Canon 8

SECOND DIVISION
[A. C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002]
ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a member of the
bar for using improper and offensive language and threatening and attempting to assault
complainant.
The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District Public Attorney of the
Public Attorneys Office in San Jose, Antique. He alleged that on May 18, 2000, while Atty.
Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a client in the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) at the Hall of
Justice in San Jose, Antique, a woman approached them. Complainant saw the woman in
tears, whereupon he went to the group and suggested that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably
as a hearing was taking place in another room. At this point, respondent Atty. Mariano
Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client,
saying,Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina, ipapreso ang imo nga kliyente para mahibal-an na anang
sala. (Why do you settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will realize his
mistake.)
Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefiancos outburst and asked him to
cool off, but respondent continued to fulminate at Atty. Salvani. Atty. Salvani tried to explain to
respondent that it was the woman who was asking if the civil aspect of the criminal case could
be settled because she was no longer interested in prosecuting the same. Respondent refused
to listen and instead continued to scold Atty. Salvani and the latters client.
As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and asked him to take it easy
and leave Atty. Salvani to settle the matter. Respondent at first listened, but shortly after he
again started shouting at and scolding Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with respondent,
complainant went inside his office. He asked his clerk to put a notice outside prohibiting anyone
from interfering with any activity in the Public Attorneys Office.
Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but when he came back he
heard respondent Pefianco saying: Nagsiling si Atty. Alcantara nga pagwa-on na kuno ako dya
sa PAO, buyon nga klase ka tawo. (Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO,
421 | P a g e

what an idiot.) Then, upon seeing complainant, respondent pointed his finger at him and
repeated his statement for the other people in the office to hear. At this point, according to
complainant, he confronted respondent Pefianco and told him to observe civility or else to leave
the office if he had no business there. Complainant said respondent resented this and started
hurling invectives at him. According to complainant, respondent even took a menacing stance
towards him.
This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert Minguez, the
Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify respondent Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of
Justice came to take respondent out of the office, but before they could do so, respondent tried
to attack complainant and even shouted at him, Gago ka! (Youre stupid!) Fortunately, the
guards were able to fend off respondents blow and complainant was not harmed.
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III, Felizardo Del Rosario,
Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his
allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that the sight of the
crying woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved him and prompted him to take up
her defense. He said that he resented the fact that complainant had ordered an employee,
Napoleon Labonete, to put a sign outside prohibiting standbys from hanging round in the
Public Attorneys Office.
Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the womans case,
complainant, with his bodyguard, arrived and shouted at him to get out of the Public Attorneys
Office. He claimed that two security guards also came, and complainant ordered them to take
respondent out of the office. Contrary to complainants claims, however, respondent said that it
was complainant who moved to punch him and shout at him, Gago ka! (Youre stupid!)
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman an administrative and criminal complaint against complainant. However, the
complaint was dismissed by the said office.
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found that
respondent committed the acts alleged in the complaint and that he violated Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed not only to
deny the accusations against him but also to give any explanation for his actions. For this
reason, it recommended that respondent be reprimanded and warned that repetition of the
same act will be dealt with more severely in the future.
We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline to be well taken.
The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent Pefianco who provoked the
incident in question. The affidavits of several disinterested persons confirm complainants
422 | P a g e

allegation that respondent Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty. Salvani and
even attempted to lay hands on him (complainant).
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[1] admonishes lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty
bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly
toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times.[2]
In this case, respondents meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the
untoward incident. He had no right to demand an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of
the woman had not or could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the
matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose husband had been
murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of her case because she needed the
money. Be that as it may, respondent should realize that what he thought was righteous did not
give him the right to demand that Atty. Salvani and his client, apparently the accused in the
criminal case, settle the case with the widow. Even when he was being pacified, respondent did
not relent. Instead he insulted and berated those who tried to calm him down. Two of the
witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert Minguez, who went to the Public Attorneys Office
because they heard the commotion, and two guards at the Hall of Justice, who had been
summoned, failed to stop respondent from his verbal rampage. Respondent ought to have
realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public
estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was
negated by the way he chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted by
another injustice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and, considering this to be his first offense, is hereby FINED in
the amount of P1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will
be sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

423 | P a g e

SECOND DIVISION
JOSE C. SABERON,

A.C. No. 6567

Complainant,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:
ATTY. FERNANDO T. LARONG,
Respondent.

April 16, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

In a Complaint[1] filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant, this Court, complainant Jose
C. Saberon (complainant) charged Atty. Fernando T. Larong (respondent) of grave misconduct
424 | P a g e

for allegedly using abusive and offensive language in pleadings filed before the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (BSP).
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant filed before the BSP a Petition [2] against Surigaonon Rural Banking
Corporation (the bank) and Alfredo Tan Bonpin (Bonpin), whose family comprises the majority
stockholders of the bank, for cancellation of the banks registration and franchise. The Petition,
he said, arose from the banks and/or Bonpins refusal to return various checks and land titles,
which were given to secure a loan obtained by his (complainants) wife, despite alleged full
payment of the loan and interests.
Respondent, in-house counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, filed an
Answer with Affirmative Defenses[3] to the Petition stating, inter alia,
5. That this is another in the series of blackmail suits filed by plaintiff
[herein complainant Jose C. Saberon] and his wife to coerce the Bank and Mr.
Bonpin for financial gain
x x x x.[4] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent made statements of the same tenor in his Rejoinder [5] to complainants
Reply.
Finding the aforementioned statements to be totally malicious, viscous [sic] and bereft
of any factual or legal basis, complainant filed the present complaint.
Complainant contends that he filed the Petition before the BSP in the legitimate exercise
of his constitutional right to seek redress of his grievances; andthat respondent, as in-house
counsel and acting corporate secretary of the bank, was fully aware that the loan obtained by
his (complainants) wife in behalf of her children had been paid in full, hence, there was no
more reason to continue holding the collaterals.
Complainant adds that respondent aided and abetted the infliction of damages upon his
wife and her children who were thus deprived of the use of the mortgaged property.
In his Comment[6] to the present complaint against him, respondent argues that: (1) there
was nothing abusive, offensive or otherwise improper in the way he used the word blackmail

425 | P a g e

to characterize the suit against his clients; and (2) when a lawyer files a responsive pleading, he
is not in any way aiding or abetting the infliction of damages upon the other party.
By Resolution of March 16, 2005,[7] the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his Report and Recommendation dated June 21, 2006,[8] IBP Investigating
Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa held that the word blackmail connotes something sinister
and criminal. Unless the person accused thereof is criminally charged with extortion, he added,
it would be imprudent, if not offensive, to characterize that persons act as blackmail.
Commissioner Funa stressed that a counsel is expected only to present factual
arguments and to anchor his case on the legal merits of his clients claim or defense in line with
his duty under Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten
to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any
case or proceeding.
Moreover, he noted that in espousing a clients cause, respondent should not state his personal
belief as to the soundness or justice of his case pursuant to Canon 15 [9] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Investigating Commissioner also opined that by using words that were unnecessary
and irrelevant to the case, respondent went overboard and crossed the line of professional
conduct. In view thereof, he recommended that respondent be found culpable of gross
misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for 30 days.
By Resolution No. XVII-2007-036 of January 18, 2007,[10] the IBP Board of Governors
disapproved the recommendation and instead dismissed the case for lack of merit.
The Commission on Bar Discipline, by letter of March 26, 2007, transmitted the records
of the case to this Court.[11]
Complainant appealed the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors to this Court via a
petition filed on March 7, 2007, under Section 12 (c) of Rule 139-B [12] of the Revised Rules of
Court.

426 | P a g e

Complainant challenges the IBP Board of Governors Resolution as illegal and void ab
initio for violating the mandatory requirements of Section 12(a) of Rule 139-B of the Revised
Rules of Court that the same be reduced to writing, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and
the reasons on which it is based.
Finding the ruling of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent is guilty of grave
misconduct to be in accordance with the evidence, complainant nevertheless submits that the
recommended penalty of suspension should be modified to disbarment. The offense committed
by respondent, he posits, manifests an evil motive and is therefore an infraction involving moral
turpitude.
In his Comment to [the] Petition for Review, respondent states that the administrative
complaint against him is a harassment suit given that it was in his capacity as counsel for the
bank and Bonpin that he filed the Answer objected to by complainant.
Moreover, respondent claims that the purportedly offensive allegation was a statement of
fact which he had backed up with a narration of the chronological incidents and suits filed by
complainant and his wife against his clients. That being the case, he contends that the
allegation made in the Answer must be considered absolutely privileged just like allegations
made in any complaint or initiatory pleading.
Respondent in fact counters that it was complainant himself who had made serious
imputations of wrongdoing against his clients the bank for allegedly being engaged in some
illegal activities, and Bonpin for misrepresenting himself as a Filipino.
Nonetheless, respondent pleads that at the time the allegedly abusive and offensive
language was used, he was only two years into the profession, with nary an intention of bringing
dishonor to it. He admits that because of some infelicities of language, he may have stirred up
complainants indignation for which he asked the latters and this Courts clemency.
In his Reply,[13] complainant counters that respondents Comment reveals the latters
propensity to deliberately state a falsehood; and that respondents claim that the administrative
complaint was a harassing act, deducible from the fact that [it] post-dates a series of suits,
none of which has prospered x x x against the same rural bank and its owner, is bereft of
factual basis.
Complainant goes on to argue that respondent, as counsel for Bonpin, knew of the two
criminal cases he and his wife had filed against Bonpin and, as admitted by respondent, of the

427 | P a g e

criminal charges against him for libel arising from his imputations of blackmail, extortion or
robbery against him and his wife.
Finally, complainant refuses to accede to respondents entreaty for clemency.
This Court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language
in his pleadings.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar
to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.[14]
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.[15] Language abounds
with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.[16]
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. [17] In keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
[18]

It is of no consequence that the allegedly malicious statements of respondent were

made not before a court but before the BSP. A similar submission that actuations of and
statements made by lawyers before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) are not
covered by the Code of Professional Responsibility, the NLRC not being a court, was struck
down in Lubiano v. Gordolla,[19] thus:
428 | P a g e

Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National

Labor Relations Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an
oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics.[20]
The observation applies with equal force to the case at bar.

Respecting respondents argument that the matters stated in the Answer he filed before
the BSP were privileged, it suffices to stress that lawyers, though they are allowed a latitude of
pertinent remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of
their clients, should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety in making such
remark or comment.[21]
True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have
consistently been considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they may be,
but only for so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry. [22] The test of
relevancy has been stated, thus:
x x x. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged
defamatory matters privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which
the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the
subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its relevancy
and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it
need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. It
must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of
the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial
x x x. [23]

Granting that the proceedings before the BSP partake of the nature of judicial
proceedings, the ascription of blackmail in the Answer and Rejoinder filed by respondent is not
legitimately related or pertinent to the subject matters of inquiry before the BSP, which
were Bonpins alleged alien citizenship and majority stockholding in the bank. Those issues
were amply discussed in the Answer with Affirmative Defenses without need of the further
allegation that the Petition was another in a series of blackmail suits . . . to coerce the Bank
and Mr. Bonpin for financial gain. Hence, such allegation was unnecessary and uncalled for.
More so, considering that complainant and his wife were well within their rights to file the cases
against the bank and/or Bonpin to protect their interests and seek redress of their grievances.
Respecting the assailed Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, indeed only a Notice
of Resolution was transmitted to this Court, together with the Records of the case, which Notice
429 | P a g e

simply stated that on January 18, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XVII-2007-036 in which it:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the aboveentitled case for lack of merit.

Upon such Notice, it is evident that there is no compliance with the procedural
requirement that the IBP Board of Governors decision shall state clearly and distinctly the
findings of facts or law on which the same is based. Thus Section 12 of Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12.
Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - (a)
Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of
Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with
his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing
and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it
is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days
from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's
report. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The above requirement serves a very important function not just to inform the parties of
the reason for the decision as would enable them on appeal to point out and object to the
findings with which they are not in agreement, but also to assure the parties that the Board of
Governors has reached the judgment through the process of legal reasoning.[24]
With regard to complainants plea that respondent be disbarred, this Court has
consistently considered disbarment and suspension of an attorney as the most severe forms of
disciplinary action, which should be imposed with great caution. They should be meted out only
for duly proven serious administrative charges.[25]
Thus, while respondent is guilty of using infelicitous language, such transgression is not
of a grievous character as to merit respondents disbarment. In light of respondents apologies,
the Court finds it best to temper the penalty for his infraction which, under the circumstances, is
considered simple, rather than grave, misconduct.
WHEREFORE, complainants petition is partly GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Fernando
T. Larong, is found guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using intemperate language. He
is FINED P2,000 with a stern WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
430 | P a g e

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant for appropriate
annotation in the record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 4807

March 22, 2000

MANUEL N. CAMACHO, complainant,

vs.
ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D. BALMORES, CATHERINE V.
LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES LAW
OFFICES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically
Canon 9 thereof,viz:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a
party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent
upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party
not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law.
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and
Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores,
Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some
expelled students from the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97431 | P a g e

30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then
counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his
knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the
aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might
have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents
was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had
taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various Re-Admission
Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had
nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole
purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine students of AMACC
who were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal.
The students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F.
Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and
Cleo B. Villareiz, were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had
caused to be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member
Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found
the students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student
publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring students.
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President,
gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending, letters of
apology and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of some
of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo,
assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC
President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter
Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President;
letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission
Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter or apology, dated 22 September
1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC
President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his
parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC President.
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a
Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was
pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for
defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution,
dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon dismissed
Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
432 | P a g e

On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP")
passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case
against the other Respondents for they did not take part in the negotiation of the case.
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were
formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the
civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the
students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to
negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least communicating the matter to their
lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This
failure of respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of
the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague.
Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the
administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the Manifestation1 which, among other
things, explicitly contained the following stipulation;viz:
1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their
parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President,
AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER
COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings which they may have against
the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal.
xxx

xxx

xxx

3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No.
Q-97-30549 will by filed them.1wphi1
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of
Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would
appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the explanation of
respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt of
433 | P a g e

this decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and
as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Panganiban, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
WILFREDO T. GARCIA,
Complainant,

A.C. No. 6422

Present:

-versus-

ATTY. BENIAMINO A. LOPEZ,

Respondent.

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 28, 2007

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x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

In a complaint dated September 24, 2002, complainant Atty. Wilfredo T. Garcia charged
respondent Atty. Beniamino A. Lopez with violation of his oath as a member of the bar and
officer of the court, and misrepresentation, amounting to perjury and prayed that respondent be
suspended or disbarred.
Complainant was the counsel of the late Angelina Sarmiento, applicant in LRC Case No.
05-M-96 which was pending in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 15.
[1]

Sarmiento sought the registration and confirmation of her title over a 376,397 sq. m. tract of

land. This was granted by the court.[2] The case went all the way to the Supreme Court and
ultimately, the RTC decision was upheld. The decision became final and executory and the
RTC, in an order dated February 21, 2002, directed the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to
issue the decree of registration and certificate of title. [3] The LRA failed to comply, prompting the
complainant to file an urgent motion to cite the LRA administrator or his representative in
contempt of court. Hearings were scheduled.
On September 19, 2002, respondent, claiming to be the counsel of the heirs of
Sarmiento, filed his entry of appearance and motion for postponement.[4]
Complainant alleged that he was surprised by this, considering that he had not
withdrawn from the case. He contended that respondent should be sanctioned for
misrepresenting to the court that he was the counsel of all the heirs of Sarmiento and omitting to
mention that complainant was the counsel of record. According to him, his attorney's fee was
arranged on a contingent basis and therefore, the attempt of respondent to enter his
appearance at the final stage of the proceedings was tantamount to unfair harvesting of the
fruit of complainant's labors since 1996.[5]

435 | P a g e

It appears that Sarmiento was succeeded by the following compulsory heirs: Gina
Jarvia (Angelina's daughter by her common-law husband Victor Jarvia), Alfredo, Zenaida,
Wilson, Jeanette and Geneva, all surnamed Ku (Angelina's children by her husband prior to her
relationship with Victor). Complainant presented an affidavit executed by Gina Jarvia and
Alfredo Ku wherein they stated that they did not engage the services of respondent and that
they recognized complainant as their only counsel of record.
In his defense, respondent claimed that he was merely representing Zenaida and Wilson
Ku[6] who sought his help on September 19, 2002 and told him that they wanted to retain his
services. They allegedly did not have a lawyer to represent them in a hearing scheduled the
next day. Because of the scheduled hearing, he had to immediately file an entry of appearance
with motion for postponement. He asserted that it was an honest mistake not to have listed the
names of his clients. He claimed it was not deliberate and did not prejudice anyone. He insisted
that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself to the court.
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). The investigating commissioner, Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes, in his report and
recommendation dated January 8, 2004, found respondent guilty of misrepresentation and
violation of Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) when he failed to specify
in his entry of appearance the individuals he was representing. He recommended that
respondent be strongly reprimanded for his act with a reminder that a repetition of the same or
similar offense would be dealt with more severely. This was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors in its resolution passed on February 27, 2004.
We affirm the factual findings of the IBP but modify the penalty recommended.
Lawyers are officers of the court who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend
the causes of their clients. The law imposes on them peculiar duties, responsibilities and
liabilities. Membership in the bar imposes on them certain obligations. [7] They are duty bound to

436 | P a g e

uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards
each other and otherwise conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times.[8]
Complainant was the counsel of Sarmiento, the original applicant. Upon her death, the
attorney-client relationship was terminated. However, complainant was retained as counsel by
Gina Jarvia and Alfredo Ku. In filing an entry of appearance with motion of postponement in
behalf of the compulsory heirs of the late Angelita Sarmiento when in truth he was merely
representing some of the heirs but not all of them, respondent was guilty of misrepresentation
which could have deceived the court. He had no authorization to represent all the heirs. He
clearly violated his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court.
Likewise, the CPR states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Moreover, Canon 8 of the CPR demands that lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers:
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

Respondent failed to observe the foregoing rules. He made it appear that he was entering his
appearance as counsel for all the heirs of Sarmiento which was highly unfair to complainant
who had worked on the case from the very beginning (i.e. since 1996) and who had not been
437 | P a g e

discharged as such. It is true that without the formal withdrawal of complainant as counsel of
record, respondent would merely be considered as collaborating counsel. Nevertheless, by
being less than candid about whom he was representing, respondent undeniably encroached
upon the legal functions of complainant as the counsel of record.
We cannot casually brush aside what respondent did. Even assuming that it was not a
calculated deception, he was still remiss in his duty to his fellow lawyer and the court. He
should have been more careful about his actuation since the court was relying on him in its task
of ascertaining the truth.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Beniamino A. Lopez is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) month for violating Canons 8 and 10, Rules 8.02 and 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is warned that the commission of the same or similar
act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant for appropriate annotation in the record
of respondent.

SO ORDERED.
Canon 9

FIRST DIVISION
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA,

Adm. Case No. 6290

Complainant,
Present:

- versus -

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,

PANGANIBAN,
SANTIAGO,
CARPIO, and
AZCUNA, JJ.

ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO,

438 | P a g e

Respondent.
Promulgated:
July 14, 2004
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000, complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a
former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the
latter with deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely representing
herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior and subsisting marriage with
another woman. However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio,
Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage contract, [1] which states that they were married on 10
February 1980 in Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila [2] and the National
Statistics Office (NSO)[3] prove that no record of marriage exists between them. The false date
and place of marriage between the two are stated in the birth certificates of their two children,
Donnabel Tenorio[4] and Felicisimo Tenorio III.[5] But in the birth certificates of their two other
children, Oliver Tenorio[6] and John Cedric Tenorio,[7] another date and place of marriage are
indicated, namely, 12 February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the respondent caused the
dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina
Alora Jacome. The respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant
and her co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant alleged that the
respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband, who is not a member of
the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her clients money to her own use and benefit, which led to the
filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family on 24
January 2000 with the statement Isang bala ka lang to deter them from divulging respondents
illegal activities and transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to the charge of
deceit, she declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married
439 | P a g e

on 12 February 1980 as shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the
Civil Registry of Quezon City.[8] Her husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another
woman.
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that she caused the
dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary,
it was Councilor Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the
complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around the city of Makati on the
pretext of conducting a survey but did so to besmirch respondents good name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise denied by the
respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Officeis registered with the Department of
Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of Registration of
Business Name.[9] Hence, she has no partners in her law office. As to the estafa case, the
same had already been dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.[10] The respondent likewise denied that she
threatened the complainant with the words Isang bala ka lang on 24 January 2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed by the
complainant to get even with her. She terminated complainants employment after receiving
numerous complaints that the complainant extorted money from different people with the
promise of processing their passports and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on her
promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is politically motivated: some politicians offered to
re-hire the complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this complaint, which they did and
for which they were re-hired. The respondent also flaunted the fact that she had received
numerous awards and citations for civic works and exemplary service to the community. She
then prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the complainant would
submit a Reply to respondents Answer, while the respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the
Reply. The parties also agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would
constitute as the respective direct testimonies of the parties and the affiants.[11]
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent cooperated in the
illegal practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office[12] where the name of Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a
440 | P a g e

Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card[13] signed by the respondent as

Chairperson where her husband is identified as Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. She added that
respondents husband even appeared in court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law partnership with her
husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court on her behalf. If there was an instance
that her husband appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The
letterhead submitted by the complainant was a false reproduction to show that her husband is
one of her law partners. But upon cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead
of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office bearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,
is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are named
as senior partners because they have investments in her law office.[14]
The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., on 12
February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their marriage contract was
not registered she applied for late registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence
a certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General and
authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the birth certificates of her children as to
the place and date of her marriage were merely an oversight.[15]
Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence and Memoranda,
the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly
realizing that this disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of
facts. Thus, she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon
by the IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP Commissioner on
Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant failed to substantiate the
charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of
the charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility based on the following
evidence: (1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,
as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card of Atty.
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., signed by respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18
June 1997 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729 20734,
wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as counsel and even moved for the
provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the private complainants to appear and for lack

441 | P a g e

of interest to prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended that the
respondent be reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner San
Juan. The modification consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from
the practice of law for six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would be
dealt with more severely.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as approved and
adopted with modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion to Withdraw
Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos,[16] we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by
complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of
suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne
out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to
the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the
respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of
complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.

Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case should
proceed accordingly.

The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct were not
substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving his case
by convincing evidence.[17] With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the charge of
442 | P a g e

malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet convicted
thereof. In Gerona vs. Datingaling,[18] we held that when the criminal prosecution based on the
same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the
same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.
We, however, affirm the IBPs finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to misrepresent
himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of
the Bar in good standing.
The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the
public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his
services. Holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose
like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating
oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law. [19] Such acts constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds himself out as
one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in the unauthorized practice of the
legal profession.
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior
partners. She admitted that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the
letterhead of her law office as senior partners because they have investments in her law office.
[20]

That is a blatant misrepresentation.

The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof that the

respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the public that he is a

lawyer. Notably, the identification card stating that he is Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., bears the
signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the Group.

443 | P a g e

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized
practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice
of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and
ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be
used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid
a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.[21]
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional

Responsibility,

respondent

Atty.

Ana

Luz

B.

Cristal-Tenorio

is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective
immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorios record as
attorney in this Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

Canon 10

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant,
FLORIDO, respondent.

vs. ATTY.

JAMES

BENEDICT

C.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

444 | P a g e

This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict
C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as
a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals
Resolution/Order.[1]
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate
spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living
separately from each other. They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five
years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are in
complainants custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage
which is pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235 entitled,
James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al.
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence in
Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be
surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the
Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody.
[2]
Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any
motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of
Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution
closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing
something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC
Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and
demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully
take them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The
responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be
clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the
Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on
complainant the appellate courts resolution/order.[3] In order to diffuse the tension, complainant
agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would
not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay
City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van
arrived at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod
445 | P a g e

City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed
until later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch
31, a verified petition[4] for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpusasserting his right to custody
of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the meantime,
complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January
18, 2002[5] from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to
surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not
appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his
attorneys oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in
and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted
to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission
on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning
that another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. [6] On June 23, 2003, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the Commission
with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively
liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the
Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied
by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by
the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at
least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as
Special Proc. Case No. 3898,[7] which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City;
and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay
City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it was respondent who
used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would
be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will
have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be
imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in
the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth. [8] Thus, the Code of
professional Responsibility states:
446 | P a g e

CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text
of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in
describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified,
emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession.[9] The lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court
and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentlemen to another.[10] By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a
vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a
lawyer.
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute
gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However,
we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser
period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby
imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member
of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
447 | P a g e

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.,
Complainant,

ADM. CASE No. 4495

Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

ATTY. APOLONIA A. C. SOGUILON,

Respondent.
Promulgated:
October 8, 2008
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Before us is an administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant Antonio de
Zuzuarregui, Jr. against respondent Atty. Apolonia A.C. Soguilon. Complainant accuses
respondent of misconduct, concealment of the truth and misleading the court.

448 | P a g e

Respondent acted as counsel for the petitioner in LRC No. Q-7195 (95) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 93. In his letter [1]dated 15 September 1995,
complainant narrated that in the course of the presentation of evidence in support of the petition
for reconstitution, respondent introduced as evidence the certified copy of the technical
description and the sketch plan of the land both issued by the Land Management Services. The
documents

were

subsequently

marked

as

Exhibits

and

G,

respectively.

A closer study of the documents however revealed that they contained the following
notations:
a)

In re Exhibit F
Note: This is not an updated survey data. This might have been already
superseded by subsequent subd./cons. surveys, Amendment, correction or
[c]ancellation by the order of [the] court or by the Regional Executive/Technical
Director, DENR. This is not valid for land titling/Registration and for preparation of
deed of sale and/or transfer of right.
b)

In re Exhibit G
Note: This plan is used for reference purposes only.[2]

The above-quoted notations notwithstanding, the trial court allowed reconstitution of the
title. As such, complainant submitted that respondent was remiss in not calling the attention of
the trial court to the notations indicated in the documents, emphasizing her duty to avoid
concealment of the truth from the court.
In his Supplemental Letter[3] dated 25 October 1995, complainant additionally charged
respondent of committing fraud. For one, complainant alleged that the requirements of Section
12 in relation to Section 3(f) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 were not observed as the petition
failed to state the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property or the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest
in the property. Secondly, respondent allegedly manifested untruthfully to the trial court that her
client had complied with the requirements of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) when in fact
449 | P a g e

there had been no compliance. And finally, complainant contended that per the certification
issued by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Rizal Province, TCT No. 17730, the title sought to be
reconstituted, was missing as of the inventory conducted in September 1981. As such,
complainant asserted, there was no basis for the claim that the said title belonged to one
Gregorio Agabao.
In answer to these allegations, respondent submitted to this Court her Comment[4] dated 6
April 1996 wherein she refuted all the charges against her. Anent the annotations on the
documents, respondent stated that she could not be charged of concealing facts from the court
as she had submitted the documents without alteration for the evaluation of the trial court. With
regard to the alleged non-observance of the requirements of R.A. No. 26, respondent countered
that she had to merely rely, as she did, on the documents and information supplied to her by her
client. As to the charge of having fraudulently claimed compliance with the LRA requirements,
respondent averred that she submitted the documentary requirements to the LRA through
certified copies thereof which were all received by the records clerk of said office. Lastly,
concerning the contention that the certification issued by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Rizal
Province did not contain the name of the real owner, the location and the metes and bounds of
the property referred in the certification, as well as the name and purpose of the person who
requested for it, respondent asserted that she had nothing to do with the preparation of said
certification and therefore cannot be blamed for any of the lapses committed by the one who
issued it.
The Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation. Both parties presented their respective evidence before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP. After investigation, the Commissioner made the following findings and
recommendation:
As to the charge of misleading the court by not pointing out the notations in
the technical description and sketch plan, there appears to be no malice or
intentional machination to mislead the court. Indeed, the said notations were
not hidden or manipulated by Respondent. x x x It is clear that Respondent
and the trial court committed error that should be characterized as reversible
error in the absence of proof of intentional machination or collusion.

450 | P a g e

The same findings are true for the charge of deliberate omission of
persons entitled to notice under R.A. No. 26. The said omission should have
been fatal omissions that should have jeopardized the petition for reconstitution
of title. Nevertheless, it was allowed by the trial court to prosper. Furthermore,
there appears to be no reason for Respondent to disbelieve or not to rely on the
representation made to her by her client.
As to the alleged fraudulent claim of compliance with LRA requirements, it
is noted that the trial judge of RTC, Quezon City, Branch 93 x x x did not cite
Respondent in contempt of court.
xxxx
Clearly, what should have been fatal omissions on the part of
Respondent, as counsel of the petitioner in the Petition for Reconstitution (LRC
Case No. Q-7195 [95]) were allowed to pass without challenge. A simple perusal
of the Decision dated June 5, 1995 (In Re: Petition for Reconstitution of TCT No.
17730, LRC Case No. Q-7195 [95]) x x x shows that there was reversible
error on the part of the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 93 of Quezon City.
xxxx
x x x However, the disciplinary process does not punish errors, mistakes
or incompetence. Errors and mistakes are corrected by legal remedies such as
motions for reconsideration, appeals, and petitions for relief. The reversal of the
June 5, 1995 Decision of the trial court has remedied the error committed.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that respondent did not
commit any act for which she should be disciplined or administratively
sanctioned.
It is therefore recommended that this CASE BE DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

[5]

On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution [6] dismissing the
complaint based on the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Funa. The parties were
furnished with copies of the IBP Resolution. On 6 September 2005, the Court received a
Petition[7] from complainant praying that his administrative complaint be reinstated on the basis
of the appellate courts pronouncements in its: (1) Decision dated 30 January 1997[8] in C.A.
451 | P a g e

G.R. SP No. 40897 entitled Edith R. Agabao v. Hon. Demetrio B. Macapagal as RTC Judge, Br.
93, Quezon City, ADEZ REALTY, INC.., AGUEDO EUGENIO and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and (2) Decision dated 29 March 2004 [9] in C.A. G.R. CV No. 59363 entitled In
the Matter of the Petition for the Reconstitution of TCT No. 17730 of the Register of Deeds for
the Province of Rizal under R.A. No. 26 Edith R. Agabao v. Adez Realty, Inc. and the Republic
of the Philippines, affirming the Order dated 22 February 2006[10] of the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 93 which set aside the reconstitution previously ordered.
The crux of the controversy is whether respondent maliciously misled the court by failing
to point out material notations in the documents she had submitted; whether she deliberately
omitted mention of certain persons entitled to notice under the law; and whether she
fraudulently claimed that she had complied with the LRA requirements or whether all these
omissions could be considered honest mistakes or errors.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the Commissioner.
The Court agrees with the Commissioners evaluation that respondent did not employ
deceit or misrepresentation in acting as counsel for the petitioner in the petition for reconstitution
of title. Anent respondents failure to point out the notations in the documents she had
submitted, in the Courts opinion, the Commissioner correctly observed that there was absence
of proof that respondent had intended to mislead or deceive the trial court. In fact, the said
notations were laid bare for the trial courts evaluation. There were no attempts on respondents
part to manipulate or hide them.
As regards respondents failure to state in the petition certain persons entitled to notice
under the law, specifically the parties allegedly in possession of the properties, respondent
unflinchingly countered that she had duly asked of her client the names of the persons having
interest in the property subject of the title sought to be reconstituted. [11] In fact, the petition for
reconstitution filed before the court contained the names and addresses of the adjoining land
owners.[12]And even in retrospect, it appears that there was no reason for respondent to
disbelieve the representations made by her client on the matter.

452 | P a g e

Regarding respondents claim that she had complied with the LRA requirements when in
truth she had not, the Court concurs with the Commissioners finding that respondent was not
sufficiently informed that compliance was insufficient and improper.
In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of
proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant.[13] In the present case, the Court finds that complainant, who notably owns one of
the properties subject of the title sought to be reconstituted,[14] and is consequently an adverse
party, failed to present clear and preponderant evidence to show respondents guilt of the
charges he had leveled against her. In any event, it is worth mentioning that the prejudice, if
any, caused by respondents oversight against complainant and other interested parties had
been rectified later on by a different judge who set aside the order of reconstitution.[15]
All told, the lapses of respondent were committed without malice and devoid of any desire
to dupe or defraud the opposing party. They are innocuous blunders that were made without
intent to harm. As plain acts of inadvertence, they do not reach the level of professional
incompetence. While professional incompetence is not among the grounds of disbarment
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court yet there are instances
where a lawyer may be disciplined for inexcusable ignorance as the list is not exclusive. Indeed,
the Court is convinced that respondent should not be sanctioned.
Pertinently, the Court expressed in Mendoza v. Mercado,[16] to wit:
An attorney-at-law is not expected to know all the law. For an honest
mistake or error, an attorney is not liable. Chief Justice Abbott said that, no
attorney is bound to know all the law; God forbid that it should be imagined that
an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know all the law.
(Montorious v. Jefferys, 2 Car. & P. 113, cited in In Re Filart, 40 Phil. 205, 208).[17]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Resolution of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated 25 June 2005in Adm. Case No. 4495 is
AFFIRMED. The administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent Atty. Apolonia A.C.
Soguilon is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

453 | P a g e

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 3294 February 17, 1993

MARIO S. MARIVELES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ODILON C. MALLARI, respondent.
Rodolfo B. Ta-asan for complainant.

PER CURIAM:
On January 11, 1989, Mario S. Mariveles of Davao City filed an administrative complaint against
his former counsel, Attorney Odilon C. Mallari, whose legal services he had engaged in 1984 to
handle his defense in Criminal Case No. 6608 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City where
he was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
After an adverse decision was rendered on December 26, 1986, Mariveles instructed Attorney
Mallari to appeal the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, which the respondent did.
However, in the Court of Appeals, despite numerous extensions of time, totalling 245 days,
which he obtained from the Court, Attorney Mallari failed to file the appellant's brief, resulting in
the dismissal of the appeal.
Complainant discovered his lawyer's desertion only when he was subpoenaed by the trial court
to appear before it for the execution of the decision which had become final.
Through new counsel, complainant filed a Petition for Reinstatement of Appeal, Cancellation of
Entry of Judgment and Admission of Appellant's Brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, but it was
denied by the appellate court.
He sought relief in this court (G.R. No. 85964, "Mario S. Mariveles vs. Court of Appeal, et al.")
which, on March 13, 1989, granted his petition, ordered the Court of Appeals to cancel the entry
of judgment in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, reinstate the appeal, and admit the appellant's brief filed
by his new counsel. The Court said:

454 | P a g e

It is true that the failure of counsel to file brief for the appellant
which led to the dismissal of the appeal does not necessarily
warrant the reinstatement thereof. However, where the negligence
of counsel is so great that the rights of accused are prejudiced
and he is prevented from presenting his defense, especially where
the appellant raises issues which place in serious doubt the
correctness of the trial court's judgment of conviction, the
aforesaid rule must not be rigidly applied to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. These teachings of jurisprudence are present in the case
at bar.
On the first aspect, the failure of petitioner's former counsel to file
the brief, for reasons unknown and without any cause imputable to
petitioner, amounted to deliberate abandonment of his client's
interest and justifies reinstatement with consequent due
consideration of petitioner's appeal through a new counsel. (pp.
106-107, Rollo).
On February 15, 1989, the administrative complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP's Committee on Bar Discipline investigated the complaint and held hearings. On March
3, 1992, it submitted to this Court a report/resolution finding:
In sum, what was committed by the respondent is a blatant violation of our Code
of Professional Responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time
to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Suffice it to state that a lawyer has no business practicing his profession if in the
course of that practice, he will eventually wreck and destroy the future and
reputation of his client and thus disgrace the law profession. The last thing that
his peers in the law profession and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines would do
is to disrobe a member of the profession, for he has worked for the attainment of
his career burning the midnight oil throughout school and passing the bar. The
undersigned, however, could not find any mitigating circumstances to
455 | P a g e

recommend a lighter penalty. Disbarment is the only recourse to remove a rotten

apple if only to instill and maintain the respect and confidence of all and sundry to
the noble profession. (pp. 249-250, Rollo)
The Court concurs with the above observations. The respondent demonstrated not only
appalling indifference and lack of responsibility to the courts and his client but also a shameless
disregard for his duties as a lawyer. He is unfit for membership in this noble profession.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Attorney Odilon C. Mallari guilty of abandonment and
dereliction of duty toward his client and hereby orders him DISBARRED from the legal
profession and to immediately cease and desist from the practice of law. Let the Office of the
Court Administrator and the Executive Judges of the Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Judicial
Regions, be furnished with copies of this resolution for dissemination to all the courts in those
regions.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
Quiason, J., took no part.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

456 | P a g e

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6442. October 21, 2004]
HON. MARIANO S. MACIAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALANIXON A. SELDA, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
For violation of the lawyers oath, Judge Mariano S. Macias, Presiding Judge of Regional
Trial Court, Branch 28, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) a Petition for Administrative Discipline against Atty. Alanixon A. Selda.[1]
The facts are undisputed. On January 24, 2000, respondent Selda withdrew as counsel for
one Norma T. Lim, private protestee in Election Case No. SE-01 entitled Ruth Maraon v. The
Municipal Board of Canvassers, Salud, Zamboanga del Norte, and Norma T. Lim for Annulment
of Election, etc.[2] He basically submitted as ground for his withdrawal that he could not cope up
with the pace of the proceedings in view of his workload. He claimed that the hearings of the
election protest case would run from 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. and he still had to attend to his other

457 | P a g e

cases including classes at Philippine Advent College, which start at 5:30 p.m. on Mondays and
Wednesdays.
In light of these representations, complainant granted the Motion and ordered respondent
relieved of all his responsibilities as counsel for private protestee. However, on May 22, 2000,
respondent executed an affidavit disavowing his grounds for withdrawing as counsel for private
protestee. He swore that he only filed theMotion on account of the pre-judgment of the case by
complainant, who, on several occasions insinuated to him that his client would lose in the
protest. He stated that he was convinced that chaos would result if his client were unseated,
and withdrawal from the case was his best recourse.
On the basis of respondents affidavit, his former client and private protestee in subject
election protest case, moved for the inhibition of complainant. On June 2, 2000, complainant
granted the motion for his inhibition if only to disabuse any doubt on his impartiality. But on
August 23, 2000, this Court set aside complainants inhibition after finding no strong and valid
reason therefor, and directed him to continue hearing the case and to resolve it with reasonable
dispatch.
Deploring the act of respondent as serious deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct as a
lawyer and in utter violation of the lawyers oath, complainant requested the IBP to investigate
the matter and recommend to the Court an appropriate penalty against respondent. On January
30, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline[3]required respondent to answer. He failed.
On November 21, 2003, after several postponements filed by the parties, their failure to
personally appear before the IBP investigating commission, and the request of complainant to
resolve the case on the basis of the pleadings, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala,
submitted her report and recommended to the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
The Board, in its Resolution No. XVI-2004-122 dated February 27, 2004, adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Maala. It
reduced the suspension of respondent to six (6) months; hence, the transmittal of the case and
its records to this Court for final resolution [4]pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules
of Court, viz:
Review and Decision by the Board of Governors. x x x x (b) If the Board, by the vote of a
majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the
practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
We affirm the findings of the IBP on the culpability of respondent.
All members of the legal profession made a solemn oath to, inter alia, do no
falsehood and conduct [themselves] as [lawyers] according to the best of [their] knowledge
458 | P a g e

and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients. These
particular fundamental principles are reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically:
Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice.
When respondent executed his affidavit of May 22, 2000 retracting his reason for
withdrawing as counsel for Norma T. Lim, he acknowledged, under oath, his
misrepresentation. He misled the court in clear violation of his oath as lawyer and failed to
abide by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of the practicing lawyer.[5] In fact, this
obligation to the bench for candor and honesty takes precedence. [6]Thus, saying one thing in
his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Private Protestee and another in his subsequent affidavit
is a transgression of this imperative which necessitates appropriate punishment.
The appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant attorney involves the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the facts of the case. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
provides, viz:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The circumstances in this case demand that respondent be imposed suspension from the
practice of law for one (1) year. This serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the court,
the legal profession and the public. For indeed, if respect for the courts and for judicial process
is gone or steadily weakened, no law can save us as a society.[7]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the February 27, 2004 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors in
CBD Case No. 02-921 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Alanixon A.
Selda is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, to commence upon receipt of
this Decision. He is further sternly warned that a repetition of a similar offense will call for a
more severe consequence.

459 | P a g e

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal record of respondent with the Office
of the Bar Confidant. Likewise, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all its chapters, and to all the courts in the land.
Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
460 | P a g e

A.C. No. 2837 October 7, 1994

ESTEBAN M. LIBIT, complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO A. UMALI, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Pedro Cutingting,
plaintiff versus Alfredo Tan, defendant", the Honorable Presiding Judge Domingo Panis issued
the following order:
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is hereby ordered to
conduct an investigation with the end in view of determining the author of the
Sheriff's Return which appears to have been falsified and to institute such
criminal action as the evidence will warrant. (p. 1, Final Report.)
After conducting the necessary investigation, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), through
herein complainant, charged respondents as follows:
That sometime in May 1984 in the City of Manila, at the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XLI, Manila, Philippines, the above-named Respondents, as Counsels for
PEDRO CUTINGTING in Civil Case No. 84-24144, entitled PEDRO
CUTINGTING, Plaintiff vs. ALFREDO TAN, Defendant, did then and there,
knowingly, willfully introduced/presented in evidence before the aforesaid
Regional Trial Court, a falsified Sheriff's Return of Summons during the hearing
of the aforesaid Civil Case thereby impending and/or obstructing the speedy
administration and/or dispensation of Justice. (p. 2, Final Report, ff. p. 69,
Record.)
Respondents in their respective answers denied having any hand in the falsification of the said
sheriff's return.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court En Banc of April
12, 1988, the case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In view, however, of the report of the National Bureau of Investigation to the effect that the
signature above the typewritten name Florando Umali on the last page of the complaint in said
461 | P a g e

civil case is not his signature, complainant, through counsel, agreed to the dismissal of the case
with respect to Atty. Umali.
With respect to Atty. Edelson G. Oliva, the IBP submitted the following report and
recommendation:
There is ample evidence extant in the records to prove that
Atty. Oliva has something to do with the falsification of the Sheriff's Return on the
Summons in said Civil Case No. 84-24144.
The oral and documentary evidence of the complainant strongly tend to show the
following: (1) The Sheriff's Return of the Summon in the said civil case was
falsified as it was not signed by Deputy Sheriff Rodolfo Torella (Exh. "J" Sworn
Statement of Rodolfo Torella dated February 1, 1985, and Exh. "S", which is the
falsified Sheriff's Return); (2) The summons was received from the clerk of the
Court of the Manila
RTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo Romero, a messenger in the law office of Attys.
Umali and Oliva and said messenger brought the summons to the law office of
the respondents (Exh. "H" Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Ronaldo Romero, and
Exh. "G", Exh. "I" Sworn Statement dated February 28, 1985 of Mariano
Villanueva, Chief Staff Asst. 2, RTC, Manila; (3) On the basis of the falsified
Sheriff's Return on the Summons, Atty. Oliva, counsel for the defendant [should
be plaintiff] in said civil case, filed a typewritten Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default (Exh.) "R" Motion to Declare Defendant In Default in said civil case
signed and filed by Atty. Oliva);
(4) On March 29, 1984, Atty. Oliva, in his capacity as Operations Manager of
Judge Pio R. Marcos Law Office, sent a final demand letter on Alfredo Tan, the
defendant in said Civil case, for payment of the sum of P70,174.00 (Exh. "T"
Demand Letter dated March 28, 1984 of Atty. Oliva addressed to Alfredo Tan); (5)
The demand letter of Atty. Oliva (Exh. "T"), the complaint in said civil case (Exh.
"Q", "Q-1", and "Q-2"), the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons (Exh. "S"),
the Motion To Declare Defendant In Default dated October 30, 1984 signed and
filed by
Atty. Oliva (Exh. "R" and "R-1") were typed on one and the same typewriter, as
shown in the Questioned Document Report No. 198-585 dated 19 June 1985
(Exh. "Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2"; Exh. "V", "V-1" and
"V-2").
After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the IBP,
the Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which
warrant the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the
evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live up to his duties as
a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and
462 | P a g e

advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives
and malicious intentions against the other party.
At this juncture, it is well to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is
the observance of honesty and candor. It can not be gainsaid that candidness, especially
towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled
to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before
them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation. It is
essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather
to the courts, that they are above all court officers sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice
to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their
clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court (Chavez vs. Viola, 196 SCRA 10 [1991].
In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a
lawyer that he shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of
DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar
Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Florando Umali.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

463 | P a g e

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

RODRIGO A.
MOLINA,

A.C. No. 1900

Complainant,
Present:

PERALTA, J., Acting

Chairperson,*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,* *

- versus -

MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, J
J.

ATTY. CEFERINO R. MAGAT,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
June 13, 2012
464 | P a g e

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is the undated Resolution[1] of the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Ceferino R. Magat(Atty. Magat) liable for unethical
conduct and recommending that he be reprimanded.

The Facts:
The case stemmed from a complaint for disbarment [2] filed by Rodrigo A.
Molina (complainant) against Atty. Magat before the Court on May 5, 1978. The complaint
alleged, among others, that complainant filed cases of Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority and Breach of the Peace and Resisting Arrest against one Pascual de Leon (de
Leon) before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila; that the counsel of record for accused
de Leon in both cases was Atty. Magat; that a case for slight physical injuries was filed against
him (Molina) by de Leon as a counter-charge and Atty. Magat was also the private prosecutor;
that Atty. Magat subsequently filed a motion to quash the information on Assault upon an Agent
of a Person in Authority on the sole ground of double jeopardy claiming that a similar case for
slight physical injuries was filed in court by a certain Pat. Molina (Molina); that based on the
record, no case of slight physical injuries was filed by Molina against de Leon; that Atty. Magat
was very much aware of such fact as he was the counsel and private prosecutor on record of de
Leon from the very start of the case way back on May 24, 1974; that Atty. Magats act of filing
the Motion to Quash was a malicious act done in bad faith to mislead the court, thus, a betrayal
of the confidence of the court of which he is an officer; and that Atty. Magat likewise committed
willful disobedience of the court order when he appeared as counsel for de Leon on two (2)
occasions despite the fact that he was suspended from the practice of law.
In his Answer,[3] Atty. Magat averred that in so far as the filing of the motion to quash was
concerned, he was really under the impression that a criminal case in lieu of the two (2) charges
was indeed filed and that the said motion was opposed by the other party and was denied by
the court. He admitted his appearances in court while under suspension. He explained that his
appearance in the December 21, 1977 hearing was to inform the court that the accused was
sick and to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused. In the January 9,
1978 hearing, he appeared because the accused had no money and pleaded that his testimony
465 | P a g e

be finished. Atty. Magat begged for the indulgence of the court and conveyed his repentance
and apology and promised that the same would not happen again.
The complaint was endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[4] Thereafter, the OSG transmitted the records of the
case to the IBP for proper disposition.
In his Report and Recommendation[5] dated March 20, 2009, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline found merit in the complaint and recommended that Atty. Magat be reprimanded and
fined P50,000.00. It stated that:
This Commission finds it hard to believe that respondent would have
mistakenly been under the impression that a case for physical injuries was filed
against his client when there was no such case filed. Respondent was either
negligently reckless or he had mischievous intentions to deceive the trial court. In
any case, he committed a transgression for which he should be punished.
However, the graver sin of respondent is, and this he admits, that he
appeared as counsel before a trial court on at least two (2) occasions
notwithstanding the fact that he had been suspended by the Supreme Court from
the practice of law. Despite professing his contrition in his Answer, this
Commission is not convinced. Otherwise, respondent should have had, at the
onset of the proceedings, admitted to his misdeeds and put his fate squarely with
the disciplinary body. Yet, he proceeded to fight the charges against him.
Moreover, if respondent was indeed moved by altruistic intentions when
he made those appearances before the trial court despite having been
suspended, he could have so informed the Presiding Judge of his plight and
explained why the party he was representing could not attend. Yet, what he
proceeded to do was to enter his appearance as counsel. Indeed, it is beyond
doubt he trifled with the suspension order handed by the Supreme Court.
If there is one thing going for respondent, it is that the passage of time
with which this case remains pending makes it difficult to impose a penalty of
suspension on him. Under normal circumstances, this Commission would not
have thought twice of suspending respondent. However, the acts committed by
respondent occurred over TWENTY (20) YEARS ago. It would not be fair to now
impose a suspension on respondent, more so considering that he is, in all
likelihood, in the twilight of his career.
On the other hand, there is still a need to discipline respondent if only to
set an example to other lawyers that suspension orders of the Supreme Court
cannot simply be ignored. Thus, it is the recommendation of the undersigned that
respondent be meted a fine of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (50,000.00) and that
he be heavily reprimanded for his actions, the passage of time notwithstanding.[6]

466 | P a g e

On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors passed its Resolution[7] adopting the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner. It, however, deleted the imposition of fine.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but not with respect to the penalty.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possess and
continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all
times a high standard of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. They must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and
their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.[8]
Atty. Magats act clearly falls short of the standards set by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 10.01, which provides:
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, the Court agrees with the observation of the IBP that there was a deliberate
intent on the part of Atty. Magat to mislead the court when he filed the motion to dismiss the
criminal charges on the basis of double jeopardy. Atty. Magat should not make any false and
untruthful statements in his pleadings. If it were true that there was a similar case for slight
physical injuries that was really filed in court, all he had to do was to secure a certification from
that court that, indeed, a case was filed.
Furthermore, Atty. Magat expressly admitted appearing in court on two occasions
despite having been suspended from the practice of law by the Court.Under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as
an attorney for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court and/or for corruptly
or wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so. It provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. [Underlining supplied]

467 | P a g e

As stated, if Atty. Magat was truly moved by altruistic intentions when he appeared
before the trial court despite having been suspended, he could have informed the Presiding
Judge of his plight and explained why the party he was representing could not attend. On the
contrary, Atty. Magat kept his silence and proceeded to represent his client as counsel.
WHEREFORE, respondent
Atty.
Ceferino
R.
Magat
is
hereby
ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with a WARNING that the
commission of the same or similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.

SECOND DIVISION
JUDGE ALDEN V.
CERVANTES,

A.C. No. 7828

Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. JUDE JOSUE L. SABIO,

Respondent.

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CORONA,*
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 11, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Judge Alden V. Cervantes (complainant) was the presiding judge of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Cabuyao, Laguna until his optional retirement onNovember 23, 2005. Some of
the cases lodged in his sala were ejectment cases filed by Extra-Ordinary Development
Corporation (EDC) against the clients of Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio (respondent). It appears that
respondent had filed motions for inhibition of complainant on the basis of the fact that EDC
gave him a house and lot putting into serious doubt his impartiality, independence and
integrity. The motions were denied.
After the retirement of complainant, respondent, by Affidavit-Complaint dated April 6,
[1]

2006, sought the investigation of complainant for bribery.

468 | P a g e

In support of the charge, respondent submitted a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 6,

2006 of Edwin P. Cardeo,[2] a utility worker in the MTC of Cabuyao, stating that, inter
alia, orders and decisions of complainant were not generated from the typewriter of the court but
from a computer which the court did not have, it having acquired one only on May 2, 2005; that
there had been many times that a certain Alex of EDC would go to the court bearing certain
papers for the signature of complainant; that he came to learn that a consideration of P500.00
would be given for every order or decision released by complainant in favor of EDC; and that he
also came to know that attempts at postponing the hearings of the complaints filed by EDC were
thwarted by complainant as he wanted to expedite the disposition thereof.
By Resolution of August 30, 2006, [3] this Court, after noting the July 20, 2006
Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) relative to respondents complaint
against complainant, approved the recommendation of the OCA to dismiss the complaint for
lack of merit, the complaint being unsubstantiated and motivated by plain unfounded suspicion,
and for having been filed after the effectivity of his optional retirement (underscoring supplied).
Thus, spawned the present verified December 18, 1996 letter-complaint[4] of complainant
against respondent, for disbarment.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
From the Report and Recommendation[5] of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Randall
C. Tabayoyong, it is gathered that despite the January 12, 2007Order for respondent to file an
answer to the complaint, he failed to do so, prompting the Commissioner to declare him in
default.
It is further gathered that after the conduct by the Investigating Commissioner of a
mandatory conference on May 25, 2007, the parties were ordered to file their respective position
papers. In compliance with the Order, complainant submitted his verified position paper.
[6]

Respondent did not.

Defined as issues before the IBP were:
(1)

Whether . . . the complaint filed by respondent against the

complainant before the Office of the Court Administrator in Admin Matter
OCA IPI No. 06-1842-MTJ was malicious, false and untruthful.

(2)

If in the affirmative, whether . . . respondent is guilty under the Code

of Professional Responsibility.
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On the first issue, the IBP Commissioner did not find respondents complaint against
herein complainant false and untruthful, it noting that respondents complaint was dismissed by
this Court due to insufficiency of evidence which, to the IBP, merely shows a failure on the part
of respondent to prove his allegations against complainant.
Noting, however, this Courts August 30, 2006 Resolution finding respondents complaint
unsubstantiated and motivated by plain, unfounded suspicion, the Investigating Commissioner
concluded that respondent knowingly instituted not only a groundless suit against herein
complainant,

but

also

a suit

based

simply

on

his

bare

suspicion

and

speculation. (underscoring supplied)

On the second issue, the IBP found that by filing the groundless bribery charge against
complainant, respondent violated the proscription of the Code of Professional Responsibility
against wittingly or willingly promot[ing] or su[ing] any groundless suit including baseless
administrative complaints against judges and other court officers and employees.
The Investigating Commissioner thus concluded that
while the evidence on record is sufficient to show that the allegations in
respondents affidavit-complaint against herein complainant were false, the
evidence nonetheless show[s] that respondent had knowingly and maliciously
instituted a groundless suit, based simply on his unfounded suspicions against
complainant;[7] (Underscoring supplied)

and that he violated Canons 10,[8] 11,[9] & 12[10] and Rule 11.04[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility under his oath of office.
He accordingly recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of P5,000, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
The Board of Governors of the IBP, by Notice of Resolution, [12] informs that on November
22, 2007, it adopted the following Resolution adopting and approving with modification the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with
modification,
the
Report
and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
470 | P a g e

laws and rules, and considering Respondents violation of Canons 10, 11 and 12
and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional responsibility for filing a groundless
suit against complainant, Atty. Jude Sabio is hereby REPRIMANDED with Stern
Warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. (Emphasis in the original)
The Court finds the action taken by the IBP Board of Governors well taken.
Respondent ought to be aware that if a court official or employee or a lawyer is to be
disciplined, the evidence against him should be substantial, competent and derived from direct
knowledge, not on mere allegations, conjectures, suppositions, or on the basis of hearsay.[13]
No doubt, it is this Courts duty to investigate the truth behind charges against judges
and lawyers. But it is also its duty to shield them from unfounded suits which are intended to,
among other things, harass them.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Jude Josue L. Sabio, is FINED in the amount of Five
Thousand (P5,000) Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar questioned
act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

471 | P a g e

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

ATTY.
JOSABETH
ALONSO andSHALIMAR P. LAZATIN,

V.

A.C. No. 8481

[Formerly B.M. No. 1524]

Complainants,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO-MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus -

BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
472 | P a g e

ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA, JR.,

August 3, 2010

Respondent.
x --------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Complaint[1] dated October 13, 2005 for disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. filed by Attys. Josabeth V. Alonso and Shalimar P.
Lazatin, counsel of Servier Philippines, Incorporated for violating the rules on forum shopping
and res judicata.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

In March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier
Philippines, Incorporated (Servier) docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 30-03-01583-01, alleging

473 | P a g e

constructive dismissal with prayer for reinstatement or payment of separation pay, backwages,
moral and exemplary damages.

On July 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier.[2] It held that Ebanen
voluntarily resigned from Servier and was, therefore, not illegally dismissed.

Ebanen appealed at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On March 31,
2003, the NLRC-Third Division affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.[3]

Thus, Ebanen moved for reconsideration. However, the NLRC denied the same in a
Resolution[4] dated May 5, 2003.

Unsatisfied, Ebanen filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 77968. In a Decision[5] dated January 16, 2004, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings of the NLRC that Ebanen voluntarily resigned and that there
was no constructive dismissal. Ebanen moved anew for reconsideration, but was denied in a
Resolution[6] dated April 30, 2004.

Unrelenting, Ebanen filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court. However, in
a Resolution[7] dated August 4, 2004, the Court found no reversible error on the part of the CA,
thus, denied said petition. Ebanen filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied with finality
in a Resolution[8] dated October 11, 2004.

Ebanen filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolutions dated August 4, 2004 and October 11, 2004, respectively. On January 19, 2005,
the Court denied her motion.[9]

474 | P a g e

Persistent, Ebanen filed a Motion to Admit a Third Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution dated January 19, 2005. On April 20, 2005, the Court denied her motion for being a
prohibited pleading and noted without action Ebanens third motion for reconsideration.[10]

On July 27, 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Court noted without action
Ebanens Motion for Leave to Admit Supplemental Third Motion for Reconsideration dated June
1, 2005, in view of the entry of judgment on February 17, 2005.[11]

On February 17, 2005, the Courts Resolution dated August 4, 2004 has already become
final and executory; thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment[12] has been issued.
However, despite said entry of judgment, Ebanen, thru her counsel, Atty. Relamida,
filed a second complaint on August 5, 2005 for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of
action of constructive dismissal against Servier, now docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-0807222-05.

Thus, on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint addressed to
the then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be disciplinary sanctioned for
violation of the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.

Subsequently, in a Resolution[13] dated November 15, 2005, the Court required both
Ebanen and Atty. Relamida to comment on the letter-complaint against them.

On January 16, 2006, respondents filed their Comments. [14] Both respondents admitted
the filing of the second complaint against Servier. They claimed that the judgment rendered by
the Labor Arbiter was null and void for want of due process, since the motion for the issuance
of subpoena duces tecum for the production of vital documents filed by the complainant was
ignored by the Labor Arbiter. They opined that the dismissal did not amount to res
judicata, since the decision was null and void for lack of due process. As a result, they claimed
that there was also no violation of the rule on forum shopping.[15]
475 | P a g e

On February 7, 2006, the Court referred the instant bar matter to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[16]
On January 22, 2007, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the second complaint on the grounds
of res judicata and forum shopping. It further reiterated that Ebanen voluntarily resigned from
employment and was not constructively dismissed.

On March 14, 2008, during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainants
failed to appear. Ebanen manifested that she is not a lawyer.

Both parties were required to submit their respective position papers.

Atty. Relamida reiterated that Ebanen is not a lawyer and that she is the daughter of Atty.
Leonardo Aurelio (Atty. Aurelio), the senior partner of A.M. Sison Jr. and Partners Law Offices
where he is employed as associate lawyer.

He narrated that on March 28, 2001, Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal
against Servier. He claimed that in the beginning, Atty. Aurelio was the one who prepared and
reviewed all the pleadings and it was Atty. Lapulapu Osoteo who stood as counsel for Ebanen in
the said labor case. Atty. Relamida admitted, however, that during the filing of the second
complaint he took over as counsel of Ebanen, as requested by Atty. Aurelio.[17] He also admitted
that during the pendency of the first complaint, he occasionally examined pleadings and signed
as counsel for Ebanen.[18]

Atty. Relamida reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had no
choice but to represent the latter. Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her right to
due process due to the denial of her motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He
then argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void; thus, there was no res
476 | P a g e

judicata.[19] He maintained that he did not violate the lawyers oath by serving the interest of his
client.

Servier, on the other hand, argued that the filing of the second complaint is a violation of
the rights of Servier, since the issue has already attained finality. It contended that Atty.
Relamida violated the rules on forum shopping for the same act of filing a second complaint. As
a consequence, they are being made to defend themselves in a case that has been settled
before the labor tribunals and courts. Likewise, Servier insisted that the filing of the second
complaint was also a blatant violation of the rule on res judicata. Hence, Servier prayed that
Atty. Relamida be disciplinary dealt with due to his abuse of the processes of the courts.

On April 19, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that
respondent Atty. Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. It
imposed no sanction on Ebanen for being a non-lawyer.

In its Report, the IBP found that by filing the second complaint, Atty. Relamida was guilty
of violating the rules on res judicata and forum shopping. It concluded that Atty. Relamida
abused his right of recourse to the courts by filing a complaint for a cause that had been
previously rejected by the courts.

On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification as to penalty the report of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it recommended that Atty.
Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month for his violation of the rules
on res judicata and forum shopping.
On December 7, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant
complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative case against Atty. Relamida.

We sustain the findings of the IBP-CBD.

477 | P a g e

All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty
formality. When they take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of
justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of the land. As the first Canon of the
Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Moreover, according to the
lawyers oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."[20]

In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Relamida is guilty of forum shopping and violation
of the rule on res judicata. Atty. Relamida should have refrained from filing the second complaint
against Servier. He ought to have known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice, since it
had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. He was aware of all the proceedings which the
first complaint went through as by his own admission, he participated in the preparation of the
pleadings and even signed as counsel of Ebanen occasionally.[21] He knew that the decision in
the subject case had already attained finality. Atty. Relamida was well aware that when he filed
the second complaint, it involved the same parties and same cause of action, albeit, he justified
the same on the ground of nullity of the previous dismissal.
His allegation that he was not the original counsel of Ebanen and that his intention was
only to protect the rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the
prior complaint deserves scant consideration. He should know that once a case is decided with
finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to
enjoy the fruits of his victory, while the other party is obliged to respect the courts verdict and to
comply with it.[22]

The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining
a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An
important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the partieslitigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. Forum shopping
exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another. Thus, the following requisites should concur:[23]

478 | P a g e

x x x (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same

interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the courts
processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration
of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the lawyer who files
such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing
any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the
courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with
truth and honor.[24]

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the
doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and
Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate "to delay no man for money or
malice."[25]

The Court has, time and again, warned lawyers not to resort to forum shopping for this
practice clogs the court dockets. Their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration
of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice
contravenes such lawyers duty.[26] This we will not tolerate.

479 | P a g e

In cases of similar nature,[27] the penalty imposed by this Court was six (6) months
suspension from the practice of law. Thus, consistent with the existing jurisprudence, we find
that, in this case, the suspension of six (6) months from practice of law is proper.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-286, dated June 5, 2008, of the IBP, which
found respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. guilty of violating the Rules on Res
Judicata and Forum Shopping, is AFFIRMED. Atty. Relaminda is hereby SUSPENDED for six
(6) months from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. He is warned
that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the personal record of Atty. Relamida as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

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