Wills and Succession Case Matrix

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY.
BATUNGBAKAL)
Case Name
Doctrine
FACTS
ISSUE & HELD
**CARABAO**
On various dates since the year 1968, defendant Isabelo Nacar incurred indebtedness to plaintiff Ildefonso
Japitana in the total sum of P2,791.00, and which the defendant had not been able to pay despite repeated
demands. Defendant died in 1970 leaving among other things personal property consisting seven (7) heads of
carabaos now in the possession of Nicanor Nacar.
Whether or not the indebtedness may be enforced against Nicanor Nacar who was or had in his possession
the carabaos that formed the estate of the late Isabelo Nacar?
MTC: Respondent Japitana filed a complaint before the MTC of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur against petitioner
Nacar entitled: Claim against the Estate of the Late Isabelo Nacar w/ Preliminary Attachment , naming
Nicanor Nacar as a respondent to recover the aforementioned sum. On the basis of this complaint,
Respondent Judge Nistal ordered provincial sheriff to attach 7 heads of cattle (as what stated in the complaint)
in possession of petitioner Nacar, but only 4 were attached due to the fact that the other 3 were already
slaughtered during the rite preceding the burial of the late Isabelo
Respondent Japitana has no cause of action against petitioner Nacar. Indeed, although Japitana may have a
legal right to recover an indebtedness due him, Nicanor Nacar has no correlative legal duty to pay the debt
for the simple reason that there is nothing in the complaint to show that he incurred the debt or had anything
to do with the creation of the liability. As far as the debt is concerned, there is no allegation or showing that the
petitioner had acted in violation of Mr. Japitana's rights with consequential injury or damage to the latter as would
create a cause of action against the former. The respondent court's reason for not dismissing the case is contrary to
applicable precedents on the matter.
INHERITANCE
"Appropriate actions for the enforcement or

defense of rights must be taken in
accordance with procedural rules and
cannot be left to the whims or caprices of
litigants. It cannot even be left to the
untrammeled discretion of the courts of
justice without sacrificing uniformity and
equality in the application and effectivity
thereof
Nacar vs. Nistal
Suit to recover the claim of the private

respondents may not be filed against the
administrator or executor of his estate.
One arising from a contract, may be
pursued only by filing the same in the
administration proceedings to settle the
estate of the deceased Isabelo Nacar
Nicanor filed:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
a motion to dismiss,
dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment and
order the return of the carabaos and
raised lack of jurisdiction and
absence of Cause of Action.
He averred that the indebtedness mentioned in the complaint was alleged to have been incurred by the late
Isabelo Nacar and not by Nicanor Nacar. There was, therefore, no cause of action against him. The petitioner
also stated that a municipal court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action involving a claim filed against the
estate of a deceased person.
Japitana filed an opposition, Doloricon filed a compliant in intervention (he claims to be the owner of the
cattles). Judge Nistal dismissed the motion
SC: Nacar then filed a motion for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus raising the same argument. SC issued
preliminary mandatory injunction.
Anderson vs.
Perkins
Before the perishable and other property of
the estate of the deceased are sold by the
special administrator, it is clear that
proceedings must first be taken to
segregate the alleged exclusive property of
the surviving spouse. The issue of the
ownership of said properties should be
decided first, and the conjugal properties
liquidated, or at least the surviving spouse
should agree as to which properties he or
she does not mind to be sold. Any sale
done without this requirement should be
considered premature, and the court must
therefore refuse to grant permission.
Whether or not Japitana has a cause of action against Petitioner Nacar
Petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson filed a petition for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of the
late Eugene Arthur Perkins who allegedly possessed of personal and real properties. On the same day
Petitioner also filed an urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of
the estate. The court issued an order appointing Enrile as such special administrator upon his posting of a
bond also on the same day.
Oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased, entered an opposition to the probate of the
will presented by petitioner.
The special administrator submitted an inventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as
belonging to the deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death.
2 years later the special administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to
some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased which
were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value in order to avoid their further deterioration and to save
whatever value might be obtained in their disposition. The court required the administration to submit a
specification of the properties sought to be sold. The special administrator submitted to the court a copy of the
It is also patent from the complaint that respondent Japitana filed the case against petitioner Nacar to recover seven
(7) heads of carabaos allegedly belonging to Isabelo Nacar which Japitana wanted to recover from the possession of
the petitioner to answer for the outstanding debt of the late Isabelo Nacar. This matter, however, is only ancillary to
the main action. The ancillary matter does not cure a fatal defect in the complaint for the main action is for the
recovery of an outstanding debt of the late lsabelo Nacar due respondent Japitana, a cause of action about which
petitioner Nacar has nothing to do.
Separate Opinion, VASQUEZ, J., concurring:
xxx Isabelo Nacar died before the said complaint was filed. It does not appear that any proceeding has been filed to
settle his estate. Under these facts, the filing of an ordinary action to recover said claim is not allowed in any
court. Even if settlement proceedings had been taken to settle the estate of Isabelo Nacar, the suit to recover
the claim of the private respondents may not be filed against the administrator or executor of his estate. The
claim of private respondents, being one arising from a contract, may be pursued only by filing the same in the
administration proceedings to settle the estate of the deceased Isabelo Nacar. If such a proceeding is instituted and
the subject claim is not filed therein within the period prescribed, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." xxx
The carabaos, if really owned by Isabelo Nacar, pertained to his estate upon his death. The claim of the private
respondents may only be satisfied by a voluntary act on the part of the heirs of Isabelo Nacar, or pursued in the
appropriate settlement proceedings. A municipal court may not entertain such a proceeding, it not being vested,
under the law then in force, with probate jurisdiction. Xxx
Whether or not the oppositors contention that she is entitled to a large portion of the personal properties in
question either because they were conjugal property of herself and the deceased, or because they are her
own exclusive, personal property should be entertained.
YES. The Court held that the records show that up to the time the proposed sale was asked for and judicially
approved, no proceedings had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate the alleged exclusive property of the
oppositor appellant from the mass of the estate supposedly left by the deceased, or to liquidate the conjugal
partnership property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased.
Before the perishable and other property of the estate of the deceased are sold by the special administrator, it is clear
that proceedings must first be taken to segregate the alleged exclusive property of the surviving spouse. The issue of
the ownership of said properties should be decided first, and the conjugal properties liquidated, or at least the
surviving spouse should agree as to which properties he or she does not mind to be sold. Any sale done without this
requirement should be considered premature, and the court must therefore refuse to grant permission.
After all, most of the items sought to be sold can easily be protected and preserved with proper care and storage
measures in either or both of the two residential houses (in Manila and in Baguio City) left by the deceased, so that
WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

inventory of the personal properties belonging to the estate with the items sought to be sold.
Oppositor filed an opposition to the proposed sale on the grounds that (1) most of the properties sought to be
sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) unauthorized removals of fine
pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been made.
no reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong opposition and objection of
oppositor appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a substantial portion of the personal estate in question.
The lower court approved the proposed sale. Oppositor moved to reconsider this order on the grounds that:
(1) said order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the
deceased, contrary to Rule 81, sec. 2, Rules of Court;
(2) said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought to be sold were
perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court;
(3) the personality sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of oppositor;
(4) there is evidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of the estate,
and the sale of the inventoried lot would prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed;
and
(5)there is also evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial part of the personal
estate.
The lower court's order authorizing the special administrator to sell certain personal properties of the estate is set
aside.
NOTE:
Properties not belonging to the estate must be excluded, for they are not part of the inheritance. Hence,
it is important to determine the ownership of the properties involved.
Another issue raised in this case is won a special administrator can sell these perishable personal
properties. Pwede daw according to Sec. 2 Rule 81 ng Rules of Court then, and ALSO those other
properties as the court ordered.
The lower court denied the above motion for reconsideration. Oppositor appealed.
RIGHTS TO THE SUCCESSION ARE TRANSMITTED FROM THE MOMENT OF DEATH
3
Maria Vda. de
Reyes vs. CA
*** HOMECOMING***
Art. 777, the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of decedents
death
The estate of the decedent would then be
held in co-ownership by the heirs.
The co-heir or co-owner may validly
dispose of his share or interest in the
property subject to the condition that the
portion disposed of is eventually allotted to
him in the division upon termination of the
co-ownership.
Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest
of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes,
Sr., can only acquire that which Rafael, Jr.
could transmit to them upon his death.
Nemo dare potest quod non habet.||
During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less
located in Cavite. He failed to register it for a Torrens title before his death, so the application was continued by
his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his property.
In 1936 the property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs. In the subdivision plan, each resultant lot
was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. Two lots, were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one
of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations for their
respective shares.
In 1941, about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole property
was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already
deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.
On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters, more or
less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola. According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No.1-A14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. I-A-14.
The vendee immediately took possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.
On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
based on the aforestated subdivision plan, and the lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was
already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his only son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr.
RTC: Petitioners herein, as successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 against private
respondents for recovery of possession or, in the alternative, for indemnification, accounting and damages.
They allege therein that after "having definitely discovered that they are the lawful owners of the property," they,
"including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated demands to defendants to surrender the
possession of and vacate the parcel of land belonging to the former, but defendants refused to vacate and
surrender the possession of the said land to herein plaintiffs;" They further allege that they have been deprived
by said defendants of the rightful possession and enjoyment of the property since September 1969.
Private respondents deny the material averments in the complaint and assert that they are the owners of the lot
in question, having bought the same from Rafael Reyes, Sr.; that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null and
W/n the sale of the land to Gardiola was valid

Yes. upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel of
land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. The estate of the
decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share
or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the
division upon termination of the co-ownership.
In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the estate
of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir,
Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.
Therefore, since under Art. 777, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of decedents death,
the sale of the land by Rafael Reyes Jr. was valid.
Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that which
Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it
was sold by his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T- 27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot
No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does
not create a right in favor of an heir. It is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he
never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement did not improve his condition, and
the subsequent registration of the deed did not create any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the
petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot give them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest
quod non habet.||

void, for such sale was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that they have been in possession of the property and have
been paying the land taxes thereon; and that petitioners are barred by prescription and/or laches.
The trial court concluded that petitioners' "title over the subject property is valid and regular and thus they are
entitled to its possession and enjoyment,".
CA:reversed. the existence of a subdivision plan, and from the uncontroverted testimony of appellants'
witness, We can only infer that at least an oral partition of heirs, which under the law is valid and binding, was
entered into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes regarding his properties in 1936. As held in a long line of decisions,
extrajudicial partition can be done orally, and the same would be valid if freely entered into. The reason for this
is because a partition is not exactly a conveyance for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property
from one to the other but rather a confirmation by them of their ownership of the property
***GREEDY MOTHER***
Danilo Suarez
vs. CA
Petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his estate consisting of several
valuable parcels of land in Pasig, Metro Manila has not been liquidated or partitioned.
Article 777 "The rights to the succession

are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent."
In 1977, petitioners widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for rescission
of contract and for damages, and were ordered by the RTC to pay, jointly and severally, respondents the
aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as damages.
"The legitime of the legitimate children and

descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate of the father and of the
mother.
The judgment against petitioners mother and Rizal Realty Corporation having become final and executory their
fathers estate (5 paercels of land in Pasig) were levied and sold on execution on June 24, 1983 in favor of the
private respondents as the highest bidder Private respondents were then issued a certificate of sale.
Petitioners became co-owners of the

property not because of their mother but
through their own right as children of their
deceased father.
RTC: Before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reinvindicatory action against private
respondents for the annulment of the auction sale and the recovery of the ownership of the levied pieces of
property. They alleged that being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable
therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied nor sold on
execution. The Sheriff issued to private respondents a final deed of sale.
Petitioners are not barred in any way from

instituting the action to annul the auction
sale to protect their own interest.
Teofista Suarez joined by herein petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of the RTC claiming
that the parcels of land are co-owned by them but was denied. Upon Motion for Reconsideration, it was
granted by the RTC.
w/n the property should be subject to levy

No. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the law applicable at the time of the institution of the case. "The rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
Article 888 further provides: "The legitime of the legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the
hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half, subject to the
rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."
The proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their
mother. Petitioners became co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as
children of their deceased father. Therefore, petitioners are not barred in any way from instituting the action to annul
the auction sale to protect their own interest.
RTC issued an Order directing Teofista Suarez and all persons claiming right under her to vacate the lots
subject of the judicial sale; to desist from removing or alienating improvements thereon; and to surrender to
private respondents the owner's duplicate copy of the torrens title and other pertinent documents.
CA:Respondents appealed to the CA, which affirmed RTC decision.
Hence this petition
INTESTATE
Intestate
the description of a person who dies without making a valid will A Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
Settlement of an estate need not undergo judicial proceedings all the time. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the extrajudicial settlement of estate by agreement among the heirs.
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of
a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds
5
Constantino vs.
CA
JOSEFA TORRES died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at Balagtas, Bulacan. Among her heirs are
respondents Aurora S. Roque, Priscilla S. Luna and Josefina S. Austria. In 1984, the heirs of Josefa Torres
Whether or not the CA erred in concluding that Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale did not
reflect the true intent of the parties.

(VENDORS), and petitioner Nelia A. Constantino (VENDEE), entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land
(250sqm).
Sales v. CA that the extrinsic validity of a

document was not affected by the fact that
it was notarized in a place other than
where the subject matter thereof was
located. What is more important under the
Notarial Law is that the notary public has
authority to acknowledge the document
executed within his territorial jurisdiction.
Given that Josefa Torres died intestate and
her parcel of land in Bulacan is commonly
owned by all of her heirs. It is of primary
importance that all be aware of the legal
standing of the parcel of land. Given that
fraud was present in getting the signatures
of all ten heirs, such Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale is void. NO MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN
PARTIES ON LAND AREA TO BE SOLD
The lot, owned in common by the Torres heirs, is being occupied by petitioners' mother and sister. An adjoining
lot, also co-owned by the heirs, is being occupied by Sps. Severino and Consuelo Lim. Pursuant to their
agreement, the heirs authorized petitioner to prepare the necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Sale. After having the document drafted with several spaces left blank including the specification as to
the metes and bounds of the land petitioner asked the heirs to affix their signatures on the document. The
heirs signed the document with the understanding that respondent Roque, one of the heirs, would be present
when the latter would seek permission from the Bureau of Lands and have the land surveyed. However,
without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property was subsequently surveyed, subdivided and
then covered by 2 TCTs.
Petitioner did not furnish the heirs with copies of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale nor of
the subdivision plan and the certificates of title. Upon securing a copy of the deed from the Registry of Deeds,
the respondents learned that the area of the property purportedly sold to petitioner was much bigger than that
agreed upon by the parties. It already included the portion being occupied by the Sps. Lim. Private
respondents sent a letter of demand to petitioner (for surrender of the deed of settlement & conveyance, the
subdivision plan and the CTs); but to no avail.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: Presented the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale wherein
respondents agreed to divide and adjudicate among themselves the inherited property (w/ area of 1,503sqm).
In the same document, they caused the subdivision of the property into 2 lots according to a plan identified as
Lot 4-A (1,096sqm) and Lot 4-B (407sqm), and acknowledged the sale to petitioner of said Lot 4-B. As a
consequence, on 18 March 1985, the Register of Deeds issued TCTs in the name of the heirs of Torres and
another in the name of petitioner.
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: that all the heirs signed the document before the land was
surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as yet no definite area to be sold that could be indicated in the
deed at the time of the signing. They also claimed that they were not notified about the survey and the
subdivision of the lot and therefore they could not have agreed on the area supposedly sold to petitioner. The
respondent heirs insist that they could not have agreed to the extent of the area actually reflected in the deed
because it included the portion being occupied by the Lim spouses, which was already the subject of a
previous agreement to sell between them and their predecessor.
RTC: Bulacan an action for annulment of the deed and cancellation of the certificates of title.
RTC had doubts with respect to the preparation and due execution of the said Deed, taking into account that:
petitioner was not able to enumerate all the signatories to the document; while petitioner claimed that the
document was signed only after the survey of the land was completed, or on Oct 10, 1984, such fact was
negated by her own witness who testified that the survey was conducted only on Oct 16,1984; and, while
petitioner alleged that the document was signed and notarized in Manila no explanation was offered why the
same could not have been signed and notarized in Bulacan where notaries public abound which could have
been less inconvenient to the parties concerned. Additionally, RTC relied heavily on the assertions of
respondents as reflected in their demand letter that they did not give their consent to the sale of Lot 4-B. Thus
RTC ordered the annulment and cancellation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale, 2
TCTs and Subdivision Plan.
CA: Sustained the decision of the RTC and denied Motion to Reconsider
SC: affirmed the CAs decision
HEIRS
NO MEETING OF THE MINDS BETWEEN PARTIES ON LAND AREA TO BE SOLD; Petitioner also insists that
the real intent of the parties was to make the entire Lot 4-B the subject matter of the sale. She claims that during
cross-examination respondent Roque admitted that she signed in behalf of her co-heirs a receipt for P30,000.00 as
partial payment for the lot occupied by Ka Baring and Lina (relatives of petitioner) and Consuelo Lim. . . . The
admission of respondent Roque cannot prevail in the face of the clear evidence that there was as yet no meeting of
the minds on the land area to be sold since private respondents were still awaiting the survey to be conducted on the
premises. . . . Likewise, we find the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed prior to the survey, or before
determination of the area to be sold, worthy of credit as against the contention of petitioner that they signed after the
survey or on 10 October 1984.
As found by the RTC, such contention was contradicted by petitioner's own witness who positively asserted in court
that the survey was conducted only on 16 October 1984 or 6 days after the signing. Quite obviously, when
respondents affixed their signatures on the deed, it was still incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be prepared
left several spaces blank, more particularly as regards the dimensions of the property to be sold. The heirs were
persuaded to sign the document only upon the assurance of petitioner that respondent Roque, pursuant to their
understanding, would be present when the property would be surveyed after obtaining permission from the Bureau of
Lands. As it surfaced, the supposed understanding was merely a ruse of petitioner to induce respondents to sign the
deed without which the latter would not have given their conformity thereto.
We ruled in the Sales v. CA that the extrinsic validity of a document was not affected by the fact that it was notarized
in a place other than where the subject matter thereof was located. What is more important under the Notarial Law is
that the notary public has authority to acknowledge the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction. The ruling
in Sales is not applicable to the present case. Our concern here is not whether the notary public had the authority to
acknowledge the document executed within his territorial jurisdiction but whether respondents indeed appeared
before him and signed the deed. However, the quantum of evidence shows that they did not. RTC correctly
appreciated the fact that the deed was notarized in Manila when it could have been notarized in Bulacan. This
additional detail casts doubt on the procedural regularity in the preparation, execution and signing of the deed. It is
not easy to believe that petitioner and the Torres heirs traveled all the way to Manila to have their questioned
document notarized considering that they, with the exception of respondent Roque, are residents of Balagtas,
Bulacan, where notaries public are easy to find. Consequently, the claim of private respondents that they did not sign
the document before a notary public is more plausible than petitioner's feeble claim to the contrary.
Apparently, petitioner deceived respondents by filling the blank spaces in the deed, having the lots surveyed and
subdivided, and then causing the issuance of transfer certificates of title without their knowledge, much less consent.
Thus all the elements of fraud vitiating consent for purposes of annulling a contract concur: (a) It was employed by a
contracting party upon the other; (b) It induced the other party to enter into the contract; (c) It was serious; and, (d) It
resulted in damages and injury to the party seeking annulment. Perhaps, another compelling reason for the
annulment of the document of settlement and conveyance is that the 2nd page thereof clearly manifests that the
number of the subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A and 4-B were merely HANDWRITTEN while all
the rest of the statements therein were TYPEWRITTEN, which leads us to the conclusion that handwritten figures
thereon were not available at the time the document was formalized.

The trial court cannot make a declaration
of heirship in the civil action for the reason
that such a declaration can only be made
in a special proceeding.
Heirs of
Yaptinchay vs.
CA
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997

Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is
defined as "one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong" while a special proceeding is "a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish
a status, a right, or a particular fact."
declaration of heirship must be made in an
administration proceeding, and not in an
independent civil action
if the suit is not brought in the name of or
against the real party in interest, a motion
to dismiss may be filed on the ground that
the complaint states no cause of action.
Valente
Raymundo vs.
Isagon Vda. De
Suarez
Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of spouses Yaptinchay, the owners-claimants of two lots situated
in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. On Marc h 17, 1994 petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouses. On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the
aforesaid properties were titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation
("Golden Bay").
NO. The Court ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. The determination of who are legal heirs of the
deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property.
RTC:
With the discovery, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of TCTs over the properties.
Upon learning that Golden Bay sold portions of the subject land, petitioners filed with the RTC an
Amended Complaint to mention the TCTs to be annulled.
The RTC granted the same.
On August 12, 1995, the private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that
among others, the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action being that they have not established
their status as heirs.
The Motion to Dismiss was granted, holding that t he petitioners have not shown any proof that
they have been declared legal heirs of the deceased couple.
Petitioners contend that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that
the issue of heirship should first be determined before trial of the case could proceed.
They further contend that the respondent court should have proceeded with the trial and
simultaneously resolve d the issue of heirship in the same case.
The Court denied their motion to dismiss.

Hence, this petition.
Marcelo and Teofista Isagon Suarez marriage was blessed with both material wealth and progeny in herein
respondents. During their marriage, governed by the CPG regime, they acquired the subject properties. After
the death of Marcelo Sr. in 1955, Teofista and herein respondents, as well as Elpidio Suarez, executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, partitioning Marcelo Sr.s estate.
All the properties were held pro indiviso by Teofista and her children; and respective titles thereto were not
changed, with Teofista as de facto administrator thereof. In 1975, Rizal Realty Corporation and Teofista, the
latter owning ninety percent (90%) of the formers shares of stock, were sued by petitioner Valente Raymundo,
his wife Violeta, Virginia Banta and Maria Concepcion Vito (plaintiffs) in consolidated cases for Rescission of
Contract and Damages. Thereafter, in 1975, the CFI of Rizal, rendered judgment: (1) rescinding the
respective contracts of plaintiffs with Rizal Realty and Teofista, and (2) holding the two defendants solidarily
liable to plaintiffs for damages in the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000.00. Eventually, a certificate
of sale was issued to the plaintiffs, having bought the properties levied on execution to satisfy the judgment.
Parenthetically, before expiration of the redemption period, herein respondents filed a revindicatory action
against petitioners docketed as Civil Case No. 51203, for the annulment of the auction sale and recovery of
ownership of the levied properties.Meanwhile, the RTC issued an Order directing Teofista: (1) to vacate the
subject properties. CA affirmed.
Civil Case No. 51203 was dismissed by the RTC for failure of herein respondents to prosecute. But in yet
another turn of events, the RTC lifted its previous order of dismissal and directed the issuance of alias
summons. Thus, it was now petitioners turn to file a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the various
orders of the RTC, which all rejected their bid to dismiss. The CA granted their petition. From this ruling, herein
respondents appealed to the SC. SC reversed the decis of CA and ordered Civil Case No. 51203 reinstated
only to determine that portion which belongs to petitioners and to annul the sale with regard to said
portion.
It was at this point when another series of events transpired, culminating in the present petition. Part of the
records went missing and were lost. In this regard, herein respondents filed a Motion for Reconstitution of
Whether or not the trial court can make a declaration of heirship in the civil action?
CIVIL ACTION
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, a civil
action is defined as one by which a party sues another
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
a remedy which a party seeks to establish a right, or
particular fact.
The Court held that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners
in the case at bar are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
declaration of heirship must be made in an administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil action
The plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or
even a semblance of it except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays
that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple
Whether theres still a need to re-declare respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr.

We find the petition bereft of merit. In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint was dismissed for failure of the petitioners to
demonstrate any proof or even a semblance of it that they had been declared the legal heirs of the deceased
couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark contrast, the records of this case reveal that there is no need to redeclare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case interminably. Petitioners became
owners of the properties only by virtue of an execution sale to recover Teofistas judgment obligation. This judgment
obligation is solely Teofistas, and payment therefor cannot be made through an execution sale of properties not
absolutely owned by her. These properties were evidently conjugal properties and were, in fact, even titled in the
name of Marcelo, Sr. married to Teofista. Thus, upon Marcelo Sr.s death, by virtue of compulsory succession,
Marcelo Sr.s share in the conjugal partnership was transmitted by operation of law to his compulsory heirs.
Compulsory succession is a distinct kind of succession, albeit not categorized as such in Article 778 of the Civil
Code. It reserves a portion of the net estate of the decedent in favor of certain heirs, or group of heirs, or combination
of heirs, prevailing over all kinds of succession. The portion that is so reserved is the legitime. Article 886 of the Civil
Code defines legitime as that part of the testators property which he cannot dispose of because the law has
reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs. Herein respondents are primary compulsory
heirs, excluding secondary compulsory heirs, and preferred over concurring compulsory heirs in the distribution of the
decedents estate.
Herein respondents ownership of the subject properties is no longer inchoate; it became absolute upon Marcelos
death, although their respective shares therein remained pro indiviso. Ineluctably, at the time the subject properties
were sold on execution sale to answer for Teofistas judgment obligation, the inclusion of herein respondents
share therein was null and void. Significantly, petitioner Valente does not even attempt to dispute the conjugal
nature of the subject properties. Since Teofista owns only a portion of the subject properties, only that portion could
have been, and was actually, levied upon and sold on auction by the provincial sheriff of Rizal. Thus, a separate
declaration of heirship by herein respondents is not necessary to annul the judicial sale of their share in the subject
properties.

Records of the case. The RTC eventually granted the motion for reconstitution. Thereafter, an Urgent Motion
to direct compliance by respondents with SC Decision or to consider the matter submitted without evidence on
the part of respondents was filed by petitioners.
The case is dismissed. Consequently, herein respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The
appellate court granted the petition. The petitioners filed a notice of appeal on the order of the RTC. The
appeal, on
motion of [herein respondents] was denied. The denial of petitioner Valentes MR prompted the filing of this
present petition for certiorari. On the ground that: The CA ignored and violated the SCs ruling in Heirs of
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario which held that a declaration of heirship must be made in a special administration
proceeding and not in a civil action.
8
Development
Bank of the
Philippines vs.
Ella Garagani
Spouses Dionesio and Matea S. Asok owned several parcels of land September 14, 1973 and February 22,
1982, respectively- THEY DIED & their 11 children inherited the properties. Inheritance includes a lot covered
by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4272 (1967), located in Misamis Oriental. (Land as a free patent)
Pursuant to the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with quitclaim executed by the spouses' children, the
subject property was inherited by Denison Asok hence, OCT became a TCT under his own name (1987)
August 31, 1989: Denison and wife (ELLA GAGARANI, respondent) borrowed P100,000 from petitioner
Development Bank of the Philippines, a government financial institution created and operating under EO 81, as
amended by RA 8523. As a collateral, they mortgaged the lot in Misamis Oriental. On due date, however, they
failed to pay the loan and the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed pursuant to Act 3135. Petitioner emerged
as the highest bidder with a bid of P163,297.
November 28, 1991: certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioner; was registered
subsequently and a new TCT issued also.
October 24, 1993: Denison died and succeeded by his surviving spouse and children
(respondents). May 15, 1998: respondents filed a complaint for repurchase against petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Initao, Misamis Oriental
July 3, 1998: they filed an amended complaint on learning that TCT No. T-9626 had been
cancelled by TCT No. T-27172 issued in the name of petitioner. They invoked their right to
repurchase the property under Sec. 119 of CA 141 (Every conveyance of land acquired under the
free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant,
his widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from date of the conveyance)
RTC dismissed the complaint and reconsideration was also denied. It ruled that the one-year period for
redemption should be reckoned from the date of sale, i.e., November 28, 1991. Then the five-year period
provided under Sec. 119 of CA 141 should be counted from the expiration of the redemption period, i.e.,
November 28, 1992.Therefore, respondents had until November 28, 1997 to exercise their right to repurchase.
However, the complaint was filed on May 15, 1998 which was beyond the prescribed period.
Respondents appealed to CA. CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Reconsideration was denied in a
resolution dated March 28, 2006. It held that the period of redemption started from the date of registration of
the certificate of sale, i.e., December 24, 1992, and not from the date of sale. Thus, respondents had until
December 24, 1998 to repurchase the property and the complaint was seasonably filed.
a.)
Petitioner contends that respondents cannot claim the right under Sec. 119 which covers
homesteads and free patents because the free patent issued to Asok's parents had already been
cancelled and a new TCT had in fact been issued to him. Thus, the property mortgaged to it was
We note the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, where we scrutinized our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay We
ruled thus: The common doctrine in these cases in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a
decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if
there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the
determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where
special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heirs
has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its reopening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of
the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
All told, under the circumstances, in addition to the already settled status of herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo
Sr., there is no need to dismiss Civil Case No. 51203 and require herein respondents to institute a separate special
proceeding for a declaration of their heirship
1) Whether the free patent issued to Denison Asok's parents had already been cancelled by the issuance of
new TCT before the mortgage.
The plain intent of Sec. 119 is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve and keep in the family
the land that the State has gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in cleaning, developing and cultivating it.
Hence, the fact that the land had been inherited by the patentees' son (and a new title in his name issued) does not
bring it outside the purview of Sec. 119. In fact, the policy behind the law is fulfilled because the land remains in the
family of the patentee.
Ferrer v. Mangente: The applicant for a homestead is to be given all the inducement that the law offers and is entitled
to its full protection. Its blessings, however, do not stop with him. This is particularly so in this case as the appellee is
the son of the deceased. There is no question then as to his status of being a legal heir. The policy of the law is not
difficult to understand. The incentive for a pioneer to venture into developing virgin land becomes more attractive if he
is assured that his effort will not go for naught should perchance his life be cut short. This is merely a recognition of
how closely bound parents and children are in a Filipino family. Logic, the sense of fitness and of right, as well as
pragmatic considerations thus call for
continued adherence to the policy that not the individual applicant alone but those so closely related to him as are
entitled to legal succession may take full advantage of the benefits the law confers
2) Whether respondents the "legal heirs" contemplated in the provision (on patentees)? -Petitioner is wrong
The rationale behind Sec. 119, we reject a restricted definition of legal heirs. It is used in a broad sense and the law
makes no distinctions. In Madarcos v. de la Merced, we held that:
The term "legal heirs" is used in Section 119 in a generic sense. It is broad enough to cover any person who is called
to the succession either by provision of a will or by operation of law. Thus, legal heirs include both testate and
intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not
necessarily compulsory heirs but they may be so if the law reserves a legitime for them.
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules on intestacy as entitled to succeed to the
estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step into the shoes of the decedents.
They should be considered as among the legal heirs contemplated by Section 119 as entitled to redeem the

b.)
c.)
no longer covered by a free patent but by a TCT

respondents are not the legal heirs of the patentees because respondents are merely their
daughter-in-law and grandchildren.
even if respondents could be considered as being entitled to the right under Sec. 119, this had
already prescribed because the period should be counted from the date of conveyance which
means the date of sale and not the date of registration of the certificate of sale.
homestead.
The above interpretation of "legal heirs" as contra-distinguished from the restrictive construction given it by the lower
court is more in keeping with the salutary purpose behind the enactment of Section 119 and the jurisprudence laid
down on the matter. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to arrive at a more liberal conclusion if the section is analyzed in
accordance with its purpose . . .
Respondents inherited the property from Asok, their husband and father, who in turn inherited it from his parents.
Respondent Ella Gagarani Asok, as daughter-in-law of the patentees, can be considered as among the legal heirs
who can repurchase the land in accordance with Salenillas v. CA. In that case, we allowed the daughter and son-inlaw of the patentees to repurchase the property because this would be "more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We
have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law
should prevail". Furthermore, the law must be liberally construed in order to carry out its purpose.
3) Whether even right of respondents had already prescribed (under Sec. 119) - Lacks merit
Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. CA: Thus, the rules on redemption in the case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of land
acquired under free patent or homestead statutes may be summarized as follows: . . . If the land is mortgaged to
parties other than rural banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration of the
certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may repurchase the property within five
(5) years from the expiration of the redemption period also pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act
There is no dispute that in extrajudicial foreclosures under Act 3135, the debtor or his or her successors-in-interest
may redeem the property within one year. This redemption period should be reckoned from the date of registration of
the certificate of sale. The five-year period fixed in Sec. 119 begins to run from the expiration of the one-year
redemption period. Here, the certificate of sale was registered on December 24, 1992 and the one- year redemption
period expired on December 24, 1993. Reckoned from that day, respondents had a five-year period, or until
December 24, 1998, to exercise their right to repurchase under Sec. 119 of CA 141. Consequently, the CA was
correct in holding that the complaint filed on May 15, 1998 was on time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines is ordered to execute
a deed of reconveyance in favor of respondents upon payment by the latter of the redemption price.
REQUISITES OF A FORMAL WILL

9
Paz
SarmaniegoCelada vs.
Lucia D. Abena
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayores (Margarita) while
respondent was the decedents lifelong companion since 1929
On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as her parents,
grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first cousins Catalina SamaniegoBombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner.
Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament on February 2, 1987 where she bequeathed
one-half of her undivided share of a real property located at Singalong Manila, consisting of 209.8 square
meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1343 to respondent, Norma A. Pahingalo, and
Florentino M. Abena in equal shares or one-third portion each. She likewise bequeathed one-half of her
undivided share of a real property located at San Antonio Village, Makati, consisting of 225 square meters, and
covered by TCT No. 68920 to respondent, Isabelo M. Abena, and Amanda M. Abena in equal shares or onethird portion each. Margarita also left all her personal properties to respondent whom she likewise designated
as sole executor of her will.
(1)whether the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with the
formalities required by law
(2) whether said court erred in not declaring the will invalid because it was procured through undue
influence and pressure, and
(3) whether it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita, and in not
issuing letters of administration to petitioner.
After careful consideration of the parties contentions, we rule in favor of respondent.
We find that the issues raised by petitioner concern pure questions of fact, which may not be the subject of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The issues that petitioner is raising now i.e., whether or not the will was signed by the testator in the presence of the
witnesses and of one another, whether or not the signatures of the witnesses on the pages of the will were signed on
the same day, and whether or not undue influence was exerted upon the testator which compelled her to sign the will,
are all questions of fact.

On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of Margarita before the
RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1531.
This Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Section 1 of Rule 45 limits this Courts review to questions of law only.
On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a petition for probate of the will of Margarita before the RTC of Makati.
The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1607 and consolidated with SP Proc. No. M-1531.
Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. When supported by substantial evidence, the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court,
unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:
On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated
and respondent as the executor of the will.
When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals, in a decision dated
October 13, 2000, affirmed in toto the RTC ruling.
Hence, the instant petition.
Contentions:
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, argues that Margaritas will failed to comply with the formalities required under
Article 805 of the Civil Code because the will was not signed by the testator in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses and in the presence of one another. She also argues that the signatures of the testator on pages A,
B, and C of the will are not the same or similar, indicating that they were not signed on the same day. She
further argues that the will was procured through undue influence and pressure because at the time of
execution of the will, Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely dependent upon respondent and her
nephews for support, and these alleged handicaps allegedly affected her freedom and willpower to decide on
her own. Petitioner thus concludes that Margaritas total dependence on respondent and her nephews
compelled her to sign the will. Petitioner likewise argues that the Court of Appeals should have declared her
and her siblings as the legal heirs of Margarita since they are her only living collateral relatives in accordance
with Articles 1009 and 1010 of the Civil Code.
Respondent, for her part, argues in her Memorandum that the petition for review raises questions of fact, not of
law and as a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on
appeal to the Supreme Court. She also points out that although the Court of Appeals at the outset opined there
was no compelling reason to review the petition, the Court of Appeals proceeded to tackle the assigned errors
and rule that the will was validly executed, sustaining the findings of the trial court that the formalities required
by law were duly complied with. The Court of Appeals also concurred with the findings of the trial court that the
testator, Margarita, was of sound mind when she executed the will.
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;When the
findings of fact are conflicting;When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;When the findings are contrary to those of
the trial court;When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
We find that this case does not involve any of the abovementioned exceptions.
Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of Appeals, reveal that petitioners
arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly held:
With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz Samaniego-Celada, et al.] that the testator [Margarita Mayores]
was not mentally capable of making a will at the time of the execution thereof, the same is without merit. The
oppositors failed to establish, by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict the presumption that the
testator was of sound mind (See Article 800 of the Civil Code). In fact, witness for the oppositors, Dr. Ramon
Lamberte, who, in some occasions, attended to the testator months before her death, testified that Margarita
Mayores could engage in a normal conversation and he even stated that the illness of the testator does not warrant
hospitalization. Not one of the oppositors witnesses has mentioned any instance that they observed act/s of the
testator during her lifetime that could be construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may be
admitted to be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. [The] testimonies of
contestant witnesses are pure aforethought.
Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation clause states that
the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the
attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause is not a
part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of
pages of the will as stated in the attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that
the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the
possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the
will is the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of liberal interpretation enunciated in
Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:
In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is
proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of
Article 805.
The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures of the testator were affixed on different
occasions based on their observation that the signature on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture and
appearance as compared with the signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination of the signatures, the court
does not share the same observation as the oppositors. The picture (Exhibit H-3) shows that the testator was affixing
her signature in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to show that the first
signature was procured earlier than February 2, 1987.

Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted on the testator to execute the subject will. In
fact, the picture reveals that the
testator was in a good mood and smiling with the other witnesses while executing the subject will (See Exhibit H).
In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the time of its execution, that the
notarial will presented to the court is the same notarial will that was executed and that all the formal requirements
(See Article 805 of the Civil Code) in the execution of a will have been substantially complied with in the subject
notarial will.
Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC. Since, petitioner and her siblings are not
compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 887 of the Civil Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her
properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the decedents estate.
1
0
Manuel Lee vs.

Atty. Tambago
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent Atty. Regino B.
Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last
will and testament.
Whether the will is valid. = NO.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the
contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto
Grajo, the purported witnesses to its execution.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the
disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death. A will may either be notarial or holographic.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a
parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965. Complainant,
however, pointed out that the residence certificate of the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was
dated January 5, 1962. Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as donor
in a deed of donation (containing his purported genuine signature). Complainant averred that the signatures of
his deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation were in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically
opposed from (sic) one another in all angle[s].
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of the purported witnesses
Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and merely copied from their
respective voters affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the archives division of the
Records Management and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this
connection, the certification of the chief of the archives division dated September 19, 1999 stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ
on June 30, 1965 and is available in this Office[s]
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against him contained false
allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in question
was fake and spurious. He alleged that complainant was not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last
will and testament was validly executed and actually notarized by respondent per affidavit of Gloria Nebato,
common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint affidavit of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr.,
namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee, Jr. xxx.
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because the criminal case filed by
complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman did not prosper.
Respondent did not dispute complainants contention that no copy of the will was on file in the archives division
of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested will could be found there because none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against him as he (complainant)
did not first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the will and demand his share in the inheritance.
We affirm with modification.
of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance alone, the will must
be considered void. This is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the other
requirements under Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and
declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the
notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold
purpose: (1) to safeguard the testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered
in the manner that he intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this particular requirement was
neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the
residence certificates of the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of
the testators old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions
by respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the formalities of a
will and those of notarization. As we held in Santiago v. Rafanan:
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party
to every document acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the
residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary
weight attached to notarized documents. A notary public, especially a lawyer, is bound to strictly observe these
elementary requirements.

In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate upon notarization of a document or
instrument:
In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of pertinent provisions of the
old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal
ethics, particularly Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Thus, the
investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the suspension of
respondent for a period of three months.
Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence tax. Every contract, deed, or other
document acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have presented
their proper [cedula] residence certificate or are exempt from the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be entered
by the notary public as a part of such certificate the number, place of issue, and date of each [ cedula] residence
certificate as aforesaid.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006, resolved:
The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax Act which stated:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of his
function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year
and Respondents notarial commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for
two (2) years.
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any document before a notary public xxx it
shall be the duty of such person xxx with whom such transaction is had or business done, to require the exhibition of
the residence certificate showing payment of the residence taxes by such person xxx.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and correct identity of the person to
whom it is issued, as well as the payment of residence taxes for the current year. By having allowed decedent to
exhibit an expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of both the old Notarial
Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his failure to demand the exhibition of the residence
certificates of Noynay and Grajo.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized will to the
archives division, Article 806 provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witness. The notary public
shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. (emphasis
supplied)
Respondents failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will was therefore not a
cause for disciplinary action.
Notaries public must observe with utmost care and utmost fidelity the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will invalid. This carelessness cannot
be taken lightly in view of the importance and delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and the witnesses,
as in this case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm its contents. Accordingly, respondent must
be held accountable for his acts. The validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach
of duty.
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary duties of his office. Contrary to
his claims that he exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with due regard to the provision of existing
law and had complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx, we find that he acted very
irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension
from the practice of law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission and his perpetual
disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional misconduct. He violated
(1) the Lawyers Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year and his notarial commission
REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer
of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public.
11
Danilo Aluad vs
Zenaido Aluad
10
Maria and Zenaido were raised by the childless spouses Matilde and Crispin. Crispin was the
owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After
Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.
Whether or not the Deed of Donation is a donation mortis causa and have complied with the formalities of a
will.

On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation of Real Property
Inter Vivos" (Deed of Donation) in favor of Maria covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her
husband Crispin. On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued
in Matilde's name.
On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No. 676 to Zenaido by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property. Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament, devising Lot Nos.
675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No. 674 to Zenaido.
Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.
Maria's heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a
Complaint, for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos. 674 and 676, and damages
against Zenaido. Zenaido filed an Answer contending that that the Deed of Donation is forged and falsified and
petitioners' change of theory showed that "said document was not existing at the time they filed their complaint
and was concocted by them after realizing that their false claim that their mother was the only daughter of
Matild[e] Aluad cannot in anyway be established by them"; and that if ever said document does exist, the
same was already revoked by Matilde "when [she] exercised all acts of dominion over said properties until she
sold Lot 676 to defendant and until her death with respect to the other lots without any opposition from
Maria Aluad."
RTC held that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lots 674 and 676 to Zenaido as
she had previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. On appeal, CA held that the Deed of
Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with
the formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had
no attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code. The Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
The Deed of Donation which is one of mortis causa, not having followed the formalities of a will, it is void and
transmitted no right to petitioners' mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it
was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No.
674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matilde's) will must be
probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on
August 26, 1991.
The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed but they were not, as it
was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code. Further, the witnesses
did not even sign the attestation clause the execution of which clause is a requirement separate from the
subscription of the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will. An unsigned
attestation clause results in an unattested will. Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the
notary public, which is not in accordance with the requirement of Article 806 of the Civil Code that every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The requirement that all the pages of the will
must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page was not also followed.
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
1
2
1
3
Estate of the
Deceased
Victorina
Villaranda,
Eusebio Lim vs.
Juliana Chinco
Agustin Barrera
vs. Jose
Tampoco
11
The late Victorina Villaranda y Daz, 80, was a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan at the time of her death. On
the morning of 2 June 1929, she was stricken with apoplexy, incident to cerebral hemorrhage, and was taken in
an unconscious condition via wheelchair to her room. Doctor Geronimo Gaanan, a local physician, visited her
three to four times to check on her condition on 3 June. He found her insensible and incapable of talking or
controlling her movements. On the same day, the parish priest was called to administer last rites of the church;
and being unable to obtain her confession, he limited his time to performing extreme unction. Doctor Isidoro
Lim, of Manila, was also called upon to visit her and he came two to three times. With his approval, the
deceased was brought to Hospital de San Juan de Dios where she was put under the charge of Doctor
Guillermo Lpez del Castillo and later died. Victorina left no ascendants or descendants, and a document
produced as her will purported to dispose of certain property worth P50, 000 to three collateral relatives:
Eusebia, Crispina and Mara Lim. Said paper was prepared by Attorney Perfecto Gabriel whose wife appeared
to be related to the named beneficiaries. After informing himself of the testatrixs condition, he went to an
adjacent room to that occupied by the patient, and wrote the instrument in question. Gabriel suggested to Dr.
Lpez del Castillo to have him sign the will as a witness, but the latter excused himself for the reason that he
considered the patient to be lacking in testamentary capacity. Another person, Marcos Ira, a first cousin of the
deceased, was asked by Gabriel to sign the will as witness but refused. In the end, three persons, all of whom
were Gabriels friends, and two relatives of his wife, served as his witnesses. Victorina was not able to affix her
signature on the document, and it was signed for her by her attorney. After such signing, the will was presented
for probate by Eusebia, named in the will as executrix. Juliana Chinco, full sister of the deceased, opposed the
probate. The will was later disapproved by the probate court on the ground that the testatrix did not have
testamentary capacity at the time the instrument purports to have been executed by her.
Olivia Villapaa died in Tarlac on 13 December 1948. On 31 December 1948, Agustn Barrera filed a petition
for probate of the will (executed on 17 July 1948) and for his appointment as executor before CFI Tarlac.
According to the petition, the properties left by the testatrix were worth P94, 852.96, and the heirs instituted
were the nephews, nieces and grandchildren in the collateral line. Jos Tampoco and Victoriano Tampoco,
alleged grandchildren of the testatrix in the direct line, filed an opposition, claiming that the will was not
executed and attested in accordance with the law, that the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity, that there
was undue influence and pressure in its execution, that the signature of Olivia Villapaa was obtained by fraud
and trickery, and that the testamentary provisions are illegal. Consorcia Lintang, Nemesio Villapaa, Marcos
Whether the supposed testatrix had testamentary capacity at the time the paper referred to was signed.
No. The late Victorina was not capable of performing any conscious act as she was in a comatose condition. The
testimonies of Doctors Gaanan and Lpez del Castillo are sufficient upon this point as they were the ones who had
the deceased under their care, the former when he took care of her from her last illness until she was moved to
Manila, and the latter was a neighbor who was called in when she was struck with apoplexy and visited her until she
was rushed to Manila. They stated that the patient was in a continuous state of coma during her stay in Meycauayan,
subsequent to the attack, and that, as a result thereof, she did not have any command over her faculties to perform
any valid act. Doctor Lim, who testified for the proponent of the will, stated that she did not suffer from any cerebral
hemorrhage but from uremic trouble, and that after her first attack, she was relieved and her mind was cleared up
that she might have made the alleged will. Attorney Gabriel testified that he was able to talk to the deceased when
the will was made and that he read the instrument over to her clause by clause and asked her whether it expressed
her wishes. He said that she made signs that enabled him to understand that she concurred with what was written.
But, it is clear from the facts that the decedent, and from Gabriels statement, that she was unable to utter intelligible
speech. Therefore, the will presented for probate was properly disallowed.
Whether or not the will of Olivia Villapaa should be considered as a valid will.
Yes. Olivia Villapaas will is valid. The trial court erred in denying its probate. Of the three attesting witnesses, only
Lacson and Atty, Puno positively testified that the will was indeed signed by Olivia and the three witnesses in the
presence of each other, and that it was read to her before being signed. However, Antonio, the third witness, testified
that he arrived at the scene of the execution of the will after the testatrix and Lacson had already signed and after
Atty. Puno was half thru with the will, and that Olivia left before Antonio finished signing all the copies. Indeed, Atty.
Puno, being aware of his job as a lawyer and as justice of the peace, had to comply with the formalities of the law in
1
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The Heirs of the

Late Matilde
MontinolaSanson vs. CA
Villapaa, Jess Villapaa, Vicente Villapaa, Ursulo Villapaa, Avelina Villapaa, and Rosario Villapaa,
alleged nephews and nieces, also filed an opposition on substantially the same grounds on which the
opposition of Jos and Victoriano Tampoco was based. After protracted trial from the submission for probate
until 1951, the probate court disallowed the will. The court found that Olivia had testamentary capacity, that
there was no fraud, forgery, trickery or undue influence in the execution of the will, and that petition of the
forced heirs is not a ground for denying probate; but the will was disallowed because it was not the personal
last will and testament and it was not based on the finding that Olivia did not furnish the names of the persons
instituted as heirs and that the will was not read to her before she signed it. The second ground is premised on
the conclusion that attesting witness Laureano Antonio was not present when Olivia Villapaa and attesting
witness Honorio Lacson signed the will; that Antonio only partially saw the signing by attesting witness Modesto
Puno; and that Olivia saw Antonio sign only two or three times.
The appellants contended that 2 or 3 days before 10 July 1948, Pilar Taedo called on Attorney
Modesto Puno, who was also justice of the peace of Concepcin, Tarlac, and requested him to come to Manila
for a conference with Olivia, Pilars aunt. On 10 July, Atty. Puno went to Pilars house where Olivia was staying.
The latter informed him that she wanted him to prepare her will, giving the names of her heirs and the
properties to be left. Olivia asked Atty. Puno to get the description of the properties and from Pilars husband,
Agustn Barrera. Atty. Puno noted the wishes of Olivia, and, as there was then no available typewriter, he
informed the old woman that he would prepare the will in his office in Concepcion and come back with it on the
following Saturday. As promised, Atty. Puno returned to the house of Olivia, carrying with him one original and
three copies, in typewritten form, of the will he drafted in accordance with the instructions of Olivia Villapaa.
Atty. Puno arrived about noon. He read the will to Olivia to find out whether it conformed to her wishes, and she
indicated that it was all right. After lunch Atty. Puno manifested that two other witnesses were necessary,
whereupon Pilar requested Honorio Lacson and Laureano Antonio, who were then living in the first floor of the
house, to come up. Lacson and Antonio did as requested. Olivia Villapaa, Atty. Puno, Lacson and Antonio
were then seated around a small rectangular table in sala, and at this juncture Atty. Puno gave a copy of the
will to Olivia, Lacson and Antonio, while he retained one. The Attorney again read the will aloud, advising the
rest to check their respective copies. As Olivia agreed to the will, she proceeded to sign all the four copies, on
the lines previously placed by Atty. Puno, followed successively by Lacson, Atty. Puno and Antonio, all in the
presence of each other. After the signing, Atty. Puno gave the original and a copy to Olivia, and retained the
other two copies. Atty. Puno , Lacson and Antonio stayed for a while even ate merienda prepared by the sisters
Pilar and Beatriz Taedo. Olivia delivered her will to Agustin Barrera for safekeeping on October 17, 1948 when
she was taken to U.S.T. Hospital where she remained until November 7, 1948. Her doctors lost all hope for her
recovery and Olivia Villapaa was brought to Tarlac, Tarlac, her hometown, where she later died.
The appellees alleged that the will presented by petitioner was not executed in accordance with
law, in that attesting witness Antonio did not see the testatrix and Lacson sign the will or any of its copies, that
he saw Atty. Puno when the latter was already half thru signing the document, and that the testatrix did not see
Antonio sign any of the copies.
Private respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez filed a Petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila (now
Regional Trial Court) seeking the probate of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola who died single,
parentless and childless on March 29,1981 at the age of 70 years, devised in this will several of her real
properties to specified persons.
Whether or not the will may be probated.

Yes. Art. 841 of the Civil Code provides that a will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an
heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so instituted should not
accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.
Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of the deceased but who was not named in the
said will, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not entirely written,
dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was
not in full possession of her mental faculties to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was
exerted upon the person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the win; and that the will failed
to institute a residual heir to the remainder of the estate.
In such cases, the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied with and the remainder
of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs. Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven
(11) of her real properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was of unsound mind. The
portion of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the deceased in intestate succession.
After a hearing on the merits, the probate court, finding the evidence presented in support of the petition to be
conclusive and overwhelming, rendered its decision allowing the probate of the disputed will.
Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than compulsory heirs have been omitted, for
while blood ties are strong in the Philippines, it is the testator's right to disregard non-compulsory heirs. The fact that
some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither fraud or undue influence. Diversity of apportionment is
the usual reason for making a testament, otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate.
Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate court to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
decision, insisting that the fact that in her holographic will the testatrix failed to dispose of all of her estate is an
12
having at least 3 witnesses sign the will in the presence of the testatrix and of one another. Moreover, there was in
fact no hurry on the part of any of the participants in the will, because the testatrix Olivia Villapaa was not dying (she
died some five months after the execution of the will) and the parties could therefore take all the time that they
wanted. Indeed, none of the three witnesses left the house of Olivia Villapaa and they even stayed therein until
after merienda time. The fact that Atty. Puno id the brother of Jose Puno who is the husband of Carmen Taedo, one
of the beneficiaries of the will, and that Honorio Lacson is the husband of Bibiana Lacson who is a first cousin of
Agustin Barrera, herein petitioner and husband of Pilar Taedo, is not sufficient to make then biased witnesses. If
Atty. Puno had any material interest, this fact should have caused him to be more careful in seeing to it that the
formalities of the law were strictly complied with, and this should be true with respect to Honorio Lacson. The trial
court erroneously considered Antonios testimony with regard to his arrival at the house after a great part of the will
had been signed as it had heard that Atty. Puno declared in one place that "the signing of the testament commenced
around between one o'clock and two o'clock" and in another place that the signing took place "around two and three
o'clock," and Honorio Lacson declared that he was called by Pilar Taedo to act as witness at around two o'clock or
two thirty. From the testimony of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson the court concluded that the signing actually
commenced between one and two o'clock. The specification of the time of the signing refers to an immaterial or
unimportant detail which, in view of the lapse of time, might have been a mistake by one or the other participant in the
execution of Oliva's will. What is important and decisive and this should be impressed in the mind of an attorney
preparing and taking charge of the signing of will, is that the testatrix and each of the three attesting witnesses
must affix their signatures in the presence of one another. Wherefore, the appealed order is reversed and the will
executed by Oliva Villapaa on July 17, 1948, is hereby allowed.
The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by undue influence or improper pressure exerted by the

indication of the unsoundness of her mind.
beneficiaries of the will cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is not enough that there was
opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have been exercised. The exercise of improper
pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually exercised.
There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject Will. To Our minds, the most authentic proof that
decreased had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the Will, is the Will itself which according to a
report of one of the two expert witnesses reveals the existence of significant handwriting characteristics.
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
Annie Sand died on November 25, 1982. She executed a holographic will and it was submitted for
probate before the RTC of Quezon City. In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners
Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand,
Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children. prLL
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's
holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting
under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
1
5
*
4
8
Spouse
Roberto and
Thelma Ajero
vs. CA
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the
signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly
signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.
The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in
its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, RTC admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. RTC
found that no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually
executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not written in
the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the
question of identity of will. The identity of the will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will
submitted in Court must be deemed to be the will actually executed by the testatrix.
1
6
Testate Estate
of Edward
Christensen
Aznar vs.
Christensen
Garcia
Yes, the holographic will is valid. In Abangan vs. Abangan , "The object of the solemnities surrounding
the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and
to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to
attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of
the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures
such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded."
For purposes of probating holographic wills what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally
autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
"A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand
of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed." Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
GROUNDS FOR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was
dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its
validity." It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code.
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and
consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until his death. During the entire period of his residence in the Philippines he had always considered
himself a citizen of California.
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen
In his will executed on March 5, 1951, Edward Christensen instituted an acknowledged natural
daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in the amount of Php3,600
in favor of Maria Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared as an acknowledged
natural daughter of the decedent in another proceedings.
The California Conflict Rule states: If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated,
is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile.
In accordance to the provisions of the testators will, the executor in his final account and project of
partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the
estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Reason demands that the court of forum should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If the law of California is enforced as
in comity, as so declared in Article 16 of the Civil Code, then the law of California must be enforced in accordance
with the express mandate thereof, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for
those domiciled abroad.
An Opposition was filed by Helen, the legal grounds being: (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it
denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children. It was further alleged that the law that
should govern the estate of the decedent should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law
thereof because several foreign elements are involved, Under California law, the matter is referred back to the
13
Whether or not the holographic will executed by Anne Sand in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter: (1) the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and (2) the
conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California.
Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. The
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the oppositor-appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal
law of California.

law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be
increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand,
counsel for Lucy Christensen contends that it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of
the deceased must apply, Philippine courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter;
that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any
property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to
anything and his will remain undisturbed.
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had
five legitimate children with his first wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, three legitimate children with his
second wife, Violet Kennedy and three illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be
divided in trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children (Amos Jr., Maria Cristina and Miriam Palma) at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
1
7
*
3
0
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate
childrens successional rights
No, Texan law applies. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national
law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions with regard to four items: (a) the order of
succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will;
and (d) the capacity to succeed. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Moreover,
the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. Even
assuming Texas has a Conflict of Law Rule, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas Law. The Philippine
Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos Bellis.
(2)
Whether or not decedent may assign Philippine law to govern his will
Lastly, assuming that it was the decedents intention to make another will to be governed by Philippine
law, it would not alter the law. For as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in
a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and
not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to
probate in the Philippines. The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire
bequest therein.
Bellis vs. Bellis
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its Executors Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition where it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the
three illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the
executor divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testators seven legitimate
children by his first and second marriages.
Among the three illegitimate children, Maria Cristina and Miriam Palma filed their respective
opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate
children. Moreover, herein oppositors-appellants also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to
govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law
to govern his Philippine estate.
1
8
(1)
Lources
Dorotheo vs.
CA
The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration. Aggrieved, herein oppositorsappellants filed a direct appeal before the Supreme Court.
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Thereafter, her husband Alejandro
also died. In 1977, Lourdes Dorotheo filed a special proceeding for the probate of Alejandros last will and
testament. The children of spouses filed their opposition. The RTC ruled that Lourdes being not the wife of
Alejandro the will is intrinsically void; the oppositors are the only heir entitled to the estate. Lourdes filed a
Motion for Consideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro
prior to his death although they were not legally married to each other. This was denied by the trial court. The
CA dismissed her appeal for her failure to wile the same within the extended period.
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become
final and executor still be given effect?
No. A final and executor decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may
be.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof are void.
Alejandro gave all the property to the concubine. Such is invalid because one cannot dispose what he does not own.
In this case, the whole property is the conjugal property of Alejandro and Aniceta. Such has become final and
executor. The only instance where a party interested in probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable
to negligence with circumstances do not concur herein.
NOTARIAL WILL
1
9
Felix Azuela vs.

CA
14
On April 10, 1984, a petition for probate will was filed by petitioner Felix Azuela with the RTC of Manila seeking
to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Ogsolo w/c was notarized on June 10, 1981. Felix Azuela is
the son of the cousin of the decedent.
The will consists of two (2) pages and written on the vernacular Pilipino. *read in full
Whether or not there is substantial compliance with the formalities required by law. - NO.
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, which we

HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na
gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin at
testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento:
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-ayong sa kaugalian at patakaran
ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng bantayog upang
silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;
Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking pamangkin na si Felix Azuela,
na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon, yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block
24 at nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay na
nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob
kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24,
Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang pasubalit at kondiciones;
Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at kagustuhan
ko rin na hindi na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya.
Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.
(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
(Tagapagmana)
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia
E. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng
nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawat dahon, sa
harap ng lahat at bawat sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana
at sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at
bawat dahon ng kasulatan ito.
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: 500 San Diego St.
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
QUIRINO AGRAVA
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981
15
replicate in full.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also
sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator
signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction,
in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary
public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation clause to
state the number of pages of the will. The total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in
the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in
the probate proceedings. (J.B.L. Reyes, also mentioned in Caeda v. CA) The failure of the attestation clause to state
the number of pages on which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in
requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. The
failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental
witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and
subscribed to. Following Caneda v. CA there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states
elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of.
However, in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under
Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of
pages which comprise the will. However, an examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even more critical
defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection. For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the
instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will,
they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary
public. The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform
substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable, because
said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its
pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it
would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or
all of the witnesses.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge. The
requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses" has also not been complied with. In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at
ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila." By no manner of contemplation can
those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in
going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It might be possible to construe
the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit
where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor. Yet even if

LAMBERTO C. LEAO
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981
JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.
(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA
Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81
we consider whatwas affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express
requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to.
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both
pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and
that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague.
Geralda Castillo, who represented herself as attorney-in-fact of the 12 legitimate heirs of the
decedent, opposed the petition. She claimed that the will is a forgery and that the true purpose of its
emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by the oppositor against
petitioner. It also asserted that contrary to the representations of Azuela, the decedent was actually survived by
12 legitimate heirs. Per records, it was shown that decedent was a widow of Bonifacio Igsolo. She further
alleged that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the law; that the decedents signature
did not appear on the second page of the will and that it was not properly acknowledged.
RTC admitted the will to probate and ruled the will in question is authentic and had been executed
by the testatrix in accordance with law. It also ruled that there is substantial compliance with the formalities
required by law. (1. May Attestation at acknowledgment, 2. kahit walang number of pages 2 pages lang naman
daw, 3. signing ng attesting witness sa left margin instead sa bottom ng attestation substantial complaince na
daw) The CA reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. The CA noted that
the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and
undeserving of probate. Hence, this petition.
BLIND TESTATOR
2
0
In the Matter of
the Probate of
the Last Will
and Testament
of the
Decesased
Brigido
Alvarado vs.
Gaviola
79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an
illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting
probate before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz, Laguna. As testified to by the three
instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent who were present at the execution, the
testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the
eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses
and the notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished
them.
Meanwhile, Brigidos holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate. A codicil entitled
Kasulatan ng pagbabago ng ilang pagpapasiya na nasasaad sa huling abilin na may petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977
ni Brigidco Alvarado was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the
16
Whether or not Brigido Alvarado was blind for purposes of Article 808 at the time his Huling Habilin and
codicil were executed. If so, was the double-reading requirement of said article complied with
Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes
was only of "counting fingers at three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he had been suffering from for
several years and even prior to his first consultation with an eye specialist.
Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still capable of reading at the time
his will and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do
so because of his "poor," defective, or blurred vision making it necessary for private respondent to do the actual
reading for him.
The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez
13
provides an insight into the scope of the term

testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory
clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of
the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the
three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading
using their own copies.
A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death by
private respondent as executor with the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan, Laguna.
Petitioner filed an opposition on the following grounds: that the will sought to be probated was not executed
and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapacitated to make a will
at the time of its execution due to senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of
fear and threats; that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of the testator's estate; and lastly, that the signature of the
testator was procured by fraud or trick. Petitioner failed to substatntiate the grounds relied upon. Hence, a
probate order was issued from w/c an appeal was made. The main thrust of the appeal was that the deceased
was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto was
executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not complied with,
probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied.
Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the following findings: that Brigido
Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his blindness, the
reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with when both documents were read aloud to the
testator with each of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their
respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded that although Art. 808 was not
followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of making known to the testator the
contents of the drafted will was served.
"blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit:

The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will
himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if
they are not in accordance with his wishes . . .
Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or
another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of
his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there
can be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is
used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who
drafted the will and codicil did so confortably with his instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and
entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied with.
Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by
one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged. The
purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to give him
an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions. That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond
cavil. Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the
eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not
twice as Art. 808 requires.
Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the single reading
suffices for purposes of the law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance or compliance
to the letter and since it is admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read the contents of the
will and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter's will and codicil should have been disallowed.
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the
testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed,
upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and
acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will
and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the
"Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of
the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged
that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino
went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft.
The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict
compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal
imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may
only defeat the testator's will.
As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's Probate Order and its affirmance
by the Court of Appeals, we quote the following pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, 18 to wit:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid the substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on the
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must
17

not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's will, must be
disregarded (emphasis supplied).
Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin"
and the codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside fro the mere reason that a legal requirement
intended for his protection was not followed strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the
fact that the purpose of the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of his will,
had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where the purpose has been served.
Whether or not Brigido Alvarado was blind for purposes of Article 808 at the time his Huling Habilin and
codicil were executed. If so, was the double-reading requirement of said article complied with
Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes
was only of "counting fingers at three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he had been suffering from for
several years and even prior to his first consultation with an eye specialist.
Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still capable of reading at the time
his will and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do
so because of his "poor," defective, or blurred vision making it necessary for private respondent to do the actual
reading for him.
The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez
"blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit:
13
provides an insight into the scope of the term
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will
himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if
they are not in accordance with his wishes . . .
Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or
another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of
his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there
can be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is
used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who
drafted the will and codicil did so confortably with his instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and
entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied with.
Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by
one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged. The
purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to give him
an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions. That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond
cavil. Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the
eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not
twice as Art. 808 requires.
Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the single reading
suffices for purposes of the law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance or compliance
to the letter and since it is admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read the contents of the
18

will and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter's will and codicil should have been disallowed.
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the
testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed,
upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and
acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will
and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the
"Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of
the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged
that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino
went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft.
The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict
compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal
imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may
only defeat the testator's will.
As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's Probate Order and its affirmance
by the Court of Appeals, we quote the following pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, 18 to wit:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid the substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on the
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a
will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's will, must be
disregarded (emphasis supplied).
Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin"
and the codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside fro the mere reason that a legal requirement
intended for his protection was not followed strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the
fact that the purpose of the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of his will,
had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where the purpose has been served.
HEIRS
2
1
Salud Teodo
Vda. de Perez
vs. Hon. Zotico
Tolete
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens, established a
successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A.
Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens

Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and
personal property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive
his wife, he bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as
trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as
substitute executor.
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and testament containing the
same provisions as that of the will of her husband.
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted
their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed
19
Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon
compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed
by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity
with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is
imperative.

separate proceedings for the probate thereof. These two wills were admitted to probate and letters
testamentary were issued in his favor.
Later, Evelyns mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that
Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New
York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters
were Joses heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in
accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the
reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.
Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines
are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in
the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact
that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills
(III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954];
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is
impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.
On Lack of Notice to Joses Heirs
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered
herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition,
she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or
formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in
case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard
to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for
probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and
notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines"
and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
EXTRINSIC VALIDITY
2
2
*
2
6
2
3
2
4
Garcia vs. La
Cuesta
Yap Tua vs.

Yap Ka Kuan
* Signature; first
name
Abangan vs.
Abangan
20
Doctrine: When somebody else writes the

testators name for him, the mere placing
of the testator of the testator of a cross
after his name, without there being a
statement that somebody had signed for
him, is not sufficient which makes the will
void.
The testator can sign the will with his
initials or any other mark provided that he
intends the same to be his signature. In
the presence does not mean actually
seeing, it is enough that the testator could
have done so or felt it without any physical
obstruction, had he wanted to.
A petition for probate of the will of the late Arturo Mercado was filed before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte. The said will was admitted but was later contested for failure to comply with the formal requirements of a
notarial will. The Court of Appeals reversed the Court of First Instance decision. Petitioner Garcia appealed on
the decision of the Court of Appeals in disallowing the will of Arturo Mercado. The Court of Appeals held that
the failure to indicate in the attestation clause that Atty. Florentino Javier signed it on behalf of the testator
Mercado in his presence and under his express direction before the witnesses constituted a fatal defect
thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Garcia averred that there was no need for such recital because the
testator already placed a cross after his name, which constitutes a sufficient signature. Petitioner also added
that the signature of Atty. Javier was a surplusage.
A petition to admit probate of the Last Will and Testament (August 11) of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong was
presented to the Court of First Instance of Manila by Perfecto Gabriel representing the petitioner Yap Tua. The
petition was accompanied by the alleged will of the deceased which provided that it complied with all the
requirements of the law. The will was later admitted to probate. However, five (5) months later, the respondents
file a petition to intervene on the ground that they were interested in the matters of the will and asked the court
to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent them. Gabriel La O, the appointed guardian ad litem, sought for the
annulment of the probated will on the following grounds: a.) the will was not signed by Tomasa; b.) Tomasa was
not of sound mind at the time of the execution of the will; c.) Tomasas signature was obtained through fraud
and undue influence. La O also averred that an earlier will (August 6) was executed by Tomasa with the
formalities prescribed by law. Rehearing was conducted and several witnesses were called to prove the
circumstances attending the execution of the August 11 will.
Ana Abangans will was duly probated and said document consisted of two sheets, the first page contains all
the dispositions of the testatrix and duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the
direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains the attestation clause signed at
the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. The sheets were not signed on the left margin by the testatrix
Whether or not the attestation clause was fatally defective?

The court held that the attestation clause was fatally defective for failing to state that the testator, Arturo Mercado
caused Atty. Javier to write the formers name under his express direction as provided under Section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. The court added that the cross was not proven to be the usual signature of Arturo Mercado, thus
it was not liken to a thumbmark.
Whether or not the August 11 Will (Exhibit A) was validly executed?

The court held that the August 11 Will was validly executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. The
court explained that there was no undue influence and that Tomasa was of sound mind when she executed and
signed the will as proven by the witnesses and evidence. The court added that the execution of an earlier will is no
proof that she did not execute a later will for she had the perfect right to change her will up to the last moment of her
life. The will was also held to be sufficiently signed by Tomasa in the presence of the witnesses and of one another
upon examination of the place where the will was executed. There was an opporutunity for Tomasa to see that the
will was being signed by the witness. The mere placing of the initials or that of the first name Tomasa in the will
constitute sufficient signature.
Whether or not the will should probated
Yes, the Court ruled that the will was duly probated. The Court held that in a will consisting of two sheets
the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three
witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three

and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters. According to the appellants, these are defects whereby the
probate of the will should have been denied.
Agustin Liboro, the appellant, seeks to oppose the will of Don Sixto Lopez, almost six months after the
execution of the document. He claims that the will was not executed and attested to as required by law. The will
in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a separate sheet. The first sheet is
not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. Also, he claims that Don Lopez only affixed his thumb mark in
said will. The appellant believes these are fatal defects in the will that would provide for the denial of its
probate.
2
5
2
6
*
2
2
2
7
Lopez vs.
Liboro
* Signing with a
thumbark;
substantial
compliance
Garcia vs. La
Cuesta
* Signing with a
cross
Taboada vs.
Rosal
* Attestation
clause
21
witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or
be paged. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the testator
and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645 seeks to avoid the substitution of any sheets in the
will, which would change the testators dispositions. In the case at bar, the dispositions are wholly written on only one
sheet and signed by the testator and the three witnesses. Therefore, the requirement of the marginal signatures
would be purposeless. The signatures at the bottom already guarantees its authenticity. Another signature on the
margin would be unnecessary.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been
removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute
disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
The signatures provided by the testatrix and the witnesses in the attestation clause are already sufficient as what has
been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. The Court held that the signatures of the testatrix and the three
witnesses on the margin and the numbering of the pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the statute. With
respect to the signature of the testatrix in the attestation clause, the Court held that it is not necessary as the
attestation clause only refers to the act of the witnesses, as they are the ones who attest to the execution of the will.
Therefore, the will was duly probated.
Whether or not the will suffers from fatal defects
No, the Court ruled that the will did not suffer from a fatal defect and therefore, such will was give due probate. The
purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the
substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages as was held in Abangan vs. Abangan. In the case at bar, the
omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification
more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as
the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their
meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are obviously a continuation of the last
sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page.
With respect to the thumb mark as a fatal defect, the Court ruled that such was not the case. The testator affixed his
thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for this was that the testator was suffering
from "partial paralysis." The Court held that there is nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose
the use of mark as the means of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. A statute requiring a
will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark.
When somebody else writes the testators

name for him, the mere placing of the
testator of the testator of a cross after his
name, without there being a statement that
somebody had signed for him, is not
sufficient which makes the will void.
A petition for probate of the will of the late Arturo Mercado was filed before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte. The said will was admitted but was later contested for failure to comply with the formal requirements of a
notarial will. The Court of Appeals reversed the Court of First Instance decision. Petitioner Garcia appealed on
the decision of the Court of Appeals in disallowing the will of Arturo Mercado. The Court of Appeals held that
the failure to indicate in the attestation clause that Atty. Florentino Javier signed it on behalf of the testator
Mercado in his presence and under his express direction before the witnesses constituted a fatal defect
thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Garcia averred that there was no need for such recital because the
testator already placed a cross after his name, which constitutes a sufficient signature. Petitioner also added
that the signature of Atty. Javier was a surplusage.
Taboada filed with the respondent court a Petition for Probate of the Will of Dorotea Perez. The petitioner
attached the alleged last will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez. The first page contains the entire
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left
hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains the attestation clause
and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and
at the left hand margin by the testatrix. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted his evidence and presented
Vicente Timkang, one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, who testified on its genuineness and due
execution.
The trial court, thru then Presiding Judge Ramon C. Pamatian denied the probate of the will of Dorotea Perez
Whether or not the attestation clause was fatally defective?

The court held that the attestation clause was fatally defective for failing to state that the testator, Arturo Mercado
caused Atty. Javier to write the formers name under his express direction as provided under Section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. The court added that the cross was not proven to be the usual signature of Arturo Mercado, thus
it was not liken to a thumbmark.
WON Article 805 requires that the testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign at the
end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one another?
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed. Attestation consists in witnessing the testator's
execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that those things are, done which the statute requires for
the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the
signing of the witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of Identification of such paper as the will which
was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v. Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).

for want of a formality in its execution. The respondent Judge interprets Art. 805, for a notarial will to be valid, it
is not enough that only the testatrix signs at the "end" but an the three subscribing witnesses must also sign at
the same place or at the end, in the presence of the testatrix and of one another because the attesting
witnesses to a will attest not merely the will itself but also the signature of the testator. It is not sufficient
compliance to sign the page, where the end of the will is found, at the left hand margin of that page.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the probate of the will. However, the
motion together with the previous manifestation and/or motion could not be acted upon by the Honorable
Ramon C. Pamatian due to his transfer to his new station. Respondent Judge Avelino S. Rosal assumed the
position of presiding judge of the respondent court. Subsequently, the new Judge denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence the petitioner decided to file the present petition.
Insofar as the requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view that the will in this case was
subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the purpose of Identification.
The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will attested not only to the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation
clause.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be
ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444, 449).
The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the law
on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective
is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will" ( Report of the Code
commission, p. 103).
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental
witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so
when the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the
testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order. WHEREFORE, the present
petition is hereby granted. The respondent court is ordered to allow the probate of the wig and to conduct further
proceedings in accordance with this decision
Rimando opposes the admission for probate of a certain will on the ground that Javellana, one of the
subscribing witnesses therein was not present in the small room where it was executed at the time when the
testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures. It was alleged that Javellana was
outside the room eight or ten feet away from the testator and other witnesses when they attached their
signatures to the instrument. That time he was outside in a large room that is connected with the smaller room
by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the
testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.
2
8
Nera vs.
Rimando
*"in the
presence"
WON one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the time
when the testator and the other witnesses attached their signatures
Yes. The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually
saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering
their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each
signature.
But we are unanimously of opinion that had this subscribing witness been proven to have been in the outer room at
the time
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the
subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of
course, does not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument
in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been able to see each other sign at that moment,
without changing their relative positions or existing conditions.
Whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each
other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its
subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other
were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign.
SUBSTANTIVE OR INTRINSIC VALIDITY
22

Lorenzo Llorente and Paula Llorente got married in Nabua, Camarines Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific
War, Lorenzo departed for the United States since he was a serviceman of the US Navy. Paula stayed in their
conjugal home in Camarines Sur.Sometime in 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States Citizenship.
2
9
Llorente vs. CA
* Wife has an
illicit
relationship
with her
husband's
brother while
husband was in
the US
Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
When Lorenzo visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo returned to the United States and
filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula,
represented by a council, actively participated in the proceedings. The grant the divorce decree.
Paula Llorente and her children with Lorenzo. The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen
long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4)
death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Later on Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila who has no knowledge of the first marriage. They
produced 3 offsprings.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
In 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament where he gives all his property to Alicia and their three
children. In 1983, Lorenzo filed with the RTC a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and
testament. The trial court denied the motion for the reason that Lorenzo is still alive. In 1985, before the
proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a
petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos
will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in
the conjugal property. Alicia filed in the testate proceeding ,a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas
petition. the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision declared the marriage with Alicia void and the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo void which declares Paula entitled to one-third of the estate.
The Civil Code clearly provides:Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.Art. 16. Real property as
well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found
The Civil Code provides:Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in
a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the
will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered
by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
3
0
*
1
7
Bellis vs. Bellis
Which law will apply in executing the deceaseds will? Philippine Law or Texas Law?
first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally,
three illegitimate children. Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all
taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in
trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his
three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and
(c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by
his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
Amos then died.1His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The People's Bank
and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00
in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their
respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court.
23
What applies is the Texas law. Mr. Bellis is a national and domicile of Texas at the time of his death. Hence, both the
intrinsic validity of the will (substance or successional rights) and the extrinsic validity (forms of the will) are governed
by Texas law. Since under Texas law, the decedent may dispose of his property as he wishes, the Will should be
respected. The illegitimate daughters are not entitled to any legitime.
Assuming that Texas law is in conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of domicile) should
govern, the same should not result in a reference back (renvoi) to the Philippine law since Mr. Bellis was both a
national and domicile of Texas at the time of his death. Nonetheless, if Texas law has a conflict rule, renvoi would not
arise, since the properties covered by the second will are found in the Philippines. The renvoidoctrine applied in the
case of Aznar v. Garcia cannot be applied since said doctrine is pertinent where the decedent is a national of one
country and domiciliary of another country. Moreover, it has been pointed out that the decedent executed two (2)
wills- one to govern his Texas properties and the other his Philippine estate; the latter being the basis of the argument
of illegitimate children that he intended Philippine law to govern. Assuming that such was the intention of the
decedent in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law. As rule in Miciano v. Brimo, a provision of

On the preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of
Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last
Will and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.
3
1
Cayetano vs.
Leonidas
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her
sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving
heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby
he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Reprobate of the Will
Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was
allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
testatrix. Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a
permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila
on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her
lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and
registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A, and that therefore, there is an urgent
need for the appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate
located in the Philippines.
Contention of Hermogenes Campos (Father of Adoracion)
An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has
every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and
void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply
inasmuch as they would work injustice and injury to him. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With
Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now
confirms the same to be truly the probated will of his daughter Adoracion."
Respondent judge issued an order admitting and allowing probate in the Philippines the Last Will and
Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby appointed Administratrix of
the estate of said decedent.
Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal of his opposition,
acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.
On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing the will be set
aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured through fraudulent means.
When the case was called for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate
instead of adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order
24
foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with the
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that there are no
forced heirs or legitimes under the laws of the state of Texas. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Ratio: Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.Intestate and
testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and
to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found.
Whether or not the reprobation of the will is invalid for it divested the father of his legitime.
NO. As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.
The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will,
Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him. This contention is
without merit. Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge
should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was,
at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. The law which governs Adoracion Campo's
will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a
complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound
and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law. It is a settled rule that
as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code,
the national law of the decedent must apply. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby
dismissed for lack of merit.

dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied.
Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which, incidentally has been
questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null and void, and a
fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed
a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant case which was granted by the court.
JOINT WILLS
On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Florentina Rella, both of Ligao, Albay, together
with all their living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this judicial guardian
Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de
Particion Extrajudicial over the then present and existing properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Do a
Florentina.
3
2
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Doa Florentina, also known as Doa Tinay separately executed their
respective holographic wills, the provisions of which were in conformity and in implementation of the
extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of the
other to his or her share in the conjugal properties, the other half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned
to constitute their legitime among their four living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949.
On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Doa Tinay executed their mutual and reciprocal codicils
amending and supplementing their respective holographic wins. Again, the codicils similarly acknowledged and
provided that one-half of all the properties of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been disposed of,
conveyed to and partitioned among their legitimate heirs in the "Escritura de Particion" of November 25, 1949,
but that they reserved for themselves (the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay) the other half or those not
disposed of to the said legitimate heirs under the above agreement of partition, and that they mutually and
reciprocally bequeathed unto each other their participation therein as well as in all properties which might be
acquired subsequently. Each spouse also declared that should she or he be the surviving spouse, whatever
belongs to him or her or would pertain to him or her, would be divided equally among the four children. It was
also declared in both codicils that upon the death of either of the spouses, the surviving spouse was
designated mutually and reciprocally as the executor or administrator of all the properties reserved for
themselves.
Alsua-Betts vs.
CA
Whether or not the will of Don Jesus could be distributed independently of the holographic will and codicil of
Dona Tinay.
Upon the death of Doa Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the free portion was distributed in accordance with
her holographic will dated January 25, 1955 and her codicil dated August 14, 1956. It must be stressed here that the
distribution of her properties was subject to her holographic win and codicil, independently of the holographic will and
codicil of Don Jesus executed by him on the same date. This is fundamental because otherwise, to consider both
wills and codicils jointly would be to circumvent the prohibition of the Civil Code on joint wills (Art. 818) and secondly
because upon the death of Doa Tinay, only her estate was being settled, and not that of Don Jesus.
We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will and codicil of Doa Tinay and We find no indication
whatsoever that Doa Tinay expressly or impliedly instituted both the husband and her children as heirs to her free
portion of her share in the conjugal assets. In her holographic will, mention of her children as heirs was made in the
fourth clause but it only provided that, to wit: "Should I acquire new properties after the execution of this testament,
the same shall be partitioned among my spouse and above named children or the children mentioned in above par. 3
in the same proportion, that is, one- half (1/2) to my spouse; and the other half to my children in equal parts." From
the above-quoted provision, the children would only inherit together with Don Jesus whatever new properties Doa
Tinay would acquire after the execution of her will.
Likewise, the codicil of Doa Tinay instituted her husband as sole heir to her share in the free portion of the conjugal
assets.
WITNESSES TO WILLS
witnesses possess the qualifications under
Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the
disqualifications of Art. 802
3
3
Gonzales vs.
CA
Credibility depends on the convincing

weight of his testimony in court.
Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces of the deceased
Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in
Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two months prior to the death of Isabel. It
consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page 4
and the left margin of all the pages.
Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the probate.
The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed and attested in accordance
with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.
REVOCATION OF WILLS AND TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS
3
4
Testate Estate
of Adriana
Maloto vs. CA
* Doctrine of
Dependent
Relative
Revocation
Gan vs. Yap
25
Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will
No. The law requires only that witnesses possess the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the
disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement that they are of good standing or reputation in the community,
for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is believed and accepted in court. For the
testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that evidence be established on record that the witnesses have good
standing in the the community. Competency is distinguished from credibility, the former being determined by Art. 820
while the latter does not require evidence of such good standing. Credibility depends on the convincing weight of his
testimony in court.

5
3
Rodelas vs.
6
Aranza
3
Gago vs.
7
Mamuyac
ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS
3
8
3
9
4
0
4
1
4
2
4
3
4
4
4
5
4
6
4
7
Lopez vs.
Gonzaga
* Need for a
probate
Caniza vs. CA
* Effect of no
probate - right
is inchoate
unless the will
is probated
Spouse
Pascual vs. CA
* Effect of no
probate
Pastor vs. CA
*Validity of a
will
Re-Testate of
Suntay
* No opposition
to probate of
the lost or
destroyed will
Ngo The Hua
vs. Chung Kiat
Kung
* Intervention
Heirs of Lasam
vs. Umengan
(Testator's
capacity
Seangio vs.
Reyes
* Probate and
right of
disposition
Guevara vs.
Guevara
* No
prescription
Maloles II vs.
Phillips
* Probate
during lifetime
of the testator
26

GROUNDS FOR DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS
4
8
*
1
5
Sps Ajero vs
CA
* Grounds
exclusive
Annie Sand died on November 25, 1982. She executed a holographic will and it was submitted for probate
before the RTC of Quezon City. In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and
Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe
Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic
will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under
duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature
therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The
petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in
its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, RTC admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. RTC found that no
evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will actually executed by the
testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not written in the handwriting of
the testatrix which properly refers to the question of its due execution, and not to the question of identity of will.
The identity of the will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be
deemed to be the will actually executed by the testatrix.
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The
Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." It held that the
decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code.
Whether or not the holographic will executed by Anne Sand not in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law therefore be a ground for its disallowance.
NO, the holographic will executed by Anne Sand is valid and may be admitted for probate,
For purposes of probating holographic wills what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally
autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
"A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed."
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that
is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of
the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the
dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the
whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary
conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of
the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:
"Article 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and
with the requisites required in Article 688.
"Article 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.
"In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the
year of its execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must
contain a statement of the year, month and day of its execution.
"If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify
them over his signature.
"Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language."
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article
810 of the New Civil Code and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code are essential to the
probate of a holographic will.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and
lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation
constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent herself
indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand
(which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety.). Thus, as correctly held by
27

respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's other heirs.
INSTITUTION OF HEIR
4
9
5
0
5
1
Austria vs.
Reyes
* Invalidation of
institution
based on false
cause;
requisites
JLT Agro, Inc
vs. Balansang
* Preterition
Nuguid vs.
Nuguid
* Preterition vs.
disinheritance
Perez vs.
Garchitorena
* Fiduciary
PCIB vs.
Escolin
5
* No
3
fidiecommissar
y substitution
CONDITIONS, MODES AND TERMS
5
2
Miciano vs.
Brimo
*Void condition
Rabadilla vs.
5
CA
5
* Condition;
effect; mod
LEGITIME
5
4
5
Raymundo vs.
6
Vda de Suarez
*
* Compulsory
5
succession
9
defined
COMPULSORY HEIRS
5
7
5
8
Lapuz vs.
Eufemio
* When legal
separation is
pending
Baritua vs. CA
* Estrangement
- not a legal
28

ground for
disqualification
Raymundo vs.
Vda de Suarez
* Primary
compulsory
heirs and
secondary
compulsory
heirs
Reyes vs. CA
6
* Natural and
0
spurious
children
RESERVA TRONCAL
5
9
*
5
6
6
1
Padura vs.
Baldovino
* Unreported
6
2
*
6
4
Gonzales vs.
CFI Manila
* Purpose
6
3
Edroso vs.
Sablan
* Purpose
6
4
*
6
2
Gonzales vs.
CFI Manila
* Persons
Involved
6
5
6
6
6
7
6
8
Florentino vs.
Florentino
*4th civil degree
- excluded;
cannot inherit
the reserved
property
Nieva vs. Alcala
* Applies only to
legitimate
family
Sumaya vs.
IAC
* Upon the
death of the
reservista
Carillo vs. De
Paz
* Prescriptive
Period
29

COMPUTATION OF LEGITIME
Pakatipunan vs.
IAC
* Manner of
computation
Heirs of
Marcelino
Doronio vs.
7
Heirs of
0
Fortunata
Doronio
* Manner of
computation
DISINHERITANCE
6
9
7
Chua vs.
1
Cabangbang
LEGACIES AND DEVISES
7
2
7
3
Fuentes vs.
Canon
Chiong Joc-Soy
vs. Vano
Philippine Trust
7
Company vs.
4
Webber
LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION
7
5
7
6
7
7
*
8
7
Testate Estate
of the Late
Adrian Maloto
vs. Maloto
* Re:
jurisdiction of
the intestate
court
OrtanezEnderes vs. CA
* Re:
jurisdiction of
the RTC as a
probate or
inestate court
and question of
ownership
Heirs of the
Late Mario vs.
Changlionco
Adm.
* Re: retirement
benefits, salary
adjustments,
and unused
30

vacation and
sick leaves
7
8
7
9
8
0
8
1
8
2
8
3
8
4
8
5
8
6
Bagunu vs.
Piedad
* Right of
representation
Salao vs. Salao
*
Representation
in collateral
lines
Saguisin vs.
Lindayag
* Re: presence
of adopted
children
Banawa vs.
Mirano
* Reversion
adoptive
Diaz et. al. vs.
IAC
* Re: iron
curtain rule
Leonardo vs.
CA
* Re: barrier
rule
Corpus vs.
Administrator
* Re: barrier
rule
Manuel vs.
Ferrer
* Principle of
absolute
separation
between the
legitimate and
illegitimate
family
Tolentino vs.
Para
* Surviving
legitimate wife
and bigamous
wife
31
8
7
*
7
7
8
8
8
9
9
0
9
1
9
2
Heirs of the
Late Mario vs.
Changlionco
Adm.
* Re:
Distribution of
estate where
the estate is left
to a surviving
spouse,
legitimate son,
and two
recognized
illegitimate
children
Del Rosario vs.
Conanan
* Re:
distributionof
estate where
the decesased
leaves a
surviving
spouse,
legitimate
mother, and an
adopted
daughter
Sarita vs.
Candia
* Re: right of
representation
in the collateral
line
Fuentes vs.
Cruz
* Re: collateral
heirs and
institution of the
widow as sole
heir
Filomena
Abellana de
Bacayo vs.
Gaudencio
Ferraris de
Borromeo
* Re: aunt vs.
nephews and
nieces
Bicomong vs.
Almanza
* Re: nephews
32

and nieces
inherit in their
own right
ACCRETION
9
3
9
4
9
5
Policarpio vs.
Salamat
* Accretion
Torres vs.
Lopez
* Co-heir gets
the share by
accretion
Nepomuceno
vs. CA
* Concubinage
33

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WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY.

ISSUE & HELD

"Appropriate actions for the enforcement or

Nacar vs. Nistal

Suit to recover the claim of the private

Whether or not Japitana has a cause of action against Petitioner Nacar

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

W/n the sale of the land to Gardiola was valid

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

Article 777 "The rights to the succession

"The legitime of the legitimate children and

Petitioners became co-owners of the

Petitioners are not barred in any way from

w/n the property should be subject to levy

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

Sales v. CA that the extrinsic validity of a

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997

The RTC granted the same.

The Court denied their motion to dismiss.

Whether theres still a need to re-declare respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr.

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

no longer covered by a free patent but by a TCT

REQUISITES OF A FORMAL WILL

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

Manuel Lee vs.

Whether the will is valid. = NO.

We affirm with modification.

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

The Heirs of the

Whether or not the will may be probated.

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

Felix Azuela vs.

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

provides an insight into the scope of the term

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

"blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit:

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

provides an insight into the scope of the term

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens

Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed.

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

Yap Tua vs.

Doctrine: When somebody else writes the

Whether or not the attestation clause was fatally defective?

Whether or not the August 11 Will (Exhibit A) was validly executed?

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

When somebody else writes the testators

Whether or not the attestation clause was fatally defective?

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

SUBSTANTIVE OR INTRINSIC VALIDITY

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

Bellis vs. Bellis

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)

WILLS AND SUCCESSION 2016 2017 (ATTY. BATUNGBAKAL)