Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Gener
al
Princip
les
Huma
n
Relatio
ns
Foreign Laws; Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws
w/c, like any other fact, must be alleged and proved either by: (1) an official
publication thereof; (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied by a certification
from the secretary of the Phil. Embassy or legation in such country or by
the Phil. Consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent stationed in
such country, or by any other authorized officer in the Phil. foreign service
assigned to said country that such officer has custody.
Garcia
v.
Recio,
GR
13832
2, Oct.
2,
2001.
ABUSE OF RIGHT; Art. 19, NCC; Where a person exercises his rights but
does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is not
in keeping w/ honesty and good faith, he opens himself to civil liability. The
elements of abuse of ones rights are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
w/c is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing
of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will;
it partakes of the nature of fraud. In this case, the declaration of petitioner
as excess teacher was not an abuse of right.
Andra
de v.
CA,
GR
12793
2,
Dec.
7,
2001.
DBP v.
CA,
GR
12620
0,
Aug.
16,
2001.
Page 1 of 87
Civil Laws
Petrop
hil
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
12279
6,
Dec.
10,
2001.
Indepe
n-dent
and
Separa
te Civil
Action
s
Citizen
ship
Person
s
Marria
ge
MC
Engg.
v. CA,
GR
10404
7,
April
3,
2002.
Civil Laws
Marco
s v.
Marco
s, GR
1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
2)
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3)
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the
celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
existed when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage.
5.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The illness must
be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will.
6)
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the FC as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7)
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
(8)
The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court.
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated
by the Court in Santos v. CA (240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995):
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do
not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. Defects like Failure of respondent to
provide material support to, and his resort to physical abuse and
abandonment of, his family are not sufficient to establish psychological
incapacity on his part. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of
the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines in outlined in
Molina.
13649
0, Oct.
19,
2000.
Civil Laws
Caliste
rio v.
Caliste
illegal and void ab initio. The exceptions to this rule are found in paragraph
2 of said article. It further provides that in order for the subsequent
marriage to be valid, the spouse present so contracting the later marriage
must have done so in good faith. A judicial declaration is not necessary as
long as the prescribed period is met. These exceptional cases are explicit to
be deemed valid until declared null and void by a competent court. In
contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage to be valid, the ff. conditions must concur: (1) the prior spouse of
the contracting party must have been absent for 4 consecutive years, or 2
years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Art.
391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (2) the spouse present
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (3)
there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee for w/c the spouse present can institute a summary
proceeding in court.
rio, GR
13646
7,
April
6,
2000.
Same; Need for Declaration of Nullity: The 1st and 2nd marriage of
private respondent, contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. Under the Civil Code, there is
no express provision that requires judicial declaration of nullity. In Mendoza
(1954) and Aragon (1957) the Court held that no judicial declaration is
necessary for the nullity of marriage. The provisions of the FC could not be
retroactively applied to those marriages governed under the Civil Code, for
to do so would prejudice the VESTED RIGHTS of petitioner and of her
children.
Ty, v.
CA,
GR
12740
6,
Nov.
27,
2000.
PP v.
Mendo
za,
1954;
PP v.
Arago
n,
1957
Civil Laws
Gome
z
v.
Lipana
,
1970;
Consu
egra
v.
GSIS,
1971.
Apiag
v.
Canter
o,
1997.
Sy v.
CA,
GR
12726
3,
April
12,
2000.
Ferna
ndez
v.
Ferna
ndez,
GR
14325
6,
Aug.
28,
2001
Civil Laws
Carlos
v.
Abelar
do, GR
THE FAMILY because it was used to purchase the house and lot w/c became
the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding
the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the FC, he shall
be solidarily liable for such loan together w/ his wife.
14650
4,
April
9,
2002.
Dianci
n
v.
CA,
GR
11999
1,
Nov.
20,
2000.
Same; Similarly, land acquired through the Sales Patent under CA 141 by
the wife whose application was approved and whose payments of the
purchase price was made during her marriage, was declared to be conjugal
property.
*** Isabela College, Inc. v. Heirs of Tolentino-Rivera, GR 132677, Oct. 20,
2000.
Same; Under the FC, the disposition of conjugal property by the husband
as administrator in appropriate cases requires the WRITTEN CONSENT of
the wife; otherwise, the disposition is VOID. Court authorization under Art.
124 of the FC is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not
give consent is incapacitated. In this case, the petitioner failed to alleged
and prove that respondent wife was incapacitated to give her consent to
the contracts.
*** Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa, GR 147978, Jan. 28, 2002.
Administration of Conjugal Partnership; Art. 124 of the FC
contemplates a situation where the spouse is absent or separated in fact or
has abandoned the other, or whose consent is withheld or cannot be
obtained, Proceedings thereunder are governed by the rules on summary
judicial proceedings. But said rule does not apply to cases where the nonconsenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent, as
where the subject spouse is in a comatose or semi-comatose condition. In
such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court.
Uy v.
CA,
GR
10955
7,
Nov.
29,
2000.
Civil Laws
Mijare
s
v.
CA,
GR
10892
1,
April
time of death of his or her spouse, was not divorced or if divorced, due to
the fault of the deceased spouse, was entitled to a portion in usufruct equal
to that which pertains as legitime to each of the legitimate children or
descendants not bettered (Article 834, 1st paragraph.) In addition, under
the jurisprudence prevailing at the time of Benitos death, the rule was that
while parents may be the guardians of their minor children, such
guardianship did not extend to the property of their minor children. Parents
then had no power to dispose of the property of their minor children
without court authorization. W/o authority from a court, no person could
make a valid contract for or on behalf of a minor or convey any interest of a
minor in land.
12,
2000.
Liyao
v.
Tanhot
iLiyao,
GR
13896
1,
March
7,
2002.
De
Jesus
v.
Estate
of
Dizon,
GR
14287
7, Oct.
2,
2001.
Liyao
v.
Tanhot
Page 7 of 87
Civil Laws
iLiyao,
GR
13896
1,
March
7,
2002.
Same; Same; Period for Filing the Action; Art. 285, NCC provides that
the action for the recognition may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents(s), subject to two (2) exceptions provided therein. One of
these exceptions is if the father or mother died during the minority of the
child, in w/c case the latter may file the action before the expiration of 4
years from attainment of his majority (at least upon reaching 22 years
old). The two exceptions above have been omitted by Arts. 172, 173, and
175 of the FC. Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an
illegitimate child must be brought w/in the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Nonetheless, the FC provides caveat that rights that have already vested
prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired. Hence,
Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the FC took effect (03
Aug. 1988) and whose putative parent died during their minority are given
the right to seek recognition for a period of up to 4 years from attaining
majority age.
Berna
be v.
Alejo,
GR
14050
0, Jan.
21,
2002.
Same; Natural Children in Art. 285 of the Civil Code; It has been
clarified to include minors even if their parents were disqualified from
marrying each other; and spurious children.
id.
Same; Art. 263, NCC, Art. 171, FC and other related Articles on
Paternity and Filiation; Contemplates situations where a doubt exists
that a child is indeed a mans child by his wife, and the husband (or, in
proper cases, his heirs) denies the child filiation. Not where a child is
alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple.
***Labagala v. Santiago, GR 132305, Dec. 4, 2001; Lee v. CA, GR 118387,
Oct. 11, 2001; Fernandez v. Fernandez, supra.
PROOF OF FILIATION; Illegitimate Children; Like legitimate children, is
established by: (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence of the foregoing, filiation shall be proved by: (3) the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (4) any other
means allowed by the rules of court and special laws. The due recognition
of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.
However, a claim for recognition predicated on evidence other than the
foregoing will require judicial action w/in the applicable statute of
limitations.
*** De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, supra; Go Kim Huy v. Go Kim Huy, GR
137674, Sept. 20, 2001.
Same: The filiation of illegitimate children may be proved by any of the
forms of recognition of natural children, viz: (1) Voluntarily, which must be
express such as that in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in an authentic writing; (2) legally, i.e., when a natural child is
recognized, such recognition extends to his or her brothers and sisters of
the full blood; and (3) judicially or compulsory, which may be demanded
Page 8 of 87
Civil Laws
Cenid
o
v.
Apacio
nado,
GR
13247
by the illegitimate child of his parent. The action for compulsory recognition
of the illegitimate child must be brought during the lifetime of the
presumed parent. After the parents death, the child cannot bring such
action, except in only two cases: one is when the supposed parent died
during the minority of the child or the case for recognition is pending, and
the other is when after the death of a parent, a document is discovered in
which the parent recognized the child as his. The action must be brought
within 4 years from attainment of majority in the first case, and from the
discovery of the document in the second case.
4,
Nov.
19,
1999.
Bonda
gjy v.
Bonda
gjy,
GR
14081
7,
Dec.
7,
2001.
Tonog
v. CA,
GR
12290
6,
Feb.
7,
2002.
SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY; Under Art. 218 of the FC, the ff. shall
have special parental authority over a minor child while under their
supervision, instruction or custody: [1] the school, its administrators and
teachers; or [2] the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.
This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution such as field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils
St.
Marys
Acade
my v.
Carpit
anos,
GR
Page 9 of 87
Civil Laws
14336
3,
Feb.
6,
2002.
Lee v.
CA,
GR
11838
7, Oct.
11,
2001.
Locsin
v.
Locsin
,
2001.
Usufru
c-tuary
Heme
des v.
CA,
GR
10713
2, Oct.
8,
1999.
Proper
ty,
Ownershi
p and
its
Modific
ations
Civil
Registr
y
POSSESSION; The legal presumption in Art. 541 of the Civil Code is merely
a disputable presumption. In the absence of actual, public and adverse
possession, the declaration of land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership.
*** Cequena v. Bolante, GR 137944, April 6, 2000.
Occupation; Under Art. 714 of the Civil Code, ownership of a piece of land
cannot be acquired by occupation.
*** Heirs of Seraspi v. CA, GR 135602, April, 28, 2000.
Possessor/Builder in Good Faith; W/ regard to rented land, lessees and
sub lessees are neither possessors nor builder s in good faith. They know
that their occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the
lease and, they cannot as a matter of right neither recover the value of
their improvements from the lessor nor retain the premises until they are
reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Art. 1678 of the Civil Code w/c
allows reimbursement to lessees of up to of the value of their
improvements, if the lessor so elects.
*** Sps. Virgilio v. Patricia, GR 134651, Sept. 18, 2000.
Page 10 of 87
Civil Laws
PNB v.
CA,
GR
13521
9, Jan.
17,
2002.
Same; Same; The owners of a property have no authority to use force and
violence to eject alleged usurpers who were in prior physical possession of
it. They must file the appropriate action in court and should not take the
law into their own hands.
*** Heirs of Laurora v. Sterling TechnoPark III, GR 146815, April 9, 2003.
CO-OWNERSHIP; Concept; Before a property owned in common is
actually partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an IDEAL OR ABSTRACT
QUOTA OR PROPORTIONATE SHARE IN THE ENTIRE PROPERTY. A co-owner
has no right to demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing
owned in common because until division is effected his right over the thing
is represented only by an ideal portion. As such, the only effect of an action
brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain recognition of
the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion
of the property because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the
plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property.
Engre
so v.
De la
Cruz,
GR
14872
7,
April
9,
2003.
Santos
v.
Santos
,
GR
13952
4, Oct.
12,
2000.
Same; Right of Pre-emption; After the physical division of the lot among
the brothers, the community ownership terminated; and the right of preemption or redemption for each brother was no longer available.
*** Sps. Si v. CA, GR 122047, Oct. 12, 2000.
Same; Right of Redemption; The notice required in Art. 1623 of the Civil
Code must be given by the vendor or prospective vendor and not by any
other person.
*** Francisco v. Boiser, GR 137677, May 31, 2000.
Same; Generosa sold not only her undivided shares in the building
also the share of the respondents. Such a sale w/o the consent of
respondents is not null and void as it conveys the rights of the seller
owner thereby making the buyer a co-owner to that extent together w/
respondents who owned the share therein.
Page 11 of 87
Civil Laws
but
the
cothe
Ferna
ndez
v.
Ferna
ndez,
2001.
Succes
sion
Fajard
o
v.
Freed
om to
Build,
Inc.,
GR
13469
2,
Aug.
1,
2000.
Villanu
eva v.
Velasc
o, GR
13084
5,
Nov.
27,
2000.
WILLS; The wishes and desire of the testator must be strictly followed. A
will cannot be the subject of a compromise w/c would thereby defeat the
very purpose of making a will.
*** Rabadilla v. CA, GR 113725, June 29, 2000.
Same; The clear intent of the decedent to bequeath his property to his
second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed.
Since the decedent was a foreigner, Philippine law on family rights and
Page 12 of 87
Civil Laws
Lloren
te
v.
CA,
duties, status, condition and legal capacity did not govern. Whether the will
is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from the decedent are issues best
proved by foreign law w/c must be pleaded and proved. As a guide,
however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not
intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
GR
12437
1,
Nov.
23,
2000.
Partition Inter Vivos; It may be done for as long as legitimes are not
prejudiced. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation,
as provided for in Art. 1061, NCC.
*** Zaragosa v. CA, GR 106401, Sept. 29, 2000.
INSTITUTION OF HEIRS; Modal institution distinguished from
fideicommisary substitution; further distinguished from conditional
testamentary disposition: The institution of an heir in the manner
prescribed in Art. 882 is what is known in the law of succession as an
institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the
testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or
application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed
by the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir
or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession;
while In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to
preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.
Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir
or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first
heir is not related by first degree to the-second heir. And in a conditional
testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order
for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends
but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. 20 To
some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.
Rabad
illa v.
CA,
GR
11372
5,
June
29,
2000.
Rabad
illa v.
CA,
GR
11372
5,
June
29,
2000.
Civil Laws
Nazar
eno v.
CA,
GR
13884
2, Oct.
18,
2000.
Donati
on
Magla
sang
v.
Heirs
of
Cabati
ngan,
GR
13195
3,
June
5,
2002.
Heme
des v.
CA,
GR
10713
2, Oct.
8,
1999.
(Justic
e
Vitug,
concur
ring)
Sps.
Gesto
pa v.
CA,
GR
11190
4, Oct.
5,
2000.
Page 14 of 87
Civil Laws
Austri
aMagat
v. CA,
GR
10675
5,
Feb.
1,
2002.
Same; Formalities; Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the
donor, donee and their witnesses affixed their signatures. However, the
acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only the donor.
Thus, the trial court ruled that for the donnees failure to acknowledge her
acceptance before the notary public, the same was set forth merely on a
private instrument, i.e., the first page of the instrument and was not valid.
The Court held that lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the
notary public does not render the donation null and void. The instrument
should be treated in its entirety. The fact that it was acknowledged by the
donor before a notary public converts the deed of donation in its entirety to
a public instrument. That the donee was not mentioned by the notary
public in the acknowledgment is of no moment.
id.
Obligati
ons
Page 15 of 87
Civil Laws
Austri
aMagat
v. CA,
GR
10675
5,
Feb.
1,
2002.
Same; Surety; A suretyship agreement can secure future loans even if the
amount is not yet known.
*** South City Homes, Ba Finance Corp., GR 135462, Dec. 7, 2001.
Same; Same; However, the obligation of a surety cannot be extended by
implication beyond its specified limits. When a surety executes a bond, it
does not guarantee that the plaintiffs cause of action is meritorious, and
that it will be responsible for all the costs that may be adjudicated against
its principal in case the action fails. The extent of a suretys liability is
determined only by the contract of suretyship.
*** Visaya Surety & Insurance Corp. v. CA, GR 127261, Sept. 7, 2001.
Same; Same; Suretys liability re: CREDIT CARD; While the Court
commiserates in the financial predicament petitioner now faces, the liability
she incurred is only the legitimate consequence of an undertaking that she
freely and intelligently obliged to. Prospective sureties to credit card
applicants would be well-advised to study carefully the terms of the
agreements prepared by the credit card companies before giving their
consent, and pay heed to stipulations that could lead to onerous effects,
likein the present case where the credit applied for was limitless.
Molino
v.
Securi
ty
Diners
Intl.
Corp.,
supra.
Civil Laws
Ong
Yong
v. Tiu,
GR
14447
6,
Feb.
1,
2002.
Ong
Yong
v. Tiu,
GR
14447
6,
Feb.
1,
2002.
Ong
Yong
v. Tiu,
GR
14447
6,
Feb.
1,
2002.
Ong
Yong
v. Tiu,
GR
14447
6,
Feb.
1,
2002.
Calala
s
v.
CA,
GR
12203
9, May
31,
2000.
Civil Laws
Singso
n
v.
Exting
uishment
of
Obligati
ons
beyond the common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and such
increase or decrease could not be reasonably foreseen or was manifestly
beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of
the obligation. The supervening event of extraordinary inflation is never
assumed. While there was decline in the purchasing power of the Phil.
Currency from the period 1966 to 1986, such cannot be considered as
extraordinary; rather, it was a normal erosion of the value of the Phil. Pesos
w/c is characteristics of most currencies. The effect of extraordinary
inflation is not to be applied w/o an official declaration thereof by
competent authorities.
Caltex
,
Phils.,
GR
13779
8, Oct.
4,
2000.
Liguta
n
v.
CA,
GR
13867
7,
Feb.
12,
2002.
id.
id.
PAYMENT; The right to specify w/c/ among his various obligations to the
same creditor is to be applied first rest w/ the debtor. Under the law, if the
debtor does not declare at the time he makes payment w/c among his
debts w/ his creditor the payment is to be applied, no payment is to be
made to a debt that is not yet due and the payment has to be applied first
to the debt most onerous to the debtor. The lease over the Fairview Wet
Market property is the most onerous among all the obligations of petitioner
to respondent in this case. Hence, ejectment case based on alleged failure
to pay rentals (as the payment of the debtor was applied to obligations
Faculd
o
v.
Ragal
ado,
GR
12385
5,
Nov.
20,
Page 18 of 87
Civil Laws
other than the rental then due) was w/o basis and should have been
dismissed.
2000.
Repub
lic v.
Sandi
ganba
yan,
GR
12860
6,
Dec.
4,
2000.
Civil Laws
Heirs
of
Seras
pi
v.
CA,
GR
13560
2,
April
28,
2000.
2000.
LACHES; There is no absolute rule on what constitutes laches. It is a
creation of equity and applied not really to penalize neglect or sleeping
upon ones rights but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so
would result in a clearly inequitable situation. The question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court and each case must be
declared according to its particular circumstances.
Villanu
evaMijare
s
v.
CA,
GR
10892
1,
April
12,
2000.
Huibo
nhoa
v. CA,
GR
95897
, Dec.
14,
1999.
Same; For novation to take place, the ff. requisites must concur: [1] there
must be a valid obligation; [2] there must be an agreement of the parties
concerned to a new contract; [3] there must be the extinguishment of the
old contract; and [4] there must be the validity of the new contract. In the
case at bar, the 3rd requisite is not present. The parties did agree that the
amount loaned would be converted into respondents contribution to the
partnership, but this conversion did not extinguish the loan obligation.
Significantly, novation is never presumed. It must appear by express
agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and
unequivocal to be mistaken for anything else. An old obligation to pay a
sum of money is not novated in a new instrument wherein the old is
ratified by changing
only the terms of payment and adding other
obligations not incompatible w/ the old one, or wherein the old contract is
merely supplemented by the new one.
Sps.
Reyes
v. CA,
GR
14775
8,
June
26,
2002.
Cebu
Intl.
Financ
e
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
12303
1, Oct.
12,
1999.
Cebu
Intl.
Financ
e
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
12303
1, Oct.
12,
1999.
Espina
v. CA,
Page 20 of 87
Civil Laws
Prescri
p-tion
of
Action
s
must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of
a new one. Where there is no clear agreement to create a new contract in
place of the existing one, novation cannot be presumed to take place,
unless the terms of the new contract are fully incompatible w/ the former
agreement on every point.
GR
11680
5,
June
22,
2000.
Same; Incompatibilities between the old and the new obligations included
variance in the principal amount of the obligation; and positive as well as
negative covenants found in one contract and not in the other. Since the
earlier loan obligation was extinguished by novation, the Indemnity
Agreement, an accessory obligation, was necessarily extinguished also,
pursuant to Art. 1296 of the Civil Code.
Securi
ty
Bank
v.
Cuenc
a, GR
13854
4, Oct.
3,
2000.
Liguta
n
v.
CA,
GR
13867
7,
Feb.
12,
2002.
Same; Subrogation; The transfer of all the rights of the creditor to a third
person, who substitutes him in all his rights. It may either be legal or
conventional. Conventional Subrogation requires an agreement among the
3 parties concerned the orig. creditor, the debtor, and the new creditor. In
this case, the MOA expressly requires the consent of Anglo-Asean to the
subrogation. The absence of such conformity prevents the agreement from
becoming effective and a source of any cause of action for the signatories
thereto.
Licaro
s
v.
Gatma
itan,
GR
14283
8,
Aug.
9,
2001.
id.
Asunci
on v.
Evang
elista,
GR
13349
1, Oct.
13,
1999.
Vda
de
Delga
do v.
CA,
supra;
Barrer
Page 21 of 87
Civil Laws
a
v.
CA,
GR
12393
5,
Dec.
14,
2001.
Oral Contract; An action to enforce an oral contract prescribes in 6 years.
The right to demand an accounting for a partners interest as against the
person continuing the business accrues at the date of dissolution, in the
absence of any contrary agreement.
Sunga
-Chan
v.
Chua,
GR
14334
0,
Aug.
15,
2001.
Forcible Entry; it must be filed w/in 1 year from the date of actual entry
on the land. After the lapse of the 1-year period, the remedies of the party
dispossessed is to file either an accion publiciana w/c is a plenary action to
recover the right of possession or an accion reinvindicatoria w/c is an action
to recover ownership as well as possession.
Gener
v. De
Leon,
GR
13073
0, Oct.
19,
2001.
Lee v.
CA,
2001.
Santos
v.
Santos
,
GR
13389
5, Oct.
2,
2001
Ingjug
tiro v.
Casals
,
GR
13471
8,
Aug.
20,
2001.
Biona
v. CA,
GR
10564
7, July
31,
2001.
Page 22 of 87
Civil Laws
owner w/o demurrer and molestation for a long period of time, never
claiming the land as their own until 1985 when the property has greatly
appreciated in value.
Contra
cts
Same; The concept of laches is not concerned w/ the lapse of time but only
w/ the effect of unreasonable lapse. In this case, the alleged 16 years of
inaction has no adverse effect to make one guilty of lapses.
Santos
v.
Santos
,
GR
13389
5, Oct.
2,
2001.
Same; The doctrine of stale demands would apply only where by reason of
the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his
legal rights. Moreover, except for every strong reasons, the Court is not
disposed to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of
an owner.
Tsai v.
CA,
GR
12009
8, Oct.
2,
2001.
MC
Engg.
v. CA,
GR
10404
7,
April
3,
2002.
Same; Same; PU could not validly given consent to the contract of sale, as
he was not even conceived yet at the time of its alleged perfection. LC
could not have acted as representative of JPU. In the first place, she did not
have the right to represent JPU for lack of legal authority to do so. W/o
authority from the court, no person can make a valid contract in behalf of a
minor.
Pua v.
CA,
GR
13499
2,
Nov.
20,
2000.
Same; Same; When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract
is in a language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the
person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been
fully explained to the former.
Unica
ne
Food
Produ
cts
Manuf
acturi
ng v.
CA,
GR
Page 23 of 87
Civil Laws
12549
7,
Nov.
20,
2000.
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT; The owner is not obligated to sell simply
because the other party is in actual possession of the property, absent any
prior agreement vesting in them as occupants, the right of first priority to
buy.
Gabel
o
v.
CA,
GR
11174
3, Oct.
8,
1999.
Hanil
Dev.
Co. v.
CA,
GR
11317
6, July
30,
2001.
Maest
rado
vs.
CA,
327
SCRA
678
(2000)
.
Villalo
n
v.
CA,
GR
11699
6,
Dec.
1999
Integr
ated
Packa
ging
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
11511
7,
June
8,
2000.
Marub
eni
Corp.
v.
Lirag,
GR
13099
Page 24 of 87
Civil Laws
8,
Aug.
10,
2001;
Davao
Light
&
Power
Co. v.
CA,
GR
11168
5,
Aug.
20,
2001.
Ferna
ndez
v.
Ferna
ndez,
GR
14325
6,
Aug.
28,
2001.
Rizal
Comm
.
Banki
ng
Corp
v. Alfa
RTW
Manuf
acturi
ng
Corp.,
GR
13387
7,
Nov.
14,
2001.
Same: Contracts bind the parties not only to what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all necessary consequences of their acts.
Torres
v. CA,
GR
13455
9,
Dec.
9,
1999.
Heme
des v.
CA,
GR
10713
2, Oct.
8,
Page 25 of 87
Civil Laws
1999.
PERFECTION OF CONTRACT; Offer and Acceptance; The letter of
petitioner to respondent constituted acceptance of respondents offer as
contemplated by law. While the same letter enumerated certain basic
terms and conditions, these were imposed on the performance of the
obligation rather than on the perfection of the contract. While failure to
comply w/ conditions imposed on the perfection of a contract results in
failure of a contract. Failure to comply w/ conditions imposed merely on the
performance of an obligation merely gives the other party options/ or
remedies to protect his interest.
Jardin
e
Davis
v. CA,
GR
12806
6
&
12806
9,
June
19,
2000.
Pealo
sa v.
Santos
,
2001.
Same; The Civil Code upholds the spirit over the form, and an agreement
will be deemed to exist, provided the essential requisites are present, viz.:
proof of consent, subject matter and cause. It is generally obligatory in
whatever form it may have been entered into.
Cordia
l
v.
Miran
da, GR
13549
5,
Dec.
14,
2000.
Cenid
o
v.
Apacio
nado,
GR
13247
4,
Nov.
19,
1999.
Santos
v.
Heirs
of
Maria
no, GR
14332
5, Oct.
24,
2000.
Same; The counter offer was denied twice by GSIS and therefore there was
clearly no meeting of the minds and no perfected contract.
Urban
o
v.
GSIS,
GR
13790
4, Oct.
19,
2001.
Page 26 of 87
Civil Laws
Sarmi
ng v.
Dy, GR
13364
3,
June
6,
2002.
id.
Huibo
nhoa
v. CA,
GR
95897
, Dec.
14,
1999.
Sps.
Puerto
v. CA,
GR
13821
0,
June
6,
2002.
Huibo
nhoa
v. CA,
GR
95897
, Dec.
14,
1999.
Page 27 of 87
Civil Laws
Relian
ce
Comm
odities
v. IAC,
GR
74729
, May
31,
2000.
Huibo
nhoa
v. CA,
GR
95897
, Dec.
14,
1999.
Gome
z
v.
CA,
GR
12074
7,
Sept.
21.
2000.
SBMA
v.
Univer
sal
Intl.
Group
of
Taiwa
n, GR
13168
0,
Sept.
14,
2000.
Justice
Vitug,
dissen
ting in
Equito
rial
Realty
Dev.
Inc. v.
Mayfai
r
Theat
er, GR
Page 28 of 87
Civil Laws
13387
9,
Nov.
21,
2001.
Same; Same; In Arts. 1191 and 1592, rescission is a principal action w/c
seeks the resolution or cancellation of a contract; while in Art. 1381, the
action is a subsidiary one limited to cases of rescission for lesion as
enumerated in said article.
Same; Same; Rescission under Art. 1191 involves only those who are
parties to the contract. On the contrary, rescission under Art. 1381, the
legal effects are not restricted to the contracting parties only but also to
third person or a stranger to the contract. Once rescinded, the contract is
non-existent or void from its inception.
Equito
rial
Realty
Dev.,
Inc. v.
MayFa
ir
Theat
er, GR
13387
9,
Nov.
21,
2001.
Concul
ada v.
CA,
GR
13056
2, Oct.
11,
2001;
Pealo
sa v.
Santos
,
supra;
Ferna
ndez
v.
Ferna
ndez,
supra.
Viewm
aster
Constr
uction
Corp.
v.
Roxas,
GR
13357
Page 29 of 87
Civil Laws
6, July
13,
2000.
Kinds
of
Contra
cts
Cordia
l
v.
Miran
da, GR
13549
5,
Dec.
14,
2000.
Sigua
n
v.
Lim,
GR
13468
5,
Nov.
19,
1999.
Adora
ble v.
CA,
GR
11946
6,
Nov.
25,
1999.
China
Banki
ng
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
12964
4,
Sept.
7,
2001.
Marub
eni
Corp.
v.
Lirag,
2001.
Modin
a
v.
CA,
GR
10935
5, Oct.
29,
1999.
Page 30 of 87
Civil Laws
Same; PARI DELICTO; When the parties are equally at fault, the law
leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them.
Guan
v.
Ong,
GR
14473
5, Oct.
18,
2001.
Blanco
v.
Quash
a, GR
13314
8,
Nov.
17,
1999.
Same; Same; The execution of the three documents on the same day and
other relevant facts in this case sustain the allegation that the contract of
sale was simulated and that private respondents received no consideration
for it. The said documents were executed by the parties for the sole
purpose of obtaining a bank loan and to present the subject lot as
collateral, free from any prior liens.
Sps.
Bartim
eo v.
CA,
GR
13685
7,
Nov.
22,
2000.
Same; Same; Where the parties agreed that the title would revert back to
Felisa Manese once her daughters Lutgarda and Ciceron Manese were
financially capable. The sale was arranged without any pecuniary benefit
for Felisa. It was done so that the property may be used as collateral for a
P500,000.00 loan from Planters Development Bank. Not a single centavo
was given to Felisa Manese, how then can this be considered a sale when
there was no consideration received by the seller?
Unica
ne
Food
Produ
cts
Manuf
acturi
ng v.
CA,
GR
12549
7,
Nov.
20,
2000.
Pealo
sa v.
Santos
,
GR
13374
9,
Aug.
23,
2001.
;
Labag
ala v.
Santia
go, GR
13230
5,
Dece
Page 31 of 87
Civil Laws
mder
4,
2001.
Same; Same; Same; An Absolutely simulated contract of sale is void ab
initio and transfers no right of ownership.
Cruz
v.
Banco
m
Financ
e
Corp.,
GR
14778
8,
March
19,
2002.
Domin
go v.
CA,
GR
12754
0, Oct.
17,
2001;
Guan
v.
Ong,
GR
14473
5, Oct.
18,
2001.
Same; Same; Same; As where the Deed of Sale was executed merely to
facilitate the transfer of the property to petitioner pursuant to an
agreement between the parties to enable them to construct a commercial
building and to sell the property to their children. Being merely a
subterfuge, that agreement cannot be taken as the consideration for the
sale.
id.
Ingjug
tiro v.
Casals
,
GR
13471
8,
Aug.
20,
2001.
Same; Same; Same; Sale of real property by parties who have not been
authorized by the owner to sell.
AF
Realty
& Dev.
V.
Diesel
man
Freigh
t
Servic
es, GR
11144
8, Jan.
Page 32 of 87
Civil Laws
16,
2002.
Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Burden of proving alleged simulation of a
contract falls on those who impugn its regularity and validity. A failure to
discharge this duty will result in upholding of the contract.
Ramo
s
v.
Heirs
of
ramos
,
GR
14084
8,
April
25,
2002.
VOIDABLE CONTRACTS; Under Arts. 1330 and 1390, NCC, the ff.
contracts are voidable: [1] those where one of the parties is incapable of
giving CONSENT to a contract; [2] those where the consent is VITIATED by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
Katipu
nan v.
Katipu
nan,
GR
13241
5, Jan.
30,
2002.
Katipu
nan v.
Katipu
nan,
GR
13241
5, Jan.
30,
2002.
Same; Fraud; There is fraud when the sale of the subject house is not
safely habitable.
Jumalo
n
v.
CA,
GR
12776
7, Jan.
30,
2002.
Villanu
evaMijare
s
v.
CA,
supra.
INTEREST; Computed from the time of judicial demand, the date the
complaint was filed.
Bayer
Phils.
v. CA,
GR
10926
9,
Sept.
15,
2000.
Pilipin
as
Hino
Page 33 of 87
Civil Laws
v. CA,
GR
12657
0,
Aug.
18,
2000.
Estopp
el
Acosta
v. CA,
GR
13208
8,
June
28,
2000.
Same; It is only when a party puts in issue in the pleadings the failure of
the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties thereto that
said party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
the written agreement. The fact that the terms of the MOA are explicit and
leave no doubt as to the intention of the parties, coupled w/ petitioners
failure to contest the contract for failing to express the true intention of the
parties, behooves the courts not to read into the MOA any other intention
that would contradict its apparent import, such that the literal meaning of
its stipulations must control. There is no factual nor legal basis for
petitioners claim that the respondents are obligated to rid the subject
property of squatters and unauthorized structures. The existence of
squatters and unauthorized structures in the subject property is not
covered by the phrase liens and encumbrances.
Sabio
v. Intl.
Corpor
ate
Bank,
GR
13270
9,
Sept.
4,
2001.
Chua
v. CA,
GR
11925
5,
April
9,
2003.
Lim v.
Phil.
Fishin
g Gear
,
GR
13644
8,
Nov.
3,
1999.
Metro
bank
v. CA,
GR
12289
9,
June
8,
2000.
Page 34 of 87
Civil Laws
Sales
PERFECTION OF SALE; From the time a party accepts the other partys
offer to sell w/in the stipulated period, a contract of sale is deemed
perfected. Under the law, the meeting of the minds between the parties
gives rise to a binding contract although they have not affixed their
signatures to a written form.
Gabel
o
v.
CA,
GR
11174
3, Oct.
8,
1999.
Roble
v.
Arbas
a, GR
13070
7, July
31,
2001.;
Biona
v. CA,
GR
10564
7, July
31,
2001.
Heirs
of San
Andre
s
v.
Rodrig
uez,
GR
13563
4, May
31,
2000.
San
Miguel
Proper
ties v.
Sps.
Huang
,
GR
13729
0, July
31,
2000.
Pealo
sa v.
Santos
,
supra.
Same; The preponderance of evidence shows that NDC sold to PUP the
whole NDC compound, including the leased premises, w/o the knowledge
much less consent of the lessee w/c had a valid and existing right of first
PUP v.
CA,
GR
Page 35 of 87
Civil Laws
refusal. Interpretations that there was a mere transfer, and not a sale, apart
from being specious sophistry and a mere play of words, is too strained and
hairsplitting.
14351
3,
Nov.
14,
2001.
Leao
v. CA,
GR
12901
8,
Nov.
15,
2001.
Tuazo
n
v.
Garila
o, GR
14367
3,
aug.
10,
2001.
Same; Same; Art. 1592, NCC is not applicable to the case at bar. However,
any attempt to cancel the contract to sell would have to comply w/ the
provisions of RA 6652 (Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act), w/c
recognizes in conditional sales of all kinds of real estate (industrial,
commercial, residential) the right of the seller to cancel the contract upon
non-payment of installments by the buyer, w/c is simply an event that
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding
force.. The law also provides for the rights of the buyer in case of
cancellation.
Leao
v. CA,
GR
12901
8,
Nov.
15,
2001.
Same; The stipulation that the payment of the full consideration based on
a survey shall be due and payable in 5 years from the execution of a formal
deed of sale is not a condition w/c affects the efficacy of the contract of
sale. It merely provides for the manner by w/c the full consideration is to be
computed and the time w/in w/c the same is to be paid.
Heirs
of San
Andre
s
v.
Rodrig
uez,
GR
13563
4, May
31,
2000.
Gome
z
v.
CA,
supra.
Insular
Life
Assura
nce
Co. V.
Young,
GR
14096
4, Jan.
16,
2002.
Page 36 of 87
Civil Laws
Chua
v. CA,
GR
11925
5,
April
9,
2003.
id.
Page 37 of 87
Civil Laws
transfer of the certificate of title in the name of the buyer, and transfer of
ownership to the buyer. The buyer may become the owner of the real
property even if the certificate of title is still registered in the name of the
seller. As between the seller and buyer, ownership is transferred not by the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the buyer but by the
execution of the instrument of sale in a public document. In a contract of
sale of real property, delivery is effected when the instrument of sale is
executed in a public document. When the deed of absolute sale is signed
by the parties and notarized, then delivery of the real property is deemed
made by the seller to the buyer (Art. 1498 of the Civil Code). Similarly, in a
contract to sell real property, once the seller is ready, able and willing to
sign the deed of absolute sale before a notary public, the seller is in a
position to transfer ownership of the real property to the buyer. At this
point, the seller complies with his undertaking to sell the real property in
accordance with the contract to sell, and to assume all the obligations of a
vendor under a contract of sale pursuant to the relevant articles of the Civil
Code. In a contract to sell, the seller is not obligated to transfer ownership
to the buyer. Neither is the seller obligated to cause the issuance of a new
certificate of title in the name of the buyer. However, the seller must put all
his papers in proper order to the point that he is in a position to transfer
ownership of the real property to the buyer upon the signing of the contract
of sale.
Contract of Sale Distinguished from Contract to Sell or Conditional
Sale; Option Contract; Earnest Money; Conditions imposed upon
the perfection of the contract distinguished from conditions
imposed on the performance of an obligation; Whenever earnest
money is given in a contract of sale, it is considered as part of the
purchased price and proof of the perfection of the contract. Although the
MOA is also denominated as a Contract to Sell, it was held that the
parties contemplated a contract of sale. A deed of sale is absolute in nature
although denominated a conditional sale in the absence of a stipulation
reserving title in the owner until full payment of the purchase price. In such
case, ownership of the thing sold passes to the vendee upon actual or
constructive delivery thereof. The mere fact that the obligation to pay the
balance of the purchase price was made subject to the condition to first
deliver the reconstituted title of the house and lot does not make the
contract a contract to sell for such condition is not inconsistent w/ a
contract of sale.
EARNEST MONEY; Respondents did not give the P1M as earnest money
contemplated in Art. 1842 of the Civil Code. Said amount was merely a
deposit of what would eventually become an earnest money or
downpayment, should a contract of sale be made by them. The amount
was thus given not as a part of the purchase price and as proof of the
perfection of the contract of sale but only as a guarantee that respondents
would not back out of the sale. Respondents in fact described the amount
as an "earnest-deposit." The P1M "earnest-deposit" could not have been
given as earnest money as contemplated in Art. 1482 because, at the time
when petitioner accepted the terms of respondents' offer of March 29,
1994, their contract had not yet been perfected. This is evident from the
following conditions attached by respondents to their letter, to wit: (1) that
they be given the exclusive option to purchase the property within 30 days
from acceptance of the offer; (2) that during the option period, the parties
would negotiate the terms and conditions of the purchase; and (3)
petitioner would secure the necessary approvals while respondents would
handle the documentation. Thus, it is not the giving of earnest money, but
the proof of the concurrence of all the essential elements of the contract of
sale which establishes the existence of a perfected sale.
San
Miguel
Proper
ties v.
Sps.
Huang
,
GR
13729
0, July
31,
2000.
Same; It is true that Article 1482 of the Civil Code provides that
"[W]henever earnest money is given in a contract of sale, it shall be
considered as part of the price and proof of the perfection of the contract."
However, this article speaks of earnest money given in a contract of sale. In
Chua
v. CA,
GR
11925
Page 38 of 87
Civil Laws
this case, the earnest money was given in a contract to sell. The Receipt
evidencing the contract to sell stipulates that the earnest money is a
forfeitable deposit, to be forfeited if the sale is not consummated should
Chua fail to pay the balance of the purchase price. The earnest money
forms part of the consideration only if the sale is consummated upon full
payment of the purchase price. If there is a contract of sale, Valdes-Choy
should have the right to compel Chua to pay the balance of the purchase
price. Chua, however, has the right to walk away from the transaction, w/
no obligation to pay the balance, although he will forfeit the earnest money.
Clearly, there is no contract of sale. The earnest money was given in a
contract to sell, and thus Article 1482, w/ch speaks of a contract of sale, is
not applicable.
5,
April
9,
2003.
Bacus
v. CA,
GR
12769
5,
Dec.
3,
2001.
Rivier
a
Filipin
a, Inc.
v. CA,
GR
11735
5,
April
5,
2002.
Page 39 of 87
Civil Laws
id.
Litonju
a
v.
L&R
Corp.,
GR
13072
2,
Dec.
9,
1999.
Alcant
ara v.
Reta,
GR
13699
6,
Dec.
14,
2001.
PUP v.
Page 40 of 87
Civil Laws
refusal that stands upon valuable consideration. In the instant case, the
right of first refusal is an integral and indivisible part of the contract of
lease. The consideration for the right is built into the reciprocal obligations
of the parties. When a lease contract contains a right of first refusal, the
lessor is under a legal duty to the lessee not to sell to anybody at any price
until after he has made an offer to sell to the latter at a certain price and
the lessee has failed to accept it. The option in this case was incorporated
in the contracts of lease for the benefit of the lessee w/c, in view of the
total amount of its investments in the property, wanted to be assured that
it would be given the first opportunity to buy the property at a price for w/c
it would be offered for sale.
CA,
GR
14351
3,
Nov.
14,
2001.
Domin
go v.
CA,
GR
12754
0, Oct.
17,
2001.
Santos
v.
Santos
,
GR
13389
5, Oct.
2,
2001.
Sabio
v. Intl.
Corpor
ate
Bank,
GR
13270
9,
Sept.
4,
2001.
Same; Ownership of the thing sold is not acquired by mere agreement, but
by tradition or delivery. In this case, delivery was not had because it was
effectively prevented by a legal impediment. The sale to Equitorial may
have been valid from inception, but it was judicially rescinded before it
could be consummated. Petitioner never acquired ownership, not because
the sale was void, as erroneously claimed by the trial court, but because
the sale was not consummated by a legally effective delivery of the
property sold. Not having been the owner, petitioner cannot be entitled to
the civil fruits like rentals of the property sold. Furthermore, petitioners bad
faith bars the grant of such benefits.
Equito
rial
Realty
Dev.,
Inc. v.
Mayfai
r
Theat
er, GR
13387
9,
Nov.
21,
2001.
(Justic
e Melo
concur
ring.)
Page 41 of 87
Civil Laws
Justice
Sando
val,
dissen
ting in
Equito
rial
Realty
Dev.,
Inc. v.
Mayfai
r
Theat
er, GR
13387
9,
Nov.
21,
2001.
Same; Delivery of Real Property; Under the law, the vendor is bound to
transfer ownership of and deliver the thing object of the sale to the vendee.
In the present case, although the sale was made through a public
document and hence equivalent to delivery of the thing sold, petitioner
Hermogena vehemently denied the fact of the sale and interposed her
objection to private respondents enjoyment of the property. As such fiction
must yield to reality and petitioners obligation to deliver the sold portion of
lot to private respondent remains.
Engre
so v.
De la
Cruz,
GR
14872
7,
April
9,
2002.
Aron
v. CA,
GR
12692
6,
Aug.
16,
2001.
Equito
rial
Realty
Dev.,
Inc. v.
Mayfai
r
Theat
er, GR
13387
9,
Nov.
21,
2001.
Page 42 of 87
Civil Laws
(Justic
e Melo
concur
ring.)
Tsai v.
CA,
GR
12009
8, Oct.
2,
2001.
SALE OF REAL ESTATE FOR A LUMP SUM (Art. 1542, NCC); Pursuant
to Article 1542, Civil Code of the Philippines, in the sale of real estate,
made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of
measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price
although there be a greater or lesser area or number than that stated in the
contract. Thus, the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything within
the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that distinguishes the
determinate object. However, this rule admits of an exception. A vendee of
land, when sold in gross or with the description "more or less" with
reference to its area, does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in
the land. The use of "more or less" or similar words in designating quantity
covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. In the case at bar, the
parties to the agreement described the land subject of the sale in this wise:
"This is a whole parcel of residential land, xxx xxx having an approximate
area of 240 square meters more or less, with all improvements thereon.
An area of "644 square meters more" is not reasonable excess or
deficiency, to be deemed included in the deed of sale of January 2, 1976.
When the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successor-in-interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
Roble
v.
Arbas
a, GR
13070
7, July
31,
2001.
Integr
ated
Packa
ging
Corp.
v. CA,
supra.
Lafort
eza v.
Machu
ca,
supra.
Iringa
n
v.
CA,
GR
12910
7,
Sept.
26,
2001.
Urban
o
v.
GSIS,
GR
13790
Page 43 of 87
Civil Laws
the needs of the members of the GSIS" and assuring "the actuarial solvency
of the Fund administered by the GSIS." As mandated by P.D. 1146, this
discretion may be exercised in acquiring, utilizing or disposing of, in any
manner recognized by law, "real or personal properties in the Philippines or
elsewhere necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
4, Oct.
19,
2001.
Harris
on
Motor
s
Corp.
v.
Navarr
o, GR
13226
9,
April
27,
2000.
Isidro
v.
Nissan
Motoo
r, Gr.
13650
0, dec.
3,
1999.
Servic
ewide
Specia
lists v.
CA,
GR
11636
3,
Dec.
10,
1999.
DACION EN PAGO; Art. 1245 of the Civil Code provides that the law on
sales shall govern an agreement of dacion en pago. A contract of sale is
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds of the parties
thereto upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the
price. In dacion en pago, property is alienated to the creditor in satisfaction
of a debt in money. It is "the delivery and transmission of ownership of a
thing by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the
performance of the obligation." It "extinguishes the obligation to the extent
of the value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or
as may be proved, unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, or
by their silence, consider the thing as equivalent to the obligation, in which
case the obligation is totally extinguished. The undertaking really partakes
in one sense of the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is really buying the
thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be charged against
the debtor's debt. As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale,
namely, consent, object certain, and cause or consideration must be
present. In its modern concept, what actually takes place in dacion en pago
is an objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an
accepted equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as
the object of the contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the
purchase price. In this case, there was no meeting of the minds between
the parties on whether the loan of the petitioners would be extinguished by
Phil.
Lawin
Bus
Co. v.
CA,
GR
13097
2, Jan.
23,
2002.
Page 44 of 87
Civil Laws
dacion en pago.
PACTO DE RETRO SALE; Right to Repurchase; Art. 1606, 3rd
Paragraph; The application of the third paragraph of Article 1606 (The
right to repurchase in a pacto de retro sale) is predicated upon the bona
fides of the vendor a retro. It must appear that there was a belief on his
part, founded on facts attendant upon the execution of the sale with pacto
de retro, honestly and sincerely entertained, that the agreement was in
reality a mortgage, one not intended to affect the title to the property
ostensibly sold, but merely to give it as security for a loan or other
obligation. In that event, if the matter of the real nature of the contract is
submitted for judicial resolution, the application of the rule is meet and
proper; that the vendor a retro be allowed to repurchase the property sold
within 30 days from rendition of final judgment declaring the contract to be
a true sale w/ right to repurchase. Conversely, if it should appear that the
parties' agreement was really one of sale transferring ownership to the
vendee, but accompanied by a reservation to the vendor of the right to
repurchase the property and there are no circumstances that may
reasonably be accepted as generating some honest doubt as to the parties'
intention, the proviso is inapplicable. The reason is quite obvious. If the rule
were otherwise, it would be within the power of every vendor a retro to set
at naught a pacto de retro, or resurrect an expired right of repurchase, by
simply instituting an action to reform the contract known to him to be in
truth a sale with pacto de retro into an equitable mortgage. As
postulated by the petitioner, "to allow herein private respondents to
repurchase the property by applying said paragraph . . . to the case at bar
despite the fact that the stipulated redemption period had already long
expired when they instituted the present action, would in effect alter or
modify the stipulation in the contract as to the definite and specific
limitation of the period for repurchase (2 years from date of sale or only
until June 25, 1958) thereby not simply increasing but in reality
resuscitating the expired right to repurchase . . . and likewise the already
terminated and extinguished obligation to resell by herein petitioner." The
rule would thus be made a tool to spawn, protect and even reward fraud
and bad faith, a situation surely never contemplated or intended by the law.
This Court has already had occasion to rule on the proper interpretation of
the provision in question. In Adorable v. Inacala, where the proofs
established that there could be no honest doubt as to the parties' intention,
that the transaction was clearly and definitely a sale with pacto de retro,
the Court adjudged the vendor a retro not to be entitled to the benefit of
the third paragraph of Art. 1606. In the case at bar, both the trial court and
the CA were of the view that the subject transaction was truly a pacto de
retro sale; and that none of the circumstances under Art. 1602 of the Civil
Code exists to warrant a conclusion that the transaction subject of the
"Deed of Sale" and "Option to Buy" was an equitable mortgage. The CA
correctly noted that if respondents really believed that the transaction was
indeed an equitable mortgage, as a sign of good faith, they should have, at
the very least, consigned with the trial court the amount of P896,000.00,
representing their alleged loan, on or before the expiration of the right to
repurchase on August 21, 1983. Clearly, therefore, the declaration of the
transaction as a pacto de retro sale will not, under the circumstances,
entitle respondents to the right of repurchase set forth under the third
paragraph of Article 1606 of the Civil Code.
Abilla
v.
Gobon
seng,
GR
14665
1, Jan.
17,
2002.
Ayala
Corp
v.
RosaDiana
Realty
and
Dev.
Corp.,
GR
13428
Page 45 of 87
Civil Laws
4,
Dec.
1,
2000.
Lease
DOUBLE SALES; To merit protection under Art. 1544 (2) of the Civil Code,
the second buyer must act in GOOD FAITH in registering the deed. He must
have no knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold.
Bayoc
a
v.
Nogal
es, GR
13820
1,
Sept.
12,
2000.
Distaj
o
v.
CA,
GR
11295
4,
Aug.
25,
2000.
Bayer
Phils.
v. CA,
GR
10926
9,
Sept.
15,
2000.
T & C
Dev.
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
11838
1, Oct.
26,
1999.
Oral Contract of Lease; For the lease of real property for a period longer
than 1 year unenforceable.
R & M
Gen.
Merch
andise
v. CA,
supra.
LL and
Comp
any
Devm
t. and
AgroIndust
rial
Corp.
v.
Huang
,
GR
Page 46 of 87
Civil Laws
14237
8,
March
7,
2002.
Same; Same; The extension of a lease contract must be made before its
term expires not after. Upon the lapse of the stipulated period, courts
cannot belatedly extend or make a new lease for the parties, even on the
basis of equity.
id.
Tala
Realty
Servic
es
Corp.
v.
Banco
Filipin
o
Saving
s and
Mortg
age
Bank,
GR
13798
0,
June
20,
2000.
LL and
Comp
any
Devm
t. and
AgroIndust
rial
Corp.
v.
Huang
,
GR
14237
8,
March
7,
2002.
Same; Courts may Fix the Rate of Rentals; Claim that the rental
demanded for the sublease is unconscionable or exorbitant, not
established; The trial court has the authority to fix the reasonable value for
the continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the
termination of the lease contract, and it is not bound by the stipulated
rental in the contract of lease since upon termination or expiration of the
contract of lease, the rental stipulation therein may no longer be the
reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a result or
by reason of the change or rise in values. Moreover, the trial court can take
judicial notice of the general increase in rentals of real estate especially of
business establishments.
Golde
n
Horizo
n
Realty
Corp.
v. Sy
Chuan
,
GR
14541
6,
Sept.
21,
2001.
Page 47 of 87
Civil Laws
R & M
Gen.
Merch
andise
v. CA,
GR
14418
9, Oct.
5,
2001.
Buce
v. CA,
GR
13691
3, May
12,
2000.
Same; IMPLIED NEW LEASE; In Ledesma vs. Javellana, 121 SCRA 794,
798 (1983), the Court ruled that a covenant to renew a lease, which makes
no provision on its terms, implies an extension or renewal subject to the
same terms in the original lease contract. Since the parties did not make a
new one, the terms and conditions of the original except the provision on
the rate and period of lease are deemed extended. Corollarily, Art. 1678 of
the Civil Code did not apply.
Lhuilli
er
v.
CA,
GR
12805
8,
Dec.
19,
2000;
Unica
ne
Food
Produ
cts v.
CA,
supra.
Lhuilli
er
v.
CA, id.
Sps.
Virgili
o
v.
Patrici
a, GR
13465
1,
Sept.
18,
2000.
Same; Even after the expiration of petitioner's lease contract with National
Development Company, petitioner continued to pay rent to National
Development Company and the latter continued to accept such rent
payments while the case between them was pending. This situation
obtained even during the period in which private respondent occupied the
subleased premises and after demand had been made upon him to vacate
the same. Under such circumstances, it is but fair that private respondent
Golde
n
Horizo
n
Realty
Corp.
v. Sy
Page 48 of 87
Civil Laws
Chuan
,
GR
14541
6,
Sept.
21,
2001.
Obligations of the Lessee; Art. 1667 and 1665, NCC provides that the
lessee is responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless
he proves that it took place w/o his fault.
Minde
x
Resou
rces
Dev.
V.
Morillo
,
GR
13812
3,
March
12,
2002.
Tala
Realty
Servic
es
Corp.
v.
Banco
Filipin
o
Saving
s and
Mortg
age
Bank,
GR
13798
0,
Nov.
15,
2000.
T & C
Dev.
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
11838
1, Oct.
26,
1999.
LL and
Comp
any
Devm
t. and
AgroIndust
rial
Corp.
v.
Huang
Page 49 of 87
Civil Laws
Work
and
Labor
,
GR
14237
8,
March
7,
2002.
Herrer
a
v.
Bollos,
GR
13825
8, Jan.
18,
2002.
Herbo
sa v.
CA,
GR
11908
6, Jan.
25,
2002.
id.
Calvo
v.
UCPB
Gen.
Insura
nce
Co.,
GR
14849
Page 50 of 87
Civil Laws
6,
March
19,
2002.
Same; Extraordinary Diligence; From the nature of their business and
for reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to observe extra
ordinary diligence and vigilance w/ respect to the safety of the goods and
the passengers they transport. The extraordinary responsibility lasts from
the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of and
received for transportation by the carrier until they are delivered, actually
or constructively, to the consignee or to the person who has a right to
receive them.
Belgia
n
Overs
eas
Charte
ring
and
Shippi
ng
N.V. v.
Phil.
First
Insura
nce,
GR
14313
3,
June
5,
2002.
Same; Same; Common Carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reason of public policy, are mandated to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them. As a GENERAL RULE, common carriers are PRESUMED
to have been at fault or negligent if the goods transported by them are lost,
destroyed, or if the same deteriorated.
The
Phil.
Ameri
can
Gener
al
Insura
nce
Co. V.
Mgg
Marin
e
Servic
es, GR
13564
5,
March
8,
2002;
Herbo
sa v.
CA,
2002.
Belgia
n
Overs
eas
Charte
ring
and
Shippi
ng
N.V. v.
Phil.
First
Insura
nce,
Page 51 of 87
Civil Laws
GR
14313
3,
June
5,
2002.
Same; Same; In this case, petitioner accepted the cargo w/o exception
despite the apparent defects in some of the container vans. Hence, for
failure of petitioner to prove that she exercised extraordinary diligence in
the carriage of the goods in this case or that she is exempt from liability,
the presumption of negligence as provided in Art. 1735 holds.
Calvo
v.
UCPB
Gen.
Insura
nce
Co,
GR
14849
6,
March
19,
2002.
Minde
x
Resou
rces
Dev.
V.
Morillo
,
GR
13812
3,
March
12,
2002;
PhilAm
Gen.
Insura
nce v.
Mgg
Marin
e
Servic
es, GR
13564
5,
March
8,
2002.
Belgia
n
Overs
eas
Charte
ring
and
Shippi
ng
N.V. v.
Phil.
First
Insura
nce,
Page 52 of 87
Civil Laws
GR
14313
3,
June
5,
2002.
Partner Essential Requisites: (1) mutual contribution to a common stock; and (2)
-ship
a joint interest in the profits. The registration of partnership w/ a capital of
P3,000 or more under Art. 1772, NCC, is not mandatory.
Sunga
-Chan
v.
Chua,
GR
14334
0,
Aug,
15,
2001.
Lim v.
Phil.
Fishin
g Gear
Ind.,
GR
13644
8,
Nov.
3,
1999.
Tocao
v. CA,
GR
12740
5,
Sept.
20,
2001.
BPI
Invest
ment
v. CA,
GR
13363
2,
Feb.
15,
2002.
First
Mtro
Invest
ment
Corp.
v. Este
del Sol
Mount
ain
Reser
ve, GR
14181
1,
Nov.
Loan
Page 53 of 87
Civil Laws
15,
2001.
Mortga
ge
Usury Law; Central Bank Circular No. 905 neither repealed nor amends,
but merely suspended the effectivity of, the Usury Law. The illegality of
usury is wholly the creature of legislation. A Central Bank Circular cannot
repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law. Thus, retroactive
application of a Central Bank Circular cannot, and should not, be presumed.
id.
Brione
s vs.
Camm
ayo,
No. L23559
,
41
SCRA
404,
411
(1971)
.
Sps.
Puerto
v. CA,
GR
13821
0,
June
6,
2002.
Pache
co v.
CA,
GR
12667
0,
Dec.
2,
1999.
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES; Under Art. 2085 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites are essential to the contracts of pledge and mortgage:
(1)
That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal
obligation;
(2)
That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing
pledged or mortgaged;
(3)
That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free
disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally
authorized for that purpose.
"Third persons who are not parties to the principal obligation may secure
the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property." Thus, only the
absolute owner of the property can constitute a valid mortgage on it.
Cruz
v.
Banco
m
Financ
e
Corp,
GR
14778
8,
March
19,
2002.
Adrian
o
v.
Pangili
nan,
GR
13747
1, Jan.
Page 54 of 87
Civil Laws
must bear the loss." In the present case, the mortgagor (who is engaged in
the business of lending money secured by real estate mortgage), could
have easily avoided the loss by simply exercising due diligence to ascertain
the identity of the impostor who claimed to be the registered owner of the
property mortgaged.
16,
2002.
DBP v.
CA,
GR
12947
1,
April
28,
2000.
Isaguir
re
v.
De
Lara,
supra.
Adrian
o
v.
Pangili
nan,
GR
13747
1, Jan.
16,
2002.
Asunci
on v.
Evang
elista,
GR
13349
1, Oct.
13,
1999.
Litonju
a
v.
L&R
Corp.,
GR
13072
2,
Dec.
9,
1999.
PNB v.
CA,
GR
12271
0, Oct.
12,
2001.
San
Juan v.
Page 55 of 87
Civil Laws
and misrepresentation.
CA,
GR
11005
5,
Aug.
20,
2001.
Bank
of
Ameri
ca NT
and
SA v.
Ameri
can
Realty
Corp.,
GR GR
13387
6,
Dec.
29,
1999.
Sps.
Reyes
v. CA,
GR
13416
6,
Aug.
25,
2000.
Magda
lena
Balnci
a
v.
Vda.
De
Caluor
,
GR
13825
1, Jan.
29,
2002.
Sps.
Puerto
v. CA,
GR
13821
0,
June
6,
Page 56 of 87
Civil Laws
2002.
Same; EXTRA-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE; Notice and publication
Reqmts.; Venue of Proceedings; The requirement in Act No. 3135, as
amended, that said notice shall be posted in at least three [3] public places.
At any rate, even if the Notice of Sale was not posted in three public places
as required, this would not invalidate the foreclosure conducted. As
explained in Olizon vs. CA, 238 SCRA 148,155-156 that the lack of notice
in 3 public places and not the publication thereof in a newspaper of general
circulation does not fail the object of a notice of sale w/c is to inform the
public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the
time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the purpose of
securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If these objects
are attained, immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency
of the notice; but if mistakes or omissions occur in the notices of sale which
are calculated to deter or mislead bidders, to depreciate the value of the
property, or to prevent it from bringing a fair price, such mistakes or
omissions will be fatal to the validity of the notice, and also to the sale
made pursuant thereto. The Court take judicial notice of the fact that
newspaper publications have more far-reaching effects than posting on
bulletin boards in public places. There is a greater probability that an
announcement or notice published in a newspaper of general circulation
which is distributed nationwide, shall have a readership of more people
than that posted in a public bulletin board, no matter how strategic its
location may be, which caters only to a limited few. Hence the publication
of the notice of sale in the newspaper of general circulation alone is more
than sufficient compliance with the notice-posting requirement of the law.
By such publication, a reasonably wide publicity had been effected such
that those interested might attend the public sale, and the purpose of the
law had been thereby subserved.
Langk
aan
Realty
Dev.
V.
UCPB,
GR
13943
7,
Dec.
8,
2000.
Same; Same; ACT 3135 gives the right to redeem not only to the
mortgagor-debtor but also to his successor-in-interest.
Litonju
a
v.
L&R
Corp.,
GR
13072
2,
Dec.
9,
1999.
Casan
o
v.
Magat
, A.M.
No. P021539,
Jan.
24,
2002.
Sps.
Ong v.
CA,
GR
12149
4,
June
8,
2000.
Page 57 of 87
Civil Laws
China
Banki
ng
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
12964
4,
Sept.
7,
2001.
Tando
v. CA,
GR
12798
4,
Dec.
14,
2001.
Estani
slao v.
CA,
GR
14368
7, July
31,
2001.
id.
Page 58 of 87
Civil Laws
date ; [ii] Taxes. The redemptioner must also pay the assessment or taxes
paid by the purchaser. However, the latter must give notice to the officer
who conducted the sale of the assessment or taxes paid by him and file the
same w/ the Registry of Deeds.
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION DISTINGUISHED FROM EQUITY OF
REDEMPTION; The right of redemption exists only in the case of extrajudicial foreclosure. Act 3135 grants the mortgagor the right of redemption
w/in one (1) year from the registration of the sheriffs certificate of
foreclosure sale. No such right is recognized in judicial foreclosure, except
only where the mortgagee is the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In
the event of judicial foreclosure, if the mortgagee is not PNB or a bank or
banking institution, the foreclosure sale, when confirmed by an order of the
court, shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and
vest their rights in the purchaser.. There exists only what is known as the
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION w/c is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor
to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying
the secured debt w/in 90-DAY PERIOD after the judgment becomes final, or
even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
Huert
a Alba
Resort
v. CA,
GR
12856
7,
Sept.
1,
2000.
Bank
of
Ameri
ca NT
and
SA v.
Ameri
can
Realty
Corp.,
GR GR
13387
6,
Dec.
29,
1999.
Amil v.
CA,
GR
12527
2, Oct.
7,
1911;
Busta
mante
v.
Rosel,
GR
12680
0,
Nov.
29,
1999.
PACTO DE NON ALIENDO; Art. 2130 of the Civil Code renders viod any
stipulation forbidding the owner from alienating the immovable mortgaged
property. A mortgage does not extinguish the title of the debtor.
Chatte
l
Mortga
ge
Page 59 of 87
Civil Laws
Neela
nd v.
Villanu
eva,
AM P-
Pledge
Guara
nty
991316,
Oct.
29,
1999.
Tsai v.
CA,
GR
12009
8, Oct
2,
2001.
Mechanics Lien; Under Art. 1731 of NCC, one can legally retain, by way
of pledge, the movable upon which it executed its work.
Lima
v.
Trans
way
Sales
Corp.,
GR
10677
0, Oct.
22,
1999.
Notice of Auction Sale; Art. 212, NCC does not prohibit the sending of a
single notice of sale to the debtor and pledgor informing of the scheduled
public auction sale and a second public auction sale on the following day, in
the event that the pledge shares are not sold on the first auction.
Insular
Life
Assura
nce
Comp
any v.
Young,
GR
14096
4, Jan.
16,
2002.
Securi
ty
Bank
v.
Cuenc
a, GR
13854
4, Oct.
3,
2000.
Same; Exception to the Rule: The stipulation binding the surety not only
to the specified term of the loan, but to any extension thereafter made, w/o
notice to the surety, who waived the right to be notified of any renewal or
extension of the bond w/c may be granted under this indemnity agreement.
The Indemnity agreement is a CONTINUING SURETY does not authorize the
Philam
gen v.
Mutuc
Page 60 of 87
Civil Laws
Dino
v. CA
Same; Tan Chong Lin, the President of Great Asian, is being sued in his
personal capacity based on the Surety Agreements he signed wherein he
solidarily held himself liable with Great Asian for the payment of its debts to
Bancasia. Indisputably, Tan Chong Lin explicitly and unconditionally bound
himself to pay Bancasia, solidarily w/ Great Asian, if the drawers of the
checks fail to pay on due date. The condition on w/c Tan Chong Lin's
obligation hinged had happened. As surety, Tan Chong Lin automatically
became liable for the entire obligation to the same extent as Great Asian.
Tan Chong Lin, however, contends that the following warranties in the
Deeds of Assignment enlarge or increase his risks under the Surety
Agreements. He maintains that these warranties in the Deeds of
Assignment materially altered his obligations under the Surety Agreements,
and therefore he is released from any liability to Bancasia. Under Art. 1215
of the Civil Code, what releases a solidary debtor is a "novation,
compensation, confusion or remission of the debt" made by the creditor w/
any of the solidary debtors. These warranties, however, are the usual
warranties made by one who discounts receivables w/ a financing company
or bank. The Surety Agreements, written on the letter head of "Bancasia
Finance & Investment Corporation," uniformly state that "Great Asian Sales
Center . . . has obtained and/or desires to obtain loans, overdrafts,
discounts and/or other forms of credits from" Bancasia. Tan Chong Lin was
clearly on notice that he was holding himself as surety of Great Asian w/c
was discounting postdated checks issued by its buyers of goods and
merchandise. Moreover, Tan Chong Lin, as President of Great Asian, cannot
feign ignorance of Great Asian's business activities or discounting
transactions with Bancasia. Thus, the warranties do not increase or enlarge
the risks of Tan Chong Lin under the Surety Agreements. There is,
moreover, no novation of the debt of Great Asian that would warrant
release of the surety. In any event, the provisions of the Surety Agreements
are broad enough to include the obligations of Great Asian to Bancasia
under the warranties. Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides, ". . . There is a
solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the
law or nature of the obligation requires solidarity." The stipulations in the
Surety Agreements undeniably mandate the solidary liability of Tan Chong
Lin w/ Great Asian. Moreover, the stipulations in the Surety Agreements are
sufficiently broad, expressly encompassing "all the notes, drafts, bills of
exchange, overdraft and other obligations of every kind w/c the PRINCIPAL
may now or may hereafter owe the Creditor". Consequently, Tan Chong Lin
must be held solidarily liable w/. Great Asian for the nonpayment of the
fifteen dishonored checks, including penalty and attorney's fees in
accordance w/ the Deeds of Assignment.
Asian
Sales
Center
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
10577
4,
April
25,
2002.
CONTINUING SURETY; The EXTENSIONS of the terms for paying the loans
did not release the surety. The "continuing guarantee" executed by the
petitioner provided that the he consents and agrees that the bank may, at
any time or from time to time extend or change the time of payments
and/or the manner, place or terms of payment of all such instruments,
loans, advances, credits or other obligations guaranteed by the surety.
Hence, the extensions of the loans did not release the surety.
Taed
o
v.
Allied
Banki
ng
Corp.,
GR
13660
3, Jan.
18,
Page 61 of 87
Civil Laws
2002;
Lee v.
CA,
GR
11791
3,
Feb.
1,
2002.
Agenc
y
Agenc
y
GENERAL AGENCY; A general power permits the agent to do all acts for
w/c the law does not require a special power. (ACTS OF ADMINISTRATION)
Domin
ion
Insura
nce
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
12991
9,
Feb.
6,
2002.
Domin
ion
Insura
nce
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
12991
9,
Feb.
6,
2002.
Same; [7] TO LOAN OR BORROW MONEY, unless the latter act be urgent
and indispensable for the preservation of the things w/c are under
Administration; xxx [12] TO CREATE or CONVEY REAL RIGHTS over
immovable property; xxx
Adrian
o
v.
Pangili
nan,
Page 62 of 87
Civil Laws
GR
13747
1, Jan.
16,
2002.
Trusts
Pineda
v. CA,
GR
12709
4,
Feb.
6,
2002.
Same; In this case, Cruz had no authority from the Board of Directors of
respondent corporation to sell or negotiate the sale of the subject lot, much
less to appoint other persons for the same purpose. Such lack of authority
precludes from conferring any authority to Politan involving the subject
realty. Necessarily, neither could Politan authorize Felicisima. Clearly, the
collective acts of Criz, Politan and Felicisima cannot bind respondent
corporation in the purported contract of sale.
AF
Raelty
&
Devel
opme
nt
v.
Diesel
man
Freigh
t
Servic
es, GR
11144
8, Jan.
16,
2002.
Domin
ion
Insura
nce
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
12991
9,
Feb.
6,
2002.
Bacali
ng v.
Muya,
GR
14840
4-05,
April
11,
2002.
IMPLIED TRUST; For the provision of Art. 1448 of the Civil Code to apply,
the price must be paid by another for the purpose of having a beneficial
interest of the property.
Viewm
aster
Constr
uction
v.
Roxas,
Page 63 of 87
Civil Laws
supra.
Compr
o-mise
Same; The Genguyons trusted Mateo and then Josue being officers of the
association formed by the tenants (including the Genguyons) of a building,
to negotiate, among others, the acquisition of the subject apartment unit in
their behalf. Instead Mateo surreptitiously purchased the subject apartment
unit from the original owners and resold the same to Josue who was aware
of the questionable circumstances attending Mateos acquisition. Both
Mateo and Josue denied that a constructive trust was created as defined
under Art. 1456, NCC, because they (petitioner) did not acquire the subject
property through mistake or fraud. but the SC held that constructive trust
does not only arise out of fraud or duress, it may also from abuse of
confidence, in order to satisfy the demands of justice.
Arlegu
i
V.
CA,
GR
12643
7,
March
6,
2002.
Arlegu
i
V.
CA,
GR
12643
7,
March
6,
2002.
id.
The General Rule: That a compromise has upon the parties the effect and
authority of res judicata, with respect to the matter definitively stated
therein, or w/c by implication from its terms should be deemed to have
been included therein. This holds true even if the agreement has not been
judicially approved. Moreover, a compromise agreement cannot bind a
party who did not sign to it nor availed of its benefits.
Cebu
Intl.
Financ
e
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
12303
1, Oct.
12,
1999.
Anacle
to
v.
Van
Twest,
GR
13141
1,
Aug.
29,
2000.
San
Antoni
o
v.
CA,
GR
12181
0,
Dec.
7,
2001.
MC
Page 64 of 87
Civil Laws
Engg.
v. CA,
GR
10404
7,
April
3,
2002.
Gamo
gamo
v.
PNOC
Shippi
ng
and
Transp
ort
Corp.,
GR
14170
7, May
7,
2002.
Escrow
The
Prov.
Of
Bataa
n
v.
Villafu
erte,
GR
12999
5, Oct.
19,
2001.
Extra-
Calala
Page 65 of 87
Civil Laws
Contra
c-tual
Obligati
ons
s
v.
CA,
GR
12203
9, May
31,
2000.
PADC
OM
Condo
miniu
m
Corp.
v.
Ortiga
s
Center
Assn.,
GR
14680
7, May
9,
2002.
Ramo
s
v.
CA,
GR
12435
4,
April
11,
2002.
Page 66 of 87
Civil Laws
Ramo
s v. CA
,
GR
12435
4,
Dec.
29,
1999.
Ramo
s
v.
CA,
GR
12435
4,
April
11,
2002.
Page 67 of 87
Civil Laws
Reyes
v.
Sisters
of
Mercy
Hospit
al, GR
13054
7, Oct.
3,
2000.
Ramo
s
v.
CA,
GR
12435
4,
April
11,
2002.
Page 68 of 87
Civil Laws
Same; Joint and Solidary Liability; Hospital and Doctors; The unique
practice (among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff w/ attending
and visiting "consultants," who are allegedly not hospital employees,
presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical
malpractice cases. However, the difficulty is only more apparent than real.
In the first place, hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and
firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work w/in the hospital
premises. Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots, visiting or attending,
are required to submit proof of completion of residency, their educational
qualifications; generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board
(diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references. These
requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital
administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either
accept or reject the application. This is particularly true w/ respondent
hospital. After a physician is accepted, either as a visiting or attending
consultant, he is normally required to attend clinico-pathological
conferences, conduct bedside rounds for clerks, interns and residents,
moderate grand rounds and patient audits and perform other tasks and
responsibilities, for the privilege of being able to maintain a clinic in the
hospital, and/or for the privilege of admitting patients into the hospital. In
addition to these, the physician's performance as a specialist is generally
evaluated by a peer review committee on the basis of mortality and
morbidity statistics, and feedback from patients, nurses, interns and
residents. A consultant remiss in his duties, or a consultant who regularly
falls short of the minimum standards acceptable to the hospital or its peer
review committee, is normally politely terminated. In other words, private
hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and
visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically
employees, a point w/c respondent hospital asserts in denying all
responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of
an employer-employee relationship, w/ the exception of the payment of
wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control
test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that
for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their
attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now
arises as to whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with
respondent doctors for petitioner's condition. The basis for holding an
employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found
in Art. 2180 of the Civil Code w/c considers a person accountable not only
for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former's
responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility
ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have
observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In
other words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs,
once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents (parent,
guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In the instant
case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility
over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and
supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence w/ regard to the
degree of supervision w/c it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to
offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby
failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Art. 2180. Having
failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible
w/ its physicians for Erlinda's condition.
Ramo
s
v.
CA,
GR
12435
4,
April
11,
2002.
Smith
Bell
Dodw
ell
Shippi
Page 69 of 87
Civil Laws
ng
Agenc
y
Corp.
v.
Borja,
GR
14300
8,
June
10,
2002.
Smith
Bell
Dodw
ell
Shippi
ng
Agenc
y
Corp.
v.
Borja,
GR
14300
8,
June
10,
2002.
Therm
ochem
v.
Naval,
GR
13154
1, Oct.
20,
2000.
Smith
Bell
Dodw
ell
Shippi
ng
Agenc
y
Corp.
v.
Borja,
GR
14300
8,
June
10,
2002.
Jarco
Marke
ting
Corp.
v. CA,
Page 70 of 87
Civil Laws
GR
12979
2,
Dec.
21,
1999.
Castile
x
Indust
rial
Corp.
v.
Vasqu
ez, GR
13226
6,
Dec.
21,
1999.
Cartes
iano v.
Nuval,
GR
13805
4,
Sept.
28,
2000.
Castile
x
Indust
rial
Corp.
v.
Vasqu
ez, GR
13226
6,
Dec.
21,
1999.
Page 71 of 87
Civil Laws
Page 72 of 87
Civil Laws
Bank
of
Ameri
ca NT
and
SA v.
Ameri
can
Realty
Corp.,
GR GR
13387
6,
Dec.
29,
1999.
Same; In awarding damages for the tortuous injury, it becomes the sole
design of the courts to provide for adequate compensation by putting the
plaintiff in the same financial position he was in prior to the tort. It is
fundamental principle in the law on damages that a defendant cannot be
held liable in damages for more than actual loss which he has inflicted and
that a plaintiff is entitled to no more than the just and adequate
compensation for the injury suffered. His recovery is, in the absence of
circumstances giving rise to an allowance of punitive damages, limited to a
fair compensation for the harm done. The law will not put him in a position
better than where he should be in had not the wrong happened. In the
present case, petitioners insist that as the passenger jeepney was
purchased in 1982 for only P30,000.00 to award damages considerably
greater than this amount would be improper and unjustified. Petitioners are
at best reminded that indemnification for damages comprehends not only
the value of the loss suffered but also that of the profits which the obligee
failed to obtain. In other words, indemnification for damages is not limited
to damnum emergens or actual loss but extends to lucrum cessans or the
amount of profit lost.
Lim v.
CA,
GR
12581
7, Jan.
16,
2002.
id.
PP v.
Rios,
GR
13263
2,
June
19,
2000;
Integr
ated
Packa
ging
Corp
v. CA,
supra.
PP v.
Gopio,
GR
13392
5,
Nov.
29,
2000.
Viron
Transp
ortatio
n
v.
De los
Santos
,
GR
13829
Page 73 of 87
Civil Laws
6,
Nov.
22,
2000.
Same; Same; While the testimony of private respondent that he had made
promotions of the product in some provinces was not rebutted by
petitioner, no receipts covering such expenditures were adduced in
evidence and private respondents testimony thereon was not
corroborated. Actual damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly
proved w/ reasonable degree of certainty.
Bayer
Phils.
v. CA,
GR
10926
9,
Sept.
15,
2000;
Countr
y
Banke
rs
v.
Lianga
Bay
Coop.,
GR
13691
4, Jan.
25,
2002;
Herbo
sa v.
CA,
2002;
Mindr
ex
Resou
rces v.
Morillo
,
2002.
Same; Same; Petitioners claim for actual damages was premised only
upon Lornas bare testimony. She has not shown how she arrived at the
amount of P50,000, resulting from the improper disconnection of electric
power. While respondent does not rebut his testimony on the expenses
incurred by the spouses in moving the dinner out of their residence due to
the disconnection, no receipts covering such expenditures have been
adduced in evidence. Neither is the testimony corroborated. Actual or
compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved w/ a
reasonable degree of certainty. It is dependent upon competent proof of
damages that petitioners have suffered and of the actual amount thereof.
The award must be based on the evidence presented not on the personal
knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative
and unsubstantial proof.
Sps.
Quisu
mbing
v/
Manila
Electri
c Co.,
GR
14294
3,
April
3,
2002;
Sarmi
ng v.
Dy, GR
13364
3,
June
6,
2002.
PP v.
Bangc
ado,
GR
Page 74 of 87
Civil Laws
burial practices and damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased,
even though the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to
support its claim for damages.
13233
0,
Nov.
28,
2000.
Cartes
iano v.
Nuval,
GR
13805
4,
Sept.
28,
2000.
Bengu
et
Elect.
Coop.
v. CA,
GR
12732
6
Net Earning =
Life
Capacity
Expectancy
PP v.
Arella
no, GR
12247
7,
June
30,
2000;
PP v.
Reanz
ares,
GR
13065
6,
June
29,
2000.
Dodw
ell
Shippi
ng
Agenc
y
Corp.
v.
Borja,
GR
14300
8,
June
10,
2002.
Same; Same; Net income; It is net income (or gross income less living
expenses) w/c is to be used in the computation of the award for loss of
income. In fixing the amount of the said damages, the necessary expenses
of the deceased should be deducted from his earnings. When there is no
showing that the living expenses constituted a smaller percentage of the
Dodw
ell
Shippi
ng
Agenc
Page 75 of 87
Civil Laws
gross income, the living expenses are fixed at half of the gross income
(50% gross income). To hold that one would have used only a small part of
the income, w/ the larger part going to the support of ones children, would
be conjectural and unreasonable. Life expectancy should not be based on
the retirement age of government employees, w/c is pegged at 65. In
calculating the life expectancy of an individual for the purpose of
determining loss of earning capacity under Art. 2206 (1) of the Civil Code, it
is assumed that the deceased would have earned income even after
retirement from a particular job.
y
Corp.
v.
Borja,
GR
14300
8,
June
10,
2002.
Dodw
ell
Shippi
ng
Agenc
y
Corp.
v.
Borja,
GR
14300
8,
June
10,
2002.
Sabio
v. Intl.
Corpor
ate
Bank,
GR
13270
9,
Sept.
4,
2001.
Ferna
ndez
v.
Ferna
ndez,
supra
Same; Same; Under Arts. 2199 and 2200, NCC, actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or
injury sustained. There are two kinds of these damages: (1) loss of what a
person already possess; and (2) failure to receive as a benefit that w/c
would have pertained to him. In the latter instance, the familiar rule is that
damages consisting of unrealized profits, frequently referred to as
ganacias frustadas or lucrum cessans, are not to be granted on the
basis of mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise, but rather by reference
to some reasonably definite standard, such as market value, or established,
experienced, or direct inference from known circumstances. In the case at
bar, actual damages in the form of unrealized profits were awarded on the
basis of the sole testimony of private respondent that he lost an average
income of P18,000 per month. Private respondents could have presented
such evidence as reports on the average actual profits earned by their
gasoline business, their financial statements, and other evidence of
profitability w/c could aid the court in arriving w/ reasonable certainty at
the amount of profits w/c private respondents failed to earn.
Produ
cers
Bank
of the
Phils.
v. CA,
GR
11158
4,
Sept.
17,
2001.
Page 76 of 87
Civil Laws
Far
East
Bank
&
Trust
Co. v.
Diaz
Realty
,
GR
13858
8,
Aug.
28,
2001;
Rizal
Comm
ercial
Banki
ng
Corp.
v. Alfa
RTW
Manuf
acturi
ng
Corp.,
GR
13387
7,
Nov.
14,
2001.
Tan v.
CA,
GR
11628
5, Oct.
19,
2001.
id.
First
Metro
Invest
ment
Corp.
v. Este
del Sol
Mount
ain
Reser
Page 77 of 87
Civil Laws
ve,
supra.
Segovi
a Dev.
Corp.
v. J.L.
Dumat
ol
Realty
and
Dev.
Corp.,
GR
14128
3,
Aug.
30,
2001.
Remm
an v.
CA,
GR
12501
8,
April
6,
2000.
MORAL DAMAGES; To sustain this award, it must be shown that (1) the
claimant suffered injury, and (2) such injury sprung from any of the cases
listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. It is not enough that the
claimant alleges mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social
humiliation, and the like as a result of the acts of the other party. It is
necessary that such acts be shown to have been tainted with bad faith or ill
motive.
Indust
rial
Insura
nce
Co. v.
Bonda
d, GR
13672
2,
April
12,
2000.
Same; Art. 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages
may be recovered. One such case is when the rights of individuals,
including the right against deprivation of property w/o due process of law,
are violated. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Although incapable of
pecuniary computation, such damages may be recovered if they are the
PROXIMATE RESULTS of the defendants wrongful act or omission. Case Law
establishes the ff. REQUISITES FOR THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES: [1]
there is an injury whether physical, mental or psychological clearly
sustained by the claimant; [2] there is a culpable act or omission factually
established; [3] the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and [4] the award
of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code.
Sps.
Quisu
mbing
v.
MERA
LCO,
GR
14294
3,
April
3,
2002.
NPC v.
Philipp
Bros.
Ocean
Page 78 of 87
Civil Laws
ic, GR
12620
4,
Nov.
20,
2001.
Same; Same; Exception; The corporation has sufficiently shown that its
REPUTATION was tarnished after it immediately ordered equipment from its
suppliers on account of the urgency of the project, only to be cancelled
later.
Jardin
e
Davis
v. CA,
supra.
BPI
Invest
ment
Corp.
v. D.G.
Carreo
n
Comm
.
Corp.,
GR
12652
4,
Nov.
29,
2001;
GSIS
v. Sps.
Gonza
lo,
supra.
Calala
s
v.
CA,
supra.
Same; In awarding such damages, the court shall take into account the
circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages according to its
discretion. In this case, private respondents are engaged in several
businesses, such as rice and corn trading, cement dealership, and gasoline
proprietorship. The dishonor of private respondents checks and the
foreclosure initiated by petitioner adversely affected the credit standing as
well as the business dealings of private respondents as their suppliers
discontinued credit lines resulting in the collapse of their businesses. The
banks wrongful act caused serious anxiety, embarrassment, and
humiliation to private respondents for w/c they are entitled to recover
moral damages in the amount of P300T w/c the Court deemed it
reasonable.
Produ
cers
Bank
of the
Phils.
v. CA,
2001.
Same; The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of
BAD FAITH by clear and convincing evidence, for the law always presumes
good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights,
mental anguish, and serious anxiety as a result of the actuations of the
other party. Invariably, such action must be shown to have been willfully
done in bad faith or w/ ill motive.
Ace
Hauler
s
v.
CA,
GR
12793
4,
Page 79 of 87
Civil Laws
Aug.
23,
2000.
Same; No basis to Award; Burden of Proof; The law presumed good
faith, and any person who seeks an award of damages due to acts of
another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or w/ ill
motive. It is not enough that one says he suffered mental anguish, serious
anxiety, social humiliation, wounded feelings, and the like as a result of the
actuations of the other party. Proof of moral suffering must be introduced;
otherwise, the award for moral damages is not proper.
Estani
slao v.
CA,
2001.
Padilla
v. CA,
GR
11970
7,
Nov.
29,
2001
BPI
Invest
ment
Corp
v. CA,
GR
13363
2,
Feb.
15,
2002;
AF
Realty
&
Devel
opme
nt
v.
Diesel
man
Freigh
t
Servic
es,
2002;
Insular
Life
Assura
nce
Co. v.
Young,
2002.
Produ
cers
Bank
of the
Phils.
v. CA,
2001.
SPs.
Quisu
mbing
Page 80 of 87
Civil Laws
v.
MERA
LCO,
GR
14294
3,
April
3,
2002.
Same; Awarded in the following cases: [i] In view of verbal and written
THREATS directed against petitioner by respondent (Carlos v. Abelardo, GR
146504, April 9, 2002); [ii] The airlines personnel who examined
respondents attache case were rude, brusque, arrogant and domineering
and the manager who attended to him answered his querries in a
reprehensible manner, thus causing him humiliation as the other
passengers were already looking at him. The implementation of SECURITY
MEASURES IN THE AIRLINE BUSINESS must be attended by basic courtesies
(NORTWEST Airlines v. Laya, GR 145956, May 29, 2002). However, the
award of P10T moral damages in this case was improper, absent a specific
finding and pronouncement from the trial court that petitioners acted in
bad faith or w/ malice (Sarming v. Dy, GR 133643, June 6, 2002); [iii]
Improper DISCONNECTION OF ELECTRIC POWER by MERALCO (Sps.
Quisumbing v. MERALCO, supra.).
TEMPERATE DAMAGES; Awarded when the court is convinced that there
has been pecuniary loss but definite proof thereof cannot be offered.
GSIS
v. Sps.
Gonza
lo,
supra.
BPI
Invest
ment
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
13363
2,
Feb.
15,
2002.
Bank
of
Ameri
ca NT
and
SA v.
Ameri
can
Realty
Corp.,
GR GR
13387
6,
Dec.
29,
1999.
Sps.
Quisu
Page 81 of 87
Civil Laws
not given to enrich one party and impoverish another, but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to socially deleterious actions.
In this case, to serve an example that before a disconnection of electric
supply can be effected by a public utility like MERALCO, the requisites of
law must be faithfully complied w/ - the amount of P50T was awarded to
the petitioners.
mbing
v.
MERA
LCO,
GR
14294
3,
April
3,
2002;
Carlos
v.
Abelar
do, GR
14650
4,
April
3,
2002;
North
West
Airline
s
v.
Laya,
GR
14595
6, May
29,
2002;
Sarmi
ng v.
Dy, GR
13364
3,
June
6,
2002.
Tsai v.
CA,
supra.
Indust
rial
Insura
nce
Co. v.
Bonda
d, GR
13672
2,
April
12,
2000.
Produ
cers
Bank
of the
Page 82 of 87
Civil Laws
Phils.
v. CA,
GR
11158
4,
Sept.
17,
2001.
Minde
x
Resou
rces v.
Morillo
,
GR
13812
3,
March
12,
2002;
BPI
Invest
ment
Corp
v. CA,
GR
13363
2,
Feb.
15,
2002;
AF
Realty
v.
Diesel
men
Freigh
t
Servic
es, GR
11144
8, Jan.
16,
2002;
Insular
Life v.
Young,
2002;
Quirin
o
v.
Diaz,
GR
13730
5, Jan.
17,
2002.
Indust
rial
Insura
nce
Co. v.
Bonda
d,
supra.
Page 83 of 87
Civil Laws
Same; The award of attorney's fees for P2,000 is justified under Article
2208(2) of the Civil Code, 29 in view of the trial court's finding that the
unjustified refusal of petitioners to reform or to correct the document of
sale compelled respondents to litigate to protect their interest.
Sarmi
ng v.
Dy, GR
13364
3,
June
6,
2002.
Liguta
n
v.
CA,
GR
13867
7,
Feb.
12,
2002.
Great
Asian
Sales
Center
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
10577
4,
April
25,
2002.
Produ
cers
Bank
of the
Phils.
v. CA,
GR
11158
4,
Sept.
17,
2001.
GSIS
v. Sps.
Gonza
lo, GR
13564
4,
Sept.
17,
2001.
id.
Sps.
Quisu
mbing
v.
MERA
LCO,
Page 84 of 87
Civil Laws
GR
14294
3,
April
3,
2002.
Same; Same; No premium should be placed on the right to litigate. No
penalty should be imposed on those who exercise such right in good faith,
even though erroneously. The fact that private respondents incurred
expenses to protect their rights does not necessarily imply that the action
w/c they were opposing was instituted in bad faith. The award of attorneys
fees must be deleted where the award of moral and exemplary damages
are eliminated.
Estani
slao v.
CA,
GR
14368
7, July
31,
2001.
Hanil
Dev.
Corp.
v. CA,
GR
11317
6, July
30,
2001.
Tan v.
CA,
GR
11628
5, Oct.
19,
2001.
Countr
y
Banke
rs
Insura
nce
Corp
v.
Lianga
Bay
and
Comm
.
MultiPurpo
se
Coop.,
GR
13691
4, Jan.
25,
2002.
GSIS
v.
Bengs
on
Comm
ercial
Buildi
Page 85 of 87
Civil Laws
the only "costs" that a winning party may recover are those prescribed in
Rule 142, Revised Rules of Court (1964 Revision). Any pecuniary award
granted to a party in the form of "costs of suit" referred exclusively to the
costs specified in Rule 142. These provisions bind all lower courts, including
the CA, the Sandiganbayan, the CTA, the RTCs, and MTCs. No court may
award costs in excess of the sums specified therein. The afore-cited rule
limits the recovery of "costs of suit" to the items enumerated therein. Thus,
the prevailing party may recover only the costs fixed therein "and no
other." Consequently, the trial court's award to respondent Bengson of
thirty-one million pesos as "costs of suit" cannot be justified by any stretch
of the imagination, unless the total amount claimed runs to billions of pesos
for which the filing fees would amount to such sum.
ngs,
GR
13744
8, Jan.
31,
2002.
id.
Hanil
Dev.
Corp.
v. CA,
supra.
Easter
n
Shippi
ng
Lines,
Inc. v.
Court
of
Appea
ls and
Merca
ntile
Insura
nce
Co.,
Inc.,
234
SCRA
78,
95-97
[1994]
Page 86 of 87
Civil Laws
Concurr
en-ce
and
Prefere
nce of
Credits
id.
Heme
des v.
CA,
GR
10713
2, Oct.
8,
1999.
Bayan
i
v.
Panay
Electri
c Co.,
GR
13968
0,
April
12,
2000.
DBP v.
CA,
GR
12620
0,
Aug.
16,
2001.
Page 87 of 87
Civil Laws