Professional Documents
Culture Documents
DAVID A. BALDWIN
Politicalscientists
are fondof observing
that"poweris to us what
moneyis to the economist:themediumvia whichtransactions
are
observedand measured."' The analogysometimesimplies,as it
does in thisquotation,
thatmoneyand powerperform
similarsocial
functions.At othertimesit seemsto meanthatpoliticalscientists
oughtto spendas muchtimethinking
aboutpoweras economists
do thinking
aboutmoney. At stillothertimesone detectsan envious tone thatseemsto say, "How luckyare the economists
to
*The authorwould like to thankthe followingcolleagueswho reviewed
and offered
the manuscript
helpfulsuggestions:Colin Campbell,RogerDavidson, Nelson Kasfir,David Kettler,JosephMassey,Michael Smith,Denis G.
Sullivan,and RichardWinters.
1J. David Singer,"Inter-NationInfluence:A Formal Model," American
PoliticalScience Review,57 (June 1963), 420.
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turnuse it to exercisepurchasingpower. Are theresymbolsof political power that can be similarlyused as media of exchange to
transferpolitical power fromone person (or group) to another? I
suggestthat the nearestpolitical counterpartof moneyis found in
those symbolsof legitimatepolitical power, the possession and use
of which allows one to exercise legitimatepolitical power. Why
legitimatepolitical power? Because it is in this realm that widely
accepted symbols are most often found. Indeed, the concept of
"legitimacy"of the symbolsof political power correspondsclosely
to the concept of "acceptability"(or liquidity) of the symbolsof
purchasing power.37 The symbols of legitimate political power
mightinclude such thingsas titles (judge, senator,president,etc.),
uniforms,badges, identificationcards, officialcars, votes, office
space in public buildings,crowns,thrones,etc. Note that not all
politicalsymbolsare included. Possessionof an Americanflagmay
not allow one to exercise much political power. Possession of a
police uniform,however,may well allow one to exercise political
power even ifone is not a policeman-at least fora while.
Althoughwe are accustomedto thinkingof money in termsof
an exchange process,there is somethingdisconcertingabout viewing politicalsymbolsin a similarway. In what ways do these symbols functionas media of exchange? One example would be the
town representative
who pins a sheriff's
badge on JohnWayne in a
westernmovie,thus allowingWayne to exerciselegitimatepolitical
power. Similarly,the Americanpeople, as the joint owners of all
the officialbadges, buildings,vehicles, and titles,can be seen as
giving these thingsto certainpeople as symbolsof their support.
The people to whom such symbolicsupport has been given can
then use it to exercise legitimatepolitical power. It is easier to
thinkof votingas an exchangeprocess,since we are accustomedto
thinkingof ourselvesas "having a vote" and as "givingit to someone." We are not, however,accustomed to thinkingof ourselves
as ownersof the White House who permitselected personsto live
there in exchange for the performanceof certain services. The
process by which the people exchange symbols of legitimatepo37Cf. Parsons,"Conceptof PoliticalPower,"238; and Coleman,"Political
Money,"1081.
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litical power for performanceof governmentalfunctionshas become so bureaucratizedthat it is easy to lose sightof it. Evidence
of a basic residueof understandingof thisexchangeprocess,though,
is found in the irate speeder who remindsthe policeman who has
stopped him that as a taxpayerhe is in some sense the policeman's
employer.
In summary:(1) there is nothingrevolutionaryin the concept
of political exchange; (2) it is probably more useful to consider
power as a kind of exchangethan to considerit as a mediumof exchange; (3) the conceptionof bartermost likely to be helpful in
analyzingpolitical exchange is that definedin termsof the directness of exchange; (4) it is probably more useful to regard power
as a relationto be symbolizedthan to regard it as a symbol; and
(5) the nearestpolitical equivalentof moneyis a set of symbolsof
legitimatepolitical power, the possession and use of which facilitates the exercise of political power. To say that certain symbols
of legitimatepolitical power are the closest political counterpartto
moneyis not to say that the similaritiesare great. It may well be
that the differences
between these two kinds of symbolicmedia are
more interestingthan the similarities. Let us take a closer look at
the degree to which the symbols of purchasingpower resemble
those of political power.
How MUCH
ISOMORPHISM?
MONEY
AND POWER
593
42.
39Parsons,
"Conceptof PoliticalPower,"234.
40Ibid.,242.
120. See also, International
4'Deutsch,Nervesof Government,
Relations,
594
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IONEY
AND POWER
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imperfectly
so. Power cannot be countedexactly,but it can be
estimatedin proportion
to thepowerresourcesor capabilitiesthatare
visiblyavailable,such as the numbersof countablesupporters,
voters,
or soldiersavailableor requiredin a particular
politicalcontext.44
ikewise,one could say that priorto the inventionof money,purhasing power could not be measured exactly,but could be estiiatedin termsof a varietyof power resources. This was precisely
ie situationthatthe inventionof moneywas designed to eliminate.
"he point of inventingmoneyis to make measurementof purchas-ig power easy by eliminatingthe need to express purchasing
lowerin termsof 499,999 power resources. To say that power is
ke moneyexcept forthe lack of a standardizedmeasure of power
? to say thatthe problemof measuringpoliticalpower is verymuch
ke the problem of measuringpurchasingpower in an economy
,ithoutmoney.
If political scientistsare to benefitfromcomparingthe measureTientof purchasingpower withthe measurementof politicalpower,
ve must understandwhy one is easier to count than the other.To
ttributethisto some "peculiarproperty"45of politicalpower is not
ery helpful. Parsons explains the relativedifficulty
of measuring
ioliticalpower in termsof an inherentquality that he calls "the
uierarchical
aspect of power systems."46This line of argumentleads
LS to thinkthat purchasingpower has always been easier to measire than political power because the peculiar nature of political
towermakes it inherentlyharder to quantify. Purchasingpower,
iowever,has not always been easier to measure than political
tower. The Almightydid not create a standardized measuring
od forpurchasingpower at the time He created life. Man had to
nventhis own measure of value. Prehistoricman may even have
ound politicalpower easier to measure,i.e., widespread agreement
inphysicalstrengthas the measureof politicalpower but relatively
ittle agreementon a standard by which to measure purchasing
44Deutsch,Nervesof Government,
120. AlthoughDeutschmakesa similar
)ointin International
Relations(42), he seemsmorecautiousabout stressing
he similarities
betweenmoneyand powerin thisbook.
45Mitchell,
SociologicalAnalysis,90.
46See Parsons,"Concept of PoliticalPower,"242-248; "PoliticalAspect,"
'9; and Mitchell,SociologicalAnalysis,90.
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POWER
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to economicanalysisin the sense that "a centralplace in it is occupied by a generalizedmedium involved in the political interaction
process, which is also a 'measure' of the relevantvalues,"49 he is
between economics
obscuringone of the mostimportantdifferences
reasons why politifundamental
of
the
One
and political science.
of a "generthe
absence
is
difficult
enormously
cal analysis is so
which
process,
interaction
alized medium involved in the political
Kaplan
and
Lasswell
values."50
the
relevant
is also a 'measure' of
were especially concerned about the consequences of a failureto
realize that political power was tied to particularpower bases and
could not be expressedin termsof a "unitaryconceptionof power."51
They warned: "Failure to recognizethatpower may reston various
bases, each with a varyingscope, has confused and distortedthe
conceptionof power itself,and retardedinquiryinto the conditions
and consequences of its exercise in various ways."52 Purchasing
power also restson various bases, but it does not matterso much,
since economistscan convert the potential purchasing power of
each base into a commondenominator. The power-moneyanalogy
can be helpfulif it stimulatesawarenessof the similaritiesbetween
barterand political exchange,but the analogy can be harmfulif it
temptsus to single out a particularbase value in termsof which to
expressthe value of the others. If thereis no generalagreementon
a measure of political value, it would be follyto pretendthatthere
is.
(3) Recognitionthatpolitical exchange occurs under conditions
that are more akin to barterthan to the sophisticatedmarketsof a
48Catlin,Science,251.
"Conceptof PoliticalPower,"234.
49Parsons,
on the
5oWilliamMitchellseemsto agreethatit is usefulto focusattention
to the above
betweenmoneyand its politicalanalogues. Contrary
differences
however,he sees Parsons'sapproachas helpingto producethis
interpretation,
focus. See Mitchell,SociologicalAnalysis,87-93.
5lLasswelland Kaplan, Power,92.
of analyzingpower withouta satisfactory
52Ibid.,85. On the difficulty
formsof power can be reduced,see
to which different
commondenominator
also RobertA. Dahl and CharlesE. Lindblom,Politics,Economicsand Welfare (New York: Harper& Row, 1953), 228-229.
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modernmoney economycan lead us to ask a numberof theoretically provocativequestions. Why are the media of political exchange not more like money? Under what conditionsmight one
expect generalizedmedia of political exchange to emerge? Would
it be desirable to have media of political exchange that were more
like money? What are the consequences of using relativelyprimitive media of politicalexchange?53 These questionsand otherslike
themare unlikelyto be asked by those who focus only on the similaritiesbetween the media of political and economic exchange and
neglect the differences.
Scope and Domain
One importantconsequence of a standardizedmeasure of economic value is that economistsneed not be so careful as political
scientistsmustbe in specifyingthe scope and domain of power relations. Whereas economistsrarely bother to specify the scope
and domain of purchasingpower, Dahl and Lasswell both have
warned that it is practicallymeaninglessfor a political scientistto
discusspower withoutreferenceto thesetwo dimensionsof power.54
Economistscan comparethe purchasingpower of diversegoods and
services simplyby convertingthem into the common denominator
of money. Money may be thoughtof as different
fromother resourcesprimarilyin its higherdegree of liquidity.55This "liquidity"
is a functionof (1) time, (2) scope, and (3) domain. In other
words, the differencebetween money and other resourcesis that
with money one can buy a greatervarietyof things frommore
people more quickly. Because money is so generalized in scope
and domain and because the value of most goods and servicescan
be expressedin monetaryterms,economistscan ignore scope and
domainand get away withit-at least mostof the time.56
53Mitchell'sSociologicalAnalysis(87-93) containssome very interesting
speculationon the implications
of theabsenceof a politicalanalogueto money.
He suggeststhatthereis a significant
degreeof uncertainty
in politicalcalculationthatis due to theabsenceof a standardized
measureofpoliticalvalues.
54Dahl,"Power,"408; Lasswelland Kaplan,Power,76.
55Cf.Blau, Exchangeand Power,269; and Boulding,EconomicAnalysis,
II, 70-72.
56Foran exampleof a case in whichfailureto specifythescope and domain
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diminishing
marginalutility"],however,it becomesclear thatwhat a
thingis worthto us dependson how muchof it we have, and that
thereforethe worthis not anythingin a commodity. It is not a
physicalpropertyof an object like weightor volume,but is simply
how we feel about it. Things are valuable because somebody
thinkstheyare,and forno otherreasonwhatever. This is true,as we
shall see, even of gold-a commodity
which people are inclinedto
thinkhas an intrinsicvalue. Gold, like everything
else, is valuable
onlybecause people thinkit iS.58
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"does not tell quite the whole story."65He impliesthat the portion
of the storyit does tell is correctbut incomplete. Most economists,
however,would regardexplanationsof the value of moneyin terms
of the value of gold not merely as incomplete,but as incorrect.
When economistsreferto the belief that gold determinesthe value
of money,they usually depict it as one of several discreditedor
erroneousbeliefs on this subject.66 (In the Americancase, for example, it would make more sense to say that dollars determinethe
value of gold than it would to say that gold determinesthe value of
dollars.) On the basis of his dual explanation of the value of
money,Parsons observesthat "the question of whetherit [force] is
or is not the 'basis' of power is ambiguousin a sense exactlyparallel
to that of the question of 'basing' the value of moneyon command
of gold reserves."67In the eyes of most economists,however,it is
not ambiguous to say that monetaryvalue is based on gold; it is
wrong. AlthoughParsons may not intend to argue that gold and
force are the ultimate determinantsof economic and political
power, he is certainlyambivalenton the issue. Given the widespread misunderstanding
of both gold and force,such ambivalence
is likelyto do more harm than good.
The second pitfallto be avoided in comparinggold with force
is the assumptionof a fixedsocial role foreach. AlthoughDeutsch
and Parsonsfrequentlysay thatthe role of forcein politicalsystems
is parallel to the role of gold in economic systems,it is not clear
what thismeans. It is obvious thattheyview forceas occupyinga
special place in political systemscomparable to the special place
that they thinkgold occupies in economic systems;but precisely
what is this special place, and why is it occupied by gold and
force?68 Apparently,they see gold and force as the most intrinsically effectivebases of purchasingand political power. As such,
65Ibid., 44.
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theyare usuallyheld in reserveand used onlyin "showdown"situations. In such situationsthe ultimateweapons of gold and force
Justas
are broughtinto action as "damage-controlmechanisms."69
governmentswill oftenuse forceto bolster confidencein theirpolitical power,so theywill also use gold to bolsterconfidencein the
purchasingpower of money.
Althoughone could dispute the particularsocial roles attributed
by Deutsch and Parsons to gold and force-e.g., Parsons's contention that gold provides the base upon which a complex credit
structureis erected70-such disputes would matter less than the
overall assumptionthat the social roles of gold and force are unchanging. From the writingsof Deutsch and Parsons one gets the
impressionthat there is some generallyshared conceptionof "the
role of gold in economicsystems"and "the role of forcein political
systems." When Parsonstalksabout the role of gold in "the'normar
circumstancesof monetarytransaction,"'1we are apparently expected to know what he means. In discussinggold Deutsch and
Parsons seem to have in mind one of the roles played by gold in
certaineconomicsystemsfor a few years beforethe Second World
War. Gold has played severalroles in economicsystems,and these
roles have never been fixed.72Contemporarystudentswill findit
hard to reconcilethe discussionof gold and forceby Deutsch and
Parsons with Samuelson's observationsthat metallic backing for
moneyhas no real meaningany more,that gold ceased to be legal
tenderin Americain 1933,that it would be illegal foran American
to use gold to pay a debt even if he wanted to, and that gold is not
even one of the componentsof the U.S. moneysupply,let alone the
mosteffective
component.73When Parsonsand Deutsch tell us that
122-123.
69Deutsch,Nervesof Government,
70Parsons,
"Reflections
on the Place of Force,"44.
71Ibid.
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and economic systems,i.e., the fact that only the latterhas a generalized medium of exchange that also serves as a standardized
measure of value. One of the most valuable services the analogy
between politics and economics can renderto political scientistsis
of this difference. In comparingpolitical with
clear identification
economic processes, as in comparingmen with women, we may
as the similarities.
as interesting
findthe differences
THE
"ZERO-SUM
PROBLEM"
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607
Althoughthe power-moneyanalogy is not new, systematicdevelopmentof it has not proceeded very far. A few of the more
promisinglines of developmentmay now be surveyedin the hope
of stimulatingfurtherinvestigation.83
(1) Political banking. Perhaps the mostprovocativesuggestion
forexpandingthe analogyis Parsons'scomparisonof the processby
which banks create money with the process by which power is
generatedin a polity.84 He compareslendingsupportto a political
group (e.g., by joiningit or votingforit) to depositingmoneyin a
bank. Justas banks can safelylend out part of the money deposited with them withoutspecificauthorizationfrom depositors,so
politicalgroupscan lend out part of the power depositedwiththem
withoutspecificauthorization. Political leaders can thus increase
the amount of power in a polity just as bankers can increase the
amountof moneyin an economy. One consequence of this power
creation,however,is that,like bankers,politicianswill be unable to
meet all theirobligationsinstantaneously.This illiquiditypresents
no problemforeitherpoliticiansor bankersas long as the psychological atmospherewithin which transactionsoccur remains relativelystable. If it is disturbed,however,theremay be a confidence
crisisthat will starta rush to withdrawdeposits of money and/or
power.
The politics-bankinganalogy must be developed with extreme
care. Describing the process by which banks create money is not
easy, as anyone who has ever tried to explain it to undergraduates
will testify. Both Coleman and Deutsch have damaged the analogy
while attemptingto improve it. They have fallen victim to the
commonfallacyof assumingthat banks lend more moneythan has
83Usefulsuggestionsfor developingthe analogy are found in Coleman,
"Comment,"77-80; Coleman,"PoliticalMoney,"1082-1087;Deutsch,Nerves
of Government,
125-127; Mitchell,SociologicalAnalysis,95-97; and Ilchman
and Uphoff,PoliticalEconomy.
84Parsons,
"Conceptof Influence,"
59-62; "ConceptofPoliticalPower,"250257; "PoliticalAspect,"90-104. See also, Deutsch, Nerves of Government,
120-121; and International
Relations,43-44.
608
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610
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612
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of the power-money
Dissatisfactionwith particularformulations
of
the
underlyingassumpvalue
us
to
the
not
blind
analogy should
and
economic
political
it
compare
useful
to
tion that is
processes.
94Sociological
Analysis,86, 92-93. See also FrankH. Knight,Risk,Uncertaintyand Profit(New York: Harper,1921).
95See, for example,George Dalton, ed., Primitive,Archaic,and Modern
Economies:EssaysofKarlPolanyi(GardenCity,N.Y.: Doubleday,1968).
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AND POWER
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Relations,43.
98Deutsch,International