The Cosmological Argument William L. Rowe No&ucire: Vol. 5, No. 1 (Feb., 1971), 49-61. Stable URL: hutp//links jstor.org/sici?sict=0029-4624% 28197 102%29S%3A 1% 3C49%3ATCA3E2,0,CO%3B2-Z. Noducire:s is currently published by Blackwell Publishing. ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use, available at hhup:/www.jstororg/about/terms.hml. JSTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at hup:/www jstor.org/journals/black. hum Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or printed page of such transmission, STOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals, For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support @jstor.org. hupslwww jstor.org/ Mon Mar 7 13:31:58 2005,FIFTH SYMPOSIUM The Cosmological Argument* Wruam L. Rowe PURDUE UNIVERSITY Commentators: Antony Fiew SUNY AT BUFFALO Rozen G. TURNBULL omo stare UNIVERSITY ‘The Cosmological Argument began with Plato and Aristotle, flourished in the writings of Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Leibniz, and Samuel Clarke, and was laid to rest by Hume and Kant. I think its death premature, if not unjustified. But my purpose here is not to resurrect it. My aim in this paper is to uncover, clarify, and examine some of the philosophical concepts and theses essential to the rea- soning exhibited in the argument. ‘There are, I believe, two high-watermarks in the history of the Cosmological Argument. The first occurred in the 13th century and is represented by the first three of Aquinas’ five ways. The second occurred in the 18th century and is represented by the form the argument takes in the writings of Leibniz and Samuel Clarke. ‘The focus of attention in this paper is on the second of these two hhigh-watermarks; namely, the form the argument takes in the 18th century.? ‘The Cosmological Argument is an argument for the existence *T have benefited from discussions of the ideas in this paper. In par- ticular I wish to thank Bill Forgie, Bill Gustason, Norman Kretzmans, George Nakhnikian, Kermit Scott, Ted Ulrich, and James Zartman. “Although the argument we shall examine i only one version of the Cosmological Argument, for convenience I shall use the phrase “The Cos- rmological Argument” to denote this argument. 4950 nots of God. As such, the argument has two distinct parts. The first part is an argument to establish the existence of a necessary being. The second partis an argument to establish that this necessary being is God. In what follows I shall be concerned solely with the concepts and theses essential to the reasoning exhibited in the first part of the Cosmological Argument, the argument for the existence of a neces- sary being. Using the expression ‘dependent being’ to mean ‘a being that has the reason for its existence in the causal efficacy of some other being, and the expression ‘independent being’ to mean ‘a being that has the reason for its existence within its own nature’, we may state the argument for the existence of a necessary being as follows: 1. Every being is either a dependent being or an indepen- dent being; 2, It is false that every being is dependent; therefore, 3, There exists an independent being; therefore, 4, There exists a necessary being. This argument contains two premises, propositions (1) and (2), and two inferences, the inference from (1) and (2) to (3), and the inference from (3) to (4). Neither premise is obviously true, and only the first of the two inferences is above suspicion. Let's begin our examination of this argument by considering the second premise. ‘The second premise asserts that not every being is such that its existence is accounted for by the causal ellicacy of some other being. Now unless some restriction is placed on the scope of the term ‘being’ what this premise asserts is surely true. For consider such “beings” as numbers or sets. The number two, for example, exists and its existence is not accounted for by the causal efficacy of some other being. Hence, it's true that not every being is a de- pendent being. This interpretation and justification of the second Premise, however, is of no help to the proponent of the Cosmologi- cal Argument. We must, then, in his behalf, place some restriction ‘on the scope of the term ‘being’ as itis used in the second premise. I propose the following rough restriction. In speaking of beings in the second premise we shall restrict ourselves to beings that could be caused to exist by some other being or could be causes of the existence of other beings. God (if He exists), a man, a star, a stone are beings of this sort, Presumably, numbers, sets and the like are not. What premise (2) asserts, then, is that not every being of the‘THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 51 sort described by this restriction is a being that exists by reason of the causal efficacy of some other being, Granted this restriction, why should we accept the second premise of the Cosmological Argument? Well, if every being that exists (or ever existed) is dependent then the whole of existing things (ie, things that could be caused or could be causes), it would seem, consists of a collection of dependent beings, that is, 1 collection of beings each member of which exists by reason of the causal efficacy of some other being. This collection would have to contain an infinite number of members. For suppose it con- tained a finite number, let us say three, a, b, and c. Now if in Scotus’ phrase “a circle of causes is inadmissible” then if c is caused by b and b by a, a would exist without a cause. But in that case @ ‘would not be what by supposition it is, namely, a dependent being. Hence, if we grant that a circle of causes is inadmissible, itis false that the whole of existing things consists of a collection of depen- dent beings finite in number. Suppose, then, that the dependent beings making up the col- lection are infinite in number. Why is it false that the whole of ‘existing things consists of such a collection? The proponent of the Cosmological Argument answers as follows. The infinite collection itself, he argues, requires an explanation of its existence. For since it is true of each member of the collection that it might not have existed, it is true of the whole infinite collection that it might not have existed. What then accounts for the fact that there is an in- finite collection of dependent beings, rather than no dependent beings at all? The explanation cannot lie in the causal efficacy of some being outside of the collection, since by supposition the col- lection itself includes every being capable of causal efficacy. Nor, it seems, can the explanation of the existence of the collection be found within the collection itself. Hence, if we assume that every being is dependent we must conclude that there exists an infinite collection of dependent beings for whose existence there is no ex- planation whatever. But since premise (1) tells us that whatever exists has an explanation of its existence, it cannot be that there exists an infinite collection of dependent beings for whose existence there is no explanation. The assumption which led to this conclu- 2 $0e, for example, Samuel Clarke's dlscussion of Propositions TI and IIL in his A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (Sth Edition, London, 1738). ‘This discussion is summarized by Hume in Part IX of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.52. wots sion must, therefore, be false. Since the assumption in question is that every being is dependent, its denial, premise (2), must be true. Critical discussion of the reasoning just given has centered around two questions: I, Is it true that there must be an explanation of the exis- tence of the collection of dependent beings? IL. Is it true that if every being is dependent there will be no explanation of the existence of the collection of de- pendent beings? ‘The 18th century proponents of the Cosmological Argument con- tend that reason requires affirmative answers to these questions. But many philosophers from Hume to Russell either have argued that these questions (one or both) must be answered negatively or have argued that there are no good reasons for the view that each requires an affirmative answer. How are we to settle the dis- agreements conceming the answers to these two questions? G. E. Moore once observed that philosophical disagreements are mainly due to the attempt to answer questions, without first discovering precisely what question it is which you desire to an- swer. The philosophical disagreements conceming the answers to our two questions illustrate, I believe, Moore's observation. For we ‘cannot answer either question without first discovering what it is for there to be an explanation of the existence of the collection of dependent beings. I suggest, then, that we begin with the prior question: IIL What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for there to be an explanation of the existence of the collec- tion of dependent beings? There is, unfortunately, no direct answer to this question in the writings of the 18th century proponents of the Cosmological Argument. But it is clear, I think, that the following two conditions are, in their view, necessary, if not sufficient, for there to be an explanation of the existence of the collection of dependent beings. Cl. There is an explanation of the existence of each of the ‘members of the collection of dependent beings. C2. ‘There is an explanation of why there are any dependent beings.‘THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 53. In what follows I shall assume that the existence of the collection of dependent beings will have an explanation only if C1 and C2 obtain. ‘Are the proponents of the Cosmological Argument right in giving an affirmative answer to the second of our two questions? Are they right, that is, in contending that on the supposition that every being is dependent there will be no explanation of the exis- tence of the infinite collection of dependent beings? It is, of course, true that C1 will obtain. That is, each member of the collection will have an explanation of its existence, the explanation being found in the causal efficacy of some other dependent being. When, therefore, the proponents of the Cosmological Argument contend that on the supposition that every being is dependent there will be ‘no explanation of the infinite collection of dependent beings they are not contending that some member of that collection will lack an explanation, they are not contending that Cl will not obtain. ‘What they are contending is that C2 will not obtain. They are contending that if the whole of existing things consists of a collec- tion of dependent beings there will be no explanation of why there are (or have ever been) any dependent beings at all. For by sup- position there is no being outside of the collection of dependent beings whose causal efficacy might provide the explanation. Nor can the explanation be found within the collection itself. For since there might have been no dependent beings at all we cannot explain why there are dependent beings by appealing to the existence and causal efficacy of some member of the collection of dependent be- ings—any more than we can explain why there are men by ap- pealing to the existence and causal efficacy of Adam. Nor can we explain why there are (or have ever been) dependent beings by appealing to all the members of the infinite collection of dependent beings. For if the question to be answered is why there are (or have ever been) any dependent beings at all, we cannot answer that ‘question by noting that there always have been dependent beings, each one accounting for the existence of some other dependent be- ing. Thus on the supposition that every being is dependent there will be no explanation of why there are dependent beings. C2 will not obtain, Therefore, on the supposition that every being is de- pendent there will be no explanation of the existence of the collec- tion of dependent beings. ‘Although I think the proponents of the Cosmological Argu- ‘ment are right in their contention that the supposition that every54 wots being is dependent leaves us with no explanation of the existence of the collection of dependent beings, there is a difficulty in their reasoning to this conclusion. For they contend that there might (logically) have been no dependent beings at all. If this were not s0, if, that is, it were logically necessary that dependent beings ‘exist, I think the proponents of the argument would concede either that no explanation of why there are dependent beings is required or that if an explanation is required it might lie within the collec- tion of dependent beings—for the nature of the collection is such, it might be argued, that itis logically necessary for there to exist members of it. Thus it seems that the proponents of the Cosmologi- cal Argument must claim that it is possible for there to be no de- pendent beings at all. But how can it be established that it is logically possible for there to be no dependent beings? In considering the supposition that every being is dependent, Samuel Clarke remarks: According to this .. . supposition, there is nothing in the universe self-existent or necessarly-existing, And if so, then it was originally ‘equally possible that from eternity there should never have existed ‘any thing at all; as that there should from eternity have existed a succession of changeable and dependent beings. Apparently, Clarke tries to establish the proposition that it is pos- sible for there to be no dependent beings by inferring it from the Proposition that no dependent being necessarily exists. The i ference he makes may be expressed as follows: A. If for every dependent being it is possible that it doesn’t exist then it is possible that every dependent being doesn't exist, ‘The diftculty is that this inference does not appear to be sanctioned by any valid rule of modal logic. We may take A as an instance of B. B. If for every being it is possible that it has P then it is possible that every being has P. But B is an invalid principle. Of course, from the fact that A is an instance of an invalid principle it doesn't follow that A isn't a neces- sary truth. A might (for all we know) be a necessary truth. But if A isn't a necessary truth then the proponents of the Cosmological 8 Demonstration, (9th Eaton), p. 14,‘THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 5 Argument are mistaken in thinking that the proposition that it is possible for there to be no dependent beings follows from the prop- ‘sition that no dependent being is such that it necessarily exists. Furthermore, even if A is a necessary truth, since we do not seem to know that it is, appealing to it cannot enable us to know that it is possible for there to be no dependent beings. Hence, it appears that a vital portion of the reasoning in the Cosmological Argument rests on the unproved premise that there might (logically) have ‘been no dependent beings. In spite of this difficulty itis reasonable, I think, to concede to the proponent of the Cosmological Argument the premise that it is possible that no dependent beings exist. Indeed, some critics hold views which, I think, entail the truth of that premise. In any case, if we grant that premise I think we must conclude that the proponents of the Cosmological Argument are right in their conten- tion that reason requires an affirmative answer to the second of the ‘two critical questions noted earlier. They are right in contending that if every being is dependent there will be no explanation of the existence of the collection of dependent beings—for if every being is dependent there will be no explanation of why there are any dependent beings at all. ‘Turing now to the first of our two questions: Is it true that there must be an explanation of the existence of the collection of dependent beings? Many critics are prepared to grant that on the supposition that every being is dependent there will be no explana~ tion of the collection of dependent beings. What they deny is the need for an explanation. Why, then, do the proponents think there must be an explanation of the existence of the collection of depen- dent beings? There is, I believe, a rather widespread misconception con- ‘ceming this matter. Many critics think that the proponents of the Cosmological Argument infer that the collection of dependent beings has an explanation from the premise that every member of that collection has an explanation.* Rejecting this inference as fallacious, the critics conclude that the proponents’ contention that there must be an explanation of the collection of dependent beings is unwarranted. Perhaps some proponents of the Cosmological Argument have used the inference which the critics reject as fallacious. But many 4 Seo, for example, Ronald W, Hepbum, Christianity and Paradox (Lon- don: Watts, 1958), pp. 167-168.56 ods of them have not. Samuel Clarke, for example, reasons that the collection of dependent beings must have an explanation of its existence by appealing to the principle expressed in the first premise of the Cosmological Argument—namely, the Principle Of Sufficient Reason. That principle assures us that whatever exists has an explanation of its existence. But if there exists an infinite collection of dependent beings then, Clarke reasons, there must be an explanation of the existence of that collection. Is Clarke right in thinking that the Principle of Sufficient Reason, as expressed in the first premise, entails that the collection of dependent beings has an explanation of its existence? Is he right, that is, in accepting the following inference? PSR: Every existing being has a reason for its existence either within itself or in the causal efficacy of some other being; therefore, 5. The infinite collection of dependent beings has an ex- planation of its existence. T doubt that Clarke is right in accepting this inference. For, as we saw earlier, to explain the existence of the collection of dependent beings is not to explain the existence of some particular being. It is, in part, to explain why there are any dependent beings at all. And it does not appear to be inconsistent for it to be true that every being has an explanation of its existence and yet false that there is an explanation of why there are any dependent beings at all, ‘The question I'm raising about the inference of (5) from PSR: is one that apparently did not occur to the 18th century proponents of the Cosmological Argument. The reason for this, I think, is that the proponents of the argument never saw clearly that the collection of dependent beings is not itself a dependent being. They tended to confuse the question of why the collection of dependent beings has members (rather than not having any) with the altogether different question of why a certain being exists. ‘Thus in considering the view that the infinite succession of de- pendent beings might itself not have an explanation, Clarke re- marks: “"Tis in reality, and in point of argument, the very same supposition as it would be to suppose one continued being, of be- ginningless and endless duration, neither self-cxistent and necessary‘THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 37 in itself, nor having its existence founded in any self-existent cause,”* “Although the inference of (5) from PSR, is dubious, we must not dismiss too quickly the contention that (5) is entailed by the Principle of Sullicient Reason. For that principle is a good deal ‘mare general than PSR:. PSR, implies only that every existing thing has a reason for its existence. Thus if we come upon a man in a room, PSR: implies that there must be a reason why that particular man exists. But, as stated, PSR, doesn't imply that there must be ‘reason why the man in question is in the room he’s in, rather than somewhere else. As stated, PSR, doesn't imply that there must be a reason why the man in question is in poor health, say, or a reason why he is at the moment thinking of Paris rather than, say, Lafay- tte, Indiana. But surely the Principle of Sufficient Reason is meant to imply that there must be a reason not only for the existence of the man in question but also for the fact that he's in a particular room, in poor health, and thinking of Paris. Leibniz’ statement of the principle makes this clear. “The principle in question is the principle of the want of a sufficient reason in order to anything's existing, in order to any event's happening, in order to any truth’s taking place.”* Clarke also appears to understand the Principle of Sufficient Reason in this general way. Thus he remarks: “Nothing can be more absurd than to suppose that any thing (or any cir- cumstance of any thing) is, and yet that there be absolutely no reason why it is, rather than not."' Perhaps, then, when expressed in its more general form, the Principle of Sufficient Reason does entail that there is an explanation of the existence of the collection of dependent beings. ‘Suppose we take the Principle of Sulicient Reason in its gen- eral form to be the following: PSRa: Every actual state of affairs has a reason either within itself or in some other state of affairs. PSRz I think, docs entail that there is an explanation of the exis- tence of the collection of dependent beings. But it suffers from the defect that there are reasons for rejecting it as false. For consider the following argument. SDemonstration, (9th Edition): 13-14. Leibniz Clarke Correspondence, Sth Let Letter to a Critic", published as an appendix in the 9th Edition of his Demonstration, p. 490,58 nots 1. There are positive, contingent states of affairs; 2 If there are positive, contingent states of affairs then there is some state of affairs for which there is no reason; therefore, 3. PSRs is false. ‘The reasoning in support of premise (2) in this argument proceeds as follows. Consider the state of affairs $ expressed by the proposi- tion “There are positive, contingent states of affairs. Its fair to assume that § is itself a contingent state of affairs. There must, then, according to PSR: be some state of affairs which is the reason for S, which accounts for the fact that there are positive, contingent states of affairs rather than not. Suppose someone says that the state of affairs constituted by the exitsence of God is what accounts, for S, giving as his reason that God caused there to be positive, ‘contingent states of affairs. We then ask whether the existence of God is a contingent state of affairs. If the existence of God is a contingent state of affairs then, since it clearly is a positive state of affairs, it cannot account for S, it cannot explain why there are positive, contingent states of affairs rather than not—no more than citing the existence of Adam and his act of generating children can explain why there are any men rather than none. Hence, the de- fender of PSR: must say that the state of affairs constituted by the existence of God is a necessary state of affairs. We then ask whether the state of affairs recorded by the proposition ‘God caused. there to be positive, contingent states of affairs’ is a contingent or a necessary state of affairs. If God's causing there to be positive, con- tingent states of affairs is itself a contingent state of affairs, then, since it is clearly a positive state of affairs, it cannot account for S, it cannot explain why there are positive, contingent states of affairs rather than not* That is, if the question to be answered is “Why are there any positive, contingent states of affairs rather than none?” ‘we cannot answer it by appealing to some positive, contingent state of affairs. Consequently, the defender of PSRz must say that God's causing there to be positive, contingent states of affairs is itself a necessary state of affairs. But if the existence of God is necessary ‘and God's causing there to be positive, contingent states of affairs ‘81'm supposing throughout this argument that any state of affairs which explains the fact that there are positive, contingent states of alfalrs must it self be a postioe state of affairs or entail some positive state of affairs.‘THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 59 4s also necessary, it follows that it is necessary that there are posi tive, contingent states of affairs. But, as we noted at the outset, it is contingent, riot necessary, that there are positive, contingent states of affairs. Consequently, since PSR: implies that there is a reason for S, implies that there is an explanation of the fact that there are positive, contingent states of affairs, PSRs is false.” It'seems, then, that neither the general form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSRz) nor its more restricted form (PSR:) can be used to justify the contention that the existence of the col- lection of dependent beings has an explanation. For PSR,, although perhaps true, does not entail proposition (5). And PSRz, although it entails proposition (5), does not appear to be true. Perhaps the best move for the proponent of the Cosmological Argument to make at this juncture is to formulate a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which will yield the desired result concerning the collection of dependent beings but which will not fall victim to the argument against PSR:, He might, for example, appeal to the following principle: PSRs: For every collection whose members are existing be- ings (which can be caused to exist or which can cause the existence of other beings) there is an explanation of the fact that it has members. PSR; does not imply that every positive, contingent state of affairs has an explanation; it does not fall prey to the argument that re- futes PSR:. PSRs, however, does imply that there is an explanation of the existence of the collection of dependent beings. Hence, if PSR; is true the proponents of the Cosmological Argument are right im giving an affirmative answer to the first of the two main ‘questions noted earlier; they are right, that is, in contending that there must be an explanation of the existence of the collection of dependent beings. But is PSRs true? Indeed, is even PSR,, the first premise of the Cosmological Argument, true? These are important questions. Any final judgment of the Cosmological Argument depends on how they are answered. ‘Some philosophers thought that the truth of PSR, could be For an argument which is similar to the one just presented see James F, Ross, Philosophical Theology (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merill Company, Tne, 1969): 295-904, Although similar, Ross's argument is logically indepen dent of the one given above.60 nots proved. But their arguments to this end are notoriously bad.!® OF course, if PSR; eannot be proved, it does not follow that it cannot be known to be true. For if we know any propositions to be true there must be some propositions which we can know to be true without having to prove them, without having to derive them from other propositions we know to be true. But it is doubtful that any of us knows that PSR, is true. Other philosophers have claimed that although PSR: is not known to be true it is, nevertheless, a presupposition of reason, a metaphysical assumption that all men make, whether or not they reflect sufficiently to become aware of the assumption.** If true, what bearing would this view have on the Cosmological Argument? Tt would not, of course, show that it is a sound argument. For PSR, could still be false. The fact, if it is a fact, that all of us pre- suppose that every existing being has an explanation of its existence does not imply that no being exists without an explanation of its existence. Nature is not bound to satisfy our presuppositions. As James has remarked in another connection: “In the great boarding house of nature, the cakes and the butter and the syrup seldom ‘come out so even and leave the plates so clean.” However, if we do make such a presupposition we could not consistently reject the Cosmological Argument solely because it contains PSR, as a premise. But it is doubtful that all men do make this metaphysical assumption. Perhaps the truth we can know about the Cosmological Argu- ment is this. Although it may be a perfectly sound argument, it cannot reasonably be maintained to be a proof of its conclusion, For although its premises may be true, we are not in the position of knowing that they are true. And since to claim of an argument that it is a proof of its conclusion is to imply that its premises are known to be true, we are not entitled to claim that the Cosmological ‘Argument is a proof of the existence of a necessary being. T am aware that this conclusion will satisfy neither the proponents of the argument nor its critics. The critics wish to show that the argument is invalid, contains false premises, or premises arrived at by fallacious reasoning. And if our judgment is correct 10 For a discussion of some of these arguments sco my paper “The Cosmological Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason”, Man and World 2 (1968): 278-292. 11 See, for example, Richard Taylor, Metophysles (Englewood Chis, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Ine, 1963): 80-87.‘THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT a this wish must go unfulfilled. The proponents wish to show that the argument provides a good and conclusive reason for accepting its conclusion. This wish too must remain unfulfilled. Like most important philosophical arguments, it appears that the Cosmolog- {cal Argument is neither as good as its supporters have claimed nor as bad as its critics have believed.