CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC.

), Petitioner,
vs.
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and CLARK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents
Facts:
On June 28, 2002, the Board of Directors of respondent Clark Development
Corporation (CDC) issued and approved Policy Guidelines on the Movement of
Petroleum Fuel to and from the Clark Special Economic Zone. In one of its
provisions, it levied royalty fees to suppliers delivering Coastal fuel from outside
sources for Php0.50 per liter for those delivering fuel to CSEZ locators not
sanctioned by CDC and Php1.00 per litter for those bringing-in petroleum fuel from
outside sources. The policy guidelines were implemented effective July 27, 2002.
The petitioner Chevron Philippines Inc (formerly Caltex Philippines Inc) who is a fuel
supplier to Nanox Philippines, a locator inside the CSEZ, received a Statement of
Account from CDC billing them to pay the royalty fees amounting to Php115,000 for
its fuel sales from Coastal depot to Nanox Philippines from August 1 to September
21, 2002.
Petitioner, contending that nothing in the law authorizes CDC to impose royalty fees
based on a per unit measurement of any commodity sold within the special
economic zone, protested against the CDC and Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA). They alleged that the royalty fees imposed had no reasonable
relation to the probably expenses of regulation and that the imposition on a per unit
measurement of fuel sales was for a revenue generating purpose, thus, akin to a
tax.
BCDA denied the protest. The Office of the President dismissed the appeal as well
for lack of merit.
Upon appeal, CA dismissed the case. CA held that in imposing the royalty fees, CDC
was exercising its right to regulate the flow of fuel into CSEZ under the vested
exclusive right to distribute fuel within CSEZ pursuant to its Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA) with Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and Coastal Subic Bay Terminal,
Inc. (CSBTI) dated April 11, 1996. The appellate court also found that royalty fees
were assessed on fuel delivered, not on the sale, by petitioner and that the basis of
such imposition was petitioners delivery receipts to Nanox Philippines. The fact that
revenue is incidentally also obtained does not make the imposition a tax as long as
the primary purpose of such imposition is regulation.
When elevated in SC, petitioner argued that: 1) CDC has no power to impose fees
on sale of fuel inside CSEZ on the basis of income generating functions and its right
to market and distribute goods inside the CSEZ as this would amount to tax which
they have no power to impose, and that the imposed fee is not regulatory in nature

but rather a revenue generating measure; 2) even if the fees are regulatory in
nature, it is unreasonable and are grossly in excess of regulation costs.
Respondents contended that the purpose of royalty fees is to regulate the flow of
fuel to and from the CSEZ and revenue (if any) is just an incidental product. They
viewed it as a valid exercise of police power since it is aimed at promoting the
general welfare of public; that being the CSEZ administrator, they are responsible
for the safe distribution of fuel products inside the CSEZ.
Issue:
Whether the act of CDC in imposing royalty fees can be considered as valid exercise
of the police power.
Held:
Yes. SC held that CDC was within the limits of the police power of the State when it
imposed royalty fees.
In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, the determining
factor is the purpose of the implemented measure. If the purpose is primarily to
raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the measure results in
some form of regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate,
then it is deemed a regulation and an exercise of the police power of the state, even
though incidentally, revenue is generated.
In this case, SC held that the subject royalty fee was imposed for regulatory
purposes and not for generation of income or profits. The Policy Guidelines was
issued to ensure the safety, security, and good condition of the petroleum fuel
industry within the CSEZ. The questioned royalty fees form part of the regulatory
framework to ensure free flow or movement of petroleum fuel to and from the
CSEZ. The fact that respondents have the exclusive right to distribute and market
petroleum products within CSEZ pursuant to its JVA with SBMA and CSBTI does not
diminish the regulatory purpose of the royalty fee for fuel products supplied by
petitioner to its client at the CSEZ.
However, it was erroneous for petitioner to argue that such exclusive right of
respondent CDC to market and distribute fuel inside CSEZ is the sole basis of the
royalty fees imposed under the Policy Guidelines. Being the administrator of CSEZ,
the responsibility of ensuring the safe, efficient and orderly distribution of fuel
products within the Zone falls on CDC. Addressing specific concerns demanded by
the nature of goods or products involved is encompassed in the range of services
which respondent CDC is expected to provide under Sec. 2 of E.O. No. 80, in
pursuance of its general power of supervision and control over the movement of all
supplies and equipment into the CSEZ.
There can be no doubt that the oil industry is greatly imbued with public interest as
it vitally affects the general welfare. Fuel is a highly combustible product which, if

left unchecked, poses a serious threat to life and property. Also, the reasonable
relation between the royalty fees imposed on a per liter basis and the regulation
sought to be attained is that the higher the volume of fuel entering CSEZ, the
greater the extent and frequency of supervision and inspection required to ensure
safety, security, and order within the Zone.
Respondents submit that the increased administrative costs were triggered by
security risks that have recently emerged, such as terrorist strikes. The need for
regulation is more evident in the light of 9/11 tragedy considering that what is being
moved from one location to another are highly combustible fuel products that could
cause loss of lives and damage to properties.
As to the issue of reasonableness of the amount of the fees, SC held that no
evidence was adduced by the petitioner to show that the fees imposed are
unreasonable. Administrative issuances have the force and effect of law. They
benefit from the same presumption of validity and constitutionality enjoyed by
statutes. These two precepts place a heavy burden upon any party assailing
governmental regulations. Petitioners plain allegations are simply not enough to
overcome the presumption of validity and reasonableness of the subject imposition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated November 30, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87117 is hereby AFFIRMED.
FACTS:
On July 23, 1990, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued and order, directing the petitioners "to
desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending the resolution of the
vendors/squatters complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the
CHR.
On September 10, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss questioning CHR's jurisdiction and
supplemental motion to dismiss was filed on September 18, 1990 stating that Commissioners' authority
should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights,
and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case were not civil and political rights, but their privilege to
engage
in
business".
On March 1, 1991, the CHR issued and Order denying petitioners' motion and supplemental motion to
dismiss. And petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied also in an Order, dated April 25, 1991.
The Petitioner filed a a petition for prohibition, praying for a restraining order and preliminary injunction.
Petitioner also prayed to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580,
entitled
"Ferno,
et.al
vs.
Quimpo,
et.al".
ISSUE:
Is the issuance of an "order to desist" within the extent of the authority and power of the CRH?
HELD:
No, the issuance of an "order to desist" is not within the extent of authority and power of the CHR. Article
XIII, Section 18(1), provides the power and functions of the CHR to "investigate, on its own or on
complaint by any part, all forms of human rights violation, involving civil and political rights".
The "order to desist" however is not investigatory in character but an adjudicative power that the it does
not possess. The Constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal

aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be
construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue an restraining order or writ of injunction, for it
were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Not being a court of justice, the CHR
itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the
Judge in any court in which the action is pending or by a Justice of the CA or of the SC.
The writ prayed for the petition is granted. The CHR is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with
CHR Case No. 90-1580.
Smith Bell Co. vs Natividad

SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.), v JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD 40 PHIL 136

Facts:
Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippine Islands. A majority of its stockholders are British subjects. It is the owner of a motor
vessel known as the Bato built for it in the Philippine Islands in 1916, of more than fifteen tons
gross The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the purpose of transporting
plaintiff's merchandise between ports in the Islands. Application (Certificate of Philippine
Regitry) was made at Cebu, the home port of the vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a
certificate of Philippine registry. The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his
reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., were not citizens either of the United
States or of the Philippine Islands under Act No. 2761 which provides:
SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. Upon registration of a vessel of domestic
ownership, and of more than fifteen tons gross, a certificate of Philippine register shall be issued
for it. If the vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen tons gross or less, the taking of the
certificate of Philippine register shall be optional with the owner.
SEC. 1176. Investigation into character of vessel. No application for a certificate of
Philippine register shall be approved until the collector of customs is satisfied from an
inspection of the vessel that it is engaged or destined to be engaged in legitimate trade
and that it is of domestic ownership as such ownership is defined in section eleven hundred
and seventy-two of this Code.
Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., the equal protection of
the laws because it, in effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels, and because
classification of corporations based on the citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is
capricious, and that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its properly without due process of
law because by the passage of the law company was automatically deprived of every beneficial
attribute of ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not use.
Issue: Whether the legislature through Act no. 2761 can deny registry of vessel with foreign
stockholders.
Ruling: Yes. We are inclined to the view that while Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., a corporation having
alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process of law and
equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No.

2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co.
Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to
that vicious species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall
within authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so
does not offend against the constitutional provision.
The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of the first paragraph of the
Philippine Bill of Rights, are universal in their application to all person within the territorial
jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, color, or nationality. The word "person"
includes aliens. Private corporations, likewise, are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties
in so far as their property is concerned. Classification with the end in view of providing
diversity of treatment may be made among corporations, but must be based upon some
reasonable ground and not be a mere arbitrary selection.
A literal application of general principles to the facts before us would, of course, cause
the inevitable deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by reason of its denial to a
corporation, some of whole members are foreigners, of the equal protection of the laws.
To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits corporations or companies to obtain
a certificate of Philippine registry only on condition that they be composed wholly of citizens of
the Philippine Islands or of the United States or both, as not infringing Philippine Organic Law, it
must be done under some one of the exceptions.
One of the exceptions to the general rule, most persistent and far reaching in influence
is, broad and comprehensive as it is, nor any other amendment, "was designed to interfere with
the power of the State, sometimes termed its `police power,' to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and legislate so as
to increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to its wealth and
prosperity. From the very necessities of society, legislation of a special character, having these
objects in view, must often be had in certain districts. This is the same police power which the
United States Supreme Court say "extends to so dealing with the conditions which exist in the
state as to bring out of them the greatest welfare in of its people." For quite similar reasons,
none of the provision of the Philippine Organic Law could could have had the effect of denying
to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise
that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the
promotion of the general welfare and the public interest.
Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the Philippine Legislature is seen to be
to enact an anti-alien shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to encourage
Philippine ship-building.
1. VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG [86 SCRA 270; NO.L-29646; 10 NOV 1978]
Fernandez (J)

FACTS: On 22 February 1968, Ordinance 6537 (An ordinance making it unlawful for any
person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be
engaged in any kind of trade, business or occupation within the City of Manila without first
securing an employment permit from the mayor of Manila; and for other purposes) was passed by
the Municipal Board of Manila and signed by Manila Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on 27 March 1968.
The Ordinance prohibits aliens from employment and trade in the City of Manila without the
requisite mayors permit; but excepting persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions
of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and
any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of
religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
The permit fee is P50, and the penalty is imprisonment of 3 to 6 months or fine of P100-200, or
both. On 4 May 1968, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila, filed a petition, with
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila (Civil Case 72797), praying for (1) the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the implementation of the ordinance, and (2)
judgment to declare the ordinance null and void. On 24 May 1968, Judge Francisco Arca (CFI
Manila, Branch I) issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on 17 September 1968, the Judge
rendered a decision declaring the ordinance null and void, and the preliminary injunction is made
permanent. Mayor Villegas filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 is unreasonable and violates the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
HELD: The ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to
aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Requiring a person, before he can be
employed, to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila, who may withhold or refuse it at will is
tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to
all persons, both aliens and citizens. The ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to
guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted powers. The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of
regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. The amount is
unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider differences in situation among aliens
required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, full-time, part-time, rank-an-file or executive.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION

(PBMEO) Versus PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO.
FACTS: Petitioners herein alleged that they informed the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills of their decision to have a mass demonstration at Malacaang,
in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. The company respondent
pleaded to exclude the employees in the first shift to join the mass
demonstration, however the petitioners still included them. As a result, the
company respondent filed a case thru the city prosecutor and charged the
demonstrating employees of violation of the CBA. Trial court rendered judgment
in favor of the respondent company, and the petitioners failed to file a
timely motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the case dismissal as a consequence of a procedural fault violates
due process.
HELD: Yes. The decision of the CIR to dismiss the petition based on
technicality (being 2 days late) was rendered null and void. (The
constitutional rights have dominance over procedural rules.) And, the company
was directed to reinstate the eight officers with full backpay from date of
separation minus the one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have
realized from other sources during their separation from service. (The removal

from employment of the officers were deemed too harsh a punishment for their
actions)

CONSTANTINO A. NUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON.

ALBERTO V. AVERIA AND EDGARDO H. MORALES,
SUBSTITUTED
BY
RODOLFO
DE
LEON,
RESPONDENTS.
FIRST DIVISION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court sets aside respondent courts questioned
pending election protest before it on the authority of its
1974 in Cases L-36927-28, L-37715 and L-38831[1]
instance should continue and exercise their jurisdiction
election protests filed before them.

order of dismissal of the

recent decision of April 15,
ruling that courts of first
to hear, try and decide the

Petitioner is the protestant in Election Case No. TM-470 of respondent court

contesting the November 8, 1971 election results in certain precincts for the
mayoralty of Tarnate, Cavite on the ground of fraud, irregularities and corrupt
practices. Original protestee was the proclaimed mayor-elect Edgardo Morales, who
was ambushed and killed on February 15, 1974 in a barrio of Tarnate[2] and hence
was succeeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo de Leon who as the incumbent mayor is
now substituted in this action as party respondent.[3]
Respondent court had in its questioned order of January 31, 1974 granted
protestees motion for dismissal of the election protest on the ground that this
court has lost its jurisdiction to decide this case for the reason that the same has
become moot and academic, citing the Presidents authority under General Order
No. 3 and Article XVII, section 9 of the 1973 Constitution to remove from office all
incumbent government officials and employees, whether elective or appointive.
Petitioner filed a timely appeal. Upon receipt of respondents comment the Court
resolved to consider petitioners petition for review on certiorari as a special civil
action and the case submitted for decision for prompt disposition thereof.
The Court in its unanimous joint decision en banc in the above-cited cases of
Paredes, Sunga and Valley has already declared such dismissal orders as clear
error, ruling that (I)t must be emphasized that the right of the private

respondents to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of Section 9 of

Art. XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed
elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections.
Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective
positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions,
enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to
enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them by said constitutional provision,
and that (I)t is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Art. XVII of the New
Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are
now holding their respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion that
they hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been
elected, although the same is now indefinite.
The Court further stressed therein that (T)he Constitutional Convention could not
have intended, as in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who had been
unduly elected. To hold that the right of the herein private respondents to the
respective offices which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to question
would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an
election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other
forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the
sanctity of the ballot.
In upholding the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and
decide election protests, the Court pointed out that (S)ection 7 of Art. XVII of the
New Constitution provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the
National Assembly. And there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of
section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right
to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected, and that it is expressly
provided under Article XVII, section 8 of the 1973 Constitution that All courts
existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise
their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this
Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and
determined under the laws then in force. x x x
ACCORDINGLY, respondent courts dismissal order of January 31, 1974 is hereby set
aside and respondent court is directed to immediately continue with the trial and
determination of the election protest before it on the merits. In line with previous
precedents involving election cases, this decision shall be immediately executory
upon promulgation hereof.
Crespo vs Provincial Board 160 SCRA 66
Facts: Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967. On
25January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed against him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for

harassment, abuse of authority and oppression. As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why he should
not be dealt with administratively, with the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, in accordance with Section 5, Republic
Act No. 5185.On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent Provincial Board
conducted a hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During the hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco
was allowed to present evidence, testimonial and documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented,
the respondent Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51preventively suspending petitioner from his office as
municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija.In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for
preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public respondent Provincial
Board, preventively suspending him from office and to enjoin public respondent from enforcing and/or implementing
the order of preventive suspension and from proceeding further with the administrative case. According to petitioner,
the order of preventive suspension embodied in Resolution No.51 issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, highhanded, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of Section5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing and
investigation of the truth or falsity of charges before preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of
preventive suspension, the respondent Provincial Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated the fundamental and
elementary principles of due process. On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process?
Held: Yes. In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc.6 this Court held: It is a principle in American jurisprudence
which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a
"property right and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property
within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law. Undoubtedly, the order of preventive
suspension was issued without giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he
was not fully notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum, contends that "Atty.
Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in writing, sent to the Secretary of
the Provincial Board his desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said petitioner mayor at the
usual time of the respondent Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the
petitioner mayor to appear as requested by him, he failed to appeal." The contention of the Provincial Board cannot
stand alone in the absence of proof or evidence to support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on 15 February
1971, nothing therein can be gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written explanation submitted by
petitioner was taken in to account. The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the evidence presented ex
parte by respondent Wycoco. In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said: From the earliest inception of institutional
government in our country, the concepts of notice and hearing have been fundamental. A fair and enlightened system
of justice would be impossible without the right to notice and to be board. The emphasis on substantive due process
and other recent ramifications of the due process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that
due process was initially concerned with fair procedure. Every law student early learns in law school definition
submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) that due process is
the equivalent of law of the land which means "The general law; a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeding upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property,
and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern society. As porting opportunity to be heard and
the rendition of judgment only after a lawful hearing by a coldly neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of
procedural due process. The petition, however, has become moot and academic. Records do not show that in the last
local elections held on18January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public office.

REPUBLIC VS ROSEMOOR MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (RMDC)

G.R. NO. 149927 MARCH 30, 2004
This case was petitioned for review to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:

RMDC had been granted License No. 33 by the Bureau of Mines to allow them to
mine in the mountains (Mt. Mabio) of Biak naBato, San Miguel, Bulacan, after they
had discovered high quality marble deposits.
After Ernesto Maceda was appointed as DENR Minister, he cancelled License No.
33 through a letter addressed to RMDC.
Maceda said the the issuance of License No. 33 was illegal since it violated section
69 of PD 463 and that there is no more public interest served by the continued
existence or renewal of the license. Also, according to Proclamation No. 84, public
interest would be served by reverting back the excluded land and making it part of
Biak naBato National Park
RMDC claimed that in the cancellation of the license, their right to due process was
violated and that Proclamation No. 84 was invalid because:
- It violates the clause on non-impairment of contracts and
- It is an ex post facto law/bill of attainder
- It was issued by the President after the effectively of the 1987
Constitution
Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, reversed the ruling of CA

Whether or not Proclamation No. 84 was valid.

Issue:

Ruling/Ratio:

Yes Proclamation No. 84 was valid. It did not violate the clause on non-impairment of
contract since the respondents license is not a contract to which the protection of the
clause can extend to. It is not a bill of attainder because the cancellation of the
license was not a punishment within the constitutional proscription against the bill of
attainder. It is also not an ex post facto law because Proclamation 84 was not penal
in character. Ex post facto laws are limited to matters criminal in nature. Also, the
President during the time when she issued the Proclamation still validly have the
legislative power under the Provisional Constitution

Pedro vs Provincial Board of Rizal

G. R. No. 34163, September 18, 1931
Facts: Gregorio Pedro argues for the nullity of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved
on December 29, 1928, by the temporary councillors appointed by the provincial governor of
Rizal, Eligio Naval, on the ground that (1) it impairs the acquired rights of said appellant;
(2) it was enacted on account of prejudice, because it was intended for a special and not a
general purpose, namely to prevent, at any cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation

of the cockpit of the said petitioner-appellant; and (3) it provides for special committee
composed of persons who are not members of the council, vested them with powers which
of their very nature, cannot be delegated by said council to that committee.
He further contends that, having obtained the proper permit to maintain, exploit, and open to
the public the cockpit in question, having paid the license fee and fulfilled all the
requirements provided by Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, he has acquired a right
which cannot be taken away from him by Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, which was
subsequently approved.
Issue: Whether a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit falls under
property rights which a person may not be deprived of without due process of law
Held: No.
The court held: (1) That a license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is
not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of law, but a
mere privilege which may be revoked when the public interests so require; (2) that the
work entrusted by a municipal council to a special sanitary committee to make a study of the
sanitary effects upon the neighborhood of the establishment of a cockpit, is not legislative in
character, but only informational, and may be delegated; and (3) that an ordinance,
approved by a municipal council duly constituted, which suspends the effects of another
which had been enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid and legal.

FACTS:
This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to
deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to
property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is
unconstitutional
o
Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property
right
o

HELD:
Petitioner

cannot

find

solace

to

the

above-quoted

Constitutional

provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether
life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license
authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right.
In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely a permit or
privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the
authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more emphatic pronouncement, we
held

in

Oposa

vs.

Factoran,

Jr.

that:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution.
xxx
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of
PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful
holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. Following the American doctrine,
it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected
under

our

Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be
exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably

imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees
fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be
revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a
revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege
within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court,
in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: The correlative power to revoke or recall a
permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State
is always revocable.

United
Toribio

States

vs

Luis

Police Power
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered.
His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He
nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually
sued and was sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that
the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid
exercise of police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate
exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the
property as would be inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal
rights of others or greatly impair the public rights and interests of the community.