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CONSILIUM

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN U N I O N


GENERAL SECRETARIAT

Field
ecurity
handbook
Field
Security
Series
OCTOBER 2 0 0 8

Notice
This brochure, which has been prepared by the General Secretariat of the Council, does not commit either the EU
institutions or the Member States.
Further information can be obtained from the Public Information Department of the Communication Unitin
Directorate-General F, at the following address:
General Secretariat of the Council
ruede la Loi 175
-1048 Brussels
Fax
E-mail
Internet

+32 (0)2 281 53 32


public.info@consilium.europa.eu
www.consilium.europa.eu

A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet.
It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://www.europa.eu).
ISBN 978-92-824-2380-6
DOI 10.2860/32782
European Communities, 2008
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Printed in Belgium
DGF-Communication / Cration graphique - RS 34/2008

FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

October 2008

Field Security Handbook


Table of Contents
Preface

Generic Field Security Documents


Overview

3
3

Field Security Policy

Guidelines for Mission Security Officers

Actions in the Event of Hostage-Taking

Building up a Mission
Overview

The Security Dimension in Planning Documents and Mission Documents

10

Exploratory Mission Report

11

Fact-Finding Mission Report

12

Technical Fact-Finding Mission Report

13

Crisis Management Concept and CONOPS

14

Council Joint Action

15

OPLAN

16

Mission Security Plan

17

Evacuation Plan, Contingency Plans and SOPs

18

Security Roles, Responsibilities and Tasks


Overview
Chain of Command and Communication

21
21
22

Overview

22

ESDP Missions

23

EUSR Teams

24

GSC Actors

25

Overview

25

GSC Security Office

26

EU Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN)

29

Civilian Operation Commander (CivOpCdr)

30

Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)

31

Watchkeeping Capability (WKC)

33

Field Actors

34

Overview

34

Host State

35

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

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EU Special Representative (EUSR)

36

Head of Mission (HoM)

37

Security Management Team (SMT)

38

Mission Security Officer (MSO) or Mission Security Focal Point

39

Wardens

42

Area Security Coordinators (ASC)


Applicability of Security Arrangements and Non-Compliance with Security-Related
Decisions and Instructions

43
45

Overview
Applicability of Security Arrangements

45
46

Non-compliance with Security-Related Decisions and Instructions

47

Risk Assessments and Risk Ratings

51

Security Phase System

55

Overview

55

Declaration and Implementation of Phases

56

Phase Zero - No Restrictions

58

Phase One - Precautionary

59

Phase Two - Restricted Movement

61

Phase Three - Relocation

63

Phase Four - Programme Suspension

65

Phase Five - Evacuation

66

Minimum Security Operating Standards (MSOS)


Overview
General Aspects

69
69
70

Legal Framework

71

Minimum Security Operating Standards

72

Linkage between MSOS and the SIAC Risk Ratings

73

Basic Concepts and Terminology

76

Low Risk

78

Overview

78

Low Risk - Telecommunications

79

Low Risk - Security Plan

81

Low Risk - Equipment

84

Medium Risk
Medium Risk - Telecommunications

85
86

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Medium Risk Security Plan and Equipment

88

High/Critical Risk

90

Office and Residence Security

92

Overview

92

Introduction

93

Office Security

94

Security of Residences of Mission Personnel

96

The Mission Security Plan

99

Overview

99

General Principles and PreImplementation of the Mission Security Plan

100

Overview

100

General Principles

101

Precautions to be Taken Before Implementing the Mission Security Plan

103

Guidelines for Preparation of a Mission Security Plan

105

Overview

105

Summary of Security Situation at EU Mission Location

106

Officials Responsible for Security

107

Listings of Mission Personnel for Security Purposes

108

Record of Personnel

109

Record of LocallyRecruited Mission Personnel

111

Division of Country/City into Zones

113

Communications

114

Selection of Coordination Centre/Concentration Point

116

116

Safe Havens

117

Essential Reserves/Supplies

120

Wardens

121

Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phase One

123

Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phase Two

124

Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phases Three, Four and Five

125

Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

126

Overview

126

Unauthorized Entry and Office Occupancy

127

Threatening Telephone Calls

130

Bomb Threats

131

Reporting Arrest or Detention of Mission Personnel or GSC staff

133

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

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Emergency Evacuation and Relocation Plan (EERP)

137

Overview

137

Document Status, Scope and Structure of the EERP

138

General Principles

140

Organisation and Responsibilities of the EMT

143

Emergency Management Team/Brussels (EMT/B)

147

Monitoring

148

Communication Structure

149

Relocation

150

Assembly Areas and Central Assembly Point

151

Departure Point

152

Exit Routes

153

At the Relocation Destination

155

Safe Havens

156

Safe Haven Checklist

IV

157

Action to Resume Operations after Initiating Evacuation and Emergency Relocation

158

Appendix - Contact List

159

Contingency Plans

161

Overview

161

Contingency Planning

162

Contingency Planning and Operations Planning

163

Planning Process

164

Security Incident Reporting

167

Overview

167

Field Security Policy Requirements

168

Reporting Security Incidents

170

Security Incidents in ESDP Missions: Handling at GSC Level

171

Security Incident Reporting System (SIRS)

172

EU Classified Information (EUCI)

173

Acronyms and Abbreviations

175

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October 2008

FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

Preface

Full title

Field Security Handbook for the protection of personnel, assets, resources and
information

Background

The arrangements in this Handbook have been developed by the Security


Office of the General Secretariat of the Council in support of the Policy of the
European Union on the security of personnel deployed outside the European
Union in an operational capacity under Title V of the Treaty on European
Union (document 9490/06).

Scope

While the above-mentioned Policy covers EU civilian and military crisis


management operations as well as EUSR deployments, this Handbook does
not cover military operations. However, the principles and standards it
contains should be reflected in the documentation applicable to such
operations.

Content and
intended
recipients

This Handbook therefore defines the guidelines for the organisation and
management of security in civilian deployments, under both ESDP missions
and EUSR teams.
As such, it should be made available to those responsible for the elements of
security described in it.

"Mission"

Throughout this Handbook, the term "mission" is used to refer to ESDP


missions and EUSR teams. To the extent that there is a difference, this is
defined clearly.

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

Generic Field Security Documents


Overview

Introduction

Apart from this Field Security Handbook, other documents define security
policies and standards which are common to all EU civilian crisis management
missions. This part presents such documents.

Contents

This part contains the following topics:


Topic
Field Security Policy
Guidelines for Mission Security Officers
Actions in the event of hostage-taking

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October 2008

Field Security Policy

Aim

The Council approved on 7 June 2006 a "Policy of the European Union on the
security of personnel deployed outside the European Union in an operational
capacity under Title V of the TEU" whose aim is to ensure that all reasonably
practicable measures are taken to protect personnel deployed outside the
European Union from harm and injury.
The current version of this Policy is set out in Council document 9490/06. It
is due to be revised in the course of 2008 in the light of lessons learned and to
take account of new structures in EU civilian crisis management.

"Field Security
Policy"

This Policy will be referred to hereafter as the "Field Security Policy".

Scope

Crisis management under the ESDP involves an array of resources contributed


by Member States and third States, the GSC, the European Commission and
the Mission itself under the relevant chain of command.
The Policy applies to all deployments of personnel to the field in preparation
for, or as part of, a crisis management operation or under the authority of an
EUSR - whether short or long term - including:
personnel assigned by contributing Member States or third States to a crisis
management operation (including fact-finding missions and CRT
deployments) or to an EUSR
international and local staff contracted under the authority of a HoM or
EUSR
GSC and other EU officials
national experts seconded to European institutions

Core measures

The Field Security Policy rests on integration between headquarters and the
field. Its core measures are the following:
risk assessment and security assessment, undertaken by the GSC
protective measures designed to ensure an operationally acceptable level of
security of personnel, assets (including premises, transport and
communication), resources and information in the area of operations, which
include:
- ensuring the visibility and distinctiveness of the mission from other actors
in the same area of operations
- concluding, whenever possible, a status of mission agreement with the host
State
Continuedon next page
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Field Security Policy, Continued

- applying a mission-specific security plan


- establishing a system to manage the movement of personnel to, from and
within the crisis area
- establishing appropriate medical care measures, including medical
evacuation
- training personnel in field security
- developing resources such as security guidelines and handbooks
- ensuring that appropriate insurance coverage is provided for all personnel
- ensuring the protection of EU classified information in accordance with
the Council's security regulations

Core measures
(continued)

a system for managing security incidents and their consequences, operational


on a 24/7 basis, both at headquarters and at field level
a relocation and evacuation plan, including means of extraction if necessary
an information strategy designed to communicate to and with the parties in
conflict, stakeholders and the local community
Roles,
responsibilities
and core tasks

The Field Security Policy clarifies the roles, responsibilities and core tasks for
the security of personnel respectively of:

the Host State


the Council
contributing Member States and third States
the GSC
the CivOpCdr
the EUSR
the HoM of a civilian operation

Note
The role, responsibilities and core tasks of the CivOpCdr are described in doc.
9919/07 and will be included in a revised Field Security Policy.
Individual
members

Such clarification of roles, responsibilities and tasks is, however, without


prejudice to the responsibility of individual members of a crisis management
operation for:
exercising common sense and good judgement with regard to their own
safety and security
complying with security rules, regulations, procedures and instructions

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FIELD SECURITY H A N D B O O K

October 2 0 0 8

Guidelines for Mission Security Officers


Introduction

The GSC will publish separately a document aimed at providing detailed


guidance to MSOs on the security management of EU civilian crisis
management missions.

Title and
publication

It will be titled "Guidelines for Mission Security Officers" and will be


published later in 2008.

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

October 2008

Actions in the Event of Hostage-Taking

Document

The Council will be invited to examine, later in 2008, a document aimed at


providing detailed guidance in the event of a hostagetaking scenario affecting
a mission.

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

Building up a Mission
Overview
Crisis
management
mission
documents

The Field Security Policy states that, "In the case of a crisis management
operation, the security dimension will be addressed when preparing the
planning documents, including the CONOPS and the OPLAN to be approved
by the Council, and the Joint Action (accompanied by a financial statement) to
be adopted by the Council. The resulting security measures will be elaborated
in a mission-specific security plan and apply to all personnel deployed as part
of the operation."

EUSR
documents

The Field Security Policy also provides that, "In the case of deployment of an
EUSR, the security dimension will be addressed in the Joint Action
(accompanied by a financial statement) on the appointment of the EUSR. The
resulting security measures will be implemented by the EUSR on the basis of
an assessment of security arrangements for him or herself and assigned
personnel in the field."

Contents

This part briefly explains the build-up process for a mission and, in particular,
how security considerations are reflected in that process and in the
corresponding documents.
Note

The process described here is subject to adjustments in the near future,


depending on changes in the overall mission establishment procedures.
This part contains the following topics:
Topic
The Security Dimension in Planning Documents and
Mission Documents
Exploratory Mission Report
Fact-Finding Mission Report
Technical Fact-Finding Mission Report
Crisis Management Concept and CONOPS
Council Joint Action
OPLAN
Mission Security Plan
Evacuation Plan, Contingency Plans and SOPs

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11
12
13
14
15
16
17
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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

The Security Dimension in Planning Documents and Mission


Documents

Introduction

A specific document corresponds to every stage in a mission's buildup


process. The table below names such documents and indicates the security
elements contained in them.
Stage
Exploratory mission
Factfinding mission
Technical fact
finding mission

Crisis management
document
Report
Report
Report
CMC
CONOPS
Council Joint Action

Mission planning
team

OPLAN

Mission

MSP

Security elements/
documents
Preliminary security
assessment
Security assessment
Security recommendations
Draft security management
concept
Draft missionspecific SOS
and SORS
Security organisation
Release ofEUCI to third
parties
Security management
concept
Missionspecific SOS and
SORS
SOPs
Contingency Plans
Evacuation and Relocation
Plans

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

October 2008

Exploratory Mission Report

Exploratory
mission

Exploratory missions usually include security experts from the GSC Security
Office, who will establish tentative relations with UN agencies/UNDSS,
LEAs, NGOs, Member States' representatives and relevant security staff of the
European Commission to determine the general security environment, threat
analysis, security risk assessments, highlighting up front as many of the
potential security issues, in broad terms, that any mission in the area is likely
to face.

Report

Upon returning from the exploratory mission, each member presents a


completed checklist of elements he/she had to verify and contributes to the
final report of the mission. This report serves as the basis for any ensuing
political decision and for the possible decision to continue with the dispatching
of the fact-finding mission and the planning of the operation.

Security
elements in the
report

Based upon the feed-back provided by agencies already in-country, the


security elements usually covered in the exploratory mission are as follows:

security climate and risk assessment


communications
specific threats
to the extent they can be identified, security-related issues for which
contingencies will have to be developed
the degree to which MSOS are applicable and specific areas which may
require potential upgrades
country-specific requirements not envisaged by MSOS

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

Fact-Finding Mission Report

Fact-finding
mission

Once the attention of the EU and, in particular, of the PSC is drawn to a


mounting crisis, the GSC, together with the Commission where appropriate,
may dispatch a fact-finding mission to the field to verify facts and to assess the
need for further EU action.
Fact-finding missions usually include security experts from the GSC Security
Office.

Report

Upon returning from the fact-finding mission, each member presents a


completed checklist of elements he/she had to verify and contributes to the
final report of the mission. This report serves as a basis for any ensuing
political decision and for the possible decision to continue with the planning of
the operation and the dispatching of a technical fact-finding mission.

Security
elements in the
report

The security elements usually covered in the fact-finding mission report are as
follows:

security risk assessment


natural conditions
transportation
humanitarian situation
conflicts
terrorist activity
corruption
organised crime activity
common crime
gender discrimination
foreign intelligence activity
foreign interests in the area
missions by other international organisations in the same area
border control
presence in neighbouring countries of potentially hostile elements
communications

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October 2008

Technical Fact-Finding Mission Report

Technical factfinding mission

On the basis of the fact-finding mission's report, the PSC has additional
elements to evaluate the launching of an operation. When a political
agreement has been reached among Member States, a technical fact-finding
mission is sent to the crisis area to assess the technical and organisational
aspects of the deployment of the operation.
Technical fact-finding missions may include a security expert from the
Security Office's Engineering Sector. Depending on the size and scope of the
mission, a representative from the External Protection Section of the GSC
Security Office may also be present.

Report

Upon returning from the technical fact-finding mission, each member presents
a completed checklist of elements he/she had to verify and contributes to the
final report of the mission. This report serves as a basis for the subsequent
elaboration of the operation's needs in terms of:
budget
procurement
personnel

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Crisis Management Concept and CONOPS


Crisis
management
concept (CMC)

On the basis of the fact-finding mission report, a CMC is developed. It sets


down the EU's political interest and political objectives as well as the options
for a n overall EU response to a crisis. It highlights the recommended
comprehensive course of action.

Concept of
operation
(CONOPS)

On the basis of the CMC and the decision to take action, a CONOPS is
developed. That document can be seen as the detailed mandate of the Council
t 0 the HoM.
Compared to the CMC, the CONOPS contains more detailed provisions on
technical aspects:
personnel
logistics
CIS
procurement
security, etc.

Security
elements in the
CONOPS
Responsibility
for drafting
security
elements

draft security management concept


security recommendations for the mission-specific SOS ("MS-SOS")

At this stage the GSC Security Office, working in collaboration with CPCC, is
responsible for interpreting security policy and defining the security
component of the CONOPS based upon previous findings made during the
earlier fact-finding and technical verification missions.

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October 2 0 0 8

Council Joint Action


Definition

The Council Joint Action establishing a mission is the legal cornerstone ofthat
mission, as it constitutes a legally binding decision. It provides the mandate
for the mission, defines strategic options and the financial reference amount.

Security
elements in the
Joint Action

A Joint Action typically contains two articles on security:


o n e j s titled "Security". It defines the main roles and responsibilities
(CivOpCdr, HoM, GSC Security Office, possibly MSO) and the basic
arrangements for the security of the mission
the other is titled "Release of classified information". It defines the scope
and the maximum level of EU classified information generated for the
purposes of the mission which may be released to third parties such as:
- Host State, or
- third States/organisations contributing to the mission

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October 2008

OPLAN

Definition

The OPLAN is the key document for the conduct of the operation as such. It
can be seen as the response of the HoM on how he/she intends to implement
the mandate conferred by the Council. Consequently, it is the HoM and
his/her Planning Team who draft the OPLAN working with the CPCC.
The OPLAN is as detailed as possible as to the implementation of the
operation and contains detailed technical annexes on:
personnel
logistics
CIS
procurement
security, etc.

Security

The security management concept of the operation is defined in the OPLAN.

elements in the

OPLAN

r/he OPLAN also contains, as an annex, the MSSOS, established on the basis
of the GSC Security Office recommendations and contained in the CONOPS.
It is worth noting that at this stage, the HoM is presenting the effective
business case for:
the upgrade of the MSOS applicable to the riskrating provided by SIAC (or
other appropriate risk rating for risk not covered by the SIAC report), or
the introduction of new MSSOS
This is based upon the identification of other specific direct/indirect threats
against which new risk mitigation are deemed appropriate and necessary.
These MSSOS should never fall below the standards set by MSOS. To the
extent that MSSOS is considered a variation of MSOS, GSC Security Office
validation of the new measures must be obtained. GSC Security Office
reserves the right not to accept any such variations which it deems jeopardises
the EUs duty of care requirements..
To the extent that MSSOS is considered an enhancement of MSOS, it is
CPCC responsibility, in the case of an ESDP mission, to consider the
technical, financial and procurement implications for such enhancements and
recommend accordingly. In this instance the GSC Security Office need only
be informed of the upgrade in order to validate it.

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October 2008

Mission Security Plan

Definition

The MSP describes the security arrangements for the daily activity of the
Mission as well as for emergency situations such as:

hostilities
accidents
major public disorder
natural disasters
missing persons
abduction, etc.

Living
document

The mission security plan is a living document which is destined to evolve in


accordance with any modifications in the aims and tasks of a mission as well
as with the security situation in the mission area.

Further
guidance

Detailed guidance on the contents and preparation of a security plan is given


on page 99 et seq..

Responsibility
for drafting the
Security Plan

Using a GSC Security Office approved template, responsibility for assisting


the HoM or EUSR with drafting the Security Plan lies with the mission's
MSO.
Mission Security Plans are reviewed and validated by the SGC Security
Office.

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

Evacuation Plan, Contingency Plans and SOPs

General

The evacuation plan, contingency plans and SOPs are essential parts of the
MSP.

Evacuation plan In order to ensure the state of preparedness of a mission to respond to an


imminent threat, the mission planning team prepares an evacuation plan.
It is a living document which continues to evolve during the lifetime of a
mission.
Further
guidance

Detailed guidance on the contents and preparation of an evacuation plan is


given on page 137 et seq..

Contingency
plans

In order to endure its state of preparedness to respond to unforeseeable


circumstances, the mission planning team develops contingency plans in
parallel with its evacuation plan.
These may cover circumstances including, but not limited to:

natural disaster
fire
pandemic
public disorder
kidnapping
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FIELD SECURITY H A N D B O O K

October 2 0 0 8

Evacuation Plan, Contingency Plans and SOPs, continued

SOPs

As part of its security management, the mission - more specifically, the MSO
- develops its own SOPs to describe the exact actions to be taken by specified
personnel in any given circumstances within the relevant country.
SOPs include, but are not limited to:

travel management
accreditation of visitors
management of classified information
fire prevention
leave procedures
real life support
communications
reporting
guard orders
bomb threats
ambush attack
illegal check points

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October 2008

Security Roles, Responsibilities and Tasks


Overview

Introduction

Responsibility for planning and launching a mission and for managing such a
mission is shared by many actors, both at the GSC and in the field.
This part first outlines the chain of command/authority and communication for
ESDP missions and EUSR teams. It then goes on to describe the roles,
responsibilities and tasks of the actors involved in planning and managing the
security of a mission.

Contents

This part contains the following topics:


Topic
Chain of command and communication
GSC Actors
Field Actors

See Page
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25
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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

Chain of Command and Communication


Overview
Introduction

With the exception of the strategic and political level, the overall chain of
command/authority and communication is different for ESDP missions and
EUSR teams.
This chapter presents this chain in a schematic form.

Contents

This chapter contains the following topics:


Topic
ESDP Missions
EUSR Teams

See Page
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24

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October 2008

FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

ESDP Missions

Political Control and Strategic


Direction

Council

PSC

SG/HR

CivOpCdr

CPCC
GSC
Security
Office

t
WKC
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Chain of Command
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October 2008

FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

EUSR Teams

Strategic Guidance and Political


Direction

Council

PSC

SG/HR

GSC Security Office


Authority and operational
direction

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October 2008

FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

GSC Actors
Overview

Introduction

The role of the GSC in planning and managing the security of a mission is
described in the Field Security Policy and, as far as the Security Office is
concerned, in its mandate.
This chapter describes the roles, responsibilities and tasks of each of the actors
involved.

Contents

This chapter contains the following topics:


Topic
GSC Security Office
EU Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN)
Civilian Operation Commander (CivOpCdr)
Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)
Watchkeeping Capability (WKC)

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29
30
31
33

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

October 2008

GSC Security Office

Mandate of the
GSC Security
Office

Pursuant to article 14 of Decision 198/03 of the SG/HR:


"For the deployment of civilian GSC personnel and - as appropriate - civilian
member State personnel in the context of missions or field activities
undertaken within CFSP, the GSC Security Office shall - without prejudice to
the specific responsibility for mission security of the Head of Mission - be
responsible for drawing up security policy and standards for all such missions
and field activities.
To that effect the GSC Security Office will:
as appropriate, be included in all mission preparation discussions and ensure
that all security-related requirements relative to the security of the mission,
its staff and its assets and resources are met
be responsible for developing and implementing generic Field Security
Directives and supporting procedures for the aforementioned missions and
field activities and for gauging their effectiveness
contribute to the development of security requirements for Agreements or
Arrangements with the Host State relative to the security of the EU-led
mission
contribute to the definition of the profiles for local contract security staff and
- where such staff needs to be hired - participate in the planning of the
recruitment and the selection of such staff in co-ordination with the mission's
staffing section
ensure that mission staff receives the appropriate briefings relative to their
personal security
conduct evaluations - or cause evaluations to be conducted - relative to the
security requirements for the protection of EUSRs
carry out inspections as appropriate to ensure compliance with the Security
Regulations and Field Security Directives and supporting procedures."
conduct investigations following security incidents to determine causes and
review possible "lessons identified" in order to be able to promulgate
appropriate measures and requirements/recommendations aimed at avoiding
re-occurrence

Training

Additionally, the GSC Security Office organises and manages all GSC field
security training programmes and related issues for preparatory actions and
assists both ESDP and EUSR missions in managing their responsibilities in
this respect.
Continuedon next page

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FIELD SECURITY

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October 2008

GSC Security Office, continued

Monitoring and
compliance
verification

The Security Office also exercises a monitoring and compliance verification


role, by conducting field security compliance/assessment visits, which may
result in adapted or new security recommendations aimed at reinforcing the
security and safety of EU staffin line with the principle of duty of care.

How often

Follow-up security assessments are carried out as part of a Council-agreed


compliance verification plan and in the event of a serious breach of the
security of the mission.

Report

Following the assessment, the GSC Security Office produces a "Security


Compliance Report" which is forwarded to (as appropriate):
the mission
the SG/HR
the PSC
the CivOpCdr

Recommendations

The report includes security recommendations which consist of a list of


security measures to be adopted by the HoM or EUSR. Recommendations
have three levels of classification, according to their mandatory or optional
nature and to the timing for their implementation, as follows:
Level 1 Essential security measures which require immediate
implementation. These are measures which mitigate unacceptable
risk to the personal security of the EUSRSC's mission and that of
his staff or they are cost-effective "quick-wins" aimed at
enhancing the mission's overall general security environment.
Level 2 Necessary security measures which can be budgeted/implemented
in the medium term. In the intervening time, the EUSRSC has to
define compensatory measures in the specific security plan to
mitigate.
Level 3 The risk exists but the probability is low. Recommended security
measures can be implemented at the discretion of the EUSRSC.
Continuedon next page

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_____

October 2008

GSC Security Office, Continued

Security Office
support

The GSC Security Office has expertise in a variety of areas which can be
drawn on by missions and EUSRs on request as detailed hereafter:
Internal Protection:
- personal protection
- hostage situation management
Security Engineering and Logistics:
- selection of mission locations
- drawing up functional and technical specifications for buildings and
security systems
EUCI Security and Investigations:
- providing advice on the protection of EU classified information
- assistance with technical sweeping
- assistance with management of security clearance process

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EU Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN)

Risk assessment The Field Security Policy specifically attributes to the SITCEN action through
and risk rating the Single Intelligence Analysis Capability ("SIAC") the responsibility for
providing the Council with a risk assessment, including defined risk ratings, of
the threat against personnel in an intended area of operation to help the
Council to take a view on security measures required before establishing a
crisis management operation.
To allow missions to react appropriately to situations as they develop, it is
against these risk ratings, and others as appropriate and necessary if particular
risks are not covered by the SIAC assessment, that the generic MSOS
requirements are broadly defined. The MS-SOS define the specific risk
mitigation measures aimed at reducing the known risks associated with theatre
of operations.

Communication

SITCEN operates as a communications hub available 24/7. Within the GSC,


the SITCEN is responsible for world-wide monitoring and assessment of the
political and security situation and for keeping key officials in EU institutions
and Member States informed thereof. All security incidents relating to GSC
staff, EUSR missions and their staff or visitors should be reported to SITCEN.
This is distinct from the WKC to which incidents relating to ESDP missions,
their staff and visitors should be reported.

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Civilian Operation Commander (CivOpCdr)

Overall
responsibility

The Civilian Operation Commander has overall responsibility for ensuring that
the EU's duty of care with regard to personnel safety and security is properly
discharged in ESDP missions in accordance with the Field Security Policy and
its supporting standards documentation. This also applies where the EU
provides a civilian support component to an operation led by another
international organisation.

Support to HoM He/she assists in the HoM's planning of security measures for personnel,
assets, resources and information within the mission area.

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Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)

Guidance and
advice

On the CivOpCdr's behalf, the CPCC will conduct the tasks in the field
security area such as the budgeting and logistical planning of the
implementation of agreed security requirements and advise on the measures
and solutions to meet those security requirements.

Horizontal
activity

assisting missions with the implementation of agreed or required security


measures stemming from the CONOPS and OPLAN and with the
implementation of the measures set out in this Manual
facilitating information exchange with the GSC Security Office in order to
contribute to the continuous improvement of field security conditions and
suggesting corrective action where necessary
without prejudice to the Inter-Institutional Working Groups mandate and
existing GSC Security Office- EC Security Directorate - DG RELEX K8
liaison, coordinate with the European Commission, DG RELEX K8
(Security) as appropriate
preparing the field security related aspects of directives, orders and
instructions issued by the CivOpCdr or his/her Deputy/Chief-of-staff to the
HoMs and ensure their compatibility with established field security policy
and supporting documentation
without prejudice to the annual field security compliance verification
conducted by the Security Office as part of a Council-approved plan,
conducting security-related visits to missions as appropriate

Activity in
collaboration
with the
Security Office

providing input for the mission-specific security aspects of Civilian Strategic


Options
providing a Plan of Necessities to cover mission security needs, including a
cost estimate
providing input for the mission-specific security aspects of the CONOPS
assisting HoMs in developing the security aspects of their OPLAN
assisting the Planning Cell with all other field security-related
implementation planning issues
Continued on next page

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Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), Continued

Operations
support activity

assisting in the implementation of planned field security measures for


civilian ESDP missions
as appropriate, requesting and processing information related to the safety
and security of ESDP missions
reporting on relevant security risks and incidents in mission areas
assessing the readiness of mission evacuation plans
liaising with the GSC Security Office in order to ensure that mission security
plans are correctly implemented
assisting the Security Office in exercising their responsibility under art. 14 of
SG/HR decision 198/03 with regard to the recruitment and selection process
of security personnel for ESDP missions
supporting and advising the MSO 24/7

Review/closure

assisting and advising, as far as field security-related aspects are concerned,


on possible refocusing or termination of civilian ESDP missions

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Watchkeeping Capability (WKC)

Presentation

The WKC provides a 24/7 capability to monitor ESDP operations to ensure


the passage of operation-specific information in a systematic way. This
includes reception and transmission of all relevant information to the
competent GSC departments, and tracking that a timely response is given. In
the case of incidents or crises, the WKC ensures the immediate circulation of
information that needs to be brought to the attention of the relevant Brusselsbased actors.

Reporting
security
incidents

All security incidents relating to ESDP missions, their staff or visitors should
be reported to the WKC. This is distinct from the SITCEN to which incidents
relating to GSC staff, EUSR missions, their staff and visitors should be
reported. ~

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Field Actors
Overview
Introduction

The Field Security Policy describes the roles, responsibilities and core tasks
incumbent on the actors present in the field.
This chapter presents such roles, responsibilities and tasks.

Contents

This chapter contains the following topics:


Topic
Host State
EU Special Representative (EUSR)
Head of Mission (HoM)
Security Management Team (SMT)
Mission Security Officer (MSO) or Mission Security
Focal Point
Wardens
Area Security Coordinators (ASC)

See Page
35
36
37
38
39
42
43

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Host State

Primary
responsibility

Where consent has been given for a crisis management mission, the
government of the Host State has the primary responsibility for ensuring the
security and safety of personnel travelling or deployed within its borders in the
context of a crisis management mission.
This responsibility flows from every government's inherent function of
maintaining order and protecting persons and property within its jurisdiction.

Provisions to be Where possible, the EU shall conclude a SOMA or MoU with the Host State
agreed with
in question.
Host State
Privileges and
immunities

EU's own
measures

EU crisis management operations' personnel or those involved in preparatory


missions are entitled to enjoy the privileges and immunities that are
necessary for the fulfilment of their mission and the independent exercise of
their functions
EU personnel shall be given the same repatriation facilities in time of
international crisis as diplomatic envoys
the premises of the EU crisis management mission, EUSR missions or
preparatory missions shall be "inviolable"
mission assets, resources and information, wherever located and by
whomsoever held, will be immune from any form of interference
This does not obviate the requirement for the EU to take adequate steps of its
own to ensure the security of its personnel, particularly where state authority is
limited or non-existent.

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EU Special Representative (EUSR)


Appointment

EUSRs are appointed through a Council Joint Action.

Characteristics
of EUSR
missions

An EUSR may have a support team in the country (or one of the countries)
covered by his/her mandate. The number of people in a support team is
variable.

General
responsibility

In accordance with the Field Security Policy, the EUSR will, in relation to the
security of personnel, take all reasonably practicable measures, in conformity
with his/her mandate and the security situation in his/her geographical area of
responsibility, for the security of personnel under his/her direct authority, by
applying, mutatis mutandis, the specific measures incumbent upon a HoM
listed on page 37 below.

Specific
responsibilities

Besides, he/she will ensure that any recommendations made following security
assessments are implemented and provide written reports at regular intervals
on their implementation and on other security issues to the SG/HR, the
Council and the Commission.

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Head of Mission (HoM)

Appointment

HoMs for EU civilian crisis management operations are appointed through a


PSC Decision.

General
responsibility

The HoM is responsible and accountable for the security management of


his/her mission. He/she will take all reasonably practicable measures, in
conformity with his/her mandate and the security situation in the area of
operation, for the security of personnel under his/her authority.

Specific
responsibilities

Besides, the HoM will:


set out a security management strategy, and core elements for its
implementation, as an annex to the mission OPLAN
establish a detailed mission-specific security plan, on the basis of the generic
guidelines set out from page 105 of this Handbook, to include inter alia:
- mission specific security measures and operating procedures
- management of the movement of personnel to, and within, the mission area
- a mission evacuation plan
operate an effective 24/7 system for managing security incidents within the
operation, including medical emergencies
make sure that all personnel deployed in the crisis management operation are
covered by a high risk insurance as required by the conditions in the mission
area
include security as part of the mission induction training, in accordance with
guidelines on a core curriculum provided by the Security Office, to be
received by all members deployed in the crisis management operation before
or upon arriving in the mission area of operations
ensure that any recommendations made following security assessments are
implemented and provide written reports at regular intervals on their
implementation and on other security issues to the SG/HR, the Council and
the Commission
ensure that the numbers of staff and authorised visitors to the mission never
exceeds the mission's capability to ensure their safety and security in general
(i.e. secure transport means) and more specifically in terms of a mission's
capabilities to manage the medical and emergency evacuation of its staff and
authorised visitors

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Security Management Team (SMT)

Constitution

The constitution of an SMT is provided:


for a civilian crisis management operation, in the relevant CONOPS
for an EUSR, in the Council Joint Action or as a consequence of the tasks
included in it

Role

Composition

The SMT advises the HoM or EUSR on all security-related matters.

a
Ide lly such a team includes (non-limitative list):

Adjusted
composition

the HoM or EUSR


his/her appointed deputy
the MSO
a ny mission personnel which by training, background or experience can
contribute to the team
a medical officer
mission personnel familiar with local conditions and the local la ngua ge(s)
mission personnel with a legal background
a press officer

The HoM or EUSR is expected to adjust the composition of the SMT in


a
rel tion to the particular nature of an emergency.

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Mission Security Officer (MSO) or Mission Security Focal


Point

Mission Security When required by MS- SOS or by the GSC Security Office's security
Officer
assessment, an MSO will be appointed. This individual will be a professional
security technician.
In accordance with article 14 of SG/HR Decision 198/03 and to ensure that the
candidates have the security technical skills needed for this critical position,
the GSC Security Office will participate in the selection process of MSO
candidates.
Responsibilities
of the MSO

Coordination
and reporting
responsibilities

The MSO, directly accountable to the HoM or EUSR, will be responsible


for managing all physical, organizational and procedural measures related to
the safety and security of mission staff as described below.
The MSO's coordinating and reporting responsibilities are as follows:
assist the HoM or EUSR in the execution of his/her responsibilities with
regard to the security of personnel, assets, resources and information
cooperate closely on security matters with the CPCC and with the GSC
Security Office
develop good contacts with the Host State's law enforcement agencies with
a view to obtaining the best possible protection for ESDP mission personnel
and for the mission's assets, resources and information
identify and report potential security hazards
report all cases in which mission personnel or visitors have been victims of
conventional crime and report on such cases through the established chain
of communication
operate the post-security incident reporting system (SIRS)
serve as a member of the SMT
Continuedon next page

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Mission Security Officer (MSO) or Mission Security Focal


Point, Continued

Personnelrelated
responsibilities

The MSO's personnel-related responsibilities are as follows:


conduct regular appropriate exercises (e.g., fire drills, communications
tests) to ensure staff preparedness for emergencies (e.g., earthquakes)
ensure that mission personnel are kept informed on matters affecting their
security and that appropriate arrangements are made for briefing newlyarrived mission personnel, including hostile environment security training
Maintain up-to-date, detailed instructions for mission personnel on the
precautions they should take in relation to the implementation of the security
plan, including a comprehensive listing of emergency supplies they should
have on hand and guidance on the behaviour during a variety of emergencies,
including natural disasters and political crises.

Security and
confidentiality
responsibilities

The MSO's security and confidentiality responsibilities are as follows:


develop, and keep updated, a mission specific security plan, contingency
plans, SOPs and security listings of mission personnel
ensure that plans for relocation/evacuation to a safe haven are current and
can be implemented
keep MS-SOS and MS-SORS updated
conduct security surveys of residential areas and premises
ensure that the appropriate level of confidentiality is maintained with regard
to security matters and ensure the application of the basic principles and
minimum standards of security regarding EU classified information as per
Council Decision 2001/264/EC

Mission Security In EU crisis management operations without a dedicated MSO, the HoM or
Focal Point
EUSR will designate a Mission Security Focal Point to assist him with the
above responsibilities.
In this case the HoM or EUSR may:
ask the CPCC GSC Security Office, as appropriate, to provide punctual
advice on security matters affecting the mission, or
request the CPCC or GSC Security Office, send an expert to:
- to provide on-the-spot advice
- to assess security requirements, or to provide support when necessary
Continued on next page

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Mission Security Officer (MSO) or Mission Security Focal


Point, Continued

Relationship
The MSO may seek CPCC assistance with respect to planning the
with CPCC
implementation of agreed security measures. CPCC shall be responsible for
(ESDP missions) the processing of security information and, where necessary, reporting it to or
seeking advice from the GSC Security Office. Similarly, the CPCC shall be
responsible for reviewing and giving the necessary approvals, as appropriate,
to upgrades to MS-SOS. Such approvals must be conveyed to the GSC
Security Office for final acknowledgement and validation as appropriate.

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Wardens

Introduction

When required by the size of an ESDP mission and in order to facilitate


coordination of the security arrangements, information and instructions, the
HoM will, in consultation with the SMT, appoint a number of wardens (and
where necessary deputy wardens). To the extent that it is feasible and indeed
practicable, where an EUSR has mission staff in the same country,
arrangements will be made to include those mission staffunder the mission's
warden umbrella except in those cases where a separate arrangement is
deemed appropriate by the EUSR.
Each of the wardens will ensure the proper implementation of the security plan
in a particular predetermined zone.

Zone covered

The zone covered by a warden should preferably be small enough to enable


him/her to reach mission personnel by any available means in case of an
emergency. For reasons of practicality, the area covered by a warden should
preferably not be larger than would be enable him/her to reach mission
members on foot within one hour, in case of an emergency.

Duties

The warden has the following duties and responsibilities (in addition to his/her
other responsibilities as a member of the mission):
function as a channel of communication between the HoM and mission
personnel in his/her zone
keep the MSO permanently informed of any events or information which
might affect the security conditions of the mission
ensure that mission personnel in his/her zone are informed with regard to
security arrangements and emergency phases in effect
check to see that instructions on precautionary measures are being followed
ensure that one person is designated to maintain contact with visitors to the
mission residing temporarily at hotels within the warden's zone
carry out other duties as assigned by the HoM or their MSO

Instructions

Instructions to wardens are contained from page 121 below, under "The
Mission Security Plan".

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Area Security Coordinators (ASC)

Rationale

Some of the larger countries have specific areas that are separate from the
mission headquarters in terms of both distance and exposure to emergencies.
For such areas, the HoM, in consultation with the SMT, will appoint an ASC.

Who is it?

If necessary, the ASC may be a deputy MSO and have responsibilities similar
to those of the MSO.
For areas where this is not necessary, coordination of security matters may be
exercised by an individual officially designated by the HoM for that purpose.

Responsibilities

The ASC, on the HoM's behalf, coordinates and controls the security
arrangements for the area, including the appointment of wardens.
As regards field security, ASCs have responsibilities similar to those of the
MSO and report to the MSO on security issues.
In addition, they keep the MSO continuously informed with regard to
incidents or developments in the area which have a bearing on the security and
protection of mission personnel, assets, resources and information.

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Applicability of Security Arrangements and Non-Compliance


with Security-Related Decisions and Instructions
Overview

Contents

This part contains the following topics:


Topic
Applicability of Security Arrangements
Non-compliance with Security-Related Decisions and
Instructions

See Page
46
47

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Applicability of Security Arrangements


Applicability

The provisions of this handbook apply to all deployments of personnel to the


field in preparation for, or as part of a crisis management operation, including:
personnel assigned by contributing Member States or third States to a crisis
management operation or to an EUSR
international and local staff contracted under the authority of a HoM or
EUSR
GSC and other EU Officials
National Experts seconded to European institutions

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Non-compliance with Security-Related Decisions and


Instructions

Non-compliance The following table describes what happens when EU crisis management
with instructions mission personnel refuse to comply with the instructions of the HoM/EUSR:
Stage
1

Description
The personnel should be informed, in writing, that their action
may be considered as an act of defiance and that failure to
comply with security and protection arrangements may result in
the institution of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of
disciplinary measures as provided for in the relevant regulations.
If, after this notice, a member of personnel still refuses to comply
with the instructions, he/she/they should be informed that they do
so at their own risk and that it may not be possible to include
them in any subsequent relocation/evacuation arrangements.

letters should be forwarded to the GSC Security Office, via the CPCC in the
case of ESDP mission members (see sample letters on the next page)
it is the responsibility of the HoM/EUSR to ensure compliance in this
regard since any insurance benefits which have been negotiated especially
for specific hazardous missions may not be applicable if mission
personnel refuses to comply with security instructions
Mission vs.
national
instructions

Relocations/evacuations ordered by the SG/HR / CivOpCdr may not


necessarily coincide in extent and timing with those recommended by Member
States' representations.
ESDP mission personnel and personnel deployed as part of EUSR teams
should always follow the instructions of their respective chain of
command/authority. By not following such instructions, an individual engages
his own responsibility and accountability.
Continuedon next page

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Non-compliance with Security-Related Decisions and


Instructions, Continued

Sample letter:
First Notice

First Notice

Date:
To:
(if applicable)

Through:
From:

The Head of Mission

Subject:

Compliance with EU Field Security Arrangements

Compliance with the safety and security regulations to protect the assets,
resources and information of the mission is mandatory. I would urge you to
follow my instructions with regard to the implementation of the Mission
Security Plan. Furthermore, I would remind you that non-compliance may
have serious consequences and may possibly entail referral to your parent
organisation or the institution of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition
of disciplinary measures as provided in the relevant regulations.

Receipt acknowledged or verified:

Date / Time:

Continued on next page

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Non-compliance with Security-Related Decisions and


Instructions, Continued

Sample letter:
Second Notice

Second Notice

Date:
To:
Through:

(if applicable)

From:

The Head of Mission

Subject:

Compliance with EU Field Security Arrangements

Following receipt of the first notice of your non-compliance with securityrelated decisions and instructions dated [...], it is my duty as Head of Mission
to inform you that any personnel refusing to comply with my security
directives is jeopardising the protection of the personnel, assets, resources and
overall security of the mission.
You are hereby formally informed that any further failure to comply with the
Mission Security Plan will be at your own risk, and that it may not be
possible to include you in subsequent evacuation arrangements. Further, I
must point out that by refusal to comply, the EU will be relieved of further
responsibility.
Receipt acknowledged or verified:

Date/Time:

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Risk Assessments and Risk Ratings


Background

Points 13 and 36(b) of the Field Security Policy require the GSC
(SITCEN/SIAC) to define risk ratings. These , and others as appropriate when
particular risk are not assessed by the SIAC reports, will guide the level of
physical and procedural protection measures, consistent with MSOS, to be
provided for in preparing and conducting crisis management operations. SIAC
risk ratings also determine the level of risk allowances for mission personnel.

Risk ratings

The following five risk ratings have accordingly been defined (cf. doc.
11422/06) regarding:
the nature of direct threat against an EU presence in the field (i.e. mission,
staff and infrastructure), and
the nature of indirect threat arising from the local environment:
NEGLIGIBLE
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
CRITICAL

no indications of threats and no prospect of such threats


materialising in the short term
benign environment
very limited indications of threats, but unlikely to
materialise in the short term
generally benign environment
limited indications of threats to materialise in the short
term
partially hostile general environment
clear indications of threats likely to materialise in the
short term (but no specific time frame and/or target)
hostile general environment
clear indications of imminent threats very likely to
materialise within a specific time frame and/or against a
specified target
highly hazardous general environment

To allow missions to react to situations appropriately as they develop, it is


against these risk ratings that the generic MSOS requirements are broadly
defined. However, for the purposes of clarity, it is the MS-SOS which will
define the specific mitigation measures recommended to reduce the risk
associated with specific threats identified within the relevant geographic
location.

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Criteria used

The following criteria are used by the GSC for determining the ratings
included in its risk assessments:

Internal situation

International situation

Terrorism

Organised crime

Health/medical

Attractiveness of EU
mission as a target

On ratings

socio-political instability
brutal changes after elections
internal armed conflict
failing security apparatus
military disorganisation
ethnic disorders
religious disorders
poor economy
local weaknesses at the infrastructure level (road
network)
hostile environment and armed conflicts; and
presence of EOD devices (mines, explosives,
booby traps)
hostile environment
armed conflicts
territorial claims
incursions of armed bands
domestic
international
capabilities and intentions of the concerned groups
logistical support in the population and/or the
neighbouring countries
clear threats
history of attacks against international presence
(including modus operandi)
operating environment
level of corruption
trafficking (either as hub or transit route)
money laundering
arms smuggling
links with terrorism
proclivity to natural disasters
pandemics
poor humanitarian situation in the
country/neighbouring countries
infrastructure (hospitals, clinics, medical
assistance)
for local opponents
for domestic or internationally operating terrorists

Risk assessments will always provide ONE overall rating amalgamating the
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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

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risks in each area. Depending on circumstances, they may also highlight the
ratings for one or more of the most significant risk components.
The SIAC risk ratings are provided in a scheduled basis and updated
appropriately.

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Security Phase System


Overview
Introduction

The security phase system serves the purpose of adopting security procedures
commensurate with the current situation in the area of activity and/or
deployment of a mission.

Contents

This part contains the following topics:


Topic
Declaration and Implementation of Phases
Phase Zero - No Restrictions
Phase One - Precautionary
Phase Two - Restricted Movement
Phase Three - Relocation
Phase Four - Programme Suspension
Phase Five - Evacuation

See Page
56
58
59
61
63
65
66

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Declaration and Implementation of Phases

Deciding a
phase change

Decisions on phase changes are based:


either on an area-specific imminent risk established by the HoM or EUSR, or
on a change in the risk rating attributed by the SITCEN (SIAC) to a
particular area of operations

Maintaining a
status board

The CivOpCdr shall be responsible for informing the SG/HR of the status of
security phases for all mission areas in his weekly report.
CPCC shall be responsible for maintaining a full status board of the security
phases relevant to each area covered by ESDP missions. This is to be updated
on a weekly basis and a consolidated report submitted to the GSC Security
Office.
The EUSRs shall each be responsible for submitting to the GSC Security
Office, on a weekly basis, the relevant security phase in place in the areas
covered by their missions. The GSC Security Office shall, in turn, submit a
consolidated report to the SG/HR. The GSC Security Office shall maintain a
consolidated security phase status board for each ESDP and EUSR mission.
This shall be shared with DGAIB to notify all other GSC staff possibly
travelling to the country in question.

Order of phases Phases should be implemented as the situation dictates.


Different phases In geographically scattered missions, different locations may be under
in same country different phases.
Different
In the same country, different missions may be in different phases, according
missions in same to their specific risk level.
country
Continued on next page

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Declaration and Implementation of Phases, Continued

Declaring a

Security Phase

When moving up to a higher phase, the phase declaration is decided as shown


on the table below:
Phase
One
Two
Three
Four
Five

Urgency

On recommendation of And notified as


appropriate to
HoM or EUSR SMT
SITCEN/WKC
HoM or EUSR SMT
SITCEN/WKC
HoM or EUSR SMT
SITCEN/WKC
SITCEN/WKC
HoM or EUSR
PSC / SG/HR
SITCEN/WKC
PSC / SG/HR HoM or EUSR
Declared by

If the situation so requires and/or if it is impossible to reach the CivOpCdr in


time, the HoM may declare Phase Four or Five and inform the CivOpCdr as
soon as possible thereafter in the case of an ESDP mission.
The CivOpCdr will inform the SG/HR, who will confirm such declaration as
soon as possible.
If the situation so requires and/or if it is impossible to reach the SG/HR in
time, the EUSR may declare Phase Four or Five and inform the SG/HR as
soon as possible thereafter in the case of an EUSR mission. The SG/HR will
confirm such declaration as soon as possible.

EUSR

An EUSR may only declare a change of phase for his/her own mission or
support team.

Reduction of
security phases

As soon as the situation allows, a risk assessment must be undertaken by the


HoM or the EUSR, supported by their competent personnel in-country,
together with the GSC Security Office, and CPCC as appropriate, to determine
the appropriateness of reducing the security phase.

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Phase Zero - No Restrictions

Definition

This phase is the normal one, when there are no threats against the mission's
personnel, assets, resources and information.

Travel

Travel should take place in accordance with the procedures contained in the
missionspecific SOS and in the relevant SOPs.

Other measures

Other measures should be in accordance with the procedures contained in the


MSSOS and in the relevant SOPs.

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Phase One - Precautionary


Definition

Phase One should be declared when one or more isolated incidents have
occurred in a part or in all the AoR of the mission and these incidents have not
targeted EU personnel, assets, resources and information.

Declaration

The HoM or EUSR may declare Phase One to warn mission personnel that the
security situation in the country or in a portion of it warrants this declaration
and that they should take action as outlined for this phase, as well as be
prepared to take action as outlined for subsequent phases.

Travel

Implicit in the declaration of Phase One is a ban on travel to the area where the
incidents happened without the prior clearance of the HoM or EUSR. The
necessary precautions are to be taken before and during travel.

Other measures

Phase One having been declared by the HoM and WKC informed, WKC shall
notify the CPCC and the GSC Security Office of the change of status.
Phase One having been declared by the EUSR and SITCEN informed,
SITCEN shall notify the GSC Security Office of the change of status.
Upon declaration of Phase One, the HoM and/or EUSR, as appropriate, shall:
notify Member States' representations in the safe haven country, as well as in
nearby countries, of the implementation of Phase One
convene the SMT and establish a coordination centre. It is essential that this
centre be located in a suitable position to coordinate security arrangements
and emergency measures
convene a meeting of wardens with the following agenda:
- review and update the security plan
- check and update lists of mission personnel and locations within the
country
- identify mission personnel members for specific security-related tasks
ensure that ASCs are advised to maintain regular contact with the HoM or
EUSR
advise the MSO or doctor of any medical condition which might require
attention should relocation/evacuation be ordered
Continued on next page

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Phase One - Precautionary, Continued

Other measures
(continued)

notify all mission personnel of the implementation of Phase One, reminding


them to adopt the necessary precautions for all movements and to check the
validity of their identity documents
advise the CPCC, via the WKC, of any cases of hospitalization or other
medical problem that could need special attention
update essential reserves and supplies:
- refuel all EU crisis management mission vehicles
- check food, water and gas supplies
- check flashlights, candles, matches and first-aid kits

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Phase Two - Restricted Movement

Definition

Phase Two should be declared when one or more isolated incidents have
occurred in a part or in all the AoR of the mission and these incidents have
targeted EU personnel, assets, resources or information.

Declaration

The HoM or EUSR mission may declare Phase Two - Restricted Movement to
signify a much higher level of alert than the precautionary phase and to impose
important restrictions on the movement of all EU crisis management mission
personnel.

Travel

During this phase all mission personnel will adopt precautionary measures in
order to prevent any kind of incident.
Travel to the areas where the incidents took place should only occur:
when specifically authorized by the HoM or EUSR as necessary travel, and
when they have filled out the required travel clearance form

Other measures

Phase Two having been declared and WKC informed by the HoM, WKC shall
notify the CPCC and the GSC Security Office of the change of status. Phase
Two having been declared by the EUSR and SITCEN informed, SITCEN shall
notify the GSC Security Office of the change of status.
Upon declaration of Phase Two, the HoM and/or EUSR, as appropriate, shall:
notify the Member States' representations in the safe haven and nearby
countries that Phase Two has been implemented
instruct all EU mission personnel living and/or deployed in the areas where
the incidents took place to remain at home, except those who are required to
maintain operations or implement security measures
determine, in consultation with the SMT, which staff members could be
considered as non-essential in the event that Phase Three is implemented
notify all EU mission personnel deployed in the area where the incidents
took place of the following measures they must immediately take:
- pack one suitcase of clothing per person (each not exceeding 15 kg).
Label each suitcase with name
- prepare extra food to be taken in case next phase is implemented
- ensure that updated copies of inventories of personal effects are submitted
for transmission to headquarters, keeping copies for personal records
ensure the ASCs are advised to maintain regular contact with the HoM or
EUSR
Continued on next page

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Phase Two - Restricted Movement, Continued

Other measures
(continued)

notify EU mission personnel in other parts of the country not affected by the
declaration of Phase Two that all travel to the affected area must be cleared
maintain close liaison with government authorities, as appropriate
obtain from host government details of any road or rail restrictions and the
current situation of ports and airports, as applicable
request, as appropriate, police or military assistance for road control and/or
escort duties in the area where the incidents took place
convene a meeting of wardens with the following agenda:
- review and update the security plan
- check and update lists of mission personnel and locations within the
country
- identify mission personnel members for specific security-related tasks
advise the MSO or doctor of any medical condition which might require
attention should relocation/evacuation be ordered
advise the WKC in the case of ESDP staff or visitors, or SITCEN in the case
of EUSR staff or visitors, of any cases of hospitalization or other medical
problem that could need special attention
update essential reserves and supplies:
- refuel all EU crisis management mission vehicles
- check food, water and gas supplies
- check flashlights, candles, matches and first-aid kits

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Phase Three - Relocation

Definition

Phase Three should be declared when incidents have occurred in a part or in


all the AoR of the mission and, even if not targeting EU personnel, assets,
resources and information, contribute to a downgraded general situation in the
AoR.

Mandatory
actions

Phase Three - Relocation is to enable the HoM or EUSR to implement any or


all of the following actions:
temporary concentration of all EU mission personnel in one or more sites
within a particular area
relocation of all EU mission personnel to alternative locations within the
country and/or
relocation outside the country of all non-essential EU mission personnel

Essential vs.
non-essential
EU mission
personnel

Other measures

the determination of which EU personnel are designated as essential for


security purposes will be made by the HoM or EUSR
when making that decision, he/she will take into consideration the
recommendations of the SMT
any mission personnel that is unable to effectively carry out his/her assigned
tasks due to the deteriorating security situation should be considered non
essential
Phase Three having been declared and WKC informed by the HoM, WKC
shall notify the CPCC and the GSC Security Office of the change of status.
Phase Three having been declared by the EUSR and SITCEN informed,
SITCEN shall notify the GSC Security Office of the change of status.
Upon declaration of Phase Three, the HoM and/or EUSR as appropriate, shall:
notify the Member States' representations in the safe haven country, as well
as in nearby countries, of the implementation of Phase Three
notify the host government and request assistance as necessary
notify wardens and ASCs to instruct mission personnel regarding actions to
be taken
brief wardens and ASCs, as necessary, on further steps that may be required
including:
- transportation arrangements
- securing of housing and personal property
- arrangements for luggage, documents and food
Continued on next page

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Phase Three - Relocation, Continued

Other measures
(continued)

review other arrangements to be taken under Phases Four and Five,


including modification of the Security Plan to take into account the departure
of some personnel
notify mission personnel in other parts of the country unaffected by the
declaration of Phase Three of developments through the ASC
notify the GSC Security Office that no official travel by mission personnel
or visiting HQ staff should be undertaken without the explicit approval of
the HoM or EUSR through the SGC Security Office
convene a meeting of wardens with the following agenda:
- review and update the security plan
- check and update lists of mission personnel and locations within the
country
- identify mission personnel members for specific security-related tasks
advise the MSO or doctor of any medical condition which might require
attention should relocation/evacuation be ordered
advise the WKC in the case of ESDP staff or visitors, or SITCEN in the case
of EUSR staff or visitors of any cases of hospitalization or other medical
problem that could need special attention
update essential reserves and supplies:
- refuel all EU crisis management mission vehicles
- check food, water and gas supplies
- check flashlights, candles, matches and first-aid kits

Fielding of new
mission
personnel

Specific measures necessary for the continuation of essential program


activities may be approved by the SG/HR or the PSC.
In this respect, the fielding of any new mission personnel which is considered
essential - when approved and duly justified by the HoM or EUSR - must be
notified to the GSO.

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Phase Four - Programme Suspension

Definition

Phase Four should be declared when incidents have occurred in a part or in all
the AoR of the Mission targeting or not targeting EU personnel, assets,
resources or information but contributing to a downgraded general situation in
the AoR that makes it impossible to pursue the activities of the mission.

Declaration

Phase Four - Program Suspension is to enable the HoM or EUSR as


appropriate to recommend to the SG/HR and PSC through the SITCEN/WKC
(as appropriate), a halt to the activity of the mission in a non-secure region or
in the wide AoR and, if the security situation so requires, the relocation to
another region of the AoR or outside the country of all remaining EU mission
personnel, except those directly concerned with emergency operations or
security matters. All other EU mission personnel that heretofore were
considered essential to maintain mission activities will be evacuated at this
time.
In case of emergency, the HoM could declare Phase Four and inform the
CivOpCdr as soon as possible thereafter, through the WKC. The WKC should
notify the CivOpCdr, who will in turn notify the SG/HR, who will confirm the
declaration as soon as possible.
In the case of an EUSR mission, the EUSR should notify the SITCEN as well
as the SG/HR, who will confirm the declaration as soon as possible.
The WKC must notify the CPCC and GSC Security Office as soon as possible.
The SITCEN must notify the GSC Security Office as soon as possible.

Actions

With the declaration of Phase Four, the HoM or EUSR will take all of the
following actions:
notify the Member States' representations in the safe haven country, as well
as in nearby countries, of the implementation of Phase Four
notify the host government and request assistance as necessary
notify wardens or otherwise instruct EU crisis management mission
personnel on action to be taken
review the Security Plan and make necessary adjustments
partially activate the Evacuation Plan
preparation of relevant instructions for Phase V

Member States'
representations

When Phase Four is declared in a mission, Member States' representations in


the safe haven country and in nearby countries shall make preparations for
possibly receiving mission personnel should Phase Five be declared.

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Phase Five - Evacuation

Definition

Phase Five should be declared when the general situation in all the AoR of the
Mission is so downgraded that the activities of the Mission become impossible
and all remaining personnel of the Mission must leave the AoR or the
Country.

Declaration

The decision to initiate Phase Five - Evacuation, which should be taken by the
SG/HR, signifies that the situation has deteriorated to such a point that all
remaining EU mission personnel are required to leave.
In case of emergency, the HoM could declare Phase Five and inform the
CivOpCdr as soon as possible thereafter, through the WKC. The WKC should
notify the CivOpCdr, who will in turn notify the SG/HR, who will confirm the
declaration as soon as possible.
In the case of an EUSR mission, the EUSR should notify the SITCEN as well
as the SG/HR, who will confirm the declaration as soon as possible.
The WKC must notify the CPCC and the GSC Security Office as soon as
possible.
The SITCEN must notify the GSC Security Office as soon as possible.

Mandatory
actions

With the declaration of Phase Five, normally by the SG/HR, the HoM or
EUSR will take all of the following actions:
notify the Member States representations in the safe haven country, as well
as in nearby countries, of the implementation of Phase Five
activate and implement the Evacuation Plan
activate the Destruction Plan for sensitive resources and information
notify the host government and request assistance as necessary.
designate a senior locally-recruited staff member as officer-in-charge and
issue instructions for, inter alia:
- the safety and welfare of locally-recruited staff members
- the security and safekeeping of EU facilities, assets, resources and
information
Continued on next page

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Phase Five - Evacuation, Continued

Member States* The Member States representations in the safe haven country will be
representations responsible for the evacuated personnel in terms of organizing their reception,
for assistance in finding accommodation and for the payment of any
subsistence allowance payable to them.
They will also lend all possible assistance to evacuated EU crisis management
and EUSR mission personnel on a reimbursable basis.
Relocation of
individual
members of
personnel

Situations may arise in which an individual member of personnel of an EU


crisis management mission (internationally-recruited or locally-recruited) is
threatened because of his/her nationality, ethnic origin or religion. In addition,
during emergencies a personnel member may be threatened by the location of
his/her residence.
In such cases, the HoM may - in consultation with the CivOpCdr through the
WKC, which will also inform the CPCC, as well as the GSC Security Office,
relocate the personnel member to an alternate location either within or outside
the mission location.
In cases of extreme urgency the HoM may authorize relocation within or
outside the mission location and inform the CivOpCdr) post facto through the
WKC.
In such cases where the EUSR or his staff may be affected, the EUSR may in consultation with the SG/HR through the SITCEN, which will also inform
the GSC Security Office - re-locate the personnel member to an alternate
location either within or outside the mission location.
In cases of extreme urgency, the EUSR may authorize relocation within or
outside the mission location and inform the SG/HR post facto through the
SITCEN.

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Minimum Security Operating Standards


(MSOS)
Overview

Introduction

The MSOS are a set of security measures and arrangements aimed at ensuring
the appropriate protection of mission personnel, assets, resources and
information.
The MSOS are a reference document with defined norms and criteria. They
have to be adapted to the security risk situation of each Mission, thus
becoming the MS-SOS. This consideration is vital as the risk rating will guide
the level of physical and procedural protection measures consistent with
MSOS, to be provided for in preparing and conducting crisis management
operations.
These risk ratings will always provide one overall rating amalgamating the
risks in the area. Depending on the circumstances, they may also highlight the
ratings for one or more of the most significant risk components which in turn
will define the mission specific enhancements which, as seen, will give rise to
MS-SOS.
These measures are broadly grouped by SIAC Risk Rating according to the
risk situation. When a risk rating is declared, all the measures described under
this phase have to be implemented forthwith.

Contents

This part contains the following topics:


Topic
General aspects
Low Risk
Medium Risk
High/Critical Risk
Office and Residence Security

See Page
70
78
85
90
92

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General Aspects

Contents

This chapter contains the following topics:

Topic
Legal framework
Minimum Security Operating Standards
Linkage between MSOS and the SIAC Risk Ratings
Basic Concepts and Terminology

See Page
71
72
73
76

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Legal Framework

Requirements
Paragraph 18(c) of the Field Security Policy foresees that for civilian crisis
for civilian
management operations and EUSRs, a mission-specific security plan should
operations
te
iSSUQ respectively by the HoM or the EUSR based on generic field
security operating standards.
Generic
standards

Updating

Paragraph 36(e) of the same policy document requires the GSC to produce
generic field security operating standards. This Part of the Field Security
Handbook sets out those standards.

such

This Part will be periodically updated by the GSC Security Office based on
experience gained on the ground and the development of international best
practice.

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Minimum Security Operating Standards

What they are

The MSOS set out in this Part are designed to establish standard criteria for
minimum security arrangements to ensure the safety and security of personnel
deployed in EU crisis management missions and in support of EUSRs in order
to reduce risk to the mission's personnel, assets, resources and information to
an operationally acceptable level.
They provide guidance for developing and implementing a mission-specific
security plan.

How they were


developed

They constitute the baseline MSOS and have been developed through
discussion, coordination and review of common standards and good field
security practices applied by other international actors in the crisis
management field.

Mandatory
minimum
standards

The baseline MSOS is a generic document that sets out the mandatory
minimum operating security standards for all EU civilian crisis management
operations and EUSRs.

Mission-specific
SOS

As part of the OPLAN, HoMs and their SMTs or, in the case of the EUSRS,
the Joint Action, are required to develop and implement MS-SOS and a
Mission Security Plan, drawing on MSOS and taking account of countryspecific requirements set out in the security assessments conducted by the
GSC Security Office.

Variations to the Varying circumstances and environments may require the HoM ot the EUSR
MSOS
to adapt the requirements of the MSOS to a particular operational situation.
GSC Security Office field assessments will recommend any such variations
which should be taken into account by the HoM or the EUSR in developing
their mission-specific security plan.
Responsibility
and

Responsibility and accountability for applying and ensuring compliance with


MSOS is as defined in the Field Security Policy.

accountability

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Linkage between MSOS and the SIAC Risk Ratings

Low Risk
baseline
requirements

The MSOS are presented on page 69 et seq. of this Handbook and are set out
in a structure broadly in line with the SIAC risk ratings.
The MSOS requirements identified for the Low Risk environment are the level
of permanent security cover against which subsequent risk rating requirements
can be compared.
The Low Risk environment sets out the minimum standards:
at the pre-implementation stage, before a crisis management operation is
launched, or
once the mission has started and when the risk rating is not elevated
There are three subsequent risk rating benchmarks, as set out on page 51 et
seq. of this Handbook.

Cumulative
requirements

The risk rating requirements are cumulative, i.e. those requirements starting at
Low Risk are implicit to all other phases.
Example
The requirements of MSOS under High Risk environments include all the
requirements of Low and Medium Risk environments.

Transition from
a lower to a
higher risk
rating

The MSOS system is designed to ensure, as far as possible, a logical and


smooth transition from a lower to a higher risk rating with minimal increase in
actual resources and allowing for budgetary and procurement considerations.
The largest resource requirement is from Low Risk to Medium Risk.

Transition from As risk levels are reduced, a return to a lower risk rating may be called by
a higher to a
SIAC. This must be done in close consultation between SIAC, PSC, HoM
lower risk rating a n d / o r E U S R w i t h S M T a n d C P C C SITCEN must notify GSC Security
Office of any reduction in the risk rating.
Deciding a
change

Risk rating changes are decided as set out on pages 51 et seq. of this
Handbook.
Such decision is based on a change in the risk rating attributed by the SIAC to
a particular theatre of operations.
Continuedon next page

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Linkage between MSOS and the SIAC Risk Ratings, Continued

Different risk
ratings in one
theatre

Different areas of an area of operations can be at a different risk ratings, i.e.


the security risk in a capital may be LOW, while outlying areas may be
MEDIUM or HIGH.

Linkage
between risk
ratings and
security phases

The single risk rating enables missions to define the baseline requirements
which may be enhanced/tempered by MS-SOS. The purpose of linking MSOS
^0 m e j-jsk rating is to enable the budgetary and procurement considerations to
^ e realistically respected whilst maintaining an over watch of the component
elements which define the single rating.
Concurrently, the security phase system exists to enable missions at the
regional and local level to respond effectively to events in a timely manner and
to follow measured procedural responses without being hamstrung by
potentially unachievable requirements or unrealistic expectations.
Example
A country may be considered as a medium risk country generally whilst
considered low in the capital. A particular area may be operating at security
phase 2. An event occurs which has the potential to escalate quickly. The
overall risk climate may remain the same but the SMT might elect to place
those staff in the immediate area on a higher alert status, perhaps moving to
security phase 3. This can be effected quickly and with the minimum of
description. As the situation deteriorates further or improves, the SMT can
respond accordingly.
The aim is to ensure that throughout the planning and management of the
mission, MSOS, enhanced by MS-SOS, as defined by ongoing risk
assessments and effective planning for contingencies, will enable the mission
to be robust enough in its resiliency. The security phases merely define the
procedures to be followed in response to events.

Timing for
implementing a
higher risk
rating

When moving up to a higher risk rating (e.g. Low to Medium) the increased
measures for the new rating should be implemented without delay, hence the
paramount importance of pre-planning to allow for budgetary and procurement
considerations.
The expectation is that the requirements of a higher risk rating should be fully
implemented within 48 hours from the rating change.
Continued on next page

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Linkage between MSOS and the SIAC Risk Ratings, Continued

Planning

A crisis management mission operating at a particular risk rating (X) must


have a contingency plan for the implementation and procurement of assets and
resources necessary to move to rating X+2. It is expected that the MS-SOS
will ensure that sufficient advance consideration will have been given to
mitigation measures required to reduce the level of specific threats.

Impact on
budget

In accordance with paragraph 32 (e) of the Field Security Policy, the Council
w ill ensure that sufficient human, material and financial resources are made
available for an operation to implement measures for the security of personnel
commensurate with the level of threat assessed in the intended area of
operation including, where necessary, the provision of a protection element for
the mission.
The HoM or EUSR will accordingly take due account of MSOS and MS-SOS
when preparing his/her mission budget.

Frequency of
SMT
meetings

It is mandatory that all SMTs meet on a regular basis. The frequency of these
meetings will be determined by the security phase in effect at the duty station.
p o r those duty stations where there is no phase in effect, SMTs are expected to
meet monthly or as needed; for duty stations in phase 1, the SMT shall meet
monthly; for duty stations in phases 2, 3 and 4, meetings will be weekly or as
needed, as dictated by circumstances. For duty stations which are in phase 5
and where the SMT is located outside the duty station, meetings will be held
daily or more frequently, as required.
In all cases, minutes of the meetings will be produced and submitted to the
GSC Security Office and all members of the SMT within 48 hours.

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Basic Concepts and Terminology

Emergency
Communication
System (ECS)

The concept of an ECS ensures there is a reliable communications


structure/link established between EU personnel with security and safety
responsibilities (i.e. HoM/EUSR, MSO, SMT members, Wardens, ASCs and
selected staff).
ECS is a structural and procedural element of MSOS that is reinforced by
radios at Phase One. It has two primary functions:
to ensure members of the security management structure are able to
communicate with each other during a crisis or emergency, and
to enable the HoM/EUSR and SMT to communicate security/emergency
information to the CivOpCdr, WKC, the GSC Security Office and other
relevant offices outside the country

Emergency
power supply

'Emergency power supply' is a commonsystem, independent and reliable


source of electrical generation to ensure communications equipment is
operative, security lighting is available at all times and essential business
functions can be conducted even after the loss of 'city supplied' or
commercially supplied power.
In certain locations, electricity or other power supplies may sometimes be
critical for basic warmth. Emergency fuel is required for these facilities in all
instances. Contingency plans shall designate procurement guidelines for
increase from Low Risk to Medium Risk equipment.

Road traffic
The provision of:
accidents (RTA)
appropriate vehicles
instructions for their use
procedural requirements
Adapted to the terrain and meteorological conditions mission personnel will be
required to work in (i.e. mountainous, abundant snowfall or icy conditions,
jungle, etc.) is an essential security responsibility.

Field vehicle

'Field Vehicle' is a full size 4x4 type vehicle equipped with:

radio communications for field missions outside of the capital area/region


rations
water for two days
an improved first aid kit
Continued on next page

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Basic Concepts and Terminology, Continued

Emergency bag

The 'Emergency Bag' is a 15 kilogram (maximum) bag designed to be ready


for rapid evacuation and relocation. It shall contain travel and identification
documents and essential items only.
Essential items are a person's immediate necessary and reasonable essential
clothing and other sundry items, packed for proper transport. Pack as long as
it is comfortable (a lightweight backpack is highly recommended, it reduces
portage carrying load). Make sure you pick up lightweight but high energy
food and drinking.
A good pair of sturdy boots are recommended, emergency relocation tracks
could be on the rough side. A good jacket, preferably a breathable seamsealed type is a bonus.

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Low Risk
Overview

Introduction

Low Risk sets out the minimum standards at the pre-implementation stage
before a EU crisis management operation is launched or, once it has started,
when the risk is not elevated.

Contents

This chapter contains the following topics:


Topic
Low Risk - Telecommunications
Low Risk - Security Plan
Low Risk - Equipment

See Page
79
81
84

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Low Risk - Telecommunications


Central Mission Establish an ECS throughout the main place of operations, and its operational
Office/
locations, utilizing "appropriate and available means" (see Note below) in
Main Duty
order to:
Station
provide communication structures between HoM, EUSR, MSO, ASC, SMT
and Wardens. This may be a combination of cellular telephones, landline
telephones, email or radios as appropriate. Mobile satellite telephones are
required to enable the MSO and the HoM/EUSR to maintain
communications with the SG/HR, the CivOpCdr, the SITCEN/WKC, the
GSC Security Office and other relevant authorities
establish an ECS to enable secure communications between the HoM/EUSR
and SMT/MSO and relevant EU Offices outside the country, including the
SITCEN/WKC and the GSC Security Office
a system is to be established to ensure all ECS communications are
monitored 24/7. Monitoring may be allocated to a duty officer or other
nominated personnel member to ensure their radio is on, and capable of
being responded to
provide mobile satellite telephones
Note

With regard to an ECS in Low Risk countries, the term "appropriate and
available means" would typically mean cellular/mobile telephones, together
with satellite telephones.

Local
Establish an ECS throughout the operational area utilizing "appropriate and
Sub-Operating available means" in order to:
Offices
provide communications between the ASC and the AMSO, SMT within the
Area
provide communications between ASC and HoM/EUSR & MSO in the main
place of operations
Individual
Personnel

HoM/EUSR, MSO, SMT members, ASCs and selected personnel provided


with "appropriate and available means" of communications in order to
establish and operate an ECS. The whereabouts of mission personnel must be
known at all times.

Procedures

ECS is to be tested and practiced at regular intervals


a contingency plan for provision and maintenance of communication
technology and ECS for Phase One is to be developed
Continued on next page

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

October 2008

Low Risk - Telecommunications, Continued

Requirements

ECS network to be capable of operating 24/7 with uninterrupted and reliable


communications between the HoM/EUSR, MSO, SMT and all Wardens and
ASCs and the relevant authorities in Brussels (SITCEN/WKC).

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October 2008

Low Risk - Security P lan

Central Mission
Office/Main
Duty Station

A functional Security Plan, based on a formal Risk Assessment, is required for


all EU crisis management and EUSR mission locations. This plan will include
an operational Warden system and the appointment of ASCs as appropriate.
In addition, each HoM or EUSR must establish an emergency plan for the
various emergency scenarios possible.
All buildings are to have an Emergency Evacuation Plan in place. EU mission
personnel should be fully briefed on the contents of these documents and have
access to all relevant EU policy and operational security documents.
Documentation with HoM/EUSR, SMT and MSO:

risk Assessment
Field Security H andbook
Mission Security Plan
MSSOS
security SOPs
emergency and medical evacuation procedures
relevant country maps

Warden Systems:
established and operational
exercised regularly
Building Emergency/Evacuation Plan, including an EUCI destruction plan:
established for all EU offices and facilities
exercised every three months
Local Sub
Operating
Offices/Local
Duty Stations

A functional Security Plan, based on a formal Risk Assessment, is required for


all EU crisis management and EUSR mission locations. This plan will include
an operational Warden system and the appointment of ASCs as appropriate.
In addition each HoM or EUSR must establish an emergency plan for the
various emergency scenarios possible.
All buildings are to have an Emergency Evacuation Plan in place. EU mission
personnel should be fully briefed on the contents of these documents and have
access to all relevant EU policy and operational security documents.
ASCs appointed.
Continued on next page

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

LOW Risk - Security Plan, Continued

Local SubOperating
Offices/Local
Duty Stations
(continued)

Documentation with ASC:


Field Security Handbook
area-specific Security Plan
area-specific MS-SOS
SOPs
emergency and medical evacuation procedures
relevant country maps
Warden Systems:
established and operational
exercised regularly
Building Emergency/Evacuation Plan:
- established for all EU offices and facilities
- exercised every three months

Vehicles

All EU mission vehicles may be utilised throughout all areas of the country
when in Low Risk.
Drivers must have a relevant and valid, national driving licence.
All EU vehicles appropriately registered by the Host Government and
correctly insured in the country.
All vehicles appropriately marked (logos/flags/decals) as per mission SOPs.

Personnel

HoM and EUSR to ensure all EU mission personnel are appropriately insured
against malicious acts.
All personnel provided with Security-in-the-Field factsheets.
All personnel required to make themselves aware and comply with the
Mission Security Plan, MSOS, MS- SOS and relevant policies.
All new personnel provided with country-specific security orientation briefing
by HoM, EUSR or MSO.
Continued on next page

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October 2008

LOW Risk - Security Plan, Continued

Personnel
(continued)

Training
all personnel to complete Web-based e-learning Basic Security Awareness
training, expected to be available from mid 2008
in addition, throughout the process of MS-SOS development and
implementation, security managers must be aware of the need to provide
training and briefings for staff in general and for those with security
responsibilities
based on GSC Security Office guidelines the MSO will be responsible for
implementation of the mission security training

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83

October 2008

FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

Low Risk - Equipment


Central Mission Emergency power supply available for charging and operation of appropriate,
Office/Main
commonsystem communications equipment, office external security lighting
Duty Station
and essential computer facilities. This will ensure the integrity of the ECS in
times of crisis.
Contingency plans for the procurement of Medium Risk environment
equipment requirements are to be established.

Local Sub
Operating
Offices/Local
Duty Stations

Emergency power supply available for charging and operation of appropriate,


commonsystem, communications equipment, office external security lighting
and essential computer facilities.

Vehicles

The following equipment should be carried in each mission vehicle:

Standard
Mandatory
Equipment

first aid kit


fire extinguisher
spare wheel, jack and appropriate tools
vehicles appropriately marked (as per SOPs)
seat belts
petrol and water jerry cans
specific environmental equipment as defined by the Mission Security Plan
(e.g. chains, tracks)

When an MSO is appointed to a mission, the mission budget will provide the
MSO with the following standard mandatory equipment:
radio equipment
telephone (satellite and cellular)
laptop computer and accessories
digital camera
GPS
first aid kit (as appropriate for offices and vehicles)
advanced first aid kid (as appropriate for 1st responder and advanced trauma
treatment)
field tool equipment

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

Medium Risk

Requirements

Medium risk environment requirements include:


the requirements listed above for Low Risk, and
the additional requirements listed below

Contents

This chapter contains the following topics:


Topic
Medium Risk - Telecommunications
Medium Risk - Security Plan and Equipment

See Page
86
88

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October 2008

FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

Medium Risk - Telecommunications

Central Mission ECS is to be reinforced with fully operational, independent radio network
Office/
utilizing UHF, VHF and/or HF equipment as appropriate.
Main Duty
Station

Note

Radios are required from for Medium Risk environments because they provide
an independent means of communications whose capabilities are not matched
by cellular telephones and, perhaps, hand-held satellite telephones.
Security channel for HoM/EUSR, MSO and SMT members incorporated into
radio networks.
A system is to be established to ensure all ECS communications are monitored
24/7.
All emergency calls are to be serviced 24/7. A simple system of identifying a
duty officer may be appropriate for monitoring purposes, In this way security
linkage is maintained between all security officials at the duty station.
A 24/7 common-system radio room is to be established, operated and
equipped with base station radios, satellite telephone, email, etc..
A CCC to be established. It is to be located in or close to the radio room and
is to be used during crises. It does not need to operate 24/7, but is to be
equipped with all the necessary resources to ensure such an operation. Radio
room and CCC are not to be used as storage or other disruptive uses.
Satellite telephone provided to HoM/EUSR, MSO and other key individuals.
Offices to be equipped with operational satellite telephone capacity.
Essential staff are to be identified and provided with VHF/UHF radios as
appropriate.
Initiate resource contingency plan as appropriate for the move to high risk
rating.
Continuedon next page

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

October 2008

Medium Risk - Telecommunications, Continued

Local
Sub-Operating
Offices/
Local Duty
Stations

ECS is to be reinforced with fully operational, independent radio network


utilizing UHF, VHF and/or HF equipment as appropriate.
Security channel for ASCs, SMT and Wardens incorporated into radio
networks.
A system is to be established to ensure all ECS communications are monitored
24/7.
A radio room is to be equipped and established 24/7.
A CCC is to be established.
Mobile Satellite telephone is to be made available to each ASC.

Vehicles

Provision of effective and reliable communications to all EU vehicles. May


utilise cellular telephones under a wide area coverage, or may require
VHF/UHF/HF radios as appropriate or vehicle-mounted satellite telephones.
Field Vehicles identified and equipped.
All drivers to be issued with VHF/UHF handheld radios.

Individual
personnel

HoM/EUSR, MSO, ASCs and ASCs as appropriate, SMT members, Wardens


and selected personnel provided with UHF/VHF handset radios.

Procedures

Same as under Low Risk.


Scheduled radio checks conducted.

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FIELD SECURITY H ANDBOOK

October 2008

Medium Risk - Security P lan and Equipment

Central Mission Travel clearance procedures are to be established and implemented. This
Office/Main
includes countryspecific travel clearance procedures.
Duty Station
Security authorisation request system established.
Documentation:
same as Low Risk
countryspecific travel authorisation procedures in effect
Contingency plans are required for the procurement and installation of
appropriate specialised equipment.

Local Sub
Operating
Offices/Local
Duty Stations

Security clearance procedures are to be established and implemented. This


includes countryspecific travel clearance procedures. SMT's are required to
meet at least monthly.
Security authorisation request system established.
Documentation:
same as Low Risk
area and Countryspecific travel authorisation procedures in effect
Contingency plans are required for the procurement and installation of
appropriate specialised equipment.

Personnel
Tracking
System

In the Medium Risk environment the HoM and EUSR are responsible to be
aware of the location of all EU mission personnel at all times and shall
instigate an effective and reliable Personnel Tracking System to monitor their
whereabouts.
All personnel to be provided briefing on mission security arrangements and
missionspecific Security Plan.
All personnel to prepare individual 'emergency bags'.
MSO provided with additional equipment appropriate to conditions.
Continued on next page

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

October 2008

Medium Risk - Security Plan and Equipment, Continued

Personnel

A first aid trauma bandage is allotted to each staff member.


It shall be composed of substances that rapidly stop severe bleeding (QuikClot
ACS+ or similar product).
Note

Normally this requires the attendance of a qualified paramedic, nurse or


doctor. Every mission member should be trained in the use of the first aid
trauma bandage.
Ongoing country-specific, countrywide, personnel security training scheduled.
Specialised training initiated (e.g. body armour usage; mine awareness, etc.).

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October 2008

FIELD SECURITY H ANDBOOK

High/Critical Risk

Requirements H igh/Critical Risk environments requirements include the requirements listed


above for Low Risk and Medium Risk environments and the additional
requirements listed below.

Central Mission GPS located at each office.


Office/Main
Duty Station
Emergency power supply for each office.
Emergency fuel and spare parts for emergency power supply obtained.
Emergency food stocks for Concentration Points obtained and managed.
Medical Trauma kit obtained.
Protective facilities and equipment provided as appropriate.

Local Sub
Operating
Offices/Local
Duty Stations

GPS located with ASC as appropriate.


Emergency power supply to all offices.
Emergency fuel and spare parts for emergency power supply obtained.
Protective facilities and equipment provided as appropriate.

Vehicles

'Field Vehicles' to be utilised for all missions.


Specialised protection equipment to be obtained and fitted as appropriate.
All drivers are to be provided with VHF/UHF, handheld radios.
Specialised equipment may be identified and procured for these 'Field
Vehicles' as appropriate (e.g. extra spare tyres, spare fuel, emergency lights,
ballistic blankets, etc).

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

Personnel

October 2008

Hostile Environment Security Training (HEST) provided to relevant


personnel. The curriculum is to be established by the GSC Security Office
and will include inter alia:
hostage situation avoidance and survival
small-arms awareness
protective equipment and facilities as appropriate
individual equipment and documents to be carried

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October 2008

FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

Office and Residence Security


Overview

Contents

This chapter contains the following topics:


Topic
Introduction
Office Security
Security of Residences of Mission Personnel

See Page
93
94
96

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HANDBOOK

October 2008

Introduction
Protective
For hostile areas of operation exposed to threats from conflict or war,
equipment
including:
against weapons
and artillery
explosive attack
artillery/mortar fire
aerial bombardment
heavy-machine gunfire
ambush attack
landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO)
Protective equipment and facilities may be appropriate in the development of
mission-specific SOS.
Protective
facilities

Construction, procurement and/or deployment of any of the protective


equipment/facilities described below will be conducted in accordance with
standards defined by the Security Office. These standards will be
commensurate with the SIAC risk assessment where available and/or with
international best practices or with practises used by Member Sates, the latter
taking into account the symbolic value of targeting an overall EU effort as
opposed to the risk to single Member States.
Budgetary provision will be made to ensure the mandatory implementation of
the recommendations.

When to use
protective
equipment

Safe rooms, body armour, ballistic blankets and blast resistant film (Phase
Three) are required only if the security assessment performed establishes a
likely threat from a bomb and/or other ballistic threat. The Security Office
maintains the minimum standards required for bunkers, ballistic blankets and
blast protective film for glass.

General
personal
protection
equipment

Training on correctly using body armour is required whenever the equipment


is deployed. It must include: fitting and donning, protection levels, care and
maintenance, vehicle carriage and authority to wear/discard.

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October 2008

Office Security
Introduction

All offices used by EU civilian crisis management or EUSR missions can


become subject to unauthorized occupancy by groups or individuals who wish
to draw attention to a particular cause or grievance, usually political in
character.
Although these are normally non-violent demonstrations, sit-ins accompanied
by hunger strikes may be experienced and the possibility of hostages being
taken or a violent counter-action cannot be excluded.

Physical security To the extent that the situation in the mission location warrants, some or all of
measures
the preventive measures contained in the Guidelines for physical security for
EU crisis management or EUSR mission headquarters should be implemented,
wherever practical.
Funding

Where the necessary funds for additional security measures are not available,
requests for appropriate additional financial provisions should be channelled
through the normal procedures applicable to the mission.

Selection of

In the selection of mission office premises, security should be one of the most
important criteria.

office premises

Areas in which possible targets for insurrection or terrorism are located, such
as military installations, political party headquarters, etc., should be avoided
wherever practical.
Commercial buildings in suitable urban areas have in general a better
reputation with regard to security than converted "single family" residences
surrounded by gardens or open spaces. Ground floor offices are much more
vulnerable to incidents of terrorism than those located on upper floors.
Fire protection

Adequate fire escapes should be available and should be clearly marked and
the corridors uncluttered.
Fire-fighting and other equipment must be accessible to all personnel and
regularly checked.
Continued on next page

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

October 2008

Office Security, Continued

How to act in
case of
emergency

Mission personnel should have clear instructions on how to act in case of


emergency including fire and other hazardous situations.
Periodic drills should be held to ensure that mission personnel are familiar
with the instructions and that they are prepared to deal with an emergency.

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October 2008

Security of Residences of Mission Personnel

Responsibility

The primary responsibility for the security and protection of the EU crisis
management and EUSR mission personnel and property rests with the host
government.
Often, governments, due to economic difficulties or lack of manpower, may
not be able to provide the necessary protection when there is a partial or total
breakdown of law and order resulting in increased criminal activity.

Funding of
protection
measures

When, as a result of a security risk assessment, mission personnel are required


to install special devices such as window bars, etc. for the safeguarding of
their homes, the mission's budget must foresee such capital expenditure.

Criteria for
determining
protection
measures

The following criteria apply for determining whether such measures are
justified:
the HoM or EUSR has confirmed that - based on the EU risk rating - the
area is at 'high' to 'critical' and that the government is not in a position to
provide the necessary protection. In the case of commercially rented
residences, the landlord will not install the protective devices required or
provide the protective services needed
the type of crime is essentially violent in nature and not just petty thievery
the incidence of crime demonstrates that it is widespread and not limited to
isolated instances
the preventive measures in question are commonly used in the foreign
community and are generally considered necessary
appropriate measures should be implemented to provide additional security
for single female members of staff who may be living alone

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October 2008

Security of Residences of Mission Personnel, Continued

Protection
measures

On the basis of an official submission (supported by quarterly incident reports)


by the HoM or EUSR or their MSO indicating the measures proposed, the
costs involved and providing the information listed above, the GSC Security
Office will validate the request.
Once validated by the GSC Security Office, the necessary funds will be made
available to - as appropriate - provide for:
security bars
security alarm system, or
partial/full-time security guards

Selecting a
residence

Newcomers to the EU crisis management or EUSR mission location should


routinely be advised that security is one of the most important criteria in the
selection of a place to live and should be encouraged to seek accommodations
which offer the necessary guarantees of safety and accessibility in case of
emergency.
Mission personnel responsible for certifying the "reasonableness" of
accommodation should consider this a most important factor. The importance
of adequate communications and residential protection should be emphasized.

Reporting

The HoM or EUSR or their MSO will report to the SITCEN (in the case of
EUSRS) and WKC (in the case of ESDP missions) and to the GSC Security
Office all incidents in which EU crisis management mission or EUSR
personnel and their property have been affected by common crime or violence.
Proceedings against common crime and violence shall include promptly
reporting to the host country authorities.

Record-keeping

Upon receipt of a report of an incident the WKC (in the case of the receipt of
a report from an ESDP mission) shall, according to the established incident
management procedures, notify the relevant departments, agencies and
personnel according to the criticality of the incident. In turn, those
departments and agencies are responsible, through their own duty officers, for
the maintenance of a full record of the sequence of events. Upon completion
of a period of duty, the respective duty officer shall be responsible for
informing and briefing his/her successor fully.

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

The Mission Security Plan


Overview

Aim ofthe
mission security
plan

The primary management tool for security preparedness for any EU crisis
management or EUSR mission is the Mission Security Plan.
The aim of the plan is to detail the responsibilities of individuals, the actions to
be carried out and the sequence to be followed to ensure the security of
mission personnel, assets, resources and information.

Contents

This part contains the following topics:


Topic
General Principles and Pre-Implementation of the
Mission Security Plan
Guidelines for Preparation of a Mission Security Plan
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

See Page
100
105
126

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

October 2008

General Principles and Pre-lmplementation of the Mission


Security Plan
Overview

Introduction

The mission security plan is based on the MS-SOS and on the OPLAN. It has
to be implemented before the mission starts.

Contents

This chapter contains the following topics:


Topic
General Principles
Precautions to be taken before implementing the Mission
Security Plan

See Page
101
103

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

October 2008

General Principles

Responsibility

The HoM or EUSR, assisted by the Mission Security Officer (where


appointed) and in consultation with the SMT, is responsible for establishing a
comprehensive mission-specific security plan.

Purpose of the
plan

The purpose of the plan is to detail the actions to be taken to ensure the safety
and security of EU or EUSR mission personnel, their assets, resources and
information in response to the general situation and to any emergency
situation resulting from civil or political unrest or natural disasters.

Validation

The GSC Security Office will validate mission security plans for all ESDP
missions conducted Title V of the TEU.

Flexibility

The number and type of security situations which might occur at an EU crisis
management operation location are infinite.
There will be a great many ways of dealing with each situation, the most
appropriate of which can only be determined at the time of implementation of
the mission security plan.
In addition, the most appropriate way of dealing with a situation may vary
from area to area within a country or city and from hour to hour in a quickly
evolving situation.
Therefore, the basis for any mission security plan is that it is not a plan per se
but rather a series of well thought-out options to be drawn upon, reviewed and
revised as circumstances dictate.
The basic options should be prepared so as to apply to a full-scale evacuation
as well as to the relocation of smaller numbers of mission personnel.
Continued on next page

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

General Principles, Continued

Updating

The mission security plan and related documents should be updated:


every time a revised OPLAN is presented for approval
if a security evaluation conducted by the GSC Security Office has shown
areas for improvement
every six months, whichever comes first
In countries with current internal security or other related problems, the plan
should be reviewed - and updated if appropriate - every three months. The
HoM or EUSR, in consultation with the respective MSO, shall however
constantly review the MSP to determine its effectiveness in light of the
prevailing situation.
All the changes introduced in the mission security plan or related documents
have to be recorded in a "record of changes" chapter attached to each
document.

Preparation

Summary guidelines for the preparation of the mission security plan are
contained on pages 99 et seq..
More detailed guidelines are presented in the Guidelines for MSO.
In preparing the mission security plan, the HoM/EUSR should ensure that it
addresses the specific needs and reflects the specific conditions of the country
or environment his/her mission operates in.

Continuity

The mission specific security plan, security measures taken by the host
government and any supporting arrangements decided by the HoM/EUSR
and/or the CivOpCdr should enable EU missions to continue to carry out their
normal functions insofar as this is appropriate in the light of disturbances,
hostilities, natural disasters, etc.
Note
There may be instances when normal functioning may not be possible at all.

Security
Classification

The mission security plan and all related sensitive documents have to be
classified in accordance with the Council's security regulations. Such
documents shall be classified at least RESTREINT UE.

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October 2008

Precautions to be Taken Before Implementing the Mission


Security Plan

Precautions

Rapid and successful implementation of the mission security plan depends on


the standard of preparatory measures. There are a number of important
precautions which should be systematically enforced. These precautions are
described below.

Validity of
documents

Ensure that passports, laissez-passer, identity cards, health certificates, visas


and return transportation tickets, if issued, to all EU personnel are at all times
valid and in good order.

Travellers
cheques

Encourage EU personnel to have sufficient traveller cheques and a small


amount of cash on hand to cover themselves in case of emergency.

Medical record

Ensure that anyone with a medical problem (diabetes, etc.) has this on record
both at home and in the mission HQ.
Information should include:

ailment
type of medication
where to obtain medicine
doctor's name and address
blood type
allergies, etc.

If preferred, such information may be deposited in a sealed envelope to be


opened only during emergency. This type ofinformation may be life-saving
in case of hostage-taking, kidnapping, etc..
Safety and
security
instructions

Have handouts ready, that explain clearly the specific safety and security
precautions that each individual should take in the form of food, supplies and
actions.
Provide information regarding the personnel policies and compensation
policies in the event of property loss and damage, applicable to EU mission
personnel in case of an emergency evacuation.
Continuedon next page

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October 2008

Precautions to be Taken Before Implementing the Mission


Security Plan, Continued

Specific
arrangements

Ensure that specific arrangements are in place with selected Member States'
diplomatic missions for cooperation on security-related matters and
communicate these to the CPCC, who will inform the Council Security Office
in the case of ESDP missions. In the case of the EUSRS, the EUSR shall
communicate these directly to the Council Security Office.

Disaster-prone
areas

When an EU mission is located in disaster-prone areas, where earthquakes,


tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, fires and landslides may occur, the HoM/EUSR
should acquaint themselves with all relevant information available locally,
especially with regard to areas most at risk.
All EU mission personnel and especially new arrivals should be briefed on
the subject and be given area-specific safety instructions.

Restrictions on
mission and
visitor travel

When a security situation arises, it is essential that the WKC (in the case of
ESDP missions) or SITCEN (in the case of EUSR missions) be immediately
advised whether restrictions should be imposed on mission and visitor travel
to the country concerned. WKC and SITCEN will in turn notify the CPCC
and the GSC Security Office. In any event, the GSC Security Office should
notify DG A1B and seek clarification from the GSC Travel Office of all staff
intending to travel to the affected region. SITCEN should notify relevant
Heads of Unit of restrictions. Heads of Unit will then be responsible for
ensuring that individuals are advised and that the restrictions are respected.
Any communication reporting a security situation should also contain
information on how it affects travel to or inside the country.

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October 2008

Guidelines for Preparation of a Mission Security Plan


Overview

About these
guidelines

The present guidelines are intended to flag a number of issues and questions
which must be addressed by each HoM in the preparation of options.
This list, by its nature, is not exhaustive. Every EU crisis management
mission location and every situation will be unique and it is the responsibility
of the HoM, EUSR and the SMT to anticipate the situations which might
arise with respect to their duty station.

Contents

The mission security plan will contain the following basic information:
Topic
Summary of Security Situation at EU Mission Location
Officials Responsible for Security
Listings of Mission Personnel for Security Purposes
Record of Personnel
Record of Locally-Recruited Mission Personnel
Division of Country/City into Zones
Communications
Selection of Coordination Centre/Concentration Point
Safe Havens
Essential Reserves/Supplies
Wardens
Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phase One
Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phase Two
Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phases Three, Four and
Five

Security
Elements

See Page
106
107
108
109
111
113
114
116
117
120
121
123
124
125

In addition to the above topics, the mission security plan has to include at least
the following security elements:
SOPs
contingency plans
evacuation plan, medical or otherwise
relocation plan

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

Summary of Security Situation at EU Mission Location

Outline

The mission security plan will include a brief outline of the security situation
and likely areas of concern regarding the aims and tasks of the mission.

State of
preparedness

The mission security plan will provide an indication of the state of


preparedness of the EU mission to deal with areas of concern.

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October 2008

Officials Responsible for Security

At Council
Headquarters

During times of crisis it is important to know who to contact at the Council


Headquarters.
Communication
For ESDP missions all communication should take place via the relevant
contact point in the CPCC. In urgent situations and outside Brussels office
hours, communication should take place via the WKC.
The mission security plan must include a current listing of all officials
concerned with security in the chain of command, including:
WKC
the CivOpCdr and the CPCC
together with the appropriate telephone and fax numbers.
For EUSR missions, all communication should take place via the relevant
contact points in the EUSRs Brussels Office. In urgent situations and outside
Brussels office hours, communication should take place via the SITCEN.
The mission security plan must include a current listing of all officials
directly concerned with security, including:
SITCEN
the GSC Security Office
together with the appropriate telephone and fax numbers.

At the mission
location

The plan will list the names and regular functions of all officials directly
concerned with and responsible for the implementation of the mission
security plan, including:

the HoM/EUSR as appropriate


the MSO
the SMT
all Wardens and Deputy Wardens

A parallel list of Wardens and Deputy Wardens will be established for


locally-recruited personnel. The plan will list the responsibilities and duties
of each official as well as telephone numbers and addresses.

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Listings of Mission Personnel for Security Purposes

Introduction

It is essential in cases of emergency that up-to-date and adequate information


be available for:
all EU crisis management personnel
EUSR mission personnel
all EU personnel engaged in preparatory missions

Records

Subject to Data Protection provisions, each HoM and EUSR will maintain an
up-to-date record in the format shown under "Record of personnel" on page
109 below.
Similar information in a suitably modified format should be maintained for
locally-recruited staff members (see "Record of locally-recruited mission
personnel" on page 111 below).
A copy of these records and their updates will be sent to the WKC (in the case
of ESDP missions) and SITCEN (in the case of EUSR missions) as a reference
in case of a developing or actual security situation.

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October 2008

Record of Personnel

EU Mission
designation

Staff Member

Family Name
First Name
Date of birth
Nationality
ID Card No.

Local address

Street, number
City
Postal code
Country
Quarter
Floor
Entrance
Type of building
Attach location sketch

Telephone
number

Direct line

Home country
address

Street, number

Switchboard

City
Postal code
Country

Next of kin in
home country

Name
Kinship
Address
Telephone

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Passport

October 2008

Name
Number
Issued
Expiry
Date & Validity
of visas

Health record

Blood type
Allergies
Typhoid
Cholera
Yellow Fever
Rabies
Others

Inventory of
valuables

To be submitted on (Date):

Other relevant
information

Important!

It is the staff member's responsibility to advise the HoM of any changes in


the information given.

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October 2008

Record of Locally-Recruited Mission Personnel

EU Mission
designation

Staff Member

Family Name
First Name
Date of birth
Nationality
ID Card No.

Address

Street, number
City
Postal code
Country
Quarter
Floor
Entrance
Type of building
Attach location sketch

Telephone
number

Direct line

Next of kin

Name

Switchboard

Kinship
Address
Telephone

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Health record

October 2008

Blood type
Allergies
Typhoid
Cholera
Yellow Fever
Rabies
Others

Other relevant
information

Important!

It is the staff member's responsibility to advise the HoM of any changes in


the information given.

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Division of Country/City into Zones


Establishing the In establishing zones the following must be taken into account:
zones
geographic layout of the city
numbers of EU mission personnel
Country zones

The plan will clearly indicate the zones into which the country has been sub
divided.

City zones

It will also indicate the zones into which cities have been sub-divided.

Map

A detailed and accurate map of these sub-divisions will be an integral part of


each mission security plan.

Responsible
persons per
zone

The plan will clearly indicate the warden and deputy warden responsible for
each zone on the map, as well as the ASC, where appropriate.

EU mission
personnel per
zone

The number of EU mission personnel in each zone and their place of


residence should be clearly indicated.

Locallyrecruited
personnel

A similar zone map should be prepared for areas where locally-recruited


personnel reside.

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Communications

Introduction

Good communications, both internal and external, are a critical and essential
element of any security arrangement. Every effort must be made to ensure
that such communications are available under all circumstances.

Public
In the first instance, the available public communications (telephone, email,
communications SMS, fax) should be relied upon.
In cases of emergency such facilities are most vulnerable and may not be
available at all. H oM and EUSR missions should therefore have alternative
communication means in case of a breakdown or suspected compromise of
public communications facilities.

Minimum
Security
Operating
Standards

In view of the inherent vulnerabilities (availability and confidentiality) of non


EU owned communication systems, the MSOS for EU crisis management
missions and EUSR missions stipulate which communication means must be
available to an EU mission.
These communication means are to guarantee both the security and the safety
of mission personnel and the continuity of mission activity when the various
security phases are declared.

Available
means of
communication

The mission security plan will describe in detail the means of communication
which are available and ensure their adequacy:
between the mission location and Council H eadquarters
within the country:
between the mission HQ and/or coordination centre and mission locations
outside the main place of operations, and
within the main place of operations between wardens and the coordination
centre and between vehicles and the coordination centre
to and between neighbouring countries
Continued on next page

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Communications, Continued

Means of
communication
available to
HoM/EUSR

In addition, this section should include information on the following means of


communication available to the HoM/EUSR:
satellite telephone/fax
radio (HF and VHF)
e-mail
SMS
encryption assets
telephone/fax
courier/messenger

Technical issues This section will also include detailed information regarding frequencies to be
used, call signs and radio procedures.
Contingency
Plan

In the event of electrical power failure, the radio network will be dead within
two days because the batteries cannot be recharged.
Contingency plans should therefore be put in place whereby the radio system
will work on a fixed schedule in the absence of electricity and otherwise be
turned off.

Training

EU staff should receive appropriate training on the full range of


communication means available within the country.

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Selection of Coordination Centre/Concentration Point

Alternative
locations

The plan will indicate one or more possible coordination centres and one or
more possible concentration points. These will have been agreed with the
provider (military, Government, etc.).
It may not always be possible for all mission personnel to come to the
designated concentration centre. Therefore, alternative locations should be
foreseen.

Criteria for
concentration
points

In selecting a concentration point, the following should be taken into


consideration:
availability of and/or supplies of food and water
adequacy of sanitation facilities
availability of medical kits and/or facilities
proximity to a potential target, i.e., radio station, government building
central location
communication facilities
accessibility
availability of rest/accommodation areas
proximity of local law enforcement agency assets
proximity to potential evacuation points, i.e., airports, roads
parking facilities
availability of basements/bunkers
availability of space for storage of vehicles, etc.

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Safe Havens

Safe Haven

The plan will indicate a realistic safe haven for each area of the country and
indeed neighbouring country as well as regional alternatives. The selection of
these must be determined by the practicality of each option which must
ensure that mission personnel are not exposed to further risks or dangers by
the particular choice. Similarly, all steps must be taken to establish the
necessary memoranda of understanding with the identified host government
and contingencies considered to ensure that EU mission personnel are
safeguarded fully (e.g. ensuring that at mission members have appropriate
visas). Movement of EU mission personnel during relocation/evacuation may
require the use of land, air or sea transportation or any combination thereof.

Three means of

The plan will provide detailed information regarding how the safe haven
would be reached by the three means of transportation, as applicable:

transportation

by air
by road and/or
by ship

By air

Chartering of aircraft
Detailed information will be provided regarding the possibilities of locally
chartering aircraft, bearing in mind that national carriers, notwithstanding
prior arrangements, may not be available at the last moment during times of
crisis.
In addition, information, including the leadtime required for charter, will be
provided regarding charter possibilities in neighbouring countries. It should
be borne in mind that it sometimes becomes difficult to acquire landing and
fuelling rights for these aircraft.
Aircraft
For planning purposes, an estimate should be provided regarding the number
of persons who might be evacuated in each phase so as to be able to
determine what kind of aircraft would be required and how many flights will
be required.
Airports
Detailed information will be provided regarding available airports and what
type of aircraft they can accommodate.
Detailed information will also be provided regarding alternative routes from
the concentration point to the airport.
Continued on next page

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Safe Havens, Continued

By Road

Itinerary
The plan will include a detailed itinerary of all possible overland escape
routes, including the conditions of roads, distances between points and
refuelling possibilities.
In addition, the plan will detail whether there are any tunnels or bridges on
the road which might not be operational. Detailed maps of these escape
routes will be provided.
Vehicles
In the first instance, official vehicles will be used to move mission personnel
from their homes to concentration areas, to the airport and possibly to the safe
haven.
All official vehicles to be used will be identified; the plan will include
information regarding the vehicles':

usual location
passenger capacity
cargo capacity
whether the vehicle is adequately identified as belonging to an EU crisis
management mission
if not whether decal/flag will be required
the type of fuel used

A similar listing of privatelyowned vehicles available for these purposes will


also be provided.
A certain percentage of vehicles will not be operational at any given time and
this number should be subtracted from the total for planning purposes.

By Ship

Where applicable, the plan will include information regarding options


available for the chartering of ships, either within the duty station or from
neighbouring countries, as well as alternative routes from the concentration
point to the port.
Wardens will be fully responsible for leading all mission personnel from their
zone directly to the concentration point, the airport or the evacuation point.
Procedures should be put in place for mission personnel that is not accounted
for.
Continued on next page

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October 2008

Safe Havens, Continued

Replacement of
Warden system

After the declaration of Phase Three, when only core mission personnel
remain, the warden system will be in disarray. A second system should
therefore be put in place.
When wardens are changed, the list should be updated as necessary, taking
into consideration wardens going on leave or completing their assignment.

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October 2008

Essential Reserves/Supplies

Estimates of
requirements

The plan will include estimates of requirements for drinking water, food
reserves, medical supplies and fuel reserves to support the EU crisis
management mission for a reasonable period of time.
Plans should be drawn up regarding where these reserves would be kept.

EU
identification
materials

The plan will include:


a determination of requirements for EU identification materials, including:
-

vehicle decais
flags
armbands
reflective vests

the quantity in stock


the location

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Wardens

Introduction

In order to facilitate operation of the Mission Security Plan the HoM or


EUSR will, in consultation with the SMT, appoint in writing a number of EU
and local recruited staff members to act as Wardens.
The MSO and the SMT shall ensure that each Warden is trained and equipped
to carry out his/her function.
Wardens are appointed to ensure proper implementation of the MSP in a
predetermined area. For reasons of practicality, the area covered by a Warden
should preferably not be larger than that which would enable him/her within
one hour, to reach mission members on foot, in case of an emergency.
As this is a voluntary and additional responsibility which goes beyond the
normal responsibilities of a mission staff member.
The performance of the Warden should be reflected in the individual's
performance appraisal.

Responsibility

Wardens are responsible for:


functioning as a channel of communication between the HoM and mission
staff members
ensuring that such staff members are regularly informed with regard to
security and safety arrangements and the emergency phases in effect
checking to see that instructions on precautionary measures are being
followed
Continued on next page

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Wardens, Continued

Sample letter

Date:
To:
From: Head of Mission

Subject: Letter of Appointment - Warden


This is to confirm your appointment to Warden of Zone No.
the following area:

covering

As Warden, you are responsible to the Head of Mission for the


implementation of the mission security plan in the above zone.
Please find hereafter a detailed listing of your duties as Warden as the phases
of the mission security plan progress toward Phase Five.
Also attached is a listing of all staff members in your zone together with the
residential addresses. It will be your responsibility to verify the listing and to
ensure that it is kept up-to-date.
Duties of the
Wardens

The following are duties of the Warden during the preparation and
implementation phases of the mission security plan:
Topic
Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phase One
Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phase Two
Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phases Three, Four and
Five

See Page
123
124
125

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October 2008

Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phase One

Visits and
checks

Although Phase One procedures should have been observed as normal routine
precautions, wardens will visit the mission personnel in their zone and check
to see that the procedures have been observed.
For their guidance, the initial instructions given to all mission personnel are
as described below.

For EU mission
personnel

Prepare an inventory in triplicate of valuables; two copies are to be forwarded


to the HoM/EUSR.
Check to see that passports, laissez-passer and health certificates are in order.
Check that private and EU crisis management vehicles (if any) are constantly
refuelled and that spare wheels and toolkits are in order.
Maintain reserve finances (approximately EUR 400 per person) in traveller's
cheques.
Give consideration to selection of clothes, depending on season, to be packed.
The limit in weight to be 15 kg per person.

For locallyrecruited
mission
personnel

Check to see that identity cards are in order.

For all mission


personnel

Check that at least one week's supply of food is in your home.


Check that emergency water, gas and fuel supplies are maintained.
Check supplies of flashlights, candles, matches and contents of first-aid kits.

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Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phase Two


Visits and
instructions

Wardens will visit all mission personnel in their zone and give them the
following instructions:
all non-essential mission personnel will remain at home. If they want to
leave their home for urgent reasons, e.g., medical treatment, etc., they will
contact their warden and make the necessary arrangements
for EU mission personnel, check that one suitcase of clothing is packed with
a limit of 15 kg. per person. The suitcase must be clearly labelled showing
the person's name and nationality. Check that identity cards, passports,
health certificates and reserve finances are at hand
prepare food and water to take to the concentration area in case Phase Three
is declared

Procedures
during subsequent phases

Wardens will also advise the staff members in their zone of the procedures to
be observed during subsequent phases.

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Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phases Three, Four and Five

Relocation,
suspension,
evacuation

The following table lists the activities that take place during Phases Three,
Four and Five:

Stage
1
2

3
4
5
6
7

Description
The HoM will inform wardens of the time and place where EU
mission personnel are to be concentrated.
Wardens will inform all EU personnel of this Phase and give them
the following instructions:
Leave home at...
If they do not have a vehicle, they are to wait at their home until
they are picked up by EU transport.
They are to leave their home with their personal documents, food
and prepared luggage.
Turn off electricity, gas, water and heater connections.
Make sure their home is locked.
Arrange for vehicles (private or otherwise) to move to prearranged concentration area.
Wardens will record the details of each vehicle leaving the zone.
Wardens will accompany the last vehicle from their zone to the
concentration area.
In the concentration area, Wardens will be responsible for the
checking of all mission personnel from their zone and arrange for
the parking of their transport.
Wardens will receive further instructions from the HoM/EUSR.
Wardens will carry out all duties assigned to them by the
HoM/EUSR and will accompany the staff members from their zone
to the designated area.

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Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)


Overview

Definition and
characteristics

The SOPs are norms approved by the HoM/EUSR regarding specific


situations or activities and aimed at standardising the procedures to be
followed by all mission personnel.
The mission security plan shall include as annexes SOPs on security matters.
Such SOPs are not fully inclusive and the mission security plan may be
enhanced with additional SOPs according to the prevailing security situation
as appropriate.
SOPs should be modified according to the situation and the lessons learned.

Mandatory
SOPs

The following are mandatory SOPs:

Optional SOPs

EUCI and sensitive information management


personnel accreditation (visitors)
actions in the event of hostage-taking
incident reporting
if mission personnel may carry weapons, firearms control
travelling in the country
security of the facilities and norms for guards

The following are optional SOPs:


relations with the media
communications

Contents

This chapter contains examples of SOPs. It covers the following topics:


Topic
Unauthorized Entry and Office Occupancy
Threatening Telephone Calls
Bomb Threats
Reporting Arrest or Detention of Mission Personnel or
GSC staff

See Page
127
130
131
133

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Unauthorized Entry and Office Occupancy

Introduction

In addition to the normal office security precautions, certain measures may be


taken to either prevent unauthorised office occupancies or to safeguard
mission personnel and property during an episode of unauthorized office
occupancy.

Contact
outside the
office

In case of demonstrators outside the building wishing to speak to an EU


official, contact should be made outside the office.
If this is not feasible, only one, or at most two, representative(s) of the group
should be allowed entry into the office.

Demonstrators
inside the office

Avoid taking any risks and bear in mind that the first consideration must be
the personal safety of all mission personnel.
Isolate the group in a pre-arranged area, preventing access to telephones,
facsimile and telex, to the extent possible. If necessary, consider
disconnecting telephone, facsimile and telex.
Attempt to speak only to the designated spokesperson, preferably apart from
the main group.
Make every effort to persuade the occupants to leave the premises
immediately and peacefully. The function of the mission offices should be
explained, with special emphasis on their role.
Ascertain the reasons for the occupation. If asylum is sought, it should be
explained to the group that neither the HoM nor the EUSR is a diplomatic
envoy and the premises are not an embassy, therefore no refuge or protection
can be given.
Notify the appropriate government department, normally the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and keep it informed of developments.
Notify the SITCEN, in the case of the EUSRs and WKC in the case of the
ESDP missions immediately. In all cases, instructions will go to the HoM or
EUSR who will then coordinate actions with the offices concerned.
Warn other EU crisis management mission facilities in the country/city of the
occupancy and, if it is thought necessary, the government should be asked to
provide protection to those premises as a preventive measure.
Continuedon next page

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Unauthorized Entry and Office Occupancy, Continued

Continuing
normal
operation

Continue normal operation as long as feasible, bearing in mind the need to


ensure the safety and security of all mission personnel.
Outside normal office hours during the unauthorized occupancy, at least two
EU mission personnel members should be present on the premises as long as
their personal safety is not jeopardized.
If, in the HoM or EUSR's judgment, it becomes impossible for the office to
continue functioning, the feasibility of removing all mission personnel from
the premises should be considered. In such an event, personnel should depart
unobtrusively, remaining at home until further notice.
All other EU crisis management mission personnel should be alerted to the
situation.
If the removal of mission personnel is authorized, all rooms other than the area
occupied by the group should be locked up. The occupants should not be
informed of the decision to vacate the premises and the government should
be notified only after the action has taken place in conformity with any prior
instructions from the SG/HR, in the case the EUSRs and the CivOpsCand, in
the case of the ESDP missions.
Arrangements should be made after closing for the telephone and other
communication equipment to be disconnected.

Role of the office The role of the office in this situation should be non-participating and any
action that would in any way encourage or make it easier for the unauthorized
occupants to stay on should be avoided. Only urgent medical attention should
be given when required.
Statements to
the press

No statement to the press or other media should be given at any time or under
a n y circumstances unless authorized specifically by the SG/HR in the case of
EUSR missions and the CivOpCdr in the case of ESDP missions.
Continued on next page

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Unauthorized Entry and Office Occupancy, Continued

Petitions

Unauthorized occupancies may give expression to protests against the EU,


protests against local government or advocacy for local and international
causes such as human rights. They may result in presentations of petitions and
communications to the EU in Brussels, request for mediation on local issues,
or requests for asylum and emigration.
Petitions should not normally be received by a mission's offices. The
SG/HR's office (in the case of EUSR missions) and the CivOpCdr's office (in
the case of ESDP missions) should be contacted immediately for advice.

Assistance from
third parties

Although an initiative should not be taken in requesting assistance from third


parties in order to try to convince the occupants to leave, such an offer
- when made by knowledgeable and respected institutions or personalities
(e.g., religious leaders, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, etc.) - may be accepted.
Such assistance must not involve mediation on substantive issues, since this
could be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of the country.

Safety and
security of
mission
personnel

Finally, under any circumstances, the first concern of the HoM or EUSR
should be the safety and security of all mission personnel, and to this end
unnecessary exposure to risks should be avoided.
In all cases it is important for mission personnel to keep as low a profile as
possible and to maintain a formal position at all times.

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Threatening Telephone Calls

Reporting to the EU crisis management and EUSR mission offices, as well as individuals
HoM or EUSR members of mission personnel, can become the object of anonymous
or their MSO
threatening telephone calls.
Although such calls are usually empty threats, they should not be dismissed
lightly and should be reported to the HoM or EUSR or their MSO, no matter
their nature.
Action by the
HoM or EUSR
and their MSO

The HoM or EUSR or their MSO should immediately inform the authorities
and, if feasible, request their assistance in tracing the call.
It is especially important that the contents of the call as well as all other details
be reported as accurately as possible for subsequent evaluation of the threat in
relation to other available information.

Training of
mission
personnel

Personnel members who are likely to receive such calls (telephone operators,
persons who have received such calls before, etc.) should be provided with
instructions on how to handle this type of call.
Guidelines and forms to that effect are contained in the 'Guidelines for
MSOs'.

Questions to be
answered

All reports of threatening calls should be thoroughly analyzed in an attempt to


identify both the actual target and the objective of the threat. Every effort
should be made to arrive at an answer to the following questions:
Is the recipient of the call the actual target or is he/she merely being used as
a messenger?
What is the nature of the call?
-

Response to the
threat

Is it a crank call?
Does it relate to a personal matter?
Is it directed against the recipient in his/her official capacity?
Is the call directed against the EU programme in the country?
How serious is the threat?

Any meaningful measures to be taken in response to the threat should depend


largely on the answer to the above questions and may in serious cases take the
form of evacuation of the person(s) directly threatened.

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Bomb Threats

Bomb plan

In countries where bomb threats are a reality, it is important that all EU


mission offices have an effective bomb plan.
This plan should clearly indicate who in the office is responsible for the
decisions to be made in response to the threat (i.e., full or partial evacuation,
search, notification of the authorities).
The SOPs will define the information to be gathered by anyone receiving a
bomb threat by telephone and the steps that follow to inform the necessary
agencies.

Floor wardens

Floor wardens should be appointed who, in case of evacuation, will ensure that
no one is left behind and who would also be briefed on what to look for during
searches of their respective areas.

Evacuation
procedures

In the event of a bomb threat, a full or partial evacuation of the premises may
be in order. Consideration should be given to:

possibility of conducting a search before evacuation


establishing a pre-arranged signal for evacuation
establishing evacuation routes and checking routes for suspicious objects
possibility of ensuring that doors, windows, cabinets, etc. are left open for
venting a possible explosion
neutralizing the elevators, if any, so that they cannot be used
ensuring that an orderly evacuation takes place and avoiding panic among
the occupants of the site
providing special assistance to the handicapped
cutting off electricity and gas at main source, if possible, to reduce fire
hazard
evacuating staff members to a safe distance (at least 100 metres) to prevent
injury from the eventual effects of the blast (flying glass, masonry, etc.),
and
determining who will make the decision to permit re-entry
Bomb removal
or disposal

before the building is re-entered, a thorough search of the premises should be


conducted, preferably by an official bomb disposal unit
if a suspicious object is located and no bomb disposal unit is present, the
object should not be disturbed and arrangements should be made for removal
by experienced personnel
Continuedon next page

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Bomb Threats, Continued

Search

The following search conditions should be taken into account:


staff members should be familiar with the area they search
do not move, jar or touch anything
if the building was evacuated and a time for detonation given, searchers
should evacuate 30 minutes prior to the designated time and should not
resume their search until 30 minutes after the designated time
the search should be thorough enough so that once completed and no device
found, the threat can reasonably be classified as a hoax

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Reporting Arrest or Detention of Mission Personnel or GSC


staff
Reporting to
headquarters

When there is evidence to suggest that any EU crisis management or EUSR


mission personnel member, whether EU or locally-recruited, or other agent of
the EU has been arrested or detained by authorities of a government, it is
reported as follows:
Stage
1
2

Description
The HoM or EUSR shall report the incident by the fastest means
of communication available to the SITCEN (in the case of GSC
staff or EUSR missions) and WKC in the case of ESDP missions.
The SITCEN/WKC (as appropriate) shall inform the CivOpCdr
and other appropriate authorities, including the GSC Security
Office. The CivOpCdr shall inform the SG/HR at the earliest
opportunity. In the case of an incident involving an EUSR
mission member, SITCEN shall notify the SG/HR

Reporting to the In addition, the HoM or EUSR in whose mission the arrest or detention has
government
taken place shall immediately contact the Foreign Ministry of the government
concerned
concerned and request:
all relevant information about the arrest or detention, and
the government's cooperation in arranging as a matter of urgency that
representatives of the EU accompanied by a medical physician of their
choice be given access to the individual arrested or detained
Content of the
report to the
Secretary
General / High
Representative

The report to the SG/HR or CivOpCdr through the SITCEN/WKC - which


shall also inform the GSC Security Office and the local embassy(ies) of the
nationality of the individual(s) involved - shall convey all information readily
available. The CivOpCdr will inform the SG/HR.
The report should include:
the name and nationality of the person arrested or detained, his/her
employment status with and official functions for the EU
the time, place and other circumstances of the arrest or detention
the legal expression or term used by the applicable local law to describe the
arrest or detention
the legal grounds for the arrest or detention, including any charges against
the person concerned
Continued on next page

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October 2008

Reporting Arrest or Detention of Mission Personnel or GSC


Staff, Continued

Content of the
report to the
Secretary
General / High
Representative
(continued)

The name of the governmental agency, such as a court or an administrative


authority, under whose authority the measure is taken.
Whether a representative of the EU has been or will be given access to the
person arrested or detained. In the affirmative, any request or other reaction
from the person concerned also shall be conveyed.
Whether consular protection and/or legal counsel is or will be available to the
person arrested or detained. In the affirmative, the identity of these services
shall be conveyed.

Updating
reports

If information on some of the items listed above is not available without delay,
the available information should be forwarded immediately to the CivOpCdr
through the WKC (in the case of an ESDP mission) or to the SG/HR's office
through SITCEN (in the case of an incident involving EUSR mission members
or GSC staff) and the missing items shall be communicated in a
supplementary report or reports as soon as possible.
Additional information relevant to the case shall also be reported as soon as
possible.
In this way the availability, at headquarters level, of accurate and up-to-date
information on each EU crisis management or EUSR mission personnel who
has been arrested or detained or who has disappeared or been killed may be
ensured.

Statements to
the media

No statements concerning the incident should be made to the news media


unless previously cleared by the CivOpCdr's office in the case of an ESDP
mission or the SG/HR's office in the case of an incident involving EUSR
mission or GSC staff.

Headquarters'
response

Determining what further action may be required will involve the SG/HR and
the Permanent Representation to the EU of any seconded national expert or
EU citizen concerned.

Arrest/detention
by unauthorized
or unknown
person(s)

If the arrest or detention is carried out by an unauthorized or unknown person


or persons rather than by authorities of a government, the incident shall also be
reported immediately and this procedure shall be followed except in those
respects where it is clearly inapplicable.
Continuedon next page

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October 2008

Reporting Arrest or Detention of Mission Personnel or GSC


Staff, Continued

Suspension of
operations

The SG/HR (in consultation with the CivOpCdr in the case of an incident
involving an ESDP mission) will determine what action to take and may
request Member States to bring the necessary pressure to bear on the
government or authority concerned.

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October 2008

Emergency Evacuation and Relocation Plan (EERP)


Overview

Introduction

This part provides a template for an EERP.

Contents

This part addresses the following subjects:


Topic
Document Status, Scope and Structure of the EERP
General Principles
Organisation and Responsibilities of the EMT
Emergency Management Team/Brussels (EMT/B)
Monitoring
Communication Structure
Relocation
At the Relocation Destination
Safe Havens
Action to Resume Operations after Initiating Evacuation
and Emergency Relocation
Appendix - Contact List

See Page
138
140
143
147
148
149
150
155
156
158
159

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Document Status, Scope and Structure of the EERP

Document status The following table shows the status of this document:
Produced by
Date Production
Document owner
Reviewed by
Translated by
Date of last revision
Distribution list

HoM /EUSR

Scope

This document details arrangements to be followed in case of major security


incidents affecting the mission personnel. This document is intended to
function as a stand-alone plan or as part of the overall Mission Security Plan.

Aim

The aim of this EERP is to provide planned, agreed and, where possible,
practised procedures for the emergency evacuation of mission personnel from
the AoR to areas where their safety can be assured and/or where they can
continue activity.

Objectives

The objectives of the EERP are to:


provide policy, based upon which, rational and logical decisions may be
made
create a decision-making organisation
establish necessary arrangements with outside agencies
establish communication requirements
delegate duties and responsibilities to nominated personnel
establish set procedures that can be implemented quickly and efficiently

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Structure of the
Plan

October 2008

The following table shows the structure of the EERP. A small description
briefly explains each section of the plan.

Section
Document, status, scope
and structure of the plan
General Principles
Organisation and
Responsibilities of the
EMT
Emergency Management
Team/Brussels
Monitoring
Communication Structure
Relocation
Assembly Areas and
Central Assembly Point
Departure Point
Exit Routes
Relocation Destination
Safe Havens
Contingencies

Contents
Describes the philosophy of emergency planning
and the commitment to protect mission
personnel.
Explains the general principles for managing an
emergency situation of evacuation and
relocation.
Outlines the duties and responsibilities of the
EMT in the event of an emergency evacuation
of mission personnel from the theatre of
operations.
Describes the activities of the EMT/B at the
GSC in Brussels.
Describes the importance of monitoring a
situation and the system of notification from the
EMT to mission staff.
Outlines the general principles of the
communication structure.
Outlines the general principles of the relocation
process.
Describes the various assembly locations.
Describes the Departure Point.
Outlines the various types of transportation and
suggests routes that can be taken in the event of
an emergency relocation.
Describes the actions to be taken at the
relocation destination.
Outlines options available if emergency
relocation is not possible.
Outlines the "actions on" in the case of
unforeseen or unplanned events.

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General P rinciples

Importance of a
staged
evacuation

The manner in which a staged evacuation takes place is critical to the


personnel concerned, as well as to EU activity. It is likely to be of some
interest to the host state national and local authorities when, at some future
time after an incident, the EU approaches the host state for permission to
resume activity.
It must be noted that the manner in which the evacuation takes place is critical
to:
the personnel involved
those who may not be evacuated and will remain in the AoR
the EU if, and when, activity is to be resumed
Cooperation with the EERP is compulsory for all staff.

Health and
safety

Protecting the health and safety of everyone in the Mission is the first priority
during an emergency.

Reasons for
relocation

One common means of protection is evacuation. The safety and well being of
all mission personnel takes precedence over mission and personal property and
equipment. Emergency evacuation planning is designed to be implemented
when mission is directly threatened by security risks. Under this scenario,
there may be a requirement to either gradually relocate staff to their country of
origin or to evacuate at short notice to a safe haven.

Emergency
Management
Team

The EMT with the HoM/EUSR as its Team Leader will manage and control
any disruption to mission activity and coordinate, if required, the evacuation
and emergency relocation of mission personnel.
In the case of an incident, as support structure the EMT/B will be set up at the
GSC to advise and assist the EMT.
The EMT has the authority to implement the procedures outlined in this
document in accordance with the Security Phase System. Should it become
necessary, due to the complete breakdown of communications, the HoM may
make unilateral decisions.

Continued on next page

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Emergency
Management
Team
(continued)

October 2008

The EMT has the task of ensuring that Local Emergency Plans are updated
and workable, and that all agreed procedures, measures and personnel
necessary for the implementation of the EERP are in place. During a
deteriorating situation, the EMT will maintain close liaison with the EMT/B
and will provide regular local situation reports and assessments.
The EMT controls the actual implementation of the EERP when the decision
to evacuate or relocate is reached. As noted above, the HoM, in consultation
with his EMT, will have the authority to make the decision to evacuate and
relocate.

Emergency
Planning
Principles

The EERP is based upon the following principles:


the safety and security of mission personnel is paramount
security Phases are clearly defined
the decision making authority, and individual responsibilities, are clearly
defined and understood
timely and accurate situation reports and up-to-date threat assessments must
be available to assist balanced judgements by the EMT and EMT/B
reliable communications and reporting procedures are in place
affected employees and dependants will be well briefed on relevant
components of the EERP
updated records of the locations and contact details of all staff will be
maintained
necessary administrative details and support will be pre-planned
security of personnel and mission activity during an atmosphere of fear,
speculation and rumour will be maintained
close liaison with relevant political, security and diplomatic representations
will be maintained

General Outline Typically, relocations occur to an adjacent country. A designated place of


of relocation
relocation must be identified in the EERP.

It is likely that there will be an escalating situation, rather than a single major
event, which will necessitate the implementation of the EERP.
In the event of a gradually escalating direct threat to mission personnel all
personnel will be relocated gradually, according to their job functions and the
level of threat, or immediately if the threat warrants an immediate emergency
evacuation:
Continued on next page

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General Outline
of relocation
(continued)

October 2008

dung a gradual escalation of a threat to mission personnel, all will be


gradually relocated to their country of origin
in the event of an immediate, serious threat, all mission personnel should be
prepared to immediately relocate to a Safe Haven Country or via an
intermediate location, via regular or chartered aircraft or any other means
available, e.g. bus, ferry, H ost Nation Government vessel. From Brussels an
assessment will be made whether to return to the theatre of operations or to
relocate to Brussels.
It should be noted that in some circumstances it may be safer to seek refuge in
prearranged safe haven, rather than attempt relocation or emergency
evacuation during high risk situations.

Relocation
destination

Preferred relocation destination for all staff will be a Safe Haven Country.
The EMT is authorized to require staff to stay in the Safe Haven Country in
view of return.

Relocation Party The EERP is based on the presence of a defined number of mission personnel.
EU staff on business trip in the AoR will be relocated in the same way as
mission personnel. Other expatriates might attempt to join the evacuation
party, especially if a chartered aeroplane or other means of transport is made
available. In case the EMT considers cooperation with other entities to be
advantageous, all arrangements should be made beforehand, and the EERP
adapted accordingly. Other evacuees, with exception of those foreseen in the
EERP, are not allowed to participate as they may jeopardise the safety of
mission personnel.
In the case of EUSRs and their staff, the EERP may actually be managed by
the EC Delegation or one of the Member States' embassies. In this case, it is
the responsibility of the EUSR to ensure that his/her staffare fully aware of
the requirements of the EERP and that the mission's plan fully complements
that of the Delegation or Embassy. Further, they have a responsibility to be
fully aware of the mechanics of the EERP.

Costs of
relocation

The costs of evacuation and repatriation are borne by the EU, including
additional costs to be made for preparatory actions or costs made at the
relocation destination.
Approval of HoM/EUSR must be sought for all financial actions relating to
the EERP.

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Organisation and Responsibilities of the EMT

Membership

The membership of the EMT is to be:


Note: functions may be accumulated.

Team Leader
Logistics/Communications
Finance / Transportation
Personnel
Security
Meeting Place

Member
HoM/EUSR

Deputy

EMT meetings will be held in one of the meeting rooms at mission


headquarters. The alternate meeting place will be the Team Leader's
residence. A Contact List can be found in the Appendix (page 159).
The EMT Office will be used as the primary command centre with the Team
Leader's residence as the backup command centre. When the security
situation permits the Office will be manned to coordinate any evacuation or
relocation.
Communications will be via normal telephone, cellular telephone, radio or
satellite phone. Shortterm accommodation facilities should be made available
in the Office.

Members and
Deputies

The role of the Members will be to assume full responsibility for the
performance of the EERP, and the carrying out of the tasks discussed in this
document.
The Deputies will stand in for the Member in the case of absence. The
Deputies must be familiar with all aspects of the Member's responsibilities as
outlined in this EERP.

Responsibilities
of the Team

As the individual with overall responsibility for the safety and security of
mission personnel, the HoM/EUSR will function as the EMT's Team Leader.

Leader
Continuedon next page

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Responsibilities
of the Team
Leader
(continued)

October 2008

The Team Leader, with the CMT, will monitor and assess the local security
environment and decide on any action required, including the moving from
one Security Phase to another. The Team Leader will also:
monitor the situation and brief staff and the SG/HR and other EU bodies as
appropriate
call EMT meetings as required and organise the agenda
authorise expenditure as required
authorise media contact. No statements should be made without his/her
authorisation
select and nominate Assembly Areas and Safe Havens

Liaison
responsibilities
of the Team
Leader

The CMT Team Leader will liaise with:

Responsibilities
of the Deputy
Team Leader

The EMT Deputy Team Leader will stand in for the CMT Team Leader when
he/she is not available to attend EMT meetings and will be responsible for the
day-to-day supervision, co-ordination and implementation of the relocation
plans. The Deputy Team Leader will also:

diplomatic representations
the host nation government, including its military and police authorities, as
required
senior staff of other AoR-based international crisis management actors
other authorities, groups and individuals as required

Responsibilities
towards the
personnel

assist the CMT Team Leader as required


in the CMT Team Leader's absence, assume his/her role and responsibilities
maintain a diary of events
review security measures for personnel and property
monitor progress of action of EMT decisions
act as point of contact with Wardens

The EMT must ensure availability of all relevant information on all mission
personnel. It will:
maintain personal records of all staff
maintain an up-to-date contact list of staff
prepare lists of evacuees for each Security Phase and monitor their progress
during relocation/evacuation

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Responsibilities
towards
Transportation

October 2008

The EMT must coordinate with the host nation government to identify and
facilitate the best available means of transport and ensure that transport
resources are always available to expedite a gradual relocation or an
emergency evacuation.
Additionally, the EMT shall:
ensure all documentation for the movement of personnel, internally and
externally, is current and available
maintain contact details of airlines and shipping lines
maintain timetables of scheduled flights from the AoR and other nearby
airports and ferry departure tables
identify seasonal / climatic problems likely to affect movement.
with the assistance of the EMT/B arrange for the reception, transportation,
accommodation and onward movement of evacuees
arrange the loading or safe storage of personal possessions in case of gradual
relocation

Responsibilities
for Logistics

The EMT is responsible for ensuring all emergency supplies, required for a
gradual relocation or an emergency evacuation, are available and easily
accessible. The EMT shall:
arrange stockpiles of nonperishable food and water to last at least 1 week in
nominated residences and safe havens
arrange basic medical supplies and access to appropriate medical facilities
and services
establish and maintain communications links, internally and externally

Responsibilities
for Finance

The EMT is responsible for ensuring that emergency funds, required for a
gradual relocation or an emergency evacuation, are available and easily
accessible. The EMT shall:
ensure availability and provision of currency and/or traveller's checks
ensure all insurance issues regarding an emergency evacuation are dealt with

Responsibilities
for Security

The EMT, assisted by the MSO, will advise all staff on all security issues
relating to an emergency evacuation and the EMT will implement security
measures as required. Their activities may include:
providing regular current assessments of the local security situation and
communicate them to the WKC (in the case of an incident involving ESDP
mission staff) or SITCEN (in the case of an incident involving EUSR
mission staff or GSC staff) and the EMT/B
providing regular security briefings to mission personnel
Continuedon next page

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FIELD SECURITY HANDBOOK

Responsibilities
for Security
(continued)

liaising with senior members of the local security authorities


co-ordinating the following:
-

security
security
security
security
security

of communications
of meeting rooms used by the EMT
of documentary records
of the safe havens and nominated staff residences
escorts for senior mission personnel as required

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October 2008

Emergency Management Team/Brussels (EMT/B)


Setting up

At the GSC an EMT/B will be organised. According to the circumstances, the


EMT/B could either be consigned during office hours or be operating on a 24
hours base.
The EU Joint SITCEN meeting room will be used as a crisis room. The backup crisis room will be the Security Office's Co-ordination Centre.

Organisation

The EMT/B will be operating in close liaison with the SITCEN (in the case of
an incident involving EUSR mission staff or GSC staff) or WKC (in the case
of an ESDP mission) and advise the SG/HR and the CivOpCdr (where
relevant) on actions to be taken, including notification to Member States.

Members of the
EMT/B

The EMT/B will be developed specifically for the mission and the crisis
situation. The EMT/B is headed by the SG/HR.
Ideally it should have representatives of the following entities:
SG/HR Private Office
DSG Private Office
SITCEN
WKC
DGE
EUMS
CPCC
GSC Security Office
Presidency representative
and be able to draw on the punctual assistance of other relevant services, i.e.
financial, legal, DGA V, etc.

Responsibilities

The EMT/B is in command and control of all aspects of the crisis situation.
The members of the EMT/B will operate according to the Security Phase
System:
either as dislocated task force (on-call duty is compensatory), or
as permanent consolidated and centralized management team
(24/7 duty)

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Monitoring

Routine
Monitoring

It is important that the situation is continually monitored and assessed, so that


timely action can be initiated before an event, rather than have to respond
under, possibly, catastrophic circumstances
The Team Leader of the EMT and the SITCEN will monitor the day-to-day
security situation in the country in general, and in the AoR in particular.
Information and assessments should be regularly exchanged between them.

Sources of
Information

As the level of risk increases more dedicated monitoring will be required.


Possible sources of information include:

local security and law enforcement sources


diplomatic sources
other international crisis management actors in the AoR
Member states

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Communication Structure

Warden Contact All mission personnel must know the contact details for their Warden. All
new mission personnel and visitors must be made aware that the Warden
System exists and know which Warden they should communicate with in the
event of an emergency.

Notification
during
emergency

Mission personnel will be notified of the need to relocate, and advised of


assembly area(s) and timings, by telephone, or by personal notification by the
local area Wardens.
The EMT will notify the Wardens.
The team leader of the EMT may decide that, in circumstances existing at the
time, it may be safer to remain at home rather than attempt to move to another
location. In that case he will notify the Wardens accordingly.
In case communication between the Warden and the EMT is interrupted, the
local Warden will decide, based on the local situation. Any decision taken by
the Warden should be communicated to the EMT as soon as possible.
Once mission personnel has been notified by personal notification by a person
other than the Warden, they should contact their Warden and let them know
they have received the message.

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Relocation

Relocation

Process

Relocation includes moving mission staff to a safe haven following this


process:
gathering at AA. In case more than one AA is designated, and direct
transport from the AA's to the DP is not advisable, all groups from the AA's
will gather to the CAP, before leaving for the DP
gathering at the DP, which is the actual point of departure, such as the
airport
taking the exit routes
arriving at the Safe Havens

Head counts

The MSO should take head counts during the relocation operation at AA, on
the CAP and on the DP.
Confusion in the assembly areas can lead to unnecessary and dangerous search
and rescue operations.
The MSO should establish a method for accounting for mission staff, for non
mission personnel and remaining core personnel during evacuation.

Contents

This chapter details the following elements:


Topic
Assembly Areas and Central Assembly Point
Departure Point
Exit Routes

See Page
151
152
153

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Assembly Areas and Central Assembly P oint

Definition

AAs and CAP are locations (hereafter "assembly locations") where personnel
will gather prior to moving to the chosen DP before relocation.
Areas may combine two functions i.e. the AA can also be the DP, although
this decision needs to be correctly assessed since in time of emergency a DP
may be overflowing with evacuees.

Location

AA's and the CAP should be located for general ease of access, and should
provide a level of security.
The AA will usually be the residence of the local Warden or a senior
employee.
A high level of discretion (at least RESTREINT UE) should be exercised with
regard to all assembly locations.

Responsibilities

Assembly locations may change according to the situation and the means of
relocation or evacuation.
The nominated Warden will be responsible for calling each group to the
nominated assembly locations.
Wardens are designated to account for all mission staff.
The names and last known locations of personnel not accounted for should be
determined and given to the EMT.

Transport to the Staff will travel to the assembly locations with means preagreed with the host
nation.

AA

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Departure P oint

Transport from
the AA's to the
DP

From the AA's or the CAP each group, under the control of the Warden, will
m 0 V e to the DP.
The EMT would take responsibility for moving all the evacuees to the DP for
the relocation or emergency evacuation (to the airport, ferry terminal or
overland).
The method of transport from the AA to the CAP/DP will depend on the local
situation and the means of transport available. The first option should be via
the host nation organized transport. In extreme cases the EMT may arrange
for helicopters to pick up staff at the assembly locations for transportation to
the DP.

Evacuation by
air

For an evacuation by air, the primary DP's will be:

Primary DP

Evacuation
overland

For an evacuation overland, the primary DP's will be:

Primary DP

Evacuation by
ferry

For an evacuation by ferry (or other vessels), the primary DP's will be:

Primary DP

Alternative DP's Alternative DP's may be nominated by the EMT.


Alternative DP's

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Exit Routes
Preparations to
be made

If there would be an identifiable, gradual deterioration in the security situation


and the EMT and EMT/B have made accurate assessments, a staged relocation
will be possible.
In this case it should be possible to evacuate personnel by scheduled flights,
arranged by the EMT or external charter (arranged by host nation, Member
State or Contributing State sources) from airports around the AoR.
However, alternative routes and modes of transport must be identified in the
event this is not possible or if there is a rapid deterioration in the situation.
The following should be held to assist in a gradual evacuation or an
emergency evacuation:
a monetary float of an amount to be agreed for each person in local currency
and EUR, USD. The amount should be enough to cover anticipated and
unanticipated expenses
open air-tickets for all mission personnel to be used only in case of
emergency

Possible
Evacuation
Routes

Possible Evacuation routes from the AoR are:

Air

Sea
Land

Scheduled flights from the AoR airports direct to Save


Haven Country.
Chartered flights, arranged by the host nation, Member State
or Contributing State sources or by the EMT.
Scheduled or chartered shipping services to, respectively,
Safe Haven Country or any other alternative destinations.
Mission or host nation transport from the AoR locations to
locations outside the AoR.
Continuedon next page

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Exit Routes, Continued

Transportation
Availability

Transportation availabilities may be by:

Air

Sea

If there are flights from the AoR to Safe Havens, as well as


destinations in the other alternative areas, updated flight
schedules should be maintained.
Air charter services may be organised from within the AoR.
It may also be possible to take advantage of a diplomatically
sponsored evacuation that may use foreign military aircraft
or chartered airliners.
If shipping services (ferries) exist between the AoR ports and
regional and alternative locations, updated sailing schedules
should be maintained.
The following options for evacuation from the AoR by sea
exist:

Land

ferry
chartered vessel
The following options for evacuation from the AOR by land
exist:
road
rail

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At the Relocation Destination

External
assistance
reception

In the event of relocation the EMT/B will arrange for reception teams to meet
mission personnel at the intermediate and final destinations to respectively
facilitate their stopover and arrival.
Arrangements for lodging of staff will be made.

The Safe Haven


Country

The Safe Haven Country is the preferred primary relocation destination for all
staff since a Member State support system can quickly be put in place.

Failures

In a full scale emergency some mission personnel may miss the uplift. In that
event they should:
try to reach a safe haven and stay there
get in touch with their Point of Contact in the theatre, in adjacent countries
or in Brussels
Return of staff en route to a DP to attempt to find missing staff is not
authorised since it can jeopardise overall safety.

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Safe Havens

Selecting a
location as a
Safe Haven

In the event that Emergency Relocation is not considered possible, or it is


unsafe to execute, the EMT will make the decision that all potential evacuees
will take refuge in one or two nominated safe havens.
Wherever possible, all safe havens should have the following features:

should be located well away from government buildings and other


possible targets of attack
should be easily accessible to all mission personnel
the safe haven should have a good level of security to protect against
looting
should have primary and back-up communications facilities (local and
international) as well as basic fire fighting equipment
nominated safe havens must be large enough to accommodate all the
mission potential evacuees and any EU or Contributing States
representatives who may be visiting the AoR at the time
should be capable of being stocked with food, water, batteries and fuel
necessary for all persons for at least one week
it should also be accessible to possible relocation route - this could be
near the airport or near a ferry terminal

Typically, the nominated safe havens will be residential quarters outside the
main potential areas of trouble (see above).
Hotels selection

It is not recommended to choose a hotel as a nominated Safe Haven. When


selecting hotels in the AoR, however, the following should be considered:
because of the number of relief and crisis management actors present in the
AoR, they may become crowded during an emergency and the services of
the hotel may become stretched
also, while staying at a hotel one becomes almost entirely dependent on
others for food, water, power and communications

Basic supplies

Any safe haven should be fitted out and stockpiled with the basic necessities
as a matter of course.

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October 2008

Safe Haven Checklist

Location

A Safe Haven should be capable of being stocked with food, water, fuel,
medicines and all necessary supplies and equipment for all persons for at least
one week. Further, a Safe Haven should be:
located away from potential trouble spots, government buildings and other
possible strategic targets
easily accessible to staff and their families
be able to ensure a good level of security
be large enough to accommodate personnel and any EU or Contributing
States representatives who may be visiting at the time

Equipment
check

A Safe Haven should have:

Supplies check

backup generator and fuel (if practical)


primary and backup communications facilities
basic fire fighting equipment
shortwave battery powered radio and spare batteries
torches and spare batteries and candles
medical kit
backup gas facilities if safe haven has electric cooking facilities
cooking, eating utensils and bedding (to be brought by evacuees)
books
fuel for vehicles

A Safe Haven should have:


food including high energy / calorie snacks (for at least one week)
water (plan for 8 litres of water p/person p/day for drinking, washing, etc.)
water purification tablets should be stocked in ample quantities, since
drinking water contamination can be a problem
medication (each evacuee should bring own prescription drugs)
personal hygiene products
cleaning products and equipment (for dishes and general housekeeping)
Important remark

Wherever possible evacuees should be instructed to bring to the nominated


Safe Havens as much food, water and other supplies as they may require,
supplementing existing supplies.

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Action to Resume Operations after Initiating Evacuation and


Emergency Relocation

Assessment

The assessment process and actions taken will depend on the Security Phase
reached. The following will need to be considered by the remaining members
of the EMT in situ and the EMT/B.
Assessment

Actions

liaison with the Member States and Contributing State


Embassies in Safe Haven Country
forecast of the future stability in the area for both short and
long-term
acceptability by locally involved actors for mission to
resume operations
state of existing operations and infrastructure
state of essential services and utilities in the AoR
availability of suitable accommodation for returning
mission personnel
access to the area
state of communications
skills required /job functions for returning personnel
identify mission personnel by job function for staged return
and also contact local employees
identify return routes
identify means of transport
ensure all documentation for returning mission personnel is
current
organise accommodation, transport and essential re-supply
establish reliable communications with relevant EU
authorities

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Appendix - Contact List

Contact list

Please write below a list of useful contacts:


Name

Contact details

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Contingency Plans

Overview
Introduction

This part covers the "when" and "why" of contingency planning. It considers
the relationship to early warning, operations planning and deeds assessment
and identifies indicators which will suggest when it is prudent to initiate the
planning process.

Contents

These guidelines addresses the following subjects:


Topic
Contingency Planning
Contingency Planning and Operations Planning
Planning Process

See Page
162
163
164

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Contingency Planning

Definition

Contingency planning is a forward planning process, in a state of uncertainty,


in which scenarios and objectives are agreed, managerial and technical actions
defined, and potential response systems put in place in order to prevent, or
better respond to, an emergency or critical situation.
Prerequisites for rapid and effective emergency response are:
planning
availability of standby resources (financial, human and material),
a mechanism for rapid decision making

Identify
Critical
Services
and
Operations

Assess the impact of potential emergencies and determine the need for backup
systems. Areas to review include:

Identify
Internal
Resources and
Capabilities

Resources and capabilities that could be needed in an emergency


such as:

Establish
Procedures

Each Mission should:

services provided by suppliers, especially sole source vendors


lifeline services such as electrical power, water, gas, telecommunications
and transportation
operations, equipment and personnel vital to the continued functioning of
the mission

personnel - EMT, Warden System and Response Team, Emergency Medical


Services, Public Information Officer Equipment - fire protection and
suppression equipment, communications equipment, first aid supplies,
emergency supplies, warning systems, emergency power equipment,
transportation capacity
facilities - emergency operating centre, media briefing area, shelter areas,
first-aid stations, sanitation facilities
organizational capabilities - Security Phase System, Evacuation Plan,
Relocation Plan, SOPs, Guidelines for MSOs, staff training
backup Systems - to provide for emergency power, communication systems
and recovery support

plan for all possible contingencies from a temporary or short-term disruption


to a total failure
establish procedures for restoring lifeline systems

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October 2008

Contingency Planning and Operations Planning

Criteria for
Contingency
Planning

Planning is an ongoing activity. The oft quoted comment, "this is an


emergency, we don't have time to plan" is ill-conceived. This being said, the
whole point of contingency planning is to begin the planning before the
emergency begins by mapping out objectives and strategies prior to the crisis
stage.

Difference
between
CP and OP

There is not a great deal of difference between contingency and operations


planning. Both are planning activities as described above where objectives are
set and a strategy to achieve these objectives delineated.
The major difference between the two, is that planning for contingencies is
planning in a state of uncertainty. One must make assumptions and develop
scenarios upon which planning is based. In operations planning, one observes
a tangible situation and responds to it.

Structure

In many cases however, contingency planning takes place in the midst of a


complex operation. For example if one is planning for a serious impact
affecting a mission, then contingency planning becomes one element of
operations planning.
Here there are elements of certainty and uncertainty mixed - the realities of the
ongoing operation are well known but future developments for which one
needs to be prepared are to be assumed.

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Planning Process

Definition

Contingency planning is primarily a process. It is not a one time event, even


less a "Plan". The planning process may well have a starting point but usually
no end.
Contingency planning is best achieved through a cooperative and coordinated
effort wherein all relevant actors should work together, in the same direction,
with shared objectives and over a period of time. Meeting once and producing
a Plan is usually insufficient and the product usually inadequate. The process
revolves around regular meetings.
Inputs into these meetings include expertise, field visits, mission policy etc.,
while outputs include Plans, reports, budgets, actions, stockpiles etc..

Scenario
Identification

Based on their own experience, early warning indicators, reliable commentary


etc., the emergency planners should develop possible or likely scenarios. This
activity is the most intuitive, yet one of the most important, since this lays the
basis for all further planning.
In establishing scenarios one will inevitably make assumptions, and while
these will be based on the experiences and knowledge of a range of persons,
there will inevitably be an element of unpredictability.

Prediction of a "The only predictable thing about a scenario is that it will be wrong".
Scenario
This may be true, but it doesn't really matter that much. It is important to
settle for one or more scenarios for planning purposes and if the influx is
smaller, one knows one is well prepared, and if it is greater, one immediately
realises the importance.
Continuedon next page

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Planning P rocess, Continued

Policy/strategic The planners need to have some vision of the direction of the overall
objective
operation. To the extent possible this should be a shared vision. It is not
Identification
unusual for the various partners to hold different policy approaches to a
particular problem. If these can not be reconciled at least they should be
known and understood by all parties.
Nevertheless an effort should be made to agree on some overall principles
through establishing overall objectives for the response operation. All
activities undertaken in the plan will need to be consistent with these overall
objectives.
The overall objectives can simply be accomplished by brainstorming in
plenary. In order to divert any open confliction debate some effort may be
required prior to the final planning process to find a formula acceptable to all
parties.
The policy objectives are normally of a general nature and noncontroversial.
Objective identification is a substantive and detailed part of the planning
process. For each sector the planners should agree, in as much detail as time
will permit, on the:
objectives including standards
activities/tasks
who is responsible for implementing the task
time frame for implementation

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Security Incident Reporting


Overview

Contents

This part contains the following topics:


Topic
Field Security Policy requirements
Reporting Security Incidents
Security incidents in ESDP missions: handling at GSC
level
Security Incident Reporting System (SIRS)

See Page
168
170
171
172

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October 2008

Field Security Policy Requirements

Incident and
consequence
management

Among the core measures for the security of personnel, the Field Security
Policy provides for an incident and consequence management system to be
established in a consistent way between operations in the field, the General
Secretariat of the Council, participating Member States/contributing Third
States and the Council (through the PSC).
This system is to cover "serious security incidents or threats to the security of
personnel, whether caused by accidents, conflict, malicious acts, criminal acts,
kidnap and hostage situations or medical emergencies".
Its reporting, communication and analysis requirements are summarised in the
scheme set out in the next page:

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Reporting, Commu nicating and Analysing Seriou s Secu rity Incidents or


Threats to the Secu rity of Personnel

Contributing
third States

Participating
Member States
/

Reporting as
necessary

Commun i c a ting

General
Secretariat
of the Cou ncil

"Analysing

Communicating

GSC Security Office


Reporting

Reviewing and
improving security
measures and
structures

EUSR

Head of Mission

Force Commander
(in military
operations)

International
Organisations

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Reporting Security Incidents

Key elements

A security incident report should cover, if possible, all the elements set out
below:
reporter identification
-Name
- Function
- Reporting time
- Reporting place
incident identification
-Date
- Time
- Country
- Place
- Location details

Reporting

incident description
action taken locally
assistance requested from Brussels
impact of incident
further remarks

Incidents affecting an ESDP mission are to be reported to WKC.


Incidents affecting an EUSR team are to be reported to SITCEN.
WKC and SITCEN will, in turn, inform all other relevant actors, including the
GSC Security Office.

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Security Incidents in ESDP Missions: Handling at GSC Level

Communication Incidents affecting an ESDP mission will be handled at GSC level according
to the detailed chain of communication set out below.
WKC DO

CPCCDO

Gets news on incident from


Mission or other source

Alerts CPCC DO
Alerts SITCEN

Alerts Mission
if appropriate

Consults with WKC


DO,CPCC and proceed
to WKC. Maintains
contact with all relevant
actors through
identified PoC
concerned

Alerts Key Personnel

Assists WKC DO in
alerting Key Personnel

:.

If so instructed, alerts
Desk Officers and Hi
Rank Personnel

Assists WKC DO in
alerting Desk Officers
and HiRank Personnel

If so instructed, calls
an Operations Crisis
Meeting

Assists WKC in
calling an Operations
Crisis Meeting

Supports
implementation of
CPCC/Operations
Crisis Meeting
decisions

Supports
implementation of
CPCC/Operations
Crisis Meeting
decisions

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Security Incident Reporting System (SIRS)

Introduction

The Field Security Policy provides that "Analysis of serious security incidents
will be undertaken regularly by the GSC to allow for the continuous review
and improvement of the measures and structures for the security of personnel
deployed in crisis management operations."
In order to implement this requirement, the GSC Security Office is has been
developing an automated security incident reporting system (SIRS). SIRS will
allow relevant actors in the field to report safety and security incidents to
headquarters a posteriori. It will be a tool for collecting data in a systematic
and standardised way. The statistical results from SIRS will allow medium
and long range planning of field security needs and allow continuous
improvement to the way the safety and security of staff is managed in the
field.

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EU Classified Information (EUCI)

EU classified
information
(EUCI)

Any classified information generated:


for the purposes of a crisis management operation established by the Council
in the framework of ESDP, or
by an EUSR and his/her team
is designated as EU classified information (EUCI) in accordance with the
Council's security regulations. It must be marked accordingly.

Council's
Security
Regulations

The creation and handling of EU classified information is governed by the


Council's security regulations.
Such regulations are annexed to Council Decision 2001/264/EC, published in
Official Journal L 101, 11.4.2001, p. 1. They will be revised in the course of
2009.

Protecting EUCI Espionage by state and criminal actors in a field security environment is
in a field
endemic.
environment
Third state intelligence agencies involved or interested in the area where the
EU is projecting itself, will try to gain access to classified information to
further their own goals. These may be contrary to the objectives and interests
of the EU.
Criminal actors may also become affected by EU action in a particular area
and may seek information allowing them to hamper developments affecting
the criminal activity they are involved in.
While EUCI should be protected as a matter of course under Council Decision
2001/264/EC, protecting EUCI in a field environment takes on a special
importance as its compromise of loss may, besides affecting EU interests, also
affect the safety and security of EU staff deployed in the area.

Release to third
countries

The release of EU classified information generated for the purposes of an


operation to third countries contributing to that operation is governed by the
Council Joint Action establishing the operation.

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Practical
guidance

October 2008

Practical guidance on creating and handling EU classified information is


contained in the Guide on the Security of Information published by the GSC.
Copies may be requested at the following email address:
securite.documentation@consilium.europa.eu

Management

The management of EUCI is to be regulated in a specific SOP to be annexed


to the mission security plan. The following points shall be addressed:
which documents have to be classified and at what level
who is authorised to have access to EUCI including their security clearance
level
who is appointed to manage EUCI
where and how EUCI is to be handled and stored

Destruction

174

The destruction plan shall include procedures for the destruction of EU


classified information where needed. Such procedures shall be in accordance
with the Council's security regulations.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

List

The table below explains the meaning of the acronyms and abbreviations used
throughout this handbook.
Acronym/abbreviation
AA
AoR
ASC
CAP
CCC
CivOpCdr
CMC
CONOPS
CPCC
CRT
DP
ECS
EERP
EMT
EMT/B
EUCI
ESDP
EUSR
GSC
HEST
HoM
LEA
MoU
MSO
MSORS
MSOS
MSP
MS-SOS
NGO
OPLAN
PSC
SG/HR
SIAC
SIRS
SITCEN
SMT
SOMA
SOP
SORS
SOS

Meaning
Assembly Area
Area of Responsibility
Area Security Coordinator
Central Assembly Point
Crisis Coordination Centre
Civilian Operation Commander
Crisis Management Concept
Concept of Operation
Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
Civilian Response Team
Departure Point
Emergency Communications System
Emergency Evacuation and Relocation Plan
Emergency Management Team
Emergency Management Team/Brussels
European Union Classified Information
European Security and Defence Policy
EU Special Representative
General Secretariat of the Council
Hostile Environment Security Training
Head of Mission
Law Enforcement Agency
Memorandum of Understanding
Mission Security Officer
Minimum Security Operating Residential
Standards
Minimum Security Operating Standards
Mission Security Plan
Mission-Specific Security Operating Standards
Non Governmental Organisation
Operation Plan
Political and Security Committee
Secretary-General/High Representative
Single Intelligence Analysis Capability
Security Incident Reporting System
EU Joint Situation Centre
Security Management Team
Status of Mission Agreement
Standard Operating Procedure
Security Operating Residential Standards
Security Operating Standards

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UN
UNDSS
WKC

October 2008

United Nations
United Nations Department of Safety and
Security
Watchkeeping Capability

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Council of the European Union


Field Security Handbook - October 2008
2008 p. 182 21 29,7 cm
ISBN 978-92-824-2380-6
DOI 10.2860/32782
QC-30-08-732-EN-C

n
OJ

00

www.consilium.europa.eu

GC.EC0G/TY@

YOUR SERVfCE

DGF Cration graphique - RS 34/2008