SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136914. January 25, 2002.]

COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION , petitioner, vs.
LIANGA BAY AND COMMUNITY MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE,
INC., respondent.

Velasquez Meru & Associates for petitioner.

Alvizo Alvvizo Ranoco & Alvizo Law Offices for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
For the loss it sustained re as a result of the re, respondent led an
insurance claim with petitioner. Petitioner, however, denied the claim on the
ground that based on the submitted documents, the building of respondent was
set on re by two NPA rebels who wanted to obtain provisions. This was an
excepted risk under the policy contract.
The RTC decision, armed by the Court of Appeals, ordered petitioner to
pay respondent P200,000 with interest at 12% per annum from the date of the
ling of the complaint until paid, as well as actual damages, exemplary damages,
litigation expenses, attorney's fees and the costs of suit. Indeed, petitioner failed
to prove the facts upon which the excepted risk was based. Petitioner relied on
the sworn statements of two witnesses and the Spot Report of Pfc. Juarbal. The
sworn statements, however, were inadmissible for being hearsay inasmuch as
the people who executed them did not take the witness stand and could not,
therefore, be cross-examined. No investigation, independent of the statements,
was conducted. The testimony of Pfc. Juarbal relative to the sworn statements,
on the other hand, may be considered as independently relevant statements
gathered in the course of investigation and may be admitted as such but not
necessarily to prove the truth thereof. Nevertheless, the 12% interest and other
monetary awards were held not proper for lack of legal and valid basis. The
interest rate should be and was set to 6% from the date of filing of the complaint.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF; A PARTY MUST PROVE HIS
OWN AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS. A party is bound by his own armative
allegations. This is a well-known postulate echoed in Section 1 of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Each party must prove his own armative allegations by
the amount of evidence required by law which in civil cases, as in this case, is
preponderance of evidence, to obtain a favorable judgment. Where a risk is
excepted by the terms of a policy which insures against other perils or hazards, loss
from such a risk constitutes a defense which the insurer may urge, since it has not

assumed that risk, and from this it follows that an insurer seeking to defeat a claim
because of an exception or limitation in the policy has the burden of proving that
the loss comes within the purview of the exception or limitation set up. If a proof is
made of a loss apparently within a contract of insurance, the burden is upon the
insurer to prove that the loss arose from a cause of loss which is expected or for
which it is not liable, or from a cause which limits its liability. Stated elsewise, since
the petitioner in this case is defending on the ground of non-coverage and relying
upon an exemption or exception clause in the re insurance policy, it has the
burden of proving the facts upon which such excepted risk is based, by a
preponderance of evidence. But petitioner failed to do so.
EDcIAC

2.
ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBILITY; HEARSAY RULE; ELUCIDATED. A witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge, which means
those facts which are derived from his perception. Consequently, a witness may not
testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read
or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received
as proof of the truth of what he has learned. Such is the hearsay rule which applies
not only to oral testimony or statements but also to written evidence as well. The
hearsay rule is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and
reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not given under oath
or solemn armation and, more importantly, have not been subjected to crossexamination by opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and
articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which
the worth of the out-of-court statement depends. Thus, the Sworn Statements of
Jose Lomocso and Ernesto Urbiztondo are inadmissible in evidence, for being
hearsay, inasmuch as they did not take the witness stand and could not therefore
be cross-examined. There are exceptions to the hearsay rule, among which are
entries in official records. To be admissible in evidence, however, three (3) requisites
must concur, to wit: (a) that the entry was made by a public ocer, or by another
person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public ocer
in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public ocer or other person had
sucient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by
him personally or through ocial information. The third requisite was not met in
this case since no investigation, independent of the statements gathered from Jose
Lomocso, was conducted by Pfc. Arturo V. Juarbal.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; REPORT RELATIVE TO THE STATEMENT OF ANOTHER MAY BE
CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENTLY RELEVANT STATEMENT BUT NOT NECESSARILY
TO PROVE THE TRUTH THEREOF. The Spot Report of Pfc. Arturo Juarbal relative
to the statement of Jose Lomocso to the eect that NPA rebels allegedly set re to
the respondent's building is inadmissible in evidence, for the purpose of proving the
truth of the statements contained in the said report, for being hearsay. The said
Spot Report is admissible only insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of Pfc.
Arturo V. Juarbal since he himself took the witness stand and was available for
cross-examination. The portions of his Spot Report which were of his personal
knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and conclusions are not hearsay.
The rest of the said report relative to the statement of Jose Lomocso may be

considered as independently relevant statements gathered in the course of Juarbal's

investigation and may be admitted as such but not necessarily to prove the truth
thereof.
4.
CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; AWARD OF INTEREST; PROPER INTEREST RATE IN
INSURANCE CLAIM IS 6%. Concerning the application of the proper interest rates,
the guidelines were set in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and
Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc. The Court observed that a "forbearance" in the
context of the usury law is a "contractual obligation of lender or creditor to refrain,
during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay a loan
or debt then due and payable." The insurance claim in this case is evidently not a
forbearance of money, goods or credit, and thus the interest rate should be as it is
hereby fixed at six percent (6%) computed from the date of filing of the complaint.
5.
ID.; ID.; ACTUAL DAMAGES MUST BE PROVED. We nd no justication for
the award of actual damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). Wellentrenched is the doctrine that actual, compensatory and consequential damages
must be proved, and cannot be presumed.
6.
ID.; ID.; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; WHEN PROPER. Concerning the award of
exemplary damages for Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), we likewise nd no
legal and valid basis for granting the same. Article 2229 of the New Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction
for the public good. Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to
curb socially deleterious actions. They are designed to permit the courts to mould
behavior that has socially deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required
by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an oender. However, it cannot be
recovered as a matter of right. It is based entirely on the discretion of the court. We
find no cogent and valid reason to award the same in the case at bar.
IcHTED

7.
ID.; ID.; LITIGATION EXPENSES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES; ELUCIDATED.
With respect to the award of litigation expenses and attorney's fees, Article 2208 of
the New Civil Code enumerates the instances where such may be awarded and, in
all cases, it must be reasonable, just and equitable if the same were to be granted.
Attorney's fees as part of damages are not meant to enrich the winning party at the
expense of the losing litigant. They are not awarded every time a party prevails in a
suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
The award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the general rule. As such,
it is necessary for the court to make ndings of facts and law that would bring the
case within the exception and justify the grant of such award.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J :
p

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of

Appeals 2 dated December 29, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV Case No. 36902 arming in toto
the Decision 3 dated December 26, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Lianga,
Surigao del Sur, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. L-518 which ordered petitioner
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation to fully pay the insurance claim of
respondent Lianga Bay and Community Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., under Fire
Insurance Policy No. F-1397, for loss sustained as a result of the re that occurred
on July 1, 1989 in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), with
interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum from the date of ling of the complaint
until fully paid, as well as Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as actual damages,
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages, Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) as litigation expenses, Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney's
fees, and the costs of suit.

The facts are undisputed:

The petitioner is a domestic corporation principally engaged in the insurance
business wherein it undertakes, for a consideration, to indemnify another against
loss, damage or liability from an unknown or contingent event including re while
the respondent is a duly registered cooperative judicially declared insolvent and
represented by the elected assignee, Cornelio Jamero.
It appears that sometime in 1989, the petitioner and the respondent entered into a
contract of re insurance. Under Fire Insurance Policy No. F-1397, the petitioner
insured the respondent's stocks-in-trade against re loss, damage or liability during
the period starting from June 20, 1989 at 4:00 p.m. to June 20, 1990 at 4:00 p.m.,
for the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
On July 1, 1989, at or about 12:40 a.m., the respondent's building located at
Barangay Diatagon, Lianga, Surigao del Sur was gutted by fire and reduced to ashes,
resulting in the total loss of the respondent's stocks-in-trade, pieces of furniture and
fixtures, equipments and records.
Due to the loss, the respondent led an insurance claim with the petitioner under
its Fire Insurance Policy No. F-1397, submitting: (a) the Spot Report of Pfc. Arturo V.
Juarbal, INP Investigator, dated July 1, 1989; (b) the Sworn Statement of Jose
Lomocso; and (c) the Sworn Statement of Ernesto Urbiztondo.
The petitioner, however, denied the insurance claim on the ground that, based on
the submitted documents, the building was set on re by two (2) NPA rebels who
wanted to obtain canned goods, rice and medicines as provisions for their comrades
in the forest, and that such loss was an excepted risk under paragraph No. 6 of the
policy conditions of Fire Insurance Policy No. F-1397, which provides:
This insurance does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by or
through or in consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the following
occurrences, namely:

xxx xxx xxx

(d)
Mutiny, riot, military or popular uprising, insurrection, rebellion,
revolution, military or usurped power.
Any loss or damage happening during the existence of abnormal conditions
(whether physical or otherwise) which are occasioned by or through or in
consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of said occurrences shall be
deemed to be loss or damage which is not covered by this insurance,
except to the extent that the Insured shall prove that such loss or damage
happened independently of the existence of such abnormal conditions.

Finding the denial of its claim unacceptable, the respondent then instituted in the
trial court the complaint for recovery of "loss, damage or liability" against petitioner.
The petitioner answered the complaint and reiterated the ground it earlier cited to
deny the insurance claim, that is, that the loss was due to NPA rebels, an excepted
risk under the fire insurance policy.
In due time, the trial court rendered its Decision dated December 26, 1991 in favor
of the respondent, declaring that:
Based on its ndings, it is therefore the considered opinion of this Court, as
it so holds, that the defenses raised by defendant Country Bankers has
utterly crumbled on account of its inherent weakness, incredibility and
unreliability, and after applying those helpful tools like common sense, logic
and the Court's honest appraisal of the real and actual situation obtaining in
this area, such defenses remains (sic) unimpressive and unconvincing, and
therefore, the defendant Country Bankers has to be irreversibly adjudged
liable, as it should be, to plainti-Insolvent Cooperative, represented in this
action by its Assignee, Cornelio Jamero, and thus, ordering said defendant
Country Bankers to pay the plaintiff-Insolvent Cooperative, as follows:
1.

To fully pay the insurance claim for the loss the insured-plainti
sustained as a result of the re under its Fire Insurance Policy No. F1397 in its full face value of P200,000.00 with interest of 12% per
annum from date of filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid;

2.

To pay as and in the concept of actual or compensatory damages in

the total sum of P50,000.00;

3.

To pay as and in the concept of exemplary damages in the total sum

of P50,000.00;

4.

To pay in the concept of litigation expenses the sum of P5,000.00;

5.

To pay by way of reimbursement the attorney's fees in the sum of

P10,000.00; and

6.

To pay the costs of the suit.

For

being unsubstantiated with credible and positive evidence, the

"counterclaim" is dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. On December 29, 1998, the
appellate court armed the challenged decision of the trial court in its entirety.
Petitioner now comes before us via the instant petition anchored on three (3)
assigned errors, 4 to wit:
1.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO APPRECIATE AND

GIVE CREDENCE TO THE SPOT REPORT OF PFC. ARTURO JUARBAL
(EXH. 3) AND THE SWORN STATEMENT OF JOSE LOMOCSO (EXH. 4)
THAT THE RESPONDENT'S STOCK-IN-TRADE WAS BURNED BY THE
NPA REBELS, HENCE AN EXCEPTED RISK UNDER THE FIRE
INSURANCE POLICY.

2.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING

PETITIONER LIABLE FOR 12% INTEREST PER ANNUM ON THE FACE
VALUE OF THE POLICY FROM THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT UNTIL
FULLY PAID.

3.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THE

PETITIONER LIABLE FOR ACTUAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,
LITIGATION EXPENSES, ATTORNEYS FEES AND COST OF SUIT.

A party is bound by his own armative allegations. This is a well-known postulate

echoed in Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Each party must
prove his own armative allegations by the amount of evidence required by law
which in civil cases, as in this case, is preponderance of evidence, to obtain a
favorable judgment. 5
In the instant case, the petitioner does not dispute that the respondent's stocks-intrade were insured against re loss, damage or liability under Fire Insurance Policy
No. F-1397 and that the respondent lost its stocks-in-trade in a re that occurred on
July 1, 1989, within the duration of said re insurance. The petitioner, however,
posits the view that the cause of the loss was an excepted risk under the terms of
the fire insurance policy.
Where a risk is excepted by the terms of a policy which insures against other perils
or hazards, loss from such a risk constitutes a defense which the insurer may urge,
since it has not assumed that risk, and from this it follows that an insurer seeking to
defeat a claim because of an exception or limitation in the policy has the burden of
proving that the loss comes within the purview of the exception or limitation set up.
If a proof is made of a loss apparently within a contract of insurance, the burden is
upon the insurer to prove that the loss arose from a cause of loss which is excepted
or for which it is not liable, or from a cause which limits its liability. 6 Stated
elsewise, since the petitioner in this case is defending on the ground of noncoverage and relying upon an exemption or exception clause in the re insurance
policy, it has the burden of proving the facts upon which such excepted risk is based,
by a preponderance of evidence. 7 But petitioner failed to do so.

The petitioner relies on the Sworn Statements of Jose Lomocso and Ernesto
Urbiztondo as well as on the Spot Report of Pfc. Arturo V. Juarbal dated July 1, 1989,
more particularly the following statement therein:
. . . investigation revealed by Jose Lomocso that those armed men wanted to get can
goods and rice for their consumption in the forest PD investigation further disclosed that
the perpetrator are member (sic) of the NPA PD end. . . .

A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge,
which means those facts which are derived from his perception. 8 Consequently, a
witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he
was told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may
not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. Such is the hearsay
rule which applies not only to oral testimony or statements but also to written
evidence as well. 9
The hearsay rule is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and
reliability of hearsay evidence inasmuch as such evidence are not given under oath
or solemn armation and, more importantly, have not been subjected to crossexamination by opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and
articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which
the worth of the out-of-court statement depends. 10
Thus, the Sworn Statements of Jose Lomocso and Ernesto Urbiztondo are
inadmissible in evidence, for being hearsay, inasmuch as they did not take the
witness stand and could not therefore be cross-examined.
There are exceptions to the hearsay rule, among which are entries in ocial
records. 11 To be admissible in evidence, however, three (3) requisites must concur,
to wit:
(a)

that the entry was made by a public ocer, or by another person

specially enjoined by law to do so;

(b)

that it was made by the public ocer in the performance of his

duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and

(c)

that the public ocer or other person had sucient knowledge of

the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
personally or through official information. 12

The third requisite was not met in this case since no investigation, independent of
the statements gathered from Jose Lomocso, was conducted by Pfc. Arturo V.
Juarbal. In fact, as the petitioner itself pointed out, citing the testimony of Pfc.
Arturo Juarbal, 13 the latter's Spot Report "was based on the personal knowledge of
the caretaker Jose Lomocso who witnessed every single incident surrounding the
facts and circumstances of the case." This argument undeniably weakens the
petitioner's defense, for the Spot Report of Pfc. Arturo Juarbal relative to the
statement of Jose Lomocso to the eect that NPA rebels allegedly set re to the

respondent's building is inadmissible in evidence, for the purpose of proving the

truth of the statements contained in the said report, for being hearsay.
The said Spot Report is admissible only insofar as it constitutes part of the
testimony of Pfc. Arturo V. Juarbal since he himself took the witness stand and was
available for cross-examination. The portions of his Spot Report which were of his
personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and conclusions are not
hearsay. The rest of the said report relative to the statement of Jose Lomocso may
be considered as independently relevant statements gathered in the course of
Juarbal's investigation and may be admitted as such but not necessarily to prove the
truth thereof. 14
The petitioner's evidence to prove its defense is sadly wanting and thus, gives rise
to its liability to the respondent under Fire Insurance Policy No. F-1397.
Nonetheless, we do not sustain the trial court's imposition of twelve percent (12%)
interest on the insurance claim as well as the monetary award for actual and
exemplary damages, litigation expenses and attorney's fees for lack of legal and
valid basis.
Concerning the application of the proper interest rates, the following guidelines
were set in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Mercantile Insurance
Co., Inc.: 15
I.
When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasicontracts, delicts or quasi-delicts, is breached, the contravenor can be held
liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil
Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II.
With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of
actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the
accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1.
When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the
payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money,
the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation,
the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject
to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2.
When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of
money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded
may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the
demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or

extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot
be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the
court is made (at which time the quantication of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for
the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount
finally adjudged.
3.
When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
becomes nal and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the
case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12%
per annum from such nality until its satisfaction, this interim period
being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

In the said case of Eastern Shipping, the Court further observed that a "forbearance"
in the context of the usury law is a "contractual obligation of lender or creditor to
refrain, during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to
repay a loan or debt then due and payable."
Considering the foregoing, the insurance claim in this case is evidently not a
forbearance of money, goods or credit, and thus the interest rate should be as it is
hereby fixed at six percent (6%) computed from the date of filing of the complaint.
We nd no justication for the award of actual damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00). Well-entrenched is the doctrine that actual, compensatory and
consequential damages must be proved, and cannot be presumed. 16 That part of
the dispositive portion of the Decision of the trial court ordering the petitioner to
pay actual damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) has no basis at all. The
justication, if any, for such an award of actual damages does not appear in the
body of the decision of the trial court. Neither is there any testimonial and
documentary evidence on the alleged actual damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) to warrant such an award. Thus, the same must be deleted.
Concerning the award of exemplary damages for Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), we likewise nd no legal and valid basis for granting the same. Article
2229 of the New Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good. Exemplary damages are imposed
not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or
as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. They are designed to
permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences, and
its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of an oender.
However, it cannot be recovered as a matter of right. It is based entirely on the
discretion of the court. We nd no cogent and valid reason to award the same in the
case at bar.
With respect to the award of litigation expenses and attorney's fees, Article 2208 of
the New Civil Code 17 enumerates the instances where such may be awarded and,
in all cases, it must be reasonable, just and equitable if the same were to be
granted. Attorney's fees as part of damages are not meant to enrich the winning

party at the expense of the losing litigant. They are not awarded every time a party
prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the
right to litigate. 18 The award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the
general rule. As such, it is necessary for the court to make ndings of facts and law
that would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of such award.
We nd none in this case to warrant the award by the trial court of litigation
expenses and attorney's fees in the amounts of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), respectively, and therefore, the same must
also be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED. The rate of interest on the
adjudged principal amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) shall be
six percent (6%) per annum computed from the date of ling of the Complaint in
the trial court. The awards in the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
actual damages, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages, Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as litigation expenses, and Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as attorney's fees are hereby DELETED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.

Penned by Associate Justice Jesus M. Elbinias and concurred in by Associate

Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Marina L. Buzon, Rollo, pp. 25-29.

2.

Fourth Division.

3.

Penned by Judge Bernardo V. Saludares, Rollo, pp. 31-52.

4.

Rollo, p. 12.

5.

Tai Tong Chuache & Co. v. Insurance Commission , 158 SCRA 366, 372 [1988];
Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 110 SCRA 241, 249
[1981] citing 20 Am. Jur. 142; Paris-Manila Perfume Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co. ,
49 Phil. 753 [1926].

6.

44 Am Jur 2d Insurance 1938.

7.

44 Am Jur 2d Insurance 2021.

8.

Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.

9.

D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Maria J. Juego , G.R. No. 137873, April
20, 2001, pp. 3-4 citing 31A C.J.S. Evidence 194 and Philippine Home Assurance
Corp. v. Court of Appeals , 257 SCRA 468, 479 [1996].

10.

Section 216 [2], Gilbert, Law Summaries on Evidence, cited in Remedial Law, Vol.
V: Revised Rules on Evidence, Oscar M. Herrera, 1999 Edition, p. 565.

11.

Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Entries in ocial records made in the performance of his duty by a public ocer of
the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

12.

Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 16 SCRA 448, 452 [1966].

13.

Rollo, pp. 16-17.

14.

Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals , 273 SCRA 607, 618 [1997].

15.

234 SCRA 78, 95-97 [1994].

16.

Eduardo P. Lucas v. Spouses Maximo C. Royo and Corazon B. Royo , G.R. No.
136185, October 30, 2000, p. 9; Integrated Packaging Corporation v. Court of
Appeals , 333 SCRA 170, 179 [2000]; Lucena v. Court of Appeals , 313 SCRA 47,
61-62 [1999].

17.

Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of

litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
1)

When exemplary damages are awarded;

2)

When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plainti to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

3)

In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

4)

In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the

plaintiff;

5)

Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

6)

In actions for legal support;

7)

In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and

skilled workers;

8)

In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's

liability laws;

9)

In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

10)
11)

When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be

reasonable.
18.

Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 321 SCRA 88, 95 [1999].