CRIMINAL LAW 2

JUSTICE MARIO LOPEZ

JURISPRUDENCE
I. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS
A. TREASON
1. LAUREL vs. MISA
77 PHIL 856
FACTS:
Laurel was charged with treason on the ground that he, a Filipino citizen adhered to the
enemy by giving aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation. In a petition for habeas
corpus, Laurel alleged that he cannot be prosecuted for the same on the ground that: (1)
that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was
a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Laurel should be charged and convicted of the crime of treason.
HELD: YES
A citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his country, which
consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that
this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory
wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and
which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign.
Absolute and permanent allegiance of inhabitants occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the
occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government.
What is suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant. The
subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the
military forces is one of the rules of international law recognized in the Hague Regulation. As
a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during
the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or
sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic
theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests.
The military occupation of an enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the
occupant; that, in the first case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to
mean the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the
legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended
without putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the
second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the suspension of the
sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in
1907, and therefore it cannot be applied to the present case;

Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," as descriptive of the
relations borne by the inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military
government established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to
the temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the
territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above described, and
does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which the citizen residing in a
foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign; that just as a citizen or subject of
a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for and convicted of treason committed in a
foreign country, in the same way an inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces
of the enemy may commit treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he
adheres to the enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the
allegiance of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than
obedience to its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that
a citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto acquire the
citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial
life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other hand, lose his original
citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of the laws of his own government
or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled
to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of sovereignty
by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces,
because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the
occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal
rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance
during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only
reason that as they exclusively bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are
inoperative or not applicable to the government established by the occupant. Crimes against
national security, such as treason and espionage, etc., which are of political complexion
because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes
against the legitimate government, are also suspended or become inapplicable as against
the occupant, because they can not be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the
legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason
above stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted
government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the
occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason
committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the
inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the latter during
the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force,
unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and
regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers
of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make
new ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is
necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his
army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the
usages established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public
conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare
76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to obey them,
and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been adopted, as well and those
which, though continued in force, are in conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier,
shall be considered as suspended or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;

Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity and
obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not demand from him
a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by
giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the preceding
consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or
compel them to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such
action is not demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the
control of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to the titular
government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the occupied territory were
compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force, threat or intimidation, to give
him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if necessary as a hero, or submit
thereto without becoming a traitor;
2. PEOPLE vs. PRIETO
80 PHIL 138
FACTS:
Prieto was prosecuted for 7 counts of treason. The prosecutor was only able to adduce
evidence on charge 4. Nonetheless, the court convicted him on charges 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7.
As for charge no. 7, the information reads: In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in
conspiracy with the enemy and other Filipinos undercovers, said accused did cause the
torture of Antonio Soco and the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla activities.
On convicting Prieto on charge number 7, the court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries," with
"the aggravating circumstances.
ISSUE: Whether or not the infliction of physical injuries and the commission of the murder is
a separate and distinct crime from treason.
HELD: NO.
The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the infliction
of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine
treason law and under the United States constitution defining treason, after which the
former was patterned, there must concur both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid
and comfort. One without the other does not make treason.
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind
of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental
operation. (Cramer vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in
itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is
charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be
the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the
penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for
possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be
held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because
possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery
respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in

conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive

ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of course, preclude the punishment of murder or
physical injuries as such if the government should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically
for those crimes instead on relying on them as an element of treason. It is where murder or
physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded
separately under their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out may be
taken as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other atrocities on the
victims instead of the usual and less painful method of execution will be taken into account
to increase the penalty under the provision of article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal
Code, since they, as in this case, augmented the sufferings of the offended parties
unnecessarily to the attainment of the criminal objective.

B. PIRACY
3. PEOPLE vs. RODRIGUEZ
135 SCRA 485
FACTS:
On August 1981, the vessel M/V Noria, owned and registered in the name of Hadji Noria left
Jolo wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. After which, it left again for Labuan. Three hours after
the departure, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins of the vessel.
One witness testified that he saw the appellants armed with rifles. After the commotion,
another witness saw that the accused appellants bringing with them: dressed chicken,
softdrinks, durian, boxes of ammunitions, gallons of water, meat as well as rifles. A total of
10 victims were killed during the same.
During the arraignment, three of the accused pleaded guilty. They were convicted with the
crime of piracy and was sentenced to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of confession of guilt should be
appreciated in favor of the three accused.
HELD: NO.
PD 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amended Art. 134 of the RPC. It took effect
on August 8, 1974. Sec. 3 of which provides:
Sec. 3. Penalties Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as
herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by:
a. Piracy the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as
a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. If rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the
occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without
means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing
upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
Hence, the lower court committed no error in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance.
Art. 63 of the RPC states that:
xxx In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed.
4. PEOPLE vs. SIYOH
G.R No. L-57292
FACTS:
Antonio de Guzman and three others were merchants who sold merchandises by going to
one island to another. On July 10, 1979, they went to Pilas Island, Basilan and sold their
goods there. During the night, they would sleep at the house of Kiram, one of the accused.
After several days, they went to Baluk-Baluk with Kiram and Siyoh (accused) as their guides.
Before reaching the island, they saw another pump boat approaching them. Kiram turned off
their engine. Kiram, Siyoh and their companions from the other pump boat began to divest
Antonio and his companions of their money and goods. After which, Antonios companions
were hacked by Siyoh and KIram. Antonio was able to jump to the sea but was shot at the

back. He survived and was able to point to the constabulary members Kiram and Siyoh. One
of the victims, Anastacio was never found.
Kiram and Siyoh were there only ones arrested and were convicted of qualified piracy with
triple murder and frustrated murder. The penalty of which was death.
On appeal, the accused alleged that Anastacios body was never found hence there is no
evidence against them with regard to the death of Ananstacio.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD: YES.
In a conviction of qualified piracy, i.e rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or
on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime is punishable by death regardless of
the number of victims.
5. PEOPLE vs. TULIN
August 30, 2001
FACTS:
M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel loaded with barrels of kerosene, gasoline and diesel oil was
sailing off the coast of Mindoro.
They were suddenly boarded by seven fully armed pirates. Thereafter, the crewmen were
ordered to change the name of the vessel to M/V Galilee.
They then went to Singapore to meet another vessel but the same did not come. Several
days later, they again went to Singapore where the contents of M/T Tabangao was
transferred to the vessel Navi Pride.
The crewmembers were then released. They reported the incident to the police and the
accused, along with Cheong San Hiong, a trader of Navi Marine Services Inc., which controls
the vessel Navi Pride.
For his defense, Hiong insisted that he can no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine
waters as defined by PD 532 because RA No. 7659 has impliedly superseded PD 532. Also,
he contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person as the crime
was committed outside Philippine waters.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 7659 has superseded PD 532.
HELD: NO.
Article 122 of the RPC before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on
the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon
its amendment by RA No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to
include offenses committed in Philippine waters. On the other hand, under PD No. 532, the
coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters. Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
RA No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under PD Np. 532.
There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence,

there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the PD did was to widen the coverage of
the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from
crimes against the law of nations.
Anet the second issue, the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Hiong as the attack
and seizure of the vessel was done on Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was
later brought by the pirates to Singapore. Although PD 532 requires that the attack and
seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the
pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same
need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One, Book Two of the RPC. As such, it is an exception to the
rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant
case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy but under a special law, PD 532
which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters.
II. CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE
A. ARBITRARY DETENTION
6. UMIL vs. RAMOS
7. PEOPLE vs. BURGOS
144 SCRA 1
Cesar Masamlok surrendered to the authorities stating that he was forcibly recruited by the
accused as a member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of a firearm if he refused.
Pursuant to this, police officers went into the house of Burgos and asked him about his
firearm. He denied owning a firearm, but his wife pointed the place where the same was
buried.
Recovered with the firearm were alleged subversive documents. Burgos admitted that the
firearm was issued to him by one Nestor Ramirez, a team leader of the NPA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the accused-appellant without warrant is valid.
HELD: NO.
The trial court justified the arrest on the basis of Rule 113, sec. 6 (see Rules of Court) where
arrests may be made without a warrant.
Under sec. 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact.
The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.
In the case at bar, there is no personal knowledge. Whatever knowledge possessed by the
arresting officers came, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellants wife. At the time of the
appellants arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document.
Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive.
Neither is the arrest valid under sec. 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in
fact or actually been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an
essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed.

The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable
ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers
sought to arrest the accused. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which
transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid
arrest.
8. MILOS vs. SALANGA
152 SCRA 113
FACTS:
Juan Tuvera, Sr. a barrio captain, along with 2 other persons were charged with arbitrary
detention in the CFI of Pangasinan.
A motion to quash was filed by Tuvera, Sr. on the ground that the charges do not constitute
an offense as he is not a public officer. Hence, he could not be charged with arbitrary
detention. The trial court granted the motion to quash, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a barrio captain is a public officer
HELD: YES.
The elements of arbitrary detention are the following:
a. The offender is a public officer or employee;
b. That he detains a person;
c. The detention is without legal grounds.
The public officers liable for arbitrary detention must be vested with authority to detain or
order the detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen
and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors.
Long before PD 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named barrio
captains, now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in authority. Under RA no.
3590, otherwise known as the Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and duties of a barrio
captain include maintenance of public order in the barrio xxx he is a peace officer in the
barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he may make arrest and
detain persons within legal limits.
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted
that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may
be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors are similar to
those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is
smaller.
B. SEARCH WARRANT MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED
9. STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO
20 SCRA 383
FACTS:
10. BURGOS vs. CHIEF OF STAFF

C. OFFENDING RELIGIOUS FEELINGS

11. PEOPLE vs. BAES
FACTS:
The complainant is the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church. He alleged that the
accused have caused through force, intimidation and threats, the funeral of a person
belonging to the Church of Christ to pass through the churchyard of the church.
The offense, as stated by the complainant is that the corpse belonged to the Church of
Christ. The fiscal sought for the dismissal of the case as it did not constitute an offense
penalized under Art. 133 of the RPC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the fiscal was correct in dismissing the case.
HELD: NO.
III. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
A. REBELLION, INSURRECTION, COUP DETAT
B. SEDITION
C. INCITING TO SEDITION
D. VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
E. ILLEGAL ASSOCIATION
F. PERSONS IN AUTHORITY AND AGENTS OF PERSONS IN AUTHORITY
G. DIRECT ASSAULT
H. RESISTANCE & DISOBEDIENCE
I. DELIVERY OF PRISONERS FROM JAIL
J. EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
K. VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL PARDON
L. QUASI-RECIDIVISM
VIII. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
A. PARRICIDE
1. PEOPLE vs. JUMAWAN
116 SCRA 739
FACTS:
The victim, Rodolfo Magnaye was married to one of the co-accused, Presentacion Jumawan.
Presentacion left the conjugal abode and stayed with her sister.
The mother of Presentacion wanted Rodolfo to sign a document which shall allow them to
remarry but Rodolfo refused to sign the same.
Days later, Rodolfo informed his mother that he was going to the public market to talk to his
wife. He never went home.
According to one of the prosecution witnesses, he saw the accused Francisco Jumawan along
with Presentacion Jumawan and other family members stab and kill Rodolfo. All of the
accused were charged with homicide.

ISSUE: Should the wife be charged with parricide?

HELD: YES.
The prosecution should have charged the accused of parricide. However, since her
relationship was not alleged in the information, Presentacion, like the other accused, can
only be convicted by murder qualified by abuse of superior strength.
2. PEOPLE vs. TOMOTORGO
The victim Magdalena delos Santos had been persistently asking her husband to sell their
conjugal home. Her husband would not accede to his wifes request.
Several days after, the accused-husband left for work. When he returned, his wife and their
three month old baby were already gone. He searched and found them about 200 meters
away from their house. He pleaded with his wife to return but she refused to do so.
He tried to take their baby away from his wife, she threw the baby on the grassy portion of
the land, causing the baby to cry. Angered by what his wife did, he took a piece of wood and
hit her. But he stopped when his wife complained of pains on her chest.
He then took his wife and baby home. His wife died despite efforts of her husband to
alleviate her pains.
He was charged and convicted of parricide.
On appeal, the accused contends that he had no intent to kill his wife; that applying Art. 49,
the proper applicable penalty when the crime committed different from that intended; that
the penalty for physical injuries should be applied and not the penalty on parricide.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of physical injuries only and not parricide
HELD: He is guilty of parricide
Art. 49 does not apply to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the
offender result from his felonious act because under Art. 4, par. 1 of the RPC, he is liable for
all the direct and the natural consequences of his unlawful act. His lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong is, at best, mitigating.
The fact that the appellant intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict physical injuries
does not exempt him from the liability for the resulting serious crime.
3. PEOPLE vs. ABARCA
Kingsley Koh and the wife of the accused had an illicit relationship. The said relationship
began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 bar examinations.
In 1984, the accused went home to their residence in Tacloban. However, he was not able to
board the bus during its first trip. Hence, he was able to reach home only at 6pm in the
evening.
When he got home, the accused found his wife in the act of sexual intercourse. When the
wife and Koh noticed the accused, the latter run away.

He then looked for a firearm from a constabulary soldier. He was able to acquire an M-16
rifle. He then searched for Koh and found him playing mahjong.
He shot Koh and injured 2 other people. He was charged and convicted of the special
complex crime of murder with double frustrated homicide.
ISSUE: Whether the crime charged should be Art. 247 of the RPC.
HELD:
The crime
4. PEOPLE vs. BUENCUSECO