C.

Guardians and Guardianship R 92 to R 97

Goyena vs Ledesma Gustilo
GOYENA V. LEDESMA-GUSTILO (REMEDIAL)
Although the general rule is that the SC is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being
limited to reviewing and revising only errors of law, it is nonetheless subject to the
following exceptions which have been laid down in a number of decision of this
court:
1

When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises,

and conjectures;

When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

When there is grave abuse of discretion;

When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

When the findings of facts are conflicting;

When the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to those of the trial court;

When the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;

When the findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific

evidence on which they are based;

When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and

10 When the findings of fact of the CA is premised on the supposed absence of

evidence ans id contradicted by the evidence on record.
Facts: Amparo Ledesma-Gustilo filed a Petition for Letters of Guardianship over the person and property
of her sister Julieta since she is not in a position to take care of herself anymore due to her old age,
general weakness, and suffering from a mini-stroke thereby requiring the assistance of a guardian to
manage her interests in various enterprises.
Pilar Y. Goyena, Julietas close friend for more than six decades, opposed the petition. She claims that
Julieta is competent and sane enough to manage her person and property. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
declared Julieta to be incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property and Gustilo
was appointed to be her guardian. The RTC decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in finding Julieta to be incompetent and incapable of taking care of
herself
HELD:
It is well-entrenched doctrine that questions of fact are not proper subjects of appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is confined to questions of law. The test of
whether the question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can determine the issue
raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case it is a question of law; otherwise,
it is question of fact.
In support of an affirmative answer, Goyena posits as follows:
1. The Court of Appeals basis for its decision that there are no antagonistic interests between Julieta
and Amparo is contrary to the evidence on record,
2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that there is no showing that Amparo is hostile to the best
interest of Julieta, and
3. Julieta Ledesmas appointed representatives are most suitable to be appointed as her guardian.
Clearly, the issues raised and arguments in support of Goyenas position require a review of the
evidence, hence, not proper for consideration in the petition at bar. The Court cannot thus be tasked to
go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain if the trial
court and appellate court were correct in according them superior credit.
That the issues raised are factual is in fact admitted by Goyena in her Reply. Goyena claims that the
petition falls within the exceptions to the rule because the findings of the Court of Appeals are clearly
belied by the evidence on record.
In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with the
parties. As the Court said in Feliciano v. Comahort: As a rule, when it appears that the judge has
exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due consideration to the reasons
for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not be disturbed
unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error.
In the case at bar, Goyena has not shown that the lower courts committed any error. Goyenas
assertion that Amparos intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to take control of
Julietas properties and use them for her own benefit is purely speculative and finds no support from
the records.
Caniza vs Court of Appeals
In Caiza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997) it was ruled that: a will is essentially
ambulatory; at any time prior to the testators death, it may be changed or revoked; and until
admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law

being quite explicit: No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The Incompetent Carmen Caniza v. Court of Appeals, Pedro and Leonora Estrada
G.R. No. 110427; February 24, 1997
Facts:
Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of Chemistry
and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment of the QC RTC
in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so adjudged
because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile
dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate. Caiza was the
owner of a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo commenced a suit to eject the spouses Estrada from the
said premises in the MTC of Quezon City.
Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caiza was the absolute owner of the property in question,
covered by TCT No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children,
grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Caiza already had
urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to
meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Caiza
had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that
"by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they
** (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they ** (were) saving
money by not paying any rent for the house, the incompetent ** (was) losing much money as her house
could not be rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from
the date of first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990."
In their Answer, the defendants declared that they had been living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that
in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and the
latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she "bequeathed".
Judgement was rendered by the MetroTC in favor of Caiza but it was reversed on appeal by the Quezon
City RTC.
Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision but failed in that attempt.
It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Caiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an accion
interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or
occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Caiza," as evidenced
by what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and until it has
passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim to the property, ** it is
indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Caiza that defendants are to remain and are to
continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Caiza's supervening incompetency cannot
be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out. They conclude, on
those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's legal guardian to oust them from the disputed
premises.
Carmen Caiza died, and her heirs -- the aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C.
Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively -- were by this Court's leave, substituted for her.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Evangelista, as Caiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action;and

2. Whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Caiza after the latter's death.
Ruling:
1. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly denotes her intention that
they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista,
from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked;
and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law
being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838,id.).
An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not
inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.
And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is apparent: she
needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising
from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person and the
estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly installed her as the "guardian over
the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take possession of
the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform
all other acts necessary for the management of her properties.".
By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical
and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to relatives
and friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's
property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to possession or
control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the
right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such
actions as may be needful for this purpose.
2. As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas
thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Caiza's death automatically terminated the
guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal
personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas.
Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the
other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court, they
were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased.
"SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the
deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court
charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the

appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
Neri vs Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS, ROSA
D. NERI-MILLAN,
DOUGLAS D. NERI, EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA,
Petitioners,
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND JULPHA * IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.
Anunciacion Neri had seven children: first marriage with Gonzalo Illut, namely:
Eutropia and Victoria and second marriage with Enrique Neri, namely: Napoleon,
Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa.
Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired
several homestead properties located in
In 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as
natural guardian of his minor children
Rosa and Douglas, with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale on 7/7/1979, adjudicating
among themselves the said homestead properties and thereafter, conveying them
to the late spouses Uy for a consideration of P 80,000.00.
In June 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of
the homestead properties against spouses Uy before the RTC, assailing the validity
of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. The complaint was
later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria additional plaintiffs for having been
excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first
marriage.
RTC RULING: Rendered the sale void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived
of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares
of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
CA RULING: Reversed the RTC ruling and declared the extrajudicial settlement
and sale valid. While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they
were deemed to have ratified the sale when they failed to question it upon reaching
the age of majority. It also found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a
long period of
ISSUES: Whether the father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under
parental authority, has the power to dispose or encumber the property of the
minor?

All the petitioners are legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second
marriages and consequently, they are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares,
pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code. In the execution of the ExtraJudicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy,
all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and
Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa andDouglas were not
properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them.
While the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the
properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor
of the spouses is valid but only with respect to their proportionate
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of
the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented
them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time,
Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any
authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt
of fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or
alienation, or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the
limits of administration. Thus, A FATHER OR MOTHER, as the natural guardian of the
minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber
the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of
the wards property and even then only with courts prior approval secured in
accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor
children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching
the age of majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1)
of the Civil Code.
However, records show that Napoleon and Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In their Joint-Affidavit and
Manifestation before the RTC, they both confirmed, respect and acknowledge
the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
in 1979. The ratification thus purged all the defects existing at the time of its
execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosas 1/16 share in the estate of
Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas
for lack of evidence showing ratification.
Napoleon D. Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers, Rosa D. Neri-Millan, Douglas
D. Neri, Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos and Victoria D. Illut-Piala, Petitioners vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy
and Julpha Ibrahim Uy, Repondents.
Gr. No. 194366, October 10, 2012
Perlas-Bernabe, J.:
Facts:

When Anunciacion Neri died intestate in 1977, she was survived by her second husband Enrique Neri and
her two children from her first marriage and five children from the second marriage. Throughout the
second marriage, Anunciacion and Enrique acquired several homestead which then became the subject of
an Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Deed of Sale purporting to transfer titles to Spouses Uy, who
are now represented by their heirs. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of their two
minor children, Rosa and Douglas, and the other three children (Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda) executed
the said settlement with deed of sale the validity of which was later questioned in an action for annulment
filed by the children including those who were allegedly deprived of their legitime. The trial court ruled
that indeed, the Extra-judicial Settlement with Deed of Sale was void as it deprives some of the heirs of
their legitime. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.
Issues:
I. Whether Enrique has the capacity to dispose or alienate the share of his minor children in the latters
share in the estate considering the fact that he was their natural guardian.
II. Whether in a consequent affidavit executed by Rosa (one of the minors) confirming the Exttra-judicial
settlement of Estate with Deed of Sale constitutes her ratification to said agreement.
Ruling:
I. No. Enrique does not have the capacity to dispose or alienate the share of his minor children in the
latters share in the estate even if he is their natural guardian.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and
sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis
of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft
of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the execution of the settlement and
sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to
the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother
shall be considered a guardian of the childs property, subject to the duties and obligations of guardians
under the Rules of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two
thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his
legal guardian. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the
mother shall be considered guardian of the childs property, with the duties and obligations of guardians
under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court
may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
II. Yes. The affidavit executed by Rosa is a ratification on her part. Ratification means that one under no
disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which
without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which
amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the
party so making the ratification. Once ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when the person knowingly
received benefits from it, the contract is cleansed from all its defects from the moment it was constituted,
as it has a retroactive effect.

Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed
of sale. In Napoleon and Rosas Manifestation before the RTC dated July 11, 1997,they stated:
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land executed by our father, Enrique Neri concurred in and
conformed to by us and our other two sisters and brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji Yusop Uy
and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7, 1979, we both confirmed that the same was voluntary and freely
made by all of us and therefore the sale was absolutely valid and enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in
this case are concerned;" (Underscoring supplied)
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit, Napoleon and Rosa also alleged:
"That we are surprised that our names are included in this case since we do not have any intention to file a
case against Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect and acknowledge the
validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale dated July 7, 1979;"
(Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the foregoing statements constituted ratification of the settlement of the estate and the subsequent
sale, thus, purging all the defects existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of
Rosas 1/16 share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect
to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.

Oropesa vs Oropesa
G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012, NILO OROPESA, Petitioner, vs. CIRILO
OROPESA, Respondent.

NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO OROPESA

(G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012)
OROPESA VS OROPESAPetitioner: Nilo Oropesa (son)Respondent: Cirilo Oropesa (father)
Facts:T h i s i s a p e t i t i o n f o r r e v i e w ( R u l e 4 5 ) , C A a f f i r m e d t h e o r d e r b y R T C
P a r a n a q u e dismissed Nilos petition for guardianship over the properties of his father (widower).Nilo alleged that his
father was:- afflicted with several maladies and has been sickly for over 10 years already havingsuffered a
stroke in 2003- that his judgment and memory were impaired and such has been evident after
hishospitalization.- that even before his stroke, he was observed to have had lapses on memory
and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property.- due to his age and medical condition, he cannot
w/out outside aid, manage his propertywisely and become an easy prey for deceit and exploitation by
people around him,particularly his GF (Luisa Agamata).RT C : n i l o f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e s u f f i c i e n t
e v i d e n c e t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t G e n . O r o p e s a i s incompetent to run his personal affairs and to
administer his properties, Gens demurrer to evidence is granted, and the case is dismissed.
Issue: WON respondent is considered an incompetent person as defined under Sec 2,rule 92 of the ROC who
shld be placed under guardianship.
Ruling:The petition is without merit.Sec 2: Incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who arehospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write,
thosewho are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not beingof unsound
mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,c a n n o t w i t h o u t o u t s i d e
a i d , t a k e c a r e o f t h e m s e l v e s a n d m a n a g e t h e i r p r o p e r t y, becoming an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation.Finding that a person is incompetent shld b anchored on clear, positive and
definitee v i d e n c e . N i l o l a c k s m a t e r i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t h i s c l a i m s t h a t
h i s f a t h e r i s incompetent due to his alleged deteriorating medical and metal condition.
The onlymedical document presented report of neuropsychological screening proves that he isindeed
competent to run his personal affairs.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, we laid out the nature and purpose of guardianship in
the following wise:
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called a
"guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing
his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the wards well-being, not that of the
guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards property, as well as to render any assistance that
the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody involves immediate care
and control, guardianship indicates not only those responsibilities, but those of one in loco
parentis as well.
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may appoint a qualified guardian if the
prospective ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though
of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are
incapable of taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid are
considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The full
text of the said provision reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes

persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf
and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they
have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak
mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage
their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be
anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence." We consider that evidentiary
standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his
fathers incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister
(who were claiming interest in their fathers real and personal properties) and their
fathers former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These
testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to
convince the trial court of petitioners cause of action and instead lead it to grant the
demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioners procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer
of evidence, his documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over
real properties registered in his, his fathers and his sisters names as co-owners, tax
declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned
properties, which do not in any way relate to his fathers alleged incapacity to make
decisions for himself. The only medical document on record is the aforementioned
"Report of Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to the petition for
guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any
event, the said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the
report had negative findings regarding memory lapses on the part of respondent, it also
contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was indeed
competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed
ward was at issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at
issue, expert opinion is not necessary and that the observations of the trial judge
coupled with evidence establishing the persons state of mental sanity will suffice."
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration on the trial courts unfavorable September 27,
2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that petitioners own documentary
evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own
observation of respondents physical and mental state, to wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that
Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to
manage his own affairs. On the contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a
Neuropsychological Screening Report which states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on
the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is capable of mental
calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report concludes
that Gen. Oropesa possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired
abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that
oppositor is still sharp, alert and able.

Abad vs Biazon
Termination of Guardianship
EDUARDO T. ABAD vs. LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO
(G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012)
EDUARDO T. ABAD, Petitioner, vs. LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191993 December 5, 2012
J. Reyes
Facts:
Eduardo Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of
Maura B. Abad on March 19, 2007. He averred that Maura, who is single, more than
ninety years old and a resident of Rizal Street, Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in
dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. On June 14,
2007, Leonardo Biason filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition
alleging he was a nephew of Maura who was not notified of the pendency of the petition
for the appointment of the latters guardian. He vehemently opposed the appointment of
Eduardo as Mauras guardian because he cannot perform his duties when he resides in
Quezon City and Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. He further
prayed that he be appointed as Mauras guardian, since he was previously granted by
the latter with a power of attorney to manage her properties. Leonardo died during the
pendency of the petition so Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion prayed that the
petition be dismissed and the guardianship be terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the guardianship is terminated due to Leonardo Biasons death.
Ruling:
The court finds Mauras motion meritorious.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical
use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner
would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
In his petition, Eduardo Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision dated
August 28, 2009 and Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which dismissed his appeal from
the Decision dated September 26, 2007 of the RTC and denied his motion for
reconsideration, respectively. Basically, he was challenging Leonardo Biasons
qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC appointed him as guardian for Maura
B. Abad. However, with Leonardo Biasons demise, it has become impractical and futile
to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the
relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the
guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into
the propriety of Leonardo Biasons appointment since the juridical tie between him and
Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not
afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief.
Moreover, Eduardo, in his Comment, shared Mauras belief that the petition has
lost its purpose and even consented to Mauras prayer for the dismissal of the petition.

D. Trustees R 98
Land Bank of the Philippines vs Perez
Estafa; misappropriation;Trust Receipts Law. In order that the respondents may be validly prosecuted for
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation with Section 13 of the
Trust Receipts Law, the following elements must be established: (a) they received the subject goods in
trust or under the obligation to sell the same and to remit the proceeds thereof to [the trustor], or to return
the goods if not sold; (b) they misappropriated or converted the goods and/or the proceeds of the sale; (c)
they performed such acts with abuse of confidence to the damage and prejudice of the entrustor; and (d)
demand was made on them by [the trustor] for the remittance of the proceeds or the return of the unsold
goods. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lamberto C. Perez, et al., G.R. No. 166884, June 13, 2012.

E. Adoption and Custody of Minors

Castro vs Gregorio

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A.

"MARIA SOCORRO M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO,"
Petitioners,
v.
JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA GREGORIO,
Respondents
.
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
What will happen if there will be no strict enforcement of the law?
FACTS:
Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose) and Rosario Mata Castro (Rosario) were married unfortunately, their marriage
had allegedly been troubled, they begot a child Rose Marie, born on 1963, but succumbed to congenital
heart disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of
the incompatibilities between them. Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave
birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for about a year even if she
lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila during weekends.
Afterwards, they separated permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose
had homosexual tendencies
. She insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen (15) years despite their separation."
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition for adoption before the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos
Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jose Maria Jed Lemuel Gregorio (Jd) and Ana Maria Regina
Gregorio (Regina) were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth), whom
Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper. During this time Jose was already 70 years old.
Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family, being one of the three children of former Governor
Mauricio Castro. He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte, according to the Home
Study Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the trial court. The report also mentioned that he
was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not produce any children. It also stated that he met and
fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on August 1987,
and Regina on March 1989. Under "Motivation for Adoption," the social welfare officer noted: Since, he
has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not able to fulfill his dreams to parent a
child. However, with the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his
intention to legalize their relationship and surname. . . .
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily in Batac, Ilocos
Norte. The children have allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth's death in July 1995.
On October 16, 2000,
the trial court approved the adoption
, having ruled that
"no opposition had been received by this Court from any person including the government which was
represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General.
A certificate of finality was issued on February 9, 2006.
Rosario filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. She
alleged that Jose had been remiss in providing support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36 years.
She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while

Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry)
, and even went to the
extent of adopting Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne's knowledge and consent.
She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his
illegitimate children with Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with Larry.
Jose denies being remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He alleged that he always
offered help, but it was often declined.
He also alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina because they are his illegitimate children.
He denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by Rosario. He also stated that he had
suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been diminished
because several properties had to be sold to pay for medical treatments. He then implored the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice and equity."
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte.
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the
trial court approving Jed and Regina's adoption. In their petition,
Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption sometime in 2005.
They allege that Rosario's affidavit of consent was
fraudulent.
They also allege that Jed and Regina's birth certificates showed different sets of information, such as the
age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They argue that one set of birth certificates states
the father to be Jose and in another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the father to be
Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover. It was further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually
Jose's illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time
of their birth.
The CA denied their petition. Yes, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and Joanne of the
adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "
no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . . should be
personally notified of the hearing.
" The appellate court "abhorred the mind baffling scheme employed by Jose in obtaining an adoption
decree in favor of his illegitimate children to the prejudice of the interests of his legitimate heirs" but
stated that its hands were bound by the trial court decision that had already attained "finality and
immutability."
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of
birth certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was,
therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud was also
perpetrated during the trial and could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for
annulment of judgment. ISSUE:
Whether or not the adoption is Null and Void pursuant to the requirements laid down by the law. HELD:
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.

Petitioners are correct in arguing that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the
adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings. It is settled that "the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action." As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No. 8552 which
applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires that the
adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the
consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of his
wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock: ARTICLE III ELIGIBILITY SEC. 7.
Who May Adopt.

The following may adopt:

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases
: (i)
if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or (ii)
if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other
spouse has signified, his/her consent thereto
; or (iii)
if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . ( Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and
the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is
but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt
his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However,
the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married
despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first
signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His
submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance of the
requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have
had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her consent was not obtained,
Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they are 10 years old or older. In
Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552: SEC. 9.
Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption.

After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the
adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required: (c)
The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if
any
; ( Emphasis supplied)

The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective
siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to share their parent's love
and care, as well as their future legitimes, with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old at
the time of the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be
valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and Rosario were
childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was
never obtained, the adoption was not valid. For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required
by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all
legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on
constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights. Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne
of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE
, the petition is GRANTED
. The decision dated October 16, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in
SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID.
CASE DOCTRINE: THE RULES ON ADOPTION MUST BE
STRICTLY FOLLOWED FOR IT CAN E N D A N G E R T H E
HARMONY IN THE FAMILY WHICH THE LAW NOT JUST
P R O T E C T S B U T A L S O P R E S E RVE S . VI O L ATOR S AR E WI L L
B E P U N I S H E D A C C O R D I N G L Y.
Cang vs Court of Appeals
Title:
Herbert Cang (petitioner) v. Court of Appeal and Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano
(respondents)
Court:
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Date:
25 September 1998
CRC Provisions:
Article 3: Best interests of the child
Article 5: Parental guidance and the childs evolving capacities
Article 9: Separation from parents
Article 10: Family reunification
Article 14: Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
Domestic Provisions:
Article 188, Family Code: The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (1)
The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over; (2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal
guardian, or the proper government instrumentality; (3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of

age or over, of the adopting parent or parents; (4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the
adopting parents, if living with said parent and the latters spouse, if any; and (5) The spouse, if any, of
the person adopting or to be adopted.
Rule 99, Rules of Court: There shall be filed with the petition a written consent to the adoption signed by
the child, if fourteen years of age or over and not incompetent, and by the childs spouse, if any, and by
each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the
child, or if there are no such parents by the general guardian or guardian ad litem of the child, or if the
child is in the custody of an orphan asylum, childrens home, or benevolent society or person, by the
proper officer or officers of such asylum, home, or society, or by such persons; but if the child is
illegitimate and has not been recognized, the consent of its father to the adoption shall not be required.
Case Summary:
Background:
Mr Cang and Ms Anna Marie Clavano had three children and, following their separation, Anna Marie was
awarded custody of the children and alimony by a Court in the Philippines. Mr Ceng moved to the United
States, where he obtained a legal divorce in the state of Nevada. The divorce order from Nevada granted
sole custody of the children to Anna Marie and visitation rights to Mr Cang and he continued to pay
alimony to Anna Marie and his children. A few years later, the respondents Ronald and Maria Clavano,
respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed proceedings for the adoption of the three
children, with the consent of one of the children who was then 14 years old, as well as the consent of
Anna Marie, who alleged that the petitioner had abandoned his children and forfeited his parental rights.
Anna Marie submitted that the respondents have been assisting with the care of the children and will be
ideal adoptive parents in her absence as she plans to move to the United States.
Upon learning of the application for adoption, the petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and
filed an opposition to the adoption. However, the trial court approved the adoption application based on
the good standing of Ronald and Maria Clavano and observed that Mr Cang is morally unfit, financially
inadequate and had taken citizenship abroad. Mr Cang appealed to the Court of Appeal and asserted that
the petition for adoption was defective because, inter alia, he had never abandoned his children and did
not provide his written consent to the adoption and the children did not properly give their written
consent. The Court of Appeal agreed with and upheld the trial court's decision approving the adoption.
The current case is Mr Cangs appeal to the court of last instance - the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
Issue and resolution:
Parental consent to adoption. The Supreme Court held that written consent by the natural parent was
required and reversed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeal.
Court reasoning:
The Court explained that, although the law states that the written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption, this requirement can be dispensed with in cases
where the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate. In the
current case, however, the Supreme Court held that both the trial court and Court of Appeal had failed to
appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether
petitioner had abandoned his children. Mr Cang had provided evidence demonstrating his on-going
relationship with his children which the lower courts had ignored as they relied solely on the conclusion
that the petitioner was not able to meet the welfare and best interests of the children, as he was poorer in
financial status compared to respondents, and did not consider the emotional and psychological wellbeing
of the children and the relationship they had with the petitioner. The Court said that parental rights cannot

be entrusted to a person simply because the person could give the child a larger measure of material
comfort than his natural parent. In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are
mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations, with the welfare of the
child being the paramount consideration. Indeed, it would be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental
authority over his children. Therefore, there should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking into
account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.
Excerpts citing CRC and other relevant human rights instruments:
The case at bar applies the relevant provisions of these recent laws, such as the following policies in the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998:
(a) To ensure that every child remains under the care and custody of his/her parent(s) and be provided
with love, care, understanding and security towards the full and harmonious development of his/her
personality.
(b) In all matters relating to the care, custody and adoption of a child, his/her interest shall be the
paramount consideration in accordance with the tenets set forth in the United Nations (UN) Convention
on the Rights of the Child.
(c) To prevent the child from unnecessary separation from his/her biological parent(s).
Inasmuch as the Philippines is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
the government and its officials are duty bound to comply with its mandates. Of particular relevance to
instant case are the following provisions:
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents . . . to provide, in a manner
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by
the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention.
States Parties shall respect the right of the child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain
personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the
childs best interests.
A child whose parents reside in different States shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis, save in
exceptional circumstances personal relations and direct contacts with both parents . . .
States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents . . . to provide direction to the child in the
exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.
Underlying the policies and precepts in international conventions and the domestic statutes with respect to
children is the overriding principle that all actuations should be in the best interests of the child. This is
not, however, to be implemented in derogation of the primary right of the parent or parents to exercise
parental authority over him. The rights of parents vis--vis that of their children are not antithetical to
each other, as in fact, they must be respected and harmonized to the fullest extent possible.

CRIN Comments:
CRIN believes this decision is consistent with the CRC. According to Article 9 of the Convention, a child
must not be separated from his or her parents without their consent, unless such separation is necessary in
the best interests of the child. Furthermore, Article 21 mandates that, if required, the persons concerned
have given their informed consent to the adoption of a child on the basis of such counselling as may be
necessary. It is, therefore, clear that in considering whether to grant an adoption application, the courts
must ensure that the natural parents of a child have granted their valid consent and this requirement
should not be waived, except in a very limited set of circumstances.
Herbert Cang vs CA
G.R. No. 105308, September 25 1998

FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's
extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a
divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody of the
3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children.
Herbert contest the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA
affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written
consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the
parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to
pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent
of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them.

RULING:
Yes.
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written
consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption
signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or
hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for
the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that
the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment
imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or

refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which
parents owe their children."
In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute
abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion,
is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was
not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his
children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular
communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send
them packages catered to their whims.

Vda de Jacob vs Court of Appeals

Vda. de Jacob v Court of Appeals
312 SCRA 772

PLAINTIFF / PETITIONER: Tomasa Vda. De Jacob

DEFENDANT / RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Pedro Pilapil, and Juan F. Trivino
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
Tomasa Vda. De Jacob, alleged surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob, has been
appointed Special Administratrix of the various estates of her late husband by virtue of a
reconstructed marriage contract between her and the deceased. Defendant Pilapil intervened,
claiming to be the legally adopted son of Alfredo and demanding his share of the deceaseds
estate, being the sole surviving heir. In so doing, Pilapil also questions the validity of the
Tomasa-Alfredo marriage. The trial court declared the reconstructed marriage contract false
while it sustained the defendants claim of being the legally adopted son and sole surviving heir
of Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob. The Court of Appeals ruled in the same manner and affirmed the trial
courts decision. It is from this decision that the petition filed a petition for review before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the marriage between plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Dr.
Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and
(2) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.
HELD:
(1) Yes; (2) No. Petition granted; decision reversed.
RATIO:
(1) a. Alfredo Jacob and Tomasa had lived together as husband and wife for 5 years. Under
Article 76 of the Civil Code, this qualifies the marriage as exceptional and a marriage
license is not deemed necessary. The Civil Code takes precedence over the Family
Code in this case since the marriage in issue occurred before the FC took effect.
Art 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman, who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law or
administer oath. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
b. Evidence regarding the due execution and loss of the marriage contract have been
presented, but these were erroneously excluded by the trial court and the Court of
Appeal:
1. testimony of Adelia Pilapil, a witness to the marriage ceremony
2. testimony of the petitioner herself as a party to the event
3. testimony and affidavit of the officiating priest, Msr. Yllana
Following such rejection, secondary evidence such as photographs of the wedding
ceremony and documentary evidence as to the loss of the marriage certificate were also
unfairly disregarded.
In doing so, the lower courts confused the aforementioned evidence to show due
execution and loss as secondary evidence of the marriage.
(2) The desposition of Judge Jose L. Moya himself, who allegedly granted the petition for
adoption, clearly and positively declares that he could not recall issuing such petition,
and that the signature over his name was not his.
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship, in this case, Pedro Pilapil. Having failed to produce such evidence, the
alleged adoption is concluded to be a sham.
*****

Tomasa Vda. de Jacob vs. CA

(Presumption of Marriage)
Nature of the Case
: This is a Petition for Review assailing the decision of the CA denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration
Facts
:Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob
and wasappointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a
reconstructed Marriage Contract betweenherself and the deceased.Respondent Pedro Pilapil on the other
hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo, purportedly supported byan Order issued by then
Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by
deceasedAlfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.Pedro sought to intervene during the proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of Alfredo, claiming his share of thedeceaseds estate as Alfredo's adopted son and
sole surviving heir. Pedro likewise questioned the validity of the marriagebetween Appellant Tomasa and
his adoptive father Alfredo.Appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized
by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP,Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however
present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that theoriginal document was lost when Msgr.
Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original,Tomasa presented as
secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978. Several irregularities on
thereconstructed Marriage Contract were observed by the court such as: (1) no copy of the Marriage
Contract was sent to the localcivil registrar by the solemnizing officer; (2) a mere thumbmark was
purportedly placed by the late Alfredo Jacob on saidreconstructed marriage contract on 16 September
1975 (date of the marriage), instead of his customary signature as affixed intheir Sworn Affidavit; (3)
inconsistencies in the circumstances and personalities surrounding the lost Marriage Contract
mentionedin the affidavit executed by Msgr. Yllana and in the testimony admitted by the appellant; and
(4) appellant admitted that there wasno record of the purported marriage entered in the book of records in
San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedlysolemnized.Based on the evidence presented, the
trial court ruled for defendant-appellee Pilapil, sustaining his claim as the legallyadopted child and sole
heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and nonexistent.The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court.
Issues
: 1. WON the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was
indeed valid
Held
: Yes. The marriage between appellant and the deceased was valid.
Ratio
: Pilapils claim that the marriage was void due to absence of a marriage license was misplaced. An
affidavit executed by theappellant and the late Dr. Jacob that they lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years exempted them from the marriage license requirement (Article 76
of the Civil Code).Also misplaced was Pilapils argument that the marriage was void because of the
absence of a marriage contract and the absenceof entry of such in the Books of Marriage of the Local
Civil Registrar and in the National Census and Statistics Office. A marriagecontract is the best
evidence of a marriage ceremony. However, the contents of a document may be proven by
competentevidence other than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its
due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be
shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract. In the instantcase, appellant provided
competent evidence to prove that a marriage ceremony was solemnized between her and the late
Dr.Jacob. Such evidence was supplied by appellant Tomasa, witness Adela Pilapil and the solemnizing
officer Msgr. Yllana throughtheir sworn testimonies both in open court and in writing, and through the

photographs taken during the ceremony.The absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books
of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the NationalCensus and
Statistics Office (NCSO) does not invalidate the marriage. It is primary duty of the
solemnizing officer, not the petitioner, to send a copy of the marriage certificate to these offices in
order to be duly recorded.
In the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case
, a man and a woman deporting themselves ashusband and wife are presumed to have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage. As the fact that Dr. Jacob and appellant Tomasa
lived together as husband and wife was not disputed in this case, but was in fact even accepted, it would
follow that thepresumption of marriage was not likewise rebutted.
Republic vs Court of Appeals
**
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents petition did not
implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is
required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil
registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the
case can be had.
Republic vs Court of Appeals
James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita Mabunay, a
Filipino Citizen,who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country.The spouses
jointly filed a petition with the RTC to adopt the minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had
been living withthe couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, aswell as their parents,
gave consent to the adoption. The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition.
Issue
: Can the spouses adopt the minors?
Held
:While James Anthony unquestionably is not permittedto adopt under any of the exceptional cases
enumerated inparagraph (3) of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, canqualify pursuant to
paragraph (3)(a). Lenita may not thus adopta l o n e s i n c e A r t i c l e 1 8 5 r e q u i r e s a j o i n t
a d o p t i o n b y t h e husband and the wife, a condition that must be read along together with
Article 184. Art 185 provides: Art. 185. Husbandand wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases: (1)When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one
spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of theother.A s a m e n d e d b y E x e c u t i v e
O r d e r 9 1 , Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both the
spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses
were of the same nationality.
T h e F a m i l y C o d e h a s r e s o l v e d a n y p o s s i b l e uncertainty. Article
185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except
in only two instances: (1)When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate
child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of theother.It is
in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the C o d e , o n t h e s u b j e c t o f
p a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y , c a n a p t l y fi n d governance. Article 186. In case husband
and wife jointly adoptor one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other,

jointp a r e n t a l a u t h o r i t y s h a l l b e e x e r c i s e d b y t h e s p o u s e s
i n accordance with this Code.

Reyes vs Mauricio
Reyes vs. Mauricio & Mauricio Digest
G.R. No. 175080: November 24, 2010
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES,
ROMAN GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, Petitioners v. LIBRADA F.
MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO, Respondents.
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
Eugenio is the registered owner of a 4,500 square meter parcel of land acquired thru extrajudicial
settlement with his co-heirs. The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of
Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada), now deceased, and her alleged daughter
Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment of contract denominated asKasunduanand between Librada
and Eugenio as parties.
Respondents alleged that Eugenio took advantage of the illiteracy of Librada as she was a tenant of the
father of Eugenio thru a faked notarial instrument. The Provincial Board adjudicator ruled for Librada.
Eugenio lost on appeal to the DARAB and to the CA, thus the current petition
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a tenancy relation between Eugenio and Respondents.
HELD: The petition has no merit.
REMEDIAL LAW: Appeals
In the main, Eugenio insists that no tenancy relationship existed between him and Godofredo.This is a
question of fact beyond the province of this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court in which only questions of law may be raised.Absent any of the obtaining exceptionsto this rule, the
findings of facts of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and especially by the Court of
Appeals, are binding on this Court.
AGRARIAN REFORM: Tenancy relations
A tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a leasehold
contract; or by the sale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of the landholding
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of thePhilippines) likewise provides:
SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. The agricultural
leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a
leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding.In case
the agricultural lessorsells, alienates ortransfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or

transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural
lessor.
DISMISSED.
REYES VS MAURICIO
Filiation; cannot be collaterally attacked. It is settled law that filiation cannot be
collaterallya t t a c k e d . Wel l - k n o w n c i v i l i s t a D r . A r t u r o M . Tol e n t i n o , i n h i s b o o k
C i v i l C o d e o f t h e Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, noted that the aforecited doctrine
is rootedfrom the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:The legitimacy of the
child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue inanother action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directlyimpugning the legitimacy is more
clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) whichprovides: The contest of the legitimacy of a
child by the husband or his heirs must be madeby proper complaint before the competent court; any
contest made in any other way is void.This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and
171 of the code confirm thisview, because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy. This action
can be broughtonly by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.
EugenioR. Reyes, joined by Timothy Joseph M. Reyes, et al. vs. Librada F. Maurico and Leonida
F.Mauricio, G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010The legitimacy and filiation of a child cannot be
contested by way of defense or as collateralissue in another action for a different purpose. They can be
questioned only in a direct actionseasonally filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack.
This is confirmed by Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code which refer to the action to impugn the
legitimacy.The same rule is applied to adoption. It cannot also be assailed collaterally in a proceedingf o r
t h e s et t le me n t o f a d e c e d e nt s e st a t e. Th e l e ga l it y o f a d o p ti o n b y a te st a t ri x
can beassailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be
s u b j e c t t o collateral attack. (Reyes vs. Mauricio, G.R. 175080, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 79).
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M. REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES, ROMAN
GABRIEL M. REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, petitioners,
vs. LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F. MAURICIO, respondents.
November 24, 2010 G.R. No. 175080
FACTS:
1. Eugenio owns a parcel of land in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan (4,527 square meters, more or less, and
covered by a TCT --- property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement
among the heirs following the death of his parents).
2. Librada F. Mauricio (Librada, DECEASED) and her daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida)
filed a complaint before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan alleging that theyre the legal heirs of
Godofredo Mauricio who was the lawful and registered tenant of Eugenio through his
predecessors-in-interest to the subject land( that from 1936 until his death in May 1994,
Godofredo had been working on the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of
fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent improvements; that
through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a
document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the
subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig,
Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate
and the contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue
advantage of the weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in
the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been
employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the subject property).

3. Leonida and Librada prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for
Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject
property.
4. According to Eugenio: Godofredos occupation of the subject premises was based on the formers
mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor
authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a
relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the
contents of the document. Moreover, Librada receivedP50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day
of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since
the principal relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction
is vested on the regular courts.
Provincial Adjudicator Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving
spouse, should have peaceful possession of the land.
DARAB - Mauricios are former tenants of Spouses Reyes.
CA - affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB.
!!! ON APPEAL, Leonidas legal standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio. Eugenio submitted
that the complaint was rendered moot with the death of Librada, Godofredos sole compulsory
heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.
ISSUE: WON Eugenio can question the filiation of Leonida in a case regarding land dispute.
EUGENIO R. REYES, joined by TIMOTHY JOSEPH M.REYES, MA. GRACIA S. REYES,
ROMAN GABRIEL M.REYES, and MA. ANGELA S. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
LIBRADA F. MAURICIO (deceased) and LEONIDA F.MAURICIO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Appeals; In a petition for review under Rule 45,only questions of law may be raised.
In the main, Eugenio insiststhat no tenancy relationship existed between him and Godofredo.This is a
question of fact beyond the province of this Court in apetition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court in whichonly questions of law may be raised. Absent any of the obtainingexceptions to this rule, the
findings of facts of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and especially by the Court of Appeals,
are binding on this Court.
Tenancy Relations; Agrarian Reform Law; AgriculturalTenancy Act; Code of Agrarian Reforms of the
Philippines; Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period.
Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana andGodofredo is void, our conclusion remains. We agree
with the Court
of Appeals that a tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished bymere expiration of term or period in a leasehold
contract; or by thesale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of thelandholding. Section 9 of Republic Act No.
1199 or the AgriculturalTenancy Act provides: x x x Moreover, Section 10 of Republic ActNo. 3844 (Code
of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) likewiseprovides: SEC. 10.
Agricultural Leasehold Relation NotExtinguished by Expiration of Period, etc.
The agriculturalleasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished bymere expiration of the term
or period in a leasehold contract nor bythe sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of thelandholding.
In case the agricultural lessor
sells, alienates or
transfers the legal possession of the landholding, thepurchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to
therights and substituted to the obligations of the agriculturallessor.
Civil Law; Filiation; Filiation cannot be collaterallyattacked.
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterallyattacked. Well-known
civilista
Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his bookCivil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence,noted that the
aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of theCivil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus: The legitimacy of the
child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateralissue in another action for a different purpose. The
necessity of anindependent action directly impugning the legitimacy is moreclearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335)

which provides:The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirsmust be made by proper
complaint before the competent court; anycontest made in any other way is void. This principle applies underour Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,because they refer to the action to impugn the legitimacy.
Thisaction can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and withinthe periods fixed in the present articles.
Same; Adoption; Adoption cannot be made subject to acollateral attack.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that itcannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. In
Reyes v. Sotero
, 482 SCRA 520 (2006), this Court reiterated that adoption cannot beassailed collaterally in a proceeding for the
settlement of adecedents estate. Furthermore, in
Austria v. Reyes
, 31 SCRA 754(1970), the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by thetestatrix can be assailed
only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.

In the Matter of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
PHILIPPINES
Title:
In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia
Court:
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Date:
31 March 2005
CRC Provisions:
General reference (no specific article cited)
Domestic Provisions:
Article 365 of the Civil Code: An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
Article 189 of the Family Code: The adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and
shall have the right to use the surname of the adopters.
Case Summary:
Background:
The petitioner's application to adopt his illegitimate child was granted by the trial court who also ordered
that the child's name be changed to reflect the petitioner's surname. Before the adoption, the child had
been using her natural mother's middle name and surname. The petitioner wanted to change the child's
name such that the child would keep her natural mother's surname as her middle name and the petitioner's
surname as her surname. The trial court denied the petitioner's request as there was no law that allowed an
adopted child to use the surname of the child's biological mother as the child's middle name.

The petitioner appealed and argued that the trial court had erred in its decision. While there is no law
providing that an adopted child can use the natural mother's surname as a middle name, there is no law
prohibiting it either. It is also customary for every Filipino to have the surname of the mother as a middle
name and the use in this instance is customary, not opposed by any interested party or prohibited by any
laws.
The petitioner argued that adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence the
child's right to bear a proper name should not be violated. In addition, permitting the child to use her
mother's surname as her middle name avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Issue and resolution:
Adoption. The Court had to decide whether an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, may
use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. The Court held that it was permissible,
reversed the trial court's decision and granted the petitioner's appeal.
Court reasoning:
The Court held that there is no law expressly prohibiting the child to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name and what is not prohibited by law, is allowed. It is customary for every
Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. While not set out in law
this custom has been recognied during the lawmaking process. In fact, the Family Law Committees had
agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
The Court also said that it is necessary to preserve and maintain the childs relationship with her natural
mother because under the law, she remains an intestate heir of the mother. The underlying intent of
adoption law is in favour of the child and the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a
legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes under the law. Being a legitimate child by
virtue of her adoption by the petitioner, it follows that the child is entitled to all the rights provided by law
to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother.
Adoption law should be interpreted and construed liberally to carry out the beneficial purposes of
adoption with the interests and welfare of the adopted child being the primary and paramount
consideration.
Excerpts citing CRC and other relevant human rights instruments:
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in
general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.
The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed, confirmed
in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by
the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral responsibility,
and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.
CRIN Comments:
CRIN believes this decision is consistent with the CRC. In all matters pertaining to adoption, the best
interests of the child should be a paramount consideration.

Citation:
[2005] PHSC 336 / G.R. No. 148311
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
He prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her
surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to
Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use
the surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should
be maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189
she remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use,
as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate
Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article
365 of the CC merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189
of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption,
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
In Re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia, GR No. 148311
Posted: October 5, 2011 in Case Digests
Tags: Adoption, Illegitimate Child
0
ADOPTION;

ILLEGITIMATE

CHILD

Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga
Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been using her mothers
middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanies middle name be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname
Garcia be changed to Catindig his surname.

The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family Code,
the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to use
the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use
the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Held:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided
by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of
her father and her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
Case Digest: G. R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
In the matter of the adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. Honorato B. Catindig,
petitioner
________________________________________________________________________
Facts: Honorato B. Catindig, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie's middle name be changed to "Garcia," her mother's
surname, and that her surname be changed to "Catindig." the trial court granted the petition for
adoption. Petitioner then filed for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie
should be allowed to use the surname of her biological mother as her middle name. The trial
court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration as there is no law or jurisprudence allowing
an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Issue: Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name
when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling: There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname. The court finds no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.

In Re: Adoption of Michelle & Michael Lim

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor
children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of
DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately,
in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner
decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who
simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and
seven months old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the
adoption executed in an affidavit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.
HELD:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and
wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses
jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that
joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are
certain requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set
forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of
legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Lim
Facts: Spouses Monina P. Lim and Primo Lim were childless. Subsequently, two
minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban. Being so eager to have children of their own, Monina and Primo
registered the children to make it appear that they were the childrens parents. The
children were named Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim. The spouses reared
and cared for the children as if they were their own. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo
died. On 27 December 2000, Monina married Angel Olario, an American citizen.
Monina decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA
8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate
petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was
then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months
old. Michelle and her husband, Michael and Olario gave their consent to the
adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions.
The trial court ruled that since Monina had remarried, she should have filed the
petition jointly with her new husband.
Monina appealed contending that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed
because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest
and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal maxim dura
lex sed lex is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental
authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed,
Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was already 18 years
of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been
emancipated having attained the age of majority.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
2. Whether or not joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the
children have been emancipated having reached the age of majority.
Held:
1. No. The law is explicit. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in the
following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other, which was not present in
the case at bar.
The use of the word shall means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife
is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over
the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the
level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly.
The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. Since the petitions for
adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario,
the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section
7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of
her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of
petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each
other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply

being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of
RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with
the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at
least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he
must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the
adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were
shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees
are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or
of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
2. Petitioner's contention is untenable. Parental authority includes caring for and
rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of
their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. The father and the
mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common
children. Even the remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental
authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the children.
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that is, when he
attains the age of majority or 18 years of age emancipation terminates parental
authority over the person and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one
of the effects of legal adoption.
Even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a
legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1)
to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all
the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights.

Case Digest: In Re Petition for Adoption of Lim & Lim

G.R. Nos. 168992-93 : May 21, 2009
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim
Monina Lim, petitioner
Facts: Monina and Primo Lim were married. Two children whose parents were unknown and whose
whereabouts were unknown were brought to them. They reared and took care of the two kids. Primo died
in 1998 but Monina got married to Angel Olario, an American citizen. When the children were brought to
them, they registered them making it appear that they were the natural parents. Monina decided to adopt

the two (2) children by availing of the amnesty under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the
birth of a child, hence, she filed the petition on April 24, 2002. Michelle was 25 years old and already
married at the time of the filing of the petition. Michael was 18 years old. The husband of Michelle gave
his consent to the adoption. The DSWD issued a certification that they were abandoned children. After
trial, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the husband of Monina did not join her in the
petition as required by Section 7(c), Article III, RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. She filed a
Motion for reconsideration as she did not fall under any of the exceptions provided for by the law. (Sec.
7(c), Article III, RA 8552). It likewise ruled that the contention that mere consent of her husband would
suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and
certification of his qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must
comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint
exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of
exercising parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and
assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, she filed a petition with the Supreme Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who
has remarried, can singly adopt.
She contended that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the
State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. She argued that the legal
maxim dura lex sed lex is not applicable to adoption cases. She argued that joint parental authority is
not necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since
they have been emancipated having attained the age of majority. Is the petition proper? Explain.
Held: No. The husband and wife should have jointly filed the petition for adoption. The principle of dura
lex sed lex is applicable as the law is explicit that the husband and wife shall jointly adopt.
The use of the word shall means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. (Rep. v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147,
June 8, 1994, 233 SCRA 9).
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
herself, without joining her husband, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on
this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children
to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband. Second, the children are not
the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and her husband are not legally separated from
each other.
The fact that her husband gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not
suffice. There are certain requirements that her husband must comply being an American citizen. He must
meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has
diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines
for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain

such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country;
and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be
waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of her husband. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children
of petitioner.

Adoption: Husband And Wife Shall Jointly Adopt

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. Nos. 168992-93
May 21, 2009 IN RE: PETITIONS FOR
ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, and MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
Monina, an optometrist and her then husband, Primo were childless. Lucia entrusted
to them two minor children whose parents were unknown. Monina and Primo then
made it appear that they were the childrens parents and named them Michelle and
Michael Jude. The spouses reared the children as of they were their own; they
studied in exclusive schools, and all their records indicate the surname Lim. On
November 28, 1998, Primo died. Monina remarried an American citizen, Angel
Olario, on December 27, 2000. On April 24, 2002, Monina filed a petition for
adoption before the RTC to formalise the adoption of Michelle, then 25 years old,
and Michael 18 years old. Michelle and her husband, Michael, and Angel, Moninas
husband, gave their respective Affidavits of Consent signifying their assent to the
petition for adoption. Both Michelle and Michael were issued Certifications that they
were abandoned children.
The Regional Trial Court, however, dismissed the petition, holding that since Monina
remarried, the petition should have been filed jointly by her and her American
husband, Angel, pursuant to the provisions of Section 7 (c) Article III of Republic Act
8552.
Her motion for reconsideration denied by the RTC, Monina appealed directly to the
Supreme Court, on the sole question of whether, having remarried, she can singly
adopt. She posits that joint adoption is not necessary in this case, both adoptees
having attained legal age thus joint parental authority is not anymore required.
The Supreme Court denied the petition thus:
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner
had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her
husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial courts decision
denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at
least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support
and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and
adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or
is the spouse of the adoptees parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic
of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains
such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified
by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that
he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her
government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for
the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her
spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship
and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt.
Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining
her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section
7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of
her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of
petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply
being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of
RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with
the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at
least three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he
must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the
adopters country as the latters adopted child. None of these qualifications were
shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to
adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are
not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of
Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
xxx
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the
biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter;
and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the
adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the right of the
adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Therefore,
even if emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a
legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights of a legitimate child such as: (1) to
bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive support from their
parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all
the benefits to which biological parents are entitled such as support and
successional rights.
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold
the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are
designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. But, as we
have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the
promotion of the welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should be construed
liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must
also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact
that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate
children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial courts decision
favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified
without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time
however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondentspouses petition for adoption. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should
have jointly filed the petitions with her husband. We cannot make our own
legislation to suit petitioner.

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM and MICHAEL JUDE P.

LIM,
MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93
May 21, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner, together with her first husband, registered Michelle and Michael
making it appear as if they were their parents. Said children were entrusted to them
and their biological parents were unknown. When petitioners first husband died,
she remarried an American citizen. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by
availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated child
birth. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court. Both children were already of legal age during such petition
and gave their consent to the adoption. However, trial court ruled that since
petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her
new husband citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt
HELD:
NO. At the time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
According to Section 7, Article III of RA 8552, the husband and wife shall jointly
adopt except in three instances which were not present in the case at bar. In case
spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the
word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is
in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require
spouses to adopt jointly.
F. HABEAS CORPUS R 102
Ilusorio vs Bildner

Ilusorio vs Bildner
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of
pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was
married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin
Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board
in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio
Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city.
The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which
caused the latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for
guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March
1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that
the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from
returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the
restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint
of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos liberty
that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication
does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions.
With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights
against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the
right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his
wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial
authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried
out by the sheriffs or by any other process.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner

May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in
conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in
conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or

by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.

"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him
to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the day
and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever
the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf."

It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of

which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is
issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising
legal custody over another person.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property
valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and
President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein
petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner
(defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and
board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at
Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5
months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time
their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate.
In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person
and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting
in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.
HELD:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or

by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.
To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be
actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter
was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full
mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation
rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the
right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his
wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial
authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried
out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

Bildner and Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio, et. al.

ERLINDA I. BILDNER and MAXIMO K. ILUSORIO, Petitioners, vs. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO,
RAMON K. ILUSORIO, MARIETTA K. ILUSORIO, SHEREEN K. ILUSORIO, CECILIA A.
BISUA, and ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 157384
June 5, 2009
FACTS:
A complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action against respondent was filed by petitioners for alleged
gross misconduct, among other offenses. Said disbarment case arises from a case presided by Judge
Antonio Reyes where respondent attempted to influence the outcome of the case as can be inferred from
his acts evidenced by the following documents, to wit: (1) the transcript of the stenographic notes of the
May 31, 2000 hearing in the sala of Judge Reyes when the judge made it of record that respondent offered
Atty.Oscar Sevilla P500,000 to be given to Judge Reyes for a favorable decision; (2) the affidavit of
Judge Reyes alleged that respondent, as soon as the case started, visited him about three times in his
office, and made more than a dozen calls to his Manila and Baguio residences, some of which were even
made late evenings; and (3) the affidavit of Atty. Sevilla confirmed that he was approached by the
respondent to convince the judge, his close family friend, to rule in Atty. Singsons favor.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be administratively disciplined or disbarred from the practice of law for
the alleged misconduct in attempting to bribe Judge Antonio Reyes.
RULING:
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judgeor a judge evincing a willingnessto
discuss, in private, a matter related to a case pending in that judges sala cannot be over-emphasized. The

fact that Atty. Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a mutual friend,
Atty. Sevilla, leads us to conclude that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his
clients favor. This conduct is not acceptable in the legal profession. Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins it:
Canon 13. A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends
to influence or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
While the alleged attempted bribery may perhaps not be supported by evidence other than Judge Reyes
statements, there is nevertheless enough proof to hold Atty. Singson liable for unethical behavior of
attempting to influence a judge, itself a transgression of considerable gravity.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner, GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000; 332 SCRA 169
Posted by Pius Morados on April 29, 2012
(Special Proceedings Husband cannot be forced to live with his wife by Habeas Corpus)
Facts: Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband
Potenciano alleging that respondents refused petitioners demands to see and visit her husband.
The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration but denied the petition for
habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.
Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody
of her husband and enforce consortium as the wife.
Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision giving Erlinda visitation rights.
Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in their conjugal
dwelling.
Held: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the
extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continuous
unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedom. It is devised as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restrainment, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right choice may not be the subject of visitation
rights against free choice. The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for
habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot
be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other mesne
process.

Serapio vs Sandiganbayan
SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 396 SCRA 443 (2003)
FACTS:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the
resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a
reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal
Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former President
Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth
Foundation, a non- stock, nonprofit foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the purpose of
providing educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and
students, and support to research and advance studies of young
Muslim educators and scientists.
Petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred
Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson.
Later that year, Singson publicly accused then president Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several
illegal activities, including its operation on the illegal numbers game known as jueteng
which triggered the Ombudsman to file cases of plunder against the former president and others who were
allegedly involved.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner. In the meantime, on April 27,
2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on
May 4, 2001. For his part, petitioners coaccused Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very
Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the
resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an order declaring
that the petition for bail can and should be heard before petitioners arraignment on June 27, 2001 and
even before the other accused filed their respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set
the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioners petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the other
accused during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination.
The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the other
accused to participate in the said bail hearing considering that under Section 8,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the
bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.
The bail hearing did not proceed because petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the
amended Information on the grounds that as against him, the amended Information
does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder;
as against him, the amended Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing

until petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution contended that petitioners
motion to quash the amended Information was antithetical to his petition for bail. He also filed a petition
for Habeas Corpus.
Meanwhile, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion praying that said court resolve
his motion tofix his bail. the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion to quash the
amended Information. The motion to fix bail filed by Jose Jinggoy Estrada was also denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Jose Jinggoy Estrada
filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion
to fix bail.
ISSUES:
1.)Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for
bail may be conducted;
2.)Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the
pendency of his petition for bail;
3.)Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other
accused is mandatory;
4.)Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of
petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged
HELD/RATIO:
1. NO.
The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A
person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by
virtue of his arrest or voluntarysurrender. An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a
petition for bail.
In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash.
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail
should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue
of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before
a complaint or information is filed against him. The
Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case
filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him.
Hence, we explained therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be
to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to
quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to
be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his
right to bail.
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his
application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be
granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a
case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard
even before an accused is arraigned.

Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him
is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in
such a situation, bail would be authorized under the circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.
2. YES.
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and his
filing of a motion to quash. Bail is thesecurity given for the release of a person in the custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any
court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to obtain the
provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the
same time securing his appearance at the trial. As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the
moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity
of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for
defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. An accused may file a motion to quash the
Information, as a general rule, before arraignment. These two reliefs have objectives which are not
necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right of an
accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense punishable by such
penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right
to assail the validity of the Information charging him with such offense. It must be conceded, however,
that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the ground that the same does not charge
any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail
of an accused may become moot and academic.
3. NO.
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the
Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by different accused or that
a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case
against the other accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions
for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against
another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the
Sandiganbayan of its discretion. It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the
Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the convenience of the State, including the prosecution,
but also that of the accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and the right of
accused to a speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of the cases and of the
factual and legal issues involving petitioner and the other accused. After all, if this Court may echo the
observation of the United States Supreme Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in his being
afforded our historic individual protections, including those surrounding criminal
prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not become careless or complacent when that fashion has
become rampant over the earth.
4. NO.
Petitioners claim that the prosecution had refused to present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of
his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the
records. The prosecution did not waive, expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in
opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be

noted that the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for petitioners application for bail
but the same were reset due to pending incidents raised in several motions filed
by the parties, which incidents had to be resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing
was eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not push through
due to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001. The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioners
application for bail is therefore not imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution.
Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is evident from the following list of motions filed by him and
by the prosecution.
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge.
This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted
to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since
evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that
a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until
the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even
then, there must first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong before he may be
granted bail.

SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

396 SCRA 443
Facts:
Petitioner Edward Serapio was a member of the Board of Trustees and the
legal counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation. Sometime 2000, petitioner
received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Php 200M through Chavit
Singson. Petitioner received the donation worth the Foundations account. In 2000,
Chavit Singson publicly accused President Estrada and his family members and
friends of engaging in several illegal activities which triggered the filing with the
Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the petitioner, Joseph
Estrada and his son.
On April 4, 2001, Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan Informations
against the former president, one of which, for plunder. No bail was recommended
for the provisional release of all the accused including the petitioner. The case was
raffled to a special division which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court.
On 25 April 2001, Sandiganbayan issued a resolution finding probable cause to
justify the issuance of warrants of arrest for the accused. Arraignment was set on
27 January 2001. In the meantime, petitioner filed with Sandiganbayan an Urgent
Petition for bail, which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001. Petitioners co-accused
Jinggoy Estrada filed a motion alleging that he was entitle to bail as a matter of
right.

During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the
prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than
the June 27 schedule. However, Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the
prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should
be heard BEFORE petitioners arraignment on 27 June. On June 1, Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the other
accused during the hearing on the petitioner for bail considering that under Section
8, Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence adduced during the
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.
The people insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be
commenced because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined. The
people further stress the it is only when an accused pleads not guilty may he filed a
petition for bail and if he pleads guilty, then there would be no need for him to file
said petition. It is also the contention of the people that it is only during
arraignment that the accused is informed of the precise charge against him. He
must then be arraign first prior to bail hearings to prevent him from late on assailing
the validity of the bail hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed of
the charge considering that under section 8 of Rule 114, evidence presented during
bail hearings are reproduce in the trial. Arraignment before bail hearings also
diminished the possibility of accuseds flight since trial in absentia may be had only
if an accused escapes after he has been arraigned.
However, the bail hearing again did not proceed because the petitioner filed
with the information a motion to quash the amended information on the grounds
that as against him, the amended information does not allege a combination of
series of over or criminal acts constitutive of plunder. According to the prosecution,
the motion to quash the amended information was antithetical to his petition for
bail.
Petitioner also prays for the issuance of habeas corpus.
Issues:
(a)

W/N petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his

petition for bail may be conducted.

(b)

W/N petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended

Information during the pendency of his petition for bail.

(c)

W/N a joint hearing of petition for bail for all the accused is
mandatory

(d)

W/N petitioner should instead be released through a writ of habeas

corpus.

Ruling:

(a)
Although the petitioner was already arraigned, no plea has yet been entered
thereby rendering the issue of whether an arraignment is necessary before the
conduct of bail hearings in the petitioners case moot. Nonetheless, the court held
that arraignment of an accused is not a pre-requisite to the conduct of hearings on
his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived
of his of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.
In Lavides vs. CA, the court ruled that in cases where it is authorized, bail
should be granted before arraignment otherwise the accused may be precluded
from filing a motion to quash. However, this pronouncement should not be taken to
mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment,
because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of liberty even
before a complaint or information is filed against him. The case of Lavides must be
understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail
as well as a motion to quash. Hence, in that case, the court held that to condition
the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he had to choose between filing a motion to quash and thus delay
his petition for bail and forgoing the filing of the motion to quash so that he can be
arraign at once ad therefore be released on bail. Such would undermine the
constitutional right of the accused.
When a bail is matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail
even prior to arraignment. The Lavides case also implies that an application for bail
in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also
be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Sandiganbayan therefore committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.
(b) Court dins no inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for
bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail, is the security given for the release of
the person in custody of the law. A motion to quash on the other hand is a mode by
which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint filed against him for
insufficiency on its fact in posit of law. These tow relied have objectives which are
not necessarily antithetical to each other. However, it is true that if a motion to
quash a criminal complaint or information on the ground that the same does not
charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered
released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic.
(c) Petitioner argues that a joint bail hearing would negate his right to have his
petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearing might be
converted into a full blown trial. Prosecution on the other hand claims that joint
hearings will save the court form having to hear the same witnesses and the parties
from presenting the same evidences. There is no provision in the Rules of Court
governing the hearings of two or more petitioner for bail filed by different accused
or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the
case against the other accused. The matter should be addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. In the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan
must take into account not only the convenience of the state, including the
prosecution but also that of the petitioner and the witnesses.

In the case of Ocampo vs. Bernabe, the court ruled that in a petition or bail
hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief and
speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable
and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is early to determine the
weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter
into the inquiry as to the weight that ought to be given to the evidence against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters. In the case at bar, the case
against former President Estrada is an entirely different matter. For, with the
participation of the former president in the hearing of petitioners petition for bail,
the proceeding assumes completely different dimension. The proceeding will no
longer be summary since the proceedings will be full blown which is antithetical to
the nature of a bail hearing. The joinder of the petitioners bail will be prejudicial to
the petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of the right of
petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from his court. The
Sandiganbayn again committed a grave abuse of discretion in ordering a
simultaneous hearing of petitioners petition for bail with the trial of the case
against former president.

(d)
In the case at bar, bail is not matter of rights since the accused is charged
with a capital offense, but discretionary upon the court. Under Section 8 of rule
114, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against a person charged
with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him bail., thus, upon an
application for bail, by the person charged with a capital offense, a hearing must be
conducted where the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt against an accused is strong. When the evidence of guilt is strong, bail
becomes a matter of right, which is not so in the case at bar.
In exceptional cases, habeas corpus may be granted ny the courts even when
the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary
surrender. The writ may be issued where the deprivation of liberty while initially
valid under the lad had not later become invalid. However, there is no basis fir the
issuance of the writ in the case at bar. The general rule is that the writ does not lie
where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issued the same applied,
because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest. Petitioner in
fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities.

Lacson vs Perez
Lacson Vs. Perez
357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780
May 10, 2001
Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on
May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the

rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the
rebellion were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and
habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless
arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate
court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist arraignment and trial until
this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are allegedly faced with impending
warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against
them.
Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold
departure orders allegedly effected by the same.
Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006,
accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have
declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants
of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the
warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for mandamus and
prohibition is improper at this time because an individual warrantlessly arrested has adequate
remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested
person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for
such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal ground,
the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject
hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near
future. To declare the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper
proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief regarding their alleged
impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints have been filed against
them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to
relieve unlawful restraint which Petitioners are not subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking earlier
adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf,
are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for all acts
committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.

Sangca vs City Prosecutor of Cebu

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of

involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. The singular
function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical
liberty. (Sangca v. The City Prosecutor of Cebu, et al., G.R. No. 175864, June 28, 2007; citing In
Re: Arguelles, Jr. v. Balajadia, Jr., G.R. No. 167211, March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA 653, 657).
Mangila vs Pangilinan
The Case:
Anita Mangila and four other persons were charged with syndicated estafa as well as violations of
Republic Act 8042 with respect to the recruiting and promising of overseas employment to several
complainants, before the Presiding Judge, Heriberto Pangilinan, of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) in Puerto Princesa City. After conducting a preliminary examination of one of the complainants,
the judge ordered the arrest of Mangila and others without bail, and the records transmitted to the City
Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa for further proceedings in accordance with law. As a consequence, Mangila
was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at the NBI headquarters in Manila. Averring that Judge
Pangilinan had no authority to conduct preliminary investigation, and the issuance of the warrant was
without any justification or probable cause, Mangila filed a petition for habeas corpus. She argues that
habeas corpus is available to her as she had no adequate remedy in law since the records of the case were
already forwarded to the Office of the City Prosecutor who had no authority to recall the warrant of
arrest. The CA denied the petition for habeas corpus, holding that if the petitioner believes she is being
restrained on an invalid warrant of arrest, the remedy is not habeas corpus but a motion to quash the
warrant or reinvestigation by the municipal judge or city or provincial prosecutor. In this case, she could
have filed with the Provincial Prosecutor a motion to be released from detention on the grounds raised in
the petition. Anita appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Issue:
Whether or not habeas corpus is available to Anita.
The Ruling:
The petition for review lacks merit.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint. In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,1 the Court discoursed on the nature of
the special proceeding of habeas corpus in the following manner:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil
proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into
the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and
the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to
arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus,
he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial courts
function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to
investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits.

The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings
and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where
the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional
circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly
course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where
exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be
issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the
questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that
constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has
also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do
not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases,
the restraint is not illegal.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole
purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his
detention may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the
prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful
authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the
petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to
deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is
entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a palladium of liberty, is a prerogative writ which does
not issue as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It is, however, a writ of
right on proper formalities being made by proof. Resort to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of
which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate
purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint.The primary, if not the only object of the writ of
habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is held 2.
(Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
The object of the writ of habeas corpusis to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention
is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ
will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record.3
There is no question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and her cohorts on
June 16, 2003, Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct
preliminary investigations involving all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. His authority was expressly provided in Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. The following may conduct
preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the
proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)
Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the investigating judge could
issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion should
he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing
the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.In the context of this
rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA
properly denied Mangilas petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by
virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the
legal authority to do so.
It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and MTCC judges to conduct
preliminary investigations was removed only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26SC.
With Mangilas arrestand ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge
Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on
her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be
inquired into through habeas corpus. To quote the dictum enunciated by Justice Malcolm in Quintos v.
Director of Prisons:4
The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and
determined by a court of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under lawful authority. The
function of habeas corpus, where the party who has appealed to its aid is in custody under process,
does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by which it was issued and the
validity of the process upon its face. It is not a writ of error. xxx (Bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly states:
Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws supposedly committed by Judge Pangilinan in her attempt to
convince the Court on her entitlement to the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. She insists that the
illegality and invalidity of the warrant of arrest because of its having been issued without an exhaustive

examination of the complainants and the witnesses in writing and under oath; without a prior finding of
probable cause; and without consideration of the necessity for its issuance in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice were enough reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus.5
Mangila fails to persuade.
To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after examining Palayon, one of the
complainants against Mangila and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge, considered Palayons
evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against her and her cohorts, which finding the Court
justifiably presumes from his act of referring the case and its records to the Office of the City Prosecutor
on the day immediately following the preliminary investigation he conducted, her petition for habeas
corpus could not be the proper remedy by which she could assail the adequacy of the adverse finding.
Even granting that there was a failure to adhere to the law or rule, such failure would not be the
equivalent of a violation of her constitutional rights. 6
Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the issuance of the warrant of arrest by hinting
that the investigating judge did not at all consider the necessity of determining the existence of probable
cause for its issuance due to time constraints and in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, for that
consideration was presumed.
And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5,7 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the review by the public
prosecutor who had the power to order the release of the detainee if no probable cause should be
ultimately found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed
irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her
arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct access to the
entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinans transmittal of
them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action.8 We agree with the CA, therefore, that the writ of
habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available remedy.9
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on October 14, 2003 and November
19, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 79745; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
BERSAMIN, J.:

Tujan Militante vs Cada Deapera

As regards Petitionersassertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to state
thatservice of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition,be it under
Rule 102 or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC. A writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhatcomparable
to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of saidwrit, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. (Tujan-Militante v. Cada-Deapera, 28 July2014).

Habeas Corpus: Writ Issued By Regional Trial Courts Enforceable Within Judicial
Region It Is Situated
Raquel filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City against Ma. Hazelina, to compel her to produce before the court her biological
daughter, minor Criselda, and to return to her the custody of the child. In her
petition, she indicated three addresses of Ma. Hazelina: her residence at Novaliches,
Quezon City; one in Kamias, Quezon City, and her office at the Office of the
Ombudsman. The writ was issued but service thereof was unsuccessful, although
the sheriff left copies of the writ. Ma. Hazelina did not attend the hearing. In the
meantime, Ma. Hazelina filed a petition for guardianship over Criselda, which Raquel
opposed due to the pendency of the habeas corpus case. The QC RTC dismissed the
case, hence Raquel filed a case for kidnapping against Ma. Hazelina before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Upon request of Raquel, the Caloocan
RTC issued an alias writ of habeas corpus, which was served on Ma. Hazelina during
the preliminary investigation before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
of the kidnapping case. By way of special appearance, Ma. Hazelina moved for
quashal of the writ, arguing that she was not personally served summons thus the
Caloocan RTC had no jurisdiction over her. The Caloocan RTC denied her omnibus
motion, citing that as the habeas corpus petition is an extra-ordinary remedy,
service of the writ is comparable to service of summons; the same need not be
served at her address but anywhere she may be found as log as the same was
served upon her by an authorised person, in this case the sheriff.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, her appeal was again denied. According to the
CA, jurisdiction was properly laid in the petition. Likewise, appellate court ruled that
service of summons is not required under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,
otherwise known as the Rules on Custody of Minors and Habeas Corpus in Relation
to Custody of Minors. According to the CA, the rules on summons contemplated in
ordinary civil actions have no place in petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, it being a special proceeding. Thus, Ma. Hazelina appealed to the Supreme
Court, arguing in the main that the Caloocan RTC had no jurisdiction in the habeas
corpus case, and the writ issued by the Caloocan RTC cannot be enforced in Quezon
City.
The Supreme Court:
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court. As provided:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ of
habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The
writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the
presiding judge of the Family Court, provided, however, that the regular court shall
refer the case to the Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where
there are no Family Courts.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the
judicial region where they belong.

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with
any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular
court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits.
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The
appellate court, or the member thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of
the decision. (emphasis added)
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court or pursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, may therefore
be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement
thereof is sought.
On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, finds relevance. Said provision, which
contains the enumeration of judicial regions in the country,states:
Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. There are hereby created thirteen
Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the following judicial regions:
xxxx
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila, Quezon,
Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San
Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, and
Valenzuela.(emphasis ours)
In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities
enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within the
National Capital Judicial Region, as here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan
City. Since Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region,
the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in Quezon City.
Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the
above rule.
Anent petitioners insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04SC, a plain reading of said provision reveals that the provision invoked only applies
to petitions for custody of minors, and not to habeas corpus petitions. Thus:
Section 3. Where to file petition. The petition for custody of minors shall be filed
with the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner resides or where
the minor may be found.(emphasis added)
Lastly, as regards petitioners assertion that the summons was improperly served,
suffice it to state that service of summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas
corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.
As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable
to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.

THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 210636, July 28, 2014, MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE
IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA M. CADA, PETITIONER, VS. RAQUEL M. CADADEAPERA, RESPONDENT.

Republic vs Uy
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, G.R. No. 198010,
August 12, 2013
Remedial Law; Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. It is clear from the foregoing
discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence
of which might be detrimental and far reaching.
Service of summons as a requisite of due process. The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a
newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature
of the proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the
Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the
petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of
vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY

G.R. No. 198010

August 12, 2013

FACTS:
Respondent alleged that:
She was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera
Lugsanay.
Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is
allegedly known to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay."
Her school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine
Certificate, and passport bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay."
She is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she had
to follow the surname of her mother.

She is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname
Lugsanay and are all Filipinos.

The RTC set the case for hearing. The order was published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks. The (OSG) and the City Prosecutors Office was furnished with the copy of
the petition and court order for their information and guidance.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent. OSG assailed the decision
for failure to implead indispensable parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents compliance to publication and notice requirement under
S4R108 cured the defect of failure to implead indispensable parties?

RULING:
No. RTC/CA Decisions nullified.
If the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial
as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature.
However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied
as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as
respondent in the petition.
The respondent seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate"
to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have
impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the
persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to
make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and
notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A
reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two
sets of notices to different potential oppositors: (1) The persons named in the petition; and (2)
other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested
or affected parties.

Summons must be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to
comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the
opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
There may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties may be cured:
1 by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in
bringing to court all possible interested parties;
2 where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings;
3 when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested
parties; or
4 When a party is inadvertently left out.

When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe
Rules of Court is mandated.

Minoru Fujiki vs Marinay

G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013, MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA PAZ GALELA
MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
Remedial Law Reminders: Recognition of Foreign Divorce/Marriage Judgment
Fujiki married Maria Paz in 2004. However, his parents objected to his marriage with
Maria Paz so he was not able to bring Maria Paz to Japan when he returned. In 2008,
Maria Paz married another Japanese, Maekara, who was able to bring him to Japan.
There, Fujiki and Maria Paz met again. When she recounted her ordeal to Fujiki, he
helped her secure a judgment from the Family Court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Maria Paz and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. Fjuki then
filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying that: 1) the
Japanese judgment be recognised; 2) the marriage between Maria Paz and Maekara
be declared void for being bigamous; and 3) the Local Civil Registrar be directed to
annotate the Family Court judgement on the marriage certificate of Maria Paz and
Maekara.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of Fujiki. It ruled that based on the
provisions of Sec. 2 on the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, only the husband or
the wife may file the petition, hence Fujiki is not the proper party to file the petition.
Fujiki moved to reconsider. According to him, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10SC) is not applicable to this case, this being a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment. The rule applies only to void or voidable marriages. Rule 108 is the
applicable rule.
The RTC denied his motion for reconsideration. Among others, it justified its ruling
by holding that Fujiki is a stranger to the marriage between Maria Paz and Maekara.
A Rule 108 proceeding is not the proper remedy to nullify a marriage as ruled in the
case of Braza vs City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.
According to the RTC, the nullity of marriage can only be attacked in a direct action,
not thru a collateral attack such as petition for correction of entry.
Fujiki appealed to the Supreme Court on pure question of law. He raised the
following issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and
a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
The Office of the Solicitor General sided with the petitioner.
The Supreme Court:

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy.
xxx
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its
provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the service of summons,
the investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial,the trial and the
judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It
will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues. The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada, this Court explained that
[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation.
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment
is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic
public policy and other mandatory laws.Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that
[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad. This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the
Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises
personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such
citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot
substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final
order against a person creates a presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. Moreover, Section 48
of the Rules of Court states that the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it
can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The
rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully
proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage,
but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended
procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the
Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize
a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse
obtained a divorce decree abroad.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki
can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
xxx
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy.
On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that [a] petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wifeit
refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties
in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution
for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of
crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity
of a bigamous marriage,there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the
husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share
in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.
Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially
declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
xxx
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between
the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo
full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 0211-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage,
without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii
expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2)
whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule
39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties. Upon recognition of the foreign judgment,
this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a
new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise,
there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the
foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
MINORU FUJIKI vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA | G.R. No. 196049 |
June 26, 2013
DOCTRINE: A Petition for Recognition of a Foreign Judgment is not an action to nullify a
marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment
on a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status,
right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Thus, upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction
or cancellation of entry in the civil registry.
FACTS:

Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Marinay in the Philippines on 23 January 2004.
The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Maekara. Marinay and Maekara were married on
15 May 2008 without the first marriage being dissolved. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan.
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara.

She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki and eventually, they were able to reestablish
their relationship.

In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.

Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for the Recognition of Foreign Judgment, praying that: (1)
the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of

Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) immediately dismissed the petition, for gross violation of the
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), that it is only "the husband or the wife," in this
case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not
Fujiki.

Fujiki sought for the reconsideration of the RTCs Order on the ground that A.M. No. 02-1110-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign
judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact," and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong."

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition, arguing that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void.

ISSUES:
1

Does A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC apply to petitions for recognition of foreign judgment? NO

May the husband or wife of a prior marriage file a petition for the recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy YES

Is the petition for the recognition of foreign judgment with a prayer for the correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara? NO

RULING:
The rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is not applicable on Petitions for Recognition
of Foreign Judgment
The Rule on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. The
Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition

is bigamy." To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer
who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as
Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
There is no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.
The husband of prior subsisting marriage has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
The recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment and may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 1, any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located, may file
a petition.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. The prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property
relations arising from it. He is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage
in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives
from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve his most intimate human relation,
but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under

the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the
spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.
A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage
The validity of marriage can be questioned only in a direct action to nullify the marriage. A
petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10SC and other related laws. However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for
Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-1110-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry.
The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event
that establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry.
Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
Case Digest: Fujiki vs. Marinay Digest
G.R. No. 196049 : June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, Petitioner,v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI

MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria
Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines On 23 January 2004. The marriage
did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008
in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to
contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for the Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage. Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court
judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared voidab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of
the Philippines;and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.The RTC
cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation"
of the provisions of the rule. Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the

husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to
declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration.
In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the
petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.The trial court
reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper
venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the
petition for review.The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through
the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed
a Manifestation and Motion.

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs
"pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC be
set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.
The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an
injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in

assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castroand Nil v.
Bayadog which declared that "the validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
directive for them to comment on the petition.Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. Maekara also
denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.On the other hand, Marinay
wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.She would like to maintain her
silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her
and Fujiki.

ISSUES:

HELD: RTC decision is reversed.

REMEDIAL LAW: Proof of foreign judgments relating to the statues of a

marriage where on of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country; AM 0211-SC not applicable to petition for recognition of foreign judgment

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy."

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a

marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by
the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its
provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,the service of
summons,the investigation of the public prosecutor,the setting of pre-trial,the
trialand the judgment of the trial court.This is absurd because it will litigate the case
anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues."The interpretation of the RTC is
tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. InMijares v. Rada,this Court
explained that "if every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits,
the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering
immaterial the previously concluded litigation."

CIVIL LAW: remarriage of a Filipino citizen whose alien spouse divorces

him or her

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido,this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of
Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse"under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of
a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to
trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the

anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the
Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry
under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo which declared that the
Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served."

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a

Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage
on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare
the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or
her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino
spouse will be discriminated the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between
the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous

marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo
full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 0211-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts
have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage,
without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

700 SCRA 69 Civil Law Family Code Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage Who May File
Bigamy
Remedial Law Special Proceedings Rule 108 Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
In January 204, Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese citizen, married Maria Paz Marinay, a Filipino, here in the
Philippines. But in May 2008, Marinay, while her marriage with Fujiki was still subsisting, married
another Japanese citizen (Shinichi Maekara), here in the Philippines. Marinay and Maekara later went to
Japan.
In 2010, Fujiki and Marinay reconciled and decided to resurrect their love affair. Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a Japanese judgment declaring Marinays marriage with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
Said decree was granted in the same year. Fujiki and Marinay later went back home to the Philippines
together.
In 2011, Fujiki went to the RTC of Quezon City and filed a petition entitled Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). He filed the petition under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court (Cancellation Or Correction Of Entries In The Civil Registry). Basically, Fujiki
wanted the following to be done:
(1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles
35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and
(3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that what Fujiki wanted is to have the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared null (hence a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage); that
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, a petition for such may only be filed by the husband or wife or in
this case either Maekara or Marinay only.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC is correct.

HELD: No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable here. Whats applicable is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. As aptly commented by the Solicitor General:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record [a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, [t]he law requires the entry in the civil
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a persons legal
capacity and status x x x. The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on
the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule
108 proceeding.
Thus:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held
that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy.
But how will Fujikis petition in the RTC prosper?
Fujiki needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy
of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
Fujiki may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through
(1) an official publication or
(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has
custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.

People vs Merlinda Olaybar

Collateral attack on registered but fictitious marriages: Republic vs Olaybar
(February 10, 2014)
The recent case of Republic vs Olaybar (GR 189538, February 10, 2014) raises some interesting
questions on the susceptibility of void marriages to a collateral attack.
A brief background:

Last March 15, 2003 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule On Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void
Marriages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages) took effect. Section 2(a) of the Rule states that
[a]petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has been interpreted in the case of Ablaza vs Republic (GR 158298, 11 Aug
2010) and Carlos vs Sandoval(G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008) to apply to all actions for
declaration of nullity of marriage except [t]hose commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and [t]hose filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the
Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003. Although
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC seemingly requires the filing of a direct action only vis-a-vis the declaration of
nullity of Family Code celebrated marriages after March 15, 2003, it has been recognized as a general
rule for all marriages, that a direct action is necessary to nullify marriages, as can be gleaned from the
public policies underlying a direct action. These underlying policies are highlighted by the Supreme Court
in Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 Jun 2013) 2nd div Carpio J, as follows:
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607 SCRA 638] Thus, the validity of
marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action to nullify the marriage. [G.R. No. 181174, 4 December 2009, 607
SCRA 638]
The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
xxx
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related
laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,[FAMILY CODE , Art. 35-67.] support pendente lite of the spouses and children, [quoting Article 49 FAMILY CODE During
the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody
and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they
wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. Cf. R ULES OF COURT , Rule 61]

the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, [quoting Art 50 FAMILY CODE] and the investigation of the
public prosecutor to determine collusion.[quoting Art 48 FAMILY CODE; quoting Section 9 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. [RULES OF COURT, Rule 108, Sec. 1.] In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and the case of Fujiki vs Marinay (GR 196049, 26 Jun 2013) require a
direct action to nullify marriages, there is on the other hand, the pronouncement in Nial vs Bayadog
(G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000) 1 st Div Ynares-Santiago J that a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. The evolution of jurisprudence has been a struggle to strike a balance between the
pronouncement in Nial vs Bayadog that a void marriage can be attacked collaterally and the
underlying public policy considerations of requiring a direct action the case of Olaybar is no exception.

It may also be useful to remember that whenever the nullity of a marriage has been invoked to pray for
affirmative relief or as a defense in a Rule 108 proceeding for correction of an entry in the Civil Register,
that Rule 108 proceeding has previously been consistently and traditionally viewed as a collateral
proceeding and not a direct proceeding to nullify the marriage: see for instance Braza vs City Civil
Registrar of Himaymalan City (GR 181174, 4 Dec 2009) 1st div Carpio Morales J.
A fictitious marriage is one where there is no marriage ceremony as required by Article 3(3) of the Family
Code which requires [a] marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband
and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. Although Article 3(3) is found under
the formal requisites of marriage, a marriage lacking a marriage ceremony also lacks the essential
requisite of [c]onsent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer under Article 2(2) of the
Family Code. Athough it is stated in Article 4 of the Family Code that [t]he absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, fictitious marriages have
sometimes been viewed by jurisprudence differently from void marriages. For instance, in Morigo vs
People (GR 145226, 2004), the Supreme Court said that [t]he mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
Likewise in the recent case of Republic vs Olaybar (G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004), the Supreme
Court stated that for a fictitious marriage, there [is] no marriage to speak of.
If a marriage contract is registered, as the marriage involved in the Olaybar case, Section 23 Rule 132 of
the Rules on Evidence considers its registration as evidence, even against a third person, of the fact
which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter, that is, evidence of the fact of marriage
and of the date of the latter. The presumption that the law gives to the registration of a marriage contract
goes hand in hand with the dissent of Alex Reyes J in People vs Mendoza (G.R. No. L-5877 September
28, 1954) where he stated that it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage was void or not.
That judgment is reserved to the courts, and the need of preventing collusion between the alleged parties
to the marriage. Indeed, if parties to a marriage recorded in the civil register are allowed to falsely claim
in any collateral action (a Rule 108 proceeding being traditionally viewed as a collateral action) that their
marriage was fictitious there being no marriage ceremony, this might open the door to fraud and collusion
between these parties because of the lack of anti-collusion mechanisms that, on the other hand are found
in the rules governing direct actions to nullify marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SCand Article 48 of the
Family Code for instance requires the public prosecutor to determine if collusion exists between the
parties; this requirement is not found in Rule 108). Certainly, the prevention of collusion is an important
consideration even when the marriage is alleged to be fictitious understandably because [m]arriage is
a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation :
Article 1 Family Code.
Given this background, we now turn to the case of Republic vs Olaybar (GR 189538, February 10, 2014)
3rd div Peralta J. The Olaybar case concerned a fictitious but registered marriage what was sought to be
corrected were the entries in the marriage certificate stating that respondent Merlinda Olaybar as wife was
married to Ye Son Sune on June 24, 2002 before Judge Mamerto Califlores at the Office of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice in Cebu City when in truth she did not appear before the
judge. When Merlinda discovered the existence of this marriage certificate when she tried to obtain a
CENOMAR (Certificate of No Marriage) with the NSO, she promptly filed a petition under Rule 108 to
cancel entries referring to her as wife before the RTC of Cebu City. She impleaded the Local Civil

Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case. The Supreme Court
summarized the evidence she submitted in its Decision:
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before
Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly
celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She
completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named
witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension
House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency,
whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. Respondent also
presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that
the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who
appeared was definitely not respondent. Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing
in the marriage contract was forged.
The RTC granted respondent Merlinda Olaybars petition. The Republic through the Solicitor General
directly appealed to the Supreme Court through Rule 45 appeal by certiorari. The Supreme Court
sustained the RTC and denied the Republics appeal.
To digress a bit, the Olaybar case is unique in that it allowed a Rule 108 petition to correct or cancel the
entry in a registered marriage contract on the ground that the marriage was fictitious. Previous Rule 108
proceedings correcting entries in the civil register involving fictitious marriages have been upheld by the
Supreme Court only in relation to references of the fictitious marriages found in other registered
documents such as birth certificates. The cases of Labayo-Rowe vs Republic (G.R. No. L-53417,
December 8, 1988), Republic vs Lim (GR 153883, 13 Jan 2004), Republic vs Benemerito (G.R. No.
146963. March 15, 2004), Albavs CA (G.R. No. 164041. July 29, 2005), Republic vsKho (G.R. No.
170340, June 29, 2007), and Republic vs Coseteng-Magpayo (GR 189476, 2 Feb 2011) illustrate this. For
instance in Republic vsKho (G.R. No. 170340, June 29, 2007), the Supreme Court allowed the correction
of the entry of the birth certificates of Carlito I. Kho and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy
Moira because the entry under Date of marriage of parents shows that their parents (Juan Kho and
Epifania Inchoco) were married when in truth they were never factually married; the Supreme Court
also allowed the correction of entry of the birth certificates of Carlitos children Kevin and Kelly Dogmoc
Kho because his childrens birth certificates shows that Carlito and his wife were married on April 27,
1989 but they were not factually married at this time and were only married on January 21, 2000.
Back to the Olaybar case. The Supreme Court in sustaining the RTC and dismissing the Republics appeal
held that:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality
of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation
of Republic v. Valencia[225 Phil. 408 (1986).] in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that even substantial errors
in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established
and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding. [Barco
v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 39, 58 (2004).]
An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has

been thoroughly weighed and considered.[Republic of the Philippines v. Lim, 464 Phil. 151, 157 (2004); Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City, 431 Phil. 612, 619 (2002).]

xxx
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed
that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor
General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to
participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner,
testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence
presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was
different from respondents signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.
The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage certificate was
not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such
marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela
Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the National Statistics Office[G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013]that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related
laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A
direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.
Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was
not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the
only evidence of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule
108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before
the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of
respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted
and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife
portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to
speak of.

From the Decision in the Olaybar case, we may be tempted to see the case as having lowered the bar
when a collateral attack (a Rule 108 proceeding not being a direct proceeding) against a registered
marriage can be done. In dismissing the Republics appeal, the Supreme Court seemed to have classified
the petition which respondent Olaybar filed not as a direct action when it stated that [r]espondent indeed
sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did
not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.. If the bar were indeed
lowered, then we may be tempted to conclude that a collateral attack is permissible even if there is a
registered marriage contract, so long as the marriage is fictitious.
However, the Olaybar case cannot be interpreted as having conclusively lowered the bar of collateral
attack for the following reasons: a) the Supreme Court adverted to the ruling in Fujiki (2013) stating the
general rule that [t]o be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. b) the Supreme Court considered full opportunity to present
evidence by all parties when it said that [w]hile we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to
determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the
parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were
followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. These statements
by the Supreme Court might be indicative of a jurisprudential attitude to view the peculiar facts of the
case as a substantial compliance of the requirements of a direct action under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
which is understandable considering that the alleged husband was impleaded, considering that the
Solicitor General (through the Prosecutor) who participated in the proceedings are the same personalities
whose participation is required to prevent collusion between the parties in direct actions to nullify
marriages, and also considering that the action was filed before the RTC Branch 6 of Cebu City which is a
Family Court per AM # 08-11-667-RTC dated 12-16-2008).
It is also hard to sustain a conclusion that Olaybar has lowered the standard to permit a collateral attack
against fictitious but registered marriages. Such a conclusion would also dictate the assumption that there
is no presumption of validity for registered marriages that are alleged to be fictitious. But this assumption
cannot be sustained because the act of registration of the marriage contract itself operates to create a
presumption that the marriage is not fictitious under Section 23 Rule 132 that it was celebrated
between the individuals stated therein. If one argues that the presumption only applies if it is truly the
contracting parties themselves who appeared before the solemnizing officer, then this defeats the purpose
of the anti-collusion provisions found in the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, and it also defeats
the presumption of validity of the registered marriage, since it is precisely the purpose of a direct
proceeding to overcome the presumption of validity in carefully evaluating the allegation that the
registered marriage is fictitious.
G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
VS. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, RESPONDENT.
Rule 108: Cancellation of entry in a marriage certificate

Merlinda wants to marry her boyfriend of five years, so she secured a Certificate of
No Marriage from the NSO. To her dismay, she discovered that she was married to
Korean national Ye Son Sune on June 24, 2002 at the MTCC of Cebu. Thus she filed a
petition for cancellation of entries in the marriage certificate especially the entries
in the wife portion thereof. In support of her petition, she presented herself and
Eufrocina, an employee of the MTCC. Merlina testified that she could not have
entered into a valid marriage with Yo because at the time of the solemnisation of
the marriage, she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor. She did not
know her supposed husband, but knew the witnesses named therein because she
worked in a pension house. She believed that her name was used by a certain
Johnny, who owned a travel agency, when she gave her personal circumstances to
him when she applied for a passport. Eufrocina attested that the marriage was
indeed celebrated inside their office at the MTCC, but claimed that the wife who
appeared was definitely not Merlinda. A document examiner also appeared and
testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.
The Regional Trial Court granted Merlindas petition. The Office of the Solicitor
General moved to reconsider the order, but the same was denied by the RTC, hence,
the OSG elevated the case to the Supreme Court on pure question of law. According
to the OSG, the grant of the petition by the OSG is tantamount to a declaration of
nullity of marriage of Merlinda, which should be done in an adversarial proceeding,
not a Rule 108 petition. The petition filed by Merlinda was therefore an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, in the guise of a Rule 108 petition.
The Supreme Court:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction
of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary.
If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation
of Republic v. Valencia[19] in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under
Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error
availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding. An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings
where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and
where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be

dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion.
However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in
Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition;
it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which
would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar
and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although
the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the
court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as
long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the
civil register.
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims
that her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage
with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was
entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It
must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it
appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the
cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as
parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set
forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was
likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City
Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted
where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage
was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were
also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented,
the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate
was different from respondents signature appearing in some of her government
issued identification cards. The court thus made a categorical conclusion that
respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was
forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such
marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria
Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office that:

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry

cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary
to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of
the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity
or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that
no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only
evidence of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we
maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage,
we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had
been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures
were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and
examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was
no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect
the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction
of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to
speak of.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, G.R. No. 189538, February 10,
2014.
PERALTA, J p:
FACTS:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt
thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June
24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied
having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not
appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not
hers. She filed a Petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage
Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before

Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly
celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She
completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named
witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension
House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency,
whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. Respondent also
presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that
the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who
appeared was definitely not respondent. Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing
in the marriage contract was forged.
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision in favor of respondent and directed the Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract
of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage
contract was not that of respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter's prayer to straighten her
record and rectify the terrible mistake.
ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC correctly apply Rule 108 of the Rules of Court?
2. is the cancellation of all entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract in effect a
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio?
RULING:
1. YES. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true
facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding."
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. It provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where
all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed
and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest
which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any
person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil
register.

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not
the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such
marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be
recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was
married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the
marriage certificate. HTCSDE
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed
that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor
General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to
participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner,
testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence
presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was
different from respondent's signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.
The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent's signature in the marriage certificate was
not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such
marriage was celebrated.
2. NO. The SC maintained that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, the
SC ruled that it cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given
the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the
nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such
marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of
the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any
way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
In Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City,
and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office, the SC ruled that a
"petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of
the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A
direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry."
In this case, however, the SC found that aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was
presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that
no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and
documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage
certificate was a forgery.

PREROGATIVE WRITS

Tapuz vs Del Rosario

Tapuzet. al. vs. Del Rosario (Spouses Sanson)Facts:
The Spouses Sanson filed a complaint before the MCTC of Baruanga-Malay, Aklan for forcible entry
with damagesagainst the Tupazs (Tupaz family and about 120 John Does). The Sansons allege that they
own 1 hectare of land asevidenced by the TCT in their name. That the Tupazes, came in the morning of
April 16, 2006, came in to theproperty armed with bolos and suspected firearms, with force and
intimidation, took possession of the disputedproperty of the Sansons and built a nipa and bamboo structure.The
MCTC ruled in favor of the Sansons, finding that the latter had previous possession of the disputed land
since1993 up to 2006 when the land was taken. The MCTC issued the injunction prayed for. The
petitioners (Tupazes)appealed to the RTC. Upon motion of the Sansons, the RTC granted the issuance of a
preliminary mandatoryinjunction and also issued a writ of demolition against the Tupazes. The MR filed
by the Tupazes was denied.So the Tupazes went to the CA through rule 42, to have the Injunction and
Writ of Demolition reviewed. While inthe CA, the sheriff of Aklan served the Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition to the Tupazes. Thus, the Tupazes camebefore the SC praying for 3 remedies: Certiorari under
Rule 65, the issuance of the writ of Habeas Data and theissuance of the writ of Amparo.
Issue: May a Writ of Amparo be issued for the Tupazes in this case? NoRuling:
The writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings andenforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address theseextraordinary concerns.
What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property orcommercial. Neither is it a writ that
we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.
The writ shall issue if the Court is
preliminarily satisfied with the
prima facie
existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a
threat to orviolation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed.Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the
prima facie
existence of the ultimatefacts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of
terrorism that pose a continuingthreat to the
persons
of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be
purely
property-related
and focused on the disputed land
. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the allegedperpetrators criminally accountable, the
remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution ratherthan on the use of the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of amparo
Apropos is the Courts ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June
17, 2008, 554 SCRA 768:

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats
to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property
or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance
demands requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported
by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
xxxx
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits
that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation
of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed.
Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals,
with the petitioners therein branding as "acts of terrorism" the therein respondents
alleged entry into the disputed land with armed men in tow. The Court therein held:
On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn
is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to
questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at
all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the
extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on
the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats and harassments implied
from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing
of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the
threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or
continuing.

FACTS:
1. The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a complaint for forcible entry and
damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
petitioners and other John Does numbering about 120.

2. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners of the
disputed land; (2) they were the disputed lands prior possessors when the petitioners armed with bolos
and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons entered the disputed land by
force and intimidation, without the private respondents permission and against the objections of the
private respondents security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
3. In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and essentially claimed that: (1) they are
the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the
intruders; and (3) the private respondents certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They
asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
4. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents favor, finding prior
possession through the construction of perimeter fence in 1993.
5. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC.
6. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction upon posting of a bond. The writ authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision was actually issued by respondent Judge del Rosario after the
private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the
issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
7. The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners MR and to Defer Enforcement of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
8. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The respondent Judge nevertheless
issued via a Special Order a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriffs
written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to
effectively take actual possession of the land.
9. The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order
of Demolition in CA.
10. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition. Hence, the present
petition for certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas data.
ISSUE: W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data is proper
HELD:
No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in
substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally
defective with respect to content and substance.
Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify
the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. Based on the same material antecedents, we find too
that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at
the very least, of forum shopping. In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited
formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and
for substantive deficiencies.

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary
rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those
available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ
to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that
every petition for the issuance of the Writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the
property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly
be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to
security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the
presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none
of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of
the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus
rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or
unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition
likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police
authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for
the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not
also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the
fishing expedition that this Court in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data had in mind in
defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order. PETITION DENIED.

Caram vs Segui
G.R. No. 193652, August 05, 2014, INFANT JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, REPRESENTED BY
HIS MOTHER, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. MARIJOY D.
SEGUI, ATTY. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, CELIA C. YANGCO, AND OFFICE
OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENTS.
Ma. Christina and Marcelino had an amorous relationship which made Ma. Christina pregnant. She,
however, did not disclose her pregnancy to Marcelino, as she intends to put up her child for adoption by
the Sun and Moon Home for Children to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation.
When she gave birth to Baby Julian, it was the adoption agency who shouldered her hospital expenses.
Ma. Christina then voluntarily surrendered her child to the DSWD by way of a Deed of a Voluntary
Commitment. The DWSD, on November 27, 2009, issued a certificate declaring Baby Julian as Legally
Available for Adoption. A local matching conference was held where Baby Julian was matched to spouses
Vergel and Filomena.

Meantime, on November 26, 2009, Marcelino died of a heart attack. During the wake, Ma. Christina
narrated that she had a baby with Marcelino and that she gave up the baby for adoption due to financial
distress and embarrassment. Taken aback by the revelation, Marcelinos family vowed to help Ma.
Christina to recover and raise her baby. Thus, on May 5, 2010, Ma. Christina wrote the DWSD asking
that the adoption proceedings be suspended and that she intends to take her baby back and make her
family whole again. Also, Marcelinos brother, Noel sent a letter to the DSWD, informing them that a
DNA testing is scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the UP. The DSWD replied to Noel that they are no longer
in a position to stop the adoption process as the procedures taken to make the baby legally available for
adoption were followed to the letter. Thus, if Ma. Christina wants to take custody of Baby Julian, she
should institute appropriate legal proceedings herself.

Thus, Ma. Christina filed a petition for issuance of a writ of amparo, alleging that DSWD and the other
respondents blackmailed her into surrendering custody of Baby Julian to the DSWD utilising an invalid
certificate of availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that all
legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with.

After several hearings, the Regional Trial Court denied the writ of amparo, hence Ma. Christina elevated
the case to the Supreme Court on pure question of law, the issue being whether or not the writ of amparo
is a proper remedy to recover parental custody of a minor child.
The Supreme Court:
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., this Court held:
[
T]he Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups
or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the
State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v.
Macapagal-Arroyo where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined

only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what
constitutes enforced disappearance, the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements constituting
enforced disappearances as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information
on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her enforced separation from
Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an enforced disappearance within the context of the
Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby
Julians whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWDs May 28, 2010 Memorandum
explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition
before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent
DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August
5, 2010. There is therefore, no enforced disappearance as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the
third and fourth elements are missing.
Christinas directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the
latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the
child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental
authority over the child and contesting custody over him.
Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the
exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a
ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the
unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically
to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that
vitiate the quality of life.
Petition denied.

Vivares et al vs St. Therese College et al

Case Summary and Outcome
The right to privacy is not violated when a third party downloads images from an individuals Facebook
page that are accessible by friends of the individual or by the public at large.

Facts
Minors Nenita Julia V. Daluz and Julienne Vida Suzara, along with several others, took pictures of
themselves in their underwear, smoking cigarettes and drinking hard liquor. A third minor, Angela Tan,
uploaded them onto Facebook. A computer teacher at minors school, Mylene Rheza T. Escuedro,
discovered the pictures. The photos were reported to the Discipline in Charge and the girls were found to
have violated the Student Handbook.
The students were sent to the Principals office where they were chastised and verbally abused. They were
also banned from commencement. Angelas mother filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages asking
that the school be denied from prohibiting the girls from attending commencement. A TRO was granted
allowing the girls to attend graduation and the Plaintiffs filed a writ of habeas data alleging an invasion of
their childrens privacy by the Defendant.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for habeas data because petitioners failed to prove the
existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors right to privacy.

Decision Overview
The primary issue was whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in the case. A writ of habeas data protects
an individuals right against invasion of informational privacy, and a nexus between the right to privacy
and the right to life, liberty or security must be proven.
In this case, the core issue was the right to informational privacy, defined as the right of individuals to
control information about themselves. To what extent should the right to privacy be protected in online
social networks whose sole purpose is sharing information over the web? The petitioners argued that the
privacy settings on Facebook limit who can see what information. This gives users a subjective
expectation of privacy. The Court agreed. However, the Court also ruled that before one can have an
expectation of privacy in her Facebook information, he or she must manifest an intention to keep that
information private by utilizing privacy tools. If someone posts something on Facebook and does not
limit who can see that information, there is no expectation of privacy. The photos in the case at hand were
all viewable by the friends of the girls or by the general public. Therefore, the Court ruled that the
Defendants did not violate the minors privacy rights by viewing and copying the pictures on the
minors Facebook pages.
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014, RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS.
MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners, vs. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE, MYLENE
RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES.

AAA and BBB, students of a high school in Cebu City, and about to go into a beach
party, took digital pictures of themselves in swimsuits, along with several others.
These pictures were then uploaded by CCC on her Facebook profile. Mylene, a
computer teacher at the school, learned that some students of the school posted
pictures of themselves online, showing themselves from the waist up and in
brassieres. Mylene asked her students if they knew the names of the students in the
pictures, who were readily as identified AAA, BBB and CCC, among others. The
students logged onto their Facebook accounts and showed the pictures to Mylene of
the AAA and BBB drinking hard liquor, smoking cigarettes. Upon discovery, Mylene
reported the matter to, and showed the pictures through the Facebook profile of one
of the students to Rose, the schools Discipline-In-Charge. After investigation, the
school was able to identify the students who violated the schools Student
Handbook, such as possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts; smoking and drinking
alcoholic beverages in public places apparel that exposes the underwear; clothing
that advocates unhealthy behaviour; and posing and uploading pictures on the
Internet that entail ample body exposures.
AAA, BBB, and CCC were required to report to the office of the high school principal
and directress; according to the students, while there, they were verbally
castigated, by the school officials. What is more, they were informed that they are
barred from joining the commencement exercises to be held on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, CCCs mother filed a petition for Injunction and Damages
against the school. She prayed that the school be enjoined from implementing the
sanction of the STC. AAAs mother joined in the petition.
The RTC issued a temporary restraining order allowing the students to attend the
graduation ceremony. The school, nevertheless did not allow them to join the
graduation ceremonies, holding that they have a pending motion for reconsideration
of the TRO.
They then filed a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Data for the following
reasons: the photos of the children were merely taken for posterity; the privacy
settings of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at Friends Only, thus they
have a reasonable expectation of privacy; respondents being school officials ought
to know that the girls whose privacy were violated were the victims in this case; the
photos belong to the girls thus cannot be reproduced without their consent. Mylene
violated that right by saving digital copies of the pictures and subsequently showing
it to the school officials; the violation happened at the school premises; and the
data were boldly shown and attached by the respondents in their memorandum in
the civil case.
Preliminarily, the RTC issued a writ of habeas data and ordered the respondent to
file their reply. After issues were joined, however, where the respondents argued
that there can be no violation of the right to privacy as there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy on Facebook, the RTC, dismissed the petition for habeas
data. According to the RTC, the petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual
or threatened violation of the minors right to privacy. Having uploaded the pictures
on Facebook without restrictions on who may view them, the children lost their right
to privacy. Besides, the school gathered the photos for a legal purpose, which is to
impose the schools polices and rules on discipline.

The parents appealed the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 19 of the
Rule.
The Supreme Court ruled the petition without merit:
The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly
recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato Punos speech, The Common Right to
Privacy, where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1)
locational or situational privacy, (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional
privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case is bar is the right to informational
privacy-usually defined as the right of individuals to control information about
themselves.
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data
sharing nowadays, not to mention each systems inherent vulnerability to attacks
and intrusions, there is more reason that every individuals right to control said flow
of information should be protected and that each individual should have at least a
reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding
privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of
OSN users, In this Social Networking Environemnt, privacy is no longer grounded in
reasonable expectations, but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as
wishful thinking
xxx
Facebook connections are established through the process of friending another
user. By sending a friend request, the user invites another to connect their
accounts so that they can view any and all Public and Friends Only posts of the
other. Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are
permitted to view the other users Public or Friends Only posts, amon others.
Friending, therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships
with other users, whereby the user gives his or her Facebook friend access to his
or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images (photos) posted on his or her personal bulletin or wall except for the users
profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
Public-the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
Friends of Friends- only the users Facebook friends and the their friends can view
the photo;
Friends-only users Facebook friends can view the photo;
Custom-the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or network of the
Facebook user; and
Only Me-the digital image can only be viewed can be viewed only by the user.
xxx

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first
necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the
intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialise in
cyberspace through the utilisation of the OSNs privacy tool. In other words,
utilisation of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the users
invocation of his or her right to privacy.
xxx
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their childrens privacy being violated,
insists that Escudero intruded upon their childrens Facebook accounts, downloaded
copies of the pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach
of the minors privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly were under very
private or Only Friends setting safeguarded with a password. Ultimately, they
posit that their childrens disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not
open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their
Facebook friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post
without their knowledge and consent. As petitioners children testified, it was
Angela who uploaded the subject photos which were only viewable by the five of
them, although who are these five do not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit that my students showed me
pictures of girls clad in brassieres. This student of mine informed me that these are
senior high school students of STC, who are their friends in Facebook. x x x They
then said that there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of
these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook
account and accessed from there the various photographs. x x x. They even told me
that there had been times when these photos were public i.e., not confined to their
friends in Facebook.
In this regard, we cannot give much weight to the minors testimonies for one key
reason: failure to question the students act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves
their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any
evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible only to the five
of them, and without their challenging Escuderos claim that the other students
were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus
deserving scant consideration.
xxx
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the
sanctioned students Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task
for the perceive privacy invasion since it was the minors Facebook friends who
showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were
posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it
was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said
posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the mines. Curiously enough,
however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy
against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
xxx

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures were limited to the original
uploader, through the Me Only privacy setting, or that the users contact list has
been screened to limit access to a select few, through the Custom setting, the
result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to
the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the
users friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable
xxx
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever
they engage in cyberspace activities. Accordingly, they should be cautious enough
to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much
information about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought
to be aware that, by entering in or uploading any kind of data or information online,
they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the
perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more
importantly, information, otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be
opened, read, or copied by third parties who may may or may not be allowed to
such access.
It is thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online
dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity
serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that
claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to
have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to
persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of
their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy
tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep track
of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook, especially
because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the sites layout
often.

Razon vs Tagitis
AVELINO RAZON VS. MARY JEAN TAGITIS, December 9, 2009
Facts:
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the
Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Programme, together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo
by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City.
They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him
a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned
from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong looked for Tagitis.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP
professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported
Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. More than a month later, or on
December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact,
filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander
Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine

National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet (collectively referred to as
petitioners), with the Court of Appeals (CA). On the same day, the CA immediately
issued the Writ of Amparo and set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008.
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance
of Tagitis was an enforced disappearance under the United Nations (UN) Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled that
when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be
involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced
disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his
family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect
the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of
their actions to the CA.
Issue:
Does Tagitis fall on International Law concept of enforced disappearance and if it
is binding in the Philippines?
Held:
Enforced disappearance is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction
or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups
of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law.
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there
is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance and that this right is nonderogable. It provides that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under
any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal political instability, or any other public
emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an offense
punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law. It also recognizes the
right of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the
truth on the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of
the investigation Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing offense,
such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the
victim are established.
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that
the country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as
a crime. The absence of a specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for
action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced
disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that
the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making
powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is
guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the
UN, bound by its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and ratified,
particularly the conventions touching on humans rights. Under the UN Charter, the
Philippines pledged to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or
religion. Although no universal agreement has been reached on the precise extent of
the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed to all by the Charter, it was

the UN itself that issued the Declaration on enforced disappearance, and this
Declaration states:
Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as
a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and
flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and developed in international instruments
in this field.
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter
made in a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its
effects on the country, given our own adherence to generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land.
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive
from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees
those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States;
and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to
law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on
enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not
formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows
that enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the
international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of
international law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we
should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the international
conventions that bind us.
Title: Gen. Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, December 3 2009 Facts Tagitis, a
consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. More
than a month after his disappearance, the respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla,
directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, et. al. The petition stated that Engr. Tagitis
went out of the pension house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a
couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him
and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of
his student and according to a reliable source; that he was in the custody of police
intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr.
Tagitis with the different terrorist groups; That the respondent filed a complaint with
the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, but instead of helping
her she was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband, subject of the
petition, was not missing but was with another woman having good time
somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal to help and provide police
assistance in locating her missing husband. The petitioners mainly dispute the
sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA.
Petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the
Amparo Rule. Issue Does the Amparo Rule intended that the petition be complete in
every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights for it to

be given due course by the court? Ruling The Court ruled in negative. The framers
of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in
stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other
initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting
the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition,
however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be
able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually
acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained,
because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who
caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of
specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the
Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of
the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court
requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in
reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available
to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action
showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or
private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than
in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements
namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or
threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present. 3 |Case
Digests in Special Proceeding
5. Title: Gen Razon vs. Tagitis, G.R. No. 182498, February 16, 2010 Facts This is a
motion for reconsideration on the ruling of the Supreme Court on December 3,
2009, finding that the government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG,
and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations, together with Col. Kasim, were
fully accountable6 for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically, it was held
that Col. Kasim was accountable for his failure to disclose under oath information
relating to the enforced disappearance; for the purpose of this accountability. It was
ordered that Col. Kasim be impleaded as a party to the case. And held the PNP
accountable for the suppression of vital information that Col. Kasim could, but did
not, provide with the same obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries. However,
before this directive was given, Col. Kasim was already dead. Issue Whether or not
Col. Kasims death renders the directive to implead him moot and academic. Ruling
The Court held that the directive to implead Col. Kasim as a party to the present
case has been rendered moot and academic by his death. Nevertheless, it is resolve
to deny the petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Undisputably,
this directive can no longer be enforced, and has been rendered moot and
academic, given Col. Kasim's demise. His intervening death, however, does not
necessarily signify the loss of the information Col. Kasim may have left behind,
particularly the network of "assets" he utilized while he was in the service.
Intelligence gathering is not an activity conducted in isolation, and involves an
interwoven network of informants existing on the basis of symbiotic relationships
with the police and the military. It is not farfetched that a resourceful investigator,
utilizing the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires,13
can still access or reconstruct the information Col. Kasim received from his "asset"
or network of assets during his lifetime.

Roxas vs GMA
Title: Melissa Roxas vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 189155 (2010) Facts
In the September 7, 2010 Decision of the Supreme Court,[1] after finding that the
failure of the petitioner to present substantial proof as to the respondents'
responsibility anent her abduction and torture was in part attributable to the lack of
extraordinary diligence on the part of existing police and military investigations, this
Court ordered the conduct of further investigations, this time, to be spearheaded by
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the designated lead investigating
agency for purposes of this petition. The CHR was then required to submit a report
of its investigations as well as a recommendation to the Court of Appeals which, in
the meantime, retained jurisdiction of this case. Finally, the Court of Appeals was
directed to monitor the investigations and submit to the Court its own report and
recommendation, for its consideration and, ideally, final disposition. Issue Can the
Court of Appeals conduct a summary hearing to require the personal appearance of
confidential witnesses interviewed by the CHR and affirm their allegations under
oath? Ruling The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court pointed out that while
the CHR investigations have already been concluded, no additional evidence
tending to implicate any of the public respondents in the abduction and torture of
the petitioner have materialized. CHR Resolution (IV) No. A2010-130 is quite clear
that the evidence gathered during the CHR investigations were still not sufficient to
identify any of the respondents, or anyone in particular for that matter, as the
persons responsible for petitioner's abduction. Neither did the ocular inspections of
various military facilities and firing ranges in Pampanga, conducted by the CHR,
definitively point that petitioner was detained in any of them. The Court agreed
that bringing the persons interviewed in the CHR-Region III confidentialreports or at
the least, the CHR field investigators themselves, before a summary hearing before
the Court of Appeals will serve as a huge step towards identifying the persons
behind the abduction and torture of petitioner. Certainly, it may aid an on-going
investigations by pointing them at an alternative, if not the right direction. Before
disposing of this case once and for all, the Court must ensure that each and every
possible lead or theory was pursued and verified, and no stone left unturned. 15 |
Case Digests in Special Proceeding
17. Title: Gen. Yano vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 186640 (2010) Facts Cleofas Sanchez
filed before the Supreme Court a petition for issuance of a Writ of Amparo with
Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Esperon, the then Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The Supreme Court resolved to
issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of the
writ before the Court of Appeals. Cleofas amended her petition on January 14, 2008
to include Marciana Medina ) and to implead other military officers including Lt.
Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos as therein additional respondents. In the Amended
Petition, Cleofas and Marciana alleged that their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez
and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin,
Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac. On September 18, 2006 at around 1:00 a.m., the
wives of Nicolas, namely, Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were then at home,
heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers uniforms passing by; and that that
at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie went out to check on

Nicolas and He her son but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and airgun for
catching frogs, as well as bloodstains. They likewise alleged that Josephine Galang
Victoria informed them that she saw Nicolas and Heherson at the Camp of the Bravo
Company sometime in 2006. the respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of
Amparo, the production of the victims bodies during the hearing on the Writ, the
inspection of certain military camps, the issuance of temporary and permanent
protection orders, and the rendition of judgment under Section 18 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo. Issue 1. Whether or not failure of the respondents to present
substantial evidence to prove that the public officials observed extraordinary
diligence in the performance of their duty is ground for the grant of the privilege of
the writ of amparo. 2. Whether or not the grant of provisional remedy in Section 14
of the Amparo Rule is proper in cases where the public respondents were absolved
of the disappearance of the alleged victim. Ruling As regards the first issue, the
Court ruled in the negative. Evidence is required in Amparo petition. Effect of failure
to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the
performance of their duty the requirement for a government official or employee to
observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses the
extraordinary measures expected to be taken in safeguarding every citizens
constitutional rights as well as in the investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances. The failure to establish that the public official
observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the
automatic grant of the privilege of the Amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner
from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction
on the part of the public official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to
move and for the court to grant certain interim reliefs. On the second issue, the
Court also ruled in the negative. The interim or provisional remedies provided in
Section 14 of the Amparo Rule are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a
judicious determination of the amparo petition Section 14 of theAmparo Rule
provides for interim or provisional reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter
alia, protect the witnesses and the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant
evidence, These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives
at a judicious determination of the amparo petition.

Burgos vs Esperon

Dolot vs Paje
In Dolot v. Paje (August 27, 2013), the Supreme Court ruled that the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon has jurisdiction to hear a petition asking for continuing
mandamus, damages and attorneys fees, with a prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Environment Protection Order

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; None is

more wellsettled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the

power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is
conferred by law.None is more wellsettled than the rule that
jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear,
try and decide a case, is conferred by law. It may either be over
the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person
of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. By
virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC.
Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall
exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their
respective regions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court does not have
the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the
allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress.A.O. No. 7
and Admin. Circular No. 232008 was issued pursuant to Section
18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the Court authority to define the
territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its
authority. These administrative orders and circulars issued by the
Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court
does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or
tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in
Congress. It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency
of the Government. Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly
states that the territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the
territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Continuing Mandamus; The
concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned
Residents of Manila Bay, 574 SCRA 661 (2008); Similar to the
procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil
actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule
8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09
68SC) requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form
and substance before a court may take further action; otherwise,
the court may dismiss the petition outright.The concept of
continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay, 574 SCRA 661 (2008). Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the
Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct
procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the
enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered
by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari,

prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules

requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and
substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the
court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be
cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to
the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that
must be applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the
spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of seeing to it
that justice is served.
Same; Same; Same; On matters of form, the petition for
continuing mandamus must be verified and must contain
supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of nonforum
shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who
is aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance,
on the other hand, necessi tates that the petition must contain substantive allegations
specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and
must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the
issuance of the writ.On matters of form, the petition must be
verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn
certification of nonforum shopping. It is also necessary that the
petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of
the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned.
Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the
petition must contain substantive allegations specifically
constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must establish,
at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ,
viz.: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully
excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act
to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its
officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty
results from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or
regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of continuing mandamus is a
special civil action that may be availed of to compel the
performance of an act specifically enjoined by law. The petition
should mainly involve an environmental and other related law,
rule or regulation or a right therein.The writ of continuing
mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of to
compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law.
The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right
therein. The
RTCs mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or
order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of
continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to
wit: (c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an

environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the

government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts
decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until
judgment is fully satisfied.
Same; Same; Same; A writ of continuing mandamus is, in
essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final
judgment as it permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to
ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated
under the courts decision.Under the Rules, after the court has
rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and
such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains
jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency
concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to
monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon
full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a
final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court
finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the
satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A
writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it permits the
court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the
successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the
courts decision.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to furnish a copy of the petition to
the respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should be
dismissed.Failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the
respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should be
dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners to
furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents. It should be
remembered that courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and
they have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural
rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty
to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and
the parties right to an opportunity to be heard.

Meralco vs Lim
Title: Meralco vs. Lim, G.R. No. 184769 (2010) Facts Rosario G. Lim (respondent),
also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO). An anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of
the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which
respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY
GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO.
KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB. Copies of the
letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it,
respondent reported the matter to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National

Police. By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human

Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector
in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of
reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from
unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and
security. Respondent, by letter addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, VicePresident, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her
concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the
transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the gruelling travel from her
residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions
on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Respondent thus
requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer. No response to
her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan. Issue Whether or not a labor-related issue is within the parameters of the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data. Ruling The Court ruled in the negative.
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs
Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of
a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall
within the province of a writ of habeas data. Writ habeas data will NOT issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in
support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a
property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is
evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment are
what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction
over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiters. In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to
privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor-related.
Title: Meralco vs. Lim, G.R. No. 184769 (2010) Facts Rosario G. Lim (respondent),
also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO). An anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of
the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which
respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads: Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY
GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO.
KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB. Copies of the
letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it,
respondent reported the matter to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine National
Police. By Memorandum, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human
Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector
in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of
reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from
unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and
security. Respondent, by letter addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-

President, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her
concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the
transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the gruelling travel from her
residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the provisions
on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Respondent thus
requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer. No response to
her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan. Issue Whether or not a labor-related issue is within the parameters of the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data. Ruling The Court ruled in the negative.
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs
Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of
a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall
within the province of a writ of habeas data. Writ habeas data will NOT issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in
support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a
property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is
evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment are
what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction
over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiters. In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that
petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to
privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor-related.
Meralco v Lim (2010) GR No 184769
J. Carpio-Morales

Facts:
A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in bulacan denouncing Lim, an
administrative clerk. She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns
over her safety. She complained under the premise that the transfer was a denial of
her due process. She wrote a letter stating that:
It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly
suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. She added,
instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and
effect of management action would be a punitive one. She asked for deferment
thereafter. Since the company didnt respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data in
the Bulacan RTC due to meralcos omission of provding her with details about the
report of the letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her liberty and security. She
asked for disclosure of the data and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the
data.

Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the
petition wasnt in order.
Trial court ruled in her favor.
In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved
partys person, family or home

Issue: Is Habeas Data the right remedy for Lim?

Held: No, petition dismissed

Ratio:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party
Its a forum for enforcing ones right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a
response to killings and enforced disappearances.
Castillo v Cruz- and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions
therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Lim was concerned with
her employment, one that can be solved in the NLRC.
There was no violation of respondents right to privacy. Respondent even said that
the letters were mere jokes and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor
related due to references to real intent of management
Meralco vs Lim
G.R. No. 184769
October 5, 2010
Facts: Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at
MERALCO. On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering
Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON
NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG
GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen.
By Memorandum dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human
Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in
Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008. The transfer was in light of the

reposts regarding the accusations and threats directed against respondent that would
compromise her safety and security. Respondent appealed her transfer and requested for a
dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the
"punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process.
Issue: May an employee invoke the remedies available under the writ of habeas data where an
employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter
posted therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which
imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
Ruling: No. Respondents plea does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to
provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security against
abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given
the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of
killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights
to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
In Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario, that the writs of
amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor
when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the
Constitution.