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Citation Text: 34 Fed.Appx. 427
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defamation

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 Page 1
34 Fed.Appx. 427, 2002 WL 727010 (C.A.4 (Md.))
(Not Selected for publication in the Federal Reporter)
(Cite as: 34 Fed.Appx. 427, 2002 WL 727010 (C.A.4 (Md.)))

Affirmed.
This case was not selected for publication in the
Federal Reporter. West Headnotes

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter See [1] Libel and Slander 237 1
Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally
237 Libel and Slander
governing citation of judicial decisions issued on or
237I Words and Acts Actionable, and Liability
after Jan. 1, 2007. See also Fourth Circuit Rule
Therefor
32.1 (Find CTA4 Rule 32.1)
237k1 k. Nature and Elements of Defamation
United States Court of Appeals, in General. Most Cited Cases
Fourth Circuit. Under Maryland law, to maintain cause of action
Kirk CARTER; Reginald Fitzgerald, Plaintiffs- for defamation, plaintiff must show (1) defendant
Appellants, made defamatory communication to a third party,
v. (2) communication was false, (3) defendant inten-
Ronald MORGAN, Defendant-Appellee, ded to communicate a false statement, and (4)
and plaintiff suffered damages.
American Horse Center, Incorporated, formerly
[2] Libel and Slander 237 45(2)
known as Harbor Shuttle Company, Inc.; Silver
Clipper, Incorporated, t/a Harbor Shuttle Company, 237 Libel and Slander
Inc., Defendants. 237II Privileged Communications, and Malice
No. 01-2117. Therein
237k40 Qualified Privilege
Submitted March 27, 2002.
237k45 Common Interest in Subject-Mat-
Decided April 25, 2002.
ter
Employees brought claims against their company's 237k45(2) k. Common Business In-
president, alleging, inter alia, defamation and hos- terest. Most Cited Cases
tile work environment based on race. The United Under Maryland law, a qualified privilege is recog-
States District Court for the District of Maryland, nized in the context of employer/employee relation-
Andre M. Davis, J., entered judgment in favor of ships for defamatory statements published to fellow
president on the defamation and hostile work envir- employee with a mutual interest in the information.
onment claims, and employees appealed. The Court
[3] Libel and Slander 237 45(2)
of Appeals held that: (1) under Maryland law, even
assuming that president's allegedly defamatory 237 Libel and Slander
statement met the requisite elements for defama- 237II Privileged Communications, and Malice
tion, it was sheltered by qualified privilege where it Therein
was made by president to another employee who 237k40 Qualified Privilege
scheduled and hired employees, and (2) hostile 237k45 Common Interest in Subject-Mat-
work environment claims failed, because presid- ter
ent's alleged conduct was not objectively suffi- 237k45(2) k. Common Business In-
ciently pervasive or severe to alter a term or condi- terest. Most Cited Cases
tion of employment.
Libel and Slander 237 51(4)

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.


34 Fed.Appx. 427, 2002 WL 727010 (C.A.4 (Md.))
(Not Selected for publication in the Federal Reporter)
(Cite as: 34 Fed.Appx. 427, 2002 WL 727010 (C.A.4 (Md.)))
237 Libel and Slander
237II Privileged Communications, and Malice
Therein
237k51 Existence and Effect of Malice
237k51(4) k. Discharge of Duty to Others
or to Public and Common Interest in Subject-Mat-
ter. Most Cited Cases
Under Maryland law, even assuming the company
president's allegedly defamatory statement about
employee met the requisite elements for defama-
tion, it was sheltered by qualified privilege where it
was made by president to another employee who
scheduled and hired employees, and record was
devoid of evidence that statement was made with
malice, which would result in the loss of the priv-
ilege.
[4] Civil Rights 78 1147
78 Civil Rights
78II Employment Practices
78k1143 Harassment; Work Environment
78k1147 k. Hostile Environment; Sever-
ity, Pervasiveness, and Frequency. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 78k145)
To establish Title VII hostile work environment
claim based on race, plaintiffs must show (1) har-
assment was unwelcome, (2) harassment was based
on their race, (3) harassment was sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment
and create an abusive atmosphere, and (4) there is
some basis for imposing liability on the employer.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e et seq.
[5] Civil Rights 78 1147
78 Civil Rights
78II Employment Practices
78k1143 Harassment; Work Environment
78k1147 k. Hostile Environment; Sever-
ity, Pervasiveness, and Frequency. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 78k145)
Employees' Title VII claims for hostile work envir-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 2
onment based on their race failed where company
president's alleged conduct was not objectively suf-
ficiently pervasive or severe to alter a term or con-
dition of their employment and thereby create an
abusive work environment. Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.
*428 Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Andre
M. Davis, District Judge. (CA-01-1663-AMD).
Mark R. Millstein, Millstein Law Offices, Bal-
timore, Maryland, for Appellant. John B. Stolarz,
Stolarz & Bricker, Baltimore, Maryland, for Ap-
pellee.
Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Cir-
cuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
**1 Kirk Carter and Reginald Fitzgerald appeal the
district court's grant of Ronald Morgan's motion for
judgment on their claims of defamation and hostile
work environment based on race. We affirm.
Carter and Fitzgerald were employees of Silver
Clipper, Inc., T/A Harbor Shuttle, Inc., a Maryland
corporation. Ronald Morgan was the president, sole
shareholder, and manager of the corporation. Carter
was terminated on August 2, 1999, and Fitzgerald
resigned.
They sued Harbor Shuttle, Inc., Silver Clipper, Inc.,
and Morgan in state court, alleging defamation,
failure to pay overtime wages, and breach of con-
tract. Carter and Fitzgerald also claimed Harbor
Shuttle, Inc., and Silver Clipper, Inc., discriminated
against them in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994)
. Silver Clipper, Inc., and Harbor Shuttle, Inc., filed
for bankruptcy. Thereafter, Carter and Fitzgerald

34 Fed.Appx. 427, 2002 WL 727010 (C.A.4 (Md.))
(Not Selected for publication in the Federal Reporter)
(Cite as: 34 Fed.Appx. 427, 2002 WL 727010 (C.A.4 (Md.)))
filed a third amended complaint against Morgan al-
leging he subjected Carter and Fitzgerald to a hos-
tile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1994). Morgan removed the case to federal
court, where the parties proceeded with a jury trial
solely against Morgan.
At the close of plaintiffs' case, Morgan moved for
judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied it in part, dismissing the defamation
and hostile work environment claims, awarding
Carter overtime, and denying him treble damages
and attorney's fees. Carter and Fitzgerald timely ap-
pealed the district court's granting of Morgan's mo-
tion for judgment on their defamation and hostile
work environment claims.
Our review of the grant of a motion for judgment as
a matter of law is de novo. See Trandes Corp. v.
Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 661 (4th
Cir.1993). We must affirm the district court's ruling
unless, viewing all the evidence in the light most
favorable to Appellants and giving them the benefit
of all reasonable inferences, no reasonable juror
could have returned the verdict in their favor. Id. at
660-61.
[1][2] To maintain a cause of action for defamation
under Maryland law, a plaintiff must show: (1)
Morgan made a defamatory communication to a
third party; (2) the communication was false; (3)
Morgan intended to communicate a false statement;
and (4) plaintiff suffered damages. Gohari v. Dar-
vish, 363 Md. 42, 767 A.2d 321, 327 (2001). In the
employer/employee context, Maryland law has re-
cognized a qualified privilege for defamatory state-
ments published to a fellow employee with a mutu-
al interest in the information. Happy 40, Inc. v.
Miller, 63 Md.App. 24, 491 A.2d 1210, 1214
(Ct.Spec.App.1985) (finding employer entitled to
privilege in defamation *429 case when he told re-
maining employees of reasons for plaintiff's dis-
charge).
[3] We find the district court did not err in granting
Morgan's motion for judgment, dismissing the de-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 3
famation claims because Carter and Fitzgerald
failed to establish the elements of a prima facie
case. We further conclude, assuming the statement
met the requisite elements, it would be sheltered by
a qualified privilege because it was made by the
president of the company to another employee who
scheduled and hired employees, and the record is
devoid of evidence the statement was made with
malice, which would result in the loss of the priv-
ilege. Happy 40, Inc., 491 A.2d at 1214.
**2 [4][5] We find Carter's and Fitzgerald's claims
Morgan created a hostile work environment like-
wise fail. To establish a hostile work environment
claim, Carter and Fitzgerald must show: (1) the har-
assment was unwelcome; (2) the harassment was
based on their race; (3) the harassment was suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and
(4) there is some basis for imposing liability on the
employer. See Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801
(4th Cir.1998). In assessing whether a work envir-
onment is objectively hostile, the district court con-
sidered the totality of the circumstances, including
the frequency and severity of the discriminatory
conduct, whether it was physically threatening or
humiliating or a mere offensive utterance, and
whether it unreasonably interfered with an employ-
ee's work performance. See Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d
295 (1993). Construing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Carter and Fitzgerald, their
claims for hostile work environment fail because,
under a totality of the circumstances, Morgan's al-
leged conduct was not objectively sufficiently per-
vasive or severe to alter a term or condition of their
employment and thereby create an abusive work
environment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order
granting Morgan's motion for judgment. We deny
Appellants' request for oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
 Page 4
34 Fed.Appx. 427, 2002 WL 727010 (C.A.4 (Md.))
(Not Selected for publication in the Federal Reporter)
(Cite as: 34 Fed.Appx. 427, 2002 WL 727010 (C.A.4 (Md.)))

AFFIRMED.

C.A.4 (Md.),2002.
Carter v. Morgan
34 Fed.Appx. 427, 2002 WL 727010 (C.A.4 (Md.))

END OF DOCUMENT

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.