Professional Documents
Culture Documents
within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law. Undoubtedly, the order of preventive
suspension was issued without giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he
was not fully notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum, contends that "Atty.
Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in writing, sent to the Secretary of
the Provincial Board his desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said petitioner mayor at the
usual time of the respondent Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the
petitioner mayor to appear as requested by him, he failed to appeal." The contention of the Provincial Board cannot
stand alone in the absence of proof or evidence to support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on 15 February
1971, nothing therein can be gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written explanation submitted by
petitioner was taken in to account. The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the evidence presented ex
parte by respondent Wycoco. In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said: From the earliest inception of institutional
government in our country, the concepts of notice and hearing have been fundamental. A fair and enlightened system
of justice would be impossible without the right to notice and to be board. The emphasis on substantive due process
and other recent ramifications of the due process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that
due process was initially concerned with fair procedure. Every law student early learns in law school definition
submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) that due process is
the equivalent of law of the land which means "The general law; a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeding upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property,
and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society. As porting opportunity to be heard and
the rendition of judgment only after a lawful hearing by a coldly neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of
procedural due process. The petition, however, has become moot and academic. Records do not show that in the last
local elections held on18January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public office.
Issue:
RMDC had been granted License No. 33 by the Bureau of Mines to allow them to
mine in the mountains (Mt. Mabio) of Biak naBato, San Miguel, Bulacan, after they
had discovered high quality marble deposits.
After Ernesto Maceda was appointed as DENR Minister, he cancelled License No.
33 through a letter addressed to RMDC.
Maceda said the the issuance of License No. 33 was illegal since it violated section
69 of PD 463 and that there is no more public interest served by the continued
existence or renewal of the license. Also, according to Proclamation No. 84, public
interest would be served by reverting back the excluded land and making it part of
Biak naBato National Park
RMDC claimed that in the cancellation of the license, their right to due process was
violated and that Proclamation No. 84 was invalid because:
- It violates the clause on non-impairment of contracts and
- It is an ex post facto law/bill of attainder
- It was issued by the President after the effectively of the 1987
Constitution
Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, reversed the ruling of CA
Ruling/Ratio:
Yes Proclamation No. 84 was valid. It did not violate the clause on non-impairment of
contract since the respondents license is not a contract to which the protection of the
clause can extend to. It is not a bill of attainder because the cancellation of the
license was not a punishment within the constitutional proscription against the bill of
attainder. It is also not an ex post facto law because Proclamation 84 was not penal
in character. Ex post facto laws are limited to matters criminal in nature. Also, the
President during the time when she issued the Proclamation still validly have the
legislative power under the Provisional Constitution
The court held: (1) That a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is
not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a
mere privilege which may be revoked when the public interests so require; (2) that the
work entrusted by a municipal council to a special sanitary committee to make a study of the
sanitary effects upon the neighborhood of the establishment of a cockpit, is not legislative in
character, but only informational, and may be delegated; and (3) that an ordinance,
approved by a municipal council duly constituted, which suspends the effects of another
which had been enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid and legal.
HELD:
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether
life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license
authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right.
In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely a permit or
privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more emphatic pronouncement, we
held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.
xxx
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of
PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful
holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine,
it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected
under our Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be
exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably
imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees
fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be
revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a
revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege
within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court,
in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: The correlative power to revoke or recall a
permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State
is always revocable.
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and legislate so as
to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to its wealth and
prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these
objects in view, must often be had in certain districts. This is the same police power which the
United States Supreme Court say "extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the
state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare in of its people." For quite similar reasons,
none of the provision of the Philippine Organic Law could could have had the effect of denying
to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise
that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the
promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.
Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be
to enact an anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage
Philippine ship-building.
was ambushed and killed on February 15, 1974 in a barrio of Tarnate[2] and hence
was succeeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo de Leon who as the incumbent mayor is
now substituted in this action as party respondent.[3]
Respondent court had in its questioned order of January 31, 1974 granted
protestees motion for dismissal of the election protest on the ground that this
court has lost its jurisdiction to decide this case for the reason that the same has
become moot and academic, citing the Presidents authority under General Order
No. 3 and Article XVII, section 9 of the 1973 Constitution to remove from office all
incumbent government officials and employees, whether elective or appointive.
Petitioner filed a timely appeal. Upon receipt of respondents comment the Court
resolved to consider petitioners petition for review on certiorari as a special civil
action and the case submitted for decision for prompt disposition thereof.
The Court in its unanimous joint decision en banc in the above-cited cases of
Paredes, Sunga and Valley has already declared such dismissal orders as clear
error, ruling that (I)t must be emphasized that the right of the private
respondents to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of
Art. XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed
elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections.
Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective
positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions,
enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to
enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision,
and that (I)t is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Art. XVII of the New
Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are
now holding their respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that
they hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been
elected, although the same is now indefinite.
The Court further stressed therein that (T)he Constitutional Convention could not
have intended, as in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who had been
unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the
respective offices which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to question
would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an
election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other
forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the
sanctity of the ballot.
In upholding the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and
decide election protests, the Court pointed out that (S)ection 7 of Art. XVII of the
New Constitution provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the