PART I.

TORTS
I.

QUASI-DELICT (Arts. 2176-2194, NCC)

a. INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS
a.1 Nature, scope and coverage
DOLO VS. CULPA
2 ways of committing a crime under the Art. 3, RPC:
1.

Dolo something that is done with intent

2.

If the act or omission causing damage is committed with

intent to cause such damage, the act becomes a crime and is
governed by RPC.
Culpa or Fault done through negligence

Absence of intent

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence,
lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
Difference between torts and quasi-delict:
Torts

Quasi-delict

Common Law (customs and

usages)

Civil Law (enacted by congress)

May be intentional

Unintentional (may or may not

be voluntary)

May be criminal

May be criminal
criminal negligence)

No pre-existing
obligation

contractual

No pre-existing
obligation

(such

as

contractual

ELCANO V. HILL, 77 SCRA 98

FACTS:
Reginald Hill, son of defendant Marvin Hill, was charged criminallyfor the
killing of Agapito Elcano, son of plaintiffs Elcano spouses. Atthe time of the
killing, Reginald was a minor, married and was livingwith his father Marvin
and receiving subsistence from him.Reginald was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminalbecause of lack of intent to kill coupled with
mistake. Subsequently theElcano spouses filed a civil action for damages
against Reginald and his father arising from the killing of their son. The
casewas dismissed by the lower court andplaintiffs appealed to the
Supreme Court. One of the questions raisedwas whether the father of the
minor who was already married but livingwith, and receiving subsistence
from said father was liable in damagesfor the crime committed by the
minor.
ISSUE: W/N the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case.
RULING:
Criminal negligence is in violation of the criminal law while civil negligence
is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, having always had its own foundation
and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. It
results that the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict. Hence, the acquittal is not a bar
to the instant action against him.
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the Article 2176 is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the RPC. But the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether

intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil

action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by
the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
Now under Article 2180, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company. In the instant case, it is not
controverted that Reginald, although married was living with his father
and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and
dependent on his father.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind
the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under
Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their
minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third
persons. On the other hand the clear implication of Article 399, in
providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless,
sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or
do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a
minor child, while still a minor, does not relieve the parents of the duty to
see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to any
litigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property
which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.
(Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) Accordingly, in our considered view, Article
2170 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of
Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age,
as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become subsidiary to
that of his son.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH V. CA, GR NO.97336, FEB. 19, 1993
FACTS:
On October 27, 1987, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial
court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation
of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is
20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her country; petitioner, on the other hand, is
an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and
is an exchange student. Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and
proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they
get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced
her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that
time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioners attitude
towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live
with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone
in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering
petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that
he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
1

respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial, the lower
court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages.

Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by the public respondent, which
can be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code.

ISSUE:

HELD:

W/N Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.

The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action is found

on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil
Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the
complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference
to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items
intended to be sold for public consumption."

HELD:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines
quasi-delicts thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that
where a mans promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to
sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy.
Difference between Quasi-delict (Article 2176) and Torts:
o

Article 2176: QUASI DELICT

It is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the

notion of willfulness or intent.

known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law

concept

TORTS

The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the
vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the
parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasidelict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the
acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus, in Singson
vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, this Court stated:
We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract
between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.
Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual
relations. The liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing
products may be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other
grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.Quasi-delict, as
defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, is homologous but not identical
to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but
also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit.
a.2 Requisites
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
In order that liability under Art.2176 of the Civil Code will arise, the
following requisites must exist:
(a) There must be damage or prejudice which must be proven by the
party claiming it;

an Anglo-American or common law concept

(b) There must be an unlawful act or omission amounting to fault or

negligence; and

much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only

negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault
and battery, false imprisonment and deceit.

(c) There must be a direct causal connection between the damage or

prejudice and the act or omission.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. VS. CA, GR NO. 110295, OCT. 18, 1993
FACTS:
Geronimo, herein private respondent, filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner. She alleges in her complaint that she was the
proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen, an enterprise engaged
in the sale of soft drinks and other goods to the students of Kindergarten
Wonderland and to the public. Some parents of the students complained
to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like
matter and other foreign substances or particles. She brought the said
bottles to the Regional Health Office of the DOH for examination;
subsequently, the DOH informed her that the samples she submitted "are
adulterated. Due to this, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted
from the usual 10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting
in losses; not long after that, she had to lose shop and became jobless and
destitute.
ISSUE:
W/N the subsequent action for damages against the soft drinks
manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty
against hidden defects or merchantability pursuant to Article 1571 of the

CHILD LEARNING V. TAGORIO, GR NO.150920, NOV. 25, 2005

FACTS:
Timothy Tagario entered the boy's comfort room at the third floor of the
Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He, however, found
himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and
so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for help. When
no help arrived, he decided to open the window to call for help. In the
process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down
three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for
serious multiple physical injuries. An action under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code was filed by respondents against the Child Learning Center. The trial
court found in favor of respondents. The CA affirmed the decision in toto.
ISSUE:
W/N CLC is guilty under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to
prove by a preponderance of evidence:
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff;
2

(2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for
whose act he must respond

Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the
culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:

(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or

negligence and the damages incurred.

(1) That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only
of private concern.

Difference between fault and negligence:

o

FAULT

voluntary act or omission which causes damage to the right of

another giving rise to an obligation on the part of the actor to
repair such damage.

requires the execution of a positive act which causes damage to

another

NEGLIGENCE

failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another

person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand.

Consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage to

another.

The fact that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door
could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points that
something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the
principle of res ipsa loquitor. There is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of
liability on petitioners' part. Our pronouncement that Timothy climbed out
of the window because he could not get out using the door, negates
petitioners' other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was
Timothy's own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were the
product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
intervening cause that originated from CLC's own negligence.
b. QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM:

(2)That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the

criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification,
merely repairs the damage.
(3) That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former
are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while
the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or
negligence intervenes. However, it should be noted that not all
violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as
begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws,
and infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of
cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show
that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the
same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence
under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent
act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the penal
Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely the authorities above
cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the
defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of
the Civil Code.
JOSEPH V. BAUTISTA, GR NO.L-41423, FEB. 23, 1989
FACTS:

b.1 CULPA CRIMINAL

Culpa criminal

Culpa aquiliana

As to interest

Public

Private

As to purpose

Punitive / Corrective

Reparation through
indemnification

As to basis of
liability

There must be a law

which punishes the
act or omission

Include all acts in

which any kind of
fault or negligence
intervenes

BARREDO V. GARCIA AND ALMARIO, GR NO. 48006, JULY 8, 1942

FACTS:
A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela
occurred. The carretela was overturned and one of its passengers, a son of
Garcia and Almario, died as a result of the injuries which he received. The
driver of the taxicab, an employee of Barredo, was prosecuted for the
crime and was convicted. When the criminal case was instituted, Garcia
and Almario reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for
damages. Subsequently, Garcia and Almario instituted a civil action for
damages against Barredo.
ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto
Barredo thus making him primarily and directly responsible under Article
1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.

Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying

cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila.
On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa
was on its way to Valenzuela. Petitioner boarded the cargo truck at
Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to
Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the National
Highway proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to
overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about the
same time, a pick-up truck supposedly owned by respondents Antonio
Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro
Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process
of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards
the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner
sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio
Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of
carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as
owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
Respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion to
Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro
Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case",
alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P 7,420.61
by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that
respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to
petitioner by way of amicable settlement. The trial court decided in favor
of respondents
ISSUE:

HELD:

Was the trial court correct to dismiss the case for lack of cause of action.

The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising
from a crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; or create an
action for cuasi- delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910
of the Civil Code.

HELD:
The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's
complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise agreement under the
cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for
3

breach of contract of carriage, is untenable. If only one injury resulted

from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. In the case at
bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his
person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the
correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the
appropriate remedies allowed by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one
cause of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by
petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily identical
since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a
recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery
under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in
our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which,
obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ET.AL. GR NO.129029, APR. 3, 2000
FACTS:
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in
the business of transporting beer products for the San Miguel
Corporation (SMC). Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white
truck trailer driven by Romeo Dunca. At around 4:00 oclock in the
morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along the
national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged
portion of the road which was uneven because there were potholes
about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged
portion is smooth. Before approaching the potholes, Dunca and his truck
helper saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite
direction. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left lane
but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they
had to run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost
control of the wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane
of the Nissan. The Nissan was severely damaged, and its two passengers,
Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly. Reyes
Trucking settled the claim of the heirs of Balcita. The heirs of Dy opted
to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex
delicto they filed against Reyes Trucking. They also withdrew their
reservation to file a separate civil action against Dunca and manifested
that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal
action. TC consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a
joint trial of the same. TC held Dunca guilty of the crime of Double
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law and liable to indemnify the heirs of Dy for damages and the
dismissal of the complaint in the separate civil case. TC rendered a
supplemental decision ordering Reyes Trucking subsidiarily liable for all
the damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr., in the event of
insolvency of the Dunca.
ISSUES:
May Reyes Trucking be held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded
to the heirs of Dy in the criminal action against Dunca, despite the filing
of a separate civil action against Reyes Trucking?
HELD:
No.
Reyes Trucking, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged
guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be held
subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based
on q u a s i d e l i c t against it. However, Reyes Trucking, as defendant in
the separate civil action for damages filed against it, based on q u a s i
d e l i c t , may be held liable thereon.

Rule Against Double Recovery: In negligence cases, the

aggrieved party has the choice between:
(1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code [civil liability ex delicto];
and (2) a separate action for q u a s i d e l i c t under Article 2176
of the Civil Code [civil liability quasi delicto].

Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any
other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission of the accused (Article 2177 of the Civil Code).
In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability
on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability
quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit, subject
to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages under both types of liability."
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil
action for damages against Reyes Trucking as employer of Dunca, based
on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Under the law, the vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at
least two specific provisions of law:
Art. 2176 in relation to Art.
2180 of the Civil Code

Article 103 of the Revised

Penal Code

Preponderance
Evidence

of

Proof
Beyond
Reasonable Doubt

Liability of employer is
Direct
and
Primary
subject to the defense
of due diligence in the
selection
and
supervision
of
the
employee.

Liability of employer
is subsidiary to the
liability
of
the
employee.

Liability
attaches
when the employee
is found to be
insolvent.

Employer and employee

are solidarily liable,
thus, it does not require
the employer to be
insolvent.

SPS. SANTOS, EL. AL. V. PIZARDO, ET. AL., GR NO.151452, JUL. 29, 2005
FACTS:
Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in
connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit
bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the
lives of the van's driver and three of its passengers, including a two-month
old baby, and caused physical injuries to five of the van's passengers.
Sibayan was convicted and sentenced due to the said crime. There was a
reservation to file a separate civil action.
In the filing of the separate civil action, the trial court dismissed the
complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had already
prescribed. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which
dismissed the same for error in the choice or mode of appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court is correct in dismissing the case on the ground of
prescription based on quasi delict and not on ex delicto.
HELD:
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex
4

delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent
civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising
from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles
32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b)
where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent
and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code.Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the
cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless,
petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because
the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to
an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the
latter action had been expressly reserved.
MANLICLIC V. CALAUNAN, GR NO.150157, JAN. 25, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI)
While driving his bus going to Manila, he bumped rear left side of the
owner-type jeep of Respondent Calaunan.Because of the collision,
petitioner was criminally charged with reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property with physical injuries. Subsequently, respondent
filed a damage suit against petitioner and PRBLI.According to
respondent, his jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per
hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus
overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the
Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep.
In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep
when the jeep was hit. On the other hand, according to petitioner,
explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the
left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because
it was to overtake another jeep in front of it.Petitioner was then
acquitted of the criminal charges against him. However, in the civil case,
he, along with his employer, PRBLI, was still made to pay damages to
respondent.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of Manliclics acquittal to the civil case?
HELD:
Since the civil case is one for quasi delict, Manliclics acquittal does not
affect the case. MANLICLIC AND PRBLI ARE STILL LIABLE FOR DAMAGES.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the
Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction
exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same
negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or
culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that
acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty,
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi
delict.
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on
his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on
the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained
of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to
civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance,
there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or

ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be

instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same
will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The
responsibility arising from fault or negligence in quasi-delict is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is
entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana.
b.2 CULPA-CONTRACTUAL
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of
every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be
regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances.
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171
and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a
family shall be required.
Culpa contractual

Culpa
aquiliana

As to liability

Incidental

Direct

As to cause of action

Must prove:

Negligence

1.
2.
As
to
required

diligence

As to defense of due
diligence
in
the
selection
and
supervision
of
employees

Existence
contract
Breach
contract

of
of

Extraordinary diligence
(in case of common
carriers)

Ordinary
diligence

Not available

Available

GUTIERREZ V. GUTIERREZ, 56 PHIL 177 (1913)

FACTS:
A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while
attempting to pass each other on the Talon Bridge on the Manila South
Road in Las Pinas, Rizal. As a result of the collision a passenger in the truck,
Narciso Gutierrez, suffered a fracture in his right leg. The truck was owned
by the defendant Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was operated by
Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's
father and mother, Mr. & Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez, also defendants in this
case. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the
mother together with several other members of the Gutierrez family,
seven in all, were in the car. The court found that both drivers of the truck
and the car were negligent.
ISSUE:
Who among the passenger truck and the automobile is liable for damages
due to negligence?
HELD:
5

In case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the bus driver on

which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as
well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for
damages.
In amplification of so much of the above pronouncement as concerns the
Gutierrez family, it may be explained that the youth Bonifacio was an
incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed,
and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so
contributed by his negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the
father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles
made the father responsible for the acts of his son. Based on these facts,
pursuant to the provisions of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father
alone and not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages
caused by the minor.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, ET.AL. V. CA, GR
NO. 84698, JAN 4, 1992
FACTS:
A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on
the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit
for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time
of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at
the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the
school's academic community but were elements from outside the school.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention
and denied their motion to dismiss. The respondent appellate court
affirmed the trial court's orders.
ISSUE:
W/N PSBA is liable for civil damages through quasi-delictdue to
negligence.
HELD:
No.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes
the rule of in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law (Article 2180)
plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by
pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for
the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this
material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier
indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for
whose acts the school could be made liable.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties are bound to comply with. Because the circumstances
of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and
Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal
of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort,
also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties
not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However,
this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the
existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet,
no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been
breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security
measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, the
negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact,
that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation
between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the

school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence

occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of
violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group
determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and
environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by
proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was
not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of
that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.
AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155
FACTS:
Carrascoso was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left
Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. Air France issued a first class
round trip ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
passenger Carrascoso traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the Manager
of Air France forced him to vacate the first class seat because a white man
had a better right to it. The purser wrote in his record book First class
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and the
captain refused to intervene which was written in French. Petitioner
contends that damages must be averred that there was fraud and bad
faith in order that claim for damages should set in.
ISSUE:
W/N passenger Carrascoso was entitled to damages.
RULING:
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a
first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected
him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the
tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose
right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless,
of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of selfinterest or will or for ulterior purpose."
The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees
need not be essayed. It is well settled in law.For the willful malevolent act
of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21
of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we
held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral
damages are recoverable.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree
from any other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation
which an air-carrier sustains with the public its business is mainly with the
travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages
it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation
attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Thus, "Where a steamship company had accepted a passenger's check, it
was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in
the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was
worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." Although the
relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort".
6

REGINO V. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, GR

NO. 156109, NOV 18, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science
student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology
(PCST). She was enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents
Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers. PCST
held a fund raising campaign dubbed the Rave Party and Dance
Revolution, the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the
schools tennis and volleyball courts. The project was allegedly
implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with
additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were
denied the opportunity to take the final examinations. At the scheduled
dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, respondents Rachelle
A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad allegedly disallowed her from taking the
tests.

gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the Atlantic Company, but
the absolved the Steamship Company from the complaint.
ISSUE:
W/N Atlantic Company is liable for damages.
HELD:
It is desirable to bring out the distinction between negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation (culpa contractual) and
negligence considered as an independent source of obligation between
parties not previously bound (culpa aquiliana). This distinction is well
established in legal jurisprudence and is fully recognized in the provisions
of the Civil Code. As illustrative of this, we quote the following passage
from the opinion of this Court in the well-known case of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf & Pacific Co., and in this quotation we reproduce the first paragraph
of here presenting a more correct English version of said passage.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be
those not growing out of preexisting duties of the parties to one
another. But where relations already formed give arise to duties,
whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of
those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same
code.

ISSUE:
W/N respondents are liable for tort.
HELD:
The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation,
mental agony and demoralization of unimaginable proportions in
violation of Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code.
Art. 26.Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs,
lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other
personal condition.
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise
bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable
for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the act
that violated the contract may also be a tort. In sum, the Court holds that
the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action against respondents, and
that it should not have been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the
Court is not holding respondents liable for the acts complained of. That
will have to be ruled upon in due course by the court a quo.
MANILA RAILROAD CO. V. LA COMPANIATRASATLANTICA, GR NO. 11318,
OCT 26, 1918
FACTS:
A steamship belonging to the Compaia Transatlantica de Barcelona,
arrived at Manila with two locomotive boilers aboard, the property of The
Manila Railroad Company. The equipment of the ship for discharging
heavy cargo was not sufficiently strong to handle these boilers, and it was
therefore necessary for the Steamship Company to procure assistance in
the port of Manila. Atlantic Company was accordingly employed by the
Steamship Company.
Upon the arrival of the steamship, the Atlantic company sent out its crane
in charge of one Leyden. The crane and the boiler were however damaged
when discharging the cargoes. It was found to be so badly damaged that it
had to be reshipped to England where it was rebuilt, and afterwards was
returned to Manila. The Railroad Company made expenses for the
damage; to recover these damages the present action was instituted by
the Railroad Company against the Steamship Company. The latter caused
the Atlantic Company to be brought in as a codefendant. The trial court

Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses, either as

culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source
of an obligation between two person not formerly bound by any other
obligation; or as an incident in the performance of an obligation which
already existed, and which increases the liability arising from the already
existing obligation.
If there had been no contract of any sort between the Atlantic company
and the Steamship Company, an action could have been maintained by
the Railroad Company, as owner, against the Atlantic Company to recover
the damages sustained by the former. Such damages would have been
demandable under article 1103 of the Civil Code and the action would not
have been subject to the qualification expressed in the last paragraph of
article 1903. It is equally obvious that, for lack of privity with the contract,
the Railroad Company can have no right of action to recover damages
from the Atlantic Company for the wrongful act which constituted the
violation of said contract. The rights of the plaintiff can only be made
effective through the Compaia Trasatlantica de Barcelona with whom
the contract of affreightment was made.
CALALAS V. CA, GR NO. 122039, MAY 31, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent Eliza Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and
operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full,
Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the
vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga
stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva
and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga
was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of
contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The
trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of
another civil case for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held
liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found
Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of contract of carriage.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
HELD:
Yes.
The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tort feasor.
The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently,
7

in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established

because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the
action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract
and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or
injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate
cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach
of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person
where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case,
the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
relation thus created.
CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V.
ESTRELLA, ET.AL., GR NO.147791, SEPT. 8, 2006
FACTS:
Respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E.
Fletcher, boarded a BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they never
reached their destination because their bus was rammed from behind by a
tractor-truck of CDCP in the South Expressway. The strong impact pushed
forward their seats and pinned their knees to the seats in front of them.
They regained consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in the bus
and extricated their legs from under the seats. They were brought to the
Makati Medical Center.
Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint for damages against CDCP,
BLTB, Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court rendered a decision finding
CDCP and BLTB and their employees liable for damages. The CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court but modified the amount of damages.

driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we

already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of
injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on
which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as
well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable
for damages.
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they
commit. The persons injured may sue all of them or any number less than
all. Each is liable for the whole damages caused by all, and all together are
jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone,
that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with
him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the
tort was insignificant as compared to that of the others.
II.

ACT OR OMISSION

Art. 1173, NCC.The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the

omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of
the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles
1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
Art. 3, (RPC). Definitions. Acts and omissions punishable by law are
felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by
means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there
is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.
PROXIMATE CAUSE, defined
Proximate Cause that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is
determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic,
common sense, policy and precedent.
GAID vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 171636, Apr. 7, 2009

ISSUE:

FACTS:

Whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are solely liable for the
damages sustained by respondents.

Petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where
the Laguindingan National High School is At the time several students
were coming out of the school premises. Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old
student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by eyewitness Artman
Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left side of the road. From
where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to
flag down petitioner's jeepney which was traveling on the right lane of
the road. However, neither did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis
Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that
point.

HELD:
The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action for culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In this
regard, Article 2180 provides that the obligation imposed by Article 2176
is demandable for the acts or omissions of those persons for whom one is
responsible. Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be
instituted against the employer for an employee's act or omission. The
liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary,
but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee. In the instant case, the trial court found that
petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of Payunan, Jr.
It is well-settled that the owner of the other vehicle which collided with a
common carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same.
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of
the driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the
negligence of a third party who was the driver of another vehicle, thus
causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buo, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro Manila Transit Corporation
v. Court of Appeals, the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other
vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable
to the injured passenger or the latter's heirs. The basis of this allocation of
liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:
Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner [bus
owner] springs from contract while that of respondents [owner and

The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata's feet was pinned to the rear wheel
of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney.
Dayata was then seen lying on the groundand caught in between the rear
tires.Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and
the vehicle tilted to the right side. Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was
run over, prompting him to jump off the jeepney to help the victim.
Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos carrying the body of the
victim. Mellalos loaded the victim on a motorcycle and brought him to the
hospital. Dayata was first brought to the Laguindingan Health Center, but
it was closed. Mellalos then proceeded to the El Salvador Hospital. Upon
advice of its doctors, however, Dayata was brought to the Northern
Mindanao Medical Center where he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laguindingan found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The lower court
held petitioner negligent in his driving considering that the victim was
dragged to a distance of 5.70 meters from the point of impact. He was also
scored for "not stopping his vehicle after noticing that the jeepney's left
rear tire jolted causing the vehicle to tilt towards the right."On appeal, the
8

Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed in toto the decision of the MCTC. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment with modification in
that it found petitioner guilty only of simple negligence resulting in
homicide.

doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains doubt as to

his guilt. Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish that the
proximate cause of the victim's death was petitioner's alleged negligence,
if at all, even during the second stage of the incident.

ISSUE:

DAYWALT V. CORPORACION DE PP. AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, 39 PHIL587

W/N petitioner is negligent for the accident resulting to the death of

Dayata.

FACTS:

HELD:
The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is
determined by the operative events leading to the death of Dayata which
actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began when
Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the
road and ended when he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage
covered the span between the moment immediately after the victim was
run over and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt.
FIRST STAGE: Petitioner cannot be held liable during the first stage.
Specifically, he cannot be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate cause of the accident
and the death of the victim was definitely his own negligence in trying to
catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride. In the instant case,
petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon
reaching the vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not having
seen the victim who came from behind on the left side.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there
is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly
manifest. The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent
in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or
property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the
person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so,
the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take
precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do
so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist.
SECOND PART: The Court of Appeals found petitioner guilty of simple
negligence resulting in homicide for failing to stop driving at the time
when he noticed the bouncing of his vehicle. Verily, the appellate court
was referring to the second stage of the incident. Assuming arguendo that
petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that his negligence was
the proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that
which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient,
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. In order to establish a motorist's liability for the
negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct
causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages
complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing
factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an
injury.
The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved to be
the immediate cause of his death, as indicated in the post-mortem
findings. His skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner
immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of
the victim as the injuries he suffered were fatal. Mere suspicions and
speculations that the victim could have lived had petitioner stopped can
never be the basis of a conviction in a criminal case. The Court must be
satisfied that the guilt of the accused had been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the
guilt of the accused. The overriding consideration is not whether the court

In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated

herself to convey to Geo W. Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for
P4,000. They agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as Endencias
title to the land was perfected in the Court of Land Registration and a
Torrens title issued in her name. When the Torrens title was issued,
Endencia found out that the property measured 1,248 hectares instead of
452 hectares, as she initially believed. Because of this, she became
reluctant to transfer the whole tract to Daywalt, claiming that she never
intended to sell so large an amount and that she had been misinformed as
to its area. Daywalt filed an action for specific performance. The SC
ordered Endencia to convey the entire tract to Daywalt. Meanwhile, the La
Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (Recoletos), was a religious
corporation, which owned an estate immediately adjacent to the property
sold by Endencia to Daywalt. It also happened that Fr. Sanz, the
representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence and ascendancy
over Endencia, who was a woman of little force and easily subject to the
influence of other people. Father Sanz knew of the existence of the
contracts with Daywalt and discouraged her from conveying the entire
tract. Daywalt filed an action for damages against the Recoletos on the
ground that it unlawfully induced Endencia to refrain from the
performance of her contract for the sale of the land in question and to
withhold delivery of the Torrens title. Daywalt claims that because of the
interference of the Recoletos, he failed to consummate a contract with
another person for the sale of the property and its conversion into a sugar
mill.
ISSUE:
Whether Recoletos is liable to Daywalt for damages.
HELD:
No.
Defendants believed in good faith that the contract could not be enforced
and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into effect.
Any advice or assistance which they may have given was prompted by no
mean or improper motive. Teodorica would have surrendered the
documents of title and given possession of the land but for the influence
and promptings of members of the defendants corporation. But the idea
that they were in any degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the
desire to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their cattle
upon the land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff
cant be credited.
The stranger who interferes in a contract between other parties cannot
become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of
the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. Hence, in
order to determine the liability of the Recoletos, there isfirst a need to
consider the liability of Endencia to Daywalt. The damages claimed by
Daywalt fromEndencia cannot be recovered from her, first, because these
are special damages which were notwithin the contemplation of the
parties when the contract was made, and secondly, these damagesare too
remote to be the subject of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for
damages to Daywalt,neither can the Recoletos be held liable.
NEGLIGENCE, defined
NEGLIGENCE conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another. It is
the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that
the circumstances justly demand, whereby that other person suffers
injury. (Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v. Borja, G.R. No.
143008, June 10, 2002)
9

- want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or

comparative, not an absolute term, and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably impose. Where the danger is great a high
degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of
ordinary care under the circumstances. (US v. Juanillo, G.R. No. 7255, Oct.
3, 1912)
Elements:

Reasonable foresight of harm

Failure to take necessary precaution

DYTEBAN V. JOSE CHING, GR NO.161803, FEB. 4, 2008

FACTS:
Rogelio Ortiz was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban
Trading,
Inc.
along
the National
Highway in Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan City, going to Surigao City. A
Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane towards the
van. In between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer
that suffered a tire blowout, owned by private respondent Liberty Forest,
Inc. The driver, private respondent Cresilito Limbaga, parked the prime
mover askew occupying a substantial portion of the national highway, on
the lane of the passenger bus. He parked the prime mover with trailer at
the shoulder of the road with the left wheels still on the cemented
highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the
highway which was not equipped with triangular, collapsible reflectorized
plates. To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the
incoming passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the
approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring headlights and
the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his break slowly, swerved to
the left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the
stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime
mover.
Petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents
prime
mover
owner
and
driver
with
the RTC in Butuan City. The Joana Paula passenger bus was not impleaded
as defendant in the complaint. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. The RTC held that the proximate cause of
the three-way vehicular collision was improper parking of the prime
mover on the national highway and the absence of an early warning
device on the vehicle. The CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA held that
the proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan
van to give way or yield to the right of way of the passenger bus.
ISSUE:
W/N Limbaga was negligent in parking the vehicle.
HELD:
Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national
highway; he failed to prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming motorists.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict.
To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must
concur:
(a) damage suffered by plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of defendant; and
(c) connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of defendant and the damage
incurred by plaintiff.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person

suffers injury. The test by which to determine the existence or negligence

in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing
the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.
The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the
tortfeasor with that of an ordinary reasonable person in the same
situation. The test, as applied to this case, is whether Limbaga, in parking
the prime mover, used that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary reasonable person would have used in the same situation.
We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover
askew on the right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a
substantial portion of the national road on the lane of the passenger bus.
It was parked at the shoulder of the road with its left wheels still on the
cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder
of the highway. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime
mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It
was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk,
or at least minimize it. Private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was also
negligent in failing to supervise Limbaga and in ensuring that the prime
mover was in proper condition.
PICART V. SMITH, 69 SCRA 809
FACTS:
Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on the Carlatan Bridge in San
Fernando, La Union when the defendant, riding on his car, approached.
Defendant blew his horn to give warning. Plaintiff moved the horse to the
right instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he had no sufficient
time to move
to the right direction. Defendant continued to approach, and when he had
gotten quite near, he quickly turned to the left. The horse was frightened
that it turned his body across the bridge. His limb was broken and the
rider was thrown off and got injured. The horse died. An action for
damages was filed against the defendant.
ISSUE:
W/N the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described
was guilty of negligence such as to give rise to a civil obligation to repair
the damage done.
HELD:
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume
that the horse and rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he
moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes
that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived
that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving
vehicle. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the
defendant. And it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop
or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the
other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the
danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on
until he was almost upon the horse. When the defendant exposed the
horse and rider to this danger he was negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man
in the position of the tort feasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the
conduct or guarding against its consequences.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for
he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong
side of the road. But the defendant was also negligent; and in such case
10

the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly

responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were
not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded
the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other
party.
R TRANSPORT VS. YU
FACTS:
Loreta J. Yu, after having alighted from a passenger bus in front of
Robinson's Galleria along the north-bound lane of EDSA, was hit and run
over by a bus driven by Antonio P. Gimena, who was then employed by
petitioner. Loreta was immediately rushed to Medical City Hospital where
she was pronounced dead on arrival.
Luisito G. Yu, filed a Complaint for damages against petitioner R Transport,
Antonio Gimena, and MMTC for the death of his wife. MMTC denied its
liability reasoning that it is merely the registered owner of the bus
involved in the incident, the actual owner, being petitioner R Transport. It
explained that under the Bus Installment Purchase Program of the
government, MMTC merely purchased the subject bus, among several
others, for resale to petitioner R Transport, which will in turn operate the
same within Metro Manila. Since it was not actually operating the bus
which killed respondents wife, nor was it the employer of the driver
thereof, MMTC alleged that the complaint against it should be dismissed.
For its part, petitioner R Transport alleged that respondent had no cause
of action against it for it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees and drivers and that its buses are in good
condition.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Yu ruling that
petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the diligence required of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver, who, by its
negligence, ran over the deceased resulting in her death. It also held that
MMTC should be held solidarily liable with petitioner because it would
unduly prejudice a third person who is a victim of a tort to look beyond
the certificate of registration and prove who the actual owner is in order
to enforce a right of action. The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner may be held liable.
RULING: Yes.
Both the trial and appellate courts found driver Gimena negligent in
hitting and running over the victim and ruled that his negligence was the
proximate cause of her death.
In this case, the records show that driver Gimena was clearly running at a
reckless speed. Moreover, the location wherein the deceased was hit and
run over further indicates Gimenas negligence. As borne by the records,
the bus driven by Gimena bumped the deceased in a loading and
unloading area of a commercial center. The fact that he was approaching
such a busy part of EDSA should have already cautioned the driver of the
bus. Unfortunately, he did not take the necessary precaution despite
being aware that he was traversing a commercial center where
pedestrians were crossing the street.

the one directly responsible for the accident and death he should in turn
be made responsible to the registered owner for what the latter may have
been adjudged to pay. In operating the truck without transfer thereof
having been approved by the Public Service Commission, the transferee
acted merely as agent of the registered owner and should be responsible
to him (the registered owner), for any damages that he may cause the
latter by his negligence.
However, it must be noted that the case at hand does not involve a breach
of contract of carriage, as in Tamayo, but a tort or quasi-delict. As such,
the liability for which petitioner is being made responsible actually arises
not from a pre-existing contractual relation between petitioner and the
deceased, but from a damage caused by the negligence of its employee.
Indeed, this Court has consistently been of the view that it is for the better
protection of the public for both the owner of record and the actual
operator to be adjudged jointly and severally liable with the driver.
Hence, considering that the negligence of driver Gimena was sufficiently
proven by the records of the case, and that no evidence of whatever
nature was presented by petitioner to support its defense of due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner, as the
employer of Gimena, may be held liable for damages arising from the
death of respondent Yu's wife.
UMALI V. BACANI, 69 SCRA 263
FACTS:
On May 14, 1972 a storm with strong rain hit Alcala, Pangasinan. During
the storm banana plants standing on an elevated ground along the barrio
road near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown
down and fell on the electric wire. As a result the live electric wire was cut,
one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell
on the ground under the fallen banana plants. On the following morning,
the barrio captain who was passing by saw the broken electric wire and he
warned the people in the place not to go near the wire for they might get
hurt. He also saw and told a laborer of the electric plant of the broken line
and asked him to fix it. The employee replied that he could not do it but
he was going to look for a lineman to fix it. Manuel Saynes, a boy of 3
years and 8 months old whose house was just opposite the road, went to
the place where the broken line was and got in contact with it. The boy
was electrocuted and subsequently died. Fidel Saynes father of the boy
brought an action for damages against Teodoro Umali the owner and
manager of the electric plant. One of Umalis defenses was that as owner
and manager of the electric plant he was not liable on a quasidelict or tort
because the boys death was not due to any negligence on his part but to
a fortuitous event which was the storm the storm that caused the banana
plants to fall and cut the electric line-pointing out the absence of
negligence on the part of his employee Cipriano Baldomero who tried to
have the line repaired and the presence of negligence of the parents of
the child in allowing him to leave his house during that time.
ISSUE:
W/N Alcala Electric can be liable for TORT.
HELD:
Alcala Electric is LIABLE under TORT

Unfortunately, the records of this case are bereft of any proof showing the
exercise by petitioner of the required diligence. Nowhere was it even
remotely alleged that petitioner had exercised the required diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employee. Because of this failure,
petitioner cannot now avoid liability for the quasi-delict committed by its
negligent employee.

First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall
banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated
ground which were about 30 feet high and which were higher than the
electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the employees of the
defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that
even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered
by banana plants being blown down, did not even take the necessary
precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line.

As Tamayo is the registered owner of the truck, his responsibility to the

public or to any passenger riding in the vehicle or truck must be direct. But
as the transferee, who operated the vehicle when the passenger died, is

Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were
already aware of the possible damage the storm they did not cut off
from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act they could
11

have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had
been cut.
Third, Cipriano Baldomero was negligent because even if he was already
made aware of the live cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize
that the same posed a danger to life and property, and that he should
have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from
approaching the live wire; instead Baldomero left the premises because
what was foremost in his mind was the repair of the line, obviously
forgetting that if left unattended to it could endanger life and property.
Because of the aforementioned series of negligence on the part of
defendants' employees resulting in a live wire lying on the premises
without any visible warning of its lethal character, anybody, even a
responsible grown up or not necessarily an innocent child, could have
met the same fate that befell the victim. It may be true that the
contributory negligence of the victim's parents in not properly taking
care of the child, which enabled him to leave the house alone on the
morning of the incident and go to a nearby place cut wire was very near
the house (where victim was living) where the fatal fallen wire
electrocuted him, might mitigate respondent's liability, but we cannot
agree with petitioner's theory that the parents' negligence constituted
the proximate cause of the victim's death because the real proximate
cause was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to life and property
on that morning due to the series of negligence adverted to above
committed by defendants' employees and which could have killed any
other person who might by accident get into contact with it.
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the
employer because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision
over the work of the employees. This liability of the employer is primary
and direct. In fact, the proper defense for the employer to raise so that
he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the
good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the selection of
his employees but also inadequately supervising them over their work.
This defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial Court, and
We do not find any sufficient reason to deviate from its finding.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION V. CA, ET.AL., GR NO. L-51806,
NOV 8, 1988
FACTS:
Private respondent is a naturalized Filipino citizen and at the time of the
incident was the Honorary Consul Geileral of Israel in the Philippines.
He went to Manila International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. In
order to get a better view of the incoming passengers, he and his group
proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport.
While walking, Simke slipped on an elevation 4 inches high and fell on his
back, breaking his thigh bone in the process. He underwent an
operation and after recovery he filed a claim for damages against the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA), which was the government entity in
charge of the airport. Judgment was rendered in private respondent's
favor prompting petitioner to appeal to the Court of Appeals. The latter
affirmed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
W/N CAA was negligent
HELD:
CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a legitimate purpose
for being on the terrace and was never intended to trip down people and
injure them. It was there for no other purpose but to drain water on the
floor area of the terrace." But upon ocular inspection by the trial court, it
was found that the terrace was in poor condition. Under RA 776, the CAA
is charged with the duty of planning, designing, constructing, equipping,
expanding, maintenance...etc. of the Manila International Airport.
Responsibility of CAA

Pursuant to Art. 1173, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining

the viewing deck, a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure the
safety of the viewers using it. As these people come to look to where the
planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look down on the floor
or pavement of the viewing deck, the CAA should made sure that no
dangerous obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to
prevent
any
undue
harm
to
the
public.
Contributory Negligence
Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence contemplates a negligent act or
omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the proximate
cause of his injury, CONTRIBUTED to his own damage. The Court found no
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower
court, could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him,
considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private
respondent had been looking where he was going, the step in question
could not easily be noticed because of its construction.
RAKES V. AG & P, 7 PHIL 359
FACTS:
Rakes was a laborer employed by Atlantic. While transporting iron rails
from a barge to the companys yard using a railroad hand car, Rakes broke
his leg when the hand car toppled over and the rails fell on him. It appears
that the hand car fell due to a sagging portion of the track that gave with
the weight of the rails. Atlantic knew of the weak state of the rail but did
nothing to repair it. When Rakes filed an action for damages, Atlantics
defense was that Rakes injuries were caused by his own negligence in
walking alongside the car, instead of in front or behind it, as the laborers
were told to do.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Rakes was negligent.
2. Whether Atlantic is liable to Rakes.
HELD:
1. Rakes was negligent. He disobeyed the orders of his superiors when he
walked alongside the car instead of in front or behind it.
2. Atlantic is liable to Rakes. The negligence of Rakes will not totally bar
him from recovering anything from Atlantic, although the liability of the
latter will be mitigated as a result of Rakes contributory negligence. This is
because although Rakes contributed with his own negligence, the primary
cause of the accident was still the weak rails which Atlantic refused to
repair.
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between
the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and
those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt.
Where he contributes to the principal occurrence as one of its determining
factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum
deemedequivalent for his own imprudence.
We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa or negligence, may
be understood in two different senses: either as culpa, substantive and
independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation
between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an
incident in the performance of an obligation; or as already existed, which
cannot be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the
liability arising from the already existing obligation.
ASSOCIATED BANK v. TAN, GR No. 156940, Dec 14, 2004
FACTS:
12

Vicente Henry Tan is a regular depositor-creditor of the Associated Bank.

He deposited a postdated UCPB check with the said bank in the amount
of P101,000.00 which was added to his original deposit. The check was
duly entered in his bank record and upon advice and instruction of the
bank that it was already cleared and backed up by sufficient funds, Tan, on
the same date, withdrew the sum of P240,000.00. A day after, Tan
deposited the amount of P50,000.00 making his existing balance in the
amount of P107,793.45, because he has issued several checks to his
business partners. However, his suppliers and business partners went back
to him alleging that the checks he issued bounced for insufficiency of
funds. Thereafter, Tan, thru his lawyer, informed the bank to take positive
steps regarding the matter for he has adequate and sufficient funds to pay
the amount of the subject checks. Nonetheless, the bank did not bother
nor offer any apology regarding the incident. Consequently, Tan filed a
Complaint for Damages with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the respondent and against
the petitioner. It was shown that respondent was not officially informed
about the debiting of the P101,000.00 from his existing balance and that
the bank merely allowed the respondent to use the fund prior to clearing
merely for accommodation because the bank considered him as one of its
valued clients. It ruled that the bank manager was negligent in handling
the particular checking account of the respondent stating that such lapses
caused all the inconveniences to the respondent. Affirming the trial court,
the CA ruled that the bank should not have authorized the withdrawal of
the value of the deposited check prior to its clearing. Having done so,
contrary to its obligation to treat respondents account with meticulous
care, the bank violated its own policy. Without such notice, it is estopped
from blaming respondent for failing to fund his account.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner, which is acting as a depository bank and a collecting
agent, has properly exercised its right to set-off the account of its client for
a check deposit which was dishonored by the drawee bank.
HELD:
1.

Obligation as a depositor bank

The banking business is impressed with public interest. "Consequently, the

highest degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity
and performance are even required of it. By the nature of its functions, a
bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care. The degree of diligence required of banks is more than
that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their
relationship with their depositors is concerned. Indeed, the banking
business is vested with the trust and confidence of the public; hence the
"appropriate standard of diligence must be very high, if not the highest,
degree of diligence." The standard applies, regardless of whether the
account consists of only a few hundred pesos or of millions. The fiduciary
nature of banking, previously imposed by case law, is now enshrined in
Republic Act No. 8791 or the General Banking Law of 2000. Section 2 of
the law specifically says that the State recognizes the "fiduciary nature of
banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance."
The respondents did not treat the account of the petitioner with highest
degree of care. It is undisputed -- nay, even admitted -- that purportedly
as an act of accommodation to a valued client, petitioner allowed the
withdrawal of the face value of the deposited check prior to its clearing.
That act certainly disregarded the clearance requirement of the banking
system.
2.

Obligation as a collecting agent

As a general rule, a bank is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and
declarations of its officers or agents within the course and scope of their
employment. Due to the very nature of their business, banks are expected
to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision
of their employees. Jurisprudence has established that the lack of
diligence of a servant is imputed to the negligence of the employer, when
the negligent or wrongful act of the former proximately results in an injury

to a third person; in this case, the depositor. The manager of the banks
Cabanatuan branch, Consorcia Santiago, categorically admitted that she
and the employees under her control had breached bank policies. They
admittedly breached those policies when, without clearance from the
drawee bank in Baguio, they allowed respondent to withdraw on October
1, 1990, the amount of the check deposited.
PACIS v. MORALES, GR NO. 169467, Feb 25, 2010
FACTS:
Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old, died due to a gunshot wound in the
head which he sustained while he was at the Top Gun Firearm[s] and
Ammunition[s] Store located at Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City. The gun
store was owned and operated by defendant Jerome Jovanne Morales.
The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was fired from a gun brought in
by a customer of the gun store for repair which was left by defendant
Morales, who was in Manila that time, in a drawer of a table located inside
the gun store. It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out
the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of the table to which Alfred
Dennis Pacis got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to
return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It
went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
The trial court held that the accidental shooting of Alfred which caused his
death was partly due to the negligence of respondents employee
Aristedes Matibag (Matibag). Matibag and Jason Herbolario (Herbolario)
were employees of respondent even if they were only paid on a
commission basis. Under the Civil Code, respondent is liable for the
damages caused by Matibag on the occasion of the performance of his
duties, unless respondent proved that he observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage. The Court of Appeals held that
respondent cannot be held civilly liable since there was no employeremployee relationship between respondent and Matibag. The Court of
Appeals found that Matibag was not under the control of respondent with
respect to the means and methods in the performance of his work. Even if
no employer-employee relationship existed, it found that no negligence
can be attributed to respondent.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent is negligent for the death of Alfred Dennis Pacis.
HELD:
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, the liability of the employer, or any person for that
matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based
on a persons own negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession
or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character,
such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or
control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary
affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing
with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of
care. As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable
about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded
weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store
are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from
ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive
use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not
be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an
13

accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was

clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside
the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place,
the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was
not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. For failing to ensure that
the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Clearly,
respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a
good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone
dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in
this case.
S.D. MARTINEZ v. BUSKIRK, GR No. L-5691, Dec 27, 1910
FACTS:
Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata when a delivery
wagon belonging to the defendant which was attached a pair of horses,
came along the street in the opposite direction to that in which said
plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said
plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant
was coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk and stopped, in
order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but
that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the
carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it,
severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head,
and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse
which was drawing it.
The cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon, was a good servant and
was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had
sent to deliver some forage and for the purpose of delivery the cochero
driving the team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the
horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of
the wagon to unload the forage; that while unloading the forage and in
the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of
which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the
horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver
was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the
ground and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up
and on which street they came into collision with the carromata in which
the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.
ISSUE:

without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice

of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every
reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of
the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not.
YLARDE, ET. AL., V. AQUINO, ET.AL., GR NO. L-33722, JUL 29, 1988
FACTS:
Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School
wherein Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. That time, the school was
fittered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old
school shop that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge
stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher by the
name of Sergio Banez started burying them. Deciding to help his
colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered some of his pupils
aged ten to eleven after class dismissal to to dig beside a one-ton concrete
block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. As teacherin-charge, he called Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga
and Novelito Ylarde, to dug until the excavation was one meter and forty
centimeters deep. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the
concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of
the hole. He then left the students to level the loose soil around the open
hole while he went to see Banez to get some Rope. Three of the four kids,
Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without
any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete
block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara
were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately fo
Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning
him to the wall in a standing position which caused him several injuries
and later on died. Petitioners filed a suit for damages against both private
respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint
and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
1.

W/N both private respondents can be held liable for damages.

2.

Were there acts and omissions on the part of private respondent

Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal
relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde?

HELD:
1.

W/N defendant is guilty of negligence.

HELD:
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in
leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It
appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the
damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and
capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other
for five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time,
of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the
accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had
been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses
and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the
day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered
merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the
cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was
sanctioned by their employers.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal
practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being
delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then
being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in
the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the
custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The
public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for
years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts,

Soriano cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde,
he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and
trades.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the
head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts
committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in a school of
arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable.
However, respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in
his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions
to prevent any injury on their persons.
2.

YES, Aquino is liable for damages.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such
a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child
Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play
around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse
themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their playful and
adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of
them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the stone.
Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging, it
was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole
beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy
weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of
the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child
Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by
private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils
14

concerned to real danger. A truly careful and cautious person would have
acted in all contrast to the way private respondent Aquino did. Were it not
for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have occurred
and the child Ylarde would probably be alive today, a grown- man of
thirty-five. Due to his failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid
the hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these years.
We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the injuries
which resulted in the death of the child Ylarde were caused by his own
reckless imprudence. It should be remembered that he was only ten years
old at the time of the incident. As such, he is expected to be playful and
daring. His actuations were natural to a boy his age. The degree of care
required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person
endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same
degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to
the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. The standard of
conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that
degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity,
discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar
circumstances. Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde
with reckless imprudence.
PHIL. HAWK CORP. V. VIVIAN TAN LEE, GR NO. 166869, FEB. 16, 2010
FACTS:
The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus which
was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being
driven by Margarito Avila. Respondent testified that she was riding on
their motorcycle in tandem with her husband, who was on the wheel.
They were on a stop position at the side of the highway; and when they
were about to make a turn, she saw a bus running at fast speed coming
toward them, and then the bus hit a jeep parked on the roadside, and
their motorcycle as well. She lost consciousness and was brought to the
hospital but her husband died due to the vehicular accident.
The driver of the passenger jeep involved in the accident testified that his
jeep was parked on the left side of the highway. He did not notice the
motorcycle before the accident. But he saw the bus dragging the
motorcycle along the highway, and then the bus bumped his jeep and
sped away. The driver of petitioner's bus testified that he was driving his
bus at 60 kilometers per hour on the Maharlika Highway. When a
motorcycle ran from his left side of the highway, and as the bus came
near, the motorcycle crossed the path of the bus, and so he turned the
bus to the right. From his side mirror, he saw that the motorcycle turned
turtle ("bumaliktad"). He did not stop to help out of fear for his life, but
drove on and surrendered to the police. He denied that he bumped the
motorcycle. The trial court rendered judgment against petitioner and
defendant Margarito Avila which affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
W/N negligence may be attributed to petitioner's driver, and whether
negligence on his part was the proximate cause of the accident, resulting
in the death of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to respondent.
HELD:
There is negligence indeed on the part of petitioners driver Margarito
Avila. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such
a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain
interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but
definite class of risks. In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on the
right side of the road, already saw the motorcycle on the left side of the
road before the collision. However, he did not take the necessary
precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and
also the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that
the bus was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the
motorcycle and the passenger jeep.
Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another,
there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise
the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or

supervision of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed

by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
that petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of
its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in
him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioner's tests
were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It
also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping
incidents.
Regala vs. Carin, April 6, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent are adjacent neighbors at Spirig Street, BF
Resort Village, Las Pias City. When petitioner decided to renovate his one
storey residence by constructing a second floor, he under the guise of
merely building an extension to his residence, approached respondent for
permission to bore a hole through a perimeter wall shared by both their
respective properties, to which respondent verbally consented on
condition that petitioner would clean the area affected by the work.
In the course of the construction of the second floor, respondent and his
wife Marietta suffered from the dust and dirt which fell on their property.
As petitioner failed to address the problem to respondents satisfaction,
respondent filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the City Engineer
and Building Official. As no satisfactory agreement was reached,
respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. In his
complaint, respondent alleged in the main that, instead of boring just one
hole as agreed upon, petitioner demolished the whole length of the wall
from top to bottom into five parts for the purpose of constructing a
second floor with terrace; and that debris and dust piled up on
respondents property ruining his garden and forcing him to, among other
things, shut some of the windows of his house. Respondent thus prayed
for the award of moral and exemplary damages. Petitioner, answered that
he was the sole and exclusive owner of the wall referred to as a perimeter
wall and that the issue of its ownership has never been raised by
respondent or his predecessor; and that securing the consent of
respondent and his neighbors was a mere formality in compliance with the
requirements of the Building Official to facilitate the issuance of a building
permit, hence, it should not be taken to mean that petitioner
acknowledges respondent to be a co-owner of the wall. He added that he
eventually secured the requisite building permit and had duly paid the
administrative fine.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. Applying Article 2176 of
the Civil Code on quasi-delicts, the trial court ruled that petitioner was at
fault and negligent for failing to undertake sufficient safety measures to
prevent inconvenience and damage to respondent to thus entitle
respondent to moral and exemplary damages.
On appeal, the appellate court anchored its affirmance on Article 19 of the
New Civil Code which directs every person to, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, and observe honesty
and good faith.
ISSUE
WON the damages awarded to respondents were proper.
RULING
The trial courts award of moral and exemplary damages, as affirmed by
the appellate court, was premised on the damage and suffering sustained
by respondent arising from quasi-delict under Article 2176of the Civil
Code. Indeed, there was fault or negligence on the part of the defendant
when he did not provide sufficient safety measures to prevent causing a
lot of inconvenience and disturbance to the plaintiff and his family. The
evidence presented by the plaintiff regarding the dirt or debris, as well as
15

the absence of devices or safety measures to prevent the same from

falling inside plaintiffs property, were duly established.
To be entitled to moral damages, the claimant must satisfactorily prove
that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has sprung
from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a
wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the factual
basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant. In
the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the injuries he sustained were the proximate effect of
petitioners act or omission. It thus becomes necessary to instead look into
the manner by which petitioner carried out his renovations to determine
whether this was directly responsible for any distress respondent may
have suffered since the law requires that a wrongful or illegal act or
omission must have preceded the damages sustained by the claimant.
It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of his
property rights to introduce renovations to his abode. While he initially
did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented his real
intent when he initially sought respondents consent, the lack of the
permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner liable to
administrative sanctions or penalties.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a
wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from
the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. While
the Court harbors no doubt that the incidents which gave rise to this
dispute have brought anxiety and anguish to respondent, it is unconvinced
that the damage inflicted upon respondents property was malicious or
willful, an element crucial to merit an award of moral damages under
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, the Court is not inclined to award exemplary damages.
Petitioner, however, cannot steer clear from any liability whatsoever.
Respondent and his familys rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their
property have, at the very least, been inconvenienced from the incident
borne of petitioners construction work. Any pecuniary loss or damage
suffered by respondent cannot be established as the records are bereft of
any factual evidence to establish the same. Nominal damages may thus be
adjudicated in order that a right of the respondent which has been
violated or invaded by the petitioner may be vindicated or recognized, and
not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him.
Francisco vs. Chemical Bulk Carriers
FACTS:
Since 1965, Francisco was the owner and manager of a Caltex station in
Teresa, Rizal. Sometime in March 1993, four persons, including Gregorio
Bacsa, came to Franciscos Caltex station and introduced themselves as
employees of CBCI. Bacsa offered to sell to Francisco a certain quantity of
CBCIs diesel fuel. After checking Bacsas identification card, Francisco
agreed to purchase CBCIs diesel fuel with conditions.
There were 17 deliveries to Francisco and all his conditions were complied
with. Later, CBCI sent a demand letter to Francisco regarding the diesel
fuel delivered to him but which had been paid for by CBCI. CBCI demanded
that Francisco pay CBCI for the diesel fuel or CBCI would file a complaint
against him in court. Francisco rejected CBCIs demand. Eventually, CBCI
filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against Francisco.
According to CBCI, Petron, on various dates, sold diesel fuel to CBCI but
these were delivered to and received by Francisco. Francisco then sold the
diesel fuel to third persons from whom he received payment. CBCI alleged
that Francisco acquired possession of the diesel fuel without authority
from CBCI and deprived CBCI of the use of the diesel fuel it had paid for.
CBCI demanded payment from Francisco but he refused to pay. CBCI
argued that Francisco should have known that since only Petron, Shell and
Caltex are authorized to sell and distribute petroleum products in the

Philippines, the diesel fuel came from illegitimate, if not illegal or criminal,
acts. CBCI asserted that Francisco violated Articles 19, 20, 21, and 22 of
the Civil Code and that he should be held liable. In the alternative, CBCI
claimed that Francisco, in receiving CBCIs diesel fuel, entered into an
innominate contract of do ut des (I give and you give) with CBCI for which
Francisco is obligated to pay CBCI.
Francisco explained that he operates the Caltex station with the help of his
family because, in February 1978, he completely lost his eyesight due to
sickness. Francisco claimed that he asked Jovito, his son, to look into and
verify the identity of Bacsa, who introduced himself as a radio operator
and confidential secretary of a certain Mr. Inawat. Francisco said he was
satisfied with the proof presented by Bacsa. When asked to explain why
CBCI was selling its fuel, Bacsa allegedly replied that CBCI was in
immediate need of cash for the salary of its daily paid workers and for
petty cash.
The trial court ruled that Francisco was not liable for damages in favor of
CBCI. The Court of Appeals set aside the trial courts Decision and ruled
that Bacsas act of selling the diesel fuel to Francisco was his personal act
and, even if Bacsa connived with Inawat, the sale does not bind CBCI.
ISSUES:
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT ANTONIO FRANCISCO EXERCISED THE REQUIRED DILIGENCE
OF A BLIND PERSON IN THE CONDUCT OF HIS BUSINESS; and
RULING:
The heirs of Francisco argue that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled
that Francisco was liable to CBCI because he failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family when he bought the diesel fuel. They
argue that since Francisco was blind, the standard of conduct that was
required of him was that of a reasonable person under like disability.
Moreover, they insist that Francisco exercised due care in purchasing the
diesel fuel by doing the following: (1) Francisco asked his son to check the
identity of Bacsa; (2) Francisco required direct delivery from Petron; (3)
Francisco required that he be named as the consignee in the invoice; and
(4) Francisco required separate receipts from Bacsa to evidence actual
payment.
Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of
the person, time and place. The most common standard of conduct is that
of a good father of a family or that of a reasonably prudent person. To
determine the diligence which must be required of all persons, we use as
basis the abstract average standard corresponding to a normal orderly
person.
However, one who is physically disabled is required to use the same
degree of care that a reasonably careful person who has the same physical
disability would use. Physical handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness
or deafness, are treated as part of the circumstances under which a
reasonable person must act. Thus, the standard of conduct for a blind
person becomes that of a reasonable person who is blind.
We note that Francisco, despite being blind, had been managing and
operating the Caltex station for 15 years and this was not a hindrance for
him to transact business until this time. In this instance, however, we rule
that Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a
reasonable person who is blind. First, Francisco merely relied on the
identification card of Bacsa to determine if he was authorized by CBCI.
Francisco did not do any other background check on the identity and
authority of Bacsa. Second, Francisco already expressed his misgivings
about the diesel fuel, fearing that they might be stolen property, yet he
did not verify with CBCI the authority of Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel. Third,
Francisco relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were typewritten
on a half sheet of plain bond paper. If Francisco exercised reasonable
diligence, he should have asked for an official receipt issued by CBCI.
Fourth, the delivery to Francisco, as indicated in Petrons invoice, does not
show that CBCI authorized Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel to Francisco.
16

Clearly, Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a

reasonable person who is blind.

III.

DAMAGE TO ANOTHER (See discussion on Damages, infra.)

IV.

CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN ACT OR OMISSION AND DAMAGE

VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE

a.

FACTS:

PROXIMATE CAUSE that cause which, in natural and continuous

sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate
cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations
of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. (American Express
International Inc. v. Cordero, G.R. No. 138550, Oct. 14, 2005)

7 freshmen law students of the ADMU School of Law signified their

intention to join the Aquila Fraternity. They went to the house of Michael
Musngi, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation
rites. They were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that
they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their briefing, they were brought to the Almeda
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation. The
neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation
rites.
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito
Dizon and Artemio Villareal demanded that the rites be reopened. Upon
the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation
rites. The fraternity members then subjected the neophytes to paddling
and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The
neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in
breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys
shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon
dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When
they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the
Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him
through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened,
the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on
arrival.
ISSUE:
Whether or not hazing is a negligent act.
RULING:
In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another
is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act
performed without malice or criminal design. Here, a person performs an
initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act. Verily, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy,
is inconsistent with the idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is a vital
ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of
homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence
of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction
of injuries. Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be
inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.
Furthermore, the victims death must not have been the product of
accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed
without malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness,
or negligence the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or
imprudence resulting in homicide.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done
without malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or
material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or
advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the
danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In
contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without
grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of
a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not
immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.

Doctrine of Proximate Cause

Q: When may a person be held liable for his negligent act?

A: A person may be held liable for his negligent act if such is the proximate
cause of the injury, even though it is merely one of many concurring
efficient causes.
FERNANDO V. CA, 208 SCRA 714
FACTS:
On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao
Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of
the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in
Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa,
Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suer, Jr. Bascon won the
bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he signed the
purchase order. However, before such date, specifically on November
22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito
Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernandoand Jose Fajardo, Jr. were
found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a
fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle,
Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there.
The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five
victim sentered the septic tank without clearance neither from it nor
with the knowledge and consent of the market master. In fact, the
septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were
presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the
City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the cause
of death of all five victims as "asphyxia" caused by the diminution of
oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The lungs
of the five victims burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was
due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide gas
produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank. Petitioners,
children of the deceased, file a complaint for damages.
ISSUE:
W/N Davao City is liable.
HELD:
No. While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in
its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a
continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master
about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao
Public Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing
invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the
lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon. The public respondent, therefore,
lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. It is
likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure
to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been
using the public toilet for their personal necessities but have remained
unscathed.
In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as
toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one
removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the
victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent
opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a
septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an
ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the
attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr.
17

Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know

the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take
precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the
accident.
DYTEBAN V. JOSE CHING, supra.
ISSUE:
W/N prime mover driver Limbagas negligence was the proximate cause of
the damage to the Nissan van.
HELD:
SC held that the skewed parking of the prime mover (negligence of the
driver) was the proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. More
comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It
is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent. Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between the
act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or
far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must
be a natural and probable result of the act or omission.
Here, We agree with the RTC that the damage caused to the Nissan van
was a natural and probable result of the improper parking of the prime
mover with trailer. As discussed, the skewed parking of the prime mover
posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga failed to prevent or
minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the prime mover triggered the
series of events that led to the collision, particularly the swerving of the
passenger bus and the Nissan van. The skewed parking is the proximate
cause of the damage to the Nissan van.
BATACLAN V. MEDINA, 102 PHIL 181
FACTS:
The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina
Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano
Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and the
vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to escape by
themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including Bataclan,
who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the neighbourhood. Then
there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they
approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers died. The fire was
due to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in
her name and on behalf of her 5 minor children, sought to claim damages
from the bus company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the CA
forwarded the case to the SC due to the amount involved.
ISSUE:
What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other
passengers?
HELD:
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of
transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to
carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree that
there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the
driver Saylon. At the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as

testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that

according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense,
from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where
the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150
meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in
order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must
have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters
before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier
is liable. The only question is to what degree. A satisfactory definition of
proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that
an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
In the present case, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause
was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming
of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made
not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 am), the
rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a
rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was
more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In
other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and
was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of
some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the
burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the
driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They,
or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in
which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from
the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside
from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be
smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor
the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the
rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence
on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions
above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
MANILA ELECTRIC CO V. REMOQUILLO, 99 PHIL 117
FACTS:
Efren Magno went to repair a media agua of the house of his brother-inlaw on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila. While making the repair, a
galvanized iron roofing which he was holding came into contact with the
electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the
edge of the media agua and 2-1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and
died as a result thereof. The electric wire was already in the premises at
the time the house was built. This distance of 2-1/2 feet of the media
agua from the electric wire was not in accordance with city regulations
which required a distance of 3 feet but somehow or other the owner of
the building was able to have the construction approved. In an action for
damages brought by the heirs of Magno against the Manila Electric Co. the
18

CA awarded damages holding that although the owner of the house in

constructing the media agua exceeded the limits fixed in the permit, still
after making that finally approved because he was given a final permit to
occupy the house and that the company was at fault and guilty of
negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long
before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise
due diligence nor take other precautionary measures as may be
warranted.

experiments with the caps. They thrust the ends of the wires into an
electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the
cap with a stone and failed. They then opened one of the caps with a
knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got
matches, and the plaintiff held the cap while the other boy applied a
lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed causing injuries to
the boys. This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for
the injuries which he suffered.

HELD:

ISSUE:

SC held that the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or
negligent act of Magno himself.

W/N Manila Electric is liable for damages to the petitioners

When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the media agua just
below the third story window, it is to be presumed that due to his age and
experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or
carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he could not
have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in
them. But unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and experience
failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron
sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and
throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around
swinging his arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own
electrocution.

No. The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted
in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents
of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as
one of its determining factors, he cannot recover."

But even assuming for a moment that the defendant electric company
could be considered negligent in installing its electric wires so close to the
house and mediaagua in question, and in failing to properly insulate
those wires (although according to the unrefuted claim of said company it
was impossible to make the insulation of that kind of wire), nevertheless
to hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such
supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and
principal cause of the accident, because if the act of Magno in turning
around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the
proximate and principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not
recover.
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution
was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless
and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized
iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the
street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering
the latters length of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on
remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries, we find the following
citation helpful:
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If not danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent
cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury because of
prior defection condition, such subsequent act or condition is
the proximate cause.
TAYLOR V. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT CO., 16 PHIL 8
FACTS:
The defendant left some twenty or thirty fulminating caps used for
blasting charges of dynamite scattered in the premises behind its power
plant. The plaintiff, a boy 15 years of age, in company with another boy 12
years of age, entered the premises of the defendant, saw the fulminating
caps and carried them away. Upon reaching home they made a series of

HELD:

But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property
without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have
relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by
plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to
the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the
circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury
received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking,
"attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand,
we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap
and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the
explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that
the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus
incurred.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown
youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average
boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50
a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was
incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally
well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no
room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well
knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing
himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to
produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present,
admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the
use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the
application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he
knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that
he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in
view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at
the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became
frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise
nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of
the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant
injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less
dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he
willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be
going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he
exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required
of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly
responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the
necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to
fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts;
and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do,
19

for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily

depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his
own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be
said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and
their consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have
such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of
the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him.
SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY V. CA, 300 SCRA 20
FACTS:
This case involves a collision between a truck owned by petitioner and a
cimarron which caused the death of three persons and injuries to several
others. Petitioners truck crashed the cimarron when the driver stepped
on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and this caused his vehicle to
swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. RTC
found Petitioners driver to be responsible for the accident and awarded
damages in favor of Private respondents. Petitioner contends that the
driver of the cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence since it was
guilty of violation of traffic rules and regulations (overloading, had only
one headlight on) at the time of mishap. He also argued that sudden
swerving of a vehicle caused by its driver stepping on the brakes is not
negligence per se. He further argued that the driver should be exonerated
based on the doctrine of last clear chance, which states that the person
who has the last clear chance of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent, is solely responsible for the consequences
of the accident. He petitioner claimed that the cimarron had the last
opportunity of avoiding an accident.

nor what to do after an emergency occurs. All these could only mean
failure on the part of defendant to exercise the diligence required of it
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the sense.
Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert extra care in the selection
and supervision of their employees. They must go beyond the
minimum requirements fixed by law. But petitioner did not show in
what manner drivers were supervised to ensure that they drove their
vehicles in a safe way.
MERCURY DRUG V. BAKING, GR NO. 156037, MAY 25, 2007
FACTS:
Sebastian M. Baking, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical checkup. Respondent was given two medical prescriptions Diamicron for his
blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride. Respondent then
proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation to buy the prescribed
medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription
for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. On
the third day of taking the medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular
accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta
due to falling asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about
the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may
have a bearing on his physical and mental state at the time of the collision,
respondent returned to Dr. Sys clinic. Dr. Sy was shocked to find that
what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed
Diamicron. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent and
this was affirmed by the CA in toto.

ISSUE:

ISSUE:

1.

Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was
the proximate cause of respondents accident.

2.

W/N the cimmaron was guilty of contributory negligence due to

violation of traffic rules and regulation which added to the proximate
cause of the accident or such was based solely on the negligence of
the panel truck driver.
W/N petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees.

HELD:
1. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron
driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Petitioner has the
burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and
the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show
that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the
injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Petitioner says that
"driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during
night time certainly increases the risk of accident," that because the
Cimarron had only one headlight, there was "decreased visibility," and
that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat
overcrowded "decreased [its] maneuver ability." We are convinced that
no maneuvering which the Cimarron driver could have done would have
avoided a collision with the panel truck, given the suddenness of the
events. Clearly, the overcrowding in the front seat was immaterial.
All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of petitioners driver. As the trial court noted, the swerving
of petitioners panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not only that
petitioners driver was running the vehicle at a very high speed but that he
was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it as well.
2. With respect to the requirement of passing psychological and physical
tests prior to his employment, although no law requires it, such
circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due
diligence. As the trial court said:
. . . No tests of skill, physical as well as mental and emotional, were
conducted on their would-be employees. No on-the-job training and
seminars reminding employees, especially drivers, of road courtesies
and road rules and regulations were done. There were no instructions
given to defendants drivers as to how to react in cases of emergency

HELD:
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Requisites under Art. 2176:
(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of
the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
Petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling to respondent
Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal
mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said
employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She
should have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent was
indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care required must be
commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must
correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law
demands.
Proximate Cause
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause
is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration
of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.
Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioners
employee been careful in reading Dr. Sys prescription. Without the potent
effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent
would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision.
20

Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code.The

employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the
latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence
on the part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in
the supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption, however,
may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he
has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee. Thus, petitioner's failure to
prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for
damages caused by the latter.
BPI V. SUAREZ, GR NO. 167750, MAR 15, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Reynald R. Suarez (Suarez) is a lawyer who used to maintain
both savings and current accounts with petitioner Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI). Suarez had a client who planned to purchase several parcels
of land in Tagaytay City, but preferred not to deal directly with the land
owners. They agreed that the client would deposit the money in Suarezs
BPI account as payment for the Tagaytay properties and then, Suarez
would issue checks to the sellers. An RCBC check was then deposited to
Suarezs current account in BPI. Suarez instructed his secretary, Garaygay,
to confirm from BPI whether the face value of the RCBC check was already
credited to his account that same day it was deposited. It was alleged that
BPI confirmed the same-day crediting of the RCBC check. With this, Suarez
issued on the same day five checks for the purchase of the Tagaytay
properties. Days after while in the U.S. for vacation, he was informed by
Garaygay that the checks issued were dishonored due to insufficiency of
funds with penalties despite an assurance from RCBC that it has already
been debited in his account and fully funded. Claiming that BPI
mishandled his account through negligence, Suarez filed with the Regional
Trial Court a complaint for damages. The TC rendered judgment in favor of
respondent which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
W/N the erroneous marking of DAIF (drawn against insufficient funds),
instead of DAUD (drawn against uncollected deposit)on the checks,is the
proximate cause of respondents injury.
HELD:
In the present case, Suarez failed to establish that his claimed injury was
proximately caused by the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks.
Proximate Cause has been defined as any cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the result complained of and without which would not have
occurred. There is nothing in Suarezs testimony which convincingly shows
that the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks proximately caused his
alleged psychological or social injuries. Suarez merely testified that he
suffered humiliation and that the prospective consolidation of the titles to
Tagaytay properties did not materialize due to the dishonor of his checks,
not due to the erroneous marking of DAIF on his checks. Hence, Suarez
had only himself to blame for his hurt feelings and the unsuccessful
transaction with his client as these were directly caused by the justified
dishonor of the checks. In short, Suarez cannot recover compensatory
damages for his own negligence.
RAMOS V. C.O.L. REALTY, GR NO. 184905, AUG. 28, 2009
FACTS:
A vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan, owned by
petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin
("Aquilino"), and a Ford Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos (Ramos)
and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"). (C.O.L. Realty) averred that its
driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of five
to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just
crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos) Ford
Espedition violently rammed against the cars right rear door and fender.

With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards the
direction where it came from. A passenger of the sedan, one Estela
Maliwat ("Estela") sustained injuries. Ramos denied liability for damages
insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realtys) driver,
which was the proximate cause of the accident. Ramos maintained that
the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street
despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass
through the intersection.
Petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses
incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela. The
demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for
Damages based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City. MeTC rendered the decision
exculpating Ramos from liability. RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC.
The CA affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent in crossing
Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as per Certification of
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner could be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel
Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty for damages suffered in a
vehicular collision.
HELD:
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case,
viz:
Article 2179.When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if
his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to
be awarded.
Article 2185.Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by
the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent,
the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the
superiors action against the third person, assuming of course that the
contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of
which complaint is made.
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act
of crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence
because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of
the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered
by respondent from the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan
Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This
specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was
intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within
the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground
to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he
crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on
21

account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing

construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest
error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied
in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. It is unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodels contributory
negligence, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness
which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident.
VALLACAR TRANSIT VS. CATUBIG, GR NO. 175512, MAY 30, 2011

cargo truck and encroached on the lane traversed by the Ceres Bus while
approaching a curve. As the driver of the motorcycle, Quintin Catubig, Jr.
has not observed reasonable care and caution in driving his motorcycle
which an ordinary prudent driver would have done under the
circumstances. Passing another vehicle proceeding on the same direction
should only be resorted to by a driver if the highway is free from incoming
vehicle to permit such overtaking to be made in safety. The collision
happened because of the recklessness and carelessness of respondents
husband who was overtaking a cargo truck while approaching a curve.

FACTS:

TISON VS POMASIN, GR. NO. 173180, AUG. 24, 1990

Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and the franchise

owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus. Quirino C. Cabanilla is employed as a regular
bus driver of petitioner. On January 27, 1994, respondents husband,
Quintin Catubig, was on his way home from Dumaguete City riding in
tandem on a motorcycle with his employee, Teddy Emperado. Catubig was
the one driving the motorcycle. While approaching a curve at kilometers
59 and 60, Catubig tried to overtake a slow moving ten-wheeler cargo
truck by crossing-over to the opposite lane, which was then being
traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by Cabanilla, headed for the
opposite direction. When the two vehicles collided, Catubig and Emperado
were thrown from the motorcycle. Catubig died on the spot where he was
thrown, while Emperado died while being rushed to the hospital.
Respondent filed before the RTC a Complaint for Damages against
petitioner. Respondent alleged that petitioner is civilly liable because the
latters employee driver, Cabanilla, was reckless and negligent in driving
the bus which collided with Catubigs motorcycle.
Petitioner contended that the proximate cause of the vehicular collision
was the sole negligence of Catubig when he imprudently overtook another
vehicle at a curve and traversed the opposite lane of the road.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner was negligent
RULING:
We agree with petitioner, nonetheless, that respondent was unable to
prove imputable negligence on the part of petitioner. Respondent based
her claim for damages on Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176, of the
Civil Code. There is merit in the argument of the petitioner that Article
2180 of the Civil Code imputing fault or negligence on the part of the
employer for the fault or negligence of its employee does not apply to
petitioner since the fault or negligence of its employee driver, Cabanilla,
which would have made the latter liable for quasi-delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, has never been established by respondent. To the
contrary, the totality of the evidence presented during trial shows that the
proximate cause of the collision of the bus and motorcycle is attributable
solely to the negligence of the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.
Based on the evidence on record, it is clear that the immediate and
proximate cause of the collision is the reckless and negligent act of Quintin
Catubig, Jr. and not because the Ceres Bus was running very fast. Even if
the Ceres Bus is running very fast on its lane, it could not have caused the
collision if not for the fact that Quintin Catubig, Jr. tried to overtake a

FACTS:
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular mishap
along Maharlika Highway, Albay last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin was
driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractortrailer, driven by Claudio Jabon, was traversing the opposite lane going
towards Naga City
Jabon recounted that while he was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a
jitney on the opposite lane falling off the shoulder of the road. Thereafter,
it began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction of
the truck. To avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer
to the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney
still hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few
meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged. Multiple death
and injuries to those in the jitney resulted.
ISSUE:
WON Laarnis negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
RULING:
The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give weight
to this finding greater than the opposite conclusion reached by the
appellate court that the driver of the tractor-trailer caused the vehicular
collision. One reason why the trial court found credible the version of
Jabon was because his concentration as driver is more focused than that
of a mere passenger. The trial court expounded, thus: In the case of a
running or travelling vehicle, especially in highway travel which doubtless
involves faster speed than in ordinary roads, the driver is concentrated on
his driving continuously from moment to moment even in long trips. While
in the case of a mere passenger, he does not have to direct his attention
to the safe conduct of the travelling vehicle, as in fact he may converse
with other passengers and pay no attention to the driving or safe conduct
of the travelling vehicle, as he may even doze off to sleep if he wants to,
rendering his opportunity for observation on the precise cause of the
accident or collision or immediately preceding thereto not as much as that
of the driver whose attention is continuously focused on his driving. So
that as between the respective versions of the plaintiffs thru their
passenger and that of the defendants thru their driver as to the cause or
antecedent causes that led to the vehicular collision in this case, the
version of the driver of defendant should ordinarily be more reliable than
the version of a mere passenger of Plaintiffs vehicle, simply because the
attention of the passenger is not as much concentrated on the driving as
that of the driver, consequently the capacity for observation of the latter
of the latter on the matter testified to which is the precise point of inquiry
--- the proximate cause of the accident --- is more reasonably reliable.
Moreover, the passengers vision is not as good as that of the driver from
the vantage point of the drivers seat especially in nighttime, thus
rendering a passengers opportunity for observation on the antecedent
causes of the collision lesser than that of the driver.
Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In hindsight, it can be
argued that Jabon should have swerved to the right upon seeing the jitney
zigzagging before it collided with the tractor-trailer. Accidents, though,
happen in an instant, and, understandably in this case, leaving the driver
without sufficient time and space to maneuver a vehicle the size of a
tractor-trailer uphill and away from collision with the jitney oncoming
22

downhill. Clearly, the negligence of Gregorios daughter, Laarni was the

proximate cause of the accident.
We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon
was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on
his drivers license. Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic
regulation. However, no causal connection was established between the
tractor-trailer drivers restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision.
b. Doctrine of Imputed Negligence
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the
due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a
driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are
applicable.
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of
the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except
when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or
business.
Burden of Proof:
Q: Who has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent?
A: As a general rule, the person alleging negligence has the burden of
proving the same. But there are two notable exceptions to the rule: (1)
where the law itself provides for instances where negligence is presumed;
and (2) when the thing speaks for itself (res ipsa loquitor).
Exceptions:
- Presumption of Negligence (Art 2184 & Art 2185)
- Res Ipsa Loquitor
- Vicarious Liability
CAEDO V. YU KHE THAI, 26 SCRA 381
FACTS:
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 AM in the vicinity
of San Lorenzo Village bound for the airport. Several members of his
family were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction was the
Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo.
The two cars were traveling at a moderate speed with their headlights on.
Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela. Defendants driver did not notice it
until he was about 8 meters away. Instead of slowing down behind the
caretela defendants driver veered to the left with the intention of passing
by the caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the ream of the
caretelas left wheel wrenching it off. Defendants car skidded obliquely to
the other end and collided with the on-coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried to avoid the collision by
veering to the right but the collision occurred just the same injuring the
plaintiff and members of his family. Plaintiff brought an action for
damages against both the driver and owner of the Cadillac car.
ISSUE:
W/N Bernardo is liable? If Yes, W/N Yu Khe Thai is solidarily liable with
Bernardo?
HELD:

YES. Bernardo is liable, because facts reveal that the collision was
directly traceable to his negligence. BUT, owner, Yu Khe Thai is not
solidarily liable with his driver.
Art 2184 is indeed the basis of a masters liability in a vehicular accident.
Note however that the 2nd sentence of Art 2184 qualifies before the
owner can be made solidarity liable with the negligent driver. This is
because the basis of the masters liability is not RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
but rather the relationship of PATERFAMILIAS. The theory is that, the
negligence of the servant, is known to the master and susceptible of
timely correction by him, reflects the masters negligence if he fails to
correct it order to prevent injury or damage.Test of imputed negligence
in Art 2184 is necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held in a
uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure
of skill or proficiency either in mechanics of driving or in the observance
of traffic rules before he can own a motor vehicle. The test of his
intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that
which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to
avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a
minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught
with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and
commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of
perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who,
by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be
effectively proscribed.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had
been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been employed
by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years.
During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and
regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed
to his master.
Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the
immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure
to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear
notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it.
We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been
stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and
open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for
the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on
the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of
the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his
failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not
himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he
could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass
the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was
approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that
there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks
involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his
mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make
the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought
that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by
law to prevent the misfortune.
KAPALARAN BUS LINE V. CORONADO, GR NO. 85331, AUG 25, 1989
FACTS:
The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera has reached the intersection where
there is a traffic sign 'yield,' it stopped and cautiously treated the
intersection as a "Thru Stop' street, which it is not. The KBL bus was on its
way from Sta. Cruz, Laguna, driven by its regular driver Virgilio Llamoso, on
its way towards Manila. The regular itinerary of the KBL bus is through the
town proper of Pila, Laguna, but at times it avoids this if a bus is already
fully loaded with passengers and can no longer accommodate additional
passengers. As the KBL bus neared the intersection, Virgilio Llamoso
inquired from his conductor if they could still accommodate passengers
and learning that they were already full, he decided to bypass Pila and
23

instead, to proceed along the national highway. Virgilio Llamoso admitted

that there was another motor vehicle ahead of him. The general rule is
that the vehicle on the national highway has the right-of-way as against a
feeder road.
Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad, the sequence of
events shows that the first vehicle to arrive at the intersection was the
jeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at
the intersection began to move forward, and for his part, Atty. Manicad
stopped his car at the intersection to give way to the jeepney. At about
this time, the KBL bus was approaching the intersection and its driver was
engaged in determining from his conductor if they would still pass through
the town proper of Pila. Upon learning that they were already full, he
turned his attention to the road and found the stopped vehicles at the
intersection with the jeepney trying to cross the intersection. The KBL bus
had no more room within which to stop without slamming into the rear of
the vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to
gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven by
Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about to cross the center of the
highway and was directly on the path of the KBL bus. The gamble made by
Llamoso did not pay off. The impact indicates that the KBL bus was
travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the collision, it did not
stop; it travelled for another 50 meters and stopped only when it hit an
electric post. After trial, the trial court rendered a judgment in favor of
private respondents which was affirmed by the CA but modified the award
of damages.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable for the accident.
HELD:
Kapalarans driver had become aware that some vehicles ahead of the bus
and traveling in the same direction had already stopped at the
intersection obviously to give way either to pedestrians or to another
vehicle about to enter the intersection. The bus driver, who was driving at
a speed too high to be safe and proper at or near an intersection on the
highway, and in any case too high to be able to slow down and stop
behind the cars which had preceded it and which had stopped at the
intersection, chose to swerve to the left lane and overtake such preceding
vehicles, entered the intersection and directly smashed into the jeepney
within the intersection. Immediately before the collision, the bus driver
was actually violating the following traffic rules and regulations, among
others, in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No.
4136, as amended. Thus, a legal presumption arose that the bus driver
was negligent, a presumption that Kapalaran was unable to overthrow.
Application of Article 2180:
The patent and gross negligence on the part of the petitioner Kapalaran's
driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty
of negligence either in the selection or in the supervision of its bus driver.
Where the employer is held liable for damages, it has of course a right of
recourse against its own negligent employee. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a
prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. So far as the record
shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of
negligence on its own part.
MENDOZA V. SORIANO, ET.AL, GR NO. 164012, JUNE 8, 2007
FACTS:
Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue, was hit by a
speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. He was thrown five
meters away, while the vehicle only stopped some 25 meters from the
point of impact. One of Sorianos companions, asked Macasasa to bring
Soriano to the hospital, but after checking out the scene of the
incident, Macasasa returned to the FX, only to flee. A school bus brought
him to the hospital where he later died.

After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint against petitioner. It
found Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth Avenue by using a
small gap in the islands fencing rather than the pedestrian overpass and
that petitioner was not negligent in the selection and supervision of
Macasasa. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable and W/N respondent is guilty of contributory
negligence.
HELD:
Application of Article 2185
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating traffic regulations.
The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. First, he failed to maintain a safe speed
to avoid endangering lives. Both the trial and the appellate courts found
Macasasa overspeeding. The records show also that Soriano was thrown
five meters away after he was hit. Moreover, the vehicle stopped only
some 25 meters from the point of impact.Both circumstances support the
conclusion that the FX vehicle driven by Macasasa was overspeeding.
Second, Macasasa, the vehicle driver, did not aid Soriano, the accident
victim, in violation of Section 55, Article V of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. While Macasasa at first agreed to bring Soriano to the hospital,
he fled the scene in a hurry. What remains undisputed is that he did not
report the accident to a police officer, nor did he summon a doctor.
Application of Article 2180
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages
caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.
The liability arises due to the presumed negligence of the employers in
supervising their employees unless they prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.While
respondents could recover damages from Macasasa in a criminal case and
petitioner could become subsidiarily liable, still petitioner, as owner and
employer, is directly and separately civilly liable for her failure to exercise
due diligence in supervising Macasasa. We must emphasize that this
damage suit is for the quasi-delict of petitioner, as owner and employer,
and not for the delict of Macasasa, as driver and employee.
In this case, we hold petitioner primarily and solidarily liable for the damages
caused by Macasasa. Respondents could recover directly from
petitioner since the latter failed to prove that she exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in supervising Macasasa.
Contributory Negligence
We agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Soriano was
guilty of contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass while
crossing Commonwealth Avenue. We even note that the respondents now
admit this point, and concede that the appellate court had properly reduced
by 20% the amount of damages it awarded. Hence, we affirm the reduction
of the amount earlier awarded, based on Article 2179 of the Civil Code
which reads:
When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to
be awarded.
ANONUEVO V. CA, ET. AL., GR NO. 130003, OCT. 20, 2004
FACTS:
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while
Aonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with
owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Aonuevos brother,
Jonathan. Aonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards
Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious
24

injuries as a result. As testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano, Aonuevo

was umaarangkada, or speeding as he made the left turn into Libertad
and that Aonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary precaution, care and
diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been
avoided.
Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble
Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo before the RTC. The RTC rendered judgment
against Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo while the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by analogy to
non-motorized vehicles and whether Villagracias own fault and
negligence serves to absolve the Aonuevo of any liability for damages.
HELD:
The applicability of Art. 2185 is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only,
and there is no ground to presume that the law intended a broader
coverage.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation.
As distinguished, motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine
unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion
by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A motorized vehicle,
unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion is capable of greater
speeds and acceleration than non-motorized vehicles. At the same time,
motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage
in the event of an accident or collision.
Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to
traffic rules and regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought to be
remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the Code would have
expanded the provision to include non-motorized vehicles or for that
matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arises to
ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a motorized vehicle within the
dynamics of road travel. The fact that there has long existed a higher
degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles, arising from
the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion
that the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such
higher standard. Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are
not on equal footing with other types of vehicles. Thus, we cannot sustain
the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles,
even if by analogy.
NEGLIGENCE PER SE:
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty
constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per se.
The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an
inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury
complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended
to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the
statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury.
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise
from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The
doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a
judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising
from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a
legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny
relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory
violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient,
are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort
law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm
suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the
conduct of others.

But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes

an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, we do not inquire
whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough
that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to promote
safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was
intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was
intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm.
The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another
agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it
happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was
intended to prevent.
Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, resulting
from his violation of an ordinance?
It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be
equipped with headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to
minimize the occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At face
value, Villagracias mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded
against by the ordinance he violated. However, there is the fact which we
consider as proven, that Aonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn,
and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This
reckless behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the
path of Aonuevos car as it turned into the intersection, whether they are
fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We are hard put to conclude
that Villagracia would have avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par
with safety regulations, especially considering that Aonuevo was already
speeding as he made the turn, or before he had seen Villagracia. Even
assuming that Aonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle
was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclists part would
not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to
make the left turn. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with
accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance or
statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal
connection is established between such failure and the injury sustained.
The principle likewise finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we
declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the
proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Aonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence
of Villagracia was the proximate or contributory cause of the latters
injury.
d. Res Ipsa Loquitur
Translation: The thing speaks for itself.
The doctrine: Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care.

Not a rule of substantive law but a mere procedural

convenience.
o Rationale: Res ipsa loquitur has no legal basis.

Applicable only when there is no direct proof of negligence

available.
o Meaning: Due to the nature of the incident, it is
impossible to find direct evidence of negligence.
Requisites:
1. Event does not ordinarily occur
o NOTE: The test is not based on rarity but that it
would not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence.
2. Exclusive control of defendant
3. No other cause
4. No fault on party injured

WHEN THERE IS AN ORDINANCE:

25

Res ipsa
aquiliana

loquitur

in

culpa

Must eliminate all other causes

Res ipsa loquitur in culpa

contractual
Negligence is presumed by
the fact of breach

Negligence and proximate cause are QUESTIONS OF FACT.

o Effect: Cannot be reviewed by the SC. (General Rule)

Elements:

arises when no direct evidence is available

applicable to pure (non-contractual) torts

CAVEAT: no contributory negligence in the one invoking

Inferences:

instrumentality is within the management and exclusive control

of the defendant

the injury would have happened in the ordinary course of things

if the defendant was not negligent

Q: When there is no direct proof of negligence, does res ipsa loquitur

automatically apply?
A: No, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not automatically apply. The
party invoking the doctrine must first establish that there is no direct proof
of negligence AVAILABLE. Only after establishing that may he rely upon the
inferences under res ipsa loquitur.
Q: Why is the doctrine inapplicable in culpa contractual?
A: Because in culpa contractual, the breach of the contract is already an
act of presumed negligence. The contract governs the conduct of the
parties so that if there is a breach, all that the plaintiff needs to prove is
the existence of the contract and the breach thereof.
MAAO CENTRAL CO. V. CA, GR NO. 83491, AUG. 27, 1990
FACTS:
Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or "carbonera" of
Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner, when the locomotive
was suddenly derailed. He and his companion jumped off to escape
injury, but the train fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels and
pinned him down. He was declared dead on the spot. The claims for
death and other benefits having been denied by the petitioner, the
herein private respondent filed suit in the RTC of Bago City. Judge
Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her favor but deducted from the total damages
awarded 25% thereof for the decedent's contributory negligence and
the total pension of P41,367.60 private respondent and her children
would be receiving from the SSS for the next five years. The widow
appealed, claiming that the deductions were illegal. So did the
petitioner, but on the ground that it was not negligent and therefore not
liable at all. In its own decision, the CA sustained the rulings of the trial
court except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased and
disallowed the deductions protested by the private respondent.

supervision of its employees. The Court cannot agree. The record shows it
was in fact lax in requiring them to exercise the necessary vigilance in
maintaining the rails in good condition to prevent the derailments that
sometimes happened "every hour." Obviously, merely ordering the
brakemen and conductors to fill out prescribed forms reporting
derailments which reports have not been acted upon as shown by the
hourly derailments is not the kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil
Code.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
We also do not see how the decedent can be held guilty of contributory
negligence from the mere fact that he was not at his assigned station
when the train was derailed. That might have been a violation of company
rules but could not have directly contributed to his injury, as the petitioner
suggests. It is pure speculation to suppose that he would not have been
injured if he had stayed in the front car rather than at the back and that he
had been killed because he chose to ride in the caboose. Contributory
negligence has been defined as "the act or omission amounting to want of
ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the
defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury." It has been
held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be
shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and
body." There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding
was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite
warnings or signs of impending danger.
RES IPSA LOQUITOR
The absence of the fish plates whatever the cause or reason is by
itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The
doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate
Court. (167 SCRA 376) thus: Where the thing which causes injury is shown
to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care.
FF CRUZ & CO. V. CA, GR NO. 52732, AUG 29, 1988
FACTS:
The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz in Caloocan City was
situatedadjacent to the residence of the Mables.Sometime in August
1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz,
petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed
between the shop and Mables residence. The request was repeated
several times but they fell on deaf ears.In the early morning of
September 6, 1974, fire broke out in Cruzs shop.Cruzs employees, who
slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire, buttheir efforts
proved futile. The fire spread to the Mables house. Both the shopand
the house were razed to the ground.The Mables collected P35,000.00 on
the insurance on their house and thecontents thereof.The Mables filed
an action for damages against the Cruzs.The TC ruled in favor of the
Mables. CA affirmed but reduced the award ofdamages.
ISSUE:

ISSUE:

W/N the doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t o r is applicable to the case.

W/N the respondent court is at fault for finding the petitioner guilty of
negligence notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Art 2176 of
the Civil Code.

HELD:

HELD:

YES. The doctrine of r e s i p s a l o q u i t o r is applicable to the case. The

CA, therefore, had basis to find Cruz liable for the loss sustained by the
Mables.

Petitioner is guilty of negligence and cannot claim defense under Art 2176.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, may be stated as follows:

DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEES;

NOT EXERCISED IN THE CASE AT BAR.
The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground of Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, contending it has exercised due diligence in the selection and

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to

be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen
if those who have its management or control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
26

defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. [Africa v.

Caltex (Phil.),Inc., G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.]
The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine,
considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture
manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust,
paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found
thereon.
It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of
petitioneror its employees was not merely presumed.Cruz failed to
construct a firewall between its shop and the residenceof the Mables as
required by a city ordinance:
-

that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a

litcigarette

that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop;
and

that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop

Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Cruz's failure to
construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to
support a finding of negligence.Even then the fire possibly would not
have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent
omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a
concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over
it. Defendant's negligence,therefore, was not only with respect to the
cause of the fire but also with respect tothe spread thereof to the
neighboring houses.
In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty
of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its
property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies
with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an
ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court
as an act of negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4,
1973, 51 SCRA 181.]
US V. CRAME, 30 PHIL 2
FACTS:
Mariano Crame, chauffeur of a motor vehicle, while driving along Calle
Herran in the city of Manila, knocked down, dragged, and ran over the
body of George E. Coombs, a private in the US army, who was then
crossing the road, causing him injuries, wounds, and bruises. Moreover,
such injuries damaged his mental faculties and incapacitated him from
further performance of his duties as a soldier. Crame alleges that he was
only going at about 10 miles per hour, and that since Coombs suddenly
appeared in front of the car, he tried but failed to change the course of
the automobile so as to avoid hitting him. The trial court convicted
Crame of serious physical injuries by imprudencia temeraria, on the
ground that: 1) he did not reduce his speed sufficiently, nor did he
attempt to stop to avoid an accident; 2) he did not sound his horn or
whistle or use his voice to call the attention of Coombs to notify him
that he should stop and avoid being struck by the car; and 3) Crame was
driving in the center, or a little to the right of the center of the street
instead of on the left side thereof.

The presence of the carromata was not corroborated by any of the

witnesses. Moreover, it would have obscured his vision only for a
moment. Besides, it is the duty of automobile drivers in meeting a
moving vehicle on public streets and highways to use due care and
diligence to see to it that persons who may be crossing behind the
moving vehicle are not run down by them.
It is clearly established that Crame was driving along the right-hand side
of the streetwhen the accident happened. According to the law of the
road and the custom ofthe country, he should have been on the lefthand side of the street. According towitnesses there was abundant room
for him to drive on such side.
There is no evidence which shows negligence on the part of Coombs. At
the time he was struck, he had a right to be where the law fully
protected him from vehicles traveling in the direction in which the
accused was driving at the time of injury. There is no evidence to show
that the soldier was drunk at the time of the accident. And even if he
were, mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does it establish a want of
ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other
evidence tending to prove negligence. If ones conduct is characterized
by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is
drunk or sober.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE; PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF.
Where, in a criminal prosecution against the driver of an automobile for
running down and injuring a pedestrian crossing a street, it appeared that
at the time the injury was produced, the injured person was where he had
a right to be, that the automobile was being driven on the wrong side of
the street, and no warning was given of its approach, it was properly held
that there was a presumption of negligence on the part of the driver and
that the burden of proof was on him to establish that the accident
occurred through other causes than his negligence.
AFRICA V. CALTEX [PHIL], GR NO.L-12986, MAR. 31, 1966
FACTS:
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while
gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground
storage, right at the opening of the receiving truck where the nozzle of
the hose was inserted. The fire then spread to and burned several
neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside
them.The owners of the houses, among them petitioners here, sued
Caltex and Boquiren (agent in charge of operation).Trial court and CA
found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents
had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the
supervision of their employees. Both courts refused to apply the
doctrine of res ipsaloquitur on the grounds that as to its applicability
xxx in the Philippines, there seemsto be nothing definite, and that
while the rules do not prohibit its adoption inappropriate cases, in the
case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such doctrine.
ISSUE:
W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of
r e s i p s a l o q u i t u r should apply as to presume negligence on the part
of the appellees.

ISSUE:

HELD:

W/N Crame is criminally liable for the damages caused to Coombs.

DOCTRINE OF R E S I P S A L O Q U I T U R APPLIES. CALTEX IS LIABLE.

HELD:

Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that where the thing which
caused the injurycomplained of is shown to be under the management
of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of
explanation of defendant, that the incident happened because of want
of care.

THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE MORE THAN SUSTAINED.

The fact that Crame did not see Coombs until the car was very close to
him is strong evidence of inattention to duty, especially since the street
was wide and unobstructed, with no buildings on either side from which
a person can dart out so suddenly. Moreover, the street was also welllighted, so there is no reason why Crame did not see Coombs long
before he had reached the position in the street where he was struck
down.

The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees,
was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread
to and burned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or could
27

have known how the fire started were the appellees and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair
and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want
of care.
The report by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the
statement of the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who was transferring
the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke
out, strengthen the presumption of negligence. Verily, (1) the station is
in a very busy district and pedestrians often pass through or mill around
the premises; (2) the area is used as a car barn for around 10taxicabs
owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and possibly
smoke cigarettes is located one meter from the hole of the underground
tank; and (4) the concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only
2 meters high at most and cannot prevent the flames from leaping
over it in case of fire.
LAYUGAN V. IAC, 167 SCRA 363
FACTS:
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro,
alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a
companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked
along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck driven
recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff
was injured and hospitalized. Serrano bumped the truck being repaired by
Pedro Layugan, while the same was at a stop position. From the evidence
presented, it has been established clearly that the injuries sustained by
the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano. The police
report confirmed the allegation of the plaintiff and admitted by Daniel
Serrano on cross-examination. The collision dislodged the jack from the
parked truck and pinned the plaintiff to the ground. As a result thereof,
plaintiff sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. The left leg of
the plaintiff from below the knee was later on amputated when gangrene
had set in, thereby rendering him incapacitated for work depriving him of
his income. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff,
however, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision of the
trial court and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether the IAC acted correctly in applying the doctrine or res ipsa
loquitur with proper jurisprudential basis and if not, who is negligent?
HELD:
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the
shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no moment taking into
account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed
three or four meters from the back of the truck. But despite this warning
which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an
employee of the private respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked
cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident the petitioner
sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care
of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence.
It follows that in stamping its imprimatur upon the invocation by
respondent Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to escape liability for
the negligence of his employee, the respondent court committed
reversible error.
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR:
Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of any
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
AS DEFINED UNDER BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY:

Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or
inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that
instrumentality causing injury was in defendants exclusive control, and
that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in the
absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby
negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that
accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances
attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it
would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to
have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer.
RULE OF EVIDENCE:
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the
law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific
proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but
merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. It merely
determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and
facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due
care. The doctrine can only be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available. Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of
inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome,
where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the
specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or
where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and
all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly
appear. Finally, once the actual cause of injury is established beyond
controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no
presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable
when the circumstances have been so completely elucidated that no
inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the
source of the evidence, as in this case.
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. V. SPS.SARANGAYA, GR NO.
147746, OCT. 25, 2005
FACTS:
In 1986, spouses Sarangaya erected a building known as Super A
Building and was subdivided into three doors, each of which was leased
out. The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second
and third doors of the building.In 1988, petitioner Perla Compania de
Seguros, Inc., through its branch manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido
Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door of the Super A
Building. Perla Compania renovated its rented space and divided it into
two. The left side wasconverted into an office while the right was used
by Pascual as a garage for a 1981model 4-door Ford Cortina.
On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not
bring the car with him. Three days later, he returned, and decided to
warm up the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on
the ignition key, the engine made an odd sound and did not start. He
again stepped on the accelerator and started the car but petitioner
again heard an unusual sound. He then saw a small flame coming out of
the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and
started to push it out of the garage when suddenly, fire spewed out of
its rear compartment and engulfed the whole garage. Pascual was
trapped inside and suffered burns on his face, legs and arms.Meanwhile,
respondents were busy watching television when they heard two loud
explosions. In no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their
belongings, furniture and appliances.The city fire marshall c submitted a
report to the provincial fire marshall and concluded that the fire was
accidental. The report also disclosed that petitioner-corporation had
no fire permit as required by law.Based on the same report, a criminal
complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property
was filed against petitioner Pascual. On the other hand, Perla Compania
was asked to pay the amount of P7,992,350, inclusive of the value of the
28

commercial building. At the prosecutors office, petitioner Pascual

moved for the withdrawal of the complaint, which was granted.
Respondents (spouses Sarangaya) later on filed a civil complaint based
on quasi-delict against petitioners for a sum of money and damages,
alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence while petitionercorporation lacked the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of Pascual as its employee.
ISSUES:
W/N Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine and W/N Perla
Compania liable under tort
HELD:
a.) YES, Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself. It relates to the fact of an injury that sets
out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima
facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The
facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they
furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is
lacking. The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either
knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms. In such instance, the
plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to
establish negligence. The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff
can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to
explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of.
Thus, it is the defendants responsibility to show that there was no
negligence on his part.

The test to determine the existence of negligence in a

particular case may be stated as follows: did the defendant
in committing the alleged negligent act, use reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the same
situation would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of
the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically
checked (as its year-model and condition required) revealed
his negligence. A prudent man should have known thata14year-old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was
definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to
prove care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle,
the necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent
in the upkeep of the car.
b.) YES, COMPANIA LIABLE UNDER TORT
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records.
While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have erred in
considering Pascual for his position, its lack of supervision over him
made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire.In the supervision of
employees, the employer must formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence
that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.

To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitur, the following requisites must concur:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless
someone
is
negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person in charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured.
Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not
ordinarily occur unless there is negligence. A flame spewing out of a car
engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither
does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved. Hence, in
this case, without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it, we draw
the inference that based on the evidence at hand, someone was in fact
negligent and responsible for the accident.
Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency that triggered
the occurrence must be one that falls under the exclusive control of the
person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the fire originated
was under the control of Pascual. Being its caretaker, he alone had the
responsibility to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning. Where
the circumstances which caused the accident are shown to have been
under the management or control of a certain person and, in the normal
course of events, the incident would not have happened had that person
used proper care, the inference is that it occurred because of lack of
such care. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to defendant to
establish that he observed all that was necessary to prevent the
accident from happening. In this aspect, Pascual utterly failed.
Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that
respondents contributed to the incident. They had no access to the car
and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was
parked in a building they owned.
TEST TO DETERMINE NEGLIGENCE:
29

There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty,

breach, injury and proximate causation.
A physician-patient relationship was created when Editha employed the
services of the petitioner. As Edithas physician, petitioner was duty-bound
to use at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. The
breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their improper
performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient is injured in
body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice. As to this aspect of
medical malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level of care and
the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential. Further, inasmuch as the
causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable
only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert
testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
In the present case, respondents did not present any expert testimony to
support their claim that petitioner failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done.
V.

DEFENSES

a. Complete Defenses
a.1 Plaintiffs own negligence
FE CAYAO-LASAM v. RAMOLETE, G.R. No. 159132, December 18, 2008
FACTS:
On July 28, 1994, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was
admitted to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) due to vaginal bleeding. A
pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus weak
cardiac pulsation. The following day, Edithas repeat pelvic sonogram
showed that aside from the fetus weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal
movement was also appreciated. Due to Edithas persistent and profuse
vaginal bleeding, petitioner performed a Dilatation and Curettage
Procedure (D&C) or "raspa."
On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she
was suffering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Dr. Mayo
allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead fetus in the latters
womb. After, Editha underwent laparotomy, she was found to have a
massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha
had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy and as a result, she has no
more chance to bear a child.
Editha and her husband filed a Complaint for Gross Negligence and
Malpractice against petitioner before the Professional Regulations
Commission (PRC).
The Board of Medicine of the PRC rendered a Decision exonerating
petitioner from the charges filed against her.
Respondents went to the PRC on appeal. The PRC rendered a Decision
reversing the findings of the Board and revoking petitioners authority or
license to practice her profession as a physician.
Petitioner brought the matter to the CA in a Petition for Review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner also dubbed her petition as one
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition was
dismissed by the CA citing that neither Rule 43 nor Rule 65 was a proper
remedy. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner was guilty of negligence and malpractice.
HELD:
Worthy to mention that the fact that the PRC was not among those
enumerated in the list of quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 does not by its
fact alone, imply its exclusion from the coverage of the said Rule. The Rule
expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals from awards,
judgments final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M.

Manalo, who was a specialist in gynecology and obstetrics. He testified
that the D & C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of
Edithas uterus resulting in her hysterectomy. From his expert testimony,
the D&C procedure was conducted in accordance with the standard
practice, with the same level of care that any reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances, and
that there was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with
Editha.
Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil action
for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The defenses in an
action for damages, provided for under Article 2179 of the Civil Code are:
Art. 2179.When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to
be awarded.
In the present case, the Court notes the findings of the Board of Medicine
that petitioner advised her to return on August 4, 1994 or four (4) days
after the D&C. However, complainant failed to do so. This being the case,
the chain of continuity as required in order that the doctrine of proximate
cause can be validly invoked was interrupted. Had she returned, the
respondent could have examined her thoroughly.
Editha omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could
have avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for a follow-up
evaluation played a substantial part in bringing about Edithas own injury.
Based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in
which no negligence can be attributed to the petitioner, the immediate
cause of the accident resulting in Edithas injury was her own omission
when she did not return for a follow-up check up, in defiance of
petitioners orders. The immediate cause of Edithas injury was her own
act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the injury.
Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the CA reversed and the decision of the
Board of Medicine is affirmed.
Exception: Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance
TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT CO., supra.
ISSUE: W/N defendant company is liable to plaintiff for damages for
having negligently failed to provide security measures to prevent the
general public from entering its premises.
HELD: Counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and
inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the
intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted
in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the
30

accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's

negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were
found by the plaintiff.

prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a

child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically
a trespasser in the premises.

On this score, the doctrine of implied invitation is applicable. In the case of

young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license
might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving
a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be
likely to gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to
them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his
premises things tempting to children, the same implication should arise.

The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of

water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual
condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.

But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property
without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have
relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by
plaintiff, without other fault on his part, we are of opinion that under all
the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the
injury, and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in
cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the
proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted
upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
The doctrine of implied invitation does not apply where the said youth has
not been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the
detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing that his
action would result in an explosion.
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown
youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average
boy of his age; and the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. True, he may not have
known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion
which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, but
he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected
from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the
explosion.
We are satisfied that while it may be true that these injuries would not
have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving
the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the
proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. v. BALANDAN, 91 Phil 488
FACTS:
Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory
in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two
tanks full of water for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory
compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not
provided with any kind of fence or top covers. Through the wide gate
entrance, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity
passed, and any one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased.
There was no guard assigned on the gate. On April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son,
Mario Balandan, an 8 year old boy, while playing with and in company of
other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, while
bathing in one of the said tanks, sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be
fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia
secondary to drowning."
The CA and the CFI of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner
maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the
necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises.
ISSUE:
W/N the said tanks constitute an attractive nuisance.
HELD:
The doctrine of attractive nuisance may be stated, as: One who maintains
on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character
likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to

Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children.
Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this
danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed
to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an
artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature
without adding any new danger, (he) is not liable because of having
created an "attractive nuisance.
The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is
absolved from liability.
a.2. Assumption of Risk
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
AFILIADA v. HISOLE and HISOLE, 85 Phil 67 (cant find case; citation from
Vestil Case)
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the
same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages
should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored
him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for
damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the
caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one,
including himself.
ILOCOS NORTE CO., v. CA, GR No. 53401, Nov. 6, 1989
FACTS:
Inn the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967, strong
typhoon "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy
rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on
June 29, 1967, when the floodwaters were beginning to recede, the
deceased Isabel Lao Juan, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law,
Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and proceeded
towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium to look after her
merchandise therein that might have been damaged. The deceased was
followed by Aida Bulong and Linda Alonzo Estavillo. Aida and Linda walked
side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased.
Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water.
The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them because on the
spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a
post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for
help, Ernesto dela Cruz tried to go to the deceased, but he turned back
shouting that the water was grounded.
Thereafter, Yabes requested the police to ask the people of defendant
Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current.
Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The floodwater
was receding and the lights inside the house were out indicating that the
electric current had been cut off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to
fish for the body of the deceased. The body was recovered about two
meters from an electric post.
An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased against
INELCO. INELCO contends that the deceased could have died simply either
by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to
herself and not to petitioner. In this regard, it was pointed out that the
31

deceased, without petitioner's knowledge, caused the installation of a

burglar deterrent. Petitioner conjectures that the switch to said burglar
deterrent must have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's
electrocution when she tried to open her gate that fateful day. After due
trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner and dismissed the
complaint. An appeal was filed with the CA which reversed the trial courts
decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in not applying the legal principle of "assumption of
risk" in the present case to bar private respondents from collecting
damages.
HELD:
In order to escape liability, petitioner ventures into the theory that the
deceased was electrocuted when she tried to open her steel gate, which
was electrically charged by an electric wire she herself caused to install to
serve as a burglar deterrent. Petitioner suggests that the switch to said
burglar alarm was left on. But this is mere speculation, not backed up with
evidence.
While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for
which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality
which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention
of petitioner's negligence that death took place. In times of calamities
such as the one which occurred in Laoag City, extraordinary diligence
requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigilto prevent or avoid
any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does
not show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that
there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even
manning its office.
The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve
itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a
fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the
negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if
the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
omission"
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds
no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding
circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a
roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. A person is excused from the force
of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must
abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life
or property of another is in peril. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the
deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an
impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident
occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to
petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise.
Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering
damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.

Petitioner breached the contract of carriage on two scores. First, as found

by the CA, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and
facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers
than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of
the same law.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril
greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore,
not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the
evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that
Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of
risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the
tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those
passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry.
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN, ET.AL., v. REYES, GR No. 154259, FEB.
28, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name
"Amay Bisaya," alleged that in the evening of 13 October 1994, at the
lobby of Hotel Nikko, Dr. Violeta Filart invited him to join her in a party at
the hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels
manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. At the penthouse, they first had their picture
taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr.
Filart. When dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but,
to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by
petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who was Hotel Nikkos Executive Secretary. In
a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests,
Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka
imbitado, bumaba ka na lang"). Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was
invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however,
completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Not
long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a
Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. Mr.
Reyes claims damages in an action instituted against the hotel, Ms. Lim
and Dr. Filart.
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party
but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter and
claimed that she asked the latter to leave in the most discreet manner.

CALALAS v. CA, supra.

After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, giving more credence
to the testimony of Ms. Lim . The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr.
Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
uninvited. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court as it
found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes.

ISSUE:

ISSUE:

W/N Calalas is liable for damages to private respondent, Sunga.

HELD:

W/N the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria
considering that Mr. Reyes, by its own account, is a gate crasher.

The petition has no merit.

HELD:

The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores
the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the
principle of res judicata does not apply.

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave as he was a
"gate-crasher."

Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, the Civil Code requires

extraordinary diligence from common carriers with regard to the safety of
passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or
injury to passengers.

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury") refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent
to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine
does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent
32

Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners,
under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation
to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and
shame.

The Trial Court ruled that plaintiffs were unable to establish the
negligence of defendant and thus, dismissed the case. The trial courts
decision was reversed upon appeal to the IAC.

From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower
courts findings of fact.

W/N petitioner is answerable for the death of Engr. Calibo owing to the
negligence of its employee, Zacarias.

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate
Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that
she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in
the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are
virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible.

HELD:

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage
which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a
legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must
be his to bear alone.
a.3. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Doctrine of Supervening Negligence;
Doctrine of Discovered Peril; or the Humanitarian Doctrine
PICART vs. SMITH, supra.
ISSUE:
W/N defendant is guilty of negligence to be liable for damages.
HELD:
Defendant is liable.
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume
that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he
moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes
that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived
that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving
vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the
automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not
longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going
to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an
immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge,
to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to
avoid the danger of collision.
Plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we
have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case
the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly
responsible. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who
has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
PANTRANCO v. BAESA, GR No. 79050, Nov. 14, 1989 (cant find case)
GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER v. IAC, GR No. 70493, May 18, 1989
FACTS:
Engr. Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan
Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached
from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City in
the afternoon of July 4,1979. At about that time, the cargo truck, driven by
defendant Zacarias and owned by petitioners herein, coming from the
opposite direction of Davao City had just crossed said bridge. The cargo
truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engr Calibo died
while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt.
After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted
road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its
wheels on the road.
A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the
late Engr Calibo against the driver and owners of the cargo truck.

ISSUE:

The petition is meritorious. The IACs decision is reversed.

The finding that "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane
of the jeep when the collision occurred" is, based on nothing more than
the showing that at the time of the accident, the truck driven by Zacarias
had edged over the painted center line of the road into the opposite lane
by a width of twenty-five (25) centimeters. It ignores the fact that by the
uncontradicted evidence, the actual center line of the road was not that
indicated by the painted stripe, that although it was not disputed that the
truck overrode the painted stripe by twenty-five (25) centimeters, it was
still at least eleven (11) centimeters away from its side of the true center
line of the road and well inside its own lane when the accident occurred.
By this same reckoning, since it was unquestionably the jeep that rammed
into the stopped truck, it may also be deduced that the jeep was at the
time travelling beyond its own lane and intruding into the lane of the truck
by at least the same 11-centimeter width of space.
Nor was the IAC correct in finding that Zacarias had acted negligently in
applying his brakes instead of getting back inside his lane upon spying the
approaching jeep. Being well within his own lane, he had no duty to
swerve out of the jeep's way. And even supposing that he was in fact
partly inside the opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the jeep still
thirty (30) meters away cannot be considered an unsafe or imprudent
action, there also being uncontradicted evidence that the jeep was
"zigzagging and hence no way of telling in which direction it would go as
it approached the truck.
It was rather Engr. Calibos negligence which was the proximate cause of
the accident. Evidence and testimonies show that the jeep had been
zigzagging or was driven erratically at that time and that its driver had
been on a drinking spree on the occasion prior.
Even, however, ignoring theof negligence on the part of Calibo, and
assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in failing to
keep within his designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it was, the
physical facts,
would still absolve the latter of any actionable
responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear chance.
Both drivers had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of
one hundred fifty meters. It is also admitted that the truck was already at
a full stop while the jeep was still 30 meters away when thereafter, the
latter plowed into the truck. From these facts the logical conclusion
emerges that the driver of the jeep had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck,
either of which he had sufficient time to do. In those circumstances, his
duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a
supposed right to expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck
to swerve and leave him a clear path.
DE ROY vs. CA, January 29, 1988
FACTS:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of
Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened
wall but the former failed to do so.
The RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of
the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
petition.
33

ISSUE:
W/N petitioners are free of liability since respondents had the last clear
chance of avoiding the incident.
HELD:
The petition is denied.
This Court finds that the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article
2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or
structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private
respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they
heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of
"last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
inapplicable to this case.
PLDT vs. CA, GR No. 57079, Sept. 29, 1989
FACTS:
Private respondents spouses Esteban instituted a case against petitioner
company for the injuries they sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968
when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT. The complaint alleged that
respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was
left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any
warning light or signs.
The trial court issued a decision in favor of the private respondents. The
CA reversed the decision of the trial court. However, after granting a
second motion for reconsideration, the CA set aside its original decision
and affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner company is liable to private respondents for the injuries
sustained by the latter.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
As evidenced by the factual findings of respondent court, private
respondents jeep were running along the inside lane of Lacson street
when it suddenly swerved (as shown through the tiremarks) from the left
and thereafter hit the accident mound. Petitioner company cannot be held
liable to the private respondents. The accident had not occurred due to
the absence of warning signals but rather the abrupt swerving of the jeep
from the inside lane.
Secondly, the jeep was not running at 25kph when the accident occurred,
otherwise it would not have hit the accident mound since at that speed, it
could easily apply its brakes on time.
From the above findings, the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban
was not only contributory but rather the very cause of the occurrence of
the accident and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The
only purpose of warning signs was to inform and warn the public of the
presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew
of the presence of said excavations. It is basic that private respondents
cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise
due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. Furthermore, respondent
Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the
accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT.
As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday
and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there.
It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger; hence he is
solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
ONG vs. MCWD, 104 Phil 397
FACTS:

Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its

Balara filters in Diliman, Quezon City to which people are invited and
nominal fees are charged.
In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old boy, and
his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, arrived at the defendant's swimming
pools. This has been the 5th or 6th time that the three brothers had gone to
said natatorium. After paying the requisite admission fee, they
immediately went to one of the small pools where the water was shallow.
Later on, Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker
room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this,
Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small
pool and so they did not see the latter when he left the pool to get a
bottle of coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the
pool compound, namely, Manuel Abao and Mario Villanueva.
Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area
informed one Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming under
water for quite a long time. Another boy informed lifeguard Abao of the
same happening and Abao immediately jumped into the big swimming
pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from
the bottom. Manual artificial respiration was applied. Despite medical
attention by the nurse and Dr. Ayuyao of UP, the boy died.
Plaintiffs instituted a case to recover damages from defendant for the
death of their son in the said swimming pool operated by defendant. After
trial, the lower court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the
negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to
recover damages.
HELD:
The trial courts decision is hereby affirmed.
Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a patron,
resulting from lack of ordinary care in providing for his safety, without the
fault of the patron, he is not in any sense deemed to be the insurer of the
safety of patrons. And the death of a patron within his premises does not
cast upon him the burden of excusing himself from any presumption of
negligence. Thus in Bertalot vs. Kinnare, supra, it was held that there could
be no recovery for the death by drowning of a fifteen-year boy in
defendant's natatorium, where it appeared merely that he was lastly seen
alive in water at the shallow end of the pool, and some ten or fifteen
minutes later was discovered unconscious, and perhaps lifeless, at the
bottom of the pool, all efforts to resuscitate him being without avail.
Appellee has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives
of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death.
Appellant posits that even if it be assumed that the deceased is partly to
be blamed for the unfortunate incident, still appellee may be held liable
under the doctrine of "last clear chance" for the reason that, having the
last opportunity to save the victim, it failed to do so.
We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record
does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The
doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a
claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant
where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and
prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence. Or, "As the doctrine usually is stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an
accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the
negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident."
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and
it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation
of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it
34

appearing that lifeguard Abao responded to the call for help as soon as
his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all
efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring
him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the
doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee..
ACHEVARA vs. RAMOS, GR No. 175172, Sept. 29, 2009
FACTS:
Respondents Elvira Ramos and her two minor children filed with the RTC
of Ilocos Sur a Complaint for damages against petitioners Cresencia
Achevara, Alfredo Achevara and Benigno Valdez for the death of Arnulfo
Ramos, husband of Elvira Ramos and father of her two children, in a
vehicular accident that happened on April 22, 1995 at the national
highway along Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur. Crescencia Achevara
was sued as the operator of the passenger jeep which was involved in the
vehicular accident. Alfredo Achevara was impleaded as the husband of the
operator.
Respondents alleged that Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger jeep in a
reckless, careless, and negligent manner. He tried to overtake a
motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane
and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries
sustained by Arnulfo Ramos caused his death. Respondents alleged that
Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep.
Petitioners denied Benigno Valdez overtook a motorcycle and bumped the
vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They alleged that Benigno Valdez was
driving southward at a moderate speed when he saw an owner-type jeep
coming from the south and heading north, running in a zigzag manner,
and encroaching on the west lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez
drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the road, west of his
lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to move toward the western lane
and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it
was Arnulfo Ramos who was careless and negligent in driving a motor
vehicle, which he very well knew had a mechanical defect.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners are liable to respondents for the damages incurred as a
result of the vehicular accident.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
The testimony of respondents witness, Gamera, that the vehicular
accident occurred because the passenger jeep driven by Valdez tried to
overtake the motorcycle driven by PO3 de Peralta and encroached on the
lane of the owner-type jeep, which resulted in the collision, was refuted
by PO3 de Peralta, who testified that the passenger jeep did not overtake
his motorcycle since he was the one following behind the passenger jeep.
Gamera also testified that the collision took place on the lane of the
owner-type jeep, and one of its wheels was detached and stayed immobile
at the place of collision. However, SPO2 Marvin Valdez, who investigated
the incident, found that the collision took place on the western lane of the
national highway or the lane of the passenger jeep driven by Benigno
Valdez. It was the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos that
encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep.
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a
defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary
reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain
persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of
risks.
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag
manner as it travelled on the opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez
was made aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on
the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by immediately veering to the

rightmost portion of the road or by stopping the passenger jeep at the

right shoulder of the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass before
proceeding southward; hence, the collision occurred. The CA correctly
held that Benigno Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence by
neglecting to take such precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man
would ordinarily have done under the circumstances and which
proximately caused injury to another.
On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos guilty of gross
negligence for knowingly driving a defective jeep on the highway.
The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were
contemporaneous when Ramos continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on
the highway despite knowledge of its mechanical defect, while Valdez did
not immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road upon seeing the
wiggling vehicle of Ramos. However, when the owner-type jeep
encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez realized the peril at
hand and steered the passenger jeep toward the western shoulder of the
road to avoid a collision. It was at this point that it was perceivable that
Ramos must have lost control of his vehicle, and that it was Valdez who
had the last opportunity to avoid the collision by swerving the passenger
jeep towards the right shoulder of the road.
The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintiff
was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, but the defendant who had
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
made liable for all the consequences of the accident, notwithstanding the
prior negligence of the plaintiff. However, the doctrine does not apply
where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and the injury
cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is
or should have been discovered.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because
even if it can be said that it was Valdez who had the last chance to avoid
the mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on the western lane of
the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the opportunity to avoid the
collision.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides:
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to
be awarded.
In this case, both Ramos and Valdez failed to exercise reasonable care and
caution. Since the gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable
negligence of Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the vehicular
accident, respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to Article 2179 of
the Civil Code.
a.4. Emergency Rule
VALENZUELA vs. CA, 253 SCRA 303
FACTS:
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant to her
home. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with
her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
solicit help if needed since rear right tire was flat and that she cannot
reach her home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, put
on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to
open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car
pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was
suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant
Richard Li. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant and then fell to the ground.
35

Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh and was
eventually fitted with an artificial leg.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent and alleged that when
he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. he
was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, with a car
coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright
lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid
colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he
did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or
early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his
defense that the plaintiff's car was improperly parked.

a.5. Prescription
Art. 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is
no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the
day they may be brought.
CAPUNO vs. PEPSI, GR No. L-19331, Apr. 30, 1965
FACTS:
A vehicular collision occurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit, Pampanga
which involved a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a
private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the latter as
well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.

Both the trial court and the CA found for petitioner. However, the latter
modified the formers decision in reducing the amount of damages.
Hence, this petition.

Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence. The
information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by
the heirs of the three victims.

ISSUE:

The appearance and intervention of Prosecutor Atty. Navarro for

presentation of evidence for damages was disallowed. No appeal was
taken from the order.

W/N petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of contributory negligence to preclude

her from claiming damages.
HELD:
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of
contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. Based on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to
which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for
her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora
Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is
confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of
conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation.
Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency
was brought by his own negligence.
A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night
will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her
to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected
to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark
street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be
hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency because the
hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other
motorists.
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard
reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to
have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led
to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which
led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her
own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable
precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the
negligence of Li on the night of the accident. The circumstances
established by the evidence adduced in the court below plainly
demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer.
It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M.
after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street
slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he
was under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of
effectively dealing with changing conditions on the road were significantly
lessened.

Judgment on the criminal case was rendered on April 15, 1959, acquitting
the accused Elordi. Prior thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however,
herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi
Company and Elordi. Appellee moved to dismiss the said action relying on
the ground of prescription among others. The motion was dismissed by
the Court a quo. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the action for damages has prescribed.
HELD:
The action has prescribed.
The present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict,
which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil
Code). Appellants' intervention in the original action was disallowed and
they did not appeal from the Court's order. And when they commenced
the present civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still
pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy
afforded by the Civil Code
In filing the civil action, appellants considered it as entirely independent of
the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.
In other words, the civil action for damages could have been commenced
by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent, Capuno and
the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action
for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was
filed only on September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five
years.
The contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was
interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi is
incorrect notwithstanding that appellants had neither waived the civil
action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such reservation
was not necessary; as without having made it they could still file as in
fact they did a separate civil action even during the pendency of the
criminal case; and consequently, the institution of a criminal action cannot
have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a
quasi-delict.
b. Incomplete/Partial Defense
b.1. Doctrine of Contributory Negligence
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
PHIL. NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. TUPANG, GR No. 55347, Oct. 4, 1985
36

FACTS:

HELD:

On September 10, 1972, Winifredo Tupang, husband of plaintiff Rosario

Tupang, boarded 'Train No. 516 of appellant at Libmanan, Camarines Sur,
as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect,
the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking some two
hours before the train could resume its trip to Manila. Unfortunately,
upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the
train resulting in his death.

We are shown no good reason for the departing from the conclusion of
the trial judge to the effect that the sudden death of the child Purification
Bernal was due principally to the nervous shock and organic calefaction
produced by the extensive burns from the hot water.

W/N deceased Tupang was guilty of contributory negligence.

The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street
of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held.
There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces
in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a
ditch filled with hot water. The contributory negligence of the child and
her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its
strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.

HELD:

JARCO MARKETING CORP. vs. CA, 321 SCRA 377

The appellate court found that the train boarded by the deceased
Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other
passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the
coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even
stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had
fallen off the train at lyam Bridge.

FACTS:

Both the CFI and the CA held PNR liable for damages for breaching the
contract of carriage.
ISSUE:

The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their

destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or
any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption
that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the
contract of carriage.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required
by law, it appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory
negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the
coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the
upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off
from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not
exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the
amount adjudicated as moral damages. By the same token, the award of
exemplary damages must be set aside.
RAKES vs. ATLANTIC GULF, supra.(See under ACT OR OMISSION)
TAYLOR vs. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT CO..supra.(See under
DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE)

BANAL & ENVERSO vs. TACLOBAN ELECTRIC & HOUSE PLANT, 54 Phil 327
FACTS:
On the evening of April 10, 1925, a procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte
attended by Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal.
After the procession was over, the woman and her daughter, passed along
a public street. The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in
advance of her mother and her mothers friends. When in front of the
offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared
from the opposite direction which frightened the child that she turned to
run, with the result that she fell into the street gutter. At that time there
was hot water in this gutter coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V.
House. When the mother and her companions reached the child, they
found her face downward in the hot water. She was taken to the
provincial hospital but thereafter died. Dr. Benitez, who attended the
child, certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole
Body.
The trial court found that the company was negligent but dismissed the
case having ruled that plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence.
ISSUE:

On 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH AGUILAR were at the 2nd floor of
Syvel's Department Store owned by herein petitioner. CRISELDA was
signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when
she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind
her and saw her daughters body on the floor pinned by the store's giftwrapping counter. ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical
Center but died a few days later. The cause of her death was attributed to
the injuries she sustained.
Petitioners denied any liability claiming that CRISELDA was negligent in
exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely
roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. ZHIENETH
too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter,
triggering its eventual collapse. Petitioners also emphasized that the
counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor
collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction.
Private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH should be entitled to the
conclusive presumption that a child below nine years is incapable of
contributory negligence. And even if ZHIENETH, at six years old, was
already capable of contributory negligence, still it was physically
impossible for her to have propped herself on the counter. Also, the
testimony of one of the store's former employees, Gerardo Gonzales, who
accompanied ZHIENETH when she was brought to the emergency room of
the Makati Medical Center belied petitioners' theory that ZHIENETH
climbed the counter. Gonzales claimed that when ZHIENETH was asked by
the doctor what she did, ZHIENETH replied, "Nothing, I did not come near
the counter and the counter just fell on me."
The Trial Court ruled in favor of herein petitioners finding that the
proximate cause of ZHIENETHs injuries was the negligence of the latter
and that of her mother. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the
trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners should be absolved from liability because of private
respondents negligence.
HELD:
We deny the petition. Under the circumstances, it is unthinkable for
ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a
doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to
Gonzales' testimony on the matter.
Gonzales' earlier testimony on petitioners' insistence to keep and maintain
the structurally unstable gift-wrapping counter proved their negligence.
Petitioner was informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet,
it neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure
the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and
ordinary prudent man would have done.

W/N Enverso was guilty of contributory negligence.

37

Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive

presumption that favors children below nine years old in that they are
incapable of contributory negligence.
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively
presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account,
exempt from criminal liability. Since negligence may be a felony and a
quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either
criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively
presumed to be incapable of negligence.
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that
she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept
petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was
the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to
collapse.

Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing
what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.
In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. Hence,
petitioner is not entitled to a mitigation of its liability.
CADIENTE vs. MACAS, GR No. 161846, Nov. 14, 2008
FACTS:
Rosalinda Palero testified that on July 19, 1994, , at the intersection of
Buhangin and San Vicente Streets in Davao City, 15-year old high school
student Bithuel Macas was standing on the shoulder of the road.
Rosalinda was about two and a half meters away from the respondent
when the latter was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by
Cimafranca. Respondent was rushed to the hospital where both his legs
were amputated in order to save his life.

CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence.

Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand.
CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she
signed her credit card slip. It was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let
go of her child.

Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared. Records showed that

the Ford Fiera was registered in the name of herein petitioner, Atty.
Cadiente. However, Cadiente claimed that when the accident happened,
he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera. He alleged that he sold the
vehicle to Engr. Jalipa with the understanding that the latter would be the
one to cause the transfer of the registration.

NAPOCOR vs. CASIONAN, GR No. 165969, Nov. 27, 2008

FACTS:

The victim's father filed a complaint for torts and damages against
Cimafranca and Cadiente before the RTC. Cadiente later filed a third-party
complaint against Jalipa.

Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19 years old at the time
of the incident that claimed his life. He worked as a pocket miner.

The RTC held Cadiente and Jalipa jointly and severally liable to
respondent. Such decision was affirmed by the CA.

A trail existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used by members of
the community. Sometime in the 1970s, petitioner NPC installed hightension electrical transmission lines traversing the trail. Eventually, some
of the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance from
the ground to only about eight to ten feet.

ISSUE:

On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were
at Dalicno. They cut two bamboo poles for their pocket mining. Noble
carried the shorter pole while Melchor carried the longer pole. Noble
walked ahead as both passed through the trail underneath the NPC high
tension transmission lines on their way to their work place.

HELD:

As Noble was going uphill, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying
touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Thereafter, Melchor saw
Noble fall to the ground. He rushed to Noble and shook him but the latter
was already dead.
Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of respondents.
ISSUE:
W/N Noble Casionan is guilty of contributory negligence so as to mitigate
NAPOCORs liability.
HELD:
The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. As
established during trial, the lines were sagging around 8 to 10 feet in
violation of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the transmission lines
were properly maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by
Noble would not have touched the wires. He would not have been
electrocuted.

W/N victim is guilty of contributory negligence.

W/N petitioner is absolved from liability by the fact that he was no longer
the owner of said vehicle.
The petition is without merit.
In this case, records show that when the accident happened, the victim
was standing on the shoulder, which was the uncemented portion of the
highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder was intended for
pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as those loading or
unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Running vehicles are not
supposed to pass through the said uncemented portion of the highway.
However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without so much as slowing down,
took off from the cemented part of the highway, inexplicably swerved to
the shoulder, and recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim.
The respondent cannot be expected to have foreseen that the Ford Fiera,
erstwhile speeding along the cemented part of the highway would
suddenly swerve to the shoulder, then bump and run him over. Thus, we
are unable to accept the petitioner's contention that the respondent was
negligent.
Coming now to the second issue, this Court has recently reiterated in PCI
Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.,that the
registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to someone
else, is primarily responsible to the public for whatever damage or injury
the vehicle may cause.

Moreover, We find no contributory negligence on Nobles part.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard which he is required to conform for his own
protection. There is contributory negligence when the partys act showed
lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or
put his life in danger.
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by
members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform
passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally
touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from
38

TAMARGO vs. CA, GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992

FACTS:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age,
shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in
her death. Accordingly, a complaint for damages was filed against
respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents
with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Rapisura had
filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for
adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had
shot and killed Jennifer.
Respondent spouses Bundoc, reciting the result of the foregoing petition
for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, the
spouses Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed.
VI. LIABILITY FOR ACT OR OMISSION
a. By tortfeasor
b. Vicarious Liability

Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually

living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been
relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.

CUADRA vs. MONFORT, GR No. L-24101, Sept. 30, 1970

The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent

natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action. The CA dismissed the appeal having been filed out of time. Hence,
this petition.

FACTS:

ISSUE:

Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates
in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School. On July 9, 1962 they were
assigned to weed the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged
Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly she said aloud that she had
found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten Cuadra, tossed the object
at her. At that precise moment the latter turned around, and the object
hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and
treated it with some powder. The next day, the eye became swollen and
had to undergo surgical operation twice. Despite the medical efforts,
however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.

Whether the natural parents of Adelberto are liable for the damages
sustained by Jennifer Tamargo.

The parents instituted a suit in behalf of their minor daughter against

Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father. The RTC ruled in favor of
plaintiff to which the defendant appealed to SC on pure questions of law.

The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its
parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child
who is in their custody and control. The parental dereliction is, of course,
only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under Article 2180
of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

b.1. By parents
LIBI vs. IAC, GR No. 70880, Sept. 18, 1992

ISSUE:
W/N Alfonso Monfort can be held liable for the acts of his child which
caused damage to the Cuadra daughter.
HELD:
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or
negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no
willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is
that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then
becomes himself liable under Article 2180 under the principle of vicarious
liability. The presumption of liability is merely prima facie and may
therefore be rebutted by proving that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage."
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the
defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due
care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On
the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and
where she was under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far
as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent
prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however
careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard
against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait
in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing
and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.

HELD:
This principle of parental liability is a specie of vicarious liability or the
doctrine of imputed negligence where a person is not only liable for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom
he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus,
parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties
and responsibilities of parents their parental authority which
includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.

In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle
occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow
that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so
as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted
child. To hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that
they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented
would be unfair and unconscionable.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's
natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages
brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of
petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the
39

court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction.
b.2. By Guardians
b.3. By Owners and Managers of Establishments
PHIL. RABBIT LINES, INC. vs. PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC. G.R.
No. L-25142 March 25, 1975
FACTS:
On November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was
owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping,
Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged. Balingit was the
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
As a result of the incident, a complaint for damages was filed against PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda. The CFI dismissed the case
as to Balingit citing that the latter was not the manager of an
establishment contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
What is the meaning of manager as used in Art.2180 of the NCC?
HELD:
The Civil Code provides:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
We are of the opinion that the term manager does not include the
manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article
2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in
the sense of "employer".
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasidelictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already
mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or
dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORP. vs. VASQUEZ G.R. No. 132266 December 21,
1999

In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided
with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his
vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to
the Cebu Doctor's hospital where he died a few days after.
An action for damages was commenced by the parents of the deceased
against Abad and Castilex. The trial court ruled in favor of private
respondents. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court
holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is
"only vicarious and not solidary" with the former.
ISSUE: Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death
resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a
company-issued vehicle.
HELD:
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to
establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was
acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of
was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to
interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the
driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of
his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at
the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge
petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it
appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of
his employment.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at
the petitioner's office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City.
Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu City
where he had snacks with friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the
restaurant that the incident in question occurred. A witness then testified
that at the time of the incident, ABAD was with a woman inside his car.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own not in
line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident which
was about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988. ABAD's working day had ended;
his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which,
as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and
drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business;
neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope
of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to
show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require
that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the
negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
b.4. By Employers

FACTS:

BALIWAG TRANSIT INC. vs. CA G.R. No. 116624 September 20, 1996

On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Vasquez, was

driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was
traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but
only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand,
Benjamin Abad was manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation,
registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. On the same date and time,
Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going
around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of the
traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.

FACTS:
On 2 November 1990, petitioner's Baliwag Transit Bus No. 117 was driven
by Juanito Fidel to its terminal for repair of its brake system. Fidel told
mechanic Mario Dionisio to inform the headman about the matters so
that proper order to the mechanics could be made. Fidel then alighted
from the bus and told the gasman to fill up the gas tank.
Shortly after, Fidel returned to the bus and sat on the driver's seat.
Suddenly the bus moved; he felt something was hit. When he went down
to investigate he saw Mario Dionisio lying on the ground bleeding and
convulsive, sandwiched between Bus No. 117 and another bus parked
40

thereat. Mario Dionisio was rushed to the hospital but died a few days
after.
Thereafter a complaint for damages was lodged by private respondents
Divina Vda. de Dionisio, for herself and in behalf of her minor children. The
trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents. Upon
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N Baliwag Transit is liable solidarily with Fidel for the death of Dionisio.
HELD:
The petition must fail. The circumstances clearly show that the proximate
cause of the death of Dionisio was the negligence of driver Fidel when he
failed to take the necessary precaution to prevent the accident. Driver
Fidel should have parked the bus properly and safely. After alighting from
the bus to tell the gasman to fill the tank, he should have placed a stopper
or any hard object against a tire or two of the bus. But without taking the
necessary precaution he boarded Bus No. 117 causing it to move and roll,
pinning down the deceased which resulted in his eventual death. The
reckless imprudence of Fidel makes him liable to the heirs of offended
party for damages together with his employer.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee there instantly
arises a presumption of the law that there was negligence on the part of
the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the selection of
his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The
presumption however may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of
the employer that it had exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to
escape solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee, the
employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of
care. Petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver Juanito
Fidel will make it solidarily liable with the latter for damages caused by
him.

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for

one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held
liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was
in the performance of his assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the actual performance of
their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school
premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers
and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. This picnic had
no permit from the school head or its principal because this picnic is not a
school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular
activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by the principal
of the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in
any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of
the same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and
neither is it supported by any jurisprudence.

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs. CA, G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991

Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to

warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. Petitioners
Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand
belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who
joined the picnic. In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and
Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have
knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. The records also show
that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to
save the child.

FACTS:

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 75112 October 16, 1990

Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St.

Francis High School, joined a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and
Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.

FACTS:

During the picnic and while the students were in the water, one of the
female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including
Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand
himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate
him ashore failed.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages against the
St. Francis High School and the teachers, contending that the death of
their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's drowning.
The trial court found in favor of the respondents but absolved the school
from liability. The CA, upon appeal, ruled in favor of respondents and held
the school liable under the doctrine in Art. 2180 of the NCC.
ISSUE:
W/N St. Francis High School is liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo by
applying Art. 2180 of the NCC.
HELD:
The petition is impressed with merit. In the instant case, petitioners are
neither guilty of their own negligence nor guilty of the negligence of those
under them.
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence.
Consequently they cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:

Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an 82-year old retired

schoolteacher, was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer
and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr. was walking
along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20,
1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries
for which he was hospitalized.
Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was driving after having
persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to
him. The two fled from the scene after the incident.
Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for damages. The trial court rendered
judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault
but also Allan Masa, a non-party to the case. The Appellate Court affirmed
the trial court's decision in toto.
ISSUE:
W/N the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to
petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha.
HELD:
It is petitioner Filamer's basic contention that it cannot be held
responsible for the tortious act of Funtecha on the ground that there is no
existing employer-employee relationship between them. We agree.
In disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer has invoked the provisions of the
Labor Code, 7 specifically Section 14, Rule X of Book III which reads:
Sec. 14.Working scholars. There is no employer-employee
relationship between students on the one hand, and schools, colleges
or universities on the other, where students work for the latter in
41

exchange for the privilege to study free of charge; provided the

students are given real opportunity, including such facilities as may be
reasonable, necessary to finish their chosen court under such
arrangement.
It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law, petitioner
Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's employer. Funtecha belongs
to that special category of students who render service to the school in
exchange for free tuition Funtecha worked for petitioner for two hours
daily for five days a week. He was assigned to clean the school
passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with sufficient time to prepare
for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court,
Funtecha was not included in the company payroll.
But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha,
still the primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to
petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it
has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the
scope of his supposed employment. His duty was to sweep the school
passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes. Taking
the wheels of the jeep from the authorized driver and then driving the
vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person
were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. It is but fair
therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious
negligence.
YAMBAO vs. ZUIGA, G.R. No. 146173. December 11, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Yambao is the registered owner of Lady Cecil and Rome Trans
passenger bus. On May 6, 1992, the bus owned by the petitioner was
being driven by Venturina along EDSA. Suddenly, the bus bumped Zuiga, a
pedestrian. Zuiga thereafter died despite being given medical attention.
Private respondents, as legal heirs of Zuiga, filed a Complaint against
petitioner and her driver, Venturina, for damages. Both the trial court and
the CA ruled in favor of private respondents. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of her employees, thus absolving her from
any liability.
HELD:

efficiency. Hence, petitioner cannot claim exemption from any liability

arising from the recklessness or negligence of Venturina.
In sum, petitioners liability to private respondents for the negligent and
imprudent acts of her driver, Venturina, under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is both manifest and clear.
SYKI vs. BEGASA, G.R. No. 149149 October 23, 2003
FACTS:
On June 22, 1992, respondent Salvador Begasa and his three companions
flagged down a passenger jeepney driven by Espina and owned by
Pisuena. While respondent was boarding the passenger jeepney (his right
foot already inside while his left foot still on the boarding step of the
passenger jeepney), a truck driven by Sablayan and owned by petitioner
Syki bumped the rear end of the passenger jeepney. Respondent fell and
fractured his left thigh bone.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of common carriers
contractual obligations and quasi-delict against Pisuena, the owner of the
passenger jeepney;, herein petitioner Syki, the owner of the truck;, and
Sablayan, the driver of the truck.
The trial court dismissed the complaint against Pisuena but ordered
petitioner Syki and Sablayan, to pay respondent Begasa, jointly and
severally, actual and moral damages plus attorneys fees. The CA affirmed
the decision in toto.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner exercised due diligence of a good father in the selection
and supervision of his employees as to absolve him from liability.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners attempt to prove its "deligentissimi patris familias" in the
selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as
it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or
documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the
testimony.
Petitioner testified that before he hired Sablayan, he required him to
submit a police clearance in order to determine if he was ever involved in
any vehicular accident. He also required Sablayan to undergo a driving test
with conducted by his mechanic, Esteban Jaca.

Petitioners claim that she exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of her driver deserves but scant consideration. Her allegation
that before she hired Venturina she required him to submit his drivers
license and clearances is worthless, in view of her failure to offer in
evidence certified true copies of said license and clearances. Moreover, as
the court a quo aptly observed, petitioner contradicts herself. She
declared that Venturina applied with her sometime in January 1992 and
she then required him to submit his license and clearances. However, the
record likewise shows that she did admit that Venturina submitted the
said requirements only on May 6, 1992, or on the very day of the fatal
accident itself. In other words, petitioners own admissions clearly and
categorically show that she did not exercise due diligence in the selection
of her bus driver.

Petitioners mechanic, Esteban Jaca, on the other hand, testified that

Sablayan passed the driving test and had never figured in any vehicular
accident except the one in question.

In any case, assuming arguendo that Venturina did submit his license and
clearances when he applied with petitioner, the latter still fails the test of
due diligence in the selection of her bus driver. Petitioner failed to present
convincing proof that she went to the extent of verifying Venturinas
qualifications, safety record, and driving history. The presumption juris
tantum that there was negligence in the selection of her bus driver, thus,
remains unrebutted.

FACTS:

Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due supervision over Venturina
after his selection. Petitioner did not present any proof that she drafted
and implemented training programs and guidelines on road safety for her
employees. In fact, the record is bare of any showing that petitioner
required Venturina to attend periodic seminars on road safety and traffic

Petitioner, however, never presented the alleged police clearance given to

him by Sablayan, nor the results of Sablayans driving test. Petitioner also
did not present records of the regular inspections that his mechanic
allegedly conducted. The unsubstantiated and self-serving testimonies of
petitioner and his mechanic are, without doubt, insufficient to overcome
the legal presumption that petitioner was negligent in the selection and
supervision of his driver. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner is liable for the injuries suffered by respondent.
AGUILA vs. BALDOVISO, G.R. No. 163186 February 28, 2007
On April 19, 1993, Lisbos was driving, along EDSA in Caloocan City, a van,
registered under the name of petitioner Reyes. The van sideswiped Fausto
who was walking along the pedestrian lane and crossing EDSA. Fausto fell
on the pavement and suffered injuries, and was brought to the hospital
but subsequently died.
Faustos wife, Carmen R. Baldovizo, and children filed before the RTC a
complaint for damages against Lisbos, Reyes, Emerlito F. Aguila, the actual
operator and possessor of the van, and Times Surety and Insurance
Company, the insurer of the van under a third-party liability insurance
contract.
42

The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. The CA denied the appeal
ruling that Reyes and Aguila has lost their right to appeal.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioners have the right to appeal the amended decision after the
original decision had become final and executory?
HELD:
We find petitioners contentions devoid of merit.

employer's power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other

remuneration; (3) the employer's right to control the method of doing the
work; and (4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal.
Applying the foregoing test, it was the Municipality of Koronadal which
was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. It is
uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality.
That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of
the accident is of no moment.

While the Resolution dated August 13, 2001, correcting the March 7, 2000
Decision, stated that the name of Lisbos was inadvertently included in the
dispositive portion, hence, said name was ordered stricken off, the
ensuing Amended Decision rendered on August 13, 2001 is null and void
because any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects
the final and executory judgment is null and void.

Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give

instructions or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable. Mere
giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has
control over the vehicle.

Besides, it is not necessary to amend the original decision holding the

petitioners, Lisbos, and the insurance company solidarily liable. In an
action based on quasi-delict, the liability of the employer is direct and
primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee. Thus, even if the driver was included albeit
not served with summons, petitioners are directly and primarily liable.
Thus, petitioners Aguila and Reyes as employer and registered owner or
possessor-operator of the van, respectively, are solidarily liable in
accordance with Article 2180 in relation to Articles 2184 and 2194 of the
Civil Code.

Compare: Subsidiary Liability under Art. 103 of the RPC

SPS. JAYME vs. APOSTOL, G.R. No. 163609

FACTS:

The collision resulted in the deaths of the two drivers and two passengers
of the mini bus, Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay.

On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on

board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the
Municipality. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo
Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan.

Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus,
Mrs. Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita
Lugue, the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an action for
damages.

The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then
crossing the National Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato.

The trial court in its decision said that the act of the Franco Bus driver was
a negligent act punishable by law resulting in a civil obligation arising from
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code and not from Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. Said decision was affirmed by the IAC.

November 27, 2008

Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical attention, Marvin

expired six (6) days after the accident.
Petitioners spouses Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a complaint for
damages against respondents.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the CA absolved Miguel
from liability upon appeal, citing that the latter was not the employer of
Lozano. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
May a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of
the driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor
pedestrian?
HELD:
The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application in
the present case.
To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the
following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was
chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the
service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has
the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the
employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to
him.
Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It
is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant
evidence
In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out if Mayor
Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore liable for the
negligent acts of the latter. To determine the existence of an employment
relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves: (1) the

Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and
his direct employer.
SPS. FRANCO vs. IAC, G.R. No. 71137 October 5, 1989
FACTS:
On October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the northbound Franco Bus
he was driving to the left to avoid hitting a truck parked along the
cemented pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga, Capas
Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus driven by
one Magdaleno Lugue and making a collision between the two vehicles an
unavoidable and disastrous eventuality.

ISSUE:
Whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by herein private
respondents was predicated upon crime or quasi-delict.
HELD:
We find merit in this contention. Distinction should be made between the
subsidiary liability of the employer under the RPC and the employer's
primary liability under the NCC which is quasi-delictual or tortious in
character. The first type of liability is governed by Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code which provide as follows:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary
liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by the servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties;
While the second kind is governed by Articles 2176, 2177 and 2180 of the
Civil Code.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a
delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and
upon whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be
based. Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded
against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the
employee's criminal negligence or delict and corresponding liability
therefor are proved. If no criminal action was instituted, the employer's
liability would not be predicated under Article 103.
In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted. Thus, petitioners'
subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on considering that their liability is
43

merely secondary to their employee's primary liability. Logically therefore,

recourse under this remedy is not possible.

Renato Ramos, subsidiarily liable for payment of the adjudged indemnities

to the offended parties, ruling that --

To hold the employer liable under Article 103 of the RPC sans prior
conviction is erroneous. It is erroneous because the conviction of the
employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non for the employer's
subsidiary liability and, at the same time, absurd because we will be faced
with a situation where the employer is held subsidiarily liable even
without a primary liability being previously established.

Maximiliano Alvarez is not a party in this action. It is true that the

judgment of conviction in the criminal case binds the person
subsidiarily liable with the accused, and it is therefore the duty of the
employer to participate in the defense. The law, however, does not
authorize that the subsidiary liability of the employer be adjudged in
the criminal action. This is because, in the criminal proceeding, the
employer, not being a party, is denied the opportunity to present his
defense against such subsidiary liability. Due regard to due process
and observance of procedural requirements demand that a separate
action should be filed against the supposed employer to enforce the
subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the RPC.

Thus the present case must be decided on the basis of civil liability of the
employer as a result of the tortious act of its employee and not subsidiary
liability under Art. 103 of the RPC.
BERMUDEZ vs. HON. MELENCIO-HERRERA, G.R. No. L-32055 February 26,
1988
FACTS:
A cargo truck, driven by Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan,
bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants,
was riding. The boy sustained injuries which caused his death. As a result,
a criminal case filed against Pontino. Plaintiffs-appellants filed in the said
criminal case "A Reservation to File Separate Civil Action."
On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages.
Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action "on the assumption that
defendant Pontino's negligence constituted a quasi-delict," the trial court
stated that plaintiffs had already elected to treat the accident as a "crime"
by reserving in the criminal case their right to file a separate civil action.
That being so, the trial court decided to order the dismissal of the
complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the
hearing of the case against Pontino until after the criminal case is finally
terminated. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:

The CAs decision was not appealed. Meanwhile, on 14 December 1978,

Pajarito v. Seneris was decided by this Court, holding inter alia that-Considering that the judgment of conviction, sentencing a defendant
employee to pay an indemnity under Articles 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, is conclusive upon the employer not only with
regard to the latter's civil liability but also with regard to its amount, .
. . in the action to enforce the employer's subsidiary liability, the court
has no other function than to render decision based upon the
indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend
or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the
decision.
In view of the foregoing principles, it would serve no important
purpose to require petitioner to file a separate and independent
action against the employer for the enforcement of the latter's
subsidiary civil liability. At any rate, the proceeding for the
enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part
of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment.

Whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-appellants is founded on

crime or on quasi-delict.

After finality of the CA judgment, the case was remanded to the RTC for
execution on the strength of the Pajarito decision.

HELD:We find the appeal meritorious.

ISSUE:

To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasi-contract, crime

and quasi-delict. According to appellant, her action is one to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime. It is now settled that for an employer to be
subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be present:

W/N a separate civil action is necessary to enforce the employers

subsidiary liability.

(1) that an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his duties;
(2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability;
(3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry.
Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be
subsidiarily liable.
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice
between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi- delict under
Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may
hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee,
subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good
father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was an action for damages
based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the
criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them
from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.
ALVAREZ vs. CA, G.R. No. L-59621 February 23, 1988
FACTS:
Renato Ramos was charged with Double Homicide in the CFI of Quezon
Province. After trial, the court rendered judgment against the accused.
The accused appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court's decision
but deleted that part thereof making herein petitioner, as employer of

HELD:
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The subsidiary liability of an employer automatically arises upon his
employee's conviction, and subsequent proof of inability to pay. In this
light, the application of Pajarito is merely the enforcement of a procedural
remedy designed to ease the burden of litigation for recovery of
indemnity by the victims of a judicially-declared criminally negligent act.
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be
established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case
has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as
efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil
aspects of the case. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover
the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a
separate civil action to be filed.
CEREZO vs. TUAZON,

G.R. No. 141538

March 23, 2004

FACTS:
On 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger collided with a tricycle.
On 1 October 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages
against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line and bus driver Foronda.
The trial court ruled in Tuazons favor. The trial court made no
pronouncement on Forondas liability because there was no service of
summons on him. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the
damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezos
employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
44

Mrs. Cerezo resorted to petition for relief from judgment, petition for
certiorari and annulment of judgment. Mrs. Cerezo insisted that trial court
never acquired jurisdiction over the case considering there was no service
of summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses claimed was an
indispensable party. All of the actions were denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
W/N Foronda was an indispensable party to the action so as to enforce
Mrs. Cerezos liability.
HELD:
The petition has no merit.
Mrs. Cerezos contention proceeds from the point of view of criminal law
and not of civil law, while the basis of the present action of Tuazon is
quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code.
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict
under Article 103 of the RPC, or may give rise to an action for a quasidelict under Article 2180 of the NCC. An aggrieved party may choose
between the two remedies.
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict.
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party
to the case.

The complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing
the defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is,
however, from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their
choice of remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the plaintiff spouses
alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part of the
driver and the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, which
diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that
resulted to the death of their 7-year old son.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct
or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee.
DUAVIT vs. CA, G.R. No. 82318 May 18, 1989
FACTS:
On July 28, 1971 plaintiffs Sarmiento and Catuar were aboard a jeep.
Catuar was driving the said jeep and while approaching Roosevelt Avenue,
Catuar slowed down. Suddenly, another jeep driven by defendant
Sabiniano hit and bumped plaintiff's jeep. Catuar was thrown to the
middle of the road; his wrist was broken and he sustained contusions on
the head; that likewise plaintiff Sarmiento was trapped inside the fallen
jeep, and one of his legs was fractured.

Moreover, an employers liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and

direct, while the employers liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary.
Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of
the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When
an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has
himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the
damage.

The plaintiffs have filed this case both against Sabiniano as driver, and
against Duavit as owner of the jeep.

In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary

liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee as
provided in Article 103 of the RPC. To hold the employer liable in a
subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a
criminal action where the employees delict and corresponding primary
liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then
the trial courts jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the
present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the
delict of Foronda.

The trial court found Sabiniano negligent but absolved Duavit from
liability. Upon appeal, the CA rendered the decision holding the petitioner
jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano.

L.G. FOODS CORPORATION vs. HON. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR,

No. 158995
September 26, 2006

G.R.

FACTS:
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses
Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven
at the time by their employee, Yeneza. Charles died as a result of the
accident.
A criminal case was filed against the driver. Unfortunately, before the trial
could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide. On account
thereof, the MTCC dismissed the criminal case.
Thereafter, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against
the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that
as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees.
The defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing
that the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary liability against an
employer" under the provision of Article 103 of the RPC.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. The CA
denied the petition for certiorari and upheld the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action is founded on Article 103
of the RPC or derived from Article 2180 of the NCC.
HELD:

Defendant Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other jeep, denied

that the other defendant (Sabiniano) was his employee.
Defendant Sabiniano categorically admitted that he took the jeep from the
garage of defendant Duavit without the consent or authority of the latter

ISSUE:
W/N the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be
held liable under Article 2180 of the NCC when the said vehicle was
neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with the consent of
the latter.
HELD:
As early as in 1939, we have ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot be
held liable for an accident involving the said vehicle if the same was driven
without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him.
Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle involved in tire
mishap but completely denies having employed the driver Sabiniano or
even having authorized the latter to drive his jeep. The jeep was virtually
stolen from the petitioner's garage. To hold, therefore, the petitioner
liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was
neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like
holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the
person who stole such vehicle.
JUANIZA vs. JOSE,

G.R. No. L-50127-28

March 30, 1979

FACTS:
Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney
involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine
National Railways which resulted in the death to 7 and physical injuries to
5 of its passengers. At the time of the accident, Jose was legally married to
Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Arroyo,
for 16 years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
The CFI rendered a decision against Jose and Arroyo. The lower court
based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code which
reads:
When a man and woman living together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
45

acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their

wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
ISSUE:
W/N Arroyo who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held
jointly and severally liable for damages with the registered owner of the
same.
HELD:
The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the NCC requires that
the man and the woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Jose is legally married to Socorro
Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Arroyo.
Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a coowner of the jeepney. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo
for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by,
the passengers of the jeepney. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only
the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages
that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe
caused to any of the passengers therein.
ANONUEVO vs. CA, supra.
FGU INSURANCE CORP. vs. CA, G.R. No. 118889 March 23, 1998
FACTS:
On 21 April 1987, 2 vehicles, cruising along EDSA, figured in a traffic
accident. The car owned by Soriano was being driven by Jacildone, while
the other car, owned by respondent FILCAR, was driven by Dahl-Jensen as
lessee. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by
FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano.
As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of its
insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter. By way of subrogation, it
sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR for quasi-delict. Unfortunately,
summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer staying at
his given address. Both the RTC and CA dismissed the complaint for failure
of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation.
ISSUE:
May an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company
for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle?
HELD:
We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding
the dismissal of petitioner's complaint.
To sustain a claim based on Art. 2176, the following requisites must
concur:

FACTS:
Ildefonso Ortiz instituted a case against the Handong Irrigation
Association, Inc. to recover possession, with damages, of a lot located in
Camarines Sur, which the Irrigation Association allegedly entered and
occupied.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic, filed an urgent motion to
lift the order of garnishment against the deposits and/or pump irrigation
trust fund in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit at the PNB, Manila,
for the reason that the funds subject matter thereof are public funds and
exempt from attachment or execution. Upon denial of this motion, the
Solicitor General commenced the present certiorari and prohibition
proceeding in the CA. The appellate court sustained the propriety of the
said order. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
W/N the pump irrigation trust fund may be garnished to satisfy a moneyjudgment against the Handog Irrigation Asso.
HELD:
An infirmity of the decision under appeal originates from its ignoring the
fact that the initial complaint against the Irrigation Service Unit was that it
had induced the Handong Irrigation Association, Inc., to invade and occupy
the land of the plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz. The ISU liability thus arose from
tort and not from contract; and it is a well-entrenched rule in this
jurisdiction, embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
that the State is liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially
commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such agent's
regular duties There being no proof that the making of the tortious
inducement was authorized, neither the State nor its funds can be made
liable therefor.
MERITT vs. GOVT OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS, G.R. No. L-11154
21, 1916

March

FACTS:
Plaintiff was riding a motorcycle along Taft Avenue when the General
Hospital ambulance turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before
reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue,
without having sounded any whistle or horn and in violation of the Motor
Vehicle Act, by which movement it struck the plaintiff.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured
that, as a consequence, plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a
contractor.
ISSUE:

(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;

W/N the govt can be held liable for the damages resulting from the
negligence of the chauffeur.

(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,

HELD:

(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of

the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government
by virtue of Act No. 2457 in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to
determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is
entitled on account of said collision, . . . ."

We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the

existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of FILCAR,
because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently
established. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to DahlJensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal
liability. FILCAR did not have any participation therein.
Art. 2180 is not applicable in this case. FILCAR being engaged in a rent-acar business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such,
there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee.
Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act
of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the latter.
CADIENTE vs. MACAS, supra.
b.6. By State
REPUBLIC vs. HON. PALACIO, G.R. No. L-20322 May 29, 1968

Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted
liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit
now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to
see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the
state's immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for
the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. It did not
pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be
in the absence of the state's immunity from suit.
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
46

whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the

provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case
wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in
which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he
is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound
to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the
acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the
functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and
which are regulated by law and the regulations."
It is, therefore, evidence that the is only liable for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of
the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

b.7.. By Teachers
EXCONDE vs. CAPUNO,

G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957

FACTS:
Dante Capuno was a student of the Bilintawak Elementary School and on
March 31, 1949 he attended a parade upon instruction of the city school's
supervisor. From the school, Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep
and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it
while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep
turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore
Caperia, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno,
father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did
he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know
it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade
upon instruction of his teacher.
Delfin Capuno contends that he is not liable for damages since at the time
of the incident, he was not in supervision, custody and control of his son.
The RTC sustained the defense and the case was certified by the CA to the
SC on the ground of pure questions of law.
ISSUE:
W/N Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his
son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperia.
HELD:
Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, provide:
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is
enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with
them.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages
in question because at the time the Dante committed the negligent act
which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then
living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the
civil liability of the father is evident.
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted,
"teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused
by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this

provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any
academic educational institution. Here Dante Capuno was then a student
of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular
activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction
of the city school's supervisor. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither
the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held
liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of
an institute of arts and trades as provided by law.
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father is obvious. This is
necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them
which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping
them in their company, educating them and instructing them in
proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the
"right to correct and punish them in moderation". The only way by which
they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. This, defendants failed to prove.

SPS.PALISOC vs. BRILLANTES, G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971

FACTS:
The deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio Daffon were
classmates in Manila Technical Institute. On March 10, 1966, they,
together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory
room. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio Daffon were working on a machine while
Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark
to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark
Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave
Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist
blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist
blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc
stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward.
First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was
immediately taken to a hospital where he eventually died.
Plaintiff-appellants, as parents of the deceased, filed a case against
Daffon, Brillantes as member of the Board of Directors of the Institute,
Valenton as president and Quibulue as instructor thereof.
The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court, however, absolved from
liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical
Institute, ruling that teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be only liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
and apprentices where the latter are under their custody.
ISSUE:
W/N defendants-school officials are liable as tortfeasors with defendant
Daffon for damages resulting from Palisocs death.
HELD:
The Court holds that under the Art. 2180 of the NCC, defendants head and
teacher of the Manila Technical Institute are liable jointly and severally for
damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son at
the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability
attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board
of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has
not been properly impleaded as party defendant.
The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious
acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is
that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco
parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the child." In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the
protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation
as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the
47

students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in
the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and
hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some
student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their
fellow students. .
The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school
officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180,
Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his
classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other
defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the
cited article "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means
the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school. There is nothing in the law that requires that for
such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act
must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court,
and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must
now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. .
AMADORA vs. CA, G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora was a graduating student of Colegio de San JoseRecoletos. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their
school, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo.
The herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and
the physics teacher, together with Damon and two other students,
through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was
later dropped. The trial court held the remaining defendants liable to the
plaintiffs. On appeal to the CA, however, the decision was reversed and all
the defendants were completely absolved.
ISSUE:
W/N Art. 2180 was applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was
not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning.
W/N the students were in the custody of the school at the time of the
incident as the semester had already ended.
HELD:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question
should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision.
This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it
is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception
to the general rule.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the
non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado
Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of
the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in
its custody but if that same tort were committed in an academic school,
no liability would attach to the teacher or the school head.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic
school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his students,
why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is
caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or
non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof
instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?

The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the
head of the school of arts and trades exercises a closer tutelage over his
pupils than the head of the academic school. By contrast, the head of the
academic school is not as involved with his students and exercised only
administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly
dealing with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly
faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and
trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the custody requirement signify that that the student
should be within the control of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. However, this does not necessarily mean that
such, custody be co-terminous with the semester.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, the responsibility of the
school authorities over the student continues. At the time Alfredo
Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year
classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics
report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must
answer for his students' torts. It is not necessary that at the time of the
injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it.
Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but
refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline
instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused
by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if
the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time
when its authority could be validly exercised over him.
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held
liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge. Each of them was
exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the
direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of
particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its
discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacherin-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report
did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon,
the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no
showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Damon or
that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school
or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy
happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed
or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true that the
offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if
the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not
been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline
upon the student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved
that they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the
school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
Finally, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable
under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student
or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by
any of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to
have been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been
remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
SALVOSA vs. IAC, G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988
FACTS:
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution. However, it is
also an institution of arts and trade.
48

The BCF ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Abon received his appointment from the AFP
and received his salary from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain
Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit.
Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University
of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the
armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and
Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading
Abon, Ungos (ROTC Commandant), school officials and the BCF as party
defendants. The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of Castro. On
appeal by petitioners, the respondent Court affirmed with modification
the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Abon for damages under
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at attendance in the school"
cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in
the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of
temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still
remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school
premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess
by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being
enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not
constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory
custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Abon cannot be
considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody
of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners
cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Abon
for damages resulting from his acts.
Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Ungos, ROTC
Unit Commandant, had instructed Abon "not to leave the office and to
keep the armory well guarded." Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy
B. Abon was under the custody of the school when he committed the act
for which the petitioners are sought to be held liable, this circumstance
shows that Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite
instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot
Napoleon Castro.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS, G.R. No. 143363. February 6,
2002
FACTS:
St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the
school year 1995-1996. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful
day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to
Larayan Elementary School. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then
15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove
the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the
accident.
Thereafter, his parents filed a case for damages against James Daniel II
and his parents, Villanueva and St. Marys Academy. The RTC found the St.
Marys Academy liable while Daniels parents were subsidiarily liable.
Villanueva was absolved from liability. Said decision was affirmed by the
CA.
ISSUE:

W/N petitioner is liable for the death of Carpitanos.

HELD:
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special
parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or
(2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a
minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or
custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident. In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence
of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Evidence shows, and this the respondents did not dispute, that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or
the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the
vehicle was respondent Villanueva. The registered owner of any vehicle,
even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the
public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle
was being driven on the highways or streets. Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent
Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages
for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
b.8. Defense: Diligence of a Good Father of Family
c. Provinces, Cities and Municipalities
JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 71049 May 29, 1987
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that on August 15, 1974 he, together with his neighbors,
went to Sta. Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at the time when the
public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. On his way home,
he stepped on an uncovered opening obscured by the dirty rainwater,
causing a dirty and rusty four-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered
opening, to pierce the left leg of petitioner. After administering first aid
treatment at a nearby drugstore, his companions helped him hobble
home. Petitioner became ill and his leg swelled with great pain and was
thereafter hospitalized. After discharge, he had to walk around in
crutches. His injury prevented him from attending to the school buses he
is operating.
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated
Corporation under whose administration the Sta. Ana Public Market had
been placed. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the IAC
held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable for damages but absolved
respondent City of Manila.
ISSUE:
W/N the IAC erred in not ruling that respondent City of Manila should be
jointly and severally liable with Asiatic Integrated Corporation for the
injuries petitioner suffered.
49

HELD:
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be held liable for the
injuries sustained by the petitioner because under the Management and
Operating Contract, Asiatic Integrated Corporation assumed all
responsibility for damages which may be suffered by third persons for any
cause attributable to it.
It has also been argued that the City of Manila cannot be held liable under
the Revised Charter of Manila which provides:
The City shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or
property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any
other City Officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other
law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or
any other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions.
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides that:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of defective
conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public
works under their control or supervision.

The CA applied the Civil Code instead of Act. No. 409 (Charter of Manila),
and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application
is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a
general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions
above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule
regulating the liability of the City of Manila. Upon the other hand, Article
2189 constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by
any person by reason" specifically "of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under
their control or supervision.
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to
the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted.
What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have
either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos
Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila.
GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN, G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989
FACTS:

Thus, it is clear that the Revised Charter of Manila refers to liability arising
from negligence, in general, regardless of the object, thereof, while Article
2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due to "defective streets, public
buildings and other public works" in particular and is therefore decisive on
this specific case.

Guilatco was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at

Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and supervision of the City
of Dagupan) when she accidentally fell into a manhole. As a result thereof,
she had to be hospitalized and operated on. From the time of the mishap
on July 25, 1978 up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty
as court interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion.

Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach, that the defective public works belong to
the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted.
What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality has
either "control or supervision" over the public building in question.

The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioner. On appeal, the appellate
court reversed the lower court findings on the ground that no evidence
was presented by the plaintiff- appellee to prove that the City of Dagupan
had "control or supervision" over Perez Boulevard.

In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market,
despite the Management and Operating Contract between respondent
City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the control of the
former.

W/N control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan

exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with
article 2189 of the Civil Code.

There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of Manila to exercise

reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe for people
frequenting the place for their marketing needs.
Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no openings in the
middle of the passageways and if any, that they were adequately covered.
Had the opening been covered, petitioner could not have fallen into it.
Thus the negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the
injury suffered. The City is therefore liable for the injury suffered by the
petitioner.
CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO, G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968
FACTS:
Genaro Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole on P.
Burgos Avenue as he stepped down from the curb of the street to board a
jeepney. Teotico suffered serious injuries due to the fall.

ISSUE:

HELD:
We grant the petition.
Under Art. 2189, it is not necessary for the defective road or street to
belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The
article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter
of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer who has the
following duties:
Sec. 22.The City Engineer--His powers, duties and compensationThere shall be a city engineer, who shall be in charge of the
department of Engineering and Public Works. He shall receive a salary
of not exceeding three thousand pesos per annum. He shall have the
following duties:
xxx

ISSUE:

(j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of
waterworks and sewers, and all sources of water supply, and shall
control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in accordance
with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate the use
of all private systems for supplying water to the city and its
inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their connection with the
public sewer system.

W/N the City of Manila is liable for the damages incurred by Teotico.

xxx

HELD:

The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out,
construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and

As a consequence thereof, Teotico filed a complaint for damages against

the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city
treasurer and chief of police. The complaint was dismissed by the CFI. The
decision was affirmed by the CA except insofar as the City of Manila was
concerned which was ordered to indemnify Teotico. Hence, this appeal.

50

sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the

Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city
indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open
drainage hole is located.
VII.

STRICT LIABILITY TORTS

a. Possessor of Animals (Art. 2183)

Article 2183.The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the
same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage
should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.

The same charter also provides that the laying out, construction and
improvement of streets and regulation of the use thereof may be
legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that
the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk.
The city cannot be excused from liability by the argument that the duty of
the City Engineer to supervise or control the said road belongs more to his
functions as an ex-officio Highway Engineer or the Ministry of Public
Highway than as a city officer. This is because while he is entitled to an
honorarium from the Ministry, his salary from the city government
substantially exceeds the honorarium.
c. Head of Family (Art. 2193)
Article 2193.The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof,
is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the
same.

VESTIL V. COURT OF APPEALS, 179 SCRA 47

DINGCONG V. KANAAN, 72 PHIL 14

FACTS:

FACTS:

Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she died
because she was bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied
this, claiming they had nothing to do with the dog. The Uys sued the
Vestils, who were sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision of
the court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are now
before the Supreme Court. They prayed to set aside the judgment of the
respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial court.

Dingcong brothers are co-lessees in the upper floor of the house owned by
Saenz. The brothers established the central hotel in the building where
they were the managers. A guest, Echivarria, occupied room 10 of the
hotel for P30 per month. Kanaans occupied the lower floor of the hotel
where they established a bazaar. Echivarria let his faucet leak while the
pipes of the hotel were undergoing repairs. A bucket was placed
underneath the leaking faucet to catch the dripping water the bucket
overflowed. Water seeped through the floor the merchandise in the
bazaar below got wet and damaged worth around P1T.

ISSUE:
WON Purita Vestil is the owner of the house or of the dog left by her
father as his estate has not yet been partitioned.
HELD:
The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on
the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or
user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and
on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his
utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal
may cause.
Petition is denied.
b. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs (Art. 2187)
Article 2187.Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet
articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any
noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation
exists between them and the consumers.
GUILATCO VS.CITY OF DAGUPAN G.R. NO.61516, supra.
ISSUE:
W/N control or supervision over a national road by the city of Dagupan
exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with
Article 2189.
HELD:
YES, THE CITY OF DAGUPAN IS LIABLE.
Art. 2189 provides that Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable
for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason
of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the
province, city, or municipality for liability to attach. The article only
requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective
road or street.
This control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan
exercised through the City Engineer who according to Section 22 has the
following duties, xxx He shall have the care and custody of the public
system of waterworks and sewers xxx

Kanaans brought an action for damages against the managers (brothers

Dingcong) and Echivarria. CFI absolved 1 Dingcong brother only (because
one had already died) but held Echivarria liable. CA reversed holding
Dingcong liable for the damages.
ISSUE:
W/N the manager can be held liable.
HELD:
YES.
Dingcong, as a co-lessee and manager of the hotel has to answer for the
damage caused by things that are thrown or falling from the hotel (Art.
1910 of the Codigo Civil). Echivarria was a guest of the hotel and although
he was the direct cause of the damage, Dingcong did NOT exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family. He knew that the pipes of the
hotel were under repair, presumed that the guest Echivarria would use
the faucet, but only provided a bucket to deal with the problem of the
leaks.

d. Allied Laws: Sec 97-102, Consumer Act; Sec. 31, Corporation Code
PHIL. CONSUMER ACT || CHAPTER V || LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT AND
SERVICE
Art. 97.Liability for the Defective Products. - Any Filipino or foreign
manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be liable for redress,
independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects
resulting from design, manufacture, construction, assembly and erection,
formulas and handling and making up, presentation or packing of their
products, as well as for the insufficient or inadequate information on the
use and hazards thereof.
A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected
of it, taking relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not
limited to:
(a)

presentation

of

product;
51

(b)

use

and

hazards

reasonably

expected

of

it;
(c) a proportionate price reduction.

(c) the time it was put into circulation.

A product is not considered defective because another better quality
product
has
been
placed
in
the
market.
The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not be held liable
when it evidences:
(a) that it did not place the product on the market;
(b) that although it did place the product on the market such
product
has
no
defect;
(c) that the consumer or a third party is solely at fault.
Art. 98.Liability of Tradesman or Seller. - The tradesman/seller is likewise
liable, pursuant to the preceding article when:
(a) it is not possible to identify the manufacturer, builder,
producer
or
importer;
(b) the product is supplied, without clear identification of the
manufacturer,
producer,
builder
or
importer;
(c) he does not adequately preserve perishable goods. The party
making payment to the damaged party may exercise the right to
recover a part of the whole of the payment made against the
other responsible parties, in accordance with their part or
responsibility in the cause of the damage effected.
Art. 99.Liability for Defective Services. - The service supplier is liable for
redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by
defects relating to the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient
or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards thereof.
The service is defective when it does not provide the safety the consumer
may rightfully expect of it, taking the relevant circumstances into
consideration, including but not limited to:
(a)

the

manner

in

which

it

is

provided;

(b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it;

(c) the time when it was provided.
A service is not considered defective because of the use or introduction of
new
techniques.
The supplier of the services shall not be held liable when it is proven:
(a) that there is no defect in the service rendered;
(b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.
Art. 100.Liability for Product and Service Imperfection. - The suppliers of
durable or nondurable consumer products are jointly liable for
imperfections in quality that render the products unfit or inadequate for
consumption for which they are designed or decrease their value, and for
those resulting from inconsistency with the information provided on the
container, packaging, labels or publicity messages/advertisement, with
due regard to the variations resulting from their nature, the consumer
being able to demand replacement to the imperfect parts.
If the imperfection is not corrected within thirty (30) days, the consumer
may alternatively demand at his option:
(a) the replacement of the product by another of the same kind,
in
a
perfect
state
of
use;
(b) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with
monetary updating, without prejudice to any losses and
damages;

The parties may agree to reduce or increase the term specified in the
immediately preceding paragraph; but such shall not be less than seven
(7) nor more than one hundred and eighty (180) days.
The consumer may make immediate use of the alternatives under the
second paragraph of this Article when by virtue of the extent of the
imperfection, the replacement of the imperfect parts may jeopardize the
product quality or characteristics, thus decreasing its value.
If the consumer opts for the alternative under sub-paragraph (a) of the
second paragraph of this Article, and replacement of the product is not
possible, it may be replaced by another of a different kind, mark or model:
Provided, That any difference in price may result thereof shall be
supplemented or reimbursed by the party which caused the damage,
without prejudice to the provisions of the second, third and fourth
paragraphs
of
this
Article.
Art. 101. Liability for Product Quantity Imperfection. - Suppliers are jointly
liable for imperfections in the quantity of the product when, in due regard
for variations inherent thereto, their net content is less than that indicated
on the container, packaging, labeling or advertisement, the consumer
having powers to demand, alternatively, at his own option:
(a)

the

proportionate

price;

(b) the supplementing of weight or measure differential;

(c) the replacement of the product by another of the same kind,
mark
or
model,
without
said
imperfections;
(d) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with
monetary updating without prejudice to losses and damages if
any.
The provisions of the fifth paragraph of Article 99 shall apply to this
Article.
The immediate supplier shall be liable if the instrument used for weighing
or measuring is not gauged in accordance with official standards.
Art. 102. Liability for Service Quality Imperfection. - The service supplier is
liable for any quality imperfections that render the services improper for
consumption or decrease their value, and for those resulting from
inconsistency with the information contained in the offer or
advertisement, the consumer being entitled to demand alternatively at his
option:
(a) the performance of the services, without any additional cost
and
when
applicable;
(b) the immediate reimbursement of the amount paid, with
monetary updating without prejudice to losses and damages, if
any;
(c) a proportionate price reduction.
Reperformance of services may be entrusted to duly qualified third
parties,
at
the
supplier's
risk
and
cost.
Improper services are those which prove to be inadequate for purposes
reasonably expected of them and those that fail to meet the provisions of
this Act regulating service rendering.
CORPORATION
CODE
||
DIRECTORS/TRUSTEES/OFFICERS

TITLE

III

||

BOARD

OF

Sec. 31.Liability of directors, trustees or officers. - Directors or trustees

who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of
the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in
directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or
52

pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees

shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom
suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other
persons.

ISSUE:

When a director, trustee or officer attempts to acquire or acquires, in

violation of his duty, any interest adverse to the corporation in respect of
any matter which has been reposed in him in confidence, as to which
equity imposes a disability upon him to deal in his own behalf, he shall be
liable as a trustee for the corporation and must account for the profits
which otherwise would have accrued to the corporation.

The argument is untenable. There is no forum shopping.

VIII.

Again, We turn down the contention.

NATURE AND ENFORCEMENT OF LIABILITY

a. Between Tortfeasors: Solidary

Article 2194.The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict is solidary.

W/N there is forum shopping.

HELD:
Anent the second issue, petitioners posit that since the issues before the
NLRC and the SSC are the same, the SSC cannot make a ruling on the issue
presented before it without necessarily having a direct effect on the issue
before the NLRC. Thus, petitioners contend, Dr. Climaco was guilty of
forum shopping.
Admittedly, Dr. Climacos basis in filing the cases before the NLRC and the
SSC is his Retainer Agreement with the company. This does not mean,
however, that his causes of action are the same:
x xx Some authorities declare the distinction between demands or
rights of action which are single and entire and those which are
several and distinct to be that the former arise out of one and the
same act or contract and the latter out of different acts or contracts.
This rule has been declared to be unsound, however, and as evidence
of its unsoundness, reference has been made to the fact that several
promissory notes may, and often do, grow out of one and the same
transaction, and yet they do not constitute an entire demand. The
better rule is that the bare fact that different demands spring out of
the same or contract does not ipso facto render a judgment on one a
bar to a suit on another, however distinct. It is clear that the right of a
plaintiff to maintain separate actions cannot be determined by the
fact that the claims might have been prosecuted in a single action. A
plaintiff having separate demands against a defendant may, at his
election, join them in the same action, or he may prosecute them
separately, subject of the power of the court to order their
consolidation. There may be only one cause of action although the
plaintiff is entitled to several forms and kinds of relief, provided there
is not more than one primary right sought to be enforced or one
subject of controversy presented for adjudication. (Underscoring
supplied)

b. No double recovery for same act or omission

Article 2176.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
COCA-COLA V. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, GR NO. 159323, JUL 31,
200
FACTS:
Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. is a corporation engaged in the
manufacture and sale of softdrink beverages, Co-petitioner Eric Montinola
was the general manager of its plant in Bacolod City, Respondent Dr. Dean
Climaco was a former retainer physician at the companys plant in
Bacolod City.
In 1988, petitioner company and Dr. Climaco entered into a Retainer
Agreement for one year, with a monthly compensation and where he may
charge professional fees for hospital services rendered in line with his
specialization. The agreement further provided that either party may
terminate the contract upon giving thirty (30)-day written notice to the
other.
Explicit in the contract, however, is the provision that no employeeemployer relationship shall exist between the company and Dr. Climaco
while the contract is in effect. In case of its termination, Dr. Climaco shall
be entitled only to such retainer fee as may be due him at the time of
termination.
Meantime, Dr. Climaco inquired with the DOLE and the SSS whether he
was an employee of the company. Both agencies replied in the affirmative.
As a result, Dr. Climaco filed a complaint before the NLRC. In his
complaint, he sought recognition as a regular employee of the company
and demanded payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living allowance,
holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, Christmas bonus and all other
benefits.
During the pendency of the complaint, the company terminated its
Retainer Agreement with Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco filed another
complaint for illegal dismissal against the company before the NLRC. He
asked that he be reinstated to his former position as company physician of
its Bacolod Plant, without loss of seniority rights, with full payment of
backwages, other unpaid benefits, and for payment of damages.
Meantime, while the NLRC cases were pending, Dr. Climaco filed with the
SSC in Bacolod City, a petition praying, among others, that petitioner CocaCola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. be ordered to report him for compulsory social
security coverage.
On April 12, 1995, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that there is no employeremployee relationship between the company and Dr. Climaco; and that his
services were engaged by virtue of a Retainer Agreement..

As the SSC and the CA correctly observed, different laws are applicable to
the cases before the two tribunals. The Labor Code and pertinent social
legislations would govern the cases before the NLRC, while the Social
Security Law would govern the case before the SSC. Clearly, as the issues
pending before the NLRC and the SSC are diverse, a ruling on the NLRC
cases would not amount to res judicata in the case before the SSC.
c. Requirement as to Reservation
Rule 111, Section 3, 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
Sec. 3.When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
d. Manner of enforcement distinguished from:
d.1 culpa criminal
d.2 culpa contractual
IX.

SPECIAL TORTS

QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT, ET. AL. V. DACARA, GR NO. 150304, JUNE

15, 2005
FACTS:

53

Dacara Jr., driving a Toyota Sedan, rammed into a pile of diggings in

Quezon City which was repaired by the latter. The car turned turtle which
results to his injury.
Dacara Sr., in his sons behalf, sought indemnification from Quezon City
Government.
Petitioner City Government argued that they were not negligent because
they placed all precautionary signs to alert the public of a roadside
construction and it is Dacara Jrs sole negligence that causes the accident.
ISSUE:
W/N CA gravely erred in not holding Dacara as negligent at the time of
incident.
HELD:
Proximate cause is any cause that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such
that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent. The unanimity of the CA and
the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners' negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident bars the SC from supplanting
their findings and substituting these with their own.
Petitioners belatedly point out that Dacara Jr. was driving at the speed of
60 kph when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly above the
maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on city streets with light traffic. These
matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the
trial which is a violation of the long-entrenched rule that issues not raised
during the trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
DBP V. CA, ET. AL., GR NO. 137916, DEC. 8, 2004
FACTS:
On 1980, Gotangco spouses secured a loan for their poultry project in
Palayan City from the DBP in the amount of P121, 400.00. They then
executed a real estate mortgage over the parcels of land. Eventually,
Gotangco as vendors, executed in favor of Cucio a contract to sell over the
seven parcels of land mortgaged to DBP for P50,000.00, payable in two
installments and upon full payment of the purchase price, the Spouses
shall execute a deed of sale over the said parcels of land in favor of Cucio.
After the Gotangco applied with the DBP for the restructuring of their
loan, on 1988, the poultry farm of the spouses and the improvements
thereon were gutted by fire. Then DBP wrote the spouses demanding
payment of the balance of their loan within 10 days from notice thereof.
However, the spouses failed to respond or pay their account with the DBP.
Cucio then filed a complaint against the Spouses and the DBP with the RTC
for injunction and damages. Cucio alleged that despite his payment of the
full purchase price of the 7 parcels of land and his demands for the
turnover of the owner's duplicates of the said title to the Spouses
Gotangco, the DBP refused to do so. He further alleged that the DBP even
demanded the payment of the interest on the loan account of the
Spouses. Furthermore, Gotangco refused to execute a deed of absolute
sale of the said parcels of land in his favor.
In its answer, DBP admitted that it charged Cucio interest on the Spouses
Gotangco's loan; however, it denied that it consented to the transaction
between the Spouses Gotangco relative to the 7 parcels of land claimed by
Cucio. While the case was pending, the DBP informed the Spouses that it
was going to have the mortgage foreclosed for their failure to settle their
account.
HELD:
There is no sufficient basis for the award of moral damages in favor of the
respondent spouses based on Article 19 of the New Civil Code as a result
of petitioner's application for foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

Abuse of right under Article 19 of the New Civil Code, on which the RTC
anchored its award for damages and attorney's fees, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following:
(a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and
(c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Malice or bad faith is at the core of said provision. Good faith is presumed
and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.
The Spouses Gotangco failed to prove malice on the part of the petitioner.
The bare fact that the petitioner filed its application of the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage cannot give rise to the conclusion that the
petitioner did so with malice, to harass the Spouses.
Petition is partially granted and the award for moral damages is deleted.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, ET.AL. V. ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL OF THE PHIL,
ET.AL., GR NO. 135306, JAN 28, 2003
FACTS:
Respondent Islamic Council filed a complaint for the alledgedly libelous
statement which is published in Bulgar which reads as follows:
ALAM BA NINYO? Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa
Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay
isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay
magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila
itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin
lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'.
The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and
damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God
of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with
intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam
in the entire country.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action since the persons allegedly defamed were not identified but the
appellate court reversed; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the statement is defamatory.
HELD:
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not
actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse
however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or
spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the
absence of an allegation for special damages. In the present case, there
was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar
article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable
private respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they
cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged.
Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander the one
being, in general, written, while the other in general is oral. In either form,
defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name.
This is a "relational interest" since it involves the opinion others in the
community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff. The law of
defamation protects the interest in reputation the interest in acquiring,
retaining and enjoying one's reputation as good as one's character and
conduct warrant. The mere fact that the plaintiff's feelings and
sensibilities have been offended is not enough to create a cause of action
for defamation. Defamation requires that something be communicated to
a third person that may affect the opinion others may have of the plaintiff.
The unprivileged communication must be shown of a statement that
54

would tend to hurt plaintiff's reputation, to impair plaintiff's standing in

the community.
The Restatement of Torts defines a defamatory statement as one that
"tends to so harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him. In order for one to maintain an action for an alleged
defamatory statement, it must appear that the plaintiff is the person with
reference to whom the statement was made. This principle is of vital
importance in cases where a group or class is defamed since, usually, the
larger the collective, the more difficult it is for an individual member to
show that he was the person at whom the defamation was directed. If the
defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of
persons, they applied to any member of the group, and an individual
member could maintain an action for defamation. When the defamatory
language was used toward a small group or class, including every member,
it has been held that the defamatory language referred to each member
so that each could maintain an action.
Therefore the statements published by petitioners in the instant case did
not specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were
purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication. Respondents
can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly
resulting in damages since the word "Muslim" is descriptive of those who
are believers of Islam, a religion divided into varying sects, such as the
Sunnites, the Shiites, the Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon
political and theological distinctions.

The court laid down the elements of tortuous interference with

contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on
the part of the third person of the existence of the contract and (c)
interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse.
In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease
contract. His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not
inform him of any existing lease contract. Even assuming that petitioner
knew of the contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make
him liable for tortuous interference. Petitioner may be held liable only
when there was no legal justification or excuse for his action or when his
conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous
interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have
been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other
words, his act of interference cannot be justified.
Even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of
his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to
prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the
property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never
established.
In sum, the court ruled that inasmuch as not all three elements to hold
petitioner liable for tortuous interference are present, petitioner cannot
be made to answer for private respondent's losses.
Hence, the petition is granted.
U-BIX V. MILLIKAN, GR NO.173318, SEPT. 23, 2008

Ergo, the petition is granted.

FACTS:

LAGON V. CA, ET. AL., GR NO.119107, MAR. 18, 2005

On 1998, respondent Milliken & Company (M&C) designated petitioner UBix Corporation as its authorized dealer of Milliken carpets in the
Philippines. Under the dealership agreement, petitioner undertook to
market Milliken carpets and to keep on hand samples for the local market
and stock sufficient to cover market demand. M&C, on the other hand,
bound itself to support petitioners marketing efforts and projects.

FACTS:
Petitioner Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi two parcels
of land located at S. Kudarat. A few months after the sale, private
respondent Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages
against petitioner before the RTC.
In the complaint, private respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed that he
entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi over 3
parcels of land in Sultan Kudarat beginning 1964. One of the provisions
agreed upon was for private respondent to put up commercial buildings
which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by
those tenants would answer for the rent private respondent was obligated
to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract
ended but since the construction of the commercial buildings had yet to
be completed, the lease contract was allegedly renewed.
When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent
to the administrator of her estate. But when the administrator advised
him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he
constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the
new owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants.
He thus filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing
the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating
his leasehold rights over it.
In his answer to the complaint, petitioner denied that he induced the heirs
of Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, contending that the heirs were in
dire need of money to pay off the obligations of the deceased. He also
denied interfering with private respondent's leasehold rights as there was
no lease contract covering the property when he purchased it; that his
personal investigation and inquiry revealed no claims or encumbrances on
the subject lots.
ISSUE:
W/N the purchase by petitioner of the subject property, during the
supposed existence of private respondent's lease contract with the late
Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which petitioner
should be held liable for damages.
HELD:

In 1999, M&C informed petitioner (at that time its lone Philippine dealer)
that an international corporate client, Chase Manhattan Bank (CMB), was
furnishing its Manila office. Petitioner immediately formed a team headed
by its creative vice president, Carmen Huang, (with respondent Onofre
Eser as team member) to work on the CMB project. Later, CMB awarded
the supply contract to respondent Projexx which, like petitioner, had in
the meantime become a dealer of Milliken carpets. Eser resigned from
petitioner and joined Projexx.
On 2000, petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract, torts and
damages against M&C, Sylvan Chemical Company, Wilfred Batara, Projexx
and Eser in the RTC of Makati. According to petitioner, M&C violated the
dealership agreement when it designated Projexx as an authorized dealer
of Milliken carpets; thus it was guilty of breach of contract. It also claimed
that Projexx, with the help of Sylvan and Batara, poached the CMB project
from it. Moreover, Projexx allegedly hired Eser because he had worked on
the CMB project while in the employ of petitioner. Thus, they were guilty
of malicious interference.
In their answer, M&C, Sylvan and Batara averred that since petitioner was
unacceptable to CMB, M&C designated Projexx as authorized dealer.
Moreover, petitioner neither submitted an accomplished dealer project
registration form nor complied with the rules for project registration. It
never specified the CMB project. Therefore, petitioner never earned a
right over it. Projexx and Eser, on the other hand, contended that since no
contract was perfected between petitioner and CMB, petitioner never
acquired any proprietary interest in the project.
The RTC dismissed the complaint and aggrieved, petitioner appealed but
the CA affirmed RTC ruling in toto. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision in toto. It insists that
respondents were guilty of malicious interference.
55

HELD:
To prove that respondents were guilty of malicious interference,
petitioner had to show the following: the existence of a valid contract,
knowledge by respondents that such a contract existed and acts (done in
bad faith and without legal basis) by respondents which interfered in the
due performance by the contracting parties of their respective obligations
under the contract. Apart from the fact that these matters were factual
(and therefore beyond SCs mandate to review), petitioner failed to prove
entitlement to the relief it was seeking.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA found that respondents were not
guilty of malicious interference because no contract was ever perfected
between petitioner and CMB. Because all petitioner presented to SC were
reiterations of its arguments in the courts a quo. Ergo, there is no reason
to disturb the decision of the CA.
Hence, the petition is denied.
X.

KINDRED TORTS: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

REYES V SISTERS OF MERCY Hospital G.R. 130547 October 3, 2000

FACTS:
Petitioner Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. Five days
before his death on January 8, 1987, Jorge had been suffering from a
recurring fever with chills. After he failed to get relief from some home
medication he was taking, which consisted of analgesic, antipyretic, and
antibiotics, he decided to see the doctor.
On January 8, 1987, he was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic by his
wife. He was attended to by respondent Dr. Marlyn Rico who gave Jorge a
physical examination and took his medical history. Typhoid fever was then
prevalent in the locality, as the clinic had been getting from 15 to 20 cases
of typhoid per month Suspecting that Jorge could be suffering from this
disease, Dr. Rico ordered a Widal Test, a standard test for typhoid fever, to
be performed on Jorge. Blood count, routine urinalysis, stool examination,
and malarial smear were also made After about an hour, the medical
technician submitted the results of the test from which Dr. Rico concluded
that Jorge was positive for typhoid fever. As her shift was only up to 5:00
p.m., Dr. Rico indorsed Jorge to respondent Dr. Marvie Blanes. Dr. Blanes
attended to Jorge at around six in the evening. She also took Jorges
history and gave him a physical examination. Like Dr. Rico, her impression
was that Jorge had typhoid fever. Antibiotics being the accepted
treatment for typhoid fever, she ordered that a compatibility test with the
antibiotic chloromycetin be done on Jorge. As she did not observe any
adverse reaction by the patient to chloromycetin, Dr. Blanes ordered the
first five hundred milligrams of said antibiotic to be administered on Jorge
at around 9:00 p.m. A second dose was administered on Jorge about three
hours later just before midnight. At around 1:00 a.m. of January 9, 1987,
Dr. Blanes was called as Jorges temperature rose to 41C. The patient also
experienced chills and exhibited respiratory distress, nausea, vomiting,
and convulsions. Dr. Blanes put him under oxygen, used a suction
machine, and administered hydrocortisone, temporarily easing the
patients convulsions. When he regained consciousness, the patient was
asked by Dr. Blanes whether he had a previous heart ailment or had
suffered from chest pains in the past. Jorge replied he did not. After about
15 minutes, however, Jorge again started to vomit, showed restlessness,
and his convulsions returned. Dr. Blanes re-applied the emergency
measures taken before and, in addition, valium was administered. Jorge,
however, did not respond to the treatment and slipped into cyanosis, a
bluish or purplish discoloration of the skin or mucous membrane due to
deficient oxygenation of the blood. At around 2:00 a.m., Jorge died. He
was forty years old. The cause of his death was Ventricular Arrythemia
Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is entitled to damage applying res ipsa loquitur?
HELD:

No. There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed with, and
that is under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Thus, courts of other
jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving
of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries
sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the
area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body when another
part was intended, knocking out a tooth while patients jaw was under
anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the
patient was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an
operation for appendicitis, among others. Petitioners now contend that all
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur were present, namely: (1)
the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person in charge; and (3) the injury
suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
of the person injured. The contention is without merit. In this case, while it
is true that the patient died just a few hours after professional medical
assistance was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary
about his death. Prior to his admission, the patient already had recurring
fevers and chills for five days unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic, and
antibiotics given him by his wife. This shows that he had been suffering
from a serious illness and professional medical help came too late for him.
Respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately
apparent to a layman so as to justify application of res ipsa loquitur. The
question required expert opinion on the alleged breach by respondents of
the standard of care required by the circumstances. Furthermore, on the
issue of the correctness of her diagnosis, no presumption of negligence
can be applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. V. AGANA, GR NO.126297, JAN.31, 2007
AND GR NO.126297, FEB. 2, 2010
FACTS:
On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General
Hospital because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. After a series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil,
diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid."
On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of the Medical
City Hospital, performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He
found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left
ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it.
Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividads husband, Enrique
Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to
perform hysterectomy on her.
After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over,
completed the operation and closed the incision.
However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In the corresponding
Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984, the attending nurses entered
these remarks:
"sponge count lacking 2
"announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for
closure."
She was released from the hospital but experienced excruciating pain and
was told by Dr. Ampil that it was the natural consequence of the surgery.
On May 9, 1984, Natividad went to the United States to seek further
treatment. After four months of consultations and laboratory
examinations, Natividad was told she was free of cancer. Hence, she was
advised to return to the Philippines.
On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering
from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze
protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil
proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of
gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains
would soon vanish.
56

Dr. Ampils assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified,
prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital.
While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of
another foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5
inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal
fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to
excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to
remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984, Natividad underwent another
surgery.
Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC a complaint for damages
against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City
Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. They alleged that the latter are liable
for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividads body and
malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence.
Meanwhile, Enrique Agana also filed with the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) an administrative complaint for gross negligence and
malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes, docketed as Administrative
Case No. 1690. The PRC Board of Medicine heard the case only with
respect to Dr. Fuentes because it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Dr.
Ampil who was then in the United States.
On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above cases, Natividad
died and was duly substituted by children (the Aganas).
The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr. Ampil
and Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice. On appeal, the CA
rendered judgment that the case against defendant-appellant Dr. Juan
Fuentes is DISMISSED, and with the pronouncement that defendantappellant Dr. Miguel Ampil is liable to reimburse defendant-appellant PSI
whatever amount the latter will pay or had paid to the plaintiffs-appellees.

traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by
the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing.
2. Whether the CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any Liability
No. Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the
person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel
connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders. As stated
before, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the
"Captain of the Ship." To our mind, it was this act of ordering the closure
of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained
unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividads body. Clearly, the
control and management of the thing which caused the injury was in the
hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.
3. Whether or not res ipsa loquitor will lie.
The Aganas assailed the dismissal by the trial court of the case against Dr.
Fuentes on the ground that it is contrary to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. According to them, the fact that the two pieces of gauze were
left inside Natividads body is a prima facie evidence of Dr. Fuentes
negligence.
The requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are:
(1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was
under the control and management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence
was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if
those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the
absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the
most instrumental is the "control and management of the thing which
caused the injury."

ISSUES AND RULING:

We find the element of "control and management of the thing which

caused the injury" to be wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
will not lie.

1. Whether the CA erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable.

4. Whether PSI Is Liable for the Negligence of Dr. Ampil

No. The glaring truth is that all the major circumstances, taken together,
as specified by the Court of Appeals, directly point to Dr. Ampil as the
negligent party, thus:

PSI, is not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its own negligence
under Article 2176.

First, it is not disputed that the surgeons used gauzes as sponges to

control the bleeding of the patient during the surgical operation.

In Ramos v. Court of Appeals that for purposes of apportioning

responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians.

Second, immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted in the
surgery noted in their report that the sponge count (was) lacking 2; that
such anomaly was announced to surgeon and that a search was done
but to no avail prompting Dr. Ampil to continue for closure x x x.
Third, after the operation, two (2) gauzes were extracted from the same
spot of the body of Mrs. Agana where the surgery was performed.
An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not
complete until the sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the
leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the
incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating
surgeon. To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due
care as to raise an inference of negligence.
Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of
gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she was experiencing was
the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he been more candid,
Natividad could have taken the immediate and appropriate medical
remedy to remove the gauzes from her body. To our mind, what was
initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate
wrongful act of deceiving his patient.
This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical
negligence. To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only
prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did
something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and
that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the
elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. That Dr.
Ampils negligence is the proximate cause of Natividads injury could be

In other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over
their attending and visiting consultant staff. In assessing whether such a
relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on
the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and
visiting physicians. "
Its liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent
authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence
which have gained acceptance in the determination of a hospitals liability
for negligent acts of health professionals. The present case serves as a
perfect platform to test the applicability of these doctrines, thus, enriching
our jurisprudence.
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out"
theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, has its
origin from the law of agency. It imposes liability, not as the result of the
reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a
principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing
that the relationship or the authority exists.
The question in every case is whether the principal has by his voluntary act
placed the agent in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence,
conversant with business usages and the nature of the particular business,
is justified in presuming that such agent has authority to perform the
particular act in question.
57

In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital
the names and specializations of the physicians associated or accredited
by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the
CAs conclusion that it "is now estopped from passing all the blame to the
physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory leading
the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence."
Indeed, PSIs act is tantamount to holding out to the public that Medical
City Hospital, through its accredited physicians, offers quality health care
services.
Premised on the doctrine of corporate negligence, the trial court held that
PSI is directly liable for such breach of duty. Its liability is traceable to its
failure to conduct an investigation of the matter reported in the nota bene
of the count nurse. Such failure established PSIs part in the dark
conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes. Now, the failure
of PSI, despite the attending nurses report, to investigate and inform
Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts to callous negligence. Not
only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all persons who
practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in
fixing the negligence committed. This renders PSI, not only vicariously
liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
but also directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176.
GARCIA-RUEDA V. PASCASIO, ET.AL., GR NO.118141, SEPT. 5, 1997
FACTS:
Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda,
underwent surgical operation at the UST hospital for the removal of a
stone blocking his ureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio, Jr.
who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes was the
anaesthesiologist. Six hours after the surgery, however, Florencio died of
complications of "unknown cause," according to officials of the UST
Hospital.
Not satisfied with the findings of the hospital, petitioner requested the
NBI to conduct an autopsy on her husband's body. Consequently, the NBI
ruled that Florencio's death was due to lack of care by the attending
physician in administering anaesthesia. Pursuant to its findings, the NBI
recommended that Dr. Domingo Antonio and Dr. Erlinda Balatbat-Reyes
be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence before the Office
of the City Prosecutor.
The case took another perplexing turn when Assistant City Prosecutor
Josefina Santos Sioson, in the "interest of justice and peace of mind of the
parties," recommended that the case be re-raffled on the ground that
Prosecutor Carisma was partial to the petitioner. Thus, the case was
transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba, where a volte face
occurred again with the endorsement that the complaint against Dr. Reyes
be dismissed and instead, a corresponding information be filed against Dr.
Antonio. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning the
findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba.
Pending the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration
regarding Prosecutor Dimagiba's resolution, the investigative "pingpong"
continued when the case was again assigned to another prosecutor,
Eudoxia T. Gualberto, who recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in
the criminal information of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. While
the recommendation of Prosecutor Gualberto was pending, the case was
transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A. Arizala, who resolved to
exonerate Dr. Reyes from any wrongdoing, a resolution which was
approved by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City
Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed graft charges specifically for violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 3 against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg,
and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before the Office of
the Ombudsman. However, on July 11, 1994, the Ombudsman issued the
assailed resolution dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence.
In fine, petitioner assails the exercise of the discretionary power of the
Ombudsman to review the recommendations of the government

prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the same. Petitioner faults the
Ombudsman for, allegedly in grave abuse of discretion, refusing to find
that there exists probable cause to hold public respondent City
Prosecutors liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
ISSUE:
May this Court review the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman?
HELD:
In the exercise of its investigative power, this Court has consistently held
that courts will not interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or the
Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments
of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds
it to be insufficient in form and substance or if he otherwise finds no
ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the
investigation of the complaint if, in his view, it is in due and proper form.
Does the instant case warrant a departure from the foregoing general
rule? When a patient dies soon after surgery under circumstances which
indicate that the attending surgeon and anaesthesiologist may have been
guilty of negligence but upon their being charged, a series of nine
prosecutors toss the responsibility of conducting a preliminary
investigation to each other with contradictory recommendations, "pingpong" style, perhaps the distraught widow is not to be blamed if she
finally decides to accuse the City Prosecutors at the end of the line for
partiality under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Nor may she be
entirely faulted for finally filing a petition before this Court against the
Ombudsman for grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her complaint
against said City Prosecutors on the ground of lack of evidence. Much as
we sympathize with the bereaved widow, however, this Court is of the
opinion that the general rule still finds application in instant case. In other
words, the respondent Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in deciding against filing the necessary information against
public respondents of the Office of the City Prosecutor.
RAMOS V. CA, ET.AL., GR NO. 124354, DEC. 29, 1999
FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent an operation known as cholecystectomy
(removal of stone in her gallbladder) under the hands of Dr. Orlino
Hosaka. He was accompanied by Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, an
anesthesiologist which Dr. Hosaka recommended since Ramos (and her
husband Rogelio) did not know any.
The operation was schedule at 9am of June 17, 1985 but was however
delayed for three hours due to the late arrival of Dr. Hosaka. Dr. Gutierrez
subsequently started trying to intubate her. And at around 3pm, Erlinda
was seen being wheeled to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). The doctors
explained to petitioner Rogelio that his wife had bronchospasm. Erlinda
stayed in the ICU for a month. She was released from the hospital only
four months later or on November 15, 1985. Since the ill-fated operation,
Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died on August 3, 1999.
RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding the defendants guilty of, at
the very least, negligence in the performance of their duty to plaintiffpatient Erlinda Ramos.
On appeal to CA, the said decision was reversed dismissing the
complaint against the defendants, Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the private respondents are liable for the injury caused to Erlinda and
her family?
HELD:
YES.
We hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the
presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their
negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition.

58

Dr. Gutierrez (anesthesiologist) is held liable for failure to perform the

necessary pre-operative evaluation which includes taking the patient's
medical history, review of current drug therapy, physical examination and
interpretation of laboratory data.
In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw
Erlinda for thefirst time on the day of the operation itself, on 17 June
1985. Before this date, noprior consultations with, or pre-operative
evaluation of Erlinda was done by her.Until the day of the operation,
respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of thephysiological make-up and
needs of Erlinda. She was likewise not properly informedof the possible
difficulties she would face during the administration of anesthesia
toErlinda. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first
time onlyan hour before the scheduled operative procedure was,
therefore, an act ofexceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility. The measures cautioningprudence and vigilance in dealing
with human lives lie at the core of the physician'scenturies-old Hippocratic
Oath. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear
indicia of her negligence.Having failed to observe common medical
standards in pre-operative managementand intubation, respondent Dra.
Gutierrez' negligence resulted in cerebral anoxiaand eventual coma of
Erlinda.
Dr. Hosaka, being the head of the surgical team (captain of the ship), it
was his responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task
in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found
in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his
anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. Furthermore, it
does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another
procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's
operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he
was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares
equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.
Notwithstanding the general denial made by respondent hospital to the
effect that the respondent doctors (referred to as consultants) in this
case are not their employees, there is a showing that the hospital
exercises significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in
the conduct of their work within the hospital premises.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence
of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a
person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others
based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria
potestas.
In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of
itsresponsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence
showingthat it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
hiring andsupervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with
regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians.
In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent
hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of
Article 2180. Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently
solidarily responsible with its physiciansfor Erlinda's condition.
SPS.FLORES V. SPS.PINEDA, GR NO.158996, NOV. 14, 2008
FACTS:
Teresita Pineda was a 51-year old unmarried woman. She consulted on
April 17, 1987 her townmate, Dr. Fredelicto Flores, regarding her medical
condition. She complained of general body weakness, loss of appetite,
frequent urination and thirst, and on-and-off vaginal bleeding. Dr.
Fredelicto initially interviewed the patient and asked for the history of her
monthly period to analyze the probable cause of the vaginal bleeding. He
advised her to return the following week or to go to the United Doctors
Medical Center (UDMC) in Quezon City for a general check-up. As for her

other symptoms, he suspected that Teresita might be suffering from

diabetes and told her to continue her medications.
Teresita did not return the next week as advised. However, when her
condition persisted, she went to further consult Dr. Flores at his UDMC
clinic on April 28, 1987 with her sister, Lucena Pineda. Lucena later
testified that her sister was then so weak that she had to lie down on the
couch of the clinic while they waited for the doctor. When Dr. Fredelicto
arrived, he did a routine check-up and ordered Teresita's admission to the
hospital. In the admission slip, he directed the hospital staff to prepare the
patient for an "on call" D&C operation to be performed by his wife, Dr.
Felicisima Flores. The hospital staff forthwith took her blood and urine
samples for the laboratory tests which Dr. Fredelicto ordered.
Based on these preparations, Dr. Felicisima proceeded with the D&C
operation with Dr. Fredelicto administering the general anesthesia.
Teresita's complete laboratory examination results came and her
urinalysis showed a three plus sign (+++) indicating that the sugar in her
urine was very high. She was then placed under the care of Dr. Amado
Jorge, an internist.
By April 30, 1987, Teresita's condition had worsened. She experienced
difficulty in breathing and was rushed to the intensive care unit. Further
tests confirmed that she was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus Type II.
Insulin was administered on the patient, but the medication might have
arrived too late. Due to complications induced by diabetes, Teresita died
in the morning of May 6, 1987.
Believing that Teresita's death resulted from the negligent handling of her
medical needs, her family (respondents) instituted an action for damages
against petitioner spouses.
ISSUE:
W/N sps Dr. Fredelicto and Dr. Felicisima were guilty of medical
malpractice.
HELD:
YES.
The respondents' claim for damages is predicated on their allegation that
the decision of the petitioner spouses to proceed with the D&C operation,
notwithstanding Teresita's condition and the laboratory test results,
amounted to negligence. On the other hand, the petitioner spouses
contend that a D&C operation is the proper and accepted procedure to
address vaginal bleeding - the medical problem presented to them. Given
that the patient died after the D&C, the core issue is whether the decision
to proceed with the D&C operation was an honest mistake of judgment or
one amounting to negligence.
Elements of a Medical Negligence Case
A medical negligence caseis a type of claim to redress a wrong committed
by a medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to or the death of a
patient. There are four elements involved in a medical negligence case,
namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation.
Duty refers to the standard of behavior which imposes restrictions on
one's conduct. The standard in turn refers to the amount of competence
associated with the proper discharge of the profession. A physician is
expected to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use under the same circumstances. Breach of
duty occurs when the physician fails to comply with these professional
standards. If injury results to the patient as a result of this breach, the
physician is answerable for negligence.
We find that reasonable prudence would have shown that diabetes and its
complications were foreseeable harm that should have been taken into
consideration by the petitioner spouses. If a patient suffers from some
disability that increases the magnitude of risk to him, that disability must
be taken into account so long as it is or should have been known to the
physician. And when the patient is exposed to an increased risk, it is
incumbent upon the physician to take commensurate and adequate
precautions.
59

Taking into account Teresita's high blood sugar, Dr. Mendoza opined that
the attending physician should have postponed the D&C operation in
order to conduct a confirmatory test to make a conclusive diagnosis of
diabetes and to refer the case to an internist or diabetologist. This was
corroborated by Dr. Delfin Tan (Dr. Tan), an obstetrician and gynecologist,
who stated that the patient's diabetes should have been managed by an
internist prior to, during, and after the operation.
That the D&C operation was conducted principally to diagnose the cause
of the vaginal bleeding further leads us to conclude that it was merely an
elective procedure, not an emergency case. In an elective procedure, the
physician must conduct a thorough pre-operative evaluation of the patient
in order to adequately prepare her for the operation and minimize
possible risks and complications. The internist is responsible for generating
a comprehensive evaluation of all medical problems during the preoperative evaluation.
Significantly, the evidence strongly suggests that the pre-operative
evaluation was less than complete as the laboratory results were fully
reported only on the day following the D&C operation. Dr. Felicisima only
secured a telephone report of the preliminary laboratory result prior to
the D&C. This preliminary report did not include the 3+ status of sugar in
the patient's urine - a result highly confirmatory of diabetes.
Because the D&C was merely an elective procedure, the patient's
uncontrolled hyperglycemia presented a far greater risk than her on-andoff vaginal bleeding. The presence of hyperglycemia in a surgical patient is
associated with poor clinical outcomes, and aggressive glycemic control
positively impacts on morbidity and mortality. Elective surgery in people
with uncontrolled diabetes should preferably be scheduled after
acceptable glycemic control has been achieved. According to Dr. Mercado,
this is done by administering insulin on the patient.

(6) Exemplary or corrective.

II.

ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY

a. Definition
Art. 2199, NCC.Except as provided for by law or stipulation, one is entitled
to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him
as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.
Art. 2200, NCC.Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only
the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the oblige
failed to obtain.
b. Components of actual damages
b.1. value of loss suffered (dao emergente) Art. 2200
b.2 profits not obtained or realized (lucro cesante) Art. 2200
b.3. loss of earning capacity for personal injury
b.3.1. Formula in determining loss of earning capacity
2/3 x (80 ATD) x GAI
PEOPLE V. MUYCO, 331 SCRA 192
FACTS:
JESUS MUYCO and ARNULFO MUYCO, cousins, were charged with murder
for the death of Romeo Boteja Jr. on 13 May 1995. Only Jesus Muyco was
apprehended while Arnulfo Muyco remains at large. On 11 September
1997 the RTC, found Jesus guilty as charged and correspondingly
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Romeo Boteja
Jr. P30,000.00 as death indemnity and P27,000.00 as funeral expenses.
ISSUE:

The prudent move is to address the patient's hyperglycemic state

immediately and promptly before any other procedure is undertaken. In
this case, there was no evidence that insulin was administered on Teresita
prior to or during the D&C operation. Insulin was only administered two
days after the operation.

Are the heirs of Romeo Boteja, Jr. entitled to claim damages for loss of
earning capacity?

The above facts, point only to one conclusion - that the petitioner spouses
failed, as medical professionals, to comply with their duty to observe the
standard of care to be given to hyperglycemic/diabetic patients
undergoing surgery. Whether this breach of duty was the proximate cause
of Teresita's death is a matter we shall next determine.

Supreme Court notes that the trial court failed to award damages for loss
of earning capacity despite the testimony of Leticia Boteja to this effect. In
People v. Dizon, this Court discussed the requisites for such award

Related Law: RA No. 9439

PART II. DAMAGES

I.

INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS

a. Damages, defined
b. Damages distinguished from
b.1. Damage
b.2. Injury
c. Kinds of damages recoverable
Art. 2197, NCC.Damages may be:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Actual or compensatory;
Moral;
Nominal;
Temperate or moderate;
Liquidated; or

HELD:
Yes.

As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate

the claim for loss of earning capacity. In People v. Verde, the nonpresentation of evidence to support the claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity did not prevent this Court from awarding said
damages. The testimony of the victim's wife as to earning capacity of
her murdered husband, who was then 48 years old and was earning
P200.00 a day as a tricycle driver, sufficed to establish the basis for
such an award.
In this case, Erwin Gesmundo was only 15 years old at the time of his
death and was earning a daily wage of P100.00 as a construction worker.
As in People v. Verde, this Court is inclined to grant the claim for damages
for loss of earning capacity despite the absence of documentary evidence.
To be able to claim damages for loss of earning capacity despite the
nonavailability of documentary evidence, there must be oral testimony
that: (a) the victim was self-employed earning less than the minimum
wage under the current labor laws and judicial notice was taken of the fact
that in the victim's line of work, no documentary evidence is available; (b)
the victim was employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws. . .
In the instant case, the victim was nineteen (19) years old at the time of
his death and earning P1,600.00 monthly as a farm laborer. Thus, his heirs
are entitled to receive an award for lost earnings in accordance with the
following formula: 2/3 (80 - ATD [age at time of death]) x (GAI [gross
annual income]) - 80% GAI. 7 Thus
2/3 (80-19) x (P1,600 x 12) - 80% (P1,600.00 x 12)
2/3 (61) x P19,200 - 80% (P19,200)
60

40.67 x [P19,200 - P15,360]

On the basis of the above computation, the heirs of the deceased Romeo
Boteja Jr. are entitled to receive P156,172.80 from accused-appellant
Jesus Muyco.

and proven expenses or those that appear to have been genuinely

incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be
recognized. A list of expenses (Exhibit "J"), and the contract/receipt for the
construction of the tomb (Exhibit "F") in this case, cannot be considered
competent proof and cannot replace the official receipts necessary to
justify the award. Hence, actual damages should be further reduced to
P78,160.00, which was the amount supported by official receipts.

VICTORY LINER V. GAMMAD, ET.AL., GR NO.159636, NOV. 25, 2004

PHIL HAWK CORP V. VIVIAN TAN LEE, GR NO. 166869, FEB. 16, 2010

FACTS:

FACTS:

On March 14, 1996, respondents wife Marie Grace Pagulayan-Gammad

was on board an air-conditioned Victory Liner bus bound for Tuguegarao,
Cagayan from Manila. The bus while running at a high speed fell on a
ravine which resulted in the death of Marie Grace and physical injuries to
other passengers. Respondent and heirs of the deceased filed a complaint
for damages arising from culpa contractual against petitioner.

Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC a Complaint against petitioner
Philippine Hawk Corporation and defendant Margarito Avila for damages
based on quasi-delict, arising from a vehicular accident that occurred on
March 17,. The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a
bus. The bus was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and
was then being driven by Margarito Avila. The accident resulted in the
death of respondents husband, Silvino Tan, and caused respondent
physical injuries. Respondent sought the payment of indemnity for the
death of Silvino Tan, moral and exemplary damages, funeral and
interment expenses, medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the
motorcycles repair, attorneys fees, and other just and equitable reliefs.

40.67 x P3,840 = P156,172.80

==========

Both trial and appellate courts rendered decision in favor of respondents

as follows:
1. Actual Damages in the amount of P88,270.00;
2. Compensatory Damages in the amount of P1,135,536,10;
3. Moral and Exemplary Damages in the amount of P400,000.00; and
4. Attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the sum of the actual,
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages herein adjudged.
ISSUE:
Was the award of damages proper?
HELD:
No.The award of damages should be modified.
Article 1764 in relation to Article 2206 of the Civil Code, holds the
common carrier in breach of its contract of carriage that results in the
death of a passenger liable to pay the following: (1) indemnity for death,
(2) indemnity for loss of earning capacity, and (3) moral damages.
In the present case, respondent heirs of the deceased are entitled to
indemnity for the death of Marie Grace which under current jurisprudence
is fixed at P50,000.00.
The award of compensatory damages for the loss of the deceaseds
earning capacity should be deleted for lack of basis. As a rule,
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for
damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for
loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that in the deceaseds line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a
daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current
labor laws.
Here, the trial court and the CA computed the award of compensatory
damages for loss of earning capacity only on the basis of the testimony of
respondent Rosalito that the deceased was 39 years of age and a Section
Chief of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Tuguergarao District Office with a
salary of P83,088.00 per annum when she died. No other evidence was
presented. The award is clearly erroneous because the deceaseds
earnings does not fall within the exceptions.
However, the fact of loss having been established, temperate damages in
the amount of P500,000.00 should be awarded to respondents. Under
Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages, which are
more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved
with certainty.
The actual damages awarded by the trial court reduced by the CA should
be further reduced. In People v. Duban, it was held that only substantiated

Respondent further testified that her husband was leasing and operating a
Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon that yielded one million pesos
a year in revenue. They also had a copra business, which gave them an
income of P3,000.00 a month or P36,000.00 a year.
In this case for damages based on quasi-delict, the trial court awarded
respondent the sum of P745,575.00, representing loss of earning capacity
(P590,000.00) and actual damages (P155,575.00 for funeral expenses),
plus P50,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal, the CA sustained the
award by the trial court for loss of earning capacity of the deceased Silvino
Tan, moral damages for his death, and actual damages, although the
amount of the latter award was modified.
ISSUE:
Were the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals proper?
HELD:
No. It should be modified.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for
by Article 2206 of the Civil Code. Compensation of this nature is awarded
not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money.
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the
claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,
damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence
of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which
case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of
work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.
In this case, the records show that respondents husband was leasing and
operating a Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon. Respondent
testified that her husband earned an annual income of one million pesos.
Respondent presented in evidence a Certificate of Creditable Income Tax
Withheld at Source for the Year 1990, which showed that respondents
husband earned a gross income of P950,988.43 in 1990. It is reasonable to
use the Certificate and respondents testimony as bases for fixing the
gross annual income of the deceased at one million pesos before
respondents husband died on March 17, 1999. However, no
documentary evidence was presented regarding the income derived from
their copra business; hence, the testimony of respondent as regards such
income cannot be considered.
In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not
gross earnings, are to be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less
expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings or income, less living
61

and other incidental expenses. In the absence of documentary evidence, it

is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease and operation of the
gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross income, and peg living expenses
at 50 percent of the net income (gross income less necessary expenses).
In this case, the computation for loss of earning capacity is as follows:
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy
Reasonable and Necessary Expenses

x Gross Annual Income

X = [2/3 (80-age at the time of death)] x [(GAI) 80% of GAI

X = [2/3 (80-65)] x P1,000,000.00 - P800,000.00
X = 2/3 (15) x P200,000.00 - P100,000.00 (Living Expenses)
X = 30/3
X = 10

x
x

P100,000.00
P100,000.00

X = P1,000,000.00
The CA also awarded actual damages for the expenses incurred in
connection with the death, wake, and interment of respondents husband
in the amount of P154,575.30, and the medical expenses of respondent in
the amount of P168,019.55.
Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as
receipts, in order to prove expenses incurred as a result of the death of
the victim or the physical injuries sustained by the victim. A review of the
valid receipts submitted in evidence showed that the funeral and related
expenses amounted only to P114,948.60, while the medical expenses of
respondent amounted only to P12,244.25, yielding a total of P127,192.85
in actual damages.
b.4. Attorneys fees and interest
Art. 2208, NCC.In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses
of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff
to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against
the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and
demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers,
laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmens compensation and
employers liability laws;
(9) In separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a
crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable
that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be
recovered.
In all cases, the attorneys fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable.
Art. 2209, NCC.If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of
money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there
being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest
agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is
six per cent per annum.
Art. 2212, NCC. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this point.
QUIRANTE V. IAC, GR NO.73886, JAN. 31, 1989
FACTS:

Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a

building contractor named Norman GUERRERO. The Philippine American
General Insurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN) acted as bondsman for
GUERRERO. In view of GUERRERO'S failure to perform his part of the
contract within the period specified, Dr. Indalecio Casasola, thru his
counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN
before the RTC of Manila for damages, with PHILAMGEN filing a crossclaim against GUERRERO for indemnification.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff by rescinding the contract;
ordering GUERRERO and PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff actual, as well as
moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees. A writ of execution
was then issued by the trial court. The petition for the quashal of the writ
of execution was denied by the appellate court and hence, the case was
elevated to the Supreme Court, which remained pending at this time.
In the meantime, herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial
court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him, there
was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard
to his attorney's fees, which agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing
by the heirs. Petitioner avers that pursuant to said agreement, the
attorney's fees would be computed as follows:
A. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees
of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.
B. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the
P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I.
Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
The trial court ordered that the motion for confirmation be granted, which
was eventually set aside by the respondent court for being premature,
there being a pending case in the SC.
ISSUE:
Did the respondent court err in setting aside the trial courts order?
HELD:
No.
Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be
asserted either in the very action in which the services in question have
been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is chosen,
the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the
minimum prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the
theory that the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the
case in which the services of counsel have been rendered . It also rests on
the assumption that the court trying the case is to a certain degree already
familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services.
What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however,
different from attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the
litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the
judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by
execution. Here, the petitioner's claims are based on an alleged contract
for professional services, with them as the creditors and the private
respondents as the debtors.
In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose
to assert their claims in the same action. This is also a proper remedy
under our jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we agree with the respondent
court that the confirmation of attorney's fees is premature. As it correctly
pointed out, the petition for review on certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN in
this Court "may or may not ultimately result in the granting to the Isasola
family of the total amount of damages" awarded by the trial court. Since
the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise
has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees
and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains
added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering
attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only
when something is due to the client. Thus, it was ruled that:
62

... an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main

litigation has been decided and the subject of recovery is at the
disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when
something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.

P1,000.00 per appearance in the hearing of the case and litigation

expenses of P10,000.00.
ISSUE:

PNB V. CA, APRIL 25, 1996

Should the monetary award for damages granted by the trial court be
sustained?

FACTS:

HELD:

A check drawn against petitioner PNB in the amount of P97,650.00 was

issued by the Ministry of Education and Culture payable to F. Abante
Marketing. F. Abante Marketing, a client of Capitol City Development Bank
(Capitol), deposited the questioned check in its savings account with said
bank. In turn, Capitol deposited the same in its account with the PBCom
which, in turn, sent the check to petitioner for clearing. Petitioner cleared
the check as good and, thereafter, PBCom credited Capitol's account for
the amount stated in the check. However, petitioner returned the check to
PBCom and debited PBCom's account for the amount covered by the
check, the reason being that there was a "material alteration" of the check
number. PBCom, as collecting agent of Capitol, then proceeded to debit
the latter's account for the same amount. On the other hand, Capitol
could not, in turn, debit F. Abante Marketing's account since the latter had
already withdrawn the amount of the check. Capitol filed a civil suit with
the RTC against PBCom which, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against
petitioner for reimbursement/indemnity with respect to the claims of
Capitol. Petitioner, on its part, filed a fourth-party complaint against F.
Abante Marketing.

No.
With respect to attorney's fees, the award thereof is the exception rather
than the general rule; counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party
prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed
on the right to litigate. Attorney's fees as part of damages are not the
same as attorney's fees in the concept of the amount paid to a lawyer. In
the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has
rendered to the latter, while in its extraordinary concept, they may be
awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing
party to the prevailing party.

Should attorneys fees be deleted in the award for damages?

Attorney's fees as part of damages is awarded only in the instances

specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for the
court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within
the exception and justify the grant of such award, and in all cases it must
be reasonable. Thereunder, the trial court may award attorney's fees
where it deems just and equitable that it be so granted. While we respect
the trial court's exercise of its discretion in this case, we find the award of
the trial court of attorney's fees in the sum of One Hundred Seven
Thousand Pesos (P107,000.00) plus One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per
appearance in the hearing of the case and litigation expenses of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), to be unreasonable and excessive.
Attorney's fees as part of damages is not meant to enrich the winning
party at the expense of the losing litigant. Thus, it should be reasonably
reduced to Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00).

HELD:

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. V. CA, 234 SCRA 78 (1994)

Yes. SC ruled that the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees is hereby

deleted. In their respective decisions, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals failed to explicitly state the rationale for the said award.

FACTS:

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff Capitol and
ordered PBCom to pay damages including attorneys fees, which in turn
shall be reimbursed by petitioner PNB. The respondent court however,
modified the judgment by exempting PBCom from liability to Capitol for
attorneys fees.
ISSUE:

The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court and
depends upon the circumstances of each case. However, the discretion of
the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without
which the award is a conclusion without a premise and improperly left to
speculation and conjecture. It becomes a violation of the proscription
against the imposition of a penalty on the right to litigate. The reason for
the award must be stated in the text of the court's decision. If it is stated
only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same shall be
disallowed. As to the award of attorney's fees being an exception rather
than the rule, it is necessary for the court to make findings of fact and law
that would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of the
award.
PADILLO V. CA, 371 SCRA 27
FACTS:
This case is a petition for declaratory relief and damages initiated by
petitioner Veronica Padillo against respondent Tomas Averia, Jr. Padillo
alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of a land located in
Quezon Province which she purchased from Marina M. de Vera-Quicho
and Margarita de Vera. Petitioner ascribed fault upon Averia with unlawful
refusal to turn over the property in her favor; and that respondent Averia
even instituted a suit for rescission of 2 deeds solely for harassment and
dilatory purposes although the suit actually established petitioner's right
of ownership over the subject property.
Judgment was eventually rendered in favor of Padillo and ordering Averia
to vacate and surrender the possession of the lot and to pay petitioner
damages including attorneys fees in the sum of P107,000.00 plus

This is an action against defendants shipping company (Eastern Shipping

Lines), arrastre operator (Metro Port Service, Inc.) and broker-forwarder
(Allied Brokerage Corporation) for damages sustained by a shipment while
in defendants' custody, filed by the insurer-subrogee (Mercantile
Insurance Co.) who paid the consignee the value of such losses/damages.
Two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Yokohama, Japan for
delivery vessel "SS EASTERN COMET" owned by defendant Eastern
Shipping Lines. The shipment was insured under plaintiff's Marine
Insurance Policy. Upon arrival of the shipment in Manila, it was discharged
unto the custody of defendant Metro Port Service, Inc. The latter excepted
to one drum, said to be in bad order, which damage was unknown to
plaintiff. When defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation received the
shipment from defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., one drum was found
opened and without seal. When defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation
made deliveries of the shipment to the consignee's warehouse, the latter
excepted to one drum which contained spillages, while the rest of the
contents was adulterated/fake. As a consequence of the losses sustained,
plaintiff was compelled to pay the consignee P19,032.95 under the
aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it became subrogated to all
the rights of action of said consignee against defendants.
Both trial and appellate courts rendered judgments ordering defendants
to pay plaintiff the amount of P19,032.95, with the present legal interest
of 12% per annum from October 1, 1982, the date of filing of this
complaints, until fully paid.
ISSUES:
Whether the payment of legal interest on an award for loss or damage is
to be computed from the time the complaint is filed or from the date the
decision appealed from is rendered; and whether the applicable rate of
interest, referred to above, is twelve percent (12%) or six percent (6%).
63

HELD:
Concededly, there have been seeming variances in our jurisprudence as to
the issues involved in this case. The cases can perhaps be classified into
two groups according to the similarity of the issues involved and the
corresponding rulings rendered by the court.
In the "first group", the basic issue focuses on the application of either the
6% (under the Civil Code) or 12% (under the Central Bank Circular) interest
per annum. It is easily discernible in these cases that there has been a
consistent holding that the Central Bank Circular imposing the 12%
interest per annum applies only to loans or forbearance of money, goods
or credits, as well as to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits, and that the 6% interest under the Civil Code
governs when the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the
concept of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance
of obligations in general. Observe, too, that in these cases, a common time
frame in the computation of the 6% interest per annum has been applied,
i.e., from the time the complaint is filed until the adjudged amount is fully
paid.
The "second group", did not alter the pronounced rule on the application
of the 6% or 12% interest per annum, depending on whether or not the
amount involved is a loan or forbearance, on the one hand, or one of
indemnity for damage, on the other hand. Unlike, however, the "first
group" which remained consistent in holding that the running of the legal
interest should be from the time of the filing of the complaint until fully
paid, the "second group" varied on the commencement of the running of
the legal interest.
Malayan held that the amount awarded should bear legal interest from
the date of the decision of the court a quo, explaining that "if the suit
were for damages, 'unliquidated and not known until definitely
ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts after proof,' then,
interest 'should be from the date of the decision.'"
The ostensible discord is not difficult to explain. The factual circumstances
may have called for different applications, guided by the rule that the
courts are vested with discretion, depending on the equities of each case,
on the award of interest. Nonetheless, it may not be unwise, by way of
clarification and reconciliation, to suggest the following rules of thumb for
future guidance.

court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be

deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for
the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount
finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the
case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per
annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period
being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Petition is partly GRANTED. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the legal interest to be paid is SIX PERCENT (6%) on
the amount due computed from the decision of the court a quo. A
TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%), shall be
imposed on such amount upon finality of this decision until the payment
thereof.
SUNGA-CHAN V. CA, GR NO. 164401, JUNE 25, 2008
FACTS:
In 1977, Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership to engage in the
marketing of liquefied petroleum gas. For convenience, the business,
Shellite, was registered as a sole proprietorship in the name of Jacinto,
albeit the partnership arrangement called for equal sharing of the net
profit. After Jacintos death in 1989, his widow, petitioner Cecilia Sunga,
and married daughter, petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, continued with the
business without Chuas consent. Chuas subsequent repeated demands
for accounting and winding up went unheeded, prompting him to file on
June 22, 1992 a Complaint for Winding Up of a Partnership Affairs,
Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Attachment.
RTC rendered judgment finding for Chua, which decision was subsequently
upheld by the CA and SC. Said RTC decision then became final and
executory. Petitioners, citing Article 2213 of the Civil Code, fault the trial
court for imposing, in the execution of its final judgment, interests on
what they considered as unliquidated claims. Petitioners also question the
imposition of 12% interest on the claimed monthly profits of PhP 35,000,
reckoned from 1988 to October 15, 1992. To petitioners, the imposable
rate should only be 6% and computed from the finality of the RTCs
underlying decision, i.e., from December 20, 2001.

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasicontracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held
liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the
Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.

ISSUES:

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual

and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual
thereof, is imposed, as follows:

HELD:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of

a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest
due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate
of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e.,
from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of
money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded
may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the
demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot
be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the
interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the

Can the RTC impose interest on a final judgment of unliquidated claims?

Was the imposed interest rate proper? How much should the interest be?
The petition is partly meritorious.
In Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., the Court held that the legal interest at 12% per
annum under Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 416 shall be adjudged only in
cases involving the loan or forbearance of money. And for transactions
involving payment of indemnities in the concept of damages arising from
default in the performance of obligations in general and/or for money
judgment not involving a loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit,
the governing provision is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing a yearly
6% interest. Art. 2209 pertinently provides:
Art. 2209.If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money,
and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there
being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the
interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal
interest, which is six per cent per annum.
The term "forbearance," within the context of usury law, has been
described as a contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain,
during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to
repay the loan or debt then due and payable.
64

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. synthesized the rules on the imposition of

interest, if proper, and the applicable rate, as follows: The 12% per annum
rate under CB Circular No. 416 shall apply only to loans or forbearance of
money, goods, or credits, as well as to judgments involving such loan or
forbearance of money, goods, or credit, while the 6% per annum under
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies "when the transaction involves the
payment of indemnities in the concept of damage arising from the breach
or a delay in the performance of obligations in general," with the
application of both rates reckoned "from the time the complaint was filed
until the [adjudged] amount is fully paid." In either instance, the reckoning
period for the commencement of the running of the legal interest shall be
subject to the condition "that the courts are vested with discretion,
depending on the equities of each case, on the award of interest."
Guided by the foregoing rules, the award to Chua of the amount
representing earned but unremitted profits, i.e.. PhP 35,000 monthly,
from January 1988 until May 30, 1992, must earn interest at 6% per
annum reckoned from October 7, 1997, the rendition date of the RTC
decision, until December 20, 2001, when the said decision became final
and executory. Thereafter, the total of the monthly profits inclusive of the
add on 6% interest shall earn 12% per annum reckoned from December
20, 2001 until fully paid, as the award for that item is considered to be, by
then, equivalent to a forbearance of credit. Likewise, the PhP 250,000
award, representing the goodwill value of the business, the award of PhP
50,000 for moral and exemplary damages, PhP 25,000 attorneys fee, and
PhP 25,000 litigation fee shall earn 12% per annum from December 20,
2001 until fully paid.
Anent the impasse over the partnership assets, we are inclined to agree
with petitioners assertion that Chuas share and interest on such assets
partake of an unliquidated claim which, until reasonably determined, shall
not earn interest for him.
The October 7, 1997 RTC decision clearly directed petitioners to render an
accounting, inventory, and appraisal of the partnership assets and then to
wind up the partnership affairs by restituting and delivering to Chua his
one-half share of the accounted partnership assets. The directive itself is a
recognition that the exact share and interest of Chua over the partnership
cannot be determined with reasonable precision without going through
with the inventory and accounting process. In fine, a liquidated claim
cannot validly be asserted without accounting. In net effect, Chuas
interest and share over the partnership asset, exclusive of the goodwill,
assumed the nature of a liquidated claim only after the trial court, through
its November 6, 2002 resolution, approved the assets inventory and
accounting report on such assets.
Considering that Chuas computation of claim, as approved by the trial
court, was submitted only on October 15, 2002, no interest in his favor can
be added to his share of the partnership assets.
AIR FRANCE V. DE CASTRO, GR NO. 188691, OCT. 31, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent John Anthony de Camilis filed a case for breach of contract of
carriage, damages and attorneys fees against petitioner Air France
Philippines/KLM Air France (AF).
Respondent alleged that he went on a pilgrimage with a group of Filipinos
to selected countries in Europe. According to respondent: (1) AFs agent in
Paris failed to inform him of the need to secure a transit visa for Moscow,
as a result of which he was denied entry to Moscow and was subjected to
humiliating interrogation by the police; (2) another AF agent (a certain Ms.
Soeyesol) rudely denied his request to contact his travel companions to
inform them that he was being sent back to Paris from Moscow with a
police escort; Ms. Soeyesol even reported him as a security threat which
resulted in his being subjected to further interrogation by the police in
Paris and Rome, and worse, also lifted his flight coupons for the rest of his
trip; (3) AF agents in Rome refused to honor his confirmed flight to Paris;
(4) upon reaching Paris for his connecting flight to Manila, he found out
that the AF agents did not check in his baggage and since he had to

retrieve his bags at the baggage area, he missed his connecting flight; (5)
he had to shoulder his extended stay in Paris for AFs failure to make good
its representation that he would be given a complimentary motel pass and
(6) he was given a computer print-out of his flight reservation for Manila
but when he went to the airport, he was told that the flight was
overbooked. It was only when he made a scene that the AF agent boarded
him on an AF flight to Hongkong and placed him on a connecting
Philippine Airlines flight to Manila.
The RTC found that AF breached its contract of carriage and that it was
liable to pay P200,000 actual damages, P1 million moral damages, P1
million exemplary damages and P300,000 attorneys fees to respondent.
The appellate court affirmed the award of P1 million moral damages and
P300,000 attorneys fees. However, it reduced the actual damages to
US$906 (or its peso equivalent).
The CA also decreased the exemplary damages from P1 million to
P300,000. The CA further imposed interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the
date of extrajudicial demand until full satisfaction, but before judgment
becomes final. From the date of finality of the judgment until the
obligation is totally paid, 12% interest p.a. shall be imposed.
ISSUE:
Is the CA correct in its imposition of interests?
HELD:
Yes.
Both the RTC and the CA have competently ruled on the issue of
respondents entitlement to damages and attorneys fees as they properly
laid down both the factual and legal bases for their respective decisions.
We see no reason to disturb their findings.
The above liabilities of AF shall earn legal interest pursuant to the Courts
ruling in Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines v.
Estrella, citing Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA.
Pursuant to this ruling, the legal interest is 6% p.a. and it shall be reckoned
from April 25, 2007 when the RTC rendered its judgment, not from the
time of respondents extrajudicial demand. This must be so as it was at the
time the RTC rendered its judgment that the quantification of damages
may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained. Then, from the time
this decision becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12%
p.a. until full satisfaction.
c. Extent of Recoverable Damages
c.1. In contracts and quasi-contracts where there is
c.1.a. good faith on obligor
Art. 2201, NCC.In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which
the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the
natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and
which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the
time the obligation was constituted.
BATONG BUHAY V. CA, 147 SCRA 4
FACTS:
Defendant Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. issued Stock Certificate No.
16807 covering 62,495 shares with a par value of P0.01 per share to
Francisco Aguac who was then legally married to Paula G. Aguac, but the
said spouses had lived separately for more than 14 years prior to the said
date. On December 16, 1969, Francisco Aguac, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, sold his 62,495 shares covered by Stock Certificate No.
16807 for the sum of P9,374.70 in favor of the plaintiff, Inc. Mining
Corporation.
When Batong Buhay was about to effect the cancellation of Stock
Certificate No. 16807 and transfer the 62,495 shares covered thereby to
the plaintiff, it received a letter from Paula G. Aguac advising it to withhold
the transfer of the subject shares of stock on the ground that the same are
conjugal property. The defendants justify their refusal to transfer the
65

shares of stock of Francisco Aguac in the name of the plaintiff in view of

their apprehension that they might he held liable for damages under
Article 173 of the Civil Code.
In view of the defendant's inaction on the request for the transfer of the
stock certificate in its name, the plaintiff commenced this action praying
that the defendants be ordered to issue and release the transfer stock
certificate covering 62,495 shares of defendant Batong Buhay, formerly
registered in the name of Francisco Aguac, in favor of the plaintiff, and for
the recovery of compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages and
attorney's fees.
The trial court handed down its judgment ordering the defendant (herein
petitioner) to effect the transfer of the shares but private respondent Inc.
Mining Corporation appealed to the CA anchored on the lower court's
alleged failure to award damages for the wrongful refusal of petitioner to
transfer the subject shares of stock and alleged failure to award attorney's
fees, cost of injunction bond and expenses of litigation.
ISSUE:
May the CA award damages by way of unrealized profits despite the
absence of supporting evidence, or merely on the basis of pure
assumption, speculation or conjecture; or can the respondent recover
damages by way of unrealized profits when it has not shown that it was
damaged in any manner by the act of petitioner?
HELD:
SC answered in the negative. Speculative damages cannot be recovered.
The petitioner alleges that the appellate court gravely and categorically
erred in awarding damages by way of unrealized profit (or lucro cesante)
to private respondent. Petitioner company also alleges that the claim for
unrealized profit must be duly and sufficiently established, that is, that the
claimant must submit proof that it was in fact damaged because of
petitioner's act or omission.
The stipulation of facts of the parties does not at all show that private
respondent intended to sell, or would sell or would have sold the stocks in
question on specified dates. While it is true that shares of stock may go up
or down in value (as in fact the concerned shares here really rose from
fifteen (15) centavos to twenty three or twenty four (23/24) centavos per
share and then fell to about two (2) centavos per share, still whatever
profits could have been made are purely SPECULATIVE, for it was difficult
to predict with any decree of certainty the rise and fall in the value of the
shares. Thus this Court has ruled that speculative damages cannot be
recovered.
It is easy to say now that had private respondent gained legal title to the
shares, it could have sold the same and reaped a profit of P5,624.95 but it
could not do so because of petitioner's refusal to transfer the stocks in the
former's name at the time demand was made, but then it is also true that
human nature, being what it is, private respondent's officials could also
have refused to sell and instead wait for expected further increases in
value.
c.1.b. bad faith in obligor
GENERAL ENTERPRISES V. LIANGA BAY, 11 SCRA 73
FACTS:
Defendant seeks the reconsideration of the SC decision rendered on
August 31, 1964 on the grounds that the amount of P400,000.00 awarded
to plaintiff as lucrum cessans is not justified considering the evidence
available; that assuming the agreement entered into between the parties
to be valid, defendant is not guilty of breach thereof because its obligation
to supply the monthly two million board feet for the remainder of the
period of the agreement was not mandatory but conditional, aside from
the fact that it had the right to suspend the operation of the agreement
under the proviso contained in paragraph 8 thereof; that the request of
defendant for the renegotiation of the prices of logs which was refused by
plaintiff was a right expressly granted to it in paragraph 2 of said

agreement; and that the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees
to plaintiff is unjustified.
As a basis for the actual damages awarded to plaintiff we stated in our
decision that "whether logs were delivered to plaintiff, plaintiff earned the
commission. Had defendant continued to deliver the logs plaintiff could
have continued earning its commission in much the same way as in
previous shipments." Had the operation not been stopped, plaintiff would
have undoubtedly continued the flow of sales in pursuance of the
agreement. But defendant prevented this for reasons of its own.
ISSUE:
Was the award of damages for lucrum cessans justified?
HELD:
Yes.
We only need to emphasize that, since defendant is guilty of breaking the
agreement for reasons purely of its own, in disregard of its express
covenant, it held itself liable for all consequential damages that may result
from such breach, whether foreseen or unforeseen, and one of the items
that may be considered in determining said damages is the failure to
realize whatever profits could have been earned during the remaining life
of the agreement. It is not, therefore, proper to base such damages purely
in transactions that had been accomplished in the past and ignore those
that could have been accomplished in the future. As the law says, in case
of fraud or bad faith, "the obligor shall be responsible for all damages that
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation"
(Article 2201, new Civil Code).
c.2. In crimes and quasi-delicts
Art. 2202, NCC.In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all
the damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act
or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have
been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION V. PEOPLE, ET.AL., GR
NO. 152040, MARCH 31, 2006
FACTS:
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment.
The Marikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owneroperator of a passenger bus. Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the
regular driver of the bus.
Suelto was driving the aforementioned passenger bus when it suddenly
swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment
owned by Valdellon, causing damage thereon. Valdellon filed a criminal
complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against
Suelto. Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and
the bus company for damages.
During the trial, Valdellon testified on the damage caused to the terrace of
her apartment, and, in support thereof, adduced in evidence a receipt for
P35,000.00, dated October 20, 1993, issued by the BB Construction and
Steel Fabricator for "carpentry, masonry, welding job and electrical
[work]."
The trial court rendered judgment finding Suelto guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, and
ordered MALTC and Suelto to pay, jointly and severally, P150,000.00 to
Valdellon, by way of actual and compensatory damages, as well as
attorneys fees and costs of suit. CA rendered judgment affirming the
decision of the trial court, but the award for actual damages was reduced
to P100,000.00.
ISSUE:
Was the award for actual damages proper?
HELD:
No.
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We agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents failed to

prove that the damages to the terrace caused by the incident amounted
to P100,000.00. The only evidence adduced by respondents to prove
actual damages claimed by private respondent were the summary
computation of damage made by Engr. Jesus R. Regal, Jr. amounting to
P171,088.46 and the receipt issued by the BB Construction and Steel
Fabricator to private respondent for P35,000.00 representing cost for
carpentry works, masonry, welding, and electrical works. Respondents
failed to present Regal to testify on his estimation.
Under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, actual damages include all the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of,
classified as one for the loss of what a person already possesses (dao
emergente) and the other, for the failure to receive, as a benefit, that
which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). As expostulated by
the Court in PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of
Appeals:
Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages
are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or
injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are
designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for
the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on
torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There
are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of
what a person already possesses (dao emergente), and the other is
the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to
him (lucro cesante).
The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence
would be presented on either side. The burden is to establish ones case
by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a
whole, adduced by one side, is superior to that of the other. Actual
damages are not presumed. The claimant must prove the actual amount
of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable. Specific facts that could afford
a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are
borne must be pointed out. Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere
surmises, speculations or conjectures.
We note, however, that petitioners adduced evidence that, in their view,
the cost of the damage to the terrace of private respondent would
amount to P55,000.00. Accordingly, private respondent is entitled to
P55,000.00 actual damages.
c.3. In crimes and quasi-delicts resulting in death
Art. 2206, NCC.The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or
quasi-delict shall be at least Three thousand pesos, even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of earning capacity of
the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and
awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to
the decedents inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years the exact duration to
be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the accused.
d. Mitigation and assessment of actual damages

Art. 2203, NCC.The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting
from the act or omission in question.
Art. 2214, NCC.In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
shall reduce the damages that he may recover.
e. Subrogatory Right of Insurer
Art. 2207, NCC.If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has
received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss
arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the
insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against
the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount
paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the
aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person
causing the loss or injury.
III.

MORAL DAMAGES

a. Definition
Art. 2217, NCC.Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
b. Purpose
SIMEX INTERNATIONAL V. CA, GR NO. 88013, MARCH 19, 1990
FACTS:
The petitioner is a private corporation engaged in the exportation of food
products. It buys products from various local suppliers and then sells them
abroad. Most of its exports are purchased by the petitioner on credit. The
petitioner was a depositor of the respondent bank and maintained a
checking account. On May 25, 1981, the petitioner deposited to its
account in the said bank the amount of P100,000.00. Subsequently, the
petitioner issued several checks against its deposit but was surprised to
learn later that they had been dishonored for insufficient funds.
As a consequence, petitioner received various letters of demand,
threatening prosecution if the dishonored check issued to it was not made
good. Deliveries of the order made by petitioner were withheld; and
petitioners credit line was cancelled. The petitioner complained to the
respondent bank on June 10, 1981. Investigation disclosed that the sum of
P100,000.00 deposited by the petitioner had not been credited to it. The
error was rectified on June 17, 1981, and the dishonored checks were paid
after they were re-deposited.
Petitioner then filed a complaint claiming from the private respondent
moral damages and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees, and costs.
Both trial and appellate courts rendered holding that moral and exemplary
damages were not called for under the circumstances.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to moral damages?
HELD:
Yes.
We feel it is not enough to say that the private respondent rectified its
records and credited the deposit in less than a month as if this were
sufficient repentance. The error should not have been committed in the
first place. The respondent bank has not even explained why it was
committed at all. It is true that the dishonored checks were, as the Court
of Appeals put it, "eventually" paid. However, this took almost a month
when, properly, the checks should have been paid immediately upon
presentment.
As the Court sees it, the initial carelessness of the respondent bank,
aggravated by the lack of promptitude in repairing its error, justifies the
grant of moral damages. This rather lackadaisical attitude toward the
complaining depositor constituted the gross negligence, if not wanton bad
67

faith, that the respondent court said had not been established by the
petitioner.

Are the petitioners entitled to more than the P5,000.00 award as moral
and exemplary damages?

We also note that while stressing the rectification made by the

respondent bank, the decision practically ignored the prejudice suffered
by the petitioner. This was simply glossed over if not, indeed, disbelieved.
The fact is that the petitioner's credit line was canceled and its orders
were not acted upon pending receipt of actual payment by the suppliers.
Its business declined. Its reputation was tarnished. Its standing was
reduced in the business community. All this was due to the fault of the
respondent bank which was undeniably remiss in its duty to the
petitioner.

HELD:

Article 2205 of the Civil Code provides that actual or compensatory

damages may be received "(2) for injury to the plaintiff s business standing
or commercial credit." There is no question that the petitioner did sustain
actual injury as a result of the dishonored checks and that the existence of
the loss having been established "absolute certainty as to its amount is not
required." Such injury should bolster all the more the demand of the
petitioner for moral damages and justifies the examination by this Court of
the validity and reasonableness of the said claim.
We agree that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant
but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. In
the case at bar, the petitioner is seeking such damages for the prejudice
sustained by it as a result of the private respondent's fault. The
respondent court said that the claimed losses are purely speculative and
are not supported by substantial evidence, but it failed to consider that
the amount of such losses need not be established with exactitude
precisely because of their nature. Moral damages are not susceptible of
pecuniary estimation. Article 2216 of the Civil Code specifically provides
that "no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal,
temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated." That is
why the determination of the amount to be awarded (except liquidated
damages) is left to the sound discretion of the court, according to "the
circumstances of each case."
MAKABALI V. CA, GR NO.46877, JAN. 22, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Georgina Makabali had just graduated from the College of
Medicine, UP, and as a graduation gift from her father, was given a trip to
Hongkong. Since she had never been abroad, her parents insisted that she
be accompanied by her sister and co-petitioner Lourdes Cynthia Makabali,
a schoolteacher.
Petitioners availed of the package tour to Hong Kong offered by private
respondent Baron Travel Corporation. Petitioners were assured that they
would be going with a group of thirteen other travelers to be led by a tour
guide, a certain Mr. Arsenio Rosal, and that a representative of private
respondent would see them off at the Manila International Airport to give
them final instructions. Petitioners were also that they would be lodged at
the President Hotel in Hongkong.
However, none of these assurances happened. Nobody met petitioners at
the airport and they met no one from the supposed tour group. They
looked for and found a certain Mr. Arsenio Rosal who, to their
embarrassment, protested that he was not a tour guide but a business
executive working with International Harvester Macleod, Inc. and who was
going to Hongkong as a paying passenger. Moreover, there had been no
accommodations reserved for them at the President Hotel.
As a consequence, petitioners had to scrimp on their limited budget for
fear that their meager pocket money would not be enough to pay for their
hotel bills. All these caused them sleepless nights because of great worry,
mental anguish and public humiliation. An action for moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and costs was filed by the petitioners. Trial Court
rendered judgment in petitioner's favor but awarded them only P500.00
as moral and exemplary damages. CA increased the award to P5,000.00.
ISSUE:

Yes.
To begin with, there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what
would be a fair amount of moral damages, since each case must be
governed by its own peculiar circumstances.
Article 2217 of the Civil Code recognizes that moral damages which
include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation
and similar injury, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
We (SC) have awarded moral and exemplary damages depending upon the
facts attendant to each case. It will also be noted that We gave separate
awards for moral and exemplary damages. This is as it should be because
the nature and purposes of said damages are different. While moral
damages have to do with injury personal to the awardee, such as physical
suffering and the like, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good.
It is essential however, in the award of damages that the claimant must
have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual basis
of the damages and its causal connection to defendant's acts. This is so
because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are
in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer,
and are allowable only when specifically prayed for in the complaint.
As reflected in the records of the case, the CA was in agreement with the
findings of the trial court that petitioners suffered anguish,
embarrassment and mental sufferings due to failure of private respondent
to perform its obligation to the petitioners. According to the CA, private
respondent acted in wanton disregard of the rights of petitioners. These
pronouncements lay the basis and justification for this Court to award
petitioners moral and exemplary damages.
In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, especially the
social standing of petitioners and the embarrassment and humiliation
suffered by them, the anxiety they must have felt in their first journey to a
foreign land under uncertain circumstances and with meager funds which
could run out any time, We are inclined to award damages to the
petitioner more than what was awarded by the CA.
The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration within the limits of
the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The amount of P5,000.00 is
minimal compared to the sufferings and embarrassment of petitioners
who left Manila with high spirits and excitement hoping to enjoy their first
trip to a foreign land only to be met with uncertainties and humiliations.
c. Burden of Proof; Quantum of Evidence
PNB V. CA, GR NO. 45776, MARCH 30, 1988
FACTS:
Private respondent Napoleon Navarro was an employee of petitioner PNB.
Navarro falsified and/or forged checks and appropriated to himself the
proceeds in the aggregate amount of P28,683.77. PNB filed a civil case
against Navarro to recover the sum defalcated in the amount of P
13,906.81 with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the
properties of Napoleon Navarro. While the writ of preliminary attachment
was in the process of issuance, a Deed of Sale of Real Property and
Dwelling House was executed by respondents Navarro and Patricia Cruz in
favor of the other respondents spouses Vicente Medina and Leticia Lopez
over the former's properties. Subsequently, a new transfer certificate of
title was issued in the names of spouses Vicente Medina and Leticia Lopez.
PNB then filed another civil case No. 4507 against respondents Napoleon
C. Navarro and his wife Patricia Cruz and the spouses Vicente Medina and
Leticia Lopez for the annulment of the aforesaid Deed of Sale and the
68

cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title. An answer with

counterclaim was filed by the defendants Vicente Medina and Leticia
Lopez alleging good faith in the acquisition of the property in question and
seeking payment of damages.

accident which was "entirely attributable to an unforeseen event" or due

to the fault of the child and negligence of his parents; that the defendantspouses have exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
their driver Canciller.

The lower court finds PNB liable to Medina and Lopez for moral and
exemplary damages of P100,000.00. CA modified said judgment by
decreasing the amount awarded to P10,000.00 only, anchored on its
finding that PNB had not acted maliciously and in a wanton manner in
filing the civil case against Medina and Lopez.

Plaintiffs moved for a judgment on the pleadings, upon the claim that the
defendants' answer not only "failed to tender an issue" but as well
"admitted material allegations" of the complaint. The trial court rendered
a judgment on the pleadings, condemning the defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay "to the plaintiffs the sum of P10,000 for the death of their
child Regino Laudiano Raagas, P2,000 for moral damages, P1,000
actualdamages, P1,000 for attorney's fees, and the costs."

ISSUE:
Was the award for moral damages justified?
HELD:
No.
While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages
may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of
the court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant satisfactorily
proves the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal
relation to defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages though
incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. Moral damages, in other words, are
not corrective or exemplary damages.
For moral damages to be awarded, the law requires a wrongful act or
omission attributable to petitioner as the proximate cause of the mental
anguish suffered by private respondents spouses Vicente E. Medina and
Leticia Lopez. Respondent appellate court categorically ruled in the
negative yet awarded moral and exemplary damages in the reduced
amount of P10,000.00 in favor of aforesaid respondent spouses. This
brings to light Our ruling in Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions, Inc. which
enunciates that:
In order that a person may be made liable to the payment of moral
damages, the law requires that his act be wrongful. The adverse
result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject
the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate such right is so
precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may
exercise it erroneously, For these the law taxes costs.
Conformably with settled jurisprudence and in agreement with
petitioner's contention, We find the conclusion of respondent appellate
court that the filing of Civil Case No. 4507 was not made maliciously and in
a wanton manner inconsistent with its award of moral and exemplary
damages in the reduced amount of P10,000.00.
In the absence of malice and bad faith, the mental anguish suffered by
respondents spouses Medina and Lopez for having been made defendants
in Civil Case No. 4507 is not that kind of anxiety which would warrant the
award of moral damages. The worries and anxieties suffered by
respondents spouses Medina and Lopez were only such as are usually,
caused to a party haled into court as a defendant in a litigation. Therefore,
there is no sufficient justification for the award of moral damages, more
so, exemplary damages.
RAAGAS V. RAYA, 22 SCRA 839
FACTS:
Spouses Raagas filed a complaint against spouses Traya and Canciller
alleging that while the latter was "recklessly" driving a truck owned by
spouses Traya, said vehicle ran over the plaintiffs' three-year old son
Regino causing his instantaneous death. In their answer with
counterclaim, the defendants specifically deny that Canciller was "driving
recklessly" at the time of the mishap, and assert that the truck "was fully
loaded and was running at a very low speed and on the right side of the
road"; that it was the child who "rushed from an unseen position and
bumped the truck so that he was hit by the left rear tire of the said truck
and died", and consequently the defendants are not to blame for the

ISSUE:
Did the court a quo acted correctly when it rendered judgment on the
pleadings?
HELD:
No.
It is our view that the court erred. The plaintiffs' claim for actual, moral,
nominal and corrective damages, was controverted by the averment in the
answer to the effect that the defendants "have no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations" as
to such damages, "the truth of the matter being that the death of Regino
Raagas was occasioned by an unforeseen event and/or by the fault of the
small boy Regino Raagas or his parents." Such averment has the effect of
tendering a valid issue.
We held that even if the allegations regarding the amount of damages in
the complaint are not specifically denied in the answer, such damages are
not deemed admitted. We declared in no uncertain terms that actual
damages must be proved, and that a court cannot rely on "speculation,
conjecture or guesswork" as to the fact and amount of damages, but must
depend on actual proof that damage had been suffered and on evidence
of the actual amount. Finally, in Malonzo vs. Galang et. al., L-13851, July
27, 1960, we reaffirmed the rule that although an allegation is not
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, "it is,
nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence
of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to defendant's
acts."
The preceding disquisition points up the inescapable need of a full-blown
trial on the merits at which the parties will be afforded every opportunity
to present evidence in support of their respective contentions and
defenses.
SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC. V. MAGNO, 21 SCRA 292
FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Butuan City passed several ordinances imposing
taxes on the sale of beverages, liquors, and soft drinks. San Miguel
Brewery eventually stopped paying these taxes and thereby incurred in
back taxes. Verbal and written demands were unheeded. Accordingly,
Magno, the City Treasurer, with the approval of the Mayor of Butuan City
issued a warrant of distraint and levy against the properties of the San
Miguel Brewery; a notice of seizure by virtue of the warrant of distraint
and levy was served, and the company voluntarily surrendered the two (2)
delivery trucks seized under the warrant to the said City Treasurer.
San Miguel Brewery, Inc. instituted the present action praying for an order
directing the defendant to release the delivery trucks seized and to order
defendant to pay to the plaintiff damages. Said action was instituted
against defendant Magno in his individual capacity, and not in his official
capacity as City Treasurer. In his answer, Magno interposed the defense
that in seizing the delivery trucks of the San Miguel Brewery, Inc., he was
acting, and was in the performance of his official duty, as Treasurer of
Butuan City, and, cannot be held liable to pay to the company any
damages. He set up a counterclaim of P40,000.00 and P10,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages, respectively, allegedly sustained by him and the
members of his family on account of the shock, fright, wounded feelings,
69

mental anguish, besmirched reputation, and social humiliation they

suffered by reason of the filing of the case against him by the plaintiff, plus
attorney's fees in the amount of P2,000.00.
Trial court dismissed the complaint filed by San Miguel and ordered it to
pay Magno P2,000.00 in damages, P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs.
ISSUE:
Was it proper for the trial court to award damages in favor of Magno?
HELD:
No.
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and
proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the. While no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded,
the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court (Article
2216), it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant should satisfactorily
prove the existence of the factual basis of the damages (Article 2217) and
its causal connection to defendant's acts. This is so, because moral
damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of
an award, designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered
and not to impose a penalty on the wrong-doer. Neither may we consider
the award as exemplary damages, because the mere findings that certain
allegations in the complaint are not true, and the plaintiff committed a
mistake in instituting the action against the wrong party, do not justify the
award of this kind of damages. Penalty in the concept of damages should
not be imposed simply because a complaint is found unmeritorious by the
courts.
The amount of attorney's fees, on the other hand, is addressed to the
sound discretion of the court. It may be awarded along with expenses of
litigation, other than judicial costs, in cases where the court deems it just
and equitable under the circumstances of the case. And when as in this
case, the defendant public officer was sued in his private capacity for acts
done in the performance of official duty required by law, and was forced
to employ the services of private counsel to defend his rights, it is but
proper that attorney's fees be charged against the plaintiff. Nominal
damages may also be adjudicated. We believe the award of P2,000.00
attorney's fees and P100.00 nominal damages, is just and equitable in the
premises.
c.1. As distinguished from actual damages
d. When awardable, when not
Art. 2218, NCC.In the adjudication of moral damages, the sentimental
value of property, real or personal, may be considered.
Art. 2219, NCC.Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;
Adultery or concubinage;
Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
Illegal search;
Libel, slander or any other form of defamationl
Malicious prosecution;
Acts mentioned in Article 309;
Acts and actions referred to in Article 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced or abducted, raped, or abused,

referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may
bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.
Art. 2220, NCC.Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to

breached of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad

faith.
Art. 309, NCC.Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully
interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of the deceased for
damages, material and moral.
Art. 217, Labor Code.Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the
Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor
Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic
notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers
may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising
from the employer-employee relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare
and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee
relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,
involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless
of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters.
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or
enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. (As amended
by Section 9, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).
TULFO V. PEOPLE, GR NO.161032, SEPT. 16, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing
editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and
Philip Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily
tabloid Remate, was charged with the crime of libel by Atty. Carlos Ding So
of the Bureau of Customs in connection with the publication of the
derogatory and defamatory articles written by Tulfo, wherein the
complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official,
smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth.
Atty. Ding So testified that petitioner Tulfos act of imputing upon him
criminality, assailing his honesty and integrity, caused him dishonor,
discredit, and contempt among his co-members in the legal profession, coofficers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, co-members and peers in
the Iglesia ni Kristo, his co-officers and employees and superior officers in
the Bureau of Customs, and among ordinary persons who had read said
articles. He said it also caused him and his family sleepless nights, mental
anguish, wounded feelings, intrigues, and embarrassment.
The RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime charged and ordered them
to pay Atty. Ding So the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P800,000.00) PESOS, as actual damages, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000.00), as moral damages, and an additional amount of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), by way of exemplary
damages. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Was the award of damages proper?
70

HELD:

No.

No.

There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or
supervision over the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the
city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the Civil Code is clear.

The award of damages by the lower court must be modified. Art. 2199 of
the Civil Code provides, except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss
suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to
as actual or compensatory damages. There was no showing of any
pecuniary loss suffered by the complainant Atty. So. Without proof of
actual loss that can be measured, the award of actual damages cannot
stand.
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate
one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of
grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the
claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no
proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be
awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the sound discretion of
the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been
suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of
the cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. A
causal relation, in fine, must exist between the act or omission referred to
in the Code which underlies, or gives rise to, the case or proceeding on the
one hand, and the resulting injury, on the other hand; i.e. the first must be
the proximate cause and the latter the direct consequence thereof.
It was the articles of Tulfo that caused injury to Atty. So, and for that Atty.
So deserves the award of moral damages. Justification for the award of
moral damages is found in Art. 2219(7) of the Civil Code, which states that
moral damages may be recovered in cases of libel, slander, or any other
form of defamation. As the cases involved are criminal cases of libel, they
fall squarely within the ambit of Art. 2219(7).
Moral damages can be awarded even in the absence of actual or
compensatory damages. The fact that no actual or compensatory damage
was proven before the trial court does not adversely affect the offended
partys right to recover moral damages.
And while on the subject of moral damages, it may not be amiss to state at
this juncture that Tulfos libelous articles are abhorrent not only because of
its vilifying and demeaning effect on Atty. So himself, but also because of
their impact on members of his family, especially on the children and
possibly even the childrens children.
The award of exemplary damages, however, cannot be justified. Under
Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a
part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate
and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party. No
aggravating circumstances accompanied the commission of the libelous
acts; thus, no exemplary damages can be awarded.
GUILATCO V. CITY OF DAGUPAN, supra.
FACTS:
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Guilatco ordering defendant
City of Dagupan to pay plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P 15,924
(namely P8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses, P 7,420.00 as
lost income for one year and P 450.00 as bonus). P 150,000.00 as moral
damages, P 50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P 3,000.00 as attorney's
fees, and litigation expenses, plus costs. The appellate court reversed the
lower court findings on the ground that no evidence was presented by the
plaintiff- appellee to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or
supervision" over Perez Boulevard.
ISSUE:
Were the aforementioned damages properly awarded?
HELD:

Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to the petitioner in the
amount of P 10,000.00 should be reduced to the proven expenses of P
8,053.65 only. The trial court should not have rounded off the amount. In
determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on "speculation,
conjecture or guess work" as to the amount. Without the actual proof of
loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous.
On the other hand, moral damages may be awarded even without proof of
pecuniary loss, inasmuch as the determination of the amount is
discretionary on the court.Though incapable of pecuniary estimation,
moral damages are in the nature of an award to compensate the claimant
for actual injury suffered but which for some reason can not be proven.
However, in awarding moral damages, the following should be taken into
consideration:
(1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the claimee's acts.
(2) Second, there must be compensatory or actual damages as
satisfactory proof of the factual basis for damages.
(3) Third, the award of moral damages must be predicated on any of
the cases enumerated in the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, the physical suffering and mental anguish suffered by
the petitioner were proven. Witnesses from the petitioner's place of work
testified to the degeneration in her disposition-from being jovial to
depressed. She refrained from attending social and civic activities.
Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P 150,000.00 is excessive.
Her handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her
treatment which lasted for one year. Though evidence of moral loss and
anguish existed to warrant the award of damages,the moderating hand of
the law is called for. The Court has time and again called attention to the
reprehensible propensity of trial judges to award damages without
basis,resulting in exorbitant amounts.
Although the assessment of the amount is better left to the discretion of
the trial court under preceding jurisprudence, the amount of moral
damages should be reduced to P 20,000.00.
As for the award of exemplary damages, the trial court correctly pointed
out the basis:
To serve as an example for the public good, it is high time that the
Court, through this case, should serve warning to the city or cities
concerned to be more conscious of their duty and responsibility to
their constituents, especially when they are engaged in construction
work or when there are manholes on their sidewalks or streets which
are uncovered, to immediately cover the same, in order to minimize
or prevent accidents to the poor pedestrians.
FILINVEST V. MENDEZ, GR NO. 66419, JULY 31, 1987
LOPEZ V. PANAM, 16 SCRA 431
FACTS:
Petitioner, then Senator Fernando Lopez, along with his wife, daughter,
and son-in-law, purchased first class accommodation tickets in Flight No. 2
of Pan American World Airways. On the day of their scheduled flight
however, PAN-AM informed them that they could not accommodate
Senator Lopez and party in that trip as first class passengers, and stating
that they could not go in that flight unless they took the tourist class
therein. Senator Lopez and party were constrained to take PAN-AM's flight
from Tokyo to San Francisco as tourist passengers.
Suit for damages was thereafter filed by Senator Lopez and party against
PAN-AM. Alleging breach of contracts in bad faith by defendant, plaintiffs
asked for P500,000 actual and moral damages, P100,000 exemplary
damages, P25,000 attorney's fees plus costs. Judgment was rendered in
71

favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, which is accordingly

ordered to pay the plaintiffs the following: (a) P150,000.00 as moral
damages; (b) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; with legal interest on
both from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; and (c)
P25,000.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs of this action.

his employer submitted to the investigating fiscal who conducted the

preliminary investigation of his employer's estafa charge against Espiritu.

ISSUE:

Decision was rendered by the trial court in favor of Espiritu ordering the
defendants Lao and St. Joseph Lumber to pay jointly and severally to
Espiritu the sums of P100,000 as moral damages, P5,000 as attorney's
fees, and costs. Lao appealed to CA but it was dismissed.

Was the award of moral damages justified?

ISSUE:

Ruling:

May the damages awarded to the defaulting debtor be satisfied by

execution against the employee's property since his employer's business
has already folded up?

No. It should be modified.

Addressing ourselves now to the question of damages, it is well to state at
the outset those rules and principles. First, moral damages are recoverable
in breach of contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith (Art. 2220, New Civil Code). Second, in addition to moral damages,
exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in breach of contract where the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner
(Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code). And, third, a written contract for an
attorney's services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless
found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule
138, Rules of Court).
First, then, as to moral damages. As a proximate result of defendant's
breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social
humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. For
plaintiffs were travelling with first class tickets issued by defendant and
yet they were given only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were
expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to
welcome them, only to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not
be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be
compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected
from the contractual undertaking.
Senator Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore. International
carriers like defendant know the prestige of such an office. And he was
former Vice-President of the Philippines. For the moral damages sustained
by him, therefore, an award of P100,000.00 is appropriate. Mrs. Maria J.
Lopez, as wife of Senator Lopez, shared his prestige and therefore his
humiliation. In addition she suffered physical discomfort during the 13hour trip. Accordingly, considering the totality of her suffering and
humiliation, an award to Mrs. Maria J. Lopez of P50,000.00 for moral
damages will be reasonable. Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were
travelling as immediate members of the family of Senator Lopez. They
formed part of the Senator's party as shown also by the reservation cards
of PAN-AM. As such they likewise shared his prestige and humiliation. For
their social humiliation, therefore, the award to them of P25,000.00 each
is reasonable.
LAO V. CA, GR NO. 80808, JULY 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 58
FACTS:
Petitioner Dennis Lao was an employee of St. Joseph Lumber, owned by
the private respondent, Chan Tong. St. Joseph Lumber filed a collection
suit against a customer, the private respondent, Benjamin Espiritu, for
unpaid purchases of construction materials. St. Joseph Lumber also filed a
criminal complaint for estafa against Espiritu, based on the same
transaction. Since the petitioner was the employee who transacted
business with Espiritu, he was directed by his employer, Chan Tong, to sign
the affidavit or complaint prepared by the firm's, lawyer, Attorney Manuel
Querubin. The case was however later dismissed because the court
believed that Espiritu's liability was only civil, not criminal.
Hence, Espiritu filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against the
petitioner and St. Joseph Lumber, praying that the defendants be ordered
to pay him P500,000 as moral damages, P10,000 as actual damages, and
P100,000 as attorney's fees. Petitioner alleged that he acted only as agent
or employee of St. Joseph Lumber when he executed the affidavit which

HELD:
No.
Lao had a valid defense to the action for malicious prosecution (Civil Case
No. 84-M) because it was his employer, St. Joseph Lumber, not himself,
that was the complainant in the estafa case against Espiritu. It was Chan
Tong, the owner of the St. Joseph Lumber, who, upon advice of his
counsel, filed the criminal complaint against Espiritu. Lao was only a
witness in the case. He had no personal interest in the prosecution of
Espiritu for he was not the party defrauded by Espiritu. He executed the
affidavit which was used as basis of the criminal charge against Espiritu
because he was the salesman who sold the construction materials to
Espiritu. He was only an agent of St. Joseph Lumber, hence, not personally
liable to the party with whom he contracted.
To maintain an action for damages based on malicious prosecution, three
elements must be present: First, the fact of the prosecution and the
further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the
action was finally terminated with an acquittal; second, that in bringing
the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and third, the
prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice.
Lao was only a witness, not the prosecutor in the estafa case. The
prosecutor was his employer, Chan Tong or the St. Joseph Lumber.
Lao was not motivated by malice in making the affidavit upon which the
fiscal based the filing of the information against Espiritu. He executed it as
an employee, a salesman of the St. Joseph Lumber from whom Espiritu
made his purchases of construction materials and who, therefore, had
personal knowledge of the transaction. Although the prosecution of
Espiritu for estafa did not prosper, the unsuccessful prosecution may not
be labelled as malicious. "Sound principles of justice and public policy
dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of
wrongs and vindication of their rights without later having to stand trial
for instituting prosecutions in good faith" (Buenaventura vs. Sto. Domingo,
103 Phil. 239).
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the judgment against Lao was a
nullity and should be set aside. Its execution against the petitioner cannot
be allowed to proceed.
GUTIERREZ V. VILLEGAS, 8 SCRA 527
FACTS:
Plaintiff and the defendants are the only legal heirs of the late Irene
Santos, who died intestate. The defendant, Jose D. Villegas, is the
surviving spouse, while the plaintiff, Adela Santos Gutierrez, and the other
defendant, Rizalina Santos Rivera, are the nieces of the said decedent. A
few days after the death of Irene Santos, a petition for the administration
of her estate was filed and granted by the court. Thereafter Jose D.
Villegas qualified as the administrator of the estate. Adela Santos
Gutierrez signed a four-page document written in Tagalog, entitled
"Kasulatan Ng Bilihan At Salinan", purporting to be a sale of her share and
participation in the estate in favor of Rizalina Santos Rivera, in
consideration of P50,000.00, payable in installments. The plaintiff also
signed a "Manifestation" purporting to inform the probate court that the
plaintiff had sold all her rights, interests, and participation in the estate to
Rizalina Santos Rivera.
72

However, the plaintiff filed the present case to annul the aforesaid deed of
sale on grounds of fraud and mistake. The defendants answered denying
the charges, and counterclaimed for P200,000.00 moral and exemplary
damages and P50,000.00 attorneys' fees, because of the allegedly
malicious charges and filing of the suit.

the name of his widow, Gregoria, and daughter, Candida, when plaintiff
Modesto's children insisted and inquired from the Register of Deeds
sometime in 1956 or 1957. Plaintiffs did not intervene in the intestate
proceedings for (the) settlement of the estate of their brother Jose as they
did not know of it.

The trial court rejected the pretensions of both parties, dismissing the
complaint as well on the counterclaim. Whereupon, plaintiffs and
defendants regularly appealed to this Court directly, the amounts involved
being in excess of P200,000.00. Both parties appealed.

Plaintiffs, who are the natural children, were thus constrained to bring the
present suit seeking for the reconveyance in their favor by defendants
Gregoria and daughter Candida and husband Jose Bayor of their
corresponding participations in said parcels of land in accordance with
article 840 of the old Civil Code and attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000
plus costs and expenses of this litigation".

ISSUE:
Did the lower court err in dismissing the complaint and counterclaim?
HELD:
No. We find no reason for disturbing the decision appealed from, and,
therefore, the same is hereby affirmed.
The facts, as shown by the record, do not support the plaintiff's
conclusions. The alleged indicia of fraud upon which she rests her case are
backed only by her own uncorroborated testimony, which is contradicted
by that of defendants and their witnesses. Her alleged poor eye-sight has
not been shown with convincing evidence, but, on the contrary, during the
trial, she readily identified a letter from the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
even without eyeglasses. Plaintiff has herself testified that she needed
money to engage in business in Mindoro. The defendants, on the other
hand, proved in convincing detail the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the questioned deed through their own testimony, that of
the instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Under the present
situation, the careful preparation of the document cannot be taken
against the defendants as an indication of fraud, in the absence of other
evidence manifesting a scheme to commit it and which would link the
lawyer who caused its preparation. All the foregoing circumstances
pointed to by the plaintiff as badges of fraud do not stand unexplained,
while, on the other hand, there are certain questions which have not been
satisfactorily explained by the plaintiff.
Turning now to the defendant's appeal, we are not disposed to vary the
lower court's refusal to award them damages and attorney's fees. Such
awards are primarily in the discretion of the trial court, and it has found no
facts upon which such award can be made. Not only were the allegations
of fraud in plaintiff's complaint privileged in character, but her failure to
seek an amicable settlement before filing suit, as required of relatives by
Article 222 of the Civil Code, has not been pleaded either by answer or
motion to dismiss. As to moral damages, the record shows no proof of
mental suffering on the part of defendants upon which the award can be
based. In addition, the absence of actual damages, moral, temperate, or
compensatory, blocks the grant of exemplary damages (Civil Code, Article
2234).

The CFI dismissed plaintiffs' complaint and held that the intestate estate
of Martin Ramos was settled in Civil Case No. 217, which was terminated
on March 4,1914, and that the judgment therein is res judicata and bars
any litigation regarding the same estate. Defendants Granada Ramos,
Gregoria T. Ramos, Candida Ramos, Jose Bayor and Agustin Ramos
appealed from the lower court's decision insofar as it ignored their
counterclaim for P50,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as attorney's
fees. The defendants argue that plaintiffs' action was baseless and was
filed in gross and evident bad faith. It is alleged that the action caused
defendants mental anguish, wounded feelings, moral shock and serious
anxiety and compelled them to hire the service of counsel and incur
litigation expenses.
ISSUE:
Are the defendants entitled to an award of moral damages?
HELD:
No.
Articles 2219 and 2220 (also 1764 and 2206) of the Civil Code indicate the
cases where moral damages may be recovered. The instant litigation does
not fall within any of the enumerated cases. Nor can it be regarded as
analogous to any of the cases mentioned in those articles. Hence,
defendants' claim for moral damages cannot be sustained. The worries
and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously
instituted are not the moral damages contemplated in the law.
"The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful
and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not
have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so
precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may
exercise it erroneously."
Since no compensatory and moral damages have been awarded in this
case, defendants' claim for exemplary damages, which was ventilated for
the first time in their appellants' brief, may be as an afterthought, cannot
be granted(Art. 2229, Civil Code).

RAMOS V. RAMOS, 61 SCRA 284

GALANG V. CA, 4 SCRA 55

FACTS:

FACTS:

When the spouses Martin Ramos and Candida Tanate died, they were
survived by their three legitimate children named Jose, Agustin and
Granada. Martin Ramos was also survived by his seven natural children
named Atanacia, Timoteo, Modesto, Manuel, Emiliano, Maria and
Federico. A special proceeding was then instituted for the settlement of
the intestate estate of the said spouses.

This is an action against Rodrigo Quinit and his father Maximo Quinit to
recover damages claimed to have been sustained by plaintiff Beatriz
Galang for an alleged breach of promise on the part of Rodrigo Quinit to
marry her. It appears that plaintiff and Rodrigo Quinit were engaged, but
Rodrigo's parents were strongly opposed to their marriage. In due course,
the CFI of Baguio rendered a decision sentencing the defendants jointly
and severally to pay the sums of P275.00, by way of actual damages,
P5,000.00, as moral damages, and P500.00, as attorney's fees, apart from
the costs. On appeal, taken by the defendants, the CA absolved Maximino
Quinit, and accordingly, reversed said decision insofar as he is concerned,
and modified it as regards Rodrigo Quinit, by eliminating the awards for
moral damages and attorney's fees. The case is before us on appeal by
certiorari taken by plaintiff Beatriz Galang.

A project of partition was submitted and was eventually approved by the

court. The sum of P1,785.35, as the legal share of each natural child, was
the amount which was indicated in the project of partition and which was
to be satisfied in cash. According to the natural children however, they did
not know that intestate proceedings were instituted for the distribution of
the estate of their father. They never received any sum of money in cash
the alleged insignificant sum of P1,785.35 each from said alleged
guardian as their supposed share in the estate of their father under any
alleged project of partition. They only discovered later on that the
property administered by their elder brother Jose had a Torrens Title in

ISSUE:
Is Beatriz Galang entitled to an award of moral damages?
HELD:
73

No.
Plaintiff maintains that the CA had erred in the appreciation of the
evidence, but the findings of said Court on the credibility of said evidence
are beyond our power of review on appeal by certiorari and,
consequently, conclusive upon us.
It is next urged that said Court had also erred in not awarding moral
damages to plaintiff, who insists that moral damages for breach of
promise to marry are collectible under our laws, but this question has
already been settled adversely to plaintiff's pretense in Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals, L-14628 (September 30, 1960).
MERCADO V. LIRA, 3 SCRA 124
FACTS:
Gonzalo Mercado and others were the owners and operators of the
Laguna Transportation Company. In the afternoon of April 21, 1951, while
its passenger bus was making the trip from Batangas to Manila, the left
front tire of the bus blew out and sent it swerving gradually toward the
left side of the road, over the shoulder and into a ravine some 270 meters
away. From the wreckage, the bodies of the passengers, several dead,
others injured, were recovered, and among the fatalities was Ramon Lira,
Jr. (24), son of Mr. and Mrs. Ramon Lira, Sr. and injured Nita Lira. Two
cases for recovery of damages were commenced against the owners and
operators. As to moral damages, among others, Mercado were sentenced
to pay 4,000.00 in Civil Case No. 104 for mental anguish; and 2,000.00 in
Civil Case No. 107 for her physical and mental suffering.
On appeal to the CA, however, the award of moral damages to Nita Lira
was deleted. In other words, in the case involving the death of Ramon Lira,
Jr., the CA granted moral damages, and in the case of physical injuries
caused upon Nita Lira, moral damages awarded her, were eliminated.
ISSUE:
Were the respective awards of moral damages justified?
HELD:
Yes.
Article 2206 of the new Civil Code expressly provides that the amount of
damages for death shall be "at least three thousand pesos, even though
there may have been mitigating circumstances." In other words, the
amount of damages to be awarded for the death of a passenger may be
more than P3,000.00. It is argued that the award for moral damages for
mental anguish caused by the death of a passenger is not obligatory, and
that the amount should only be nominal if the heirs have already been
compensated substantially for the death of the deceased. Article 2206
states further that "In addition" to the amount of at least P3,000.00 to be
awarded for the death of a passenger, the spouse, legitimate and
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages as a consequence of the death of their deceased kin,
which simply means that once the above-mentioned heirs of the deceased
claim compensation for moral damages and are able to prove that they
are entitled to such award, it becomes the duty of the court to award
moral damages to the claimant in an amount commensurate with the
mental anguish suffered by them. In the Civil Code, nominal damages are
treated separately from moral damages. Any amount that should be
awarded as nominal damages, should not be confused or interlinked with
moral damages which, by itself, is a distinct class of damages. Of course,
the amount of moral damages to be awarded, should be such as may be
reasonable and just under the circumstances in a given case. Petitioners'
claim that as the other damages awarded to said respondents are already
excessive, the award for moral damages should be reduced to P500.00.
But the Court of Appeals found the other damages not to be excessive,
and as far as this factual finding is concerned, we are not authorized to
rule otherwise. In fact, the petition limits the issues only to the
reasonableness of the P4,000.00 awarded by the Court of Appeals as
moral damages and the other amount of P4,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Considering the mental anguish and sorrow that must accompany and
overwhelm the parents upon the tragic death of a son, and considering
the nature and extent of the services rendered by counsel for respondents
and other circumstances of the case, we believe the awards given by the
Court of Appeals to respondents in the sum of P4,000.00 as moral
damages for the death of Ramon Lira, Jr. and the amount of P4,000.00 for
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation, fair and reasonable (par.
11, Art. 2208, N.C.C.).
With respect to Nita Lira, it is alleged that the respondent CA erred in not
awarding moral damages to petitioner Nita Lira for physical injuries and
mental suffering sustained by her, resulting from breach of the special
contract of carriage caused by the negligence of the respondents,
contending that her case is analogous to cases of "quasi delicts causing
physical injuries" for which the new Civil Code authorizes indemnification
for moral damages in favor of the injured party (par. 2, Art. 2219 N.C.C.).
Several cases have reached this Court raising the same question, among
them is the case of Paz Fores v. Irene Miranda, G.R. No. L-12163, March 4,
1959 the facts of which are identical to those of the present one. This
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said
. . . .. Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the
respondent, the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled
(Cachero v. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., G.R. No. L-8721, May 23,
1957; Necesito, et al. v. Paras, G.R. Nos. L-10605-10606, June 30,
1958), that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions
predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of
Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code.
By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately becomes
apparent that:
(a) In cases of breach of contract (including one transportation) proof
of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately injurious
conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the
descriptive term 'analogous cases used in Art. 2219; not only because
Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by
contractual breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art.
2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where there is a
'preexisting contractual relation between the parties.'
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a
mishap resulting in the death of a passenger, in which case Art. 1764
makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that
entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the deceased
passenger to 'demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased'. But the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all
the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die, moral
damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty
of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere carelessness of
the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of
malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there
is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of moral
damages by the CA.
PERMEX V. NLRC, 323 SCRA 231
FACTS:
Petitioner Permex, Inc., a company engaged in the business of canning
tuna and sardines, with its co-petitioners Edgar Lim and Jean Punzalan, its
Manager and Personnel Manager, respectively, terminated private
respondent Emmanuel Filoteo from employment allegedly for flagrantly
and deliberately violating company rules and regulations. More
specifically, he was dismissed allegedly for falsifying his daily time record.
The dismissal arose from Filoteo's alleged violation of Article 2 of the
company rules and regulations.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Filoteo
appealed to the NLRC. Finding merit therein, NLRC reversed and set aside
74

the judgment of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners were hereby ordered to pay
complainant separation pay and backwages, as well as moral and
exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
Was it proper for the NLRC to award moral damages to Filoteo?
HELD:
No. Notwithstanding the fact that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in ruling that the private respondent was illegally dismissed,
still, that doesnt guarantee an award for moral damages.
All told we see no reason to find that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it ruled that private respondent was illegally dismissed.
Hence we concur in that ruling. Nonetheless, we find that the award of
moral and exemplary damages by the public respondent is not in order
and must be deleted. Moral damages are recoverable only where the
dismissal of the employee was tainted by bad faith or fraud, or where it
constituted an act oppressive to labor, and done in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs, or public policy. Exemplary damages may be
awarded only if the dismissal was done in a wanton, oppressive, or
malevolent manner. None of these circumstances exist in the present
case.

submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one
liable for malicious prosecution.
In this case, however, there is reason to believe that a malicious intent
was behind the filing of the complaint for estafa against respondents. All
the pieces of evidence indicate that Aurea had long acknowledged
Jovencios ownership of half of the property. Furthermore, it was only in
1993 when petitioners decided to file the estafa complaint against
respondents. If petitioners had honestly believed that they still owned the
entire property, it would not have taken them 22 years to question
Jovencios ownership of half of the property. The only conclusion that can
be drawn from the circumstances is that Aurea knew all along that she
was no longer the owner of Jovencios portion after having sold it to him
way back in 1971. Likewise, other than petitioners bare allegations, no
other evidence was presented by them to substantiate their claim.
Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the
elements of (1) malice and (2) absence of probable cause. These two
elements are present in the present controversy. Petitioners were
completely aware that Jovencio was the rightful owner of the lot covered
by TCT No. 73251, clearly signifying that they were impelled by malice and
avarice in bringing the unfounded action.

GUTIERREZ V. VILLEGAS, 8 SCRA 528

EQUITABLE BANKING CORP. V. CALDERON, GR NO. 156168, DEC. 14,

2004

YASONA V. DE RAMOS, GR NO. 156339, OCT. 6, 2004

FACTS:

FACTS:

Respondent Calderon, a reputable businessman, applied and was issued

an Equitable International Visa card by petitioner EBC. When Calderon was
in Hong Kong with friends, he purchased some items at a Gucci store using
his Visa card. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his
friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed
him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought the reconfirmation
of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did
not honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a
pair of scissors. Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid
further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that
he bought.

In November 1971, Aurea Yasoa went to the house of Jovencio de Ramos

to ask for financial assistance in paying their loans to PNB, otherwise their
residential house and lot would be foreclosed. Inasmuch as Aurea was his
aunt, Jovencio acceded to the request. They agreed that, upon payment
by Jovencio of the loan to PNB, half of Yasoas subject property would be
sold to him. Jovencio paid Aureas bank loan. As agreed upon, Aurea
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Jovencio over half of the lot
consisting of 123 square meters. Thereafter, the lot was surveyed and
separate titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in
the names of Aurea and Jovencio.
Twenty-two years later, in August 1993, Aurea filed an estafa complaint
against brothers Jovencio and Rodencio de Ramos on the ground that she
was deceived by them when she asked for their assistance in 1971
concerning her mortgaged property. The criminal complaint for estafa was
dismissed for lack of evidence. On account of this dismissal, Jovencio and
Rodencio filed a complaint for damages on the ground of malicious
prosecution, alleging that the filing of the estafa complaint against them
was done with malice and it caused irreparable injury to their reputation,
as Aurea knew fully well that she had already sold half of the property to
Jovencio.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Jovencio and Rodencio, and
the defendants therein were ordered to pay damages in the amount of
P150,000.00 by way of moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages; P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs.

Upon his return to the Philippines, Calderon filed a complaint for damages
against EBC, and claiming that he suffered much torment and
embarrassment
on
account
of
EBCs
wrongful
act
of
blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card.
The trial court, concluding that "defendant bank was negligent if not in
bad faith, in suspending, or blacklisting plaintiffs credit card without
notice or basis", rendered judgment in favor of Calderon and ordered EBC
to pay Calderon US$150.00 as actual damages; P200,000.00 as and by way
of moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; attorneys fees
and costs. CA modified said judgment by awarding costs of suit and
reducing moral damages to P100,00.00 while the rest of the awards are
deleted.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in holding that respondent is entitled to moral damages?

ISSUE:

HELD:

Was the award proper?

Yes.

HELD:

In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,

serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injury. However, to be entitled to the award
thereof, it is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental
anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other party.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we
have had the occasion to reiterate the conditions to be met in order that
moral damages may be recovered, viz:

Yes.
In this jurisdiction, the term "malicious prosecution" has been defined as
"an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein."
To constitute "malicious prosecution," there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex or humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of

An award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of

besmirched reputation, or physical, mental or psychological suffering
sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission
factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission
75

of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by

the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the
instances expressed or envisioned by Articles 2219 and 2220 of the
Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, as here, moral

damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently
or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to
bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. Verily,
the breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,
oppressive or abusive.

No.

Here, the CA ruled, and rightly so, that no malice or bad faith attended
petitioners dishonor of respondents credit card. For, as found no less by
the same court, petitioner was justified in suspending the Visa card
because Calderon exceeded his credit limit and failed to pay prior credit
purchases.
Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result of the dishonor
of his card. There is, however, a material distinction between damages
and injury. To quote from our decision in BPI Express Card Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals:
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or
harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense
or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can
be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called
damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiffa concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the
person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus,
there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for
that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty
should be the proximate cause of the injury. (Emphasis supplied).
In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a case of damnum
absque injuria.
SAVELLANO, ET. AL., V. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, GR NO. 151783, JULY 8,
2003
FACTS:
Petitioners Victorino Savellano, a mayor of Ilocos Sur; his wife Virginia, a
businesswoman; and his son, Deogracias, Vice-Governor of Ilocos Sur, filed
a complaint for damages against respondent Northwest Airlines (NW) for
what they claimed to be the humiliation and inconvenience they suffered
in the hands of its personnel.
When petitioners departed from the US on board NW flight bound for
Manila, the pilot made an emergency landing in Seattle after announcing
that a fire had started in one of the plane's engines. In Seattle, they were
housed for a night in a hotel where they were told that theyll be in a flight
to Manila by morning. However, instead of flying to Manila, they were
board on a flight to Los Angeles for a connecting flight to Manila. In LA,
before boarding a flight for Manila via Seoul, some of petitioners handcarried items were not allowed to be placed inside the passengers
baggage compartment. Upon their arrival in Manila, they found out that
some of their valuables were lost.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The CA ruled that
petitioners had failed to show respondent's bad faith, negligence or.
Hence, it held that there was no basis for the RTC's award of moral and
exemplary damages. Neither did it find any reason to grant attorney's
fees.

Did the CA err in deleting the RTCs award of moral damages?

HELD:
When, as a result of engine malfunction, a commercial airline is unable to
ferry its passengers on the original contracted route, it nonetheless has
the duty of fulfilling its responsibility of carrying them to their contracted
destination on the most convenient route possible. Failing in this, it cannot
just unilaterally shuttle them, without their consent, to other routes or
stopping places outside of the contracted sectors. However, moral
damages cannot be awarded without proof of the carrier's bad faith, ill
will, malice or wanton conduct. Neither will actual damages be granted in
the absence of convincing and timely proof of loss. But nominal damages
may be allowed under the circumstances in the case herein.
Being guilty of a breach of their contract, respondent may be held liable
for damages suffered by petitioners in accordance with Articles 1170 and
2201 of the Civil Code, which state:
"Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages." (Emphasis
supplied)
"Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which
the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the
natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation,
and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted."
"In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor
shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation."
Petitioners impute oppression, discrimination, recklessness and
malevolence to respondent. We are not convinced. There is no persuasive
evidence that they were maliciously singled out to fly the Seattle-Los
Angeles-Seoul-Manila route. The records show that respondent was
impelled by sincere motives to get petitioners to their final destination by
whatever was the most expeditious course in its judgment, if not in
theirs. Though they claim that they were not accommodated on Flight 27
from Seattle to Tokyo because respondent had taken on Japanese
passengers, petitioners failed to present convincing evidence to back this
allegation. In the absence of convincing evidence, we cannot find
respondent guilty of bad faith.
Petitioners cite the cases of Lopez v. Pan American World Airways, Zulueta
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. and Ortigas Jr. v. Lufthansa German
Airlines to support their claim for moral and exemplary damages.
To summarize, in Lopez despite sufficient time one month to inform
the passengers of what had happened to their booking, the airline agent
intentionally withheld that information from them. In Zulueta, the
passenger was deliberately off-loaded after being gravely insulted during
an altercation. And in Ortigas, the passenger was intentionally
downgraded in favor of a European.
These cases are different from and inapplicable to the present case. Here,
there is no showing that the breach of contract was done with the same
entrepreneurial motive or self-interest as in Lopez or with ill will as in
Zulueta and Ortigas. Petitioners have failed to show convincingly that they
were rerouted by respondent to Los Angeles and Seoul because of malice,
profit motive or self-interest. Good faith is presumed, while bad faith is a
matter of fact that needs to be proved by the party alleging it.
In the absence of bad faith, ill will, malice or wanton conduct, respondent
cannot be held liable for moral damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code22
enumerates the instances in which moral damages may be awarded. In a
breach of contract, such damages are not awarded if the defendant is not
shown to have acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. Insufficient
to warrant the award of moral damages is the fact that complainants
76

suffered economic hardship or that they worried and experienced mental

anxiety.

in breaches of carriage contracts, except in the two instances

contemplated in Articles 1764 and 2220 of the Civil Code, which we quote:

Nevertheless, herein petitioners will not be totally deprived of

compensation. Nominal damages may be awarded as provided by the Civil
Code. Nominal damages are recoverable if no actual, substantial or
specific damages were shown to have resulted from the breach. The
amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
taking into account the relevant circumstances.

"Article 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be

awarded in accordance with Title XVIII of this Book, concerning
Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.

CHINA AIRLINES V. CHIOK, GR NO. 152122, JULY 30, 2003

FACTS:
Daniel Chiok purchased from China Airlines, Ltd. (CAL) airline passenger
ticket for air transportation covering Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-Manila. Said
ticket was exclusively endorseable to Philippine Airlines, Ltd. (PAL for
brevity). Chiok took his trip from Manila to Taipei using the CAL ticket.
When he arrived in Taipei, he went to the CAL office and confirmed his
Hongkong to Manila trip on board PAL Flight No. PR 311. The CAL office
attached a yellow sticker appropriately indicating that his flight status was
OK. The PAL office confirmed his return trip on board Flight No. PR 311
and attached its own sticker. However, said PAL Flight No. 311 was
cancelled due to a typhoon in Manila, and passengers were automatically
rebooked for the next day. When Chiok went to the airport the next day,
he was informed that his name did not appear in PALs computer list of
passengers and therefore could not be permitted to board. And when he
sought to recover his luggage, he discovered that his new Samsonite was
lost.
Thereafter, Chiok proceeded to PALs Hongkong office and confronted
PALs reservation officer, Carie Chao, who previously confirmed his flight
back to Manila. Chao told Chiok that his name was on the list and pointed
to the latter his computer number listed on the PAL confirmation sticker
attached to his plane ticket, which number was R/MN62. Chiok then
decided to use another CAL ticket and asked Chao if this ticket could be
used to book him for the said flight. The latter, once again, booked and
confirmed the formers trip. Later, Chiok went to the PAL check-in counter
and it was Carmen who attended to him. In the ensuing commotion, Chiok
lost several valuables.
Consequently, Chiok filed a complaint for damages, against PAL and CAL,
alleging that despite several confirmations of his flight, defendant PAL
refused to accommodate him in Flight No. 307, for which reason he lost
the business option aforementioned. He also alleged that PALs personnel,
specifically Carmen, ridiculed and humiliated him in the presence of so
many people. Further, he alleged that defendants are solidarily liable for
the damages he suffered, since one is the agent of the other.
RTC held CAL and PAL jointly and severally liable for damages. CA affirmed
and ruled that the airlines negligence was the proximate cause of Chioks
excoriating experience, thus sustaining the award of moral and exemplary
damages.
ISSUE:
Is CAL liable to pay damages?
HELD:
Yes.
It is significant to note that the contract of air transportation was between
petitioner and respondent, with the former endorsing to PAL the Hong
Kong-to-Manila segment of the journey. Such contract of carriage has
always been treated in this jurisdiction as a single operation.
In the instant case, PAL acted as the carrying agent of CAL. CAL cannot
evade liability to respondent, even though it may have been only a ticket
issuer for the Hong Kong-Manila sector.
Moral and Exemplary Damages
Both the trial and the appellate courts found that respondent had
satisfactorily proven the existence of the factual basis for the damages
adjudged against petitioner and PAL. Moral damages cannot be awarded

xxx

xxx

xxx

"Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for

awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith." (Italics supplied)
There is no occasion for us to invoke Article 1764 here. We must
therefore determine if CAL or its agent (PAL) is guilty of bad faith that
would entitle respondent to moral damages.
In Lopez v. Pan American World Airways, we defined bad faith as a breach
of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.
In the case at bar, the known duty of PAL was to transport herein
respondent from Hong Kong to Manila. That duty arose when its agent
confirmed his reservation for Flight PR 311, and it became demandable
when he presented himself for the trip. It is true that due to a typhoon,
PAL was unable to transport respondent on Flight PR 311. This fact,
however, did not terminate the carriers responsibility to its passengers.
PAL voluntarily obligated itself to automatically transfer all confirmed
passengers of PR 311 to the next available flight, PR 307, on the following
day. That responsibility was subsisting when respondent, holding a
confirmed ticket for the former flight, presented himself for the latter.
In the present case, we stress that respondent had repeatedly secured
confirmations of his PR 311 flight -- initially from CAL and subsequently
from the PAL office in Hong Kong. The status of this flight was marked
"OK" on a validating sticker placed on his ticket. That sticker also
contained the entry "RMN6V." Ms Chan explicitly acknowledged that such
entry was a computer reference that meant that respondents name had
been entered in PALs computer.
Since the status of respondent on Flight PR 311 was "OK," as a matter of
right testified to by PALs witness, he should have been automatically
transferred to and allowed to board Flight 307 the following day. Clearly
resulting from negligence on the part of PAL was its claim that his name
was not included in its list of passengers for the November 24, 1981 PR
311 flight and, consequently, in the list of the replacement flight PR 307.
Since he had secured confirmation of his flight -- not only once, but twice - by personally going to the carriers offices where he was consistently
assured of a seat thereon -- PALs negligence was so gross and reckless
that it amounted to bad faith.
In view of the foregoing, we rule that moral and exemplary damages were
properly awarded by the lower courts.
e. Latest rule on corporations
MAMBULAO LUMBER V. PNB, 22 SCRA 359
FACTS:
Plaintiff applied for a P155,000 industrial loan with PNB, to which only
P100,000 was approved. To secure the payment of the loan, the plaintiff
mortgaged to PNB a parcel of land, together with the buildings and
improvements existing thereon, situated in Camarines Norte, as well as
various sawmill equipment, rolling unit and other fixed assets of the
plaintiff, all situated in its compound in the aforementioned municipality.
When plaintiff failed to pay the amortization on the amounts received to
and received by it, PNB made repeated demands to pay its obligation but
such demands went unheeded. Upon inspection and verification made by
employees of the PNB, it was found that the plaintiff had already stopped
operation.

77

PNB then sent a letter to Anacleto Heraldo, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff,
requesting him to take possession of the parcel of land, together with the
improvements existing thereon, and to sell it at public auction for the
satisfaction of the unpaid obligation of the plaintiff. Anacleto Heraldo then
took possession of the chattels mortgaged by the plaintiff and made an
inventory thereof. Upon plaintiffs request, the foreclosure sale of
mortgaged chattels was extended. However, the foreclosure sale of the
parcel of land was held and sold to PNB.

airing, broadcasting, and televising of the fourteen VIVA films subject of

the controversy. Private respondents filed counterclaim against ABS-CBN.
When RTC issued an order dissolving the TRO, ABS-CBN then filed with the
CA a petition challenging said order. CA dismissed the petition.

The trial court rendered the decision appealed from which sentenced the
Mambulao Lumber Company to pay to the defendant PNB the sum of
P3,582.52 with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum. Plaintiff
appealed.

ISSUE:Is RBS (a corporation) entitled to moral damages?

ISSUE:

As to moral damages the law is Section 1, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of

the Civil Code. Article 2217 thereof defines what are included in moral
damages, while Article 2219 enumerates the cases where they may be
recovered, Article 2220 provides that moral damages may be recovered in
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. RBS's claim for moral damages could possibly fall only under item
(10) of Article 2219, thereof which reads:

Is the appellant entitled to an award of moral damages?

HELD:
No.
Herein appellant's claim for moral damages, however, seems to have no
legal or factual basis. Obviously, an artificial person like herein appellant
corporation cannot experience physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock or social humiliation which
are basis of moral damages. A corporation may have a good reputation
which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral
damages. The same cannot be considered under the facts of this case,
however, not only because it is admitted that herein appellant had already
ceased in its business operation at the time of the foreclosure sale of the
chattels, but also for the reason that whatever adverse effects of the
foreclosure sale of the chattels could have upon its reputation or business
standing would undoubtedly be the same whether the sale was conducted
at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, or in Manila which is the place
agreed upon by the parties in the mortgage contract.
But for the wrongful acts of herein appellee bank and the deputy sheriff of
Camarines Norte in proceeding with the sale in utter disregard of the
agreement to have the chattels sold in Manila as provided for in the
mortgage contract, to which their attentions were timely called by herein
appellant, and in disposing of the chattels in gross for the miserable
amount of P4,200.00, herein appellant should be awarded exemplary
damages in the sum of P10,000.00. The circumstances of the case also
warrant the award of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees for herein appellant.
Compare with:
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORP. V. CA, GR NO.128690, JAN. 21, 1999
FACTS:
ABS-CBN and Viva executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby Viva
gave ABS-CBN an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. In one of their
dealings, a package proposal of Viva was discussed, through respondent
Vicente Del Rosario. Said Viva package film offer includes 104 films for a
total price of 60 Million. However, according to ABS-CBN General Manager
Eugenio Lopez III, he and Mr. Del Rosario allegedly agreed that ABS-CRN
was granted exclusive film rights to fourteen films for a total consideration
of P36 million. Del Rosario denied having made any agreement with Lopez
regarding the 14 Viva films. Meanwhile, Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano
Gozon of Republic Broadcasting Corporation (RBS) discussed the terms
and conditions of Viva's offer to sell the 104 films, after the rejection of
the same package by ABS-CBN. On the other hand, ABS-CBN made a
counter-proposal covering 53 films for a consideration of P35 Million, but
said counter-proposal denied as Viva would not sell anything less than the
package of 104 films for P60 million pesos. Hence, RBS was eventually
granted the exclusive right to air 104 Viva-produced and/or acquired films
including the 14 films subject of the present case.
ABS-CBN filed before the RTC a complaint for specific performance with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order against private respondents RBS, VIVA, and Del Rosario. RTC then
issued a TRO enjoining private respondents from proceeding with the

In the meantime, RTC rendered judgment in favor of RBS and Viva and
ordered ABS-CBN to pay damages which include P5 million by way of
moral damages. CA agreed with the RTC. The appellate court, however,
reduced the awards of moral damages to P2 million.
HELD:
No.

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34, and 35.
Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered. and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the
expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate then moral
suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits
of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard
against the award of exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced
restrained and measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to
passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court.
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation
because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal
contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot,
therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be
experienced only by one having a nervous system. The statement in
People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that a corporation
may recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased,
resulting in social humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On this score alone the
award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.
There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad
faith. It was honestly convinced of the merits of its cause after it had
undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a
draft contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action does
not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to damages, for
the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.
If damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque
injuria.
Compare with
NAPOCOR V. PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC. , 369 SCRA 629
FACTS:
Petitioner NAPOCOR issued invitations to bid for the supply and delivery
of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired
Thermal Power Plant. Respondent PHIBRO prequalified and was allowed
to participate as one of the bidders. After the public bidding was
conducted, PHIBRO's bid was accepted. As the winning tenderer, PHIBRO
then becomes the seller, which shall arrange and provide gearless bulk
carrier for the shipment of coal to arrive at discharging port on or before
thirty (30) calendar days after receipt of the Letter of Credit by PHIBRO.
Due to industrial disputes and strikes in Australia, PHIBRO wasnt able to
ship and deliver the imported coal on the stipulated time.
78

Consequently, NAPOCOR once more advertised for the delivery of coal to

its Calaca thermal plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this subsequent
bidding but NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's application for prequalification to bid for not meeting the minimum requirements. Upon
further inquiry, PHIBRO found that the real reason for the disapproval was
its purported failure to satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for damages due to the
delay in the delivery of the first coal shipment.
This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages against NAPOCOR.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of PHIBRO, and awarded it
moral damages in the amount of $100,000. CA affirmed in toto the RTC
decision.
ISSUE:
Was the award of moral damages proper?
HELD:
No.
First, it must be stressed that NAPOCOR was not bound under any
contract to approve PHIBRO's pre-qualification requirements. In fact,
NAPOCOR had expressly reserved its right to reject bids. Since there is no
evidence to prove bad faith and arbitrariness on the part of the petitioners
in evaluating the bids, we rule that the private respondents are not
entitled to damages representing lost profits. In other words, NAPOCOR
did not abuse its rights nor did it act unjustly in disqualifying PHIBRO from
the public bidding.
Hence, the award of moral damages is likewise improper. To reiterate,
NAPOCOR did not act in bad faith. Moreover, moral damages are not, as a
general rule, granted to a corporation. While it is true that besmirched
reputation is included in moral damages, it cannot cause mental anguish
to a corporation, unlike in the case of a natural person, for a corporation
has no reputation in the sense that an individual has, and besides, it is
inherently impossible for a corporation to suffer mental anguish. In LBC
Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we ruled:
"Moral damages are granted in recompense for physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. A corporation, being an
artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, has no
feelings, no emotions, no senses; therefore, it cannot experience physical
suffering and mental anguish. Mental suffering can be experienced only by
one having a nervous system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, and griefs
of life all of which cannot be suffered by respondent bank as an
artificial person."

FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK V. AGO

EDUCATIONAL CENTER, GR NO.141994, JAN. 17, 2005

MEDICAL

AND

FACTS:
Expos is a radio documentary program hosted by Carmelo Mel Rima
and Hermogenes Jun Alegre. Expos is aired every morning over DZRCAM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. (FBNI).
Expos is heard over Legazpi City, the Albay municipalities and other
Bicol areas. In the morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima and Alegre
exposed various alleged complaints from students, teachers and parents
against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of
Medicine (AMEC) and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts
were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago, as Dean of AMECs College of
Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre.
The complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable learning
institution. With the supposed exposs, FBNI, Rima and Alegre
transmitted malicious imputations, and as such, destroyed plaintiffs
reputation. AMEC and Ago included FBNI as defendant for allegedly
failing to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its

employees, particularly Rima and Alegre. FBNI, Rima and Alegre filed an
Answer alleging that the broadcasts against AMEC were fair and true.
The trial court rejected the broadcasters claim that their utterances were
the result of straight reporting because it had no factual basis. The
broadcasters did not even verify their reports before airing them to show
good faith. In holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that FBNI
failed to exercise diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. In absolving Rima from the charge, the trial court ruled that
Rimas only participation was when he agreed with Alegres expos. The
trial court found Rimas statement within the bounds of freedom of
speech, expression, and of the press. Both parties, namely, FBNI, Rima
and Alegre, on one hand, and AMEC and Ago, on the other, appealed the
decision. The CA affirmed the trial courts judgment with modification. The
appellate court made Rima solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre. The
appellate court denied Agos claim for damages and attorneys fees
because the broadcasts were directed against AMEC, and not against her.
Hence, FBNI filed the petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
HELD:
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because,
unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such
sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral
shock. The CA cites Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB, et al. to justify the
award of moral damages. However, the Courts statement in Mambulao
that a corporation may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may
also be a ground for the award of moral damages is an obiter dictum.
Nevertheless, AMECs claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the
recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a
natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a
corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation
and claim for moral damages. Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous
per se, the law implies damages. In such a case, evidence of an honest
mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes
only in mitigation of damages. Neither in such a case is the plaintiff
required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition
precedent to the recovery of some damages. In this case, the broadcasts
are libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages. However,
the Court found the award of P300,000 moral damages unreasonable. The
record shows that even though the broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC
has not suffered any substantial or material damage to its reputation.
Therefore, the Court reduced the award of moral damages from P300,000
to P150,000.
REPUBLIC V. TUVERA, GR NO.148246, FEB. 16, 2007
FACTS:
The instant action originated from a civil complaint for restitution and
damages filed by the Republic against Marcos and his longtime aide Juan
Tuvera, who was then Presidential Executive Assistant of President
Marcos; as well as Tuvera's son Victor and a corporation the younger
Tuvera had controlled, Twin Peaks Development Corporation. Twin Peaks
was able to engage in logging operations by virtue of the Timber License
Agreement granted by the then President Marcos. When Marcos was
ousted, Pres. Cory Aquino assumed the presidency. Among her first acts as
President was to establish the PCGG, tasked with tracking down the illgotten wealth procured by Marcos, his family, and associates during his
20-year rule. PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration on all assets, properties,
records, documents, and shares of stock of Twin Peaks on the ground that
all the assets of the corporation are ill-gotten wealth for having been
acquired directly or indirectly through fraudulent and illegal means. PCGG,
in behalf of the Republic, filed the complaint which is now the subject of
this petition. Through the Complaint, the Republic sought to recover funds
79

allegedly acquired by said parties in flagrant breach of trust and fiduciary

obligations with grave abuse of right and power in violation of the
Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint
prayed that respondents pay moral damages, among others.
ISSUE:
Is the Republic entitled to moral damages?

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioners, in filing the petition directly to the
Supreme Court, violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the
petition dismissible; and

HELD:

(2) whether or not the RTC gravely abuse its discretion when it admitted
the Amended Information.

No.

HELD:

The claim for moral damages by the Republic deserves short shrift. The
claimant in this case is a juridical person.

(1) Strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts requires that

recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. Thus, petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTC should be filed in the
Court of Appeals. The rule, however, admits of certain exceptions as
when the case involves purely legal questions. In this case,
petitioners raised a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in
criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363.

As explained Filipinas Broadcasting v. AMEC-BCCM, a juridical person is

not entitled to moral damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code. It may
avail of moral damages under the analogous cases listed in Article 2219,
such as for libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Suffice it to say
that the action at bar does not involve any of the analogous cases under
Article 2219, and indeed upon an intelligent reading of Article 2219, it is
difficult to see how the Republic could sustain any of the injuries
contemplated therein. Any lawyer for the Republic who poses a claim for
moral damages in behalf of the State stands in risk of serious ridicule.
BONIFACIO VS.RTC OF MAKATI, GR NO. 184800, MAY 5, 2010 (on
internet libel)
FACTS:
Upon the complaint filed by Jessie John P. Gimenez on behalf of the
Yuchengco Family (particularly, former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco
and Helen Y. Dee) and the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan),
Informations for libel were filed with the RTC against officers, trustees and
a member of the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), and a
certain
John
Doe,
the
administrator
of
the
website
www.pepcoalition.com, which provides a forum for planholders of Pacific
Plans, Inc. a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance
Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies to seek
redress for being unable to collect under their pre-need educational plans
after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with
prayer for suspension of payments.
The Informations alleged that the accused, holding legal title to the said
website, maliciously published therein the following defamatory article
against the Yuchengco Family and Malayan:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos.
Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation.
xxxxxxxxx
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin.
Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the next
time they will try to kill us na. x x x
However, on appeal, the Secretary of Justice directed the withdrawal of
the Informations for lack of probable cause, opining that the crime of
internet libel was non-existent. On motion of the accused, the RTC,
albeit finding probable cause, quashed the Informations for failure to
allege that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the
time the offense was committed as in fact they listed their address in
Manila, or to allege that the article was printed and first published in
Makati. The prosecution moved for reconsideration, arguing that even
assuming the Information was deficient it merely needed a formal
amendment. The RTC granted the motion and ordered the prosecution to
amend the Information to cure the defect of improper venue. The
prosecution amended the Information to show that the website was
accessible in Makati City and the defamatory article was first published
and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City.
After the RTC admitted the Amended Information, several of the accused
(petitioners) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Supreme Court faulting the RTC.

(2) The Amended Information was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in

Makati. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place
where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. Venue
of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited
to only either of two places, namely: (a) where the complainant
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or (b)
where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.
The prosecution chose the second.
Before Article 360 of the RPC was amended, the rule was that a criminal
action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous
article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or
printed. Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured
party has a choice of venue. Article 360 was amended by RA 4363 to state
that such action should be brought where the article was printed and first
published. The evil sought to be prevented by the amendment was the
indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant,
isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than to
harass or intimidate an accused, especially when the offended party is a
person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by
spite or the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published
are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal
action, the Information must allege with particularity where the
defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or
supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business
offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This
pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to
harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to
defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there
would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first
publication. To equate first access to the defamatory article on
petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would
spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought
to discourage and prevent. For the Court to hold that the Amended
Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply
because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the
floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the
pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.
Contrary to petitioners claim, the venue requirements, under Article 360
of the RPC, for libel actions filed by private persons cannot be considered
unduly oppressive as they still allow such persons to file the civil or
criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which
80

situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with

precision where the libelous matter was printed and first published.
Disposition: The RTC was directed to quash the Amended Information and
to dismiss the case.
IV.

NOMINAL DAMAGES

Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Art. 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation
arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157, or in every case where
any property right has been invaded.
GO V. IAC, GR NO. 68138, MAY 13, 1991
FACTS:
Floverto Jazmin is an American citizen and retired employee of the US
Federal Government. He had been a visitor in the Philippines since 1972.
As pensionado of the U.S. government, he received annuity checks in the
amounts of $ 67.00 for disability and $ 620.00 for retirement.
In January, 1975, Jazmin failed to receive one of the checks on time thus
prompting him to inquire from the post offices at Mangatarem and
Dagupan City. As the result of his inquiries proved unsatisfactory, Jazmin
wrote the U.S. Civil Service Commission, Bureau of Retirement at
Washington, D.C. complaining about the delay in receiving his check.
Thereafter, he received a substitute check which he encashed at the
Prudential Bank.
Meanwhile, on April 22, 1975, Agustin Go, in his capacity as branch
manager of the then Solidbank in Baguio City, allowed a person named
"Floverto Jazmin" to open Savings Account by depositing two (2) U. S.
treasury checks in the respective amounts of $1810.00 and $913.40
equivalent to the total amount of P 20,565.69, both payable to the order
of Floverto Jasmin of Maranilla St., Mangatarem, Pangasinan and drawn
on the First National City Bank, Manila.
Thereafter, the deposited checks were sent to the drawee bank for
clearance. Inasmuch as Solidbank did not receive any word from the
drawee bank, after three (3) weeks, it allowed the depositor to withdraw
the amount indicated in the checks. On June 29, 1976 or more than a year
later, the two dollar checks were returned to Solidbank with the notation
that the amounts were altered.
Jazmin received radio messages requiring him to appear before the
Philippine Constabulary headquarters in Benguet on September 7, 1976
for investigation regarding the complaint filed by Go against him for estafa
by passing altered dollar checks. Jazmin denied that he was the person
whose name appeared on the checks; that he received the same and that
the signature on the indorsement was his. He likewise denied that he
opened an account with Solidbank or that he deposited and encashed
therein the said checks. Eventually, the investigators found that the
person named "Floverto Jazmin" who made the deposit and withdrawal
with Solidbank was an impostor.
Jazmin filed a complaint for moral and exemplary damages against herein
petitioners. In their answer, the defendants contended that the plaintiff
had no cause of action against them because they acted in good faith in
seeking the "investigative assistance" of the Philippine Constabulary on
the swindling operations against banks by a syndicate which specialized in
the theft, alteration and encashment of dollar checks. The lower court
found that Go was negligent in failing to exercise "more care, caution and
vigilance" in accepting the checks for deposit and encashment.
ISSUE:
Propriety of the appellate court's award of nominal damages and
attorney's fees to private respondent
HELD:

While it is true that denouncing a crime is not negligence under which a

claim for moral damages is available, still appellants are liable under the
law for nominal damages. The fact that appellee did not suffer from any
loss is of no moment for nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
maybe vindicated or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him (Article 2221, New Civil Code).
These are damages recoverable where a legal right is technically violated
and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual
present loss of any kind, or where there has been a breach of contract and
no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be
shown. They are not intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for
the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded. And, where
the plaintiff as in the case at bar, the herein appellee has established a
cause of action, but was not able to adduce evidence showing actual
damages then nominal damages may be recovered. Consequently, since
appellee has no right to claim for moral damages, then he may not
likewise be entitled to exemplary damages. Considering that he had to
defend himself in the criminal charges filed against him, and that he was
constrained to file the instant case, the attorney's fees to be amended (sic)
to plaintiff should be increased to P3,000.00.
MEDINA V. CRESENCIA, L-8194, JULY 11, 1956
FACTS:
On May 31, 1953, passenger jeepney driven by Brigido Avorque, smashed
into a Meralco post resulting in the death of Vicente Medina, one of its
passengers. A criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence was
filed against to which he pleaded guilty. The heirs of the deceased,
however, reserved their right to file a separate action for damages, and
brought suit against the driver Brigido Avorque and Appellant Guillermo
Cresencia, the registered owner and operator of the jeepney in question.
Defendant Cresencia answered, disclaimed liability on the ground that he
had sold the jeepney in question; that the jeepney had been repeatedly
sold by one buyer after another, until the vehicle was purchased by
Rosario Avorque, the absolute owner thereof at the time of the accident;
making her a co-Defendant; which admitted having purchased the
aforesaid jeepney but alleged in defense that she was never the public
utility operator thereof. The trial court rendered judgment against
Cresencia, jointly and severally with the driver Brigido Avorque, for P6,000
compensatory damages, P30,000 moral damages, P10,000 exemplary
damages, P10,000 nominal damages, P5,000 attorneys fees, and costs,
while Defendant Rosario Avorque was absolved from liability. From this
judgment, Defendant Cresencia appealed.
ISSUE:
Who is ultimately liable to pay damages?
HELD:
Since a franchise is personal in nature any transfer or lease thereof should
be notified to the Public Service Commission so that the latter may take
proper safeguards to protect the interest of the public. As the sale of the
jeepney here in question was admittedly without the approval of the PSC,
Appellant herein, Guillermo Cresencia continued to be liable to the
Commission and the public for the consequences incident to its operation
being the registered owner and operator thereof. Wherefore, the lower
court did not err in holding him, and not the buyer Rosario Avorque,
responsible for the damages sustained by Plaintiff by reason of the death
of Vicente Medina resulting from the reckless negligence of the jeepneys
driver, Brigido Avorque.
Plaintiffs action for damages is independent of the criminal case filed
against Brigido Avorque, and based, not on the employers subsidiary
liability under the Revised Penal Code, but on a breach of the carriers
contractual obligation to carry his passengers safely to their destination
(culpa contractual). And it is also for this reason that there is no need of
first proving the insolvency of the driver Brigido Avorque before damages
81

can be recovered from the carrier, for in culpa contractual, the liability of
the carrier is not merely subsidiary or secondary, but direct and
immediate (Articles 1755, 1756, and 1759, New Civil Code).
The propriety of the damages awarded has not been questioned.
Nevertheless, it is patent upon the record that the award of P10,000 by
way of nominal damages is untenable as a matter of law, since nominal
damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. The purpose of
nominal damages is to vindicate or recognize a right that has been
violated, in order to preclude further contest thereon; and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the Plaintiff for any loss suffered by him
(Articles 2221, 2223, new Civil Code.) Since the court below has already
awarded compensatory and exemplary damages that are in themselves a
judicial recognition that Plaintiffs right was violated, the award of nominal
damages is unnecessary and improper. Anyway, ten thousand pesos
cannot, in common sense, be deemed nominal.
VENTENILLA V. CENTINO, GR NO. L-14333, JAN. 28, 196
In Civil Case entitled Oscar Ventanilla vs. Edilberto Alejandrino and Aida G.
Alejandrino, Ventanilla retained the service of Atty. Gregorio Centeno to
represent him and prosecute the case. It was an action for the recovery of
P4,000.00 together with damages. Plaintiff Oscar Ventanilla after
receiving the letter and copy of the decision went to see Atty. Centeno,
which then informed him that he intended to appeal and plaintiff agreed.
Plaintiff, however, did not leave with Atty. Centeno at that time the
amount for the appeal bond.
About the middle of Aug. 1955, Atty. Centeno wrote a letter to the
plaintiff enclosing therein forms for an appeal bond. The plaintiff
Ventanilla, however, instead of executing an appeal bond, and because
use of his reluctance to pay the premium on the appeal bond, decided to
file a cash appeal bond of P60.00. He went to the office of Atty. Centeno
but was informed by the clerk that Atty. Centeno was in Laguna
campaigning for his candidacy. Plaintiff then issued the check for P60.00
as appeal bond and delivered the same to the clerk with instruction to give
the same to Atty. Centeno upon his arrival.
Atty. Centeno returned to Manila and went to his office, encashed the
check and then went to the office of the Clerk of Court to file the appeal
bond. The check was allegedly not accepted because the period of appeal
had already expired, and that it was only at that time he came to know
that the period of appeal had expired.
The appellant claims that the trial court erred in not ordering the appellee
to pay him actual or compensatory, moral, temperate or moderate, and
exemplary or corrective damages; in ordering the appellee to pay the
appellant only the sum of P200, and not P2,000 as nominal damages; and
in not ordering the appellee to pay the appellant the sum of P500 as
attorney's fee.
ISSUE: WON the TC erred in awarding only P200 instead of P2000 as
nominal and other damages.
HELD:
Relative to the sufficiency of the sum of P200 as nominal damages
awarded by the trial court to the appellant, article 2221 of the new Civil
Code provides:
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may
be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court,
according to the circumstances of the case. Considering the
circumstances, as found by the trial court, and the degree of negligence
committed by the appellee, a lawyer, in not depositing on time the appeal
bond and filing the record on appeal within the extension period granted
by the court, which brought about the refusal by the trial court to allow
the record on appeal, the amount of P200 awarded by the trial court to
the appellant as nominal damages may seem exiguous. Nevertheless,

considering that nominal damages are not for indemnification of loss

suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or
invaded; and that even if the appeal in civil case No. 18833 had been duly
perfected, it was not an assurance that the appellant would succeed in
recovering the amount he had claimed in his complaint, the amount of
P2,000 the appellant seeks to recover as nominal damages is excessive.
After weighing carefully all the considerations, the amount awarded to the
appellant for nominal damages should not be disturbed.
V.

TEMPERATE OR MODERATE

Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal
but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not,
from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the
circumstances.
PLENO V. CA, GR NO. 56505, MAY 9, 1988
FACTS:
Florante de Luna was driving a delivery truck owned by Philippine Paper
Products Inc. at great speed along South Super Highway in Taguig when he
bumped the van driven by Maximo Pleno. The bump caused Plenos van to
swerve to the right and crash into a parked truck. As a result, Pleno was
hospitalized and his van was wrecked. Pleno sued and was awarded
actual, temperate, moral, exemplary damages and attorneys fees by the
trial court. However, the CA reduced the amount of temperate and moral
damages given because they were too high.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in reducing the amount of temperate damages
awarded?
HELD:
The CA erred in reducing the award of temperate damages. Temperate
damages are included within the context of compensatory damages.
Inarriving at a reasonable level of temperate damages to be awarded, trial
courts are guidedby our ruling that there are cases where from the nature
of the case, definite proof ofpecuniary loss cannot be offered, although
the court is convinced that there has beensuch loss.For instance, injury to
one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm isoften hard
to show certainty in terms of money. The judge should be empowered to
calculate moderate damages in such cases,rather than that the plaintiff
should suffer, without redress from the defendant'swrongful act.
As to the loss or impairment of earning capacity, there is no doubt that
Pleno is an entrepreneur and the founder of his own corporation, the
Mayon Ceramics Corporation. It appears also that he is an industrious and
resourceful person with several projects in line and if not for the incident,
might have pushed them through. His actual income however has not
been sufficiently established so that this Court cannot award actual
damages, but, an award of temperate or moderate damages may still be
made on loss or impairment of earning capacity. That Pleno sustained a
permanent deformity due to a shortened left leg and that he also suffers
from double vision in his left eye is also established. Because of this, he
suffers from some inferiority complex and is no longer active in business
as well as in social life.
BPI INVESTMENT V. DG CARREON, 371 SCRA 58
Petitioner BPI Investments was engaged in money market operations.
Respondent D.G. Commercial Corporation was a client of petitioner and
started its money market placements in September, 1978. The individual
respondents, spouses Daniel and Aurora Carreon and Josefa M. Jeceil also
placed with BPI Investments their personal money in money market
placements.
On November 15, 1979, D.G. Carreon placed with BPI Investments
P318,981.59 in money market placement with a maturity term of thirty
two days, or up to December 17, 1979, at a maturity value of P323,518.22.
82

BPI Investments issued the corresponding sales order slip for straight sale
and confirmation slip.

the spouses' property.As required by the mortgage deed, the spouses

Daeng deposited the owner's duplicate copy of the title with the GSIS.

BPI Investments paid D.G. Carreon twice in interest of the amount of

P323,518.22, representing a single money market placement, the first on
December 12, 1979, and the second on December 17, 1979. According to
petitioner, their bookkeeper made an error in posting "12-17" on the sales
order slip for "12-12." BPI Investments claimed that the same placement
was also booked as maturing on December 12, 1979.

Eleven (11) months before the maturity of the loan, the spouses Deang
settled their debt with the GSIS and requested for the release of the
owner's duplicate copy of the title since they intended to secure a loan
from a private lender and use the land covered by it as collateral security
for the loan of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) which they applied for
with one Milagros Runes. However, personnel of the GSIS were not able to
release the owner's duplicate of the title as it could not be found despite
diligent search.

On April 21, 1982, BPI Investments wrote respondents Daniel Carreon and
Aurora Carreon, demanding the return of the overpayment of
P410,937.09. The respondents asserted that there were no overpayment
and asked for time to look for the papers. Upon the request of BPI
Investments, the spouses Daniel and Aurora Carreon sent to BPI
Investments a proposed memorandum of agreement.
BPI Investments, without responding to the memorandum and proposal of
D.G. Carreon filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money against D.G.
Carreon. On May 14, 1982, the trial court issued an order for preliminary
attachment after submission of affidavit of merit to support the petition,
and the posting of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00. However, on
October 8, 1982, the trial court lifted the writ of attachment.
On July 30, 1982, respondents D.G. Carreon filed with the trial court an
answer to the complaint, with counterclaim. D.G. Carreon asked for
compensatory damages in an amount to be proven during the trial;
spouses Daniel and Aurora Carreon asked for moral damages of
P1,000,000.00 because of the humiliation, great mental anguish, sleepless
nights and deterioration of health due to the filing of the complaint and
indiscriminate and wrongful attachment of their property, especially their
residential house and payment of their money market placement of
P109,283.75. Josefa Jeceil asked for moral damages of P500,000.00,
because of sleepless nights and mental anguish, and payment of her
money market placement of P73,857.57; all defendants claimed for
exemplary damages and attorney's fees of P100,000.00.
ISSUE
Whether the claimed damages are proper.
RULING

Satisfied that the owner's duplicate copy of the title was really lost, GSIS
commenced the reconstitution proceedings with the CFI of Pampanga for
the issuance of a new owner's copy of the same. The GSIS then issued a
certificate of release of mortgage and thereafter, released the
reconstituted copy of the owners duplicate of title.
On July 6, 1979, the spouses Deang filed with the CFI, Angeles City a
complaint against GSIS for damages, claiming that as result of the delay in
releasing the duplicate copy of the owner's title, they were unable to
secure a loan from Milagros Runes.
In its defense, GSIS explained that the owners' duplicate copy of the title
was released within a reasonable time since it had to conduct standard
pre-audit and post-audit procedures to verify if the spouses Deang's
account had been fully settled.
ISSUE:
Whether the GSIS is liable for a negligent act of its employee acting within
the scope of his assigned tasks?
HELD:
GSIS is liable for damages. In a breach of contract, moral damages are not
awarded if the defendant is not shown to have acted fraudulently or with
malice or bad faith. The fact that the complainant suffered economic
hardshipor worries and mental anxietyis not enough. There is likewise no
factual basis for an award of actual damages. Actual damages to be
compensable must be proven by clear evidence. A court cannot rely on
"speculation, conjecture or guess work" as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend on actual proof.

The law on exemplary damages is found in Section 5, Chapter 3, Title XVIII,

Book IV of the Civil Code. These are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated,
or compensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminal cases as part
of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances; in quasi-delicts, if the defendant acted with
gross negligence; and in contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.30

However, it is also apparent that the spouses Deang suffered financial

damage because of the loss of the owners' duplicate copy of the title.
Temperate damages may be granted.

BPI Investments did not act in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive,

or malevolent manner, when it asked for preliminary attachment. It was
just exercising a legal option. The sheriff of the issuing court did the
execution and the attachment. Hence, BPI Investments is not to be
blamed for the excessive and wrongful attachment.

GSIS submits that there must be proof of pecuniary loss. This is untenable.
The rationale behind temperate damages is precisely that from the
nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered.
When the court is convinced that there has been such loss, the judge is
empowered to calculate moderate damages, rather than let the
complainant suffer without redress from the defendant's wrongful act.

There is no doubt, however, that the damages sustained by respondents

were due to petitioner's fault or negligence, short of gross negligence.
Temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.32 The Court deems it
prudent to award reasonable temperate damages to respondents under
the circumstances.33
GSIS V. DEANG, 365 SCRA 613
FACTS
Sometime in December 1969, the spouses Deang obtained a housing loan
from the GSIS in the amount of eight thousand five hundred pesos
(P8,500.00). Under the agreement, the loan was to mature on December
23, 1979. The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage constituted over

"Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than

nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but
its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty."

The award of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in temperate damages

is reasonable considering that GSIS spent for the reconstitution of the
owners' duplicate copy of the title.
PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK V. CA, GR NO. 159352, APRIL 14, 2004
On or about October 1994, Panacor acquired an exclusive distributorship
of products manufactured by Colgate. To meet the capital requirements of
the exclusive distributorship, which required an initial inventory level of
P7.5 million, Panacor applied for a loan of P4.1 million with Premiere
Development Bank. After an extensive study of Panacors
creditworthiness, Premiere Bank rejected the loan application and
suggested that its affiliate company Arizona should instead apply for the
loan on condition that the proceeds thereof shall be made available to
83

Panacor. Eventually, Panacor was granted a P4.1 million credit line and as
suggested, Arizona, which was an existing loan client, applied for and was
granted a loan of P6.1 million, P3.4 million of which would be used to payoff its existing loan accounts and the remaining P2.7 million as credit line
of Panacor.
As security for the P6.1 million loan, Arizona, represented by its Chief
Executive Officer Pedro Panaligan and spouses Pedro and Marietta
Panaligan in their personal capacities, executed a Real Estate Mortgage
against a parcel of land.
Since the P2.7 million released by Premiere Bank fell short of the P4.1
million credit line which was previously approved, Panacor negotiated for
a take-out loan with Iba Finance Corporation in the sum of P10 million,
P7.5 million of which will be released outright in order to take-out the loan
from Premiere Bank and the balance of P2.5 million (to complete the
needed capital of P4.1 million with Colgate) to be released after the
cancellation by Premiere of the collateral mortgage on the property.
Pursuant to the said take-out agreement, Iba-Finance was authorized to
pay Premiere Bank the prior existing loan obligations of Arizona in an
amount not to exceed P6 million.
On October 5, 1995, Iba-Finance sent a letter to Ms. Arlene R. Martillano,
officer-in-charge of Premiere Banks San Juan Branch, informing her of the
approved loan in favor of Panacor and Arizona, and requesting for the
release of TCT No. T-3475. Martillano, after reading the letter, affixed her
signature of conformity thereto and sent the original copy to Premiere
Banks legal office. Premiere Bank sent a letter-reply to Iba-Finance,
informing the latter of its refusal to turn over the requested documents on
the ground that Arizona had existing unpaid loan obligations and that it
was the banks policy to require full payment of all outstanding loan
obligations prior to the release of mortgage documents.
On October 19, 1995, Panacor and Arizona executed in favor of IbaFinance a promissory note in the amount of 7.5 million. Thereafter, IbaFinance paid to Premiere Bank the amount of P6,235,754.79 representing
the full outstanding loan account of Arizona. Despite such payment,
Premiere Bank still refused to release the requested mortgage documents
specifically, the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. T-3475.
On November 2, 1995, Panacor requested Iba-Finance for the immediate
approval and release of the remaining P2.5 million loan to meet the
required monthly purchases from Colgate. Iba-Finance explained however,
that the processing of the P2.5 million loan application was conditioned,
among others, on the submission of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No.
3475 and the cancellation by Premiere Bank of Arizonas mortgage.
Occasioned by Premiere Banks adamant refusal to release the mortgage
cancellation document, Panacor failed to generate the required capital to
meet its distribution and sales targets. On December 7, 1995, Colgate
informed Panacor of its decision to terminate their distribution
agreement.
Hence, Panacor and Arizona filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages against Premiere Bank. Then, Iba-Finance filed a complaint-inintervention praying that judgment be rendered ordering Premiere Bank
to pay damages in its favor.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable in the downgrading of the loan of loan of
respondents to support an award of actual and exemplary damages.
RULING:
In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on mere assertions,
speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of
loss.
Even if not recoverable as compensatory damages, Panacor may still be
awarded damages in the concept of temperate or moderate damages.
When the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but the
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty,

temperate damages may be recovered. Temperate damages may be

allowed in cases where from the nature of the case, definite proof of
pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced that
the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss.
It is obvious that the wrongful acts of Premiere Bank adversely affected, in
one way or another, the commercial credit of Panacor, greatly contributed
to, if not, decisively caused the premature stoppage of its business
operations and the consequent loss of business opportunity. Since these
losses are not susceptible to pecuniary estimation, temperate damages
may be awarded.
RAMOS, ET. AL. V. CA, ET. AL., supra.
ISSUE:
The propriety of the award for damages.
HELD:
The trial court awarded a total of P632,000.00 pesos (should be
P616,000.00) in compensatory damages to the plaintiff, "subject to its
being updated" covering the period from 15 November 1985 up to 15
April 1992, based on monthly expenses for the care of the patient
estimated at P8,000.00. At current levels, the P8000/monthly amount
established by the trial court at the time of its decision would be grossly
inadequate to cover the actual costs of home-based care for a comatose
individual. The calculated amount was not even arrived at by looking at
the actual cost of proper hospice care for the patient. What it reflected
were the actual expenses incurred and proved by the petitioners after
they were forced to bring home the patient to avoid mounting hospital
bills.
And yet ideally, a comatose patient should remain in a hospital or be
transferred to a hospice specializing in the care of the chronically ill for the
purpose of providing a proper milieu adequate to meet minimum
standards of care. Given these considerations, the amount of actual
damages recoverable in suits arising from negligence should at least
reflect the correct minimum cost of proper care, not the cost of the care
the family is usually compelled to undertake at home to avoid bankruptcy.
However, the provisions of the Civil Code on actual or compensatory
damages present us with some difficulties.
Well-settled is the rule that actual damages which may be claimed by the
plaintiff are those suffered by him as he has duly proved. Our rules on
actual or compensatory damages generally assume that at the time of
litigation, the injury suffered as a consequence of an act of negligence has
been completed and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these
provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as in this case,
where the resulting injury might be continuing and possible future
complications directly arising from the injury, while certain to occur, are
difficult to predict.
In these cases, the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they
are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be
one which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the
time of trial; and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be
suffered but which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with
certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and should be awarded
on top of actual or compensatory damages in instances where the injury is
chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases,
no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are
provided for. As it would not be equitable and certainly not in the best
interests of the administration of justice for the victim in such cases to
constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking
adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded
temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate
damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into account
the cost of proper care.
In the instant case, petitioners were able to provide only home-based
nursing care for a comatose patient who has remained in that condition
for over a decade. Having premised our award for compensatory damages
84

on the amount provided by petitioners at the onset of litigation, it would

be now much more in step with the interests of justice if the value
awarded for temperate damages would allow petitioners to provide
optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally specializes in
such care. They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide
substandard care at home without the aid of professionals, for anything
less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award of
P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.
Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident
occurred. She has been in a comatose state for over fourteen years now.
The burden of care has so far been heroically shouldered by her husband
and children, who, in the intervening years have been deprived of the love
of a wife and a mother.
Meanwhile, the actual physical, emotional and financial cost of the care of
petitioner would be virtually impossible to quantify. Even the temperate
damages herein awarded would be inadequate if petitioner's condition
remains unchanged for the next ten years. The husband and the children,
all petitioners in this case, will have to live with the day to day uncertainty
of the patient's illness, knowing any hope of recovery is close to nil. They
have fashioned their daily lives around the nursing care of petitioner,
altering their long term goals to take into account their life with a
comatose patient. They, not the respondents, are charged with the moral
responsibility of the care of the victim. The family's moral injury and
suffering in this case is clearly a real one. For the foregoing reasons, an
award of P2,000,000.00 in moral damages would be appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of
the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at
P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
PT & T V. CA, GR NO.139268, SEPT. 3, 2002
Felicitas B. Sipe, resident of Surralah, Cotabato remitted to her sister-inlaw, Lolita Sipe Escara, two telegraphic money orders through PT&T. The
money orders, one for P2,000.00 and the other for P1,000.00, originated
from Marbel, South Cotabato. Plaintiff was then studying for a doctoral
degree in Education at the U.P Diliman. According to the plaintiff, the
money was sent for the purpose of paying for her tuition fee for one
semester at the U.P.; paying for her fare to go back to Cotabato to enable
her to complete the requirements for a job promotion; and paying for the
cost of the medical consultation of her son who is sick of diabetes.
Despite several inquiries about the remittance in her favor, PT&T insisted
that there was no money transmitted to Lolita. Upon Lolita request,
Cabalit , the branch cashier of PT&T Cubao, issued a certification that no
telegraphic money order in favor of plaintiff was received by PT&T.
Subsequently, Cabalit informed plaintiff that the money being claimed by
her did not come from Surralah but from Marbel, South Cotabato. On
August 22, 1990, an attempt was made by PT&T to deliver the telegraphic
money order at plaintiffs dormitory but she was not around. On
September 10, 1990, plaintiff received from PT&T two checks representing
the amount remitted to her. However, plaintiff was not able to encash the
checks at once because the bank did not have a clearance from PT&T.
Finally, on September 14, 1990, plaintiff was able to encash the checks.
Aggrieved by the delay in the delivery of the remittance, plaintiff filed a
complaint for damages against PT&T and Louie Cabalit. In her complaint,
she alleged that the delay was the cause of her failure to enroll for one
semester at the U.P.; to complete her requirements for a job promotion;
and to bring her son to the doctor for medical consultation.
ISSUE:
W/N PT&T negligence warrants the awarding of damages to respondent.
HELD:
The breach of an obligation because of fraud, negligence or delay or of a
contravention by any means of the tenor of that obligation opens the
defaulting obligor to possible liability for damages.

The Court of Appeals was correct in deleting the award made by the trial
court of actual damages where proof of pecuniary loss, in an action based
on culpa contractual, is essential.
In the case at bar, the appellate court itself did not see any clear indication
of bad faith or gross negligence amounting to bad faith on the part of
petitioners. It would be error to make an award of moral damages to
private respondent merely because petitioner corporation was unable to
effect immediate delivery of the money sent through it in two money
orders, one for P2,000.00 and the other for P1,000.00.
Neither can the award of exemplary damages be sustained. Exemplary
damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. Although such damages
need not be proved, plaintiff must first show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate, or compensatory damages before a court can favorably
consider an award of exemplary damages
Still, of course, petitioner corporation is not totally free from liability. It
may have had good reasons, but it has not been able to overcome thereby
its burden to prove a valid excuse, for the breach of agreement such as by
proving, among other possible legal grounds, fortuitous event to account
for its failure. The breach would have justified a recovery of actual
damages but, there being no adequate proof of pecuniary loss found by
the appellate court, such damages cannot be awarded. Neither moral nor
exemplary damages have been justified, as hereinbefore explained, as to
warrant any recovery thereof. The Court thus is left with two alternative
possibilities an award of temperate or moderate damages or an award of
nominal damages.
Temperate or moderate damages may only be given if the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but that its amount cannot, from
the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. The factual findings of
the appellate court that respondent has failed to establish such pecuniary
loss or, if proved, cannot from their nature be precisely quantified
precludes the application of the rule on temperate or moderate damages.
The result comes down to only a possible award of nominal damages.
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated
or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered by him. The court may award nominal damages in every
obligation arising from any source enumerated in article 1157 of the Civil
Code or, generally, in every case where property right is invaded.
REPUBLIC V. TUVERA, supra.
ISSUE
W/N respondents are liable to pay moral, temperate and exemplary
damages
HELD
It bears to the most primitive of reasons that an action for recovery of sum
of money must prove the amount sought to be recovered. In the case at
bar, the Republic rested its case without presenting any evidence,
documentary or testimonial, to establish the amount that should be
restituted to the State by reason of the illegal acts committed by the
respondents. There is the bare allegation in the complaint that the State is
entitled to P48 million by way of actual damages, but no single proof
presented as to why the State is entitled to such amount.
Actual damages must be proven, not presumed. The Republic failed to
prove damages. It is not enough for the Republic to have established, as it
did, the legal travesty that led to the wrongful obtention by Twin Peaks of
the TLA. It should have established the degree of injury sustained by the
State by reason of such wrongful act.
The claim for moral damages deserves short shrift. The claimant in this
case is the Republic of the Philippines, a juridical person. A juridical person
is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural
person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as
wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.
85

However, there is sufficient basis for an award of temperate damages,

also sought by the Republic notwithstanding the fact that a claim for both
actual and temperate damages is internally inconsistent. Temperate or
moderate damages avail when "the court finds that some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty." The textual language might betray an intent that
temperate damages do not avail when the case, by its nature, is
susceptible to proof of pecuniary loss; and certainly the Republic could
have proved pecuniary loss herein.Still, jurisprudence applying Article
2224 is clear that temperate damages may be awarded even in instances
where pecuniary loss could theoretically have been proved with certainty.
Notwithstanding the language of Article 2224, a line of jurisprudence has
emerged authorizing the award of temperate damages even in cases
where the amount of pecuniary loss could have been proven with
certainty, if no such adequate proof was presented. The allowance of
temperate damages when actual damages were not adequately proven is
ultimately a rule drawn from equity, the principle affording relief to those
definitely injured who are unable to prove how definite the injury. There is
no impediment to apply this doctrine to the case at bar, which involves
one of the most daunting and noble undertakings of our young
democracythe recovery of ill-gotten wealth salted away during the
Marcos years. If the doctrine can be justified to answer for the unlawful
damage to a cargo truck, it is a compounded wrath if it cannot answer for
the unlawful exploitation of our forests, to the injury of the Filipino
people. The amount of P1,000,000.00 as temperate damages is proper.
The allowance of temperate damages also paves the way for the award of
exemplary damages. Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code, a showing that
the plaintiff is entitled to temperate damages allows for the award of
exemplary damages. Even as exemplary damages cannot be recovered as
a matter of right, the courts are empowered to decide whether or not
they should be adjudicated. Ill-gotten wealth cases are hornbook
demonstrations where damages by way of example or correction for the
public good should be awarded. Fewer causes of action deserve the
stigma left by exemplary damages, which "serve as a deterrent against or
as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions." The obtention
of the timber license agreement by Twin Peaks through fraudulent and
illegal means was highlighted by Juan Tuveras abuse of his position as
Presidential Executive Assistant. Considering the expanse of forest land
exploited by respondents, the volume of timber that was necessarily cut
by virtue of their abuse and the estimated wealth acquired by
respondents through grave abuse of trust and public office, it is only
reasonable that petitioner be granted the amount of P1,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
PHIL. HAWK CORP. V. VIVIAN TAN LEE, supra.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for damages; and
whether or not the damages awarded by respondent Court of Appeals are
proper.
HELD:
The CA correctly awarded temperate damages in the amount of
P10,000.00 for the damage caused on respondents motorcycle. Under
Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages "may be recovered when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty." The cost of
the repair of the motorcycle was prayed for by respondent in her
Complaint. However, the evidence presented was merely a job estimate of
the cost of the motorcycles repair amounting to P17, 829.00. The CA aptly
held that there was no doubt that the damage caused on the motorcycle
was due to the negligence of petitioners driver. In the absence of
competent proof of the actual damage caused on the motorcycle or the
actual cost of its repair, the award of temperate damages by the appellate
court in the amount of P10,000.00 was reasonable under the
circumstances

In fine, CA correctly awarded civil indemnity for the death of respondents

husband, temperate damages, and moral damages for the physical injuries
sustained by respondent in addition to the damages granted by the trial
court to respondent. The trial court overlooked awarding the additional
damages, which were prayed for by respondent in her Amended
Complaint. The appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds
that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the
case.
VI.

LIQUIDATED

Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a
contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a
penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable.
LAMBERT V. FAX, 26 PHIL 588
Early in 1911 the firm known as John R. Edgar & Co., engaged in the retail
book and stationery business, found itself in such condition financially that
its creditors, including the plaintiff and the defendant, together with many
others, agreed to take over the business, incorporate it and accept stock
therein in payment of their respective credits. This was done, the plaintiff
and the defendant becoming the two largest stockholders in the new
corporation called John R. Edgar & Co., Incorporated. A few days after the
incorporation was completed plaintiff and defendant entered into the an
agreement, including: Either party violating this agreement shall pay to
the other the sum of one thousand (P1,000) pesos as liquidated damages,
unless previous consent in writing to such sale, transfer, or other
disposition be obtained.
Notwithstanding this contract the defendant Fox on October 19, 1911,
sold his stock in the said corporation to E. C. McCullough of the firm of E.
C. McCullough & Co. of Manila, a strong competitor of the said John R.
Edgar & Co., Inc. This sale was made by the defendant against the protest
of the plaintiff and with the warning that he would be held liable under
the contract hereinabove set forth.
ISSUE
W/N Courts are authorized to reduce the penalty set in the contract.
HELD
Where the language used by the parties is plain, then construction and
interpretation are unnecessary and, if used, result in making a contract for
the parties. The appellee urges that the plaintiff cannot recover for the
reason that he did not prove damages, and cites numerous American
authorities to the effect that because stipulations for liquidated damages
are generally in excess of actual damages and so work a hardship upon the
party in default, courts are strongly inclined to treat all such agreements
as imposing a penalty and to allow a recovery for actual damages only.
It is the rule that parties who are competent to contract may make such
agreements within the limitations of the law and public policy as they
desire, and that the courts will enforce them according to their terms.
The only case recognized by the Civil Code in which the court is authorized
to intervene for the purpose of reducing a penalty stipulated in the
contract is when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly
fulfilled and the court can see that the person demanding the penalty has
received the benefit of such or irregular performance.
In this jurisdiction, there is no difference between a penalty and liquidated
damages, so far as legal results are concerned. Whatever differences
exists between them as a matter of language, they are treated the same
legally. In either case the party to whom payment is to be made is entitled
to recover the sum stipulated without the necessity of proving damages.
Indeed one of the primary purposes in fixing a penalty or in liquidating
damages, is to avoid such necessity.

86

HL CARLOS CONSTRUCTION V. MARINA PROPERTIES CORP., GR

NO.147614, JAN. 29, 2004

operator at a time, and he is to operate within the area while the

agreement subsists.

FACTS

The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of Philrock Sentencing the

petitioner to pay the defendant the sum of P800,000.00 as compensatory
or actual damages; P300,00.00 as moral damages, the sum of P50,000.00
as exemplary damages; and the sum of P50,000:00 as attorney's fees. The
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court except as to the award of moral
damages which it deleted on the ground that the testimonies of the
witnesses did not prove that the private respondent's good reputation
was besmirched.

MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION (MPC) is engaged in the business of

real estate development. It entered into a contract with H.I. CARLOS
CONSTRUCTION, INC. (HLC) to construct Phase III of a condominium
complex called MARINA BAYHOMES CONDOMINIUM PROJECT. The
original completion date of the project was May 16, 1989, but it was
extended to October 31, 1989 with a grace period until November 30,
1989. On December 15, 1989, HLC instituted this case for sum of money
against not only MPC but also against the latters alleged president,
[Respondent] Jesus K. Typoco, Sr. (Typoco) and [Respondent] Tan Yu (Tan),
seeking the payment of various sums with an aggregate amount of P14
million pesos, broken down as follows: a. P7,065,885.03 for costs of labor
escalation, change orders and material price escalation;
ISSUE
W/N H.L. is liable for actual and liquidated damages for failing to finish the
construction it undertook to complete
HELD
Yes. Petitioner did not fulfill its contractual obligations. It could not totally
pass the blame to MPC for hiring a second contractor, because the latter
was allowed to terminate the services of the contractor.
Either party shall have the right to terminate the contract for reason of
violation or non-compliance by the other party of the terms and
conditions herein agreed upon. As of November 1989, petitioner
accomplished only approximately 80 percent of the project. In other
words, it was already in delay at the time. In addition, Engineer Miranda
testified that it would lose money even if it finished the project; thus,
respondents already suspected that it had no intention of finishing the
project at all. Petitioner was in delay and in breach of contract. Clearly, the
obligor is liable for damages that are the natural and probable
consequences of its breach of obligation. In order to finish the project, the
latter had to contract the services of a second construction firm for
P11,750,000. Hence, MPC suffered actual damages in the amount of
P4,604,579 for the completion of the project. Petitioner is also liable for
liquidated damages as provided in the Contract. Liquidated damages are
those that the parties agree to be paid in case of a breach. As worded, the
amount agreed upon answers for damages suffered by the owner due to
delays in the completion of the project. Under Philippine laws, these
damages take the nature of penalties. A penal clause is an accessory
undertaking to assume greater liability in case of a breach.
SCOTT CONSULTANTS & RESOURCES DEVT CORP., INC. V. CA, ET.AL., GR
NO.112916, MAR. 16, 1995
FACTS:
San Mateo Mines Exploration, Inc. entered into a contract with defendant
Philrock on November 18, 1987 for the latter to operate San Mateo Mines
Exploration, Inc.'s Industrial Permit No. 40 for a period of five (5) years.
Subsequently, on February 9, 1990, San Mateo Mines Exploration, Inc.
notified the defendant that it is unilaterally terminating the contract for
being "one-sided." Five days thereafter, or on February 14, 1990, San
Mateo Mines Exploration, Inc. entered into a mining exploration contract
with the petitioner corporation, which includes the operation of Industrial
Permit No. 40. Petitioner corporation instituted the complaint herein
alleging that because of the existing activity in the mining claim area,
defendant has prevented, impeded and/or otherwise denied petitioner
access to its legitimate area of activity. Defendant, on the other hand, files
a third party complaint against San Mateo Mines Exploration, Inc., for
allegedly breaching their contract having terminated the contract on the
basis of it being one sided.
The trial court found that a mining permit is for the exclusive use of the
permittee. As a consequence thereof, the permittee can take one

ISSUE
W/N petitioner is liable for the damages awarded to the defendant.
HELD
No.
Just as in the case of moral damages, there was no credible proof of actual
damages. The trial court made no specific finding on the extent thereof.
Yet, in the dispositive portion of its decision, it awarded compensatory
and actual damages in the staggering amount of P800,000.00. How the
award of P800,000.00 was arrived at was never shown. It remains a pure
speculation. Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as is
duly proved.
Both decisions do not as well state the justification for the award of
exemplary damages of P50,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code,
exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated,
or compensatory damages. There was, therefore, no legal basis for the
award of exemplary damages since the private respondent was not
entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages and there was no
agreement on stipulated damages.
The awards of actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees in
the challenged decision are DELETED.
VII.

EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES

a. Nature
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further
contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between
the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.
Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal
but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not,
from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
Art. 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the
circumstances.
Art. 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a
contract, to be paid in case of breach thereof.
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a
penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable.
Art. 2228. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is
not the one contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the liquidated
damages, the law shall determine the measure of damages, and not the
stipulation.
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

87

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil

liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from
fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

YES. Respondent Court found malice in De Leon's refusal to satisfy Dr.

Tantocos lawful claim and in their subsequent filing of the present case
against the latter, and took into consideration the worries and mental
anxiety of latter as a result thereof.

Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the

defendant acted with gross negligence.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious

anxiety,besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation andsimilar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may berecovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act oromission.On the other hand, jurisprudence
sets certain conditions when exemplary damagesmay be awarded, to wit:

Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award

exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Art. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right;
the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be
proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of
whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated
damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in
order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless,
before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in
addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would
be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for
the stipulation for liquidated damages.
Art. 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in
advance shall be null and void.
b. When awardable
DE LEON V. CA, GR NO. L-31931, AUG. 31, 1988
FACTS
Sps. Briones were registered owners of the fishpond situated at San
Roque, Paombong, Bulacan. Said property was mortgaged twice to secure
a loan obtained from, initially Hermogenes Tantoco but was later on
assigned to, Dr. Cornelio Tantoco, Hermogenes father, in the amounts of
P20,000 and P68,824 (the later having a 10% interest per annum). Both
mortgages were duly registered and duly annotated at the back of the
TCT. While these two mortgages were still subsisting the Sps. Briones sold
the fishpond to plaintiff Sps. De Leon (Fortunato and Juana) in the amount
of P120,000.00.
Of the amount of P120,000.00, the Sps. Briones actually received only the
amount of P31,000.00 on June 2, 1959, as the amount of P89,000.00 was
withheld by the Fortunato de Leon who assumed to answer the mortgage
indebtedness of the Briones to the Tantocos. After the sale Sps. De Leon
satisfied the mortgage loan of P20,000.00 including 10% interest per
annum to Hermogenes Tantoco who then accordingly executed a deed of
discharge of mortgage, but the mortgage in favor of Cornelio S. Tantoco in
the amount of P68,824 was not satisfied.
On February 5, 1962 plaintiffs made payment of P29,382.50 to the Dr.
Cornelio. Trying to set the record straight, Dr. Cornelio clarified their total
obligation including the agreed interest amounted to P88,888.98. Hence
the above mentioned PNB check will be held in abeyance pending
remittance of the total obligation after which the necessary document will
be executed. On May 8, 1962 the Sps. De Leon filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan against defendant Cornelio S. Tantoco
for discharge of mortgage.
RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered for Sps. De Leon to pay Dr.
Cornelio the sum of P64,921.60 with interest thereon at 10% p.a.;
payment of the sum of P100,000 as moral and exemplary damages, and
further sum of P10,000 as attorneys fees On appeal, CA affirmed the
judgment of trial court with modification respecting the award of moral
and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.
ISSUE
W/N the award of moral and exemplary damages is proper?
HELD

(1) They may be imposed by way of example or correctiononly in

addition, among others, to compensatory damages and cannot be
recoveredas a matter of right, their determination depending upon
the amount ofcompensatory damages that may be awarded to the
claimant;
(2) the claimant mustfirst establish his right to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages;and
(3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the
award would beallowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive ormalevolant manner.
The entitlement to moral damages having been established the award of
exemplary damages is proper. And while the award of moral and
exemplarydamages in an aggregate amount may not be the usual way of
awarding said damagesthere is no question of Dr. Tantoco's entitlement to
moral and exemplary damage. The amount should be reduced, however,
for being excessive compared to theactual losses sustained by the
aggrieved party. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals found onFebruary
21, 1970 that the outstanding balance of the disputed loan was
P64,921.69.Twenty five percent thereof is P16,230.00 but considering the
depreciation of thePhilippine peso today, it is believed that the award of
moral and exemplary damagesin the amount of P25,000.00 is reasonable.
OCTOT VS.YBANEZ G.R. NO. L48643, JANUARY 18, 1982 | 111 SCRA 79
FACTS:
Octot was a Government Employee who held the position of Security
Guard. Pursuant to PD 6, he was dismissed from the service as he had a
pending libel case against him. Later on he was acquitted from the
criminal case. Alfredo Imbong then filed a request for Octots
reinstatement. The request was favorably acted upon by all levels. The
papers were sent to Octot stating that his request for reinstatement may
be given due course pursuant to LOI 647. Octot failed to appear and so he
was personally furnished with the necessary papers to be filed to support
his appointment. Octot sent a letter again asking for reinstatement. The
regional health director then instructed Octot to appear to furnish the
necessary documents. Octot did not appear but filed a case for mandamus
for his reinstatement. As his reinstatement was never disputed, he was
reinstated.
ISSUES
W/N Octot can claim exemplary damages
HELD
No. The delay in the reinstatement of Octot was due to his own fault. Also
seeing as there was no Bad Faith involved and that it doesnt involve the
situations under 2219 and 2220, moral damages cannot be claimed.
No. Exemplary damages are not usually recoverable in a mandamus case
unless thedefendant patently acted with vindictiveness and wantonness. It
is granted by way ofexample or correction for the public good.
Requisites:
-They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in
addition, among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon
the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the
claimant.
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-The claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate,

liquidated or compensatory damages.
-The wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award
would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
VIII.

ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

Art. 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively

increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances.
Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall
reduce the damages that he may recover.
Art. 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may
equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other than the case
referred to in the preceding article, as in the following instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the
contract;
(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the
contract;
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that
the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel;
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;
(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his
best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury.
Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or
omission in question.
INHELDER CORPORATION V. CA, GR NO. L-52358, 122 SCRA 576
FACTS
INHELDER is engaged in the manufacture and sale of medicines and drug.
McGaw Baxter Laboratories, Inc. appears to be another Company also
having its principal office on the same location as INHELDER. The
PANGANIBANS, physicians, are the owners of the DOCTOR's CLINIC. On
December 29, 1972, DOCTOR's CLINIC purchased medicines and drugs
from INHELDER in the amount of P1,385.10, payable in installments. The
PANGANIBANS were able to pay the amount of P824.10 for that purchase,
leaving a balance of P561.00 which had remained unpaid for
approximately two years.
Atty. Fajardo of INHELDER sent a letter to the PANGANIBANS requesting
settlement of the said amount of P561.00. In their reply, the
PANGANIBANS requested a statement of account. Thereafter or on
February 12, 1975, a collection case was filed.
On February 19, 1975, INHELDER sent a letter to the PANGANIBANS
"acknowledging the receipt of the PNB Check No. 32058 in the amount of
P561.00 representing full payment of the ('PANGANIBANS') account with
INHELDER".
PANGANIBANS have alleged That during the hearing of the instant case,
undersigned counsel showed to the Court plaintiffs' receipts to the effect
that several days before the malicious and unfounded complaint was filed
before said Court.
The trial court awarded damages totaling P212,550.00 in favor of the
Panganibans. Such amount was reduced upon appeal to the CA.
ISSUE:
W/N the Collection Case is considered unfounded and malicious enough to
warrant damages.
HELD:
On the above facts and circumstances, it should be difficult to conclude
that the COLLECTION CASE was a clearly unfounded civil action. It is not
clear that the account of the PANGANIBANS had already been paid as of

February 12, 1975. Under Article 1249 of the Civil Code, payment should
be held effective only when PNB Check No. 32058 was actually cashed by,
or credited to the account of, INHELDER. If that did not eventuate on or
before February 12, 1975, and there is no proof that it did, the account
would still be unpaid, and the complaint in the COLLECTION CASE,
technically, could not be considered as substantially unfounded.
It is true that when the check of the PANGANIBANS was received on
February 5, 1975, the better procedure would have been to withhold a
complaint pending determination of whether or not the check was good. If
dishonored, that would be the time to file the complaint. That procedure
was not followed because of the failure of the corresponding advice which
could have been given to Atty. Fajardo by the INHELDER Credit and
Collection Manager. But the lack of that advice should not justify
qualifying the COLLECTION CASE as clearly unfounded.
It should also be stressed that the mere filing of a suit does not render a
person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful. Judicial
discretion granted to the Courts in the assessment of damages must
always be ex with balanced restraint and measured objectivity.
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to remind Trial Courts to guard
against the award of exhorbitant damages that are way out of proportion
to the environmental circumstances of a case and which, time and again,
this Court has reduced or eliminated. Judicial discretion granted to the
Courts in the assessment of damages must always be ex with balanced
restraint and measured objectivity. The appealed judgment is hereby set
aside.
RAAGAS V. TRAYA, ET. AL., GR NO.L-20081, FEB. 27, 1968
FACTS
The complaint filed by the spouses Melquiades Raagas and Adela Laudiano
Raagas against Octavio Traya, his wife, and Bienvenido Canciller, alleges
that on or about April 9, 1958, while the latter was "recklessly" driving a
truck owned by his co-defendants, along the public highway in MacArthur,
Leyte, the said vehicle ran over the plaintiffs' three-year old son Regino
causing his instantaneous death.
On the other hand, the defendants specifically deny that Canciller was
"driving recklessly" at the time of the mishap, and assert that the truck
"was fully loaded and was running at a very low speed and on the right
side of the road"; that it was the child who "rushed from an unseen
position and bumped the truck so that he was hit by the left rear tire of
the said truck and died", and consequently the defendants are not to
blame for the accident which was "entirely attributable to an unforeseen
event" or due to the fault of the child and negligence of his parents; that
the defendant-spouses have exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their driver Canciller, whom they hired in 1946.
On June 24 it TC rendered a judgment on the pleadings, condemning the
defendants, jointly and severally, to pay "to the plaintiffs the sum of
P10,000 for the death of their child Regino Laudiano Raagas, P2,000 for
moral damages, P1,000 actual damages, P1,000 for attorney's fees, and
the costs."
ISSUE:
W/N the court a quo acted correctly when it rendered judgment on the
pleadings alone.
HELD:
No, court erred on this effect. The plaintiffs' claim for actual, moral,
nominal and corrective damages, was controverted by the averment in the
answer to the effect that the defendants "have no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations" as
to such damages, "the truth of the matter being that the death of Regino
Raagas was occasioned by an unforeseen event and/or by the fault of the
small boy Regino Raagas or his parents." Such averment has the effect of
tendering a valid issue. Jurisprudence dictates that even if the allegations
regarding the amount of damages in the complaint are not specifically
denied in the answer, such damages are not deemed admitted. Actual
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damages must be proved, and that a court cannot rely on "speculation,

conjecture or guesswork" as to the fact and amount of damages, but must
depend on actual proof that damage had been suffered and on evidence
of the actual amount. Finally, in Malonzo vs. Galang et. al., we reaffirmed
the rule that although an allegation is not necessary in order that moral
damages may be awarded, "it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant
satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its
causal relation to defendant's acts."
The preceding disquisition points up the inescapable need of a full-blown
trial on the merits at which the parties will be afforded every opportunity
to present evidence in support of their respective contentions and
defenses.

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