CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Introduction
1.2 Background of the Study
Al Shabaab is a Somalia-based Islamist group, which is designated by the United States
Government1 and several other countries as a terrorist organization. The group is infamous for its
violent and ruthless attacks both inside Somalia and in neighboring countries, with the most
recent being the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya. Prior to that was the Kampala bombing on
crowds watching 2010 FIFA World Cup final.
The attacks have had far reaching impact; and portrayed the group as a threat to not only Somalis
dream of establishing a functional government but also regional stability and peace. These two
attacks have one thing in common; both Kenya and Ugandan have had troops in Somalia, aiding
the weak Somali government, prior to the attacks. Therefore, the attacks were a stark warning to
African countries planning to send troops to Somalia. It was a message which said loud and
clear: you will not be safe in your own territory in the event you send troops to Somalia.
Both attacks were deadly and showed what the militant group is capable of doing in the event it
is attacked inside Somalia. The attacks depicted al Shabaab as a deadly group capable of carrying
out attacks in land miles away from its sphere of control.
The attacks gave the group a wide media covee and international attention, which it always seeks
to achieve. However, many in Nairobi and Mogadishu had the view that Westgate Mall attack
was an act of desperation. Whichever the case is, the group, in both attacks, left a trail of
destruction and that was the sole objective of the whole attacks. In the Westgate Mall attack, the
militant never wanted to hold any hostages nor negotiate for their release. Their mission was to
cause havoc and this could be true for its future attacks.
Recently, the group fighters entered AU Mission in Somalia's [AMISOM], largest military base
and precipitated a gun battle that lasted more than 20 hours between the attackers and AU troops
at Halane Military Camp. This daring attack on one of the most fortified and heavily guarded
area in Somalia was aimed at sending a stark warning to AU troops in Somalia that they are not
safe from the bullets of al Shabaab. It also once again revived al Shabaab threat showing that the
group can hit anywhere at will.
Recently, Mandera County governor accused local police of laxity regarding increased attacks in
Mandera by al Shabaab, saying "it is matter of time before they start moving into other parts of
the country." (Lucas Barasa, 2014).

1 See m.state.gov/md123085.htm; m.state.gov/mc712.htm

Days after the research first cited the aforementioned statement regarding al Shabaab moving
into other parts of the country, the group carried out a deadly attack on a Nairobi-bound
passenger bus along the Somalia-Kenya border at a place called Omar Jillow in Mandera County,
northern Kenya. In the 22nd November attack, at least 28 non-Muslims were killed. Ten days
later, the group again attacked a stone quarry in the same county, unleashing mid-night horror on
defenceless civilians camping at the quarry. Thirty six people were killed, all non-Muslims.
Both attacks have one thing in common; civilians bore the brunt of al Shabaab horror. One big
lesson learnt from these attacks is that the group has changed its tactics. It is now targeting soft
targets mostly defenceless civilians. One can say that these attacks are carried out of desperation,
but the fact is that this is a well-planned and well-calculated strategy aimed at instilling fear in
the heart of Kenyans so that they could pressurize their government to withdraw from Somalia. It
is aimed at depicting the government as not in a position to safeguard the security of its people
inside its own territory, and write off the government's claim of restoring peace in Somalia.
These attacks were meant to raise the question: how can you restore peace in Somalia when you
cannot guarantee the same to your people inside Kenya?
All in all, it is worth noting that these attacks would not have been possible without the help of
some natives recruited by the group. These recruits do understand well the regions' languages
and have ability to manoeuvre border checkpoints across the region.
For example in the Kampala bombings, Ugandan and Kenyan citizens allegedly facilitated the
whole process. One of the facilitators is a Kenyan of Somali origin identified as Musa Hussein
who was later killed alongside al-Qaida linchpin in the region (Mutaizibwa E. & Mwesigye S.,
2011). Musa is not the only Kenyan to be recruited by al Shabaab. Many Kenyan youths both
from traditional and non-traditional Muslim tribes were also recruited into the group. Between
2007 and 2012, about 1,000 Somalis and 200-300 non-Somalis were recruited to al Shabaab
from outside Somalia. (Alexander M., Maher S., & Sheehan J., 2012).
Going by these numbers, it is evident that the group appeals to a significant portion of the youth.
It is therefore worth investigating what appeals to these recruits in joining al Shabaab? How al
Shabaab crafts its messages and what motivates the recruits to join the militant group?
To understand and explain the answers to the above questions, one needs to look at the language
used in the group's media and particularly in this case the Somali language and Swahili. This is
so because both languages are spoken by large population of Muslim youths scattered in more
than 5 countries across the East African region. These countries are Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia,
which have significant Somali-speaking population, and Uganda and Tanzania where large
population of their citizens speak Swahili. Somali alone is spoken by considerable population of
Kenyans and Ethiopians who share close ties in terms of culture and religion with Somalis in
Somalia. A significant Somali refugee population is also hosted by these two nations giving al
Shabaab the opportunity to infiltrate this population and carry out its activities undetected. Al

Shabaab targets these Somalis which make large chunk of its recruits from outside Somalia. It
also targets non-Somali Muslims.
Going by the large number of fighters joining al Shabaab from outside Somalia, it is therefore
worth studying as a research topic al Shabaab's use of media as propaganda tool for recruitment.
This is so because the group meticulously sells itself and hones its image through its media
feeding its audiences with well-prepared and hard to resist propaganda.
Media without messages are like an empty shell. It offers nothing to its audiences. To convey
these messages the media uses embellished language to entice its audiences. Over exposure to
this kind of language generally changes the person's ideology, perception of the world and makes
his ideology conform to the agendas of the group the media outlet represents. This should not be
viewed only from the perspectives of extremist media outlets. As a result, the research will try to
analyse language(s) used in al Shabaab media by studying translated articles sourced from the
group's media outlets. In doing so, the research hopes to put into perspective the motivation
behind the large population of youths leaving their comfortable couches in their homelands to go
fight in a new territory. The research will also seek to understand how the group crafts its
messages in addressing different publics; in these case Somalis inside Somalia, Somalis outside
Somalia and Muslims in the East Africa Region.
In its address of these publics, the group uses sophisticated and modern means of media to
convey its messages. These media includes websites, radios, and social networks. It also
publishes magazines like the Gaidi Mtaani [Militant publication in Swahili and Eglish] to reach
out to Swahili speakers. It also posts videos on YouTube that carry particular messages.
1.2.1 Websites
The group has active websites where it constantly feeds its audiences with information regarding
the group's latest activities mostly news from the battle front. Currently there are two websites
which are affiliated to the group. The websites are http://www.radioandalus24.com and
http://www.calamada.com. The later was the only website in recent days giving information
regarding its activities before Radioandalus24.com was unveiled. Radioandalus24.com seems to
take a more hard-line approach and any information posted on it could be the position of the
group's leader. Radioandalus24.com website was unveiled before the death of the group's leader
Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr also known as Sheikh Ahmad Abdi Godane. Godane is also
famously known as Sheikh Ahmad Aw-Abdi Godane in northern Somalia where he hails from.
The creation of this website could be attributed to him and could be an effort to get grasp of
information reaching the audience from the group. This might have been precipitated by the
power struggle between hard-line al Shabaab leaders who are subscribed to global jihad ideology
like Godane and those with nationalistic proposition like Hassan Dahir Aweys. Today,
Calmada.com associates itself with al Shabaab by constantly feeding its audiences with the
group's activities but one can notice the difference in the tone of language used in the website.

The Calmada.com uses the term "foreigners" when refereeing to AU troops in Somalia and uses
the term "Somali Government" in its reference to Somali Government whereas the
Radioandalus24.com uses "infidels" or "crusaders" in reference to AU forces and "apostates
government" when referring to Somalia's Government. This difference in the tone of language
when referring to different parties is significant and pinpoints the difference in opinion in the
ranks and files of al Shabaab leaders. Understanding the sole reason behind the formation of ICU
[Islamic Courts Union] which al Shabaab was umbrella, before being hijacked by hard-line
youths like Godane who had Al-Qaida training in Afghanistan is key here. These youths
completely diverted the agenda of the more experienced members of the movement, which solely
wanted to end the Ethiopian occupation, and introduced a whole new agenda of global jihad.
This has resulted in a protracted discord among the ranks and files of the group which lead to the
assassination of some senior members of the group like Ibrahim Al-afqani.
1.2.2 Radio
Apart from the websites, the group also has a Radio station which airs several programs
including talk shows and news bulletins. It also airs poetries with jihad messages which are
mostly to praise the group fighters and argue the Somali speakers to join the fight. Context is key
here and one needs to understand the importance of poetry among the Somali people. Poets are
highly respected among the Somali populace. It is deeply rooted in the thick of the Somali
culture and Somalia is even referred to us the land of poets.
During the colonial period, Somalia's most famous freedom fighter Sayyid Muhammad Abdille
Hassan also known as Sayid Maxamad Abdille Hassan) used poetry to unite and rally Somalis
against the British, Italians and Ethiopian forces. He was nicknamed Mad Mullah by the British.
He established the Darvish state which stood the taste of colonial and Ethiopian forces
aggression for 20 solid years. This was possible through his motivating poetries and it seems that
al Shabaab is still capitalizing on it. Although the influence of poetry is dwindling among the
Somali people, but its captivating and riveting thrill cannot be ignored. It has the influence
hypnotizing individuals and is mostly capitalized on by women among the Somali community to
motivate warriors during communal wars.
The Radio is currently operational in areas under al Shabaab control but audiences outside
Somalia can follow it on http://www.calamada.com.
1.2.3 Social networks
Al Shabaab is present in social networks like Twitter and Facebook. Before being removed from
both the social network Twitter, its Twitter handle was HSM Press Office, @HSM_Press. HSM
is an abbreviation of Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahideen also known as Xarakat Shabaab
Mujahideen in Somali. It is Facebook page can be accessed through this link:
https://www.facebook.com/pages/%D8%A5%D8%B0%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-

%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%AF%D9%84%D8%B3/676199075768801?
fref=nf and was last updated on 21 February, 2015, this same day the above link was retrieved.
The group used this social media networks to mock its enemies and justify its violent actions on
enemy soldiers and civilians as evident in one sample of its Tweets:
"as Kenyan troops are inside our country- ruthless KDF continue massacring our people inside
Somalia & they expect us to remain silent. there's no way you massacre our people & we leave
your people & your country safe - it's our warning that it's high time you pull out from Somalia
before more & more deadly attacks are carried out inside your country - Wabilahi Towfiq."
This Tweet was posted following Mpeketoni attack and as it promised, the group once again
attacked Kenya killing over sixty civilians in two attacks within a span of 11 days.
In nutshell, apart from taunting its enemies the group used these platforms to hone its image and
boost its reputation by justifying its actions.
Al Shabaab also posts high-quality videos with specific message and particular objective on
YouTube. Some of the messages carry propaganda messages deliberately created to instill fear in
order to control the minds of the people and discourage them from embarking on anything that
might displease the group. These videos could be showing an alleged spy narrating how he
colluded with the group's enemies in passing intelligence information on the locations of al
Shabaab leaders or in other cases, showing al Shabaab fighters preparing for attacks and dashing
towards enemy fire without fear of being killed. This depicts the group's fighters as fearless and
ready to die for their cause. It is aimed at demoralizing the enemy forces.
These videos are mostly taken down by YouTube for violating its terms of service. Some of these
videos are still available in the popular-video sharing sites as they are being downloaded and redistributed by other users of the social site and tracking and taking down all of them becomes a
problem. Since the research is for academic purpose it will give the links of a few of those videos
posted in YouTube by al Shabaab. The research is not in any way advocating for violence and is
sharing them purely for academic purpose. Below are links to those videos:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=GuuETpvB8X4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5chqdmaIJ2E&feature=youtu.be

1.2.4 Magazines
Al Shabaab has a publication which goes by the name Gaidi Mtaani which literally means "street
jihadists." The publication is possibly the first Swahili jihad magazine. Apart from Swahili, the
publication is also in English. The magazine mainly targets the uneducated youths in the streets
of the Kenyan coast and the East Africa at large where its English section targets the elites.

Context is significant here and understanding the disparity in terms of education between the
Kenyan Muslims in the coast and in the north and the rest of Kenyan could be key to get a hint of
why the group choose to publish in Swahili. Since Swahili is also spoken by majority of Kenyan
Muslims in the coast as their first language, influencing them using a language they well
understand is much easier and al Shabaab is capitalizing on this.
The magazine as of now (31 December, 2014) is in its 6 th edition and it is in both Swahili and
English. For reference on earlier editions see the link:
http://jihadology.net/category/gaidi-mtaani/
In its use of these platforms, the groups aims to engage wide range of audiences who are diverse
in terms of culture, age and geographical location in order to advance its narrative of fighting for
the oppressed Muslims in Somalia against the "invading enemy" of East African Forces which it
believes is backed up by the West to proselytize the Somali people to Christianity.
This is a narrative used by the group to appeal to its audiences by presenting al Shabaab as the
ultimate defender of the Muslims in Somalia and East Africa in general against the "crusaders."
It also presents Somalia as the battlefront between forces of Islam and non-Islam.
In achieving this, the group through its platforms prioritizes certain aspect of issues in Somalia
and generally the region in advancing its agenda so as to recruit more fighters.
The group also presents the Somali Government officials as Western "mercenaries" out to sell the
country and its people.
It does so through quick and prompt information sharing of its operations and other related
incidences before objecting sources could do so. This is a strategy well-planned and employed by
the group and it does so because it wants to be the first source. This works for al Shabaab in the
sense that by the time the Somali Government releases its part of the story, the information has
already sunk in the minds of the Somali citizens, putting the Somali Government every other
time on the refuting side. The group also releases threats and propagandas well calculated that
coincide with religious holidays and other major events.
Through this, the group sets agendas to be discussed in both local and international media, giving
it significant airtime. These gives al Shabaab much needed media attention that advances the
legitimacy of its threat.
In saying so, the research is not attempting to downplay the group's threat. Although al Shabaab
in recent past suffered significant losses against the allied Somali and AU Mission in Somalia
forces, the group still poses a significant threat. Al Shabaab in recent years lost major towns such
as Mogadishu and Kismaayo.

Recently, it lost Baraawe, a key port town, to allied Somali and AU Mission in Somalia troops.
Many predicted this as the end of al Shabaab. As the researcher is undertaking this project, many
Somali websites are covering over 50 casualties on Somali Government Soldiers side following
an al Shabaab attack on an Island in Lower Jubba Region of Somalia. This therefore means the
group still poses significant threat both inside and outside Somalia.
The group also uses both targeted killings and suicide bombings to assassinate Somalia's top
leaders like members of parliament. The group has so far assassinated several members of
parliament including famous Somali-female musician cum politician Saado Ali Warsame. She
was killed in a drive-by shooting by suspected al Shabaab fighters. According to The
Independent, she was killed in a drive-by shooting on Wednesday [23 July, 2014], which is
believed to have been carried out by Islamist militants. This among other killings targeting lowranked government workers was aimed at instilling fear in the heart of the Somali populous. The
group targets high-ranked officials like the president, who was attacked in his presidential place
twice the last being on 24 May, 2014, to the taxman. Government workers are targeted to force
them seize working for the government.
The group also aimed at creating religious violence in Kenya by sparing Muslims and killing
non-Muslims. This was not the first attempt to plunge the country into violence and divide the
citizens along religious lines; Westgate attack was an epitome of such attempt. In all of these
cases, al Shabaab never achieved its objective although its action made the Muslims to be viewed
with utmost suspicion by majority of Kenyans.
These increased al Shabaab attacks along Kenya-Somalia border means the group is active in
those areas and it is not long before they head up-country and infiltrate into the masses to cause
havoc. Going by the claims that the country's police are corrupt, it is possible that al Shabaab
fighters, even when not possessing legal documents could enter the country with the aid of
corrupt immigration officials and police officers. There are several instances where the country's
police force has been accused of taking bribes from illegal immigrants and allowing them into
the country without caring about the dangers they could poss if they happen to be al Shabaab
members. In an article published in Daily Nation on 4 May, 2014 titled, "corrupt police and bent
immigration officers are costing Kenyans their lives," the writer, Rasnah Warah talked of how
corruption in the police and immigrations departments is allowing "all manner of illegal aliens,"
to walk freely in the country.
This means that al Shabaab is still a threat to Kenya and the region at large even though it lost
key port towns which supplied the group with much needed revenue to remunerate its fighters or
even bribe clan elders to buy their allegiance. These ports might have also being used by the
group as arms smuggling point and their capture by the Somali Government means al Shabaab
has suffered a great setback and one of its major arms supply route cut.

In light of these, many could argue that this is the start of the end of al Shabaab but that equals to
one's burying head in the sand when the obvious is obvious. We need to understand that al
Shabaab come into power through symmetrical and sustained guerrilla attacks against Ethiopian
troops during its early days. It is therefore inevitable that the group will resort once again to
guerrilla warfare and carry out surprise attacks to frustrate the African forces in Somalia. The
war against al Shabaab cannot be won only through conventional war, but rather through a
number of fronts including direct confrontation among others.
1.3 Al Shabaab History
Wise (2011) states, "Al Shabaab is an al Qaeda-affiliated organization that has risen rapidly to
prominence in the midst of Somalias decades-long anarchy." The group emerged as a faction of
Islamic Courts Union [ICU] which came into power in 2006. ICU was formed as an alternative
governance system to the warlords controlling lawless Somalia. It came into power with the sole
objective of restoring law and order in Mogadishu for the Somali people who were ravaged by a
decade-long civil war following the overthrow of then Somali President Muhammad Siad Barre
in 1991. Since then, Somalis have not had a single stable and functioning government.
The years to follow, Somalia was plunged into total anarchy that lead to the death of thousands
of people and displacement of millions of others that scattered Somalis all across the globe, from
Somalia to Europe, America and then to Africa as refugees. It is not rare today to find Somalis
with close family link living in five different countries because of the civil war.
Those left behind were left at the mercy of brutal and ruthless warlords with expansionist
mentality. This sometimes led to full blown conflicts among the different competing warlords
thus claiming hundreds of innocent lives and displacing thousands of others.
In the midst of all the Somalis sufferings, the warlords continued to grow powerful, competing
for control of lucrative businesses like charcoal and illegal arms trade in Somalia. This worsened
the situation necessitating the need for an alternative authority to neutralize the powers of
warlords.
In the midst of all this anarchy, clan-based Islamic courts emerged. Cedric and Hassan say that,
"a variety of Islamist organizations, centered on a long-standing network of local Islamic or
Sharia courts in Mogadishu, had come together under an umbrella organization, popularly known
in the Western media as the Islamic Courts Union. As the movement coalesced and seized control
of Mogadishu, the Islamic Courts Union became an alternative to the internationally recognized,
but internally disputed, Transitional Federal Government, then restricted to Baidoa." (Cedric B.
& Hassan H., 2007)
ICU restored peace and stability in Mogadishu and gave war-ravaged population a glimpse of
hope unthinkable of at the time once again.

This progress was later to be scuttled by a later event. In 2007, Ethiopia's invasion, which ousted
the ICU following a merger of a number of Islamist organizations during the previous year,
brought into power an Islamist administration which according to Shephard "had trouble
recruiting members, since most Somalis traditionally follow a mystical Sufi interpretation of
Islam, not the dogmatic Wahabbi practice al Shabaab demanded." [2010]
This invasion was a precious gift for Al Shabaab. Shephard further says "The presence of troops
from Somalia's historic and much hated rival attracted recruits not just from within Somalia and
the Horn of Africa but from countries like Canada and the U.S.". One important thing to be noted
is that majority of the Somalis joining the Somali war in the early days from the West were
purely driven by nationalistic dogma and were not subscribed to extreme ideologies. To them,
they were patriots and were only answering the call to defend their land against an ancient
enemy. However, the events to follow and the joining of foreign fighters from countries like
Afghanistan changed the tables after getting grip of the movement. Because of this once a
moderate nation was over-night turned into a radical Islamist baying for the blood of foreigners
which they believed was supporting financially the Ethiopian invasion that ousted the ICU.
Somalis historically being hostile to outsiders was this time presented with an opportunity to
fight an ancient enemy in their own homeland. Many Somalis back then still subscribed to
"greater Somalia" ideology after Somalia's pursuit to reclaim the Somali region of Ogaden failed
in the 1977 Ogaden war. Somalis to date blame Russia for the failed mission to reclaim the
Somali region of Ethiopia.
The Islamic Courts were a huge success in dealing with criminality in north Mogadishu (Cedric
& Hassan, op. cit.), and its ouster, in this case the Ethiopian Government, was seen as opposed to
the establishment of law and order. Al Shabaab members were not men with religious
background, but were the driving force behind the implementation of court jurisdictions. It was
in this context that a military force known as Al Shabaab (the Youth) emerged, related to but
seemingly autonomous of the broad-based Courts movement (Cedric & Hassan, op. cit.)
In the event that followed particularly the Ethiopian invasion radicalized the group. Among the
group ranks, the invasion was seen by al Shabaab as an outright war on Islam, which was an
enforcement wing of the ICU that comprised of a merger of clan courts representing different
interest groups with the sole ambition of restoring some sort of law and order due to the vacuum
created by a decade-long civil strife.
So, Ethiopia's invasion to root out Islamist was seen by Somalis as an excuse to curve out more
Somalia's territory into Ethiopia. With Somalis viewing Ethiopians with suspicion worsened by
ancient rivalry, Al Shabaab saw an opportunity to unite and rally rival Somali clans against
Ethiopian occupation. This bolstered the group military numbers and influence among the
Somali people since they were perceived as nationalist, but the group always had a hidden
agenda that will become evident in the later years.

In the year 2006, ICU was ousted from Mogadishu with little resistance and some of its leaders
fled the country. Al Shabaab, the enforcement wing of the ICU, fled to southern Somalia where it
carried out coordinated attacks and assassinations against the Ethiopian troops.
It is during this period that the group transformed into a force to reckon with in the Somali
political arena since ICU and its merger were completely disintegrated. It portrayed itself as the
sole defender of the Somali people against the Ethiopian occupation. As it become evident in the
years that followed, this strategy worked for the group as it gained control of large tracks of land
within the Somali territory.
Wise (2011) says, "Although al Shabaab has been moulded by a variety of external forces, its
initial period of growth, militarization, and radicalization came as a direct result of foreign
intervention, specifically the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia."
Ethiopia's invasion of Somali was based on the fear that radicalized groups might spill over into
its territory and reignite Somalis ambition of "greater Somalia."
(Wise 2011) says, "The invasion failed to achieve Ethiopia's goal of stamping out Islamic
radicalism in Somalia, and in fact was a primary driver behind the rise of al Shabaab. The
Ethiopian occupation of Somalia, from December 2006 to January 2009, would fuel the
development of al Shabaab's ideology, recruitment, operational strategy, and partnerships,
transforming the group from a small, relatively unimportant part of a more moderate Islamic
movement into the most powerful and radical armed faction in the country."
One of these partnerships that transformed the group is an event in 2012 where it pledged
allegiance to al-Qaida. This changed the group's focus from enacting Sharia law in Somalia to
the establishment of caliphate in the region.
Although al Shabaab became popular among the Somalis because of its earlier agenda to reclaim
areas occupied by the Ethiopian troops during the occupation, several miscalculated steps have
cost the group that has had lasting effect on how the people is viewed even today. Even though
the group established a more strict Sharia law in a moderate Sufi country, some of its actions
worked against it.
This includes increased suicide bombings, which was unheard of practice among the Somalis,
which targeted local population. One similar event is an attack in 2009 carried out by a disguised
suicide bomber as a veiled woman on a graduation ceremony and another truck bomb attack in
2011 on students who gather to register for Turkey scholarships at the education ministry in
Mogadishu. Both attacks jointly killed over 80 people.

These attacks angered Somalis in the entire globe and the perception that al Shabaab is antiSomalis and wants to annihilate the Somali population was born among the Somali people. This
idea was reinforced by the presence of foreign fighters among al Shabaab ranks. These incidents
were a small setback for a group that has in control of large swaths of the Somali land.
Even six years after this incidents first occurred, the group is still a threat and carries almost
daily attacks, assassinations and bomb attacks in Somalia. It is also capable of carrying out
attacks in the neighboring countries where al Shabaab sleeper cells are believed to be operating.
This means that even though the AU Mission in Somalia's onslaught to stamp out the group is
gaining momentum and that al Shabaab is continuing to face setbacks by losing key bastions and
financial lines like seaports, the group is still dangerous. This is so because the group's tactics has
not changed. It still carries out guerrilla attacks against AU and Somali troops. It is a tactic that
helped the group force Ethiopians to voluntarily move out of Somalia. To date, al Shabaab still
resorts to guerrilla warfare.
1.4 African Union Mission in Somalia
African Union Mission in Somalia troops was first deployed into Somalia in March 2007
according to a statement on the peacekeeping group website. The mission's military component
comprise of Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Sierra Leon, Djibouti, Burundi and Ethiopia which are
operating in six sectors across south and central Somalia. Currently the mission is authorized to
deploy a total of 21,586 soldiers as per UN Security Council Resolution 2124 and an extra 540
police officers.
1.5 Kenyan Troops
Kenya invasion of Somalia in 2011 was precipitated by a series of cross-border attacks alleged to
have been carried out by the Somalia-based Al-Qaida-affiliate group al Shabaab. These attacks
mainly targeted foreign tourists and aid workers who were kidnapped and taken to Somalia. This
prompted the Kenyan authority to retaliate by crossing over into Somalia to weaken al Shabaab
and stop such further attacks on Kenyan soil. However, Branch disagrees with this claim saying,
"This case for war is less than convincing, as it is difficult to argue that the threat from al
Shabaab is substantially worse than it has been in years past." (Deniel Branch, 2013). This means
that Kenya's claim that its invasion of Somalia was purely motivated by its desire to secure its
border can be contested as al Shabaab's threat level has reduced then due to events in Somalia by
Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers which were fighting al Shabaab in Somalia.
Branch says for three years, al Shabaab attack, cross-border raids have been a fact of life in north
eastern Kenya, and this signals the magnitude of the group's attack in Kenya. To counter these
attacks, "Kenyan troops have armed, trained, and organized proxy forces to fight al Shabaab on
the border since at least 2009, albeit to no great effect." (Branch, op.cit.)

These forces were mainly youths drawn from the Somali community and the recruitment was
done secretly. There were reports which alleged that the youths were promised a place in the
Kenyan military and were not aware that they will be used to fight al Shabaab in Somalia.
Branch further says "Kenyans incursion of Somalia was spurred less by the threat of al Shabaab
and more by domestic military and political dynamics." (Branch, op.cit.). This could be true to
some extent but the main game changer for the Kenyan authority is the presence of Ugandan
forces in Somalia which were gaining grounds against al Shabaab in the war to free the militant
from the Horn of African nation. A lot was a stake for Kenya. For many years, Kenya has been
brokering talks between opposing factions of Somalia leaders in order to start peace building
process in Somalia. Uganda's entry into the scene in a more spectacular way, which was to
confront the "anti-peace elements," was the ignition key for Kenya's incursion of Somalia.
Kenya's title as the regional leader was at a stake here and its intervention in Somalia was part of
effort to redeem it in order to continue with its hegemony.
1.6 Statement of the problem
Like other radical groups, al Shabaab has realized the importance of developing alternatives to
the mainstream media in order to advance its agenda of depicting itself as the sole defender of
Muslims interest in Somalia and generally in the East African Region.
Generally, when it comes to militant media, a lot have been researched on but in the case of Al
Shabaab media, little had been done. Researchers have focused on the group's use of Twitter
handle, which mostly posts in English for Western audiences. Therefore, there is need to research
on other al Shabaab websites which post in Somali and Swahili languages in luring multicultured fighters. The group has been successful in doing this by recruiting fighters from
neighboring countries like Kenya and Tanzania. Considering this, it is significant to study and
research al Shabaab's use of media as a propaganda tool for recruitment.
According to (Anonymous, 2009), "terrorists are adaptive adversaries who use a variety of tools
and tactics to reach potential recruits and supporters," and al Shabaab as a group designated as
terrorist by several countries is not an exception. It uses sophisticated medium to reach out to
potential recruits employing powerful propaganda. This propaganda is well crafted and targets
particular section of its audience. It is no doubt that al Shabaab was very successful in recruiting
fighters from all over the world using its media.
Alexander et al. say that, al Shabaab "holds the dubious distinction of being the first jihadist
organization to recruit an American citizen to commit an act of suicide terrorism." (2012)

This therefore means that the group is advanced in employing media to attract potential recruits
to fight inside Somalia while leaving behind comfort lives back home. It will be myopic to say al
Shabaab media content alone is the vehicle that drives these youths to join al Shabaab. There are
several other factors including poverty and government policies towards Muslim youths that
force them to join al Shabaab. By saying so, the research is not trying to downplay the significant
role the groups media content plays in altering the youths mind and contributing to their
recruitment.
(Alexander et al. further say, "Al Shabaab presents its mission in cosmic terms, invoking a
civilization conflict between the forces of Islam and non-Islam." It achieves so through its media
outlets and other public gatherings. In light of these, it is important to analyse and understand al
Shabaab's use of media as a propaganda tool for recruitment.(2012)
1.7 Objectives of the Study
1.7.1 General Objective of the study
To determine al Shabaab uses of media as a propaganda tool for recruitment
1.7.2 Specific Objectives
1
2

To determine what motivates al Shabaab to phrase its messages in certain ways.

To determine what motivates the group to vary its language in addressing different target
groups.
3 To determine the impact of violent videos and images of public beheading and execution
by al Shabaab on Somali government and AMISOM forces?
4 To determine the strategies the Kenya government can deploy to counter al Shabaab
propaganda?
5 To explain what motivates youths to join al Shabaab?
6 To find out what is the source of al Shabaab media terminology i.e., 'apostate",
"polytheists", anti-"monotheists" etc?

1.8 Research questions

This research also aims to answer the following questions:
1

2
3
4
5
6

Why does al Shabaab phrase its message in certain ways?

Why does al Shabaab vary its language in addressing different target groups by adopting
nationalist tone locally and jihadist agenda internationally?
What impact does violent videos and images of public beheading and execution by al
Shabaab have on Somali government and AMISOM forces?
What motivates youths to join al Shabaab?
What is the source of al Shabaab media terminology i.e., 'apostate", "polytheists",
anti-"monotheists" etc?
What strategies can the government of Kenya deploy to counter al Shabaab propaganda?

1.9 Significance of the Study

1.9.1 Academicians & Researchers
The study will provide the researchers with a wide knowledge and a deeper understanding on al
Shabaab media and its content. It will also provide scholars and future researchers with relevant
literature and study materials on al Shabaab media and its propaganda content.
1.9.2 Kenya Government and other interested parties
This study may also help the government of Kenya employ viable strategies in curbing youth's
recruitment into al Shabaab and other militant groups and understand ways in which the group's
media operates. It will also help the government consider the findings and recommendations
given in this study to better understand the need of the youth in its effort to fight radicalization in
the country. It will also help the government adapt its future policies to the need of the Muslim
youth so that it counters radicalization.
The research could also aid those seeking information on militants group use of media as
propaganda to woo more recruits.

1.10 Limitation of the Study

1.10.1 Suspicion
There were sometimes when the respondents were suspicious of the study and may fear being
victimized on the basis of the information they provide because of the sensitivity of the topic in
questions. The researcher had to assure them that their responses will be used purely for
academic purpose.
It was also difficult to find someone who proclaimed allegiance or is sympathizer of the group
for interview.
Since the topic is also a sensitive one for many people it was difficult to get many people who
were willing to volunteer.
1.10 Scope of the Study
The study was aimed at understanding al Shabaab's use of media as a propaganda tool for
recruitment. The study sought out for views of staffs working with a research company,
journalists and NGO's in Nairobi since it is difficult and risky to get information from the group's
fighters. The researcher sought out only the views of those individuals who had more than 3
years of experience in researching on Somalia and al Shabaab media. The study was carried out
between November and January 2015.
Documentation works on available documents that are useful to the research were also used.

Chapter Two
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the researcher presents an overview of works of other people related to the topic
under study. The theoretical review comprises of theories covering the topic under study. In his
presentation of these theoretical works, the researcher will attempt to provide a context relating
to the subject understudy.
2.2 Theoretical Literature
2.2.1 Hypodermic Needle Theory
The theory also known as Magic Bullet Theory suggests that mass media "injects" audiences
with appropriate messages that make them react uniformly to the messages in an appropriate and
desired manner. According to the theory, every member of the audience reacts uniformly to the
message.
The theory first emerged in 1920s and is one of the earliest models to explain the influence of
mass media messages on audiences. It was first developed when the press was new. It is thus a
crude model of mass media theory and has been replaced by a more modern theory like the
Agenda Setting Theory. It could be argued that this model is out of place in modern world where
technology has grown at an unprecedented speed. However, the model is still useful in today's
world.
In Somalia particularly in al Shabaab controlled areas, the only source of information
predominant is the group's media. All other alternative source of information is silenced. When
the group captures new areas, it also takes over privately owned media stations. This is so
because the group wants to manage and control the kind of information reaching its subject and
in doing so it becomes the only source of information.

This is tactically important for the group as it helps it become the sole authority to disseminate
information it deems appropriate for its audiences regardless of its content. In doing so, it shapes
people's opinions in line with its ideologies because of the unavailability of refuting sources. For
example, in October 2014 after allied Somali Army and AU Mission in Somalia troops captured
Baraawe, a coastal and strategically significant town from al Shabaab, residents who spoke with
Radio Mogadisho reporters cited several restrictions and prohibitions imposed by the group
following their takeover of the port town.

According to the residents, they were banned from using Smart phones, watching Television and
accessing Internet. Although this report was covered by pro-Somali Government Radio station
which could be argued that it is biased and subjective in its reporting in order to advance
government propaganda, the fact that al Shabaab banned the use of internet severally in areas
under its control cannot be denied as this has been covered in several international media
stations. On 9th January, 2014, Aljazeera on its website covered a story saying that al Shabaab has
banned all Somali telecommunication companies from providing internet to their subscribers,
allowing only internet cafs to continue providing the service. Although the al Shabaab claimed
the move was aimed at stopping spies from conveying intelligence information regarding the
location of its leaders to spy agencies, it is typically meant to restrict the general public access of
information online thus making them oblivious of global events and leading a blind lot was their
sole objective. If al Shabaab wanted to stop spies from conveying the location of its leaders, it
could have also cut telecommunication lines as one only needs to send a text message to alert the
spy agency he is alleged to be colluding with on the location of the group leaders.
This was a clear strategy of stopping people from accessing internet in their homes given that the
group does not have control on what information people read or watch through the internet in
their private places unlike in cafs where they could monitor people's activities, by having spies
in those cafs. In nutshell, the group was exercising control of what people access in their private
places so that they do not access information that question the group's main messages.
McCombs (2005) says "the internet dramatically changed the communication landscape with the
introduction of myriad new channels," adding that "everyone has unique external media agenda
that is a highly individualized composite constructed from this vast wealth of online news and
information," and access to such divergent information could give individuals another alternative
to gauge the truthfulness of the kind of information they are being "injected" with. It imposed
such prohibitions so that becomes the only news feed on events in the outside world to its
subject. In doing so, it selects those events that favor them and present them in manner that
advances its ideology.

It can undoubtedly be argued that over a long period of time of access to constructed and
moulded information, people will reason in a certain and uniform manner as suggested by the

theory. Individuals under al Shabaab control access only certain type of information approved by
the group which to them is the naked truths. Over a long period of "injecting" its subject with the
desired messages made the group's subjects not question its activities and at the same time take
common stands on issues such as terrorism and global jihad. The existence of a few which have
different stands on this issue cannot be ruled out but such individuals suppress their view points
and go along with the rest because of fear of retaliation if they make their convictions on these
issues public.
2.2.2 Agenda Setting Theory
The theory portrays media as a powerful tool of influence that sets agendas for people to discuss.
The theory was first formally developed in 1968 after McCombs and Shaw investigated the
United States presidential campaign of 1968, 1972 and 1976. In the 1968, the two investigated
the agenda-setting function of mass media attempting "to match what voters said were key issues
of the campaign with the actual content of the mass media used by them during the campaign."
They found out that mass media "exerted a considerable impact on readers' judgments on what
they considered the major issues of the campaign." In other words, mass media decides for
individuals what to attach with certain salience in their daily life. In this regard media not only
shapes public opinion but also influences. Media constantly presents objects suggesting what
individuals in the mass should think about, know about and have feelings about according to
Lang and Lang as cited in (McCombs and Shaw 1972). People attach certain value with objects
presented to them through the media. Media do not haphazardly select topics and present to its
audience. They present topics they well aware appeal to majority of their audience even when it
is not the position of those who control the specific media. They do so because they understand
well the kind of "objects" their audiences attach with degree of importance. It is thus important to
see "objects" circulated by media as something individuals have "attitude and opinion about," as
McCombs says. (op.cit).
By prioritizing and giving more covee to certain issues that are dearer to the audience, the media
maintains considerable influence and control over them, thus shaping people's opinion and
attitude in a manner that is in line with their ideologies. This is also true for militants' media
including al Shabaab media.
The group prioritizes certain propagandas and circulates through its media to advance influence
among its followers and potential recruits.

In doing so, there are lines it does not cross and it ensures that its propaganda, when it is aimed at
Somalis inside Somalia, is in line with the people's need. This need far much outweighs its
commitment to global jihad ideology. The group hardly talks of jihad in isolation of nationalism,

a phenomena so dear to the Somali people. In fact its war in Somalia can be described as a
nationalistic-jihad. The two are morphed together in the group's propaganda and this is so
because of the Somalis desperation for a factional government to relief them of the destruction
that came of the decades-long anarchy. They want an alternative solution and this has not
presented al Shabaab with any other option but to employ nationalistic-jihad sentiment as a way
of soliciting for fighters among the Somali clans, while advancing its global jihad ideology. This
is a propaganda that takes different shape depending on who the group is addressing when
soliciting for fighters. When it is addressing the East African Muslims, it presents itself us the
ultimate defender of Muslim interest in the region. It is through such well-crafted, powerful,
sophisticated and fluid propaganda technique does the group maintain its influence on
individuals particularly the youth. Through this means it controls their mind and such youth are
not left with any chance to think for themselves.

Chapter Three
Research Methodology

3.1 Introduction
The Chapter describes the research design. In this chapter, the research describes the general
methodology to be applied in carrying out the research project. It will describe the data collection
procedures and the tools to be used in obtaining data that was used in this research, the process
of data analysis, the study design, the target population and size, together with the sampling
techniques used in the research.
3.2 Research Design
A research design is a master plan specifying the methods and procedures for collecting and
analysing the needed information (Zikmund: 2003). It generally specifies the blueprint for the
study. Since this study researches on Al Shabaab use of media as a propaganda tool for
recruitment, the study will be mainly qualitative in nature.
3.2.1 Qualitative Research
Qualitative research deals with phenomena that are difficult or impossible to quantify
mathematically, such as beliefs, meanings, attributes and symbols, it may involve content
analysis (Denzin, Norman K. & Lincoln, Yvonna S: 2005). Since the research studies al Shabaab
propaganda which it uses to manipulate people's perception and believe of certain issue, it will be
more easy to use qualitative research method to put pieces together in producing meaning of the
topic under study. This does not mean the research will not quantify the data collected.
3.2.2 Qualitative Data
Qualitative data consists of quotations, observations, and excerpts from documents (Michael:
2001). This research will use interviews and translated excerpts from audios and clips posted on
the group's websites or in other cites through the internet to explain and understand how the
group uses propaganda.
3.3 Target Population
Target population refers to the total number of subjects of the interest to the researcher. This
research was conducted in Nairobi through interview with a number of researchers working with
research companies which monitor and collect data on al Shabaab activities on daily bases. As a
result, the target population for the research is 10, all working at the same research company.

3.4 Sample Design and Procedure

According to Anlonius, (2005) a sample is a part of the target population that is procedurally
selected to represent the population. The research used Non-probability sampling method since
this method gives the researcher the opportunity to be selective and settle on respondents the
researcher believes will give the required and necessary information for the research. The
researcher was choosy in the selection of the respondents to the research questions and only
selected individuals who have at least 3 years of expertise in Somali media and particularly al
Shabaab media and propaganda. As a result, the researcher selected 5 respondents for the
research questions whose data, after the interview, will be analysed alongside data collected from
the group's media. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (1999) a representative sample is that
which is 30% or more of large population.

The table 3.1 shows the sampling frame that was 50% of the target population.
Table 3.1 Sample frame
Target group

Target population

Sample size

University Education
Secondary education
Primary education
Total

6
4
0
10

5
0
0
5

Source: Author (2015)

3.5 Data Collection Procedures

% of sample
population
50
0
0
50

to

The research used interviews with experts on Somali and al Shabaab media in general since it is
difficult and risky to get members of the group for interview. As a result, I have resorted to
interviewing experts in the aforementioned field to get an understanding of the group's media
propaganda. Interviewing, then, is a basic mode of inquiry [Seidman, 1998]. Although the
research choice of interviewing experts will make the research be devoid of a firs thand data
from an al Shabaab fighter recruited and influenced through these media, it will none the less not
limit the research since the focus is not to find out the effectiveness of these media propaganda in
recruiting fighters for the group. A recount of these experts could help the research achieve its
purpose.
Generally, an interview is simply a talk between one or more individuals. It involves asking
questions to get a particular response. This could be an effort to find facts about a certain issue or
simply getting a response on a topical issue.
The interviews were conducted in English since my respondents are literate in the English
language and thus there was no difficult in interviewing them. They also did not have difficulties
in understanding my questions.
The researcher was choosy in the selection of the respondents to the research questions and only
selected individuals who have at least 3 years of expertise in Somali media and particularly al
Shabaab media and propaganda. The respondents were selected from different media monitoring
organization to get divergent opinions on the topic in question. As a result, the researcher
selected 5 respondents for the research questions whose data, after the interview, will be analysed
alongside data collected from the group's media.
The researcher collected a total of 23 audio clips and texts, all in Somali, but was later translated
into English. Some of this translated audio clips and texts were later used in the research to
understand the group's media propaganda. The translated audio clips and texts were sourced from
the group's websites particularly http://www.calamada.com and http://www.radioandalus24.com.
During the collection of this raw data for the research, the researcher faced some difficulties. The
most conspicuous of all is the removal of some of the video, due to violation of the social media
terms, clips posted by the group on YouTube before downloading them and translating them in
order to be used in the research.
The research also uses translated audio clips and texts from al Shabaab Radio and Websites in
understanding how the group employs propaganda and at the same time craft messages that
appeal to and influence its target public. These translated audios and texts have randomly been
selected regarding their reference in the group's media.

Majority of the data sourced from the group media will encompass statements of the group's
leaders in order to give the message certain authority as using them means the research is

capturing the position of the group in regard to certain issue or topic. This is significant because
this message has certain authority and will be more credible than an editorial note authored by
the group's website administrator. This does not mean that the administrator will publish a
publication that is not the stand of the group. Whatever they opine in regard to a topic is the
position of the group.
3.6 Data analyses procedures
This is the whole process that starts after data collection and ends at the point of interpretation of
the process results (Obure, 2002). This process included comparing data collected to check for
accuracy and completion. The data was analysed through qualitative techniques and was
presented through tables and graphs.
The study used interviews to collect necessary and required data. It also translated audios, clips
and articles posted on al Shabaab media for required data. This audios, clips and articles were
collected for a period of seven months beginning from June 2014 to January 2015. All data
collected during this period will not necessarily be used. The data will be used depending on its
relevance to the study.
3.7 Ethical issues
The researcher was ethical in his pursuit of data from the respondents in the sense that he
informed them of the purpose for the study and assured them of confidentiality. He has also
informed them of the need to be truthful and objective in their response without any subjectivism
or biasness which could mislead the research.

CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter contains summary of findings obtained from respondents, conclusions made and
recommendations regarding the topic of study. In this chapter, the researcher evaluates the
findings and gives necessary recommendations.
5.2 Summary of the findings
5.2.2 Why does al Shabaab phrase its message in certain ways?
The researcher has sought out the opinion of the respondents on why al Shabaab phrases its
messages in certain ways as this would have established the hidden agendas of the group in
phrasing their messages in certain ways. The finding of the study shows that 40% of the
respondents think that the group is motivated by the desire to remain legitimate in Somalia's
political arena whereas 60% think the group is motivated by the desire to recruit fighters in
shaping its messages in certain ways.
This backed up by evidences in remarks made by the group's leaders through the group's media
outlets. It is true that al Shabaab's desire to recruit fighters both locally and internationally
influences the way the group phrases its messages. For example, following the November 22 nd
attack where at least 28 people were killed after al Shabaab fighters descended on Nairobi-bound
passenger bus, the group claimed the attack was a "revenge" for the "oppressed" Muslims in
Mombasa in a news conference by the group's spokesperson Sheikh Ali Mahmud e also known
as Sheikh Ali Dheere. This official position was later contradicted when al Shabaab's
administrator in Galgaduud region claimed the attack and the closing of Mosques in Mombasa
was a "coincidence," contradicting the official position of al Shabaab that the attack was solely
carried to avenge for the Muslims in Mombasa.

This makes al Shabaab an opportunistic group who seizes any opportunity that fate presents to it.
In this scenario, the group saw an opportunity to appeal to the youths and present its self as the
ultimate defender of Muslims in Mombasa and it well knew that such message will have a

significant impact on dissatisfied youth. This therefore shows that the group phrases its messages
depending on what it wants to achieve.
5.2.3 Why does al Shabaab vary its language in addressing different target groups by
adopting nationalist tone locally and jihadist agenda internationally?
The researcher has sought out the opinion of the respondents on the question why does Al
Shabaab varies its language in addressing different target groups by adopting nationalist tone
locally and jihadist agenda internationally. The research found out that 20% of the respondents
think the desired to win public confidence motivates the group in varying its language when
addressing Somalis in Somalia where as another 20% of the respondents think the desire to incite
Somalis against the foreign troops in Somalia motivates the group to vary its media language. A
majority which is 60% of the total respondents cited the desire to recruit foreign troops as the
reason.
This is true as it is evident in the group's leaders' statement. For example, in statement issued by
the group's military spokesperson Sheikh Abdiaziz Abu-Mus'ab following the killing of
Somalia's deputy immigration chief, Mus'ab said:
"Many people might be asking the question why this man was killed since he was a civil servant,
adding that "this man was working with Interpol."
In the statement above, it is evident that the group's military spokesperson is trying to justify the
killing of a civil servant whose only crime was being a government worker and in the process
redeem the group's image. Al Shabaab is well aware that some of its actions do not go down well
with the Somali people including the killing of civil servants in order to force them abandon
government jobs. This is aimed at disrupting government services. The reason for this is to make
the Somali federal government appear inefficient and not in control. This will advance the
group's narrative of being the only hope to stabilize the country.
5.2.4 What impact does violent videos and images of public beheading and execution by al
Shabaab have on Somali government and AMISSOM forces?
The research also sought out the opinion of the respondents on the question regarding what
impact do violent videos and images of public beheading and execution by al Shabaab have on
Somali government and AMISOM forces. The study found out that 12.5% of the respondents
think that such violent videos and images of public beheading and execution by al Shabaab could
cause defection or desertion on Somali government or AU troops side, whereas 50% of the
respondents think that such violent videos and images of public beheading and execution by al
Shabaab could instill fear both in the Somali government and AU troops in Somalia. Another
37.5% of the respondents also said that such violent videos could stall intelligence gathering on

al Shabaab activities as it also instill fear on the members of the public, thus complicating the
government's and AMISOM's efforts to make any inroads into Al-Shabaab-controlled areas in
terms of intelligence gathering as everybody is scared of reprisal attacks by the group. This is so
because of the magnitude of brutality and violence in such videos and images. Generally, the
group is employing scare tactics.
Among those videos is one released by the group's media wing, Al-Kataib Media Foundation, on
7 January, 2014 titled "by routing them strike fear in those that are behind them." This
unequivocally shows that the purpose of these videos is to instill fear among the colleagues of
the "routed" soldiers as the title of the video suggests. The video showed the beheading of a
Somali government soldier and several bodies of killed soldiers and others drowning in the
Indian Ocean fleeing from al Shabaab fighters.
5.2.6 What motivates youths to join al Shabaab?
The research sought to find out the opinion of the respondents on the question on what motivates
youths to join al Shabaab. The research found out that 27.28% of the respondents mentioned
marginalization as what motivates youths to join al Shabaab whereas 18.18% cited
discrimination, 9.09% mentioned religious identity and a whopping 45.45% mentioned socioeconomic factors particularly lack of education and unemployment as the reason why youths join
al Shabaab.
Contrary to the popular narrative that youths join extremist groups on the motivation of religion,
only 9.09% of the respondents cited religion as the bases for the motivation of youths joining al
Shabaab.
5.2.7 What is the source of Al Shabaab media terminologies like, ''apostate", "polytheists",
''anti-monotheists", ''infidel'' and etc?
The research sought to find out the opinion of the respondents on the question on what is the
source of Al Shabaab media terminologies like, ''apostate", "polytheists", ''anti-monotheists",
''infidel."
The finding of the study shows that 16.67% of the respondents opined that the al Shabaab draws
its terminology from the Khawarijites (the term literary means those who went out and it refers
to an earlier Muslim sect), 66.66% of the respondents opined that the terminologies were cherrypicked from the Holy Quran whereas 16.67% of the respondents choose not to answer that
question.
5.2.5 What strategies can the government of Kenya deploy to counter al Shabaab
propaganda?

The research also sought out the opinion of the respondents on the question on the strategies the
government of Kenya can deploy to counter al Shabaab propaganda. The study found out that
20% of the respondents think employing a counter-narrative could help counter al Shabaab's
propaganda, establishing trust with locals was mentioned by 20% of the respondents as a strategy
to counter al Shabaab media propaganda and another 20% opined studying al Shabaab including
its mode of operation could be a strategy to counter the groups propaganda. 40% of the
respondents think monitoring the group's media outlet could be a strategy to counter its
propaganda.
5.3 Conclusion
The study was geared at determining al Shabaab's use of media propaganda as recruitment tool.
The finding of the study shows that the group's media propaganda plays a significant role in
recruiting youth for the group. This is so because of the way the group phrases its messages
convincing when addressing particular target groups. So as to appeal to potential recruits among
these publics, the group uses the presence of AU Mission in Somalia and events like the
intervention of Kenya forces in Somalia as a campaign to recruit new fighters. It strategically
uses civilian casualties and destruction of farmlands or crops by weaponries fired by Kenyan
forces and other AU troops at al Shabaab target as a media campaign to depict these forces as not
targeting al Shabaab but want to destroy Muslims land and kill civilians. The study also found
out that the group uses violent videos and images such as public beheadings as tool of instilling
fear in the heart of troops fighting al Shabaab. This is a powerful propaganda that could result in
defection as suggested by the respondents due to the level of brutality in those videos.
There is also the need to monitor the group's media outlets by governments fighting the group in
order to understand al Shabaab propaganda and plan for counter-narrative in neutralizing the
group's influence among the youths. Such initiative can go a long way in stopping the youth from
joining the group. Also suggested as a strategy was studying the group's mode of operation and
this could have been done before Kenya moved into Somalia as it would have helped the country
avoid the attacks suffered following Kenya's Defense Force crossover into Somalia. This is so
because al Shabaab uses guerrilla warfare tactic and defeating completely such group is difficult
as al Shabaab does not mostly engage its "enemy" in a direct confrontation. It mostly employs
guerrilla warfare.
As the government of Kenya took the war to al Shabaab in Somalia to confront the group, it
slipped into our own homes bringing the fight to our doorsteps. This could have been avoided if
the government could have understood well al Shabaab's mode of operation.
Marginalization, discrimination against Muslims, unemployment and lack of education are of the
factors that were mentioned by the respondents as appealing to the youths to join al Shabaab.
These above factors are real challenges that are facing many Kenyan youths across religious
divide; however, when such youths are presented with an opportunity for a better life, they will

not resist. It is therefore important to consider the grievances of the Muslim population and bring
them at par with rest of Kenyans in terms of education or employment. Only then can this
menace be stopped.
It was however surprise for the researcher that only 20% f the respondents mention religion as a
factor that is driving the youth to join al Shabaab contrary to the common believe that these
youth are motivated by religion in joining militant groups. It is therefore high time we move
from the common perception that the more a person becomes religious the more he will be
radicalized. It can be urged that non-religious person who does not understand the religion well
can easily be influenced by the cherry-picking of Quranic verses by the group.
5.4 Recommendations
Based on the finding of this study it is recommended that:
1
2
3

The government should invest more in educating Muslims youth as literacy level among
the Muslim community is low when compared to the rest of the country.
Initiate projects that could create employment opportunity for the Muslim youths in
North Eastern and Coast Province.
Employ counter-narrative to neutralize al Shabaab influence among the youths rather than
applying force as a means to deal an already worse situation. This will only fuel the
situation and will be use by militants group as a fodder in advancing its agenda.
Monitoring al Shabaab media could help the government understand the group's
propaganda and craft a counter-narrative. It could also help understand the group's mode
of operation. Monitoring should not only be restricted to al Shabaab media but also other
militants group media outlets as al Shabaab's action is influenced by the action of other
terrorist groups like Boko Haram.

5.5: Suggestion for further study

Academicians and researchers should carry out a study on the effectiveness of al Shabaab
media propaganda in recruiting fighters. This could be done by getting first-hand
information from the group's fighters.
Another topic worth studying is the high-number of undee girls from Western countries
joining the Islamic Sate of Iraq and Levant [ISIL]. What could be motivating these undee
girls to abandon their families and travel to a foreign land? Could it be possible that these
girls are driven by the thrill to marry a fighter?

New Development
Al-Shabaab has recently released a video clip in which the group identified a Kenyan man who
goes by the nom de guerre Salman al-Muhajir as the person who commandeered the Kampala
bombings in 2010. The group also through the video denied the killing of the Westgate Mall
attackers deepening the mystery surrounding the whereabouts of the mall attackers. It also called
for lone-wolf attacks against popular shopping malls in Europe and USA.
Predictions
There is a possibility that al Shabaab might vow allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and
Levant [ISIL]. ISIL is also commonly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS]
If this happens, it could change the cause of history for al Shabaab and it is more likely that the
group will vow allegiance to ISIL in the future even though this could create dissent among the
group's leaders. We have to understand that al Shabaab in 2012 vowed allegiance to al-Qaida and
vowing allegiance to a group that al-Qaida disowned because of their "violent" action could
cause backlash from the group's members loyal to al-Qaida.
All in all, this change of direction could be significant for al Shabaab as this will finance them
with much needed money for its operations, and the possibility that it might attract significant
foreign fighters, given that the group is losing its influence among the Somali people, cannot be
ignored. If this happens, then the war against al Shabaab could prolong and might not end soon.
A shrewd group such as al Shabaab will not fail to seize such an opportunity and it is only a
matter of time before it wiggles out of al-Qaida, and vows allegiance to ISIL.

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