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Case:[1970]1LNS85

[1970]1LNS85
[1971]1MLJ32

NASRIv.MESAH
FEDERALCOURT,IPOH
GILL,FJONG,CJALI,FJ
CIVILAPPEALNO.X93OF1969
8SEPTEMBER1970

LIMITATION Action for specific performance of Agreement for sale of Land Action to recover Land When
periodoflimitationbeginstorunwhen"causeofaction"arisesLimitationOrdinance,1953.
LANDLAWSAgreementtosellandMoratoriumBreach"Causeofaction".
Case(s)referredto:
BoardofTradev.Cayzer,Irvine&Co.[1927]AC610,617
Bolov.Koklan&Ors.57IALR325
Gibbsv.Guild[1881]8QBD296,302
Hempv.GarlandLR4QB519
LalaSoniRamv.KanhaiyaLal40IALR74
NgMohV.TanBokKim&Anor.[1968]1LNS88
Noyesv.Crawley[187879]Ch.D31
Ponnusamy&Anor.V.NathuRam[1959]1LNS73
Readv.Brown[1889]22QBD128,131
Reevesv.Butcher[1891]2QB509,511
ToolMetalCo.v.TungstenElectricCo.[1955]2AllER657ER657
Williamsv.Thomas[1909]1Ch.D713,730

Counsel:
FortheappellantA.MahendranM/s.Mahendran&Co.
FortherespondentR.PonnuduraiRajendra&TeikEe

JUDGMENT
GillFJ:
ThisisanappealagainstthedismissalbyChangMinTatJoftheappellant'sactionintheHighCourtatIpoh,in
which he claimed for specific performance of an agreement dated 5 June 1947 whereby the respondent had
agreedtoselltohimherlandheldunderEntryMukimRegisterNo.3400forlotNo.3970intheMukimofSabak
inthedistrictofSabakBernam.Theactionwasdismissedonthegroundthatitwasbarredbylimitation.
The facts of the case as set out in the plaintiff's statement of claim are as follows. The plaintiff paid to the
defendanttheagreedpurchasepriceof$1,000onthedateoftheagreement,andthedefendantonthesame
dayhandedtotheplaintifftheissuedocumentoftitleinrespectofthesaidland.Nodocumentoftransferwas
executedasitwouldnothavebeenpossibletohaveitregisteredbecauseofthemoratoriumtheninforce,but
thedefendantundertooktoexecuteavalidandregistrabletransferofthelandinfavouroftheplaintiffwhenthe
moratoriumwaslifted.Theplaintiffwentintooccupationoftheland,builtaplankhousewithzincroofthereon
andhaslivedtherewithhisfamilyeversinceandpaidthequitrent.Thegreaterpartofthelandwascovered
withsecondaryjungleatthetimeofthesale.Hespentabout$10,000inclearingandcultivatingthelandwith
coconuttreeswhicharenowbearingfruit.
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Aftertheexpirationofthemoratoriumperiodon30September1949theplaintiffapproachedthedefendanton
several occasions and requested her to execute a valid and registrable transfer of the land. The defendant
received sums of money from the plaintiff as travelling expenses but failed to call at the land office at Sabak
Bernamtoexecutethetransfer.Sometimein1966theplaintifflodgedacaveatagainsttheland,videcaveat
presentationNo.499of1966.On25October1966hissolicitorssentanoticetothedefendantrequiringherto
execute a transfer within 14 days from the receipt thereof, but the letter was returned undelivered with the
remark "unknown". On 8 November 1966 he caused another notice to be sent to the defendant care of one
Kardi bin Tatang, of Parit 5, Sungei Tungku, Telok Anson. There being no response from the defendant, he
commencedhisactionon3March1967.
Apart from her other defences which now call for no consideration, the defendant raised the defence of
limitation.Whentheactioncameupfortrial,CounselforbothpartiesinformedtheCourtthattheyhadagreed
nottocallanyevidenceandthatiflimitationwasheldnottoapplythedefendantwouldconsenttojudgment.
Thiswastantamounttoapleaoflimitationbeingtakenasapreliminarypointoflaw,bywayofdemurrer.Under
O.25,r.2oftheRulesoftheSupremeCourt,1957,sothattheCourtindecidingthatpointoflawhadtoaccept
thefactsstatedinthestatementofclaimasbeingcorrect(seeNoyesv.Crawley[187879]10ChD31.The
learnedtrialJudgequiterightlydealtwiththecaseonthatbasis.
The arguments put forward by Counsel for the parties in support of their respective cases were short and
simple. Counsel for the defendant contended that as the relevant period of limitation was 12 years and that
sincetimebegantorunfrom1October1949,thedayimmediatelyfollowingtheexpirationofthemoratorium
period,theplaintiff'sactionwastimebarred.ForthiscontentionhereliedonthedecisionoftheCourtofappeal
inPonnusamy&Anor.V.NathuRam[1959]1LNS73,andhewentontosaythatthedecisionofthisCourtin
NgMohV.TanBokKim&Anor.[1968]1LNS88wasnotapplicable.Healsopointedoutthatthedefendant
was still the registered proprietor of the land and referred to s. 341 of the National Land Code relating to
adversepossession.
CounselfortheplaintiffsaidthathewasrelyingonNgMoh'scase[1969]1MLJ46,andthatinthepresent
casetimebegantorunasfrom14October1966.Thereasonforhispickingonthatdate,thoughnomentionof
itwasmadetothelearnedtrialJudge,presumablywasthatonthatdatethedefendanthadwrittenaletterto
theplaintiffaskinghimtohandovertoherwithin14daysfromthedateoftheletterthegrantoftitleinrespectof
thelandandforbiddinghimtoenterthelandortakeanyproducetherefrom.Thisletterwasnotproducedtothe
Courtbutacopyofithasbeenincludedintheappealrecordwithoutanyobjectionhavingbeentakenbythe
respondenttosuchinclusion.
Iwouldpauseheretoobserveinpassingthatthelawrelatingtolimitationonthedateoftheagreementwas
contained in the Limitation Enactment (FMS Cap. 18). That Enactment was repealed by the Limitation
Ordinance,1953whichcameintoforceon19February1953.Itisclearthatthelawoflimitationwhichappliesis
thelawinforceonthedateofinstitutionoftheactionandnotthedateonwhichthecauseofactionarises(see.
LalaSoniRamv.KanhaiyaLalLR40IA74).
ThefactsinPonnusamy&Anor.V.NathuRam[1959]1LNS73wereasfollows.InAugust,1944,duringthe
Japanese occupation, Nathu Ram for valuable consideration executed in favour of one Naina a transfer in
statutoryform,handedovertohimtherelevantissuedocumentoftitleandputhiminpossessionoftheland.
Forreasonswhichwerenotclear,thetransferwasnotregisteredduringtheoccupation.Thereafter,byreason
of the Moratorium Proclamation, it was not capable of being registered until 1 October 1949 when the
moratorium was lifted. Naina had died testate on 11 February 1949 but there was considerable delay in
extractingprobate.Eventually,whenprobatewastakenout,NathuRamrefusedtoexecuteafreshtransferin
favoroftheexecutorswhothereuponcommencedanactionintheHighCourtatIpohon23November1956
claimingadeclarationoftitletothelandandanorderontheregisteringauthoritytoregistertheexecutorsas
proprietors. Their action was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation. They appealed. It was
argued on behalf of the respondent in the Court of Appeal that the period of limitation was six years. That
argument,however,wasrejectedbytheCourt.ThomsonCJ(ashethenwas)inthecourseofhisoraljudgment
said:
AsIputitcolloquiallythismorninginthecourseofdiscussionwithCounsel,whattheplaintiffsaredoingis
this. They are coming to the Court and saying 'we are entitled to this and we want this land'. And if the
Court is in agreement with them that they are entitled to the land and should be given the land, one
appropriatewayofgivingittothem,inviewoftheprovisionsoftheLandCode,istomakethedeclaration
asked for and the consequential order on the registering authority. That reasoning leads me to the
conclusionthatthisisanactiontorecoverlandwithinthemeaningofs.9oftheLimitationOrdinance(No.4
of1953).
HewentontosaythathefoundsupportforthatviewinthefollowingpassageinthejudgmentofBuckleyLJin
theCourtofAppealinWilliamsv.Thomas[1909]1Ch.D713,730:
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It has been argued, and, I think, successfully that while on the one hand the expression 'to recover any
land'ins.2oftheActof1833doesnotmeanregainsomethingwhichtheplaintiffpreviouslyhadandhas
lost, but means 'obtain any land by judgment of the Court', yet it is not limited to the meaning 'obtain
possession of any land by judgment of the Court'. For it has been held that a mortgagee's action for
foreclosureisanactionfortherecoveryoflandwithintheAct.Aforeclosureactionisnotanactiontoobtain
possession,butisanactionwhoseprincipalpurposeistoconvertthatwhichinaCourtofEquitywasbut
personalestateofthemortgageeintorealestateofthemortgagee.Itisanactiontoenablehimtoholdthe
legalestatealreadyvestedinhimdischargedfromtherightofthemortgagortoredeemhim.
He then said that what in effect the plaintiffs were seeking to do was to "obtain ... land by judgment of the
Court",andcontinued:
Havingreachedtheconclusionthatthisisanactiontorecoverlanditseemstomeimpossibletoavoidthe
further conclusion that the case falls within s. 9(1) of the Limitation Ordinance. Section 6(1) of the
Ordinance provides that in the case of actions founded on a contract the period of limitation shall be six
years but that provision is expressly stated to be 'save as hereinafter provided'. By s. 9, however, it is
expresslyprovidedthat,subjecttocertainexceptionswhicharenotrelevanthere,theperiodinrelationto
actionstorecoveranylandshallbe12yearsanditisclearthatthisappliestoallactionstorecoverland
irrespectiveofwhethertheyarefoundedoncontractorotherwise.
InNgMoh'scase[1969]1MLJ46therespondentsasplaintiffsclaimedforthereturnofacertainpieceofland
fromtheappellantonthegroundthatthelandbelongedtotheestateofTanPungChongdeceasedandthat
theyweretheadministratorsdebonisnon.Theappellantcounterclaimedthatthelandhadbeensoldtohimby
LimPheng,thepreviousadministratrixofthesaidestate,underanagreementdated30December1950after
which he had gone into occupation of the land, and prayed for specific performance of the agreement. Both
Counselconcededthatthisbeinganactionfortherecoveryoflandtheperiodoflimitationwas12years.
ThefactsinthepresentcasearenotverydifferentfromthoseinPonnusamy&Anor.V.NathuRam[1959]1
LNS73.Here,asinthatcase,theplaintiffpaidthefullpurchasepricefortheland,therelevantissuedocument
oftitlewashandedovertohimandhewentintopossessionoftheland.ForthereasonswhichIhavealready
stated,therewasnotransferexecutedinthestatutoryforminthiscase,astherewasinPonnusamy&Anor.V.
NathuRam[1959]1LNS73.Butthetransferexecutedinthatcasehadbecomeincapableofregistrationby
reasonofNaina'sdeath,sothatthepositionoftherespectivepurchaserswasalmostthesame.InPonnusamy
&Anor.V.NathuRam[1959]1LNS73theplaintiffsaskedforadeclarationoftitletothelandandanorderon
the registering authority to register them as proprietors. In the present action the plaintiff's prayer was for an
orderthatthedefendantdoexecuteavalidandregistrabletransferoftheland.Inotherwords,hewasasking
for specific performance of the agreement as in Ng Moh's case [1969] 1 MLJ 46. But what in effect he was
seekingtodowastoobtainthelandbyajudgmentoftheCourt.Itfollows,therefore,thatwhethertheactionis
forspecificperformanceofanagreementforthesaleoflandorforadeclarationoftitletoland,itisessentially
anactiontorecoverland,sothattheperiodoflimitationwouldbe12yearsineithercase.
Havingdisposedofthequestionastotheperiodoflimitationinrelationtoanactionfortherecoveryofland,I
mustnowcometothequestionastowhensuchperiodoflimitationbeginstorun.
IndeterminingthisquestionthelearnedJudgeintheCourtbelowthoughtthathehadtochoosebetweenthe
conflictingdecisionsinPonnusamy&Anor.V.NathuRam[1959]1LNS73andNgMoh'scase[1969]1MLJ
46,bothofwhichwerebindingonhim.ThedecisionoftheFederalCourtinNgMoh'scase[1969]1MLJ46
was that time did not begin to run until there was an infringement of the appellant's right under the sale
agreement. The appellant in that case had sent to Lim Pheng, the then administratrix, a letter dated 15 April
1955,requiringhertocomplywiththetermsoftheagreementwithin14days.TheCourtthereforeheldthattime
begantorunfrom30April1955,sothattheappellant'scounterclaim,whichwasfiledon16September1955,
was not barred by limitation. In coming to that decision the Court relied entirely on the judgment of the Privy
CouncilinBolov.KoklanandOrs.LR57IA325inwhichitwassaidatp.331:
Therecanbeno'righttosue'untilthereisanaccrualoftherightassertedinthesuitanditsinfringement,or
at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right, by the defendant against whom the suit is
instituted.
Bolo'scaseLR57IA325wasadecisiononarticle120oftheIndianLimitationActwhichisinparimateriawith
article97oftheFMSLimitationEnactment.ItwascitedinPonnusamy&Anor.V.NathuRam[1959]1LNS73,
althoughnomentionofitwasmadeinthejudgmentofThomsonCJ.ThelearnedtrialJudgehasstatedinhis
grounds of judgment that, as Ponnusamy & Anor. V. Nathu Ram [1959] 1 LNS 73 is not mentioned in the
judgment in Ng Moh's case [1969] 1 MLJ 46, it was not clear to him whether the latter case was meant to
overruletheformer.HehasfurtherstatedinhisjudgmentthattheIndianLimitationActspeaksof"righttosue",
whereastheLimitationOrdinance.1953speaksof"causeofaction"or"rightofaction",althoughhedidnotgo
ontosaywhethertherewasanydistinctionbetween"accrualofarighttosue'and"accrualofacauseorrightof
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action".IntheeventhedecidedthathewasboundbyPonnusamy&Anor.V.NathuRam[1959]1LNS73and
thatNgMoh'scase[1969]1MLJ46wasdecidedperincuriam.
WithrespecttothelearnedtrialJudge,thereisnoconflictbetweenthedecisioninPonnusamy&Anor.V.Nathu
Ram[1959]1LNS73andthedecisioninNgMoh'scase[1969]1MLJ46.Thesolequestiontobedecidedini
Ponnusamy&Anor.V.NathuRam[1959]1LNS73waswhethertheperiodoflimitationwassixyearsor12
years. The question which had to be and was decided in Ng Moh's case [1969] 1 MLJ 46 was whether time
begantorunfromthedateoftheagreementorfromthedateofanyinfringementorthreatofinfringementofthe
appellant'srightundertheagreement.WhatpresumablyledtheJudgetothinkthattherewasaconflictbetween
thetwocasesisthefollowingpassageinthejudgmentinPonnusamy&Anor.V.NathuRam[1959]1LNS73:
Itfollowsfromwhathasbeensaidthattheperiodoflimitationapplicableinthepresentcasewas12years
byreasonofs.9andnotsixyearsbyreasonofs.6anditiscommongroundthatbyreasonofthepost
warlegislationonthesubjectthatperiodoflimitationrunsfromtheexpirationofthemoratoriumperiodon
30September1949.Inthecircumstancesthepresentactionwascommencedwellwithintime.
I must confess that I myself as the trial Judge in Ng Moh's case [1969] 1 MLJ 46 fell into the same trap. On
reflection,however,itwouldseemcleartomethatwhatThomsonCJwassayingintheabovepassagewasby
wayofageneralobservationthatforthepurposeofcomputinganyperiodoflimitationthemoratoriumperiod
wastobeexcluded.Heclearlydidnotsayinsomanywordsthatlimitationinthatcasebegantorunfromthe
expirationofthemoratoriumperiodon30September1949.
A"causeofaction"istheentiresetoffactsthatgivesrisetoanenforceableclaimthephrasecomprisesevery
fact which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment (per Lord Esher MR in Read v.
Brown[1889]22QBD128,131).InReevesv.Butcher[1891]2QB509,511LindleyLJsaid:
This expression, 'cause of action', has been repeatedly the subject of decision, and it has been held,
particularlyinHempv.GarlandLR4QB519,decidedin1843,thatthecauseofactionarisesatthetime
whenthedebtcouldfirsthavebeenrecoveredbyaction.Therighttobringanactionmayariseonvarious
eventsbutithasalwaysbeenheldthatthestatuterunsfromtheearliesttimeatwhichanactioncouldbe
brought.
InBoardofTradev.Cayzer,Irvine&Co.[1927]AC610,617.ViscountDunedindescribed"causeofaction"as
thatwhichmakesactionpossible.Now,whatmakespossibleanactionfoundedonacontractisitsbreach.In
otherwords,acauseofactionfoundedonacontractaccruesonthedateofitsbreach.Similarly,therighttosue
onacontractaccruesonitsbreach.Inthecaseofactionsfoundedoncontract,therefore,timerunsfrombreach
(perFieldJinGibbsv.Guild[1881]8QBD296,302).Inthecaseofactionsfoundedonanyotherright,time
runsfromthedateonwhichthatrightisinfringedorthereisathreatofitsinfringement(seeBolo'scaseLR57
IA 325). It would seem clear, therefore, that the expressions "the right to sue accrues", "the cause of action
accrues" and "the right of action accrues" mean one and the same thing when one speaks of the time from
whichtheperiodoflimitationasprescribedbylawshouldrun.
ForthereasonsIhavestated,theperiodoflimitationinthepresentcasecanbesaidtohavebeguntorunonly
fromthefirstclearandunequivocalthreattotheplaintiff'srighttoatransferoftheland.ThelearnedtrialJudge
hasstatedinhisgroundsofjudgmentthatifNgMoh'scase[1969]1MLJ46wasbindingonhim,thenhewould
hold on the pleadings that the first clear and unequivocal threat to the plaintiff's right to possession was the
refusal to the first request after the expiration of the moratorium as alleged in the statement of claim. With
respect,thereisnottheslightestindicationfromtheplaintiff'sstatementofclaimthatthedefendantatanytime
clearlyandunequivocallyrefusedtosignatransfer.Noteveninthedefendant'sstatementofdefence,whichof
coursetheCourtisnotentitledtolookat,isthereanymentionofanyrefusal.Asthereisnospecificavermentin
thestatementofclaimastowhenthefirstoftheplaintiff'srequestswasmade,itwouldbeapureconjectureto
saythatsuchrequestsmusthavebeenmadeshortlyaftertheliftingofthemoratorium.Therecanthereforebe
nobasisforthelearnedJudge'sfindingthatsuchrequestwererefusedbynecessaryimplication.
Thefactthattheplaintiffchosenottolodgeacaveatagainstthelanduntil1966wouldseemtoindicatethatuntil
thentherewasnothreattohisrightundertheagreement.Inthisconnectionitissignificantthatthefirstclear
refusalbythedefendantwascontainedinherletterof14October1966towhichIhavemadereferenceearlier
inmyjudgment.Thatletter,however,wasnotinevidenceatthetrial,althoughithasbeenincludedintheappeal
record.Assumingthatwearenotentitledtolookatit,wehavetofallbackontheplaintiff'sletterof8November
1966whichhesenttothedefendantcareofanotherperson.Asthereisnoevidencethatthatletterreachedthe
defendant,thepositionwouldthereforeappeartobethatthereneverwasanyrefusalbythedefendanttocarry
outherobligationsunderthecontract.Inthecircumstances,itmaybearguedthatthisactionwaspremature,
butthatwasnotthestandtakenbythedefendant.Inanyevent,serviceofthewritonthedefendantconstituted
notice of the appellant's intention to stand on his legal right under the agreement (see Tool Metal Co. v.
TungstenElectricCo.[1955]2AllER657),andtherewasnothreattoinfringethatrightuntilthedefencewas
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filed.WhateverviewItakeofthecase,itwouldseemclearthattimedidnotbegintorunagainsttheplaintiffuntil
shortlybeforetheactionwasfiled.Itwasthereforenotbarredbylimitation.
IwouldallowtheappealwithcostshereandintheCourtbelow,setasidetheordermadebytheCourtbelow
andmakeanorderthatthedefendantdoexecuteavalidandregistrabletransferintermsoftheplaintiff'sclaim
within 14 days from today, and that in the event of her refusal or failure to execute such transfer within that
periodtheRegistraroftheHighCourtatIpohdoexecuteatransferonherbehalf.
JUDGMENT
OngCJ:
IagreewiththejudgmentjustdeliveredbyGillFJ,towhichthereisnothingIcanusefullyadd.Theorderofthis
Courtwillbeintermsasproposedbyhim.
AliFJconcurred.
Appealallowed.
[1971]1MLJ32

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