Professional Documents
Culture Documents
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
document
Political Law branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation
of the governmental organs of the State with the inhabitants of its territory.
SCOPE
1.
1.
2.
3.
4.
BASIS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Unwritten
Not integrated into a single, concrete form,
Enacted (Conventional)
Formally struck off at a definite time and
place following a conscious or deliberate
effort
Rigid
Amended only by a formal and usually
difficult process
Evolved (Cumulative)
Result of political Evolution, not
inaugurated at any specific time, changes
by accretion
Flexible
Changed by Ordinary Legislation
Qualities
Broad Not only that it covers all persons and things within the territory
but comprehensive enough to provide for every contingency.
Essential Parts
1.
Constitution of Liberty sets forth fundamental and political rights and
imposing limitatios on the powers of government as means of securing
enjoyment of those rights. (Bill of Rights)
2.
Constitution of Government Outlines organization of Government,
Enumerating its Powers, laying down certain rules relative to its
administration and defining the electorate. (Arts. VI, VII, VIII and IX)
3.
Constitution of Sovereignty points out the mode or procedure in
accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be
brought about. (Art. XVII)
4.
Social Justice and human Rights Economic, Social and Cultural. (Art.
XIII)
Interpretation/ Construction
1.
Verba Legis Words in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed
2.
Ratio legis et anima where there is ambiguity, words must be interpreted
in accordance with the intent of the Framers. Bear in mind object sought to
be accomplished and evils sought to be prevented or remedied.
3.
Ut magis valeat quam pereat interpreted as a whole.
Revision
A change that alters a basic principle of
the Constitution like altering the
principle of separation of powers or
system of checks and balances.
Change alters the substantial entirety of
the Constitution.
Several Provisions (Overhaul)
2.
Ratification. (Art. XVII, Sec. 4). Proposed amendment shall become part of
the Constitution when ratified by a majority if the votes cast in a plebiscite
held not earlier than 60 nor later than 90 days after the approval of the
proposal by congress or the Constitutional Convention. Or after the
certification by the COMELEC of the Sufficiency of the petition or initiatie
under Sec. 2, Art. XVII.
a.
b.
a.
b.
c.
d.
2.
3.
4.
Modern
Refuse to recognize the law and
determine the rights of the parties as
Partial Unconstitutionality
1.
Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portions usually shown by
the presence of a separability clause
2.
Valid portion can stand independently
CASE DOCTRINES
CHREA VS CHR
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly
clear that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As
expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others.
Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end
to what is implied.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys
fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control
and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and
utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom
and dispatch its needs may require from time to time.
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with
the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the
DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine
the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be
exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
Compensation Standardization Law.
GALICTO VS AQUINO
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. This requirement of standing relates to the
constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies.
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional
question when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favorable action.
Jurisprudence defines interest as material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present
SANIDAD VS COMELEC
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec
was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises,
permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public
utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal
rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates
are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd
paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who
is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his
work during the campaign period) can be construed to mean that the Comelec
has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media
practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods.
Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite
periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no
candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution
2167 has no statutory basis.
KILOSBAYAN VS GUINGONA
As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural
technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the
liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of
Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to
initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws,
acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether
the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an
independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or
designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered
from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The
intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.
COA OPINION ON PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY RETIRED CHIEF
JUSTICE/ ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme
Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise
of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative
acts void if violative of the Constitution.
The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the
other hand, extends from the notion that the powers of government must be
divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it
is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other
branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be
wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of
3.
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement;
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of
Proclamation 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has
rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial
power being limited to the determination of actual controversies. Nevertheless,
courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet
evading review. The present case is one such case. Once before, the President on
1 May 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to
suppress the rebellion through Proclamation 38 and General Order 1. On that
occasion, an angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed
weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons assaulted and attempted to
break into Malacaang. Petitions were filed before the Supreme Court assailing
the validity of the Presidents declaration. Five days after such declaration,
however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v.
Perez and accompanying cases precluded the Court from addressing the
constitutionality of the declaration. To prevent similar questions from reemerging,
the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the
declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the Presidents calling out
power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS COMELEC
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without
implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has
recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not
provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what
has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest).
The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot
validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to
peoples initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision,
as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization
of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by
initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue
of whether or notthe petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.
SALONGA VS PANO
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State
authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as
constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of
Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The
Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating
bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
TANADA VS ANGARA
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose
act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus
entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent
and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith.
Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow
such presumptions, this Court will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the
foregoing well-accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion and the
presumption of regularity in the Senates processes, this Court cannot find any
cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senates exercise of its
power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII
of the Constitution.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and
overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a
part of the law of the land is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and
power.
What the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether
such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry
and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people.
SANLAKAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
b) Citizens
PREAMBLE
ARTICLE II. Section 2. The Philippine renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres too the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations.
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State
and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personally, military or civil service.
ARTICLE III. Section 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
ROQUE VS COMELEC
Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent to proof; they have little, if
any, probative value and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment.
GONZALES III VS OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
President has power to remove the deputy Ombudsman as long as the acts
constitute betrayal of public trust.
c) Electors
ARTICLE VII. Section 4. The President and the Vice-President
shall be elected by the direct vote of the people for a terms of six years
which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June following the next
day of the election and shall end at noon of the same six years thereafter.
The President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years
shall be qualified for election for the same office at any time.
PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
State - a community of persons, more or less numerous permanently occupying a
definite portion of territory, independent of external control and possessing a
government to which a great body of inhabitants render habitual obedience.
State
legal and juristic concept
Nation
Ethnic or racial concept
Government
Instrumentality of the State
through which the will of
the State is implemented
and realized
Elements of State:
1.
People
a) Inhabitants
2.
T errito ry
Art. 1 RA 3046; RA 5446
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Government
Government The agency or instrumentality through which the will of the
state is formulated, expressed and realized.
Government of the Philippines - the corporate governemnt entity thorugh
which the functions of the government are eof the government are ecised
throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms thorugh which political authority is made effective
in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions, the
provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local
government.(Sec. 2 (1) Administrative Code of 1987)
Functions
a) Constituent mandatory, constituting the very bonds of society
such as maintenace of peace and order, regulation of property and
property rights.
b) Ministrant- discretionary, intended to promote the welfare,
progress and prosperity of the people.
c) Parens Patriae the parent of the state. The government may act as
guardian of the rightsof the people who may be disadvantaged or
suffering from some disability or misfortune.
Classification
De jure vs. De Facto
Kinds of De facto:
1.
Takes possession or control of, or usurps by forcec or by the voice
of the majority the rightful legal government and maintains itself
against the will of the latter
2.
Established by the inhabitants of a territory who rise in
insurrection against the parent state
3.
Which is established by invading forces of an enemy who occupy
a territory in the course of war de facto government of
paramount force.
a.
Presidential
Separation of executive and legislative
powers
Parliamentary
Fusion of both executive and legislative
powers in Parliament, although the actual
exercise of the executive powers is vested
in a Prime minister who is chosen by, and
accountable to, Parliament
Unitary
Single,
centralized
government
exercising powers over both internal and
external affairs of the State
Federal
Consists
of
autonomous
state
government units merged into a single
state, with the national government
Sovereignty
Sovereignty the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in the State
by which the State is governed.
Kinds:
1. Legal power to issue final commands
2. Political Sum total of all the influences which lie behind the law
3. Internal Supreme power over everything within its territory
4. External Independence from external control
Characteristics:
1. Permanence
2. Exclusiveness
3. Comprehensiveness
4. Absoluteness
5. Indivisibility
6. Inalienability
7. Imprescriptibility
Effects of Change in sovereignty Political laws are abrogated.
Effects of Belligerent Occupation No Change in Sovereignty.
Political laws except the law on treason are suspended (Laurel vs.
Misa)
Dominium
Capacity to own or acquire property
including lands held by the State in its
proprietary capacity
Imperium
Authority possessed by the State
embraced in the concept of sovereignty
Jurisdiction:
1.
Territorial
Exempted are:
a. Foreign states and head of States, dimplomatic representatives and
consuls to a certain degree;
b. Foreign State property including embassies, consulates and public
vessels engaged in non- commercial activities;
c. Acts of State;
d. Foreign merchant vessels exercising:
- Rights of innocent passage
- Involuntary entry
- Arrival under stress
e. Foreign armies passing through or stationed;
f. Such other persons including UN.
2.
Personal power of the state over its nationals which may be exercised
even if the individual is outside the territory
3.
Extraterritorial:
a.
Assertion of personal jurisdiction over its nationals abroad;
punish certain offenses committed outside the territory
against its national interests even if offenders are resident
aliens;
b. Relations with other states or territories when it establishes a
colonial protectorate, condominium, or administers a trust
territory or occupies enemy territory in the course of war;
c.
When local state waives its jurisdiction over persons and
things within its territory as when a foreign army stationed
therein remains under the jurisdiction of the sending state;
d. Principle of extra-territoriality as illustrated by immunities
of the head of state in a foreign country;
e.
Enjoyment of easements and servitudes;
f.
Jurisdiction in the high seas, pirates right to visit and search
and doctrine of hot pursuit;
g. Limited jurisdiction over the contiguous zone and
patrimonial sea, to prevent infringement of its customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations.
Suit against Public Officers doctrine of state immunity applies to complaints filed
against officials of the State for acts performed by them in the discharge of their duties
within the scope of their authority.
Public Officers are PERSONALLY liable if act was unauthorized. As when Ultra Vires
or attended by malice, bad faith or gross negligence.
Need for Consent Consent may be either express or implied.
Express Consent by an act of the legislative body, in a general or special law.
1.
General Law
a.
Act 3083 Money Claims of government arising from contract
whether express or implied with the Philippine Government.
b.
PD 1445- General Auditing Law. Before suing the state, one must
first file with the Commission on Audit
2.
Such execution will require another waiver since the government funds
or properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment
unless such disbursement is covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law.
Suitability vs. Liability Liability will have to be determined by the Court on the
basis of the evidence and the applicable law.
Execution will require another waiver because the power of the courts
end when the judgment is rendered (Republic vs. Villasor)
But funds belonging to GOCC whose charters provide that they can sue
and be sued are not exempt from garnishment (PNB vs. Pabalan)
Municipality funds are public in character and even though the carter
provides that it can sue and be sued, such funds may not be garnished
unless by a corresponding appropriation ordinance duly passed by the
Sanggunian Bayan. (Mun. Of San Miguel, Bulacam vs. Fernandez)
CASE DOCTRINES
REPUBLIC VS SANTOS III
The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession
of the water level from the river banks, and the dried up land did not equate to
accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river
banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not
recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian
owners had no legal right to claim ownership of the subject property.
Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural
beds are public dominions of the state. It follows that the river beds that dry up,
continue to belong to the state as its property of public dominion, unless there is
an express law that provides that the dried up river beds should belong to some
other person.
COLLECTOR VS CAMPOS RUEDA
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international
personality, petitioner has not successfully made out a case. It bears repeating four
days after the filing of this petition, in Collector that of Internal Revenue v. De
Lara, 16 it was specifically held by the Court: "Considering the State of California
as a foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and
hold, as did the Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the
exemption from the inheritance tax on the intangible personal property found in
the Philippines." 17 There can be no doubt that California as a state in the
American Union was in the alleged requisite of international personality.
Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122
of the National Internal Revenue Code.
SHIPSIDE INC VS CA
Article 1144(3) provides that an action upon a judgment "must be brought
within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues." On the other hand,
Section 6, Rule 39 provides that a final and executory judgment or order may be
executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry, but that after
the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. Taking these two provisions into
consideration, it is plain that an action for revival of judgment must be brought
within ten years from the time said judgment becomes final. While it is true that
prescription does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the
government in this case since it is no longer interested in the subject matter. While
Camp Wallace may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvez's
title was ordered cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-361, the same no
longer holds true today. With the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the
government no longer has a right or interest to protect. Consequently, the
Republic is not a real party in interest and it may not institute the instant action.
Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only
in cases where the government is a party in interest.
CABANAS VS PILAPIL
It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an
agency of the State acting as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending
suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority to his best interest. It
may happen, that family relations may press their respective claims. It would be
more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of
the country for a parent to be preferred. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible
to the validity of her plea. In a recent case, 9 there is this quotation from an
opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a
royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers
which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of
the people and the destruction of their liberties." What is more, there is this
constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. It reads: "The State shall
strengthen the family as a basic social institution."If, as the Constitution so wisely
dictates, it is the family as a unit that has to be strengthened, it does not admit of
doubt that even if a stronger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a
constitutional mandate would have led the lower court to decide as it did.
LAUREL VS MISA
A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute
and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and
obedience to his government of sovereign. The absolute and permanent allegiance
of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation,
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred
thereby the occupier. Sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during
enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government
or sovereign subsists and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance,
the basic theory on which the petitioners contention rests.
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of
fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does
not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance
from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has
no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the
operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance
owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere
and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not
demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control
of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to
the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the
occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through
force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully
resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor.
The Philippine Republic has the right to prosecute Treason committed during
Japanese occupation.
10
official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign
sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is
believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for
the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the
maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals
and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.
"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge
of their duties. (United States of America vs. Guinto)
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations (Shauf vs. Court of
Appeals):
When public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff.
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an
ordinary citizen.
where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested
in him.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity
from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the
directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable
requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.
PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY VS PGDE
The application of the state immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or
economic affairs. The state, in entering into a business contract, descends to the
level of an individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued.
Since the Intramuros Golf Course expansion Projects partakes of a
proprietary character entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot
avoid its financial liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.
SSS VA CA
The SSS was of the belief that it was acting in the legitimate exercise of its
right under the mortgage contract in the face of irregular payments made by
private respondents, and placed reliance on the automatic acceleration clause in
the contract. The filing alone of the foreclosure application should not be a ground
for an award of moral damages in the same way that a clearly unfounded civil
action is not among the grounds for moral damages. No proof has been submitted
that the SSS had acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. However,
there was clear negligence on the part of SSS when they mistook the loan account
of Socorro J. Cruz for that of private respondent Socorro C. Cruz. The SSS can be
held liable for nominal damages. This type of damages is not for the purpose of
indemnifying private respondents for any loss suffered by them but to vindicate
or recognize their rights which have been violated or invaded by petitioner SSS.
BUREAU OF PRINTING VS BUREAU OF PRNTING EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION
It is true, as stated in the order complained of, that the Bureau of Printing
receives outside jobs and that many of its employees are paid for overtime work,
but these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively
11
officers were being sued not in their personal capacity but as officers of the US
government. Since the officers were acting within the scope of their authority, it is
the government, and not the officers who are responsible for the acts.
As such, the case will not prosper unless the US government itself is made
party to the case. However, under the doctrine of state immunity, the US cannot
be made a party unless they give their consent. We follow this principle of
international law as mandated in the Constitution.
Lastly, the SC said that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo
Naval base, by officers in the performance of official duties, against employees
who themselves were Americans, the case is an internal matter that can be
resolved in the said base. (Note: during this time there was still no VFA.)
REPUBLIC VS SANDOVAL
The SC stated that the acts in question were performed by the American
officers in the discharge of their official duties. The letters were made in the course
of their official functions such that the letters were of official character. Thus, the
officers were being sued not in their personal capacity but as officers of the US
government. Since the officers were acting within the scope of their authority, it is
the government, and not the officers who are responsible for the acts.
As such, the case will not prosper unless the US government itself is made
party to the case. However, under the doctrine of state immunity, the US cannot
be made a party unless they give their consent. We follow this principle of
international law as mandated in the Constitution.
Lastly, the SC said that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo
Naval base, by officers in the performance of official duties, against employees
who themselves were Americans, the case is an internal matter that can be
resolved in the said base. (Note: during this time there was still no VFA.)
US VS RUIZ
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued
in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary
consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However, the
rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and
because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to
distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private,
commercial and proprietory acts. The result is that state immunity now extends
only
to
sovereign
and
governmental
acts.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its
commercial activities or economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of
an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued.
Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the conracts
relates the exercise of its sovereign function.
RCBC VS DE CASTRO
It is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business,
it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.
Accordingly, garnishment was the appropriate remedy for the prevailing
party which could proceed against the funds of a corporate entity even if owned
or controlled by the government inasmuch as by engaging in a particular business
thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac
vice of its own sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the
rules of law governing private corporations.
MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS CA
In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject
to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal
revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended
primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities
and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing
that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the
said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under
execution may be validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for
the said land which has been in their use already. This Court will not condone
petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation
of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be
exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.
FONTANILLA VS MALIAMAN
The functions of government have been classified into governmental or
constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of
sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise
of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional.
The court concluded that the National Irrigation Administration is a
government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body
performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages
caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GRP PEACE PANEL ON
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.
Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned
problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial
review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary
in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion
of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal
rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or treaty only
when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial
determination.
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture,[60] and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate
or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. He must show
12
3.
Additional Limitations
i. Express Grant by Law
ii. Within Territorial Limits
iii. Must not be contrary to law (act may be regulated not
prohibited)
13
ART. III Sec. 9: Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
ART. XII. Section 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or
defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just
compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the Government.
ART. XIII. Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State
shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining
retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small land owners. The State
shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
ART. XII. Sec. 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake,
in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land
reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing
and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers
and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment
opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State
shall respect the rights of small property owners.
Police Power
Promote Public welfare by
restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and
property
Property condemned is
noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose
No compensation
Eminent Domain
Inherent right of the state
to
condemn
private
property to public use
upon payment of
just
compensation
Private property to be used
for some public purpose
Just Compensation
An ejectment suit should not ordinarily prevail over the States power of
eminent Domain. (Republic vs. Tagle)
Jurisdiction over a complaint for eminent domain is with the RTC.
Determination of amount of just Compensation is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit. (Bgy. San Roque, Talisay, Cebu vs. Heirs of Francisco Pastor)
No such thing as Plaintiffs matter of right to dismiss because landowner may
have already suffered damages as of the time of the taking. Always subject to
court approval. (NAPOCOR vs. Pobre)
LGU have no inherent power of eminent domain; the can exercise only when
expressly authorized by Legislature. (Sec. 19 of LGC confers such power to local
governments but the power is not absolute; it is subject to statutory
requirements (Masikip vs. City of Pasig)
RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the
right of eminent domain and determine whether there is a genuine
necessity for it. (BARDILLON VS. LAGUNA)
2.
Private Property
3.
Taking
Prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was intended
Requisites for valid taking (Republic vs. Castelvi):
1.
Expropriator enters property;
2.
Entry must not be for more than a momentary period;
3.
Under warrant or color of authority;
4.
Property devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected;
14
5.
4.
5.
Public Use
That sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy
and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received therefor.
Just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the
owner of the land but also payment within a reasonable time from its
taking. (Eslaban vs. De Onorio)
Judicial Prerogative ascertainment of what constitutes just compensation
is a judicial prerogative which fixes payment on the basis of the assessment
by assessor or the declared valuation by the owner is unconstitutional.
Need to Appoint commissioners Indispensable in order to give the
parties the opportunity ot present evidence on the issue of just
compensation. Trial with aid of commissioners is a substantial right.
But courts are not bound by the commissioners findings, they may
substitute their own estimate if:
1.
Commissioners applied illegal principles to the evidence
submitted to them
2.
Disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence
3.
Amount allowed is grossly inadequate or excessive
Compensation may be in the form of:
1.
Money
2.
Bonds (ASLP vs. Sec. Of Agrarian Reform)
Double Taxation
1.
Same subject
2.
Same Jurisdiction
3.
Same Period
4.
Same Purpose
15
Tax Exemptions No law granting any tax exemptions shall be passed without the
concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress
1.
Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages, convents, mosques non
profit cemeteries and all lands and buildings and improvements ADE
use for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation.
2.
All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions
used ADE for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and
duties.
3.
Donations or contributions used ADE for educational purposes shall be
exempt from tax
4.
Where tax is granted gratuitously, it may be revoked at will but not if
granted for a valuable consideration.
Police Power
Regulation is primary purpose and
revenue is incidental;
Tax
Generation of revenue is primary
purpose and regulation is merely
incidental
License fee
Police measure
Amount collected is limited to the cost of
permit and reasonable police regulation
Tax
Revenue Measure
Unlimited provided it is not confiscatory
PPI VS COMELEC
To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" amounts to
"taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. Therequisites
for a lawful taking of private property for public use are: necessity for the taking;
and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking
has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the
members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec
for election purposes. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone
demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain
either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable
relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of
election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the
Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section
9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is
precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission Resolution
No. 2772 does not provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers,
against their will, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. This does not
constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
TIO VS VRB
The title of the decree, which calls for the creation of the VRB is
comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and
reasonably covered all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those
objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the decree.
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the decree, which is
the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The
tax provision is not inconsistent with nor foreign to the general subject and title.
As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the decree.
ORTIGAS VS CA
Ordinances, in exercise of police power, may be given retroactive effect and
impair vested rights and contracts. Generally, laws are to be construed as having
only prospective operation and that only laws existing at the time of the
execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the
latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. A later law which
enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intent of the parties to the
contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and cannot be given retroactive
effect without violating the constitutional prohibition against impairment of
contracts. But said principles admit exceptions. One involves police power. A
law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern certain activities
or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair
vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applicable not only to
future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non impairment of
contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the legitimate exercise of
police power. Moreover, statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read
into every contract.
16
CHAVEZ VS ROMULO
The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional
right. It is a mere statutory creation. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to
bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right. The right of
individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The
maintenance of peace and order and the protection of the people against violence
are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed
in connection and in harmony with these constitutional duties.
It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution. Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in
other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. At any rate, assuming that
petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution,
the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of
the States police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general
regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare. The basis for the
issuance fo the Guidelines was the need for peace and order in the society owing
to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the New Peoples
Army.
MMDA VS BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION
The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no
syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power.
A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." LGUs are a "body
politic and corporate" - one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of
the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants
of its territory. Our Congress delegated police power to the local government
units in the Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in Section
16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause.
PRC VS DE GUZMAN
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen
to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the
police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order,
safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in
the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be
required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen
careers. This regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to
protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance among those who would practice medicine. In the present case, the
aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended,
which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the
qualifications of candidates for the board examinations, the scope and conduct of
the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a physicians license,
or revoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to
practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the
17
upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the State may not
require a public utility to render services in the general interest, provided just
compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting
service would be the users of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation
would be for public use.
JIL CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION VS MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or
by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. Therefore
it must be strictly construed against the party exercising such power. The he
burden of proof of compliance with the requisites is on the party exercising it.
Respondent failed to prove that a valid offer was made and the same was
rejected. The letter only evidenced a desire to acquire the subject property. The
letter is not a valid and definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the
property for a price certain.
In the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent
domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such
determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. Expropriation is justified so
long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character.
FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INC VS CA
Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized
housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only
when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with
these conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are the only
safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due process
when their property is expropriated for public use.
LAGCAO VS JUDGE LABRA
LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only
when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160 specifically
Section 19 thereof, Congress conferred upon LGUs the power to expropriate.
However, the exercise by the LGUs of the power of eminent domain is not
absolute. It is limited by Sections 1 and 3 of Art. 3 of the Constitution. The
exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowners right
to private property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right necessary
for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately
connected with the rights to life and liberty. The foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of
public character.
Furthermore, RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of
property for purpose of an urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10
thereof provide that private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes
of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings may be
resorted only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance
with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of
oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what may be a tyrannical
violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them
allegedly for public records.
ESLABAN VS DE ONORIO
Under the Land Registration Act, the only servitude which a private
property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is the
easement of a "public highway, way, private way established by law, or any
government canal or lateral thereof where the certificate of title does not state
that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined." This implies that the
same should have been pre-existing at the time of the registration of the land in
order that the registered owner may be compelled to respect it. Conversely,
where the easement is not pre-existing and is sought to be imposed only after the
land has been registered under the Land Registration Act, proper expropriation
proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid to the registered owner
thereof.
Indeed, the rule is that where private property is needed for conversion to
some public use, the first thing obviously that the government should do is to
offer to buy it. If the owner is willing to sell and the parties can agree on the price
and the other conditions of the sale, a voluntary transaction can then be
concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of a judicial action.
Otherwise, the government will use its power of eminent domain, subject to the
payment of just compensation, to acquire private property in order to devote it to
public use.
REPUBLIC VS CA
Although DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, 57 of RA 6657, also provides that: Special
Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation and prosecution of criminal offenses
under the law.
LANDBANK VS CA
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land
and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or
in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit
can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust
account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express,
or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly
deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
"deposit".
PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Preamble
1.
Does not confer rights nor impose duties
18
2.
Permissible Delegation
1.
President
a.
Tariff powers
b.
Emergency Powers
Republicanism
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates from them (Sec. 1, Art. II)
1.
Essential Features:
a. Representation
b. Renovation
2.
Manifestations: GRABIS
a.
Government of laws and not of men (Villavicencio vs. Lucban)
b. Rule of Majority (Plurality in Elections)
c.
Accountability of public officials
d. Bill of Rights
e.
Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws
f.
Separation of powers
g. Delegation of Powers
h. Social Justice
Separation of Powers
Declaration of
Emergency
No legitimate
constitutional
objection can be
made
2.
a.
b.
People
Referendum
Plebiscite
Referendum
Power of the electorate to approve
or reject legislation through an
election called for the purpose.
2
a.
b.
Exercise of
Emergency Power
Constitutional Issue
Arises
Classes:
Referendum on statutes petition
to approve or reject an act or law
passed by Congress.
Referendum on local law
petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by
regional assemblies and local
legislative bodies.
Plebiscite
Electoral process by which an
initiative on the Constitution is
approved or rejected by the
people
3.
19
Justiciable Question
Implies:
1.
A given right, legally demandable
and enforceable
2.
An act or omission violative of such
right
3.
Remedy granted by law for such
breach
Concerned with legality
Political question
Question of Policy.
Questions which under the constitution
are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of government.
Concerned with wisdom
Renunciation of war
Sovereign immunity
Transformation
International law principle be
transformed into domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation
Incorporation
By mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the
force of domestic law
Civilian Supremacy- At all times supreme over the military. The AFP is the protector
of the people and the state its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the
integrity of the national territory.
Duty of Government to defend the State The prime duty of the government is to
serve and protect the people. The government may call upon the people to defend the
state and in the fulfilment thereof all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law to render personal, military or civil service.
Separation of Church and State Inviolable
Independent foreign policy and nuclear-free Philippines Consistent with national
interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
20
21
22
23
OPOSA VS FACTORAN
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution
itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a
balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.
VILLAR VS TIP
What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important
social, economic, and cultural rights is the right to education not only in the
elementary and high school grades but also on the college level. The
constitutional provision as to the State maintaining "a system of free public
elementary education and, in areas where finances permit, establish and
maintain a system of free public education" up to the high school level does not
per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and universities.
Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
"Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.
Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and
higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit."
SORIAO VS PINEDA
The Court of Appeals, invoking The 1987 Constitution and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, ordered Araceli R. Pineda, Head Teacher II of Juan
C. Angara Memorial High School, Dinalungan, Aurora to allow Louie Soriao to
enroll and to study after he was meted out a disciplinary action without due
process of law,(Sec 1 & 2 Art XIV, Sec 13 & 17 Art II)
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS DRILON
The department order applies only to female contract workers but it does
not make an undue discrimination between sexes, equality before the law under
the constitution does not import a perfect identity rights among all men and
women, it admits classifications, provided that 1. Such classifications rest on
substantial distinctions; 2. They are germane to the purposes of the law;3. They
are not confined to existing conditions; 4. They all apply equally to all members
of the same class. The classification made to female workers rest on substantial
distinctions. Women Domestic workers abroad are being ill treated in a massive
basis, theres no evidence that men suffers the same.
The deployment ban is not a violation of the right to travel because the right
to travel is subject, among other things to the requirements of public safety.
It is a settled rule that police power is primarily lodged in the legislative,
but is doesnt mean that such power may not be validly delegated, the Labor
code vest the DOLE with the rule making powers in the enforcement whereof.
ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESSICATORS VS PHILCOA
Our Constitutions, beginning with the 1935 document, have repudiated
laissez-faire as an economic principle. Although the present Constitution
enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government
the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare.
At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative
department of the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It
is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.
BASCO VS PAGCOR
Suffice it to state that these provisions are merely statements of principles
and policies. As such, they are basically not self executing, meaning a law
should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore,
for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other
words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Based
on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of PD 1869,
the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The
dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether PD 1869
remains a wise legislation considering the issues of morality, monopoly, trend
to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice,
role of youth and educational values being raised, is up for the Congress to
determine.
PAMATONG VS COMELEC
There is no constitutional right to run for or hold public office and,
particularly, to seek the presidency. What is recognized is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law.
Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor
elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the
plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort. The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of
Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State
Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not selfexecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to
the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of
the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. An
inquiry into the intent of the framers produces the same determination that the
provision is not self-executory.
24
Civil Rights
Political Rights
Right of Suffrage
Right to hold public
office
Right to petition
Rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-avis the
management
of
government
25
26
See also Harvey vs. Santiago where the court upheld the validity of the
arrest of pedophiles on orders by then Immigration Commissioner Miriam
Santiago.
Requisites of a Valid Warrant
1.
Probable cause - Such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of
the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to
rely on them and act in pursuance thereof.
a.
Must refer to one specific offense
2.
3.
The conspicuous illegality of the arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction of the trial
court, because even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a
jurisdictional defect and any objection thereto is waived when the person arrested
submits to arraignment without any objection.
1.
2.
4.
This does not mean that a Court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace
the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant therefor, where the
obtention of such search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling
consideration of urgency, subject, time and place.
Only a judge may validly issue a warrant.
Exception: Orders of arrest may be issued by administrative authoritites,
but only for the purpose of carrying out final finding of a violation of law,
for example a order of deportation or an order of contempt but not for the
sole purpose of investigation or prosecution.
Search Warrant
- Description is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow;
- Description expresses a conclusion of
fact not of law;
27
3)
4)
When the offense had just been committed and there is probable cause
to believe, based on his personal knowledge of facts or of other
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed the offense
a) Immediacy - Offense has just been committed
b) Personal knowledge - Person making the arrest has probable
cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge of facts or
of other circumstances that the person to be arrested had
committed it.
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
When the right is voluntarily waived
Warrantless Searches
1)
Voluntarily waived.
a) The right exists
b) Person involved had knowledge either actual or constructive of
the existence of such right
c) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Consent must be unequivocal, specific and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.
- Mere silence and failure to object is not a waiver
- Waiver must be given by the person whose right is
violated.
2) Stop-and-frisk
- Must precede the arrest for the principle to apply
- Apprehending officer must have a genuine reason in accordance with
his experience and the surrounding conditions to warrant the belief
that the person searched has weapons or contraband concealed about
him.
3) When the search is an incident to a lawful arrest
The arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be
reversed.
Officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting the
arrest
But take note of the case of People vs. Sucro, where the search not
preceded by an arrest was held valid because said search was
effected on the basis of probable cause. And also the case of
People vs. Tangliben where the court held the warrantless search
valid because the officers, faced with on-the-spot information, had
to act quickly.
Search must be made only within the area where he has
immediate control.
4) Search of vessels and aircraft
Why?
a.
Equipped with powerful motors that enable them to elude
pursuit
b. Seizure would be an incident to a lawful arrest
5) Moving vehicles
Why? - Not practical to secure a warrant because vehicle can be moved
quickly out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.
28
29
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
30
5)
No torture, force, etc. Which vitiates the free will shall be used
Sec.. 2 (d), RA 7438 provides that any extra-judicial confession made by
a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be:
a.
In writing
b. Signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in
the latters absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence
of any of the parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse,
the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school
supervisor, priest/minister as chosen by him.
6) Secret detention places etc. Are prohibited
7) Confessions/admissions obtained in violation of rights are inadmissible
in evidence
Two kinds:
a.
Coerced confessions, the product of third degree methods
such as torture, force, violence, threat and intimidation
b. Uncounselled statements given without the benefit of
Miranda warning
The alleged constitutional infringement during the custodial
investigation is relevant and material only where an
extrajudicial confession or admission from the accused
becomes the basis of conviction.
People vs. Samolde Even as the extrajudicial confession was in writing and
signed by counsel, because the accused was not given the Miranda warnings, the
confession was held inadmissible in evidence.
People vs. Andan Voluntary but uncounselled confession of accused to the
Mayor and to the media was admissible in evidence. Constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to the spontaneous statements not elicited
through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
the accused orally admitted having committed the crime.
Waiver:
1.
Must be writing and made in the presence of counsel
2.
No retroactive effect
3.
Burden of proof on the prosecution. The presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed cannot prevail over the presumption
of innocence
4.
What may be waived:
a.
Right to remain silent
b. Right to counsel
But not the right to be informed of these rights.
Exclusionary rule confession or admission obtained in violation of Sec. 12 and
Sec. 17, Art. III shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Confession declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or
inducement by a person acknowledging that he has committed or participated in
the commission of a crime. But before it can be admitted in evidence, the
constitution demands strict compliance with the requirements of the Bill of rights.
a.
Fruit of the Poisonous tree once the primary source is shown to
have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence
31
b.
c.
d.
e.
Exceptions:
a.
When charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and
evidence of guilt is strong.
b. Not available to military
Duty of the Court - When the accused is charged with an offense punished by
reclusion perpetua, a hearing on the motion for bail shall be conducted by the
judge to determine whther or not the evidence of quilt is strong,
Bail as a matter of right All persons in custody shall:
a.
Before conviction by the MeTC, MTC, MCTC and
b. Before conviction by RTC of an offense not punishable by death, RP or
Life Imprisonment
Be admitted to bail as a matter of right with sufficient sureties or be released on
recognizance as prescribed by law.
Bail when discretionary
1.
Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, RP or life
imprisonment, the court , on application, may admit the accused to bail.
2.
3.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional
liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years but not
more than 20 years, the accused shall be denied bail. Or bail previously
granted be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or similar circumstances:
a.
Accused is a recidivist, quasi recidivist or habitual delinquent,
hanituality
b. Accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without
valid justification
c.
Accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under
conditional pardon
d. Circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of
flight if released on bail
e.
Undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may
commit another crime
32
f.
g.
60
48
24
Duration
Submit a Report in person and in writing to Congress
Convene, voting jointly by vote of at least majority may revoke such
proclamation or suspension
30
Supreme court may review in appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ and promulgate thirty days from filing
Any person arrested during the suspension of the writ shall be judicially
charged other wise released.
asked
Accused/Respondent may not be compelled to take the witness stand
altogether
Scope: only testimonial compulsion. Does not apply where the evidence sought to
be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence.
Non-detention by reason of political beliefs or aspirations
No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political or religious beliefs.
Involuntary Servitude
- No involuntary servitude in any from shall exist axcept as punishment for a crim
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
Exceptions:
1.
Punishement for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted
2.
Service in defense of State
3.
Naval Enlistment
4.
Posse Comitatus
5.
Return to work order in industries affected with public interest
6.
Patria potestas
Prohibited Punishments
1.
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed,
unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to RP
2.
The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment
against any prisoner or detainee, or the use of substandard or
inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt
with by law.
Non-Imprisonment for debt
- No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax
Double Jeopardy
- No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Requisites:
1.
Valid complaint or information
2.
Filed before a competent court
3.
To which he had pleaded
4.
Defendant was previously acquitted or convicted or the cases
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
SC: Filing of an MR after acquittal is a violation of Double Jeopardy.
Galman case is Pro Hac Vice
Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder
- No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted
Kinds of Ex post facto laws:
1. Every law that makes criminal an action done before the passage of the law
and which was innocent when done and punishes such action
33
2. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when
committed
3. Every law that changes punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when committed
4. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense
in order to convict the offender
5. Every law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful
6. Every law which deprives persons accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal or of a proclamation of amnesty
Characteristics
1. Refers to criminal matters
2. Retroactive
3. Prejudicial to the accused
Bill of Attainder
- A legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial
- Substitutes legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt
CASE DOCTRINES
SIMON VS CHR
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted,
it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human
Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights
violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious."
While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect,
more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for
the tone it has set.
In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily
making a conclusive delineation
of the CHR's scope of investigatorial
jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may
provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the
authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." In the
particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished
are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,
erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a
"People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City
which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The
consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is
indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may,
looking at the standards hereinabove
discoursed
vis-avis
the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the
order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations
involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
ERMITA MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS VS CITY OF MANILA
The Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain
practices hurtful to public morals. There is no violation o constitutional due
process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to
implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is
dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and
injunction lifted.
PICHAY VS OFFICE OF DEPUTY EXEUTIVE SECRETARY
Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the
President. This proceeds from the well settled principle that, in the absence of a
contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same
authority on which the power to appoint is vested. Having the power to remove
and/or discipline presidential appointees, the President has the corollary
authority to investigate such public officials and look into their conduct in office.
Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of
Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order an
investigation into matters that require his informed decision.
There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees
occupying upper-level positions in government from non-presidential
appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government. Substantial
distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are
elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive
officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION ET AL VS CITY OF MANILA
The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes
upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a
guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said
ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and
hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are
tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity
sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a
limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare.
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL INC VS SOLUTA
Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly"
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.
Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32;
34
the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury
caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with
Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly
and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein
individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision
of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases, among others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in
Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
RUBI VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
The term "non-Christian" it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a
way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands
of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of the provisions of the
Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government
of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that
most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in
the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. when to advance
the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police
power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land
in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides
promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the people
in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the
development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the
general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State
through the exercise of its police power.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of
Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other
things: ". . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are
restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can
one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a
law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class."
LIBANAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any
office which the officer charged might currently be holding and not necessarily
the particular office under which he was charged. The suspension order cannot
amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Public office is
"a public agency or trust,"and it is not the property envisioned by the
Constitutional provision which petitioner invokes.
ORQUIOLA VS TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners
have rights over the subject property and hence they are proper parties in
interest in any case thereon. Consequently, private respondents should have
impleaded them in Civil Case. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be
reached by the decision in said case.
JAVIER VS COMELEC
The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that
requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must
also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure
that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them
justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They
must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the
justice they expect. Due process is intended to insure that confidence by
requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair
play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have
undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to
make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script.
There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions
only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.
GALMAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process
and fair opportunity to prosecute and prove their case which grossly violates the
due process clause. There could be no double jeopardy since legal jeopardy
attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The lower
court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent as it was ousted
of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In
effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal
case for further hearing and trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second
jeopardy.
The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where
the authoritarian President ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig
and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due pressure to the
judiciary. The courts decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its
failure in observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was also
deemed void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one
vitiated with lack of due process on the account of collusion between the lower
court and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the
accused.
PEOPLE VS CASTILLO
It is the judges prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to eek
out the truth. After careful examination of the records, it appears that the assailed
questions by the judge were merely clarificatory in nature.
35
Allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received with caution,
especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The
propriety of a judges queries is determined not by their quantity but by their
quality and in any event, by the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by
such questioning. Upon evaluation, even if all questions and answers
propounded by the judge were eliminated, the appellant would still be
convicted.
CARAS VS CA
There is no mention of when the demand to pay was made, whether before
or after the checks were dishonoured so that within 5 banking days from receipt
of such notice she could pay the check fully or make arrangements for such
payment.
The testimony of Panuelos, the branch manager of PCI Bank where
petitioner maintained her checking account indicates that the bank also failed to
send notice to the petitioner for her to pay the value of the checks or make
arrangements for their payment within 5 days from the dishonour of the said
checks. The absence of notice of dishonour necessarily deprives an accused an
opportunity to preclude a criminat prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due
process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonour ne actually served on the
petitioner.
ZALDIVAR VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest
test," the Court held that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of
such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as
to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the
authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil"
consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular
case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial
system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct
required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some
implications to the society.
VILLARUEL VS FERNANDO
Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard and this
opportunity was not denied petitioner.
Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court of
Appeals, petitioner had the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so.
Clearly, petitioners former counsel, the OSG, was negligent. This negligence,
however, binds petitioner. The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the
negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects such negligence
and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory.
SY VS ANDOK'S LITSON CORPORATION
What constitutes a valid ground to excuse litigants and their counsels from
appearing at the pre-trial under Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court is subject
to the sound discretion of a judge. Such discretion was shown by the trial court,
which was correct in putting into effect the consequence of petitioners nonappearance at the pre-trial. While Sy filed an Urgent Motion to Reset Pre-trial,
she cannot assume that her motion would be automatically granted. As found by
36
the parties affected; The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate; The Board or body should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
DUMLAO VS COMELEC
There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function
of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest
personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the
case.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another
class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES VS POEA
The principle, of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three
major powers of the Government. In the case of legislative power, such occasions
have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the
observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its
non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task
of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the myriad problems demanding its attention. Specialization even in legislation
has become necessary. These solutions may, however, be expected from its
delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to
them. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar
problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the
general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate
legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies
laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation
of supplementary regulations, such as the implementing
rules.
These
regulations have the force and effect of law.
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable
classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must
not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and
sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work
environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social,
civic, and spiritual activities.
The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is
not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness . It is restricted to
contracts with respect to property or some object of value and which confer
rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes
relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of
the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire
community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its
police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health,
safety, morals; comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though
contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract
beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them. The freedom to
contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power
of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the
State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the
general, well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may
change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. And under the Civil
Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State
because they are not ordinary contracts but are impresses with public interest.
PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS
All top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are
subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public
mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the
official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by
law, not inferred from the duties of a position. The immunity from arrest or
detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive
rule.
The Constitution guarantees that no person shall be denied the equal
protection of laws. This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person.
Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers
has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Jalosjos claimed that
the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise. Never has the call
of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those
others who are validly restrained by law. The election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty
of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the
law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Imprisonment is the
restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent
the free exercise of his power of locomotion. The functions and duties of the
37
office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest
and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration,
by its nature, changes an individual's status in society. Prison officials have the
job of preserving the security as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation
that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both
these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights.
STONEHILL VS DIOKNO
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. Two points must be stressed in connection with
this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested
warrants. No specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. It was
impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any
specific acts performed by herein petitioners. To uphold the validity of the
warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence
at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely
the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted. SC
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by
providing in that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense. The grave violation of the Constitution
made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by
the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized. Thus,
the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal .
The position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. To be sure, if
the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant
is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with
the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The
only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of
fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition
is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
PEOPLE VS BELOCURA
No arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued
by a competent judicial authority. So sacred are the right of personal security and
privacy and the right from unreasonable searches and seizures that no less than
the Constitution ordains in Section 2 of its Article III.
The consequence of a violation of the guarantees against a violation of
personal security and privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures is
the exclusion of the evidence thereby obtained. This rule of exclusion is set down
in Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution
Even so, the right against warrantless arrest, and the right against
warrantless search and seizure are not absolute. There are circumstances in
which the arrest, or search and seizure, although warrantless, are nonetheless
valid or reasonable. Among the circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which lists down when a warrantless arrest may
be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private person, namely: When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating
that
the
person to be arrested has committed it; and When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
On the other hand, the constitutional proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of the
following exceptions, namely: (a)
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 13, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court; (b) seizure of evidence under plain view; (c) search of a
moving vehicle;
(d)consented warrantless search; (e) customs search; (f)
stop-and-frisk situations (Terry search); and (g) exigent and emergency
circumstances. In these exceptional situations, the necessity for a search warrant
is
dispensed with.
To be caught in flagrante delicto necessarily implies the positive
identification of the culprit by an eyewitness or
eyewitnesses.
Such
identification is a direct evidence of culpability, because it "proves the fact in
dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption." Even by his own
admission, he was actually committing a crime in the presence or within the
view of the arresting policemen. The arrest was valid, and the arresting
policemen thereby became cloaked with the authority to validly search his
person and effects for weapons or any other article he might use in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or might be used as
evidence in the trial of the case, and to seize from him and the area within his
reach or under his control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article. The
evident purpose of the incidental search was to protect the arresting policemen
from being harmed by him with the use of a concealed weapon. Accordingly, the
warrantless character of the arrest could not by itself be the basis of his acquittal.
An evaluation of the totality of the evidence on record indicates, however,
that the corpus delicti of the crime charged was not established beyond
reasonable doubt. What must be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of
possession of the prohibited drug itself. This may be done by presenting the
38
police officer who actually recovered the prohibited drugs as a witness, being the
person who has the direct knowledge of the possession.
GAMBOA VS CHAN
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been
recognized as a constitutional right.
The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of
limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one
of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the
absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private
sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection,
in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate
to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society."
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed
to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must
exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.
Habeas data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
NOLASCO VS PANO
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically
provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized.
It is evident that the Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing
description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist
Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify
what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise
available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be
used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers
of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken
also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a
general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular
description of the things to be seized. Search warrants of general description are
considered null and void for being too general.
GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
The application of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code in the Articles of
War is in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions
to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the
equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state's dulyconstituted authorities. In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective. It, however, does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed,
the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) the
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally
to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification." In the present case, petitioner belongs to the class of those who
have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the rights accorded to
them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between those who are
convicted of offenses which are criminal in nature under military courts and the
civil courts. Furthermore, following the same reasoning, petitioner is also entitled
to the basic and time honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. It must be remembered
that the provisions of the Articles of War which the petitioner violated are penal
in nature.
No less than our Constitution guarantees the right not just to a speedy trial
but to the speedy disposition of cases. However, it needs to be underscored that
speedy disposition is a relative and flexible concept. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken
of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. In determining whether or
not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has
laid down the following guidelines: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for
such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4)
the prejudice caused by the delay.
39
PEOPLE VS CA
Dismissal of this petition is inevitable in view of the principle of double
jeopardy, making it unnecessary to address and extrapolate on the numerous
factual issues raised by Tee against the CA's Decision dated July 28, 2011 and the
procedural lapses Ando attributes to Tee. The mere fact that the decision being
brought for this Court's review is one for acquittal alerts one's attention to a
possible violation of the rule against double jeopardy.
In People v. Hon. Tria-Tirona, this Court reiterated that mistrial is the only
exception to the well-settled, even axiomatic, principle that acquittal is
immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy.
This Court was categorical in stating that a re-examination of the evidence
without a finding of mistrial will violate the right to repose of an accused, which
is what is protected by the rule against double jeopardy.
MAQUILING VS PTSI
With respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as
ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in
question and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the
employer will not suffice. But as regards a managerial employee, mere existence
of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer
would suffice for his dismissal.
The notices required before an employee may be validly dismissed are: A written
notice served on the employee specifying the grounds for termination and giving
the employee reasonable opportunity to explain his/her side; a hearing or
conference wherein the employee, with the assistance of counsel if so desired, is
given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut
evidence presented against him/her; and written notice of termination served on
the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify termination. The twin requirements of
notice and hearing constitute elements of due process in cases of employees
dismissal. The requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee
concerned of the employers intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed
dismissal. Upon the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the employee
an opportunity to answer his employers charges against him and accordingly to
defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected.
Clearly, the first notice must inform outright the employee that an
investigation will be conducted on the charges particularized therein, which, if
proven, will result to his dismissal. Such notice must not only contain a plain
statement of the charges of malfeasance or misfeasance but must categorically
state the effect on his employment if the charges are proven to be true. This
notice will afford the employee an opportunity
to avail all defenses and
exhaust all remedies to refute the allegations hurled against him for what is at
stake is
his very life and limb his employment. Otherwise, the employee
may just disregard the notice as a warning without any disastrous consequence
to be anticipated. Absent such statement, the first notice falls short of the
requirement of due process. It is worthy to note that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC
and the Court of Appeals all agree in concluding that procedural due process in
the instant case was not observed. It must be noted that the first notice was a
mere instruction to explain the matters enumerated therein. It did not apprise Dr.
Maquiling of any investigation to be conducted or being conducted that will
warrant his dismissal from service if found guilty of charges specified therein.
Thus, such notice fell short of the requirement of law that an employee must be
afforded the benefit of the two-notice rule in dismissal cases that will allow the
employee to substantiate the charges specified in the notice with full knowledge
at the outset that the investigation to be conducted may result in his dismissal or
suspension from employment.
US VS BUSTOS
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a
full discussion of public affairs. Completely liberty to comment on the conduct of
public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. Men in public life may suffer
under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the
balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with
reference to comment upon his official acts.
Only thus can the intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted.
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize
judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern.
Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper
comment. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang
suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen
and to stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which
every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any
alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official
dereliction on the part of a magistrate to bring the facts to the notice of those
whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. Public policy, the welfare of
society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been
the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. The doctrine of
privileged communications rests upon public policy, though, as an incidental
result, it may afford immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are
not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie
privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. A communication made bona
fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest,
or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which
without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. The duty under
which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and
this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in
fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the
communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of
privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule
is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest
mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional error
will not take the case out of the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege
destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff.
The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true
motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount
to proof of malice. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.
40
LUZ VS PEOPLE
The roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic
stop does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal
arrest, by virtue of the nature of questioning, the expectations of the motorist and
the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted.
BALDOZA VS DIMAANO
The Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to
information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access
to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or
decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this
right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange
of information in a democracy. Information is needed to enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of the times. Maintaining the flow of such
information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination
since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. The access to
public records predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on
matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a
legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. However,
restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access
restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a
showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of
control inadequate to maintain order.
SOCIAL SECURITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS CA
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and
conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate
with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which
are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be
referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action.
But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other
temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the
Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III
of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of GovernmentEmployees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute
arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned and
controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
PNB VS REMIGIO
We are aware that a ruling that lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not be the
object of the foreclosure proceedings after the promulgation of said decree on
October 21, 1972, would concede that P.D. No. 27 had the effect of impairing the
obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts affecting said lands. There is
no question, however, that the land reform program of the government as
accelerated under P.D. No. 27 and mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV,
Sec. 12), was undertaken in the exercise of the police power of the state. It is
settled in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court that the Constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise
of the police power of the state (citations omitted). One limitation on the contract
clause arises from the police power, the reason being that public welfare is
superior to private rights (citation omitted). The situation here, is like that in
eminent domain proceedings, where the state expropriates private property for
public use, and the only condition to be complied with is the payment of just
compensation. Technically, the condemnation proceedings do not impair the
contract to destroy its obligations, but merely appropriate or take for public use
(citation omitted). As the Land Bank is obliged to settle the obligations secured
by the mortgage, the mortgagee is not left without any compensation.
PEOPLE VS JUDGE AYSON
Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against selfincrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is
relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily
or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself. It
prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a
prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at
any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to
decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify
altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it
and could be waived.
The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under
custodial investigation when his statements were taken. One cannot invoke
violation of the right to counsel in administrative proceeding. The right to self
incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only when the accused is
subjected to custodial inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police
authorities after a person is taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any
way. Because the statements were obtained beyond the purview of custodial
investigation the evidence should be admitted in court.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the
rights of the accused include: he shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. nor force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law,
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires.
Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such
opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive
these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
PEOPLE VS BRAVO
The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision covers the
period from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of his
41
As Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Sec.
9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b),
(g) and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial
investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a
police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is
because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant
who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.
An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police
attention at the start of the investigation. In the case at bench, appellant was
identified in a police line-up by prosecution witnesses from a group of persons
gathered for the purpose. However, there was no proof that appellant was
interrogated at all or that a statement or confession was extracted from him.
During the police line-up, the accusatory process had not yet commenced.
Assuming there was interrogation, any allegation of violation of rights
during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the
basis of their conviction. Here, appellant was convicted based on the testimony of
a prosecution witness and not on his alleged uncounseled confession or
admission.
REQUISITES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: Under Section 4, Rule
133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial evidence sufficed
to convict upon the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. It is not only by direct evidence that an
accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is charged. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in
many cases, result in setting felons free and denying proper protection to the
community.
PEOPLE VS BANDULA
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when
the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the
person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of
the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense." Hence, if
there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation, any statement
elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. Custodial
investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect
who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of
interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when
42
questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.
The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he
cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or
a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.
Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when they
executed their respective extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are
inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an
independent counsel. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal
assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the
delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and
order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no better
than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial
investigations.
ABERCA VS VER
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity
and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article
32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint
speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on
irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation,
without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and
other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the
search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under
irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several
undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and
subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading
and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The
complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs
violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated
"directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within
the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its
violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set
forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action
must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the
sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no
others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
GACAD VS CLAPIS
Nothing in the questioned Order reveals the participation of the prosecution
in the hearing for bail or the presentation of prosecution evidence. This is
contrary to the requirements laid down in the case of Basco v. Rapatalo , where
the Court outlined the duties of a trial judge in the event that an application for
bail is filed:Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail Or
require him to submit his recommendation; (2) Conduct a hearing of the
43
extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight
risk and should be granted bail.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine
Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to
enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any
criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed
on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to
apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
protection of human rights.
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus,
the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired. Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the
potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused
or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled,
for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions,
to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an
extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the
grant is satisfactorily met. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate
Justice Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases.
According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extradite must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will
abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court. In this case, there
is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show tha the is not
a flight risk.
POLLO VS CONSTANTINO DAVID
Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy,
there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollos
computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless
searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American
authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its
capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection
with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the
search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief in the
CSCRO No. IV was lawyering for parties having pending cases with the said
regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious,
as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be
furtively engaged in the practice of lawyering for parties with pending cases
before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case
Jus Sanguinis all inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on Aprill 11, 1899,
residing in the islands who did not declare intention of preserving Spanish
nationality
44
Modes of Naturalization
1.
Direct:
a.
Individual through administrative proceedings
b. Special Act of legislature
c.
Collective nationality as a result of cession or subjugation
d. Adoption of orphan minors as nationals of the State where they
are born
2.
Derivative:
a.
Wife of naturalized husband
b. Minor children of naturalized person
c.
Alien women upon marriage to Filipino
B.
C.
De Guzman
De Guzman is a dual citizen by virue of
RA 9225 on Naturalization
Therefore de Guzman must perform a
separate act of renounciation by a
Personal and Sworn Renounciation
Manzano
Manzano is a dual citizen by virtue of
the interplay of Jus Soli and Jus
Sanguinis
It is enough that MAnzano files his
C.O.C.
CA 473
Qualifications:
1.
Not less than 21 years old on the date of the hearing of the petition
2.
Resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than 10 years.
May be reduced to 5 if:
a.
Honorably held office in the Government
b. Established new industry or introduced new invention
c.
Married to a Filipino woman
d. Been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines public or private not
established for particular nationality or race or any of the
branches of education or industry for a period of not less than two
years
e.
Good moral character, believes in the principle underlying the
Philippine Constitution, conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner in relation with the government and
community
f.
Own real estate worth not less than P5,000.00 or must have some
known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation
g. Speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal
Philippine languages
h. Enrolled minor children of school age in any public or private
schools where phlippine history, government and civics are taight
Disqualifications
1.
Opposed to organized government or affiliated with those opposed
2.
Defending or teaching necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas
3.
Polygamists or believers in polygamy
4.
Convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
5.
Suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease
6.
Not mingled socially with Filipinos, who have not envinced a sincere desire
to learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos
7.
Citizens or subjects or nations at war with Philippines, during such war
8.
Home country does not grant the same right to Filipinos to become
naturalized
Procedure
1.
File a declaration of intention 1 year before petition.
Except:
a. Born in Philippines AND received primary and secondary
education in public or private schools
b. Resided in the Philippines for 30 years or more before filing the
petition and enrolled children in elementary and high schools
recognized by the Government
c. Widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his
intention but dies before naturalization
2.
File petition.
Accompanied by affidavit of 2 credible, citizens of the Philippines who
personally know the petitioner as character witnesses.
3.
Publication of Petition
a.
Petition and Notice of hearing
45
b.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
RA 9139
Administrative
Cognized by Special Committee on
Naturalization
Native-born aliens who lived in the
Philippines all their lives
Lived in the Philippines all throughout
their lives
Solicitor General
(Chairman)
Secretary of Foreign
Affairs or
Representative
(Member)
National Security
Adviser
(member)
CA 473
Need not be born here, resided
continuously for 10/5 years
Not less than 21 years at the time of
HEARING of the petition
Same
46
1.
Same
2.
Same
Able to read, write and speak English or
Spanish and any principal Filipino
languages
Same
Disqualifications
Same as CA 473
Procedure
1.
File petition with Special Committee
2.
Publication of pertinent portions of petition once a week for 3 consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
3.
Copies posted in any public or conspicuous area
4.
Copies furnished to DFA, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and Civil
registrar, NBI who shall post copies of petition in any public or conspicuous
areas.
5.
Within 30 days from posting, submit to Committee a report stating whether
applicant has derogatory record on file or any information adverse to
petitioners application
6.
Within 60 days, committee shall review information and allow applicant to
explain, answer or refute the information
7.
Committee approves or denies the 0petition
8.
Within 30 days, applicant shall pay P100,000 to committee
9.
Applicant takes the oath of allegiance and a certificate of naturalization shall
issue
10. Within 5 days after the applicant has taken the oath, Bureau of Immigration
shall forward a copy of the oath to the proper local civil registrar and
thereafter cancel the petitioners alien certificate of registration
Status of Alien wife and Children
- They may file a petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of
registration with the Committee subject to payment of fees.
- But if the applicant is a married WOMAN, her husband does not benefit
from naturalization. But her minor children may still file a petition for
cancellation of their alien registration certificate.
Cancellation of Certificate of Naturalization
Special Committee may cancel certificates of naturalization in the following cases:
3.
4.
47
CASE DOCTRINES
MERCADO VS MANZANO
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual
citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states. It may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state
which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows
the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act
on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the
citizenship clause of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of
Filipino citizens to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers
and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2)
Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who
marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals
volition.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his COC that he is a Filipino citizen; that he
is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend
and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, Manzano has, as far as
the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
Manzanos oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact
that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
TECSON VS COMELEC
Aristotle described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office. The concept of
citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. Civil citizenship in the
1700s established the rights necessary for individual freedom. Political
citizenship in the 1800s encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of
political power. Social citizenship in the 1900s laid emphasis on the right of the
citizen to economic well-being and social security. Today, an ongoing and final
stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might
well be the internationalization of citizenship. The term "natural-born citizens," is
defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
Having died in 1954 at 84 years old, FPJs grandfather Lorenzo Pou would
have been born under Spanish rule and would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That
citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan
F. Poe, father of FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
48
Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens oF another country and thereafter
ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a
natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of
another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 (the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003) do not apply to him.
DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC
For a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine
citizenship under R.A. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
LABO VS COMELEC
At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9,
1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labos) certificate of
candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14,
1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it
was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining order was
issued by this Court.
The resolution cancelling Labos certificate of candidacy on the ground that
he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains the
SC to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.
Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of
the Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks
the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. The fact that he was
elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.
Local Initiative:
1.
Not less than 2,000 registered voters in case of autonomous regions
2.
Not less than 1,000 in case of provinces and cities
3.
100 in municipalities
4.
50 in case of barangays
Referendum
Power of the electorate to approve or
reject legislation through an election
called for the purpose
Referendum on Statutes
Referendum on Local Laws
House of Rep.
Natural Born Citizen
At least 25 years old
Senate
Qualifications
Natural Born Citizen
At least 35 years old
Registered Voter
Party-List Nominees
Natural Born citizen
At least 25 years old
Youth sector: cannot be
older than 30
Bona fide member of
the party or
organization which he
seeks to represent for at
least 90 days preceding
the day of the election
49
3 years
Composition
A. Senate
- The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at the
large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law. (Section 2.
Article VI)
B. House of Representatives
- Not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law consisting of:
District Representatives
Elected from legislative
districts apportioned
among the provinces,
cities, and metropolitan
Manila area
Party-list representatives
Shall constitute 20% of the
total number of
representatives, elected
through a party-list system
of registered national,
regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations
If will violate
20% threshold.
Sectoral Representatives
(For 3 consecutive terms
after the ratification of the
Constitution) One hald of
the seats allocated to
party-list representatives
shall be filled as provided
by law, by selection or
election from labor,
peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural
communities, women,
youth and such other
sectors as may be
provided by law. Except
the religious sector.
unless otherwise provided by law taken in relation with Sec. 5 (4) Art.
VI on Reapportionment of Legislative districts. So strictly speaking, may be
less may be more.
50
Any party already registered, need not register anew, but must file within
90 days before the election a manifestation of its desire to participate in the
party-list system.
51
1)
The 20% allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed 20% of the total membership of the HR (INCLUDING THE PARTY
LIST)
2)
2% x 10M = 200k
3)
The 3-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of 3 seats
1 qualifying
2 additional
o
To avoid one party-list getting all the seats
4)
5.
Regular
Special elected member shall serve only for the unexpired portion of
the term
1.
2.
Determined by law
No increase until after the expiration of the full term of all member of
Congress.
Salaries
1.
2.
Privileges
1. Freedom from arrest
In all offenses punishable by not more that 6 years imprisonment
While Congress is in Session
Under the RPC- VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
Penalty of Prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall use force, intimidation, threats or fraud to prevent any member
of National Assembly from attending the meetings of the Assembly or
of any of its committees... from expressing his opinions or casting his
vote.
Penalty of Prision correccional shall be imposed upon any public
officer or employee who shall, while the Assembly is in regular or
special session:
a. Arrest or search any member thereof except:
Such member has committed a crime punished by a penalty higher
than prision mayor. (6 years and 1 day to 12 years)
To reconcile, it must be a penalty of prision mayor or Higher
2.
52
No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the congress or in any committee thereof.
Any other place Even in Courts
Sessions
Regular
Once a year on the 4th Monday of
July, unless a different date is fixed
by law, and shall continue for such
number of days as it may determine
until 30 days before the opening of
its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays and legal
Holidays.
The ban shall last only for the duration of the term for which the
member of Congress was elected.
Incompatible Seat
Member of Congress may be validly
appointed to an incompatible office.
But if he accepts, he automatically
forfeits his seat.
Forbidden Office
Even if he is willing to forfeit his
office, he may NOT be appointed.
Other Inhibitions
1.
Cannot appear as counsel before any:
a.
Court of justice
b. Electoral Tribunal
c.
Quasi-judicial or administrative Bodies
2.
Directly or Indirectly be interested financially in any:
a.
Contract
b. Franchise
c.
Privilege Granted by the Government, during his term of office
Special
Called by the President at any time,
usually to consider legislative
measures which the president may
designate in his call
Joint Sessions
Voting Separately
1.
Choosing the president
2.
Determine Presidents disability
3.
Confirming nomination of the
VP
4.
Declaring the existence of state of
war
5.
Proposing constitutional
amendments
Voting Jointly
Revoke or extend proclamation
suspending the privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus or placing the
Philippines under martial Law
Adjournment
Neither House during the sessions of Congress shall, without the consent of
the other adjourn for more than 3 days, nor to any other place than that in which the 2
Houses shall be Sitting.
Officers
1.
2.
Senate President
Speaker of the House
Majority vote of all its respective members
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary
Quorum
Majority of each House, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such
penalties as such House may determine.
The basis in determining the existence of a quorum in the Senate shall be the
total number of senators who are in the country and within the coercive
jurisdiction of the Senate.
Discipline of members
House may punish members for disorderly behaviour.
Suspend a member with concurrence of 2/3 of all its members for not more
than 60 days or expel a member.
53
2.
Commission on Appointments
25 Members
Composition
Senate president ex officio Chairman
12 senators
12 members of HR
Powers of Congress
I. General Legislative Power power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws.
Limitations
a) Substantive
b) Express
Bill of Rights
On Taxation
Non-delegation of powers
Purpose of Titles:
o Prevents Riders
o Prevents Hodge podge or Log Rolling
o Apprise People of Subject of Legislation
54
Subject to votation
If Yeas Prevail
o
Signed by: Senate President and Speaker of the House
o
Certified and Transmitted to the President which then becomes
an enrolled bill
If Nays Prevail
o
Bill is not Killed
o
Another Bi-cameral Committee is convened to come up with the
version applicable to Both Houses
C. Approval of Bills
Bill becomes a law in any of the following cases:
a.
President approves and signs the Bill
b. President Vetoes the Bill
Two Kinds of Veto
a.
General Veto
b. Line Veto line veto or partial veto is invalid. It is allowed only for
particular items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. (Bengzon
vs. Drilon)
Effects of Veto
a.
Does not Become a Law
b.
The power of the purse belongs to congress, subject only to the veto power of
the president.
D.
E.
F.
55
G.
e.
Prohibition against transfer of appropriation
f.
Prohibition against appropriation for sectarian benefit
g. Automatic appropriation
Impoundment refusal by the president for whatever reason to spend
funds made available by congress. Failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type.
3.
Excercised through:
Legislative Veto the legislature can block or modify
administrative action taken under a statute. May be negative or
affirmative. Subject to serious questions involving the principle
of separation of powers.
War Powers
Vote of 2/3 of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately,
may declare existence of a state of war.
5.
Heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President or upon request of either House, appear before and be heard by
such House on any matter pertaining to their departments.
2.
Legislative Supervision
Scrutinize exercise of delegated law-making and permits the congress to
retain such power.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
You cannot expect congress to enact good laws if you deny it the power
to investigate.
Even if this is not found in the Constitution, the power still exists as it is
Inherent (Arnault vs. Nazareno)
Limitations:
a.
In aid of legislation
b.
In accordance with duly published rules of procedure
c.
Rights of persons appearing in or affected by such, inquiry shall
be respected
56
11.
Power of Impeachment
12.
13.
CASE DOCTRINES
TOBIAS VS ABALOS
The SC upheld the validity of RA 7675. Contrary to petitioners' assertion,
the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong"
necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49
regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. As
to thecontention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable
provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of
250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless
otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that
the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
MARCOS VS COMELEC
Residence where one stays at the moment; involves the intent to leave
when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends.
Domicile where one stays permanently characterized by actual residence
or physical presence at one point, with animus manendi (intent to stay if
present) or animus revertendi (intent to return if absent).
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied
the constitutions residency requirement.
Her marriage to Ferdinand Marcos did not necessarily result in the loss of
that domicile in favor of a new one since (1) a woman follows only the actual
residence of her husband and not his domicile and (2) as a rule, change of
domicile is proved only by the concurrence of three elements, (1) actual removal
from original domicile, (2) intent to abandon domicile, and (3) acts effecting that
intent. IMR may have practically left Leyte, but the animus revertendi remained
as evinced by her celebrating her birthdays, fiestas and important milestones in
Tacloban and Tolosa, and her careful cultivation of a political base in that district,
thereby negating the last two requirements. Assuming but not conceding that she
lost her domicile when, by her acts she proved her intent to follow her husbands
domicile, her act of writing the PCGG for the recovery of her ancestral house in
Tolosa, and public announcement to represent the 1st District in Congress after
she returned from US exile and almost three years before the 1995 elections,
showed her decision to re-establish her domicile there (domicilium voluntarium
or domicile of choice), satisfying the minimum residency requirement.
BANAT VS COMELEC
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be
composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The
Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the
House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio
of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute
the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of
legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in
Veterans, thus:
No. Of seats available to party-list representatives = [No. Of seats available
to legislative districts /
0.80] x .20
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats
available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created
by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines
has
220
district
representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A.7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire
20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x.
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the
total number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the
seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of
allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. 7941,
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x In determining
the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be
observed: (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to
one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
The Court determined that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2%
from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates (total votes cast for
the party list = 15, 950,900). The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-
57
percenters, are the party-list candidates that are entitled to one seat each, or the
guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17
guaranteed seats. The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides
that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. This is where
petitioners problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the
clause in proportion to their total number of votes to be in proportion to the
votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of
R.A. No. 7941.This Court finds that the 2% threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the
two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:1. The
parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the elections
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed
seat each 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking
in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated 4. Each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be
included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every
two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional
seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No.
7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
Total no. Of votes cast for the Party-list = 15, 950,900
Total no. Of Seats allocated for Party list representatives = 55 (ISSUE 1)
No. Of seats guaranteed to those who met the 2% threshold (FIRST ROUND) =
17
No. Of seats available for SECOND ROUND = 38 [55-17=38]
1. Get the percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at
by dividing the no. of votes garnered by each party by the total no. of votes cast
for party-list candidates [hereinafter PERCENTAGE].
Votes garnered by the party x total no. of votes cast = PERCENTAGE (%)
2. Multiply the PERCENTAGE by the remaining available seats, which is 38 to
get the partys share in the remaining additional seats.
% x 38 = partys ADDITIONAL seat
(The whole integer, i.e. if product is 2.79, the whole integer is 2, is the additional
share of the party. DO NOT ROUND UP.)
3. Assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available
seats are completely distributed.
4. Finally, apply the 3-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified
party-list candidate is entitled.
In the May 2007 Elections, the Court applied the said formula which
resulted in 36 winning party-list organizations and ALL the 55 party-list seats
are filled up. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device
that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for partylist representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure.
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed
all political parties to participate in the party-list elections. They wanted to open
up the system, and would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why
they put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that
can sit within the 50[55] allocated under the party list system.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in partylist elections through their sectoral wings.
In defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a
political party or a sectoral party, R.A. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major
political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the
intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially
legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in
patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form
coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes.
NACHURA, Separate Opinion:
To provide the mechanics for the implementation of the party-list system,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, Section 11 of which sets, among others, the
inviolable parameter that a party, sectoral organization or coalition, must obtain
at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order
to claim one seat in the House of Representatives. This is referred to as the
threshold vote, or the minimum vote requirement. Here lies the crux of its
unconstitutionality.
Given this fixed 2% threshold vote, the maximum
number of seats in the House of Representatives which may be occupied by
party-list representatives can never exceed fifty (50) because [100% / 2% = 50].
In other words, there will never be a situation where the number of party-list
representatives will exceed 50, regardless of the number of district
representatives. By virtue of the rigid 2% threshold requirement, the number of
seats that the political parties, organizations or coalitions registered under the
party-list system could ever aspire for would still be limited to only 50 even if
100 [400 district seats x 80%] party-list seats are available. Accordingly, this
stigmatizes the 2% minimum vote requirement in R.A. 7941. A legal provision
that poses an insurmountable barrier to the full implementation and realization
of the constitutional provision on the party-list system should be declared void.
Even if the 20% allocation is not required to be filled up, and R.A. 7941,
enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the
constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional
ceiling completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must
strike down the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. [He
then presents a formula which I DO NOT get but which effectively lowers the
threshold to 1%]. This 1%, is the more logical and equitable formula. It would
58
nation.
ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of
representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize
political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. The voter elects
two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative
district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice.
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the
sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral
party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of
the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of
advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty,
destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the
middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and
underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the
National Statistical Coordination Board. The recognition that national and
regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women
and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow
small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "welldefined political
constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the
other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral
parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by
their nature are
economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the
House of Representatives.
LIGOT VS MATHAY
It is self-evident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for members of
Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as petitioner must necessarily be
P7,200.00 per annum, the compensation they received "as provided by law" and
the Constitution during their term of office, since the increase could be operative
only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members of Congress.
The herein claimant-retiree was unable to receive the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum for Members of Congress precisely because of the
,constitutional ban. To allow him now to collect such amount in the guise of
retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor does it stand to reason that while he could
not legally receive such rate as salary while still in the service, he would now be
allowed to enjoy it thereafter by virtue of his retirement."
SAMPAYAN VS DAZA
The SC voted to dismiss the petition. First, the case is already moot and
academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April
6, 1992 that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for
59
the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30,
1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral
Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualification of its members. Since petitioners challenge the
qualifications of Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been
to file a petition to cancel respondent Daza's certificate of candidacy before the
election or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten [10]
days after Daza's proclamation. Third, a writ of prohibition can no longer be
issued against respondent since his term has already expired. A writ or
prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated. Fourth, as a
de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed
during his term of office because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer.
Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services
rendered.
SARMIENTO VS MISON
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the CoA, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment
of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the other courts, or in the
heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall
be effective only until disapproval by the CoA or until the next adjournment of
the Congress.
It is readily apparent that under the aforesaid provision of the Constitution,
there are 4 groups or officers whom the President shall appoint, which are:
1. The heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in the Constitution;
2. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
3. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
4. Officers lower in rank (note: under the 1935 Constitution, it is inferior
officers) whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the CoA.
Their appointments are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is
confirmed by the CoA, the President appoints. (Under the 1935 Constitution,
almost all the presidential appointments required a confirmation. While in the
1973 Constitution, consistent with the authoritarian pattern in which it was
molded the absolute power of appointment in the Presidents with hardly any
check on the part of the legislature.) Given the two extremes, one in the 1935
Constitution and another in the 1973 Constitution, the framers of the 1987
Constitution struck a middle ground by requiring the confirmation of the
60
must be respected. The speech of Enrile clearly manifests that the there is no
proposed legislation in light of the senate investigation on the matter; in fact, the
sole reason for such investigation was to investigate on the possible violations
of RA 3019. This the senate cannot do for it has no jurisdiction on investigating,
for the purpose of determining criminal liability, violations of penal laws.
In the case of Arnault vs. Nazareno, the court rules that the inquiry must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power vested by the constitution, such
as the power to legislate or expel a member. The power of congress to conduct
investigations is inherent in the legislative process; that power is broad. But
broad as it is, there is no general authority to expose the private affairs of
individuals without justification in terms of functions of congress. Since congress
can investigate only those areas which it may potentially legislate or appropriate,
it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of the
other branches of the government.
PALPARAN VS HRET
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of
a nominee the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative
of his party-list organization in the context of the facts that characterize
petitioners Abayon and Palparan s relation to Aangat Tayo and
Bantay,respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that
they presumably embody. Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out
that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs
to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right
to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from
among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them.
But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and
allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the
lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the
resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the
COMELEC seems to believe,when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon,
that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the
registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this
question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties. What
is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed
out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases
of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list
nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed
office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC s jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET s own
jurisdiction begins.
61