Research Proposal

Caleb Ziolkowski
December 9, 2016

Puzzle
When polled, do people express support for policies that are in their own
interest? Given most economists belief that free trade is a net gain for any
country (Stolper and Samuelson 1941; Melitz and Trefler 2012; Krugman,
Calvo, and Alejandro 1989), it is puzzling that a relatively large proportion
of people that seem to oppose it (Gilens 2012). Are all or even most of
these people materially injured by trade? Do those who claim to support it
actually gain from free(r) trade?
Most literature on representation falls into one of two camps. The first
focuses on either constituents professed policy preferences or some measure
of constituents material interests and compares this to their
representatives voting behavior (Miller and Stokes 1963; Macrae 1952;
Turner 1970; Froman 1963; Stratmann 2000; Bafumi and Herron 2010). The
second compares public opinion to policy outcomes (Page and Shapiro 1983;
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Weissberg 1978; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995). Some economists

have addressed whether professed policy preferences and self-interest
broadly align (Blinder and Krueger 2004; Caplan 2011). IR literature tends
to focus on measures of a constituencys interests apart from public opinion
(Milner and Tingley 2011; Conconi, Facchini, and Zanardi 2014).

Theory
Suppose that the trade preferences voters express reflect their interests.
Theoretically, this assumes a person 1) is rational, 2) know her self-interest
and policys effect on it and, 3) when asked about what policy she
supports, answers accurately. People doubt any of these assumptions. It is,
however, best to start with a tight theory and complicate it after contact
with the data reveals shortcomings.
In looking at trade policy, we also need basic trade theory, which is
largely based on assumption 1 (Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz 2015;
Caves, Frankel, and Jones 1990). This theory holds that free trade benefits
society as a whole as well as providing concentrated benefits and incurring
concentrated losses. Essentially, consumers benefit, exporters benefit, and
import competing industries suffer, with benefits outweighing losses.
We can thus posit that people who know how trade will affect their
self-interest will choose to support the trade policy that maximizes their
net gains (assumptions 1 and 2). Further, by assumption 3, we conclude

that, when asked about it, people will correctly report their preferences.
There are at least two mechanisms by which people might come to
know trade policys effects on their interests: 1) they might encounter the
theory itself; or 2) they may rationally ignore the details of the theory and
instead rely on a trusted source to tell them how trade affects them.

Data and operationalization

Given I ultimately want to explore the issue of representation, the ideal
data need several things. First, testing this theory requires polling data on
peoples trade policy preferences. Given that most economic data is
available at the country level, public opinion data at the congressional level
is probably best. Advanced methods of aggregating polls might be
necessary to get data at this level of disaggregation (Tausanovitch and
Warshaw 2013). Obtaining a representative sample of the trade preferences
of a district or county is the goal.
Second, the costs and benefits of trade for the unit of analysis must be
measured. Transforming this data from the county to the district level is
probably needed. What precise measures are needed depends upon the
trade theory being applied. If Stopler-Samuelson, the levels of different
factors of production in the district are required. The simple iteration of
this theory would require measures of capital, labor, and (arable) land. I
imagine information on capital is available. The size of the workforce would

be appropriate for measuring labor. Land suitable for agriculture is almost

certainly available. But, it may be better to break land, labor, and capital
into subcategories, like high- and low-skilled labor (Leamer 1984).
A factor-specific model of trade could also be applied. This assumes
factors of production move between industries with difficulty (think of a
laid-off factory worker unready to learn a new craft). It requires data on
labor employed in import-competing and exporting industries, which I
already have at the district level.
New trade theory and new new trade theory could also be used. New
trade theory says companies (and their employees) in industries
characterized by monopolistic competition gain and new new trade theory
says productive companies and their employees benefit while unproductive
ones are hurt (Krugman, Calvo, and Alejandro 1989; Melitz 2003).
A good proxy for the first mechanism whereby people learn trades
impact, learning the theory directly, seems to be education. College level
economics courses are the first introduction most people have to trade
theory. Educational attainment data are available. Perhaps measures of
political awareness could serve as a proxy for the second mechanismbeing
informed of trades impact by a trusted source (Zaller 1992). The basic idea
is that, in obtaining basic, factual information on politics, a person has
found a trusted source that is, among other things, informing her of her
interests regarding trade, circumventing any need for contact with the
theory. Clearly both mechanisms could be active for an individual.
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Next, compare public opinion to trades impact. A simple way would

be to find the proportion of people who gain from free trade in a district,
compare it to the proportion of losers, and if the former is great than the
latter, code the district as gaining from trade. Then look at public opinion.
If more than half of people profess support, code the district as supporting
free trade. See how the two correlate. Comparing the proportion of those
who gain in a district to the proportion of those who support free trade
may prove a more sophisticated test. Better still, a dollar amount that the
average person would experience may be calculable (Autor et al. 2016).
Other trade theories would require slightly different operationalizaiton.
Any iteration must control for education level and political awareness.
It should be noted that if a survey included all of these items (a
persons support of trade, her occupation and level of wealth, level of
education, and political awareness), it might be possible to test the theory
at the individual level. But, as noted above, the district component allows
eventual comparison of this data with a representatives behavior.

Hypotheses
There will be a positive relationship between a persons gains (losses) from
trade and her support for (opposition to) it. Also, the correlation of
professed support for the trade policy that corresponds with a persons
interests will increase as education and/or political awareness increase.