et. al.,[21] we ruled:
"As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to
assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not
discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add
to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is
burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the
law should advise them when a case such as this, should not
be permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested
judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their
clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit
do not deserve the attention of the courts."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 11
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE
RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented

petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's "unconstitutional and
obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying
petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut
justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without
knowing why he lost the case.

VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
xxx xxx xxx
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September
25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great
injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court."
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled
by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His
client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this
Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial
victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that
he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the
members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by
the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind,
but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of
his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may
know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with
a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of
Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law
IN TRUST with reservation that at any time
in the future and in the event we regain our
faith and confidence, we may retrieve our
title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the
aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967,
the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as
follows:

There is no use continuing his law practice,

Almacen said in this petition, "where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting
himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme
Court "will become responsive to all cases
brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of
merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of
men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic]
justice, who ignore their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of
the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection
therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused
the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must
clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional
bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case
entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in
which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial
court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client.
On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the
decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for

its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of

the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place
of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the
plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of
proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove
that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first
motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17,
1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached
the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial
court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty.
Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966,
had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff
interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal
bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's
decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the
appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated
March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of
the opposition thereto filed by defendantappellant; the Court RESOLVED TO
DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal,
for the reason that the motion for
reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90113, printed record on appeal) does not
contain a notice of time and place of hearing
thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of
paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to appeal,
and, consequently, the appeal was perfected
out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging
that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same
time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the
Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration,"
citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza,
L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the
applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the
motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by
defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May 8,
1967, dismissing the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some

important distinctions between this case and
that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this
Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest
case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417,
May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme
Court concerning the question raised by
appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to
the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety
& Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between
this case and that of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the
resolution denying the motion to dismiss the
appeal, based on grounds similar to those
raised herein was issued on November 26,
1962, which was much earlier than the date
of promulgation of the decision in the
Manila Surety Case, which was June 24,
1965. Further, the resolution in the
Venturanza case was interlocutory and the
Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice
to appellee's restoring the point in the brief."
In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs.
Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon
the issue sub silencio presumably because of
its prior decisions contrary to the resolution
of November 26, 1962, one of which is that
in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case.
Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no
authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We
refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the
appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second
motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was
ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his
disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is
interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its

individual members, a behavior that is as unprecedented as it

is unprofessional.

dost thou see the speck in

thy brother's eye, and yet
dost not consider the beam
in thy own eye? Or how
can thou say to thy
brother, "Let me cast out
the speck from thy eye";
and behold, there is a
beam in thy own eye?
Thou hypocrite, first cast
out the beam from thy
own eye, and then thou
wilt see clearly to cast out
the speck from thy
brother's eyes."

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28,

1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have
actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for
him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he
was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act
on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no
pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and
executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution
did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and
that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the
negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of
the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on
November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show
cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against
him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17
resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause
why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in
an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on
December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five
days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request,
otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident
submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that
since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he
preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and
in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could
observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to
file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time
to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for
his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and
thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is
unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty.
Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations,
this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo.
Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the
Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you
may not be judged. For
with what judgment you
judge, you shall be judged,
and with what measure
you measure, it shall be
measured to you. But why

"Therefore all that you

wish men to do to you,
even to do you also to
them: for this is the Law
and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of
disavowing the statements mentioned in his
petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth
of what he stated, compatible with his
lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court. But
he vigorously DENY under oath that the
underscored statements contained in the
CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous,
grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the
individual members of the Court; that they
tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute
conduct unbecoming of a member of the
noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his
statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND
AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated
with the highest interest of justice that in the
particular case of our client, the members
have shown callousness to our various pleas
for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on
this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words

of humility, appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and
above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE,
what did we get from this COURT? One
word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the
Court towards our pleas and prayers, in
simple word, it is plain callousness towards
our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell
the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the
Constitution, you remained unpunished, this
Court in the reverse order of natural things,
is now in the attempt to inflict punishment
on your respondent for acts he said in good
faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our
pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE,
CHARITY, GENEROSITY and
FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to
justify their stubborn denial with any
semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that
your respondent is given the opportunity to
face you, he reiterates the same statement
with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the
way of life in the Philippines today, that
even our own President, said: "the story
is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it
is still being circulated that justice in the
Philippines today is not what it is used to be
before the war. There are those who have
told me frankly and brutally that justice is a
commodity, a marketable commodity in the
Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We
detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack
the decision of this Court, not the
members. ... We were provoked. We were
compelled by force of necessity. We were
angry but we waited for the finality of the
decision. We waited until this Court has
performed its duties. We never interfered nor
obstruct in the performance of their duties.
But in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality on your

judgment against our client and sensing that

you have not performed your duties with
"circumspection, carefulness, confidence
and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim
his God given right to speak the truth and
his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed
to this Court and the further violations we
sought to be prevented is impliedly shared
by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things
that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous
apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what
crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O
JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or
more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are
committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free
from commission of any abuses, but who
would correct such abuses considering that
yours is a court of last resort. A strong
public opinion must be generated so as to
curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in
paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only
two more symbols, that it is also deaf and
dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of
this Court has ever heard our cries for
charity, generosity, fairness, understanding
sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense,
that inspite of our beggings, supplications,
and pleadings to give us reasons why our
appeal has been DENIED, not one word was
spoken or given ... We refer to no human
defect or ailment in the above statement. We
only describe the. impersonal state of things
and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith

and confidence in the members of this Court
and for which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost
today may be regained tomorrow. As the
offer was intended as our self-imposed
sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to
when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we
have to choose between forcing ourselves to
have faith and confidence in the members of
the Court but disregard our Constitution and
to uphold the Constitution and be
condemned by the members of this Court,
there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which
he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court,
let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for
review. We are quite aware of the criticisms2 expressed against
this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute
resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state
the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial.
We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we
know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates
the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his
arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse
unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions
rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to
have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression
cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large,
this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions
for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full
opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable to
carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr.
Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it,
is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the
particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the
observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs.
Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials
of the writ, and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different justices
to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the
uninformed, even confusing reasons for

denying petitions for certiorari, it has been

suggested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical
considerations preclude. In order that the
Court may be enabled to discharge its
indispensable duties, Congress has placed
the control of the Court's business, in effect,
within the Court's discretion. During the last
three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For
the same three terms the Court denied,
respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions
calling for discretionary review. If the Court
is to do its work it would not be feasible to
give reasons, however brief, for refusing to
take these cases. The tune that would be
required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact
that as already indicated different reasons
not infrequently move different members of
the Court in concluding that a particular case
at a particular time makes review
undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court,
through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its
considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel
urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of
Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short
resolutions, the same question has been
raised before; and we held that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within the
above constitutional requirement. They
merely hold that the petition for review
should not be entertained in view of the
provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court;
and even ordinary lawyers have all this time
so understood it. It should be remembered
that a petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion; and so there is
no need to fully explain the court's denial.
For one thing, the facts and the law are
already mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as
intended helped the Court in alleviating
its heavy docket; it was patterned after the
practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein
petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on

petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the
benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling
reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved
into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory
jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals
is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This
axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision
discretionary.A review is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, and
will be granted only when there are special
and important reasons therefor. The
following, while neither controlling nor fully
measuring the court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons which will be
considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a
question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has
decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of
the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned
such departure by the lower court, as to call
for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon
a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records,
that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered
the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and
applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away
from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,"
it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a number
of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to
exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back
as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have known
that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the
period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the
motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify
the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which
admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally articulated
in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co.,
supra:

The written notice referred to evidently is

prescribed for motions in general by Rule
15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26),
which provides that such notice shall state
the time, and place of hearing and shall be
served upon all the Parties concerned at least
three days in advance. And according to
Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall
be acted upon by the court without proof of
such notice. Indeed it has been held that in
such a case the motion is nothing but a
useless piece of paper (Philippine National
Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963;
citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81;
Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v.
Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and
Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117).
The reason is obvious: Unless the movant
sets the time and place of hearing the Court
would have no way to determine whether
that party agrees to or objects to the motion,
and if he objects, to hear him on his
objection, since the Rules themselves do not
fix any period within which he may file his
reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review
the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His
own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal,
which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from
himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a
"whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture
of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional
certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and
inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It
would thus appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen
the most circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural
for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses
what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is
why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice
their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the
manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and
criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is
especially recognized where the criticism concerns a
concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are
thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all
our official actions," said the Supreme Court of

Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people
have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and
censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public
servants, must answer for their official actions before the
chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to
an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty, with
"imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the
reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on
those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially
in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an
entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who
vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and
fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into
the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the
court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right,
but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and
expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted
in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an
officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming
the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a
citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts
in a fair and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of the
judiciary, has always been encouraged by
the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of
the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals,
he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law
journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal
pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to
see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v.
Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice
Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be
allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity,

impartiality or integrity of judges than

members of the bar. They have the best
opportunities for observing and forming a
correct judgment. They are in constant
attendance on the courts. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject
under liability to be called to account and to
be deprived of his profession and livelihood,
by the judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a
position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it
his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right.
Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to
legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am.
Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar
have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency
of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse
the privilege, as no other class has as great
an interest in the preservation of an able and
upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in
Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of
courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position
to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is
concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but
as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v.
Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall
be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations
and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His
investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders
no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative
than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows
solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the
courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and

judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him

"to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly
assume, if they do not by express declaration
take upon themselves, when they are
admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be
obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to
maintain at all times the respect due to
courts of justice and judicial officers. This
obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous demeanor
in open court, but includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward judges personally
for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20
Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the
courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice.
Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers
even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up
their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be
an abler or more learned lawyer than the
judge, and it may tax his patience and
temper to submit to rulings which he regards
as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect
are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of
the judge must be obeyed, because he is the
tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar
should at all times be the foremost in
rendering respectful submission. (In Re
Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly
of his intellectual endowment That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden
into a belief that he may attack a court's
decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez
in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L22979. June 26, 1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his
personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere
citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in
private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of
a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to
bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice,
may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination
of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither
sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in
office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102
So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a
lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation and the
application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic
theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and criticisms
which do not exceed the bounds of decency
and truth or which are not aimed at. the
destruction of public confidence in the
judicial system as such. However, when the
likely impairment of the administration of
justice the direct product of false and
scandalous accusations then the rule is
otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was
suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled
"JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal
judge of having committed judicial error, of being so
prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of
being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a
prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is
BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is
also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find
that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a
lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on
the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into
disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of
California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney
who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time
was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular
which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a

statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable

-said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of
authorities which place no limit to the
criticism members of the bar may make
regarding the capacity, impartiality, or
integrity of the courts, even though it
extends to the deliberate publication by the
attorney capable of correct reasoning of
baseless insinuations against the intelligence
and integrity of the highest courts. See State
Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA
(N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex
parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep.
637. In the first case mentioned it was
observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we
do not so decide) that a
libelous publication by an
attorney, directed against a
judicial officer, could be
so vile and of such a
nature as to justify the
disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in
that case were of graver character than those
made by the respondent here. But, in our
view, the better rule is that which requires of
those who are permitted to enjoy the
privilege of practicing law the strictest
observance at all times of the principles of
truth, honesty and fairness, especially in
their criticism of the courts, to the end that
the public confidence in the due
administration of justice be upheld, and the
dignity and usefulness of the courts be
maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734,
an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a
divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of
review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the
press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and
others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v.
Petersen is cleared up so that my name is
protected from the libel, lies, and perjury
committed in the cases involved, I shall be
compelled to resort to such drastic action as
the law allows and the case warrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to

allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that
he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible
political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the
attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism,
and whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint against a judge, it is the
right and duty of a lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities, but the
public interest and the administration of the
law demand that the courts should have the
confidence and respect of the people. Unjust
criticism, insulting language, and offensive
conduct toward the judges personally by
attorneys, who are officers of the court,
which tend to bring the courts and the law
into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be
permitted. The letter written to the judge
was plainly an attempt to intimidate and
influence him in the discharge of judicial
functions, and the bringing of the
unauthorized suit, together with the write-up
in the Sunday papers, was intended and
calculated to bring the court into disrepute
with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the
courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed,
saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It
does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the
opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged
with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a
period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed,
would tend to weaken the authority of the
court against whose members it was made,
bring its judgments into contempt,
undermine its influence as an unbiased
arbiter of the people's right, and interfere
with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the
court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any
part of that freedom of speech which he
possesses as a citizen. The acts and
decisions of the courts of this state, in cases
that have reached final determination, are
not exempt from fair and honest comment
and criticism. It is only when an attorney

transcends the limits of legitimate criticism

that he will be held responsible for an abuse
of his liberty of speech. We well understand
that an independent bar, as well as
independent court, is always a vigilant
defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl.
723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was
suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court
an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court
from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said,
constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from
practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew
the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the result of
an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The
Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there
is a growing habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and integrity of
judicial officers in the discharge of their
duties, and thereby reflecting on the
administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is influenced
by corrupt or improper motives. Every
attorney of this court, as well as every other
citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to
submit charges to the authorities in whom is
vested the power to remove judicial officers
for any conduct or act of a judicial officer
that tends to show a violation of his duties,
or would justify an inference that he is false
to his trust, or has improperly administered
the duties devolved upon him; and such
charges to the tribunal, if based upon
reasonable inferences, will be encouraged,
and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the
inherent right of an attorney in a case
decided against him, or the right of the
Public generally, to criticise the decisions of
the courts, or the reasons announced for
them, the habit of criticising the motives of
judicial officers in the performance of their
official duties, when the proceeding is not
against the officers whose acts or motives
are criticised, tends to subvert the
confidence of the community in the courts
of justice and in the administration of
justice; and when such charges are made by
officers of the courts, who are bound by
their duty to protect the administration of

justice, the attorney making such charges is

guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this
statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however,
with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and
finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too
much to look for a decision in their favor
against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only
transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted
attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of
this court, and make out a prima facie case
of improper conduct upon the part of a
lawyer who holds a license from this court
and who is under oath to demean himself
with all good fidelity to the court as well as
to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney
apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an
attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he
impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a
case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister
purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The
Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to
members of the bar is one most subversive
of the public good, if the conduct of such
members does not measure up to the
requirements of the law itself, as well as to
the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion
as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of
government. No right thinking man would
concede for a moment that the best interest
to private citizens, as well as to public
officials, whether he labors in a judicial
capacity or otherwise, would be served by
denying this right of free speech to any

individual. But such right does not have as

its corollary that members of the bar who are
sworn to act honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the courts where
justice is administered, if administered at all,
could ever properly serve their client or the
public good by designedly misstating facts
or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and
honesty of purpose by members of the bar in
such discussion is necessary. The health of a
municipality is none the less impaired by a
polluted water supply than is the health of
the thought of a community toward the
judiciary by the filthy wanton, and
malignant misuse of members of the bar of
the confidence the public, through its duly
established courts, has reposed in them to
deal with the affairs of the private
individual, the protection of whose rights he
lends his strength and money to maintain the
judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands
retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440,
the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action
using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal
corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates,"
"colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar
phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of
the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the
erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed
in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those
pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both
the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and
his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he
had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were
published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this
paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to
one who has no better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing
a widow to reward a fraud, with the court
acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and
vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper
motive for the decisions discoverable, short
of assigning to the court emasculated

intelligence, or a constipation of morals and

faithlessness to duty? If the state bar
association, or a committee chosen from its
rank, or the faculty of the University Law
School, aided by the researches of its
hundreds of bright, active students, or if any
member of the court, or any other person,
can formulate a statement of a correct
motive for the decision, which shall not
require fumigation before it is stated, and
quarantine after it is made, it will gratify
every right-minded citizen of the state to
read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension
of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused
was guilty of professional misconduct in
sending to the Chief Justice the letter
addressed to him. This was done, as we have
found, for the very purpose of insulting him
and the other justices of this court; and the
insult was so directed to the Chief Justice
personally because of acts done by him and
his associates in their official capacity. Such
a communication, so made, could never
subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in
any case would be to gratify the spite of an
angry attorney and humiliate the officers so
assailed. It would not and could not ever
enlighten the public in regard to their
judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an
exercise by the accused of any constitutional
right, or of any privilege which any
reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion,
could ever have any occasion or desire to
assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to
his position, can resent such an insult
otherwise than by methods sanctioned by
law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent,
addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can
have no redress in any action triable by a
jury. "The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the
person defamed does not constitute an
actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc.
Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the
sending by the accused of this letter to the
Chief Justice was wholly different from his
other acts charged in the accusation, and, as
we have said, wholly different principles are
applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every

way discreditable; but so far as he exercised
the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the
Constitution and sanctioned by
considerations of public policy, to which
reference has been made, he was immune, as
we hold, from the penalty here sought to be
enforced. To that extent his rights as a
citizen were paramount to the obligation
which he had assumed as an officer of this
court. When, however he proceeded and
thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he
exercised no right which the court can
recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully
violated his obligation to maintain the
respect due to courts and judicial officers.
"This obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous demeanor
in open court, but it includes abstaining out
of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward the judges
personally for their official acts." Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646.
And there appears to be no distinction, as
regards the principle involved, between the
indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a
judge, induced by his official act, and a
personal insult for like cause by written or
spoken words addressed to the judge in his
chambers or at his home or elsewhere.
Either act constitutes misconduct wholly
different from criticism of judicial acts
addressed or spoken to others. The
distinction made is, we think entirely logical
and well sustained by authority. It was
recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra.
While the court in that case, as has been
shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen
to criticise rulings of the court in actions
which are ended, it held that one might be
summarily punished for assaulting a judicial
officer, in that case a commissioner of the
court, for his rulings in a cause wholly
concluded. "Is it in the power of any
person," said the court, "by insulting or
assaulting the judge because of official acts,
if only the assailant restrains his passion
until the judge leaves the building, to
compel the judge to forfeit either his own
self-respect to the regard of the people by
tame submission to the indignity, or else set
in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his
own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man

would hold judicial office under such

conditions."
That a communication such as this,
addressed to the Judge personally,
constitutes professional delinquency for
which a professional punishment may be
imposed, has been directly decided. "An
attorney who, after being defeated in a case,
wrote a personal letter to the trial justice,
complaining of his conduct and reflecting
upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of
misconduct and will be disciplined by the
court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div.
136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in
Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re
Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it
appeared that the accused attorney had
addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the
City Court of New York, in which it was
stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not
law; neither is it common sense. The result
is I have been robbed of 80." And it was
decided that, while such conduct was not a
contempt under the state, the matter should
be "called to the attention of the Supreme
Court, which has power to discipline the
attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel
learned in the law are permitted by writings
leveled at the heads of judges, to charge
them with ignorance, with unjust rulings,
and with robbery, either as principals or
accessories, it will not be long before the
general public may feel that they may
redress their fancied grievances in like
manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be
anything but a happy one, and the
administration of justice will fall into bad
repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44
South. 671, was in this respect much the
same as the case at bar. The accused, an
attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to
the circuit judge, which the latter received
by due course of mail, at his home, while
not holding court, and which referred in
insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in
a cause wherein the accused had been one of
the attorneys. For this it was held that the
attorney was rightly disbarred in having
"willfully failed to maintain respect due to
him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and
thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As

recognizing the same principle, and in

support of its application to the facts of this
case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed.
214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va.
Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244,
3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's
Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against
the accused have been so far sustained as to
make it our duty to impose such a penalty as
may be sufficient lesson to him and a
suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a
lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a
newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the
sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two
years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an
attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and
decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the
attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but
his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest
in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a
case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published
newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court
in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts
and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public,
for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney,
dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of
years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to
make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was
ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from
the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and
impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by
lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations,
whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the
permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism
and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert
public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly

administration of justice, constitute grave professional

misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other
lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court
in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly
constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal
fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in
the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those
catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of
comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the
power of courts to punish for contempt which, although
resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different
end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such
condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may
afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel
branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as
"absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths
of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular
will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding
that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in
defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy
of which he is capable, but it is not, and
never will be so for him to exercise said
right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts requires. The
reason for this is that respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of their institution.
Without such guaranty, said institution
would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion,
the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority
of the court and an intentional contempt of
its dignity, because the court is thereby
charged with no less than having proceeded
in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to
the parties, and 'of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its
power and mocked and flouted the rights of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .

2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the

author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who,
invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news
item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local
newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High
Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is
once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow
mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that
"In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an
end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to
liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable
bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned
jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first
measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in
contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation
of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement
which he caused to be published in the
press, the respondent does not merely
criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is
pending consideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this
Court with the presentation of a bill in the
next Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court
and reducing the number of Justices from
eleven, so as to change the members of this
Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to his statement, are incompetent
and narrow minded, in order to influence the
final decision of said case by this Court, and
thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. But the respondent
also attacks the honesty and integrity of this
Court for the apparent purpose of bringing
the Justices of this Court into disrepute and
degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has
been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices,
that is to say, that it has been deciding in
favor of Que party knowing that the law and
justice is on the part of the adverse party and

not on the one in whose favor the decision

was rendered, in many cases decided during
the last years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in
the honesty and integrity of the members of
this Court, and consequently to lower ,or
degrade the administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines
is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark
to which the Filipino people may repair to
obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of
the members of this Court and believe that
they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their
own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
might be the result. As a member of the bar
and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which he owes fidelity according
to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and
not to promote distrust in the administration
of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees
the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is
under special obligation to be respectful in
his conduct and communication to the
courts; he may be removed from office or
stricken from the roll of attorneys as being
guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A.
[N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings
against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel
charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the
pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous"
pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of
the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of
counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the
sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore
quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are
which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks
of one pitfall into which this Court

has repeatedly fallen whenever the

jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations comes into question. That pitfall is
the tendency of this Court to rely on its own
pronouncements in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that
the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to
earlier rulings without as much as making
any reference to and analysis of the pertinent
statute governing the jurisdiction of the
industrial court. The plain import of all these
is that this Court is so patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of the industrial
court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error to the point
of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one
which refuses to hew to the line drawn by
the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit
in the quoted statements is that the
pronouncements of this Court on the
jurisdiction of the industrial court are not
entitled to respect. Those statements detract
much from the dignity of and respect due
this Court. They bring into question the
capability of the members and some
former members of this Court to render
justice. The second paragraph quoted yields
a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as
"so called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other
cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be
reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited
cases all of them involved contumacious statements made
in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may
ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or
malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case
and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would
now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his
studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called
upon to account were made only after this Court had written
finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has
terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this
was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs.
Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented
with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P.
Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete

disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In

re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the
Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an
editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were
conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the
validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the
case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view
expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to
the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even
after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran
in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede,
obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts
in administering justice in a pending suit or
proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt
which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A
publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in
them or that which tends to bring them in
any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise
criminal contempt, and is equally punishable
by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of
contempt, to be shielded against the
influence of newspaper comments, is the allimportant duty of the courts to administer
justice in the decision of a pending case. In
the second kind of contempt, the punitive
hand of justice is extended to vindicate the
courts from any act or conduct calculated to
bring them into disfavor or to destroy public
confidence in them. In the first there is no
contempt where there is no action pending,
as there is no decision which might in any
way be influenced by the newspaper
publication. In the second, the contempt
exists, with or without a pending case, as
what is sought to be protected is the court
itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their
utility if public confidence in them is
destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the
circumstance that his statements and actuations now under
consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's
appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for
contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the
pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he
could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation
utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of
our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the
situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty.

Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer

and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of the
disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and
duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to
preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and
unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry,
the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether
of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to
preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or
suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself
unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By
constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst
others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of
law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority
to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who
have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in
the Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are
officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one
which is essential to an orderly discharge of
judicial functions. To deny its existence is
equivalent to a declaration that the conduct
of attorneys towards courts and clients is not
subject to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority, and
cannot be tolerated. Any court having the
right to admit attorneys to practice and in
this state that power is vested in this courthas the inherent right, in the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion to exclude them
from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law
is a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence
and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court
that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of the public and of the
courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the
duty, of the court which made him one of its
officers, and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its bar, to withdraw the
privilege. Therefore it is almost universally
held that both the admission and disbarment
of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises his
functions as an attorney, not as a matter of
right, but as a privilege conditioned on his

own behavior and the exercise of a just and

sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend
has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It
has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of
Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we
now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the
utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question
are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course,
purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though
it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond
making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty
and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a
vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated
entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated
to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and
its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the
altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice
administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf
and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this
Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the
Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut
justice" while at the same time branding its members as
"calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced
threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum,"
he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his
actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up
public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called
upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered
no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed
and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the
Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its
members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon
him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition,
answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious
language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far
transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They
could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an
irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more
important of all, bring ;this Court and its members into
disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the
detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of
this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and
completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to
the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross
misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross

transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot

be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity
from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable
democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above
criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and
discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last
resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no
means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and
disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through
constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court
must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be
informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of
our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would
have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants,
prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance.
This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not
only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our
role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings
like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to.
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree,
aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is
necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from
the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with
the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly

constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the

majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very real sense, if there
be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court
itself, not the individual members thereof as well as the
people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay,
even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the
Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of
membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law
is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to
said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as
much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally
invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the
members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that
fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the
exercise of that power because public policy demands that
they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which
call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the
end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is
absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the
sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his
transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these
may range from mere suspension to total removal or
disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances
the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court which, being neither arbitrary
and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need
that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously
guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be
zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of
considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However,
heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end
desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope
that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will
realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an
advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is
ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His
demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us
no way of determining how long that suspension should last
and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same
should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone
because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but

also because, even without the comforting support of

precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely
exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason
why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and
effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of
that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the
fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for
himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For,
at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may
prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the
practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty.
Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the
practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take
effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of
Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for
their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 112869. January 29, 1996]

KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A.
RAYOS, petitioners,
vs. HON.
PAUL
T.
ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Makati, Branch 134, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders
dated December 3, 1993 and December 17, 1993 of
respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 134 of Makati, finding petitioners guilty of
direct contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.

member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom

plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796,
and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs
feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos
relief;
4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of
His Honor and to give a fighting chance for plaintiffs to prove
their case, since this will be the last case to recover the
partnership property, plaintiffs feel that His Honor inhibit
himself and set this case for re-raffle;
5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and
jurisprudence that in the first instance that a litigant doubts the
partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he should
immediately move for his inhibition.
The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the
Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering Co., brought suit in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS
Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain deeds
by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the plaintiffs
claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled
in the name of the defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by
the latter to codefendant Jose Poe. The case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134 formerly
presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was
replaced by respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wickers counsel,
Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition
of respondent judge from the consideration of the case. [1] The
motion alleged in pertinent part:
1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant
LFS Enterprises, Inc. was able to maneuver the three (3)
successive postponements for the presentation for crossexamination of Mrs. Remedios Porcuna on her 10 August
1992 Affidavit, but eventually, she was not presented;
2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of
this case was eased out of his station. In one hearing, the
Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and
in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc.
who must have known that His Honor was not reporting did
not likewise appear while other counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge
was personally recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin
Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time

Considering the allegations to be malicious, derogatory

and contemptuous, respondent judge ordered both counsel and
client to appear before him on November 26, 1993 and to
show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of
court.[2]
In a pleading entitled Opposition to and/or Comment to
Motion to Cite for Direct Contempt Directed Against Plaintiff
Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel, Atty. Rayos claimed that the
allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his views
because he merely signed the motion in a representative
capacity, in other words, just lawyering, for Kelly Wicker, who
said in a note to him that a young man possibly employed by
the Court had advised him to have the case reraffled, when the
opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos and the new judge
both failed to come for a hearing, because their absence was
an indication that Atty. Santos knew who the judge may be
and when he would appear. Wickers sense of disquiet
increased when at the next two hearings, the new judge as well
as Atty. Santos and the latters witness, Mrs. Remedios
Porcuna, were all absent, while the other counsels were
present.[3]
Finding
petitioners
explanation
unsatisfactory,
respondent judge, in an order dated December 3, 1993, held
them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer
imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of P100.00.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which
respondent judge denied for lack of merit in his order
of December 17, 1993. In the same order respondent judge
directed petitioners to appear before him on January 7,
1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their sentence.

In their petition[4] before this Court, Kelly Wicker and

Atty. Orlando A. Rayos contend that respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of his discretion in citing them for
contempt. They argue that when a person, impelled by
justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful manner,
asks a judge to inhibit himself from hearing his case, he does
not thereby become guilty of contempt.
In his comment,[5] respondent judge alleges that he took
over as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of Administrative Order No.
154-93 dated September 2, 1993 of this Court and not
because, as petitioners alleged, he was personally recruited
from the South by Atty. Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia
Calcetas-Santos; that he assumed his new office on October
11, 1993 and started holding sessions on October 18, 1993;
that when all male personnel of his court were presented to
petitioner Kelly Wicker he failed to pick out the young man
who was the alleged source of the remarks prompting the
filing of the motion for inhibition; that he was not vindictive
and that he in fact refrained from implementing the execution
of his order dated December 3, 1993 to enable petitioners to
avail themselves of all possible remedies; that after holding
petitioners in contempt, he issued an order dated December 8,
1993 inhibiting himself from trying Civil Case No. 14048; that
Atty. Rayos claim that he was just lawyering and acting as the
vehicle or mouthpiece of his client is untenable because his
(Atty. Rayos) duties to the court are more important than those
which he owes to his client; and that by tendering their profuse
apologies in their motion for reconsideration of the December
3, 1993 order, petitioners acknowledged the falsity of their
accusations against him; and that the petitioners have taken
inconsistent positions as to who should try Civil Case No.
14048 because in their Motion for Inhibition dated November
18, 1993 they asked that the case be reraffled to another sala
of the RTC of Makati, while in their petition dated November
29, 1993, which they filed with the Office of Court
Administrator, petitioners asked that Judge Capulong be
allowed to continue hearing the case on the ground that he had
a full grasp of the case.
In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge,
petitioners claim that although they wanted a reraffle of the
case, it was upon the suggestion of respondent judge himself
that they filed the petition with the Court Administrator for the
retention of Judge Capulong in the case.
What is involved in this case is an instance of direct
contempt, since it involves a pleading allegedly containing
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements submitted to the
court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, as
distinguished from a pleading filed in another case. The
former has been held to be equivalent to misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to

interrupt the proceedings before the same within the meaning

of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct
contempt.[6]
It is important to point out this distinction because in
case of indirect or constructive contempt, the contemnor may
be punished only [a]fter charge in writing has been filed, and
an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or
counsel, whereas in case of direct contempt, the respondent
may be summarily adjudged in contempt.Moreover, the
judgment in cases of indirect contempt is appealable, whereas
in cases of direct contempt only judgments of contempt by
MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable.[7]
Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for
respondent judge to hold a hearing. Hence even if petitioners
are right about the nature of the case against them by
contending that it involves indirect contempt, they have no
ground for complaint since they were afforded a hearing
before they were held guilty of contempt. What is important to
determine now is whether respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding petitioners liable for direct
contempt.
We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the
power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect
without which the administration of justice will fail. [8] The
contempt power ought not to be utilized for the purpose of
merely satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for
showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court.[9]
Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the
abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangels
finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt. A reading of the
allegations in petitioners motion for inhibition, particularly the
following paragraphs thereof:
2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case
was eased out of his station. In one hearing, the Acting
Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station and in that
set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who
must have known that His Honor was not reporting did not
likewise appear while other counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge
was personally recruited from the south by Atty. Benjamin
Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos, one time
member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom
plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796,
and although said case was dismissed, nevertheless, plaintiffs
feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos
relief;

leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge was

beholden to the opposing counsel in the case, Atty. Benjamin
Santos, to whom or to whose wife, the judge owed his transfer
to the RTC of Makati, which necessitated easing out the
former judge to make room for such transfer.
These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and
honor of respondent judge and constitute an unwarranted
criticism of the administration of justice in this country. They
suggest that lawyers, if they are well connected, can
manipulate the assignment of judges to their advantage. The
truth is that the assignments of Judges Arcangel and Capulong
were made by this Court, by virtue of Administrative Order
No. 154-93, precisely in the interest of an efficient
administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII
of the Constitution.[10] This is a matter of record which could
have easily been verified by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he
claims, he deliberated for two months whether or not to file
the offending motion for inhibition as his client allegedly
asked him to do.
In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he
merely did what he had been bidden to do by his client of
whom he was merely a mouthpiece. He was just lawyering
and he cannot be gagged, even if the allegations in the motion
for the inhibition which he prepared and filed were false since
it was his client who verified the same.
To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty. Rayos
was that he had been told by an unidentified young man,
whom he thought to be employed in the court, that it seemed
the opposing counsel, Atty. Santos, knew who the replacement
judge was, because Atty. Santos did not show up in court on
the same days the new judge failed to come. It would,
therefore, appear that the other allegations in the motion that
respondent judge had been personally recruited by the
opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been
eased out were Atty. Rayos and not Wickers. Atty. Rayos is
thus understating his part in the preparation of the motion for
inhibition.
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the
allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an
instrument of his client. His client came to him for
professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and
while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds
set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not
overstep.[11] Even a hired gun cannot be excused for what Atty.
Rayos stated in the motion. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much
responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion
for inhibition as his client.

Atty. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to that of

his client.The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him
to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by
others[12] and not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have materiality to the case.[13]
After the respondent judge had favorably responded to
petitioners profuse apologies and indicated that he would let
them off with a fine, without any jail sentence, petitioners
served on respondent judge a copy of their instant petition
which prayed in part that Respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel
be REVERTED to his former station. He simply cannot do in
the RTC of Makati where more complex cases are heared (sic)
unlike in Davao City. If nothing else, this personal attack on
the judge only serves to confirm the contumacious attitude, a
flouting or arrogant belligerence first evident in petitioners
motion for inhibition belying their protestations of good faith.
Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v.
Masaquel:[14]
Numerous cages there have been where judges, and even
members of the Supreme Court, were asked to inhibit
themselves from trying, or from participating in the
consideration of a case, but scarcely were the movants
punished for contempt, even if the grounds upon which they
based their motions for disqualification are not among those
provided in the rules. It is only when there was direct
imputation of bias or prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to
disqualify the judge, done in a malicious, arrogant, belligerent
and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in contempt
of court.
It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies to this
case.
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with
the rule that the power to cite for contempt must be exercised
for preservative rather than vindictive principle we think that
the jail sentence on petitioners may be dispensed with while
vindicating the dignity of the court. In the case of petitioner
Kelly Wicker there is greater reason for doing so considering
that the particularly offending allegations in the motion for
inhibition do not appear to have come from him but were
additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition, Wicker is
advanced in years (80) and in failing health (suffering from
angina), a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute. Wicker may
have indeed been the recipient of such a remark although he
could not point a court employee who was the source of the
same. At least he had the grace to admit his mistake both as to
the source and truth of said information. It is noteworthy
Judge Arcangel was also willing to waive the imposition of the
jail sentence on petitioners until he came upon petitioners

description of him in the instant petition as a judge who cannot

make the grade in the RTC of Makati, where complex cases
are being filed. In response to this, he cited the fact that the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines chose him as one of the most
outstanding City Judges and Regional Trial Court Judges in
1979 and 1988 respectively and that he is a 1963 graduate of
the U.P. College of Law.
In Ceniza v. Sebastian,[15] which likewise involved a
motion for inhibition which described the judge corrupt, the
Court, while finding counsel guilty of direct contempt,
removed the jail sentence of 10 days imposed by the trial court
for the reason that
Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist
the conclusion, considering the background of this occurrence
that respondent Judge in imposing the ten-day sentence was
not duly mindful of the exacting standard [of] preservation of
the dignity of his office not indulging his sense of grievance
sets the limits of the authority he is entitled to exercise. It is
the view of the Court that under the circumstances the fine
imposed should be increased to P500.00.
The same justification also holds true in this case.
WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is
MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of imprisonment for
five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P 100.00 to
P200.00 for each of the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 12
[A.C. No. 5054. May 29, 2002]
SOLEDAD NUEZ, Represented by ANANIAS B. CO,
Attorney-in-Fact for Complainant, petitioner, vs.
ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, respondent.
R ES OLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April
1999 by Soledad Nuez, a septuagenarian represented by her
attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of
respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of grave
misconduct.
From the documents submitted by the complainant, it
appears that sometime in October 1982 she authorized
respondent to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi
City for P40,000. She agreed to give respondent 10 percent of
the price as commission. Respondent succeeded in selling the
lots, but despite complainants repeated demands, he did not
turn over to her the proceeds of the sale. This forced
complainant to file against respondent and his wife an action
for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-15052.
For his failure to file an answer, respondent was declared
in default and complainant was required to present exparte her evidence. On 29 September 1993, the court rendered
its decision (Annex C of the Complaint) ordering respondent
herein to pay complainant the sum of P16,000 as principal
obligation, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date
of the commencement of the action, i.e., 8 March 1993, until it
is fully paid, and to pay the costs of suit.
Respondent and his wife appealed from the decision to
the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal was dismissed for
failure to pay the required docket fee within the reglementary
period despite notice.
On 23 October 1995 complainant filed in Civil Case No.
Q-93-15052 a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, which the court granted on 30 October 1995. The
next day, the alias writ of execution was issued (Annex B of
Complaint). It appears that only a partial satisfaction of
the P16,000 judgment was made, leaving P13,800 thereof
unsatisfied. In payment for the latter, respondent issued four
postdated checks drawn against his account in China Banking
Corporation, Legazpi City.

Upon presentment, however, the checks were dishonored

because the account against which they were drawn was
closed (Annexes D and E of Complaint). Demands for
respondent to make good the checks fell on deaf ears, thus
forcing complainant to file four criminal complaints for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City (Annexes F, G, H and I of the Complaint).
In the Joint Affidavit of respondent and his wife filed
with the Office of the Prosecutor, Quezon City, respondent
admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks
in favor of complainant. Allegedly believing in good faith that
said checks had already been encashed by complainant, he
subsequently closed his checking account in China Banking
Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four checks were
drawn. He was not notified that the checks were dishonored.
Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary
arrangements with the bank.
We required respondent to comment on the complaint.
But he never did despite our favorable action on his three
motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure
to do so compelled complainant to file on 10 March 2000 a
motion to cite respondent in contempt on the ground that his
strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension of time to
submit the comment smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is
unworthy of a member of the bar and a law dean.
In our resolution of 14 June 2000, we noted the motion
for contempt; considered respondent to have waived the filing
of a comment; and referred this case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippine (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision within ninety days from notice of
the resolution.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 12 September
2000, Investigating Commissioner Atty. Milagros V. San Juan
concluded that respondent had no intention to honor the
money judgment against him in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 as
can be gleaned from his (1) issuance of postdated checks; (2)
closing of the account against which said checks were drawn;
and (3) continued failure to make good the amounts of the
checks. She then recommends that respondent be declared
guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant and be
suspended from the practice of law for at least one year and
pay the amount of the checks issued to the complainant.
In its Resolution No. XV-2001-244 of 27 October 2001,
the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted Atty.
San Juans Report and Recommendation.
We concur with the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of
Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is

guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant.

Indeed, the record shows respondents grave misconduct and
notorious dishonesty.
There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at
an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused the
confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed
dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale
of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled
the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds
of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and
energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer
the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default,
he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again,
bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the
docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted
to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to
enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter.
Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully
done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the
alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he
had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan
not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully
adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the
account against which the checks were drawn. There was
deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying
his obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal
cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the
obligation.
All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct
in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account
because he thought complainant has already encashed all
checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before
26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other checks
due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not
be encashed before their maturity dates.
By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public
confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios v. Ricafort, 283
SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]).
Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he
miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal
profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v.
Villalon, supra).

Respondents act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of

the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by
the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice.
His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the
criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his
continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an
officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.
To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts
and judicial processes, respondent even had the temerity of
making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his
three motions for extension of time to file his comment on the
complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the
comment, he as well did not even bother to explain such
failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having
waived the filing of the comment. To the Highest Court of the
land, respondent openly showed a high degree of
irresponsibility amounting to willful disobedience to its lawful
orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, 344 SCRA 76, 82
[2000]; Sipin-Nabor v. Atty. Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073,
28 June 2001).
Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules
12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide that lawyers should
avoid any action that would unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that
lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure
to do so.
The penalty of suspension for at least one (1) year
imposed by the Board of Governors of the IBP is both vague
and inadequate. A suspension may either be indefinite or for a
specific duration. Besides, under the circumstances of this
case a suspension for a year is plainly very light and
inadequate. For his deliberate violation or defiance of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 12:03 and 12:04 of Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled with his palpable
bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings with the complainant,
respondent deserves a graver penalty. That graver penalty is
indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent
Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby INDEFINITELY
SUSPENDED from the practice of law, and is directed to pay
complainant Soledad Nuez the amount of P13,800 within ten
(10) days from notice of this resolution.
This resolution shall take effect immediately. Copies
thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to respondents personal record; the Office of the
President; the Department of Justice; the Court of Appeals; the

Sandiganbayan; and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The

Court Administrator shall also furnish all lower courts with
copies of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

ONAR SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6252

will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those

Complainant,
P
resent:

who violate it or neglect observance thereof.

__________________
*

Panganiban, J.,

On leave.

Chairman,

The Case and the Facts

- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and
Carpio Morales,* JJ

Before us is a verified Complaint [1] filed by Jonar

Promulgated:
Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,
Respondent. October 5, 2004

Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V.

Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -x

Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with

DECISION
deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under
Section 27 of Rule 138 [2] of the Rules of Court; and violation
PANGANIBAN, J.:
of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03[3], Canon 5[4], and Canons
12.07[5]and

12.08

of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

N
otaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner

performance of their duties, which are impressed with public

Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the
interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the
complainant in this wise:
solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court

x x x. In his Letter-Complaint,
Complainant alleged, among others, that
Respondent in notarizing several documents
on different dates failed and/or refused to:
a)make the proper notation regarding the
cedula or community tax certificate of the
affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized
documents in the notarial register; and c)
make and execute the certification and enter
his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents
he had notarized, all in violation of the
notarial provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code.

Complainant likewise alleged that

Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor
of his client and offered the same as
evidence in the case wherein he was actively
representing his client.Finally, Complainant
alleges that on a certain date, Respondent
accompanied by several persons waited for
Complainant after the hearing and after
confronting the latter disarmed him of his
sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting
words and veiled threats.[6]

certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in

Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -indicate the affiants residence certificates on the documents
they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for
these documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the

certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112 [9] of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the

certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said

noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR,

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of

respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their

the CBD,[7] Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to

clients on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony

the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the

is essential to the ends of justice. Complainant charged

non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

respondents

clients

with

attempted

murder. Respondent

averred that since they were in his house when the alleged
crime occurred, his testimony is very essential to the ends of
He opined that the notation of residence certificates

justice.

applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public

and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending
before courts and other government offices.He pointed out that

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had

in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before

threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their

government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence

case

by

the

provincial

prosecutor

on

January

4,

2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan

it granted that request in its Order[17] dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It

City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the

thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the

next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident

Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his

allegations, he submitted Certifications [10] from the Cabanatuan City Police
and the Joint Affidavit[11] of the two police officers who had assisted them.

The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on

September 26,

2001. Respondent did not file any.

Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated

for no other purpose than to harass him, because he was the
The IBPs Recommendation

counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed

by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against
complainant.

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors

issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-172[19]approving
After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD,
through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for
hearing

on

June

5,

afternoon. Notices[12] of the

2001,

at

two

oclock

in

the

hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the

scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so,

apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001. [13] The hearing was reset to July 3,

and

adopting

the

Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law

on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication

of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations

unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation[20] of the investigating commissioner by

increasing the fine to P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier

penalty.

2001 at two oclock in the afternoon.

The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his

138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and

Reply[14] to the verified Answer of respondent. The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July

12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of

13, 2001.[15] It also received complainants Letter-Request[16] to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly,

evidence.

corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state

The Courts Ruling

therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the

same is recorded.[22] Failure to perform these duties would
result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.
[23]

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of

Governors.

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be

Respondents Administrative Liability

simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and

evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries

Violation of the Notarial Law

public entering into their commissions are presumed to be

aware of these elementary requirements.

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and

duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the
party to every document acknowledged before them has
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from
the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and
date as part of such certification. [21] They are also required to
maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all
instruments notarized by them; and to give to each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained

the value and meaning of notarization as follows:

The importance attached to the act

of
notarization
cannot
be
overemphasized.Notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or
authorized
may
act
as
notaries
public. Notarization converts a private
document into a public document thus
making that document admissible in
evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. Courts, administrative agencies and the
public at large must be able to rely upon the

acknowledgment executed by a notary

public and appended to a private instrument.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his

claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to
For this reason, notaries public should not take for

affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these

granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office.Slipshod

formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no

methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to

qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that

be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the

he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly

performance of their duties,[25] which are dictated by public

because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad

policy and are impressed with public interest.

example of others is not an acceptable justification for

breaking the law.

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and

respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial
Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the
residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages
of the notarial registry.

We note further that the documents attached to the

verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of
respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well
as their witnesses Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 692000 for attempted murder, filed by complainants brother
against the aforementioned clients.These documents became
the basis of the present Complaint.

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance

with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits
relative to cases pending before the courts and government
agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in
Nueva Ecija.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating

commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the
absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official

authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he has

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver

personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that

responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn

they

their

oath to obey the laws.[28] No custom or age-old practice

affidavits. Respondent failed to do so with respect to the

provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to

subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that --

adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse

as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply

given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the

with the certification requirement.

Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the

voluntarily

executed

and

understood

importance of his office as a notary public.

Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea

to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of
disbar must be exercised with great caution. [29]Disbarment will
lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that
the law and legal processes.[26] They are expected to be in the
seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer
forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any
law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be welllesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment
informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
should not be decreed.[30] Considering the nature of the
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. [27] It is
infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent,
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal
we believe that the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of
principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their
obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become
susceptible to committing mistakes.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing

before

Prosecutor

Leonardo

Padolina

an

affidavit
The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed

corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondents

upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their
clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: A
clients as witnesses from that as advocates.Witnesses are
lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client.
expected

to

tell

the

facts

as

they

recall

them. In

contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively

plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall
avoid testifying in behalf
of his client, except:

distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested

witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question is one of
propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify

a)
on
formal
matters, such as the
mailing, authentication or
custody of an instrument
and the like;

b)
on substantial
matters, in cases where his
testimony is essential to
the ends of justice, in
which event he must,
during his testimony,
entrust the trial of the case
to another counsel.

for their clients.

Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of

lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism
and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the
lawyer

because

they

cannot

believe

the

lawyer

as

disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for

thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyers client,
they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not
charging, that as a witness he fortified it with his own
disqualified from being a witness,[31] except only in certain
testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and
cases pertaining to privileged communication arising from an
is looked upon as partial and untruthful.[33]
attorney-client relationship.

[32]

Having undertaken the defense of the accused,

respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no
Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from
effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the
being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the
duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every
preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses,
defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to
unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to
the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or
withdraw from active management of the case.[34]
property, except by due process of law.[36]

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly
Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we
necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the
cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the
fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his
following reasons:
clients were at his residence and could not have possibly
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert
every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the
benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which

committed the crime charged against them.Notably, in his

Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of
respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

the latters life and liberty are at stake. [35] It is the fundamental
right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the
charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a

reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their

situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the

guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction

trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the

is according to law.

preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely

inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a
preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of

securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and

charge cannot be equated with liability.[39] It is not the self-

oppressive prosecutions; protecting them from open and

serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent

public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as

that is more credible, considering that the latters allegations

expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State

are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and

from useless and expensive prosecutions.[38] The investigation

the Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.

is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by

the trial proper.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of
violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and

Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with

remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in

a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt

any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he

with more severely.

may

be

an

essential

witness

for

the

prospective

client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony

SO ORDERED.
may become essential to serve the ends of justice, the canons
of the profession require him to withdraw from the active
prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment

The charge that respondent harassed complainant and

uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by
evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare

CANON 13
A.M. No. 1769 June 8, 1992
CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent.

on the 3 defaulted cases he said he has no

objection in fact he is happy and
recommended that you mail the said
decisions in due time thru me to be delivered
to him.
xxx xxx xxx
I will communicate with you from time to
time for any future development.

PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria,
seeking disciplinary action against respondent Irineo L. Bunyi,
member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent
Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption,
dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge
and bribery", in connection with respondent's handling of
Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then pending before the
Municipal Court of Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over
by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in which respondent
Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs.
Constancia Mascarinas.
Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M.
Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm located in
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant
Lantoria was the manager and supervisor of said farm,
receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that the
complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the
squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These cases were
assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del
Bur, the acting municipal judge of which was the Honorable
Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge of
the municipal court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). 4 The
defendants in the mentioned civil cases were, in due course,
declared in default.
In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the
present case show that complainant Lantoria wrote a letter to
respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which reads as
follows:
Atty. Ireneo Bunye
928 Rizal Avenue
Santa Cruz, Manila
Dear Atty. Bunye:
xxx xxx xxx
Upon informing him of your willingness to
prepare the corresponding judgements (sic)

My best regards to you

and family and to Mrs.
Constancia Mascarinas
and all.

On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant

regarding the said three (3) cases, in this wise:
Dear Major Lantoria,
At last, I may say that I have tried my best
to respond to the call in your several letters
received, which is about the preparation of
the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge
Galicia. The delay is that I have been too
much occupied with my cases and other
professional commitments here in Manila
and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs.
Mascarinas I would say that I am so sorry
but also to you. Mrs. Mascarinas has been
reminding me but I always find myself at a
loss to prepare these Decisions at an early
date sa (sic) possible. So also with my
calendar as to the dates for the next hearing
of the remaining cases over there.
Herewith now, you will find enclosed the
three (3) Decisions against the (3) defaulted
defendants. I am not sure if they will suit to
satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once.
However, it is my request to Judge Galicia,
thru your kind mediation, that if the
preparation of these Decisions do not suit
his consideration, then I am ready and
willing to accept his suggestions or
correction to charge or modify them for the
better. And to this effect, kindly relay at
once what he is going to say or thinks if he
signs them readily and please request for
each copy for our hold.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your

kind assistance in attending to our cases
there. Regards to you and family and prayer
for your more vigor and success.

b) In the second place, the said letter of June

1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks for
itself, that if ever the same was written by
the Respondent, it was due to the insistence
of the Complainant thru his several letters
received, that the decisions in question be
drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, who
considered such preparation as a big help to
him, because he was at that time holding
two (2) salas one as being the regular
Municipal Judge of Bayugan and the other,
as the acting Judge of Esperanza, both of
Agusan del Sur, with many pending cases
and it was to the benefit of the Complainant
that the early disposition of the cases
involved would not suffer inconsiderable
delay. But, the intention to draft or prepare
the decisions in question was never spawned
by the Respondent. Instead, it came from the
under-standing between the Judge and the
complainant who, from his several letters,
had demonstrated so much interest to eject
at once the squatters from the farm he was
entrusted to manage. Furthermore, the
Complainant's conclusion that the said
decisions were lutong macao is purely nonsense as it is without any factual or legal
basis. He himself knew that Judge Galicia
asked for help in the drafting of said
decisions as at any rate they were judgments
by default, the defendants lost their standing
in court when they were declared in default
for failure to file their answers and to appear
at the place and time set for hearing thereof
(See first paragraph, letter of June 1, 1974)

It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to

complainant Lantoria, dated 04 March 1974, the contents of
which read as follows:
\
Dear Major Lantoria,
This is an additional request, strictly
personal and confidential. Inside the
envelope addressed to Judge Vicente C.
Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which
he told me to prepare and he is going to sign
them. If you please, deliver the envelope to
him as if you have no knowledge and
information and that you have not opened it.
Unless, of course, if the information comes
from him. But, you can inquire from him if
there is a need to wait from his words about
them, or copies to be furnished me, after he
signs them, it could be made thru you
personally, to expedite receiving those
copies for our hold. According to him, this
envelope could be delivered to him at his
residence at No. 345 M. Calo St., Butuan
City, during week end. or, at Bayugan if you
happen to go there, if he is not in Butuan
City.
Thanking You for your kind attention and
favor.7
Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed
with this Court the present administrative case against
respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted
three (3) letters dated 04 March, 23 April and 01 June, 1974.
Complainant contends that respondent won the said three (3)
cases because to (respondent) was the one who unethically
prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the
preparation by respondent of said decisions warranted
disciplinary action against him.
By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to
dismiss 8 the administrative complaint, admitted the existence
of the letter of 01 June 1974, but explained the contents
thereof as follows:

c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions

as prepared were in the form of drafts, as in
fact, the letter mentioned subject to
suggestion or correction to change or modify
for the better by Judge Galicia (Second
paragraph, Ibid);
d) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding
(sic) even apologized for the delay in
sending the same to the Complainant and
expressed his gratitude for his assistance in
attending to the cases involved (Last
paragraph, Ibid.)
In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred
the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and

recommendation. 9 On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General

submitted his report to the Court, with the following
averments, to wit: 1) that the case was set for hearing on April
12, September 29, and December 18, 1978, but in all said
scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi appeared; 2) that in
the hearing of 16 January 1979, both respondent and
complainant appeared; 3) that at the same hearing, the
Solicitor General reported the following development
Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of
complainant dated January 16, 1979 sworn
to before the investigating Solicitor, praying
that the complaint be considered withdrawn,
dropped or dismissed on the ground that
complainant "could hardly substantiate" his
charges and that he is "no longer interested
to prosecute" the same. For his part,
respondent manifested that he has no
objection to the withdrawal of the complaint
against him. At the same time, he presented
complainant Lantoria as a witness are
elicited testimony to the effect that
complainant no longer has in his possession
the original of the letters attached to his
basic complaint, and hence, he was not
prepared to prove his charges. 10(emphasis
supplied)
In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows:
a) that the letters of respondent Bunyi (dated 4, March and 1
June 1974), addressed to complainant, showed that respondent
had indeed prepared the draft of the decisions in Civil Case
Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of Esperanza,
Agusan del Sur, which he submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia
thru the complainant; b) that those letters indicated that
respondent had previous communications with Judge Galicia
regarding the preparation of the decisions; c) that the
testimony of complainant to the effect that he had lost the
original of said letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the
complaint in the case at bar are of no moment, as respondent
Bunyi, and his motion to dismiss filed with the Supreme
Court, admitted that he prepared the draft of the decisions in
the said civil cases, and be affirmed the existence of the
letters.

Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that

respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional
conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the
court, to help promote the independence of the judiciary and to
refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial
determination of a litigation in which he is counsel. 11 The
Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. He filed
with the Court the corresponding complaint against
respondent.
In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General,
respondent manifested that in the future he would be more
careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding
the provisions of the canons of professional ethics.
On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the
hearing of this case, the hearing was postponed until further
notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a
manifestation 13 alleging that no hearing was as yet set in the
case since the last setting on 10 December 1980, and he
requested that the next hearing be not set until after six (6)
months when be expected to return from the United States of
America where he would visit his children and at the same
time have a medical check-up.
On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing in
this case, respondent Bunyi and the Solicitor General
appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his
memorandum. Respondent Bunyi filed his memorandum on
16 November 1981. In said memorandum, 14 respondent
submitted that although he prepared the draft of the decisions
in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift or
consideration to influence the Judge in allowing him to
prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered his apology to
the Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted
from his preparation of the draft decisions.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the
determination of the merits of the instant case should proceed
notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in
the case, the respondent himself having admitted that the
letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked for an
apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters may
have had on his duty as a lawyer.
With the admission by respondent of the existence of the
letters upon which the present administrative complaint is
based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the
acts complained of on respondent's duty both as a lawyer and
an officer of the Court.

We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General

that respondent, by way of disciplinary action, deserves
suspension from the practice of law.

Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical

practice in attempting to influence the court where he had
pending civil case. 17

The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had

previous communication with Judge Galicia regarding the
preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83,
and 88, and which he in fact prepared. Although nothing in the
records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's
consent to the said preparation for a favor or consideration, the
acts of respondent nevertheless amount to conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1)
year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be
entered in the bar records of the respondent and the Court
Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this
suspension.

Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of

Professional Ethics (which were enforced at the time
respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which
provides as follows:
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on
the court
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on
the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for
by the personal relations of the parties,
subject both the judge and the lawyer to
misconstructions of motive and should be
avoided. A lawyer should not communicate
or argue privately with the judge as to the
merits of a pending cause and deserves
rebuke and denunciation for any device or
attempt to gain from a judge special
personal consideration or favor. A selfrespecting independence in the discharge of
professional duty, without denial or
diminution of the courtesy and respect due
the judge's station, is the only proper
foundation for cordial personal and official
relations between bench and bar.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's
attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as shown in Canon
No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the
merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or
gives the appearance of influencing the
court.
Rule 13.01 A lawyer shall not extend
extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor
seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity
with judges.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 159486-88. November 25, 2003]

PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
[SPECIAL DIVISION], HON. MINITA CHICONAZARIO, HON. EDILBERTO SANDOVAL,
HON. TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
and
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
R ES OLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 23 September 2003, this Court issued its resolution in
the above-numbered case; it read:
The case for consideration has been brought to this Court via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
filed by Joseph Ejercito Estrada, acting through his counsel
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, against the Sandiganbayan, et al. The
Petition prays
1. That Chief Justice Davide and the rest of
the members of the Honorable Court
disqualify themselves from hearing and
deciding this petition;
2. That the assailed resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan be vacated and set aside;
and
3. That Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565
and No. 26905 pending before the
Sandiganbayan be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Attorney Alan F. Paguia, speaking for petitioner, asserts that
the inhibition of the members of the Supreme Court from
hearing the petition is called for under Rule 5.10 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct prohibiting justices or judges from
participating in any partisan political activity which
proscription, according to him, the justices have violated by
attending the EDSA 2 Rally and by authorizing the assumption
of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency
in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that
the justices have thereby prejudged a case that would assail
the legality of the act taken by President Arroyo. The
subsequent decision of the Court in Estrada v. Arroyo (353
SCRA 452 and 356 SCRA 108) is, petitioner states, a patent
mockery of justice and due process.

Attorney Paguia first made his appearance for petitioner when

he filed an Omnibus Motion on 19 May 2003, before the
Sandiganbayan, asking that the appointment of counsels de
officio (sic) be declared functus officio and that, being the now
counsel de parte, he be notified of all subsequent proceedings
in Criminal Cases No. 26558, No. 26565 and No. 26905
pending therein. Finally, Attorney Paguia asked that all the
foregoing criminal cases against his client be dismissed.
During the hearing of the Omnibus Motion on 30 May 2003,
petitioner presented to the court several portions of the book,
entitled Reforming the Judiciary, written by Justice Artemio
Panganiban, to be part of the evidence for the defense. On 9
June 2003, petitioner filed a motion pleading, among other
things, that
a) x x x President Estrada be granted the
opportunity to prove the truth of the
statements contained in Justice
Artemio Panganibans book,
REFORMING THE JUDICIARY,
in relation to the prejudgment
committed by the Supreme Court
justices against President Estrada in
the subject case/s of Estrada v.
Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 and 356
SCRA 108; and,
b) A subpoena ad testificandum and duces
tecum be issued to Justice Artemio
Panganiban, Justice Antonio
Carpio, Justice Renato Corona,
Secretary Angelo Reyes of the
Department of National Defense,
Vice President Gloria MacapagalArroyo, Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
Jr., and Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, Jr. for them to testify and
bring whatever supporting
documents they may have in
relation to their direct and indirect
participation in the proclamation of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo on January 20, 2001, as
cited in the book of Justice
Panganiban, including the material
events that led to that proclamation
and the ruling/s in the Estrada vs.
Arroyo, supra. (Rollo, pp. 6-7.)
The truth referred to in paragraph a) of the relief sought in the
motion of petitioner pertains to what he claims should have
been included in the resolution of the Sandiganbayan; viz:

The request of the movant is simply for the Court to include

in its Joint Resolution the TRUTH of the acts of Chief Justice
Davide, et al., last January 20, 2001 in:
a) going to EDSA 2;
b) authorizing the proclamation of VicePresident Arroyo as President on
the ground of permanent disability
even without proof of compliance
with the corresponding
constitutional conditions, e.g.,
written declaration by either the
President or majority of his cabinet;
and
c) actually proclaiming Vice-President
Arroyo on that same ground of
permanent disability.
It is patently unreasonable for the Court to refuse to include
these material facts which are obviously undeniable. Besides,
it is the only defense of President Estrada. (Petition, Rollo, pp.
13-14.)
On 2 July 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued an order denying
the foregoing motion, as well as the motion to dismiss, filed
by petitioner. Forthwith, petitioner filed a Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon of the foregoing order. According to
Attorney Paguia, during the hearing of his Mosyong
Pangrekonsiderasyon on 11 June 2003, the three justices of
the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan made manifest
their bias and partiality against his client. Thus, he averred,
Presiding Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario supposedly
employed foul and disrespectful language when she blurted
out, Magmumukha naman kaming gago, (Rollo, p. 13.) and
Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro characterized the motion
as insignificant even before the prosecution could file its
comments or opposition thereto, (Rollo, p. 12.) remarking in
open court that to grant Estradas motion would result in chaos
and disorder. (Ibid.) Prompted by the alleged bias and partial
attitude of the Sandiganbayan justices, Attorney Paguia filed,
on 14 July 2003, a motion for their disqualification. On 31
July 2003, petitioner received the two assailed resolutions, i.e.,
the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 28 July 2003,
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of 6 July
2003; viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-movant Joseph
Ejercito Estradas Mosyong Pangrekonsiderasyon (Na
tumutukoy sa Joint Resolution ng Hulyo 2, 2003) dated July 6,
2003 is DENIED for lack of merit. (Rollo, p. 37.)

and the resolution (Promulgated on 30 July 2003.) of 25 July

2003, denying petitioners motion for disqualification of 14
July 2003; viz:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court,
for want of merit, hereby DENIES the Motion for
Disqualification. (Rollo, p. 48.)
The instant petition assailing the foregoing orders must be
DISMISSED for gross insufficiency in substance and for utter
lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse
of discretion, an indispensable requirement to warrant a
recourse to the extraordinary relief of petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. On the one hand, petitioner would disclaim the
authority and jurisdiction of the members of this tribunal and,
on the other hand, he would elevate the petition now before it
to challenge the two resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. He
denounces the decision as being a patent mockery of justice
and due process. Attorney Pagula went on to state thatThe act of the public officer, if LAWFUL, is the act of the
public office. But the act of the public officer, if UNLAWFUL,
is not the act of the public office. Consequently, the act of the
justices, if LAWFUL, is the act of the Supreme Court. But the
act of the justices, if UNLAWFUL, is not the act of the
Supreme Court. It is submitted that the Decision in ESTRADA
vs. ARROYO being patently unlawful in view of Rule 5.10 of
the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, is not the act of the
Supreme Court but is merely the wrong or trespass of those
individual Justices who falsely spoke and acted in the name of
the Supreme Court. (Urbano vs. Chavez, 183 SCRA [347]).
Furthermore, it would seem absurd to allow the Justices to use
the name of the Supreme Court as a shield for their
UNLAWFUL act. (Petition, Rollo, p. 11.)
Criticism or comment made in good faith on the correctness or
wrongness, soundness or unsoundness, of a decision of the
Court would be welcome for, if well-founded, such reaction
can enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an
error if committed. (In Re Sotto, 82 Phil 595.)
The ruling in Estrada v. Arroyo, being a final judgment, has
long put to end any question pertaining to the legality of the
ascension of Arroyo into the presidency. By reviving the issue
on the validity of the assumption of Mme. Gloria MacapagalArroyo to the presidency, Attorney Paguia is vainly seeking to
breathe life into the carcass of a long dead issue.
Attorney Paguia has not limited his discussions to the merits
of his clients case within the judicial forum; indeed, he has
repeated his assault on the Court in both broadcast and print
media. Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits a member of the bar from making such public

statements on any pending case tending to arouse public

opinion for or against a party. By his acts, Attorney Paguia
may have stoked the fires of public dissension and posed a
potentially dangerous threat to the administration of justice.

(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,

parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate.

It is not the first time that Attorney Paguia has exhibited

similar conduct towards the Supreme Court. In a letter,
dated 30 June 2003, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., and Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, he
has demanded, in a clearly disguised form of forum shopping,
for several advisory opinions on matters pending before the
Sandiganbayan. In a resolution, dated 08 July 2003, this Court
has strongly warned Attorney Alan Paguia, on pain of
disciplinary sanction, to desist from further making, directly or
indirectly, similar submissions to this Court or to its Members.
But, unmindful of the well-meant admonition to him by the
Court, Attorney Paguia appears to persist on end.

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or

holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate
for public office;

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is

DISMISSED, and the Court hereby orders Attorney Alan
Paguia, counsel for petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, to
SHOW CAUSE, within ten days from notice hereof, why he
should not be sanctioned for conduct unbecoming a lawyer
and an officer of the Court.
On 10 October 2003, Atty. Paguia submitted his
compliance with the show-cause order. In a three-page
pleading, Atty. Paguia, in an obstinate display of defiance,
repeated his earlier claim of political partisanship against the
members of the Court.
Canon 5.10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which Atty.
Paguia has tirelessly quoted to give some semblance of
validity for his groundless attack on the Court and its
members, provides Rule 5.10. A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on
political questions. But to avoid suspicion of political
partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches,
contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for
political office or participate in other partisan political
activities.
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term
partisan political activities; the law states:
The term election campaign or partisan political
activity refers to an act designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office
which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or
other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials

designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support
for or against a candidate.
It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in
its statutory context, relates to acts designed to cause the
success or the defeat of a particular candidate or candidates
who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in
an election. The taking of an oath of office by any incoming
President of the Republic before the Chief Justice of
the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest
Magistrate. The assailed presence of other justices of the Court
at such an event could be no different from their appearance in
such other official functions as attending the Annual State of
the Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before
the Legislative Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will
not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for,
if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task
of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor
allow the erosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system,
let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice
law in the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed,
should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally
imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the
impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the
Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede,
obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to
the mandate of Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from
making such public statements on a case that may tend to
arouse public opinion for or against a party. Regrettably,
Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Courts wellmeant admonition.

On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily

Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say What is the legal effect of that violation of President
Estradas right to due process of law? It renders the
decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void.
The rudiments of fair play were not observed. There was
no fair play since it appears that when President Estrada
filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow
justices had already committed to the other party - GMA with a judgment already made and waiting to be
formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. After the justices had
authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can
they be expected to voluntarily admit the
unconstitutionality of their own act?
Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public
statements of like nature.

The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain of

disciplinary sanction, to become mindful of his grave
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court.
Apparently, he has chosen not to at all take heed.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Alan Paguia is hereby
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, effective upon
his receipt hereof, for conduct unbecoming a lawyer and an
officer of the Court.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts of the land through the Office of the Court
Administrator.
SO ORDERED.