IRP For The Canadian Oil Gas Industry

CRITICAL SOUR DRILLING
AN INDUSTRY RECOMMENDED PRACTICE (IRP)

FOR THE CANADIAN OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
IRP VOLUME 1 2008
SANCTION
Edition
Sanction January
Date
2004
Copyright/Right to Reproduce
Copyright for this document is held by Enform, 2008. All rights reserved. No part of this
document may be reproduced, republished, redistributed, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted unless the user references the copyright ownership of Enform.
Disclaimer
This IRP is a set of best practices and guidelines compiled by knowledgeable and
experienced industry and government personnel. It is intended to provide the owner,
operator, and contractors with advice regarding the specific topic. It was developed under
the auspices of the Drilling and Completions Committee (DACC).
The recommendations set out in this IRP are meant to allow flexibility and must be used in
conjunction with competent technical judgment. It remains the responsibility of the user of
the IRP to judge its suitability for a particular application.
If there is any inconsistency or conflict between any of the recommended practices
contained in the IRP and the applicable legislative requirement, the legislative requirement
shall prevail.
Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data and
recommendations contained in the IRP. However, DACC, its subcommittees, and individual
contributors make no representation, warranty, or guarantee in connection with the
publication of the contents of any IRP recommendation, and hereby disclaim liability or
responsibility for loss or damage resulting from the use of this IRP, or for any violation of
any legislative requirements.
Availability
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Enform
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Calgary, AB T2E 8Y3
Phone: (403) 250-9606
Fax: (403) 291-9408
Website: www.enform.ca
Critical Sour Drilling
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents ................................................................................................i
List of Figures .................................................................................................... x
List of Tables ..................................................................................................... xi
1.1.
Acknowledgements and Scope .................................................................1
1.1.1. Acknowledgements and Disclaimer .....................................................1

IRP Flexibility................................................................................................1
Legislation ....................................................................................................1
Accuracy and Disclaimer ...............................................................................2
Sanction ........................................................................................................2
ARP Review Sub-Committee ..........................................................................2
1.1.2. Scope ..................................................................................................4
1.1.3. Contents..............................................................................................5
1.1.4. History ................................................................................................6
1.1.5. Review Process ...................................................................................7
1.1.6. 2003 Revisions ....................................................................................8
1.2.
Hazard Assessment ................................................................................11
1.2.1. Scope ................................................................................................11

1.2.2. Hazard Assessment ...........................................................................11
1.2.3. The Blowout Sequence ......................................................................12
1.2.4. Hazards / Threats .............................................................................13
1.2.5. Controls / IRP Reference ..................................................................14
1.3.
Planning .................................................................................................23
1.3.1. Scope ................................................................................................23

1.3.2. Project Approval ...............................................................................23
1.3.2.1.
IRP Project Approval ..............................................................23
1.3.3. Project Plan.......................................................................................23

1.3.3.1.
IRP Project Plan ....................................................................23
1.3.4. Emergency Response Plan.................................................................27

1.3.4.1.
IRP Emergency Response Plan .................................................27
1.3.5. Well Types.........................................................................................30

1.4.
Casing Design and Metallurgy ................................................................33
1.4.1. Scope ................................................................................................33
January 2008
1.4.2. Casing Design: General .....................................................................33

1.4.3. Casing Collapse Design Specifications ...............................................34
1.4.3.1.
IRP Collapse Design ...............................................................34
1.4.4. Casing Tension Design Specifications ................................................34

1.4.4.1.
IRP Casing Tension Design ......................................................34
1.4.5. Casing Burst Design Specification .....................................................35

1.4.5.1.
IRP Casing Burst Design .........................................................35
1.4.6. Environmental Degradation Mechanisms...........................................36

1.4.7. Casing and Coupling Grades ..............................................................37
1.4.7.1.
IRP Sour Service Casing Grades...............................................37
1.4.8. IRP High Temperature Sour Service Casing Grades ...........................37

1.4.9. Additional Casing Specifications ........................................................38
1.4.9.1.
IRP Additional Casing Specifications .........................................38
1.4.10.
Sulphide Stress Cracking SSC Test
Requirements ....................................................................................42
1.4.11.
NACE Testing Protocols .......................................................42
1.4.11.1. IRP NACE Testing Protocols .....................................................42

1.4.12.
Sulphide Stress Cracking SSC Test Procedures
and Acceptance Requirements ..........................................................43
1.4.12.1. IRP Test Procedures and Acceptance Criteria .............................43
1.4.13.
Manufacturer Pre Qualification............................................45
1.4.13.1. IRP Manufacturer Pre Qualification ........................................45

1.4.14.
J55 and K55 and Electric Resistance Welded
ERW L80 45
1.4.14.1. J55 and K55 and ERW L80 Type 1 Casing: SOHIC Testing ...........45
1.4.15.
J55 and K55 Casing: HIC Test Requirements .......................46
1.4.15.1. IRP J55 and K55 Casing: HIC Testing Requirements ...................46
1.4.16.
Electric Resistance Welded (ERW) Casing ........................47
1.4.16.1. IRP ERW Casing: Pressure Test Requirements............................47

1.4.17.
Casing Identification ...........................................................47
1.4.17.1. IRP Casing Identification .........................................................47

1.4.18.
Inspection ...........................................................................47
1.4.18.1. IRP Inspection of New, Compliant Casing ..................................47

1.4.18.2. IRP Non Compliant Casing: Testing and Inspection Requirements47
1.4.19.
Intermediate Casing............................................................48
1.4.20.
Intermediate Casing Setting Depth .....................................48
1.4.20.1. IRP Intermediate Casing: Setting Depth....................................48
ii
January 2008
1.4.20.2. IRP Intermediate Casing: Exemption ........................................48

1.4.21.
Re Entry Wells: General ....................................................49
1.4.21.1. IRP Re Entry Wells: General .................................................49

1.5.
Blowout Preventer Stack ........................................................................51
1.5.1. Scope ................................................................................................51

1.5.2. BOP Stack Configuration ...................................................................51
1.5.2.1.
IRP Configuration ..................................................................51
1.5.2.2.
IRP Pipe Ram Sizes ................................................................51
1.5.3. Shear Blind Rams ..............................................................................55

1.5.3.1.
IRP Shear Blind Ram Use Requirements ....................................56
1.5.3.2.
IRP Shear Blind Ram Design Requirements................................56
1.5.4. BOP Stack Auxiliary Equipment .........................................................56

1.5.5. BOP Mechanical Specifications: Pressure Rating and
Casing Bowls .....................................................................................58
1.5.5.1.
IRP Pressure Rating ...............................................................58
1.5.5.2.
IRP Casing Bowls ...................................................................58
1.5.6. BOP Metallic Materials for Sour Service .............................................58

1.5.6.1.
IRP Metallic Material Requirements...........................................58
1.5.6.2.
IRP Bolting Requirements .......................................................59
1.5.7. NonMetallic Materials Requirements for Sour Service .....................59

1.5.7.1.
IRP Non-Metallic Material Requirements for Sour Wells................59
1.5.8. BOP Transportation, Rigging Up and Maintenance ............................60

1.5.9. 1.5.8 BOP Control Systems ................................................................60
1.5.9.1.
1.5.8.1 IRP Hydraulic Pump Requirements ................................60
1.5.9.2.
IRP BOP Master Control Station Location ...................................61
1.5.9.3.
IRP Minimum Accumulator Sizing .............................................61
1.5.10.
BOP Inspection and Servicing Requirements ......................62
1.5.10.1. IRP Servicing Timing ..............................................................62

1.5.10.2. IRP Pressure Testing ..............................................................62
1.5.10.3. Reference List .......................................................................68
1.6.
Choke Manifold.......................................................................................69
1.6.1. Scope ................................................................................................69

1.6.2. Choke Manifold General.....................................................................69
1.6.2.1.
IRP Choke Manifold Design Specifications ..................................69
1.6.3. 1.6.2 Valves & Chokes .......................................................................71

1.6.3.1.
January 2008
1.6.2.1 IRP Valve and Choke Specifications ...............................71
iii
1.6.4. Flanges, Ring Gasket and Bolting ......................................................71

1.6.4.1.
IRP Flanges, Ring Gaskets and Bolting Specifications ..................71
1.6.5. Flexible Steel Hoses ..........................................................................73

1.6.5.1.
IRP Flexible Steel Hose Specifications .......................................73
1.6.6. Pressure Gauges ...............................................................................75

1.6.6.1.
IRP Standpipe and Casing Pressure Gauges ...............................75
1.6.6.2.
1.6.5.2 IRP Choke Panel Pressure Gauges .................................76
1.6.6.3.
IRP Pressure Sensor Maintenance and Testing ...........................76
1.6.7. Initial Choke Manifold Certification and Documentation....................77

1.6.7.1.
IRP Choke Manifold Certification and Documentation ..................77
1.6.8. Choke Manifold Shop Servicing and Pressure Testing........................78
1.7.
1.6.8.1.
IRP Choke Manifold Shop Servicing ..........................................78
1.6.8.2.
IRP Choke Manifold Pressure Testing Procedures ........................79
Mud Gas Separators ...............................................................................81
1.7.1. Scope ................................................................................................81

1.7.2. General Requirements .......................................................................81
1.7.2.1.
IRP Mud Gas Separator General Requirements ........................81
1.7.3. Open Bottom Mud Gas Separators ..................................................82

1.7.3.1.
IRP Open Bottom Mud Gas Separator Specifications .................82
1.7.4. Inlet Lines For Mud Gas Separators) ..............................................85

1.7.4.1.
IRP Inlet Lines for Mud Gas Separators (Both Atmospheric and
Pressure) .............................................................................85
1.7.5. Vent Lines for Open Bottom Mud Gas Separators ...........................86
1.7.5.1.
IRP Vent Lines for Open Bottom Mud Gas Separators ...............86
1.7.6. Remote Open Bottom Mud Gas Separators .....................................87

1.7.6.1.
IRP Remote Open Bottom Mud Gas Separators........................87
1.7.7. Enclosed MudGas Separators: Design Specifications .......................88

1.7.7.1.
IRP Enclosed Mud Gas Separators: Design Specifications ..........88
1.7.8. Enclosed MudGas Separators: Required Components ......................88

1.7.8.1.
IRP Enclosed Mud Gas Separators: Required Components .........88
1.7.9. Enclosed Mud Gas Separators: Fabrication and

Operating Guidelines .........................................................................89
1.7.9.1.
1.7.10.
IRP Enclosed Mud Gas Separators: Fabrication and Operating

Guidelines ............................................................................89
Vent Lines for Enclosed Separators .....................................90
1.7.10.1. IRP Vent Lines for Enclosed Separators .....................................90

1.7.11.
iv
Reference List .....................................................................90
January 2008
1.8.
Drill String Design and Metallurgy ..........................................................91
1.8.1. Acknowledgement and Disclaimer.....................................................91

1.8.2. Drill Pipe Grades ...............................................................................91
1.8.2.1.
IRP Drill Pipe Grade: Use Specifications ....................................92
1.8.2.2.
IRP Drill Pipe Grade: Use Preference ........................................92
1.8.3. Drill String Over Pull Design Considerations......................................92

1.8.4. Drill Pipe Class / Tensile Rating ........................................................92
1.8.4.1.
IRP Drill Pipe Class / Tensile Rating ..........................................92
1.8.5. Exposure Control ...............................................................................93

1.8.5.1.
IRP Exposure Control .............................................................93
1.8.6. Hardness Tested API Grade Drill Pipe Specification ..........................93

1.8.6.1.
IRP Hardness Tested Grade Drill Pipe Specification: HE, HX, HG ...93
1.8.7. SS Grade Drill Pipe Tube Specifications .............................................94

1.8.7.1.
IRP Specifications for SS Drill Pipe Tube ....................................94
1.8.7.2.
IRP Tensile Property Specifications for SS Drill Pipe Tube ............94
1.8.7.3.
IRP Hardness Specifications for SS Drill Pipe Tube ......................95
1.8.7.4.
IRP Toughness Specifications for SS Drill Pipe Tube ....................95
1.8.7.5.
IRP H2S Resistance Specifications for SS Drill Pipe Tube ..............96
1.8.7.6.
IRP Chemistry Specifications for SS Drill Pipe Tube .....................96
1.8.7.7.
IRP SS Drill Pipe Tube Transformation and Grain Size .................96
1.8.7.8.
IRP Tube / Tool Joint Transition ...............................................97
1.8.7.9.
IRP Drill Pipe Identification......................................................97
1.8.8. SS Grade Tool Joint Specification ......................................................97

1.8.8.1.
IRP Specifications for SS Tool Joints .........................................97
1.8.8.2.
IRP Tensile Property Specifications for SS Tool Joints ..................98
1.8.8.3.
IRP Dimensional and Torsion Specifications for SS Tool Joints ......98
1.8.8.4.
Hardness Specifications for SS Tool Joints ............................... 100
1.8.8.5.
Toughness Specifications for SS Tool Joints ............................. 100
1.8.8.6.
H2S Resistance Specifications for SS Tool Joints ....................... 100
1.8.8.7.
Chemistry Specifications for SS Tool Joints .............................. 101
1.8.8.8.
SS Tool Joint Transformation and Grain Size ............................ 101
1.8.8.9.
SS Tool Joint Hard banding ................................................... 101
1.8.9. Inspection .......................................................................................101

1.8.9.1.
1.8.10.
IRP Inspection .................................................................... 101

Downhole Floats................................................................102
1.8.10.1. IRP Downhole Floats ............................................................ 102
January 2008
1.8.11.
Upper Kelly Cocks, Lower Kelly Cocks and
Stabbing Valves ..............................................................................103
1.8.11.1. IRP Upper Kelly Cocks, Lower Kelly Cocks and Stabbing Valves .. 103
1.8.12.
Pup Joints and Heavy Weight Drill Pipe .............................104
1.8.12.1. Pup Joints and Heavy Weight Drill Pipe ................................... 104
1.9.
Welding ................................................................................................105
1.9.1. Scope ..............................................................................................105

1.9.2. Applicable Codes .............................................................................105
1.9.3. Welding Process ..............................................................................105
1.9.4. Welding Electrodes Sour Service ..................................................106
1.9.5. Welding Procedure Specification .....................................................106
1.9.6. Procedure Qualification Record .......................................................106
1.9.7. Welder Qualification ........................................................................108
1.9.8. Field Welding ..................................................................................108
1.9.9. Pre - Heat ........................................................................................108
1.9.10.
Interrupted Welding .........................................................109
1.9.11.
Post Heat ..........................................................................109
1.9.12.
Repair Welds .....................................................................109
1.9.13.
Product Hardness Test ......................................................109
1.9.14.
Product Pressure Test .......................................................109
1.9.15.
Casing Bowl Pressure Test ................................................109
1.9.16.
Non Destructive Testing .................................................110
1.9.17.
Welding Documentation ....................................................110
1.9.18.
Reference List ...................................................................111
1.10. Drilling Fluids .......................................................................................113

1.10.1.
Scope ................................................................................113
1.10.2.
Fluid Density .....................................................................113
1.10.2.1. IRP Minimum Drilling Fluid Density ......................................... 113

1.10.2.2. IRP Drilling Fluid Density Check: Wiper Trips ........................... 114
1.10.3.
H2S Scavenging .................................................................114
1.10.3.1. IRP H2S Scavenger Pretreatment ........................................... 114

1.10.3.2. IRP H2S Scavenger Maintenance: Soluble Sulphides.................. 114
1.10.3.3. IRP Soluble Sulphide Monitoring: Hach Test (water based fluids
only) ................................................................................. 115
1.10.3.4. IRP Soluble Sulphide Monitoring: Garrett Gas Train Tests .......... 115
1.10.4.
vi
Rheological Properties ......................................................115
January 2008
1.10.4.1. IRP Swab / Surge Pressure: Gel Strengths .............................. 115

1.10.4.2. IRP Rheological Properties .................................................... 116
1.10.5.
Alkalinity ...........................................................................116
1.10.5.1. IRP Alkalinity: pH Control ..................................................... 116

1.10.5.2. IRP pH Monitoring ............................................................... 116
1.10.6.
Equipment and Practices ...................................................116
1.10.6.1. IRP Back-up Drilling Fluid Volumes ......................................... 116

1.10.6.2. IRP Drilling Fluid Mixing System............................................. 116
1.10.6.3. IRP Drilling Fluid Material Inventory ....................................... 117
1.10.6.4. IRP Gas Detector ................................................................. 117
1.10.6.5. IRP Drilling Fluid Specialist .................................................... 117
1.10.6.6. IRP Suspension of Drilling Ahead ........................................... 117
1.11. Kick Detection ......................................................................................119
1.11.1.
Scope ................................................................................119
1.11.2.
Drilling Fluid Volume Measurement ...................................119
1.11.2.1. IRP Mud Tank Volume Monitoring System ............................... 119

1.11.3.
Flow line Flow Sensors ......................................................120
1.11.3.1. IRP Flow line Flow Sensors .................................................... 120

1.11.4.
Trip Tanks .........................................................................120
1.11.4.1. IRP Trip Tanks .................................................................... 120

1.11.5.
Monitoring Indirect Indicators ..........................................121
1.11.5.1. IRP Electronic Drilling Recorder EDR ....................................... 121

1.11.5.2. IRP Driller's Instrumentation ................................................. 121
1.11.5.3. IRP Mud Gas Logging ........................................................... 121
1.12. Wellsite Safety .....................................................................................123
1.12.1.
Scope ................................................................................123
1.12.2.
General Safety Requirements ............................................123
1.12.2.1. IRP Pre-Job Orientation ........................................................ 123

1.12.2.2. IRP H2S Training.................................................................. 123
1.12.2.3. IRP Safety Supervision ......................................................... 123
1.12.2.4. IRP Site Access Control ........................................................ 124
1.12.3.
H2S Monitoring Equipment ................................................124
1.12.3.1. Continuous H2S Monitoring System ........................................ 124

1.12.3.2. IRP Portable H2S Detection Devices ........................................ 125
1.12.4.
Breathing Air Equipment ...................................................125
1.12.4.1. IRP Breathing Air Equipment ................................................. 125
January 2008
vii
1.13. Wellsite Personnel ...............................................................................126

1.13.1.
Scope ................................................................................126
1.13.2.
Responsibilities .................................................................126
1.13.2.1. IRP Operators Representative ............................................... 126

1.13.2.2. IRP Rig Contractors Representative ....................................... 126
1.13.2.3. IRP Shared Responsibly ........................................................ 126
1.13.3.
Level of Supervision and Crew Requirements....................126
1.13.3.1. IRP Wellsite Supervisors ....................................................... 126

1.13.3.2. IRP Rig Manager .................................................................. 127
1.13.3.3. IRP Drilling Crew ................................................................. 127
1.13.4.
Minimum Qualifications .....................................................127
1.13.4.1. IRP Primary Wellsite Supervisor ............................................. 127

1.13.4.2. IRP Second Wellsite Supervisor ............................................. 128
1.13.4.3. IRP Rig Manager .................................................................. 128
1.13.4.4. IRP Drilling Crew ................................................................. 129
1.13.4.5. IRP Safety Specialist ............................................................ 129
1.13.5.
Certification and Training Course References ....................129
1.14. Practices ..............................................................................................130

1.14.1.
Scope ................................................................................130
1.14.2.
IRP Rig Inspection ............................................................130
1.14.3.
BOP, Casing and Choke Manifold Pressure
Testing 131
1.14.3.1. IRP BOP Pressure Testing ..................................................... 131
1.14.3.2. IRP Casing Pressure Testing .................................................. 131
1.14.3.3. IRP Choke Manifold Pressure Testing ...................................... 131
1.14.4.
BOP Drills ..........................................................................131
1.14.4.1. IRP BOP Drills ..................................................................... 131

1.14.5.
Tripping Practices .............................................................132
1.14.5.1. IRP Trip Supervision ............................................................ 132

1.14.5.2. IRP Hole Fill ........................................................................ 132
1.14.5.3. IRP Trip Record ................................................................... 132
1.14.5.4. IRP Flow Checks .................................................................. 133
1.14.6.
Drill Stem Testing..............................................................133
1.14.7.
Directional Surveying ........................................................133
1.14.7.1. IRP Directional Surveying ..................................................... 133

1.14.8.
viii
Coring ...............................................................................134
January 2008
1.14.8.1. IRP Coring .......................................................................... 134

1.14.9.
Fishing Operations ............................................................134
1.14.9.1. IRP Fishing Operations: Downhole Floats ................................ 134

1.14.9.2. IRP Fishing Operations: Through Drill Pipe Wireline Operations .. 134
1.14.9.3. IRP Fishing Operations: Retrieving Open Hole Logging Tools ...... 135
1.14.10.
Logging .............................................................................135
1.14.10.1.
1.14.11.
Casing / Liner Running .....................................................135
1.14.11.1.
1.14.12.
IRP Casing / Liner Running ................................................ 135
Reviews and Safety Meetings ............................................136
1.14.12.1.
IRP Pre Job Safety Meeting ............................................. 136
1.14.12.2.
IRP Emergency Response Plan Meeting ............................... 136
1.14.12.3.
IRP Safety / Operational Meetings ...................................... 136
1.14.13.
Wear Bushing ....................................................................136
1.14.13.1.
January 2008
IRP Logging .................................................................... 135
IRP Wear Bushing ............................................................ 136
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: General Failure Sequence....................................................... 12
Figure 1.2.4.2 Critical Sour Drilling Bowties ............................................ 17
Figure 1. Insufficient Mud Weight To Control Reservoir Pressure................ 17
Figure 2:. Drilling Into Unexpected High Pressure Formation..................... 18
Figure 3:. Loss of Circulation or Returns Resulting In Loss of Hydrostatic Head
Which May Cause Well To Flow ............................................... 18
Figure 4: Improper Tripping Practices .................................................... 19
Figure 5. Other Operations: DST, Coring, Fishing, Logging, Casing
Running/Cementing .............................................................. 19
Figure 6. Human Error ........................................................................ 19
Figure KICK: Improper Well Control Procedures ...................................... 20
Figure Critical Sour Drilling Bowties....................................................... 21
Figure 1.4.4 Wellhead vs. Bottomhole Pressure ...................................... 36
Figure: 1.5.1.1 BOP Stack Configuration 1 ............................................. 52
Figure: 1.5.1.4 BOP Ram Blanking Tool ................................................. 55
Figure: 1.5.9.1 Sample of Three Year Test Report ................................... 64
Figure 1.6.1.1 Choke Manifold Layout.................................................... 70
Figure 1.7.2.1 Open Bottom Mud Gas Separator; Suggested Configuration83
Figure 1.7.5.1 Open Bottom Mud Gas Separator: Remote Layout and Sizing
......................................................................................... 87
Figure 1.8.6.9 Figure: Suggested Drill Pipe Identification ......................... 97
January 2008
LIST OF TABLES
IRP 1 Review Sub Committee .............................................................. 3
Other Contributors ............................................................................... 3
Table 1.1.5.1 ARP 1 vs. IRP 1 ................................................................ 6
Table 1.2.4.1 Critical Sour Drilling: Treats, Controls and IRP 1 References ...14
Table: 1.4.7.1 Chemical Composition Requirements .................................39
Table: 1.4.7.2 Hardness Requirements ...................................................41
Table: 1.4.16.1 ...................................................................................47
Table 1.6.3.1 Recommended API Flange Choke/Kill Line Combination .........72
Table 1.7.2.1 Open Bottom Mud Gas Separator; Dimensions ...................84
Table 1.7.2.2 Open Bottom Mud Gas Separator Vessel and Vent Line
Materials ..............................................................................85
Table 1.8.5 API Drill Pipe Hardness Maximum Hardness (Rockwell C) For
HE, HX, and HG Drill Pipe .......................................................94
Table 1.8.6.2 SS Drill Pipe Tensile Properties Mpa / Ksi .............................95
Table 1.8.6.3 SS Drill Pipe Hardness Rockwell C (HRC) ...........................95
Table 1.8.6.4 SS Drill Pipe Toughness Minimum Single Valve Charpy V .....96
Table 1.8.6.6 Recommended SS Drill Pipe Chemistry Weight per Cent.........96
Table 1.8.7.2 SS Tool Joint Tensile Properties Mpa/Ksi ..............................98
Table 1.8.7.3.1 SS75 Drill Pipe Recommended SS Tool Joint Dimensions and
Resulting Strengths for Typical Connections. .............................98
Table 1.8.7.7 Recommended SS Toll Joint Chemistry .............................. 101
January 2008
xi
1.1.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND SCOPE
1.1.1.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DISCLAIMER
This Industry Recommended Practice (IRP) is a set of best practices and guidelines,
compiled by knowledgeable and experienced industry and government personnel and is
intended to provide the operator with advice regarding Drilling Critical Sour Wells.
The IRP was developed under the auspices of the Drilling and Completions Committee
(DACC).
DACC is a joint industry/government committee established to develop safe, efficient, and
environmentally suitable operating practices for the Canadian oil and gas industry in the
areas of drilling, completions and servicing of wells. The primary effort is the development
of IRP's with priority given to:
development of new IRPs where non-existent procedures result in issues because of

inconsistent operating practices;
review and revision of outdated IRPs particularly where new technology requires new
operating procedures; and
provide general support to foster development of non-IRP industry operating

practices that have current application to a limited number of stakeholders.
IRP FLEXIBILITY
The recommendations set out in this IRP are meant to allow flexibility and must be used in
conjunction with competent technical judgement. It remains the responsibility of the user
of the IRP to judge its suitability for a particular application.
Throughout this IRP the terms "shall", "must" or "will" are used to indicate firm
recommendations. However, acceptable alternatives may be considered provided:
it is clearly indicated in the planning documentation what recommendations have

been modified;
the alternative provides an equivalent degree of safety and technical integrity; and
the alternative is reviewed and endorsed by a "qualified technical expert" see IRP
1.3.1 Project Approval.
LEGISLATION
If there is any inconsistency or conflict between any of the recommended practices
contained in the IRP and the applicable legislative requirement, the legislative requirement
shall prevail.
January 2008
ACCURACY AND DISCLAIMER

Every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data and
recommendations contained in the IRP.
However DACC, its subcommittees, and individual contributors make no representation,
warranty, or guarantee in connection with the publication or the contents of any IRP
recommendation and hereby disclaim liability of responsibility for loss or damage resulting
from the use of this IRP, or for any violation of any legislative requirements.
SANCTION
The following organizations have sanctioned (sanction = review and support of the IRP as a
compilation of best practices) this document:
Alberta Employment, Immigration, and Industry
British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission
British Columbia Workers Compensation Board (WorkSafeBC)
Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling Contractors
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
Energy Resources Conservation Board (formerly AEUB)
International Intervention and Coil Tubing Association (Canada)
Manitoba Energy and Mines
National Energy Board
NWT and Nunavut Workers Compensation Board
Petroleum Services Association of Canada
Saskatchewan Industry and Resources
Saskatchewan Labour
Small Explorers and Producers Association of Canada
ARP REVIEW SUB-COMMITTEE

A sub-committee of DACC made up of knowledgeable and experienced industry and
government personnel developed this IRP.
Many others also contributed to specific sections of the IRP. While the list is not complete,
the following individuals are recognized for their significant contributions
January 2008
IRP 1 Review Sub Committee

Name
Company
Organization
Represented
Richard Corvari
Gulf
CAPP
Dennis High
BP
CAPP
Mike MacKinnon
Husky Oil
CAPP
Mike Read (Chair)
Shell
CAPP
Drew Taylor
Chevron
CAPP
John Mayall
Alberta Energy Utilities Board
Warren Randall
Nabors Drilling
CAODC
Lorne Thompson
Akita Drilling
CAODC
Darwin Hartley
Precision Drilling
CAODC
Bob Cunningham
PSC
Dick Bissett
Bissett Resource Consultants
Chris Knoechel
National Energy Board
PSAC
Other Contributors
Name
Company
Organization
Represented
Miles Sweep
Chevron
CAPP
Rick Kirkpatrick
Weatherford
PSAC
Miguel Stevens
Weatherford
PSAC
Jean-Paul Saulnier
Energy Rentals
PSAC
Ramsey Kostandi
Talisman Energy
CAPP
Karol Szklarz
Shell
CAPP
Glenn Brown
Grant Pridco
PSAC
Ed Murphy
Grant Pridco
PSAC
Scott Biluk
Energy Rentals
PSAC
Dan Belczewski
Bissett Resource Consultants
PSAC
Malcolm Hay
Shell
CAPP
Jerry Thomson
Summit Tubulars
PSAC
Bruce Williams
Triumph Tubulars
PSAC
Ron Isinger
Precision Drilling
CAODC
Darwin Hartley
Precision Drilling
CAODC
Glen Rabby
Hi-Kalibre Equipment
PSAC
Dick Molner
Baroid Drilling Fluids
PSAC
Jim Masikewich
Newpark Drilling Fluids
PSAC
January 2008
1.1.2.
SCOPE
Goal
The goal of this IRP is to provide a set of best practices that will prevent a blowout while
drilling a critical sour well.
Application
This IRP applies to overbalanced drilling of high H2S (sour) wells using jointed drill strings
on conventional drilling or modified service rigs.
It comprises a set of equipment specifications, practices and procedures to address sour
drilling issues.
Critical Sour
Critical sour refers to wells where the formation fluids are expected to contain hydrogen
sulphide (H2S) in sufficient quantities such that the potential release during a blowout would
have significant impact on the public (either high release rate or close proximity to the
public).
Critical sour or the equivalent designation is usually explicitly specified by the applicable
jurisdictional regulation, such as in Alberta Directive 056: Energy Development Applications and
Schedules.
Good Drilling Practices

This IRP is meant to supplement the normal good drilling practices applied by competent
operators and as required by governmental regulations and guidelines.
It is not meant to be a complete compilation of, or replace, good drilling practices; the focus
is on sour drilling issues only.
Competent and Experienced Drilling Personnel

This IRP is meant to be a tool for competent, experienced, and knowledgeable drilling
personnel.
It is not meant to be used by inexperienced personnel; it makes no attempt to go into
enough detail to train inexperienced personnel.
Further discussion of the experience and competencies expected are given in Sections 1.3
Planning and 1.13 Wellsite Personnel.
Underbalanced Drilling
This IRP applies to overbalanced drilling only.
For underbalanced drilling, consult IRP 6: Critical Sour Underbalanced Drilling.
Coil Tubing Drilling

This IRP applies to jointed pipe drillstring drilling only.
January 2008
For drilling with continuous tubing (coil tubing), consult IRP 21: Coil Tubing Operations,
currently under development. In the absence of IRP 21 consult IRP 6: Critical Sour
Underbalanced Drilling.
1.1.3.
CONTENTS
The following table briefly describes the contents of each section of the IRP.
A more detailed discussion is given in the Scope subsection at the start of each section.
1.1 Acknowledgement
and Scope
1.2 Hazard Assessment
1.3 Planning
Recognizes the organizations and individuals who developed

this IRP.
States the disclaimers associated with the IRP
Describes the scope, contents, format, and history of the
IRP
Organization represented
Outlines a hazard assessment that was conducted that
confirms that all the hazards that could potentially lead to a
blowout have been addressed
Describes the planning and review practices that should be
conducted
Describes the design and material specification for sour

casing
Describes the equipment specifications for a sour BOP stack
Describes the equipment specifications for a sour choke

manifold
Describes the equipment specifications for sour open bottom

and enclosed mud-gas separators.
Describes the design and material specification for sour,

jointed drill strings.
Describes the specifications for current, not fully sour
service drill strings.
Describes the specification for new, fully sour service drill
strings.
Sets the expectation that after Jan 1, 2002, all new drill
strings for critical sour wells will be manufacture to the full
sour service specifications and that by Jan 1, 2010, only the
full sour service drill strings will be acceptable on critical sour
wells.
Describes the welding guidelines for sour service equipment
1.4 Casing Design and

Metallurgy
1.5 Blowout Preventer
Stack
1.6 Choke Manifold
1.7 Mud Gas Separators
1.8 Drill String Design
and Metallurgy
1.9 Welding
1.10 Drilling Fluids
1.11 Kick Detection
1.12 Wellsite Safety
January 2008
Describes the drilling fluid density, H2S scavenging,

rheological, and acidity requirements.
Outlines additional equipment and practices
Describes the equipment specifications and practices
required for kick detection equipment
Describes the unique safety personnel and equipment
required for a critical sour well
1.13 Wellsite Personnel
1.14 Practices
1.1.4.
Describes the responsibilities, level of supervision, crew

requirements, and minimum qualification for wellsite
personnel.
Describes the enhanced practices or restrictions that should
be applied to critical sour wells
HISTORY
ARP 1, 1987
ARP 1 Drilling Critical Sour Wells was developed in the mid 1980's in response to the
findings of the Lodgepole Blowout Inquiry Panel (ERCB Decision Report 84-9).
The topics covered by ARP 1 were selected by the Blowout Prevention Review Committee
based on the findings of the panel and general industry best practices of the day.
ARP 1 Critical Sour Well Drilling was published in 1987.
ARP 1 Review, 1993
DACC considered revising ARP 1 in 1993 but after a preliminary review, it was felt that there
were no significant revisions required.
It should be noted that ARP 1 has proven very successful since there have been no blowouts
on any well drilling following ARP 1 (to the best knowledge of the ARP 1 Review Committee)
IRP 1, 2002
DACC again considered revising ARP 1 in 1999 and it was felt that there had been enough
improvements in practices that a more rigorous review and revision was worthwhile.
The ARP 1 Review Committee was established in late 1999 to review and revise the existing
ARP 1.
The committee finished its work and the revised IRP was sanctioned in January, 2002
ARP vs. IRP
To facilitate comparing the revisions to the original ARP, the following Table 1.1.5.1 ARP 1
vs. IRP 1 summarizes the sections in ARP and the corresponding section in IRP 1.
Table 1.1.5.1 ARP 1 vs. IRP 1
ARP (1987)
ARP 1.0
Scope and Contents
IRP (2001)
IRP 1.1
ARP 2.2
Blowout Preventer Stack
IRP 1.5
Acknowledgement, Scope &

Introduction
Hazard Assessment & Blowout Look
Back
Blowout Preventer Stack
ARP 1.2
Drill Pipe Design And Metallurgy
IRP 1.8
Drill String design And Metallurgy
ARP 1.3
Mud Gas Separators
IRP 1.7
Mud Gas Separators
ARP 1.4
Choke Manifolds
IRP 1.6
Choke Manifold
ARP 1.5
Auxiliary Equipment
IRP 1.8
Drill String Design And Metallurgy
ARP 1.6
Sour Service Casing
IRP 1.4
Casing Design And Metallurgy
IRP 1.2
January 2008
ARP (1987)
IRP (2001)
ARP 1.7
Mud System Design
IRP 1.10
Drilling Fluids
ARP 1.8
Kick Detection
IRP 1.11
Kick Detection Equipment
ARP 1.9
H2S Detection
IRP 1.11
Kick Detection Equipment
ARP 1.10
H2S Monitoring
IRP 1.12
Wellsite Safety
ARP 1.11
Rig Inspection
IRP 1.14
Practices
ARP 1.12
Wellsite Supervision
IRP 1.13
Wellsite Personnel
ARP 1.13
Information Exchange
IRP 1.3
Planning
ARP 1.14
Human Factors
IRP 1.13
Wellsite Personnel
ARP 1.15
Welding Guidelines
IRP 1.9
Welding
IRP 1, 2004
During 2002 and 2004 some minor editing, technical corrections to Section 1.4 Casing
Design and Metallurgy and technical corrections to Section 1.9 Welding were identified.
Small task groups addressed the issues, IRP 1 was revised in late 2003 and sanction by
DACC in January 2004
The revisions are summarized in Section 1.1.6 2003 Revisions.
IRP Volume 1, 2004
Document was revised with the new IRP style guide and released for industry review.
Comments received were not substantive to warrant a review. Document will be reviewed in
2010 if necessary.
1.1.5.
REVIEW PROCESS
DACC IRP Review Process

The sanctioned IRP will have a scheduled review date. Enform will track this date and bring
it to DACCs attention when required. At the scheduled review date, DACC members will be
asked if a review is necessary (i.e., change in scope, purpose, technology, practices, etc.).
If at a scheduled review a scope change is necessary, the change must be approved by
DACC. If a review is deemed necessary, a new IRP Subcommittee will be created, and the
steps of the IRP Development Process followed. If a review is determined not to be
necessary, the document will be copyedited by Enform (links, legislative references, etc.)
and republished with a new review date.
Notwithstanding, the scheduled review date, a DACC member organization, may request a
review of a sanctioned IRP at anytime. To initiate an unscheduled review of a sanctioned
IRP, a DACC member organization representative must present a completed IRP Proposal,
as described in this document, at a scheduled DACC meeting for consideration.
IRP 1 Review Frequency
DACC will formally review the need to revise IRP 1 every two years.
However, should a DACC member organization request, and with DACC approval, IRP 1
could be reviewed more frequently.
January 2008
1.1.6.
2003 REVISIONS
Editing and Typos

During the use of IRP 1 through 2002 and, 2003, a few editing and typographical errors
were noted and revised.
1.4 Casing Design and Metallurgy
In 2003 a small task group revised this section; the task group consisted of:
o
Malcolm Hay, Shell Canada Ltd
Dan Belczewski, Bissett Resource Consultants Ltd
The following revisions were made to Section 1.4 Casing Design and Metallurgy
Table 1.4.7.1
L80 type 1 column, Manganese line: Add a (2) beside 1.20; (i.e., change to 1.202)
C90 type 1 column, Carbon line: typographical error, (i.e., change to 0.32)
T95 type 1 column, Carbon line: Add a (3) beside 0.30; (i.e., change to 0.303)
At the bottom of the table, below

o
Not normally added to this grade: Add:
Manganese may be increased to 1.40 % maximum if the sulfur is 0.005 %

maximum.
Carbon may be increased to 0.35 % maximum and Phosphorus may be
increased to 0.015 % maximum if the molybdenum is 0.50 % minimum.
Clause 1.4.11.1
Fourth paragraph: Change to read as follows:
SSC testing of casing and couplings for critical sour gas service shall be performed in
solution A.
Clause 1.4.15.1
Add extra bullets above the existing bullets:
The following outlines the HIC testing requirements for J55 and K55 casing and
couplings.
There are two protocols:
1)
Testing of all casing and couplings as outlined below.
2)
Pre-qualification of the manufacturer and subsequent testing of selected casing and

couplings at the discretion of the purchaser/user. The protocol used for
manufacturer pre-qualification (for acceptable SSC resistance) given in clause
1.4.11.1, and the same testing procedure and acceptance criteria as outlined below
shall be followed.
January 2008
HIC testing is not required on a heat by heat (order) basis if the manufacturer has
been pre-qualified.
Table 1.8.6.3
Under Grade Maximum Average column SS105 change 27.0 to 28.0
1.9 Welding
In 2003, section IRP 1.9 Welding was identified as in need of revision.
A small task group revised the section, please review the whole section.
The task group consisted of:
Chris Chan, ABB Vetco Gray Canada Inc. (leader)
Malcolm Hay, Shell Canada Ltd
Dan Belczewski, Bissett Resource Consultants Ltd
January 2008
1.2.
HAZARD ASSESSMENT
1.2.1.
SCOPE
ARP 1 Drilling Critical Sour Wells was developed in the mid 1980's in response to the
findings of the Lodgepole Blowout Inquiry Panel (ERCB Decision Report 84-9).
The topics covered by ARP 1 were selected by the Blowout Prevention Review Committee
based on the findings of the panel and general industry best practices of the day. However,
a rigorous, formal hazard assessment was not conducted.
In preparing the revised IRP 1, a hazard assessment was conducted in order to:
confirm all hazards that could potentially lead to a blowout on a critical sour well
have been identified
these hazards have been addressed in this revised IRP.
The hazard assessment was conducted using well-established methodologies as described in

ISO 17776:2000 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Offshore Production Installations Guidelines on Tool and Techniques for Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment.
Generally the majority of hazards had been addressed in ARP 1. The revised IRP 1 has
added a few enhancements, most notably in 1.3 Planning and 1.14 Practices, to address
those few that are not covered in ARP 1.
With these enhancements, IRP 1 provides best practices that address all the hazards
identified in the hazard assessment.
1.2.2.
HAZARD ASSESSMENT
The hazard assessment was conducted using well-established methodologies as described in

ISO 17776:2000 Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Offshore Production Installations Guidelines on Tool and Techniques for Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment.
The process steps used were:
Hazard (Threat) Identification: identified all significant hazards (threats) associated

with the drilling of a critical sour well that could lead to a blowout;
Hazard Control Identification: for each threat, one or several hazard controls were
identified which would prevent the threat from escalating to a blowout; and
IRP 1 Control Review: for each required control, the appropriate section in IRP 1 was
identified.
This review identified a few minor areas that the draft IRP 1 had not addressed (e.g., fishing
operations). Appropriate enhancements to the IRP were made
In the view of the ARP 1 Review Committee, the practices outlined in IRP 1 adequately
provide the appropriate controls to address all the threats identified.
January 2008
11
The whole process and the results are outlined graphically using the "bowtie" protocol at the
end of this section.
1.2.3.
THE BLOWOUT SEQUENCE
Blowouts do not happen instantaneously, a sequence of events must take place before a
release can occur.
Firstly, formation fluids must enter the wellbore. Normally the drilling fluid hydrostatic
pressure keeps formation fluids from entering the wellbore.
There are, however, several "threats" (see 1.2.4: Hazards / Threats) that, if not controlled
(see 1.2.5 Controls / IRP Reference), could allow formation fluids to enter the wellbore.
Once the formation fluid enters the wellbore, called a kick, well control equipment and
procedures are used to control and safely dispose of the formation fluid.
If there is a malfunction of the well control equipment, or an error in procedures, an
uncontrolled release can occur. If control can quickly be regained using the existing
redundant back-up equipment on location, the release is called a blow.
Blow (as defined by ERCB Directive 056: Energy Development Applications and Schedules) - The
uncontrolled flow of wellbore fluids to the atmosphere. The flow can be shut in with the
wellhead valve or blowout prevention equipment, or it can be directed to the flare system if
the well cannot be shut in indefinitely without exceeding maximum allowable casing
pressure (MACP).
If there is a major failure of well control equipment or practices, a full uncontrolled release
can occur, called a blowout.
Blowout (as defined by ERCB Directive 056: Energy Development Applications and Schedules) - The
complete loss of control of the flow of fluids from a well to the atmosphere or the flow of
fluids from one underground reservoir to another (an underground blowout). Wellbore
fluids are released uncontrolled at or near the wellbore. Well control can only be regained by
installing or replacing equipment to shut in or kill the well or by drilling a relief well.
Figure 1: General Failure Sequence
12
January 2008
1.2.4.
HAZARDS / THREATS
The following hazards (threats) were identified as the potential causes of a blowout while
drilling a critical sour well.
These threats can also have escalation factors,, which could increase the hazard.
The following threats and escalation factors were identified:
1.
Insufficient mud weight to control reservoir pressure
2.
Drilling into unexpected high pressure formation
3.
Loss of circulation or returns resulting in loss of hydrostatic head
3E1. Losses prior to tripping

3E2. Plugging drill pipe with lost circulation material
4.
Improper tripping practices:
4E1. Swabbing / surging while tripping
4E2. improper hole fill-up
5.
Non "drilling" operations:
DST ( not allowed in the critical sour zone)
Coring
Logging
Fishing
Running and cementing casing
5E1. Insufficient fluid density
6.
Human Error (which can exacerbate any threat)
KICK: if the controls listed in 1.2.5 Controls / IRP Reference are not effective, a KICK can
result. The major threat is improper well control procedures, however there are several
escalating factors:
KICK: improper well control procedures
KE1. well shut in slow, resulting in a large kick
KE2. Equipment not appropriate for well conditions (size, pressure rating, etc.)
KE3. Material / equipment failure due to sour fluid exposure
KE4. Equipment not maintained, or worn through usage
KE5. Well control procedures not effectively executed
KE6. Flow inside drillpipe
January 2008
13
KE7. Problems encountered in open wellbore during kick circulation (lost circulation,
formation breakdown, wellbore collapse, etc.)
If the well control procedures are not immediately executed, a short term release of
formation fluids can occur, called a blow. Control may be regained through continued
application of well control procedures.
A blow could also be caused by failure of a piece of the well control equipment (BOP, Choke
Manifold, Mud-Gas Separator, etc). Control may be regained by using the redundancy
designed into this equipment (e.g., two chokes, dual mud-gas separators, etc).
If the blow cannot be controlled with the equipment on location, a full uncontrolled release
of formation fluids can occur, called a blowout. The blowout would be brought under control
by the use of specialized blowout control equipment and practices, or by drilling a relief
well.
If a blowout occurs, an emergency response plan (ERP) would be implemented. In fact, the
initial stage of the ERP would be implemented during the initial stages of a well control
incident.
These THREATS and ESCALATION FACTORS are summarized in Table 1.2.4.1 Critical Sour
Drilling: Threats, Controls and IRP 1 References.
1.2.5.
CONTROLS / IRP REFERENCE
For each threat identified in 1.2.4 Hazards / Threats, specific controls are identified as
summarized in Table 1.2.4.1 Critical Sour Drilling: Threats, Controls and IRP 1 References.
For each control identified the corresponding section in IRP 1 which deals with it are also
summarized in Table 1.2.4.1 Critical Sour Drilling: Threats, Controls and IRP 1 References.
For each threat, the controls , and IRP references are shown graphically (called "Bowtie
Diagrams") in Figure 1.2.4.1 Critical Sour Drilling Bowties.
Table 1.2.4.1 Critical Sour Drilling: Treats, Controls and IRP 1 References
Threat Description
Control:
E = Escalation Factor
Design or Practice
1. Insufficient mud weight to

control reservoir pressure
2. Drilling into unexpected

high pressure formation
14
Design: drilling program

specifies appropriate mud
weight
Practice: follow drilling
program
Practice: monitor well

conditions and increase
weight as required
weight as required
IRP 1 Reference
1.3.3 Project Plan

1.13.2 Responsibilities
1.13.3 Level of Supervision and
Crew requirements
1.14.12 Reviews and Safety
meetings
1.10.2 Fluid density
1.11.5 Monitoring Indirect Indicators
January 2008
Threat Description
Control:
Design or Practice
3. Loss of circulation or
returns, resulting in loss of
hydrostatic head which may
cause well to flow
3E1 Losses prior to tripping
pipe
3E2 Plugging drillpipe with

LC material
4. Improper tripping
practices
4E1 Tripping:
swabbing/surging while
tripping. Rapid tripping
increases swabbing
4E2 Tripping: Improper hole
fill up during tripping

weight
1.3.3 Project Plan
Design: Intermediate casing

or open hole integrity test
isolates possible loss zones
1.3.3 Project Plan

1.4.19 Intermediate Casing
1.4.20 Intermediate Casing Setting
Depth

conditions and adjust mud
properties as required
identifies potential problems,
identifies actions (e.g. pump
out sub)
specifies hole sizes, BHA,
mud weights for proper trip
margin
Design: mud properties
designed to minimize
swabbing
Practice: follow tripping
procedures, including trip
tank monitoring
5. Other Operations: DST,

Coring, Fishing, Logging,
Casing Running/Cementing
Practice: follow IRP 1

Procedures
5E1 Insufficient Fluid Density
Practice: confirm well

conditions prior to starting
operations
developed by qualified
personnel and has
appropriate scrutiny and
approval
Design: supervisors and
crew meet competency
requirements
6. Human Error
Practice: BOP drills to

improve competency
Kick: improper well control
procedures
January 2008
IRP 1 Reference
Practice: effective well

control procedures: shut in
well, circulate out kick,
1.3.3 Project Plan
1.10.4 Rheological Properties
1.11.4 Trip Tanks

1.14.5 Tripping Practices
Crew Requirements
1.13.4 Minimum Qualifications
1.14.6 Drill Stem Testing (not
allowed in sour zone)
1.14.8 Coring
1.14.9 Fishing Operations
1.14.10 Logging
1.14.11 Casing / Line Running
1.3.2 Project Approval
1.3.3 Project Plan
1.3.2 Project Approval

1.3.3 Project Plan
1.13.5 Certification and Training
Course References
1.14.4 BOP Drills
1.14.5 Tripping Practices / 1.14.12
Reviews and Safety meetings
Crew Requirements
15
Threat Description
Control:
Design or Practice
regain well control
KE1 Well shut in procedures

slow > large kick
KE2 Equipment not
appropriate for well
conditions (size, pressure
rating, etc.)
KE3 Material / Equipment
failure due to sour fluid
exposure
Practice: well conditions

monitored
identifies appropriate size &
pressure requirements
KE4 Equipment not

maintained, or worn through
usage
KE5 Well Control procedures
not effectively executed
KE6 Flow inside drillpipe
Practice: equipment in good

working order: regular
inspections and tests
Practice: effective Kick
detection, rapid shut in
Design: float valve, Stabbing
valve to prevent flow up drill
steam
Design: intermediate casing
minimizes open hole
KE7 Problems encountered

in open wellbore during kick
circulation: (lost circulation,
formation breakdown,
wellbore collapse, etc.)
BLOW: a short term
uncontrolled release of
formation fluid to the
atmosphere that was
brought under control by the
well control equipment on
location
Design: equipment meets

sour service requirements
Practice: shut in well with

redundant equipment,
circulate out kick, regain
well control
Design: redundant well

control equipment
BLOWOUT: a blow that
existing equipment cannot
control and additional
equipment or relief well used
to regain control
16
Practice: Implement ERP
IRP 1 Reference

Course References
1.14.4 BOP Drills
1.11 Kick Detection Equipment
1.3.3 Project Plan
1.4 Casing and Metallurgy

1.5 Blowout Preventer (BOP) Stack
1.6 Choke Manifold
1.8 Drill String Design and
Metallurgy
1.9 Welding
1.14.2 IRP Rig Inspection
1.14.3 BOP, Casing and Choke
Manifold Pressure Testing
1.14.4 BOP Drills
1.8.10 Downhole Floats
1.8.11 Upper Kelly Cocks, Lower
Kelly Cocks and Stabbing Valves
1.4.19 Intermediate Casing
1.4.20.1 IRP Intermediate Casing:
Setting Depth and 1.4.20.2 IRP
Intermediate Casing: Exemption
Crew Requirements
Course References
1.14.4 BOP Drills
1.5 Blowout Preventer (BOP) Stack
1.6 Choke Manifold
1.3.4 Emergency Response Plan
1.14.12 Reviews and Safety
meetings
January 2008
Figure 1.2.4.2 Critical Sour Drilling Bowties
Note:
THREATS
1. Insufficient Mud
Weight
2. Unexpected High
Pressure Formation
Overall View, Details Follow

ESCALATING FACTORS
CONTROLS
5. Other Operations:
DST, Coring, Fishing,
Logging, Casing, etc
K3. Equipment /
Material Failure
CONTROLS
CONTROLS
Controls Fail
K4. Equipment
Not Maintained
CONTROLS
KICK
4. Improper Tripping
Procedures
CONTROLS
CONTROLS
Controls Fail
3. Lost Circulation
K2. Improper
Equipment
CONTROLS
K1. Improper
Well Shut
Proper Well
Control
Procedures
CONTROLS
CONTROLS
CONTROLS
BLOW
K5. Well Control

Procedures Not
Implemented
CONTROLS
K6. Flow Inside

Drillpipe
CONTROLS
K7. Open Hole

Problems
CONTROLS
CONTROLS
Redundant
Equipment &
Procedures
Threat(s)
Figure 1. Insufficient Mud Weight To Control Reservoir Pressure
1. Insufficient weight
to control reservoir
Design: Drilling
program specifies
appropriate mud
weight
1.3.3 Project Plan
January 2008
Practice: Follow
drilling program
1.13.3 Level of
Supervision and Crew
Requirements
1.14.12 Reviews and
Safety Meetings
Practice: Monitor
well conditions
and increase
weight as
required
KICK: Improper well

control

1.11.5 Monitoring
Indirect Indicators
17
BLOW
OUT
Figure 2:. Drilling Into Unexpected High Pressure Formation
Practice: Monitor well

weight as required
2. Drilling into
unexpected high
pressure formation
KICK: Improper well

control procedures
1.10.2 Fluid Density

1.11.5 Monitoring
Indirect Indicators
Figure 3:. Loss of Circulation or Returns Resulting In Loss of Hydrostatic Head Which May
Cause Well To Flow
3. Loss of circulation or
returns resulting in loss of
hydrostatic head which may
cause well to flow
Design: Drilling program

weight
1.3.3 Project Plan
Design: Intermediate
casing or open hole
integrity test isolates
possible loss zones
1.3.3 Project Plan

1.4.19 Intermediate
Casing
1.14.18 Intermediate
Casing setting Depth
Practice: Monitor
well conditions and
adjust mud properties
as required
3E1. Losses prior to

tripping pipe
3E2. Plugging drillpipe

with LC material
Design: Drilling
program identifies
potential problems,
identifies actions
(e.g. Pump
out sub)
KICK: Improper well

control procedures

1.11.5 Monitoring
Indirect Indicators
1.3.3 Project Plan
18
January 2008
Figure 4: Improper Tripping Practices
4. Improper tripping practices

specifies hole sizes, BHA,
mud weights for proper trip
margin
Design: Mud properties

designed to minimize
swabbing
4E1. Tripping: Swabbing/

surging while tripping
1.3.3 Project Plan
1.10.4 Rheological Properties
Practice: Follow tripping

procedures, including trip
tank monitoring
4E2. Tripping: Improper

hole fill-up during tripping
KICK: Improper
well control
procedures
1.11.4 Trip Tanks

1.14.5 Tripping Practices
1.13.3 Level of Supervision & Crew
Requirements
Figure 5. Other Operations: DST, Coring, Fishing, Logging, Casing Running/Cementing

5. Other Operations:
DST, Coring, Fishing,
Logging, Casing
Running/Cementing
Practice: Follow
IRP 1 Procedures
KICK: Improper
well control
procedures
5E1. Insufficient Fluid

Density
1.14.5 Drillstem Testing not allowed
in sour zone
1.14.7 Coring
1.14.8 Fishing Operations
1.14.9 Logging
1.14.10 Casing/Liner Running
Figure 6. Human Error
6. Human Error

developed by qualified
personnel and has
appropriate scrutiny
and approval
1.3.1 Project approval

1.3.2 Project Plan
January 2008
Design: Supervisors
and crew meet
competency
requirements
1.13.2 Level of Supervision &
Crew Requirements
1.13.4 Certification & Training
Practice: BOP drills to

improve competency
KICK: Improper well control

procedures
1.14.3 BOP Drills

1.13.5 Reviews and
Safety Meetings
19
Figure KICK: Improper Well Control Procedures

KICK: Improper well
control procedures
Practice: Effective
well control
procedures: shut in
well, circulate out kick,
regain well control
1.13.2 Level of
Supervision & Crew
Requirements
1.13.3 Minimum
Qualifications
1.13.4 Certification &
Training
1.14.3 BOP Drills
KE1. Well Shut in procedures

slow > large kick
Practice: Well
conditions monitored
KE2. Equipment
not appropriate for
well conditions
(size, pressure
rating, etc)
Design: Drilling
program identifies
appropriate size &
pressure
requirements
1.3.2 Project Plan
KE3. Material /
Equipment
failure due to
sour fluid
exposure
Design: Equipment
meets sour service
requirements
1.4 CASING
1.5 BOP
1.6 CHOKE
MANIFOLD
1.7 MUD-GAS
SEPARATOR
1.8 DRILL STRING
1.9 WELDING
KE4. Equipment
not maintained,
or worn through
usage
Practice:
Equipment in good
working order:
regular inspections
and tests
1.11 KICK DETECTION

EQUIPMENT
KE5. Well Control

procedures not
effectively executed
Practice:
Effective
well control
procedures: shut in
well, circulate out
kick, regain well
control
1.14.1 Rig Inspection 1.13.3 Minimum

1.14.2 BOP & Casing Qualifications
Pressure Testing
1.14.3 BOP
Drills
KE6: Flow inside

drill pipe
Design: Float
valve, stabbing
valve to prevent
flow up drill string
1.8.9 Downhole Floats

1.8.10 Lower Kelly
Cocks & Stabbing
Valves
KE7. Problems
encountered in
open wellbore
during kick
circulation
Design:
Intermediate
casing minimizes
open hole
1.4.17 Intermediate
Casing: General
1.4.18 Intermediate
Casing Setting
Depth & Exemption
BLOW: a short term uncontrolled release of formation fluid to the atmosphere that was
brought under control by the well control equipment on location
20
January 2008
Figure Critical Sour Drilling Bowties
Blow: a short term uncontrolled release of formation fluid to the atmosphere that was
brought under control by the well control equipment on location.
Blowout: a blow that existing equipment can not control and additional equipment or a
relief well used to regain control.
Practice: Shut
in well with redundant
equipment, circulate
out kick, regain well
control
BLOW
1.13.2 Level of
Supervision & Crew
Requirements
1.13.4 Certification &
Training
1.14.3 BOP Drills
January 2008
Design: Redundant
well control equipment
1.5 BOP
1.6 CHOKE MANIFOLD
1.7 MUD-GAS
SEPARATOR
BLOWOUT
Practice: Implement
ERP
1.3.3 Emergency
Response Plan
1.13.5 Reviews and
Safety Meetings
21
1.3.
PLANNING
1.3.1.
SCOPE
The purpose of the planning section is to outline the planning and review practices that
should be conducted to ensure technical and safety integrity of a critical sour drilling
project.
1.3.2.
PROJECT APPROVAL
1.3.2.1.
IRP Project Approval
The overall project plan and application to the appropriate regulator to undertake the
drilling of a critical sour well will be developed and signed by a qualified technical expert
authorized by the operator.
That representative, by their signature will be confirming that all the requirements of this
IRP have been addressed in the plan and that the terms of the project plan will be applied
during the execution of the plan.
The signature will also confirm that appropriate input from qualified technical experts has
been obtained where required and that the qualifications of the technical experts are valid.
Flexibility and Technical Judgment
Due to the complexity of a critical sour drilling project, and to allow for continuous
improvement regarding safety and operational efficiency, IRP 1 recommendations are
meant to allow flexibility.
Therefore, competent technical judgment must be used concurrently with these
recommendations.
It is the operators responsibility to ensure the required technical judgment has been used
to develop the project plan and will be used during the execution of the project
Qualified Technical Expert
IRP 1 allows flexibility in practices in several instances provided a qualified technical expert
relative to the practice / technology has approved the options in question.
It is the operators responsibility to ensure that the expert is qualified by normal industry
standards (e.g., years of technical / operational experience, review of applicable completed
projects, references, etc.).
The operator will be able to demonstrate this upon audit.
1.3.3.
PROJECT PLAN
1.3.3.1.
IRP Project Plan
A drilling project plan (drilling program) must be developed which will address the
requirements as outlined below (based on ERCB Directive 056: Energy Development Applications
and Schedules).
January 2008
23
Plan Objectives
The purpose of the project plan is to document the well design, equipment, and practices
that will be used during the project execution.
A key use of the plan is to provide directions to the wellsite personnel; the plan must have
enough detail to allow the wellsite personnel to clearly understand the hazards and required
actions.
For those areas of common practice with no variance from normal operations, a brief
overview can be provided with references to more detailed discussion, (e.g., this IRP)
Project Plan Contents
Geological Setting / H2S Release Rate
There should be a discussion regarding the expected geological zones, including
identification of sour and critical sour zones.
An offset well data search to a minimum 5 km radius from the subject well
should be conducted.
Data from relevant wells should be reviewed to get a clear understanding of
potential problems and design issues:
Relevant = most current, analogous geology, similar depth
Examination of the wells at greater distances may be required to ensure all
relevant information is reviewed.
Offset well data (well files, logs, and drilling event data) can be obtained from
governmental agencies, as well as commercial services.
Some information respecting wells may be confidential for a period of time after
an offset well has been drilled. However, for critical sour wells, an informal
discussion is recommended with the licensee of a nearby well respecting any
potential drilling problems.
This data should be summarized and referenced on an Offset Well Map that
indicates all offset analogue wells.
Calculations used to determine H2S release rate calculations should follow:
H2S Release Rate Assessment Guidelines and Audit Forms, CAPP, 1999
A summary of this assessment should be included in the project plan
Problems and Well Design

Offset well information should be reviewed and a summary outlining the hole
problems expected, solutions and reasons for selecting casing setting depths
should be included in the project plan.
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Setting
An overview of the ERP with regard to the degree of difficulty in implementing
the plan (see 1.3.4 Emergency Response Plan)
24
January 2008
Well Type
A discussion of the well type based on (see 1.3.5 Well Types):
o
complexity of the well (geology and well design);
the potential impact to the public (magnitude of H2S release rate and
proximity to public); and
the ease or difficulty of evacuation (number of affected public and evacuation

issues).
Casing Design (see 1.4 Casing Design and Metallurgy)

Casing details: casing depth, grade, weight, size: for surface, intermediate and
production casing.
Details of the surface-casing bowl.
Details of casing design and sour service suitability of the casing grades. If
grades other than L-80 are proposed, details on chemistry specifications must be
reviewed and documented.
Casing design for horizontally drilled wells must also address the additional
stresses and loads.
Blowout Prevention Equipment (see 1.5 Blowout Preventer Stack, 1.6 Choke Manifold, 1.7
Mud Gas Separators)
BOP stack configuration used and its pressure rating.
If blind shear rams were not planned, the reasons must be included.
Choke manifold configuration and pressure rating.
The number of mud-gas separators planned. If only one mud-gas separator was
planned, include the reasons.
Drill String (see 1.8 Drill String Design and Metallurgy)
There should be a summary of the grade, type (new/used), and class of drill
pipe.
If grade is other than sour service drill pipe as defined in IRP 1.8 Drill String
Design and Metallurgy, include:
o
A discussion of sour-service suitability.
Drill pipe design of both the grade planned and Grade E, including a
comparison of overpull tensile margins at the surface or other design factors
affecting the choice of grade.
The H2S exposure control plan (see 1.10 Drilling Fluids, 1.8.5 Exposure
Control)
Drilling Fluids (see 1.10 Drilling Fluids)
January 2008
25
Provide a summary of the type, the density, the pH level, the amount of weight
material on site.
If the system will be pretreated with an H2S scavenger, and the type of
additional drilling fluid that will be kept on site.
Kick Detection (see 1.11 Kick Detection)
Provide a summary of the kick detection and monitoring equipment that will be
used.
Wellsite Safety (see 1.12 Wellsite Safety)
Provide a summary of the wellsite safety equipment and procedures that will be
used.
Inspection and Equipment Testing Procedures (see 1.14 Practices)
Provide a description of the inspection and testing procedures designed to
ensure that all equipment is fully operational prior to the well reaching the
critical depth and procedures to ensure that a state of readiness is maintained.
Wellsite Personnel (see 1.13 Wellsite Personnel)
Provide a description of the wellsite personnel and their qualifications.
Practices (see 1.14 Practices)
Provide a discussion of any special practices, for example:
o
Tripping
Coring
Directional surveys
Blowout Insurance
Provide a statement that the company (including working interest owners) is
self-insured, or other proof of insurance must be filed and available for audit.
Companies licensing a critical sour well must either be self-insured to cover the
costs of a blowout or must obtain significant liability insurance.
Insurance amounts depend on the well depth and must include provision for
pollution and seepage, evacuation expense, underground blowout, and
care/custody, and control.
In addition, if the well is a "joint venture," the company must either hold
insurance for 100 % of the working interest, or have a copy of insurance policies
for the interest of each partner.
26
January 2008
Wellbore Diagram
The information compiled in the project plan should be summarized on a
Wellbore Diagram, including:
o
Geological setting, formation expected
H2S Release Rates
Hole problems
Casing design
Formation pressure or equivalent mud density or formation pressure gradient
A copy of the Wellbore Diagram should be reviewed with rig crews and posted in
the doghouse (see 1.14 Practices).
Copies
Prior to drilling any critical well, copies of the plan must be:
o
on site during drilling operations;
filed (one copy) with the appropriate governmental field office (as required) for
use during a site inspection; and available for audit of the application for well
license, or filed with the well license application if the application is to be heard
at a public hearing.
1.3.4.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
1.3.4.1.
IRP Emergency Response Plan
A site specific Emergency Response Plan must be developed for each critical sour well. This
plan must be approved by the appropriate governmental agency responsible for public
safety.
Emergency Response Plan Overview
As a minimum, and while recognizing that any applicable regulations must be adhered to
and any uniqueness in those regulations taken into account, the Alberta ERCB Directive 71
Emergency Preparedness and Response Requirements for the Petroleum Industry should be
used as a standard for developing an ERP for drilling a critical sour well.
Each plan must consider site-specific circumstances. Variations in the plans can be expected
based on factors such as the geological prognosis of the well, population density and
distribution, and the consequences of a blowout.
Public input from local residents, municipal administrators and first responders is an integral
part of preparing an effective emergency response plan. In some instances it may be
necessary to hold public meetings to obtain this input.
The appropriate jurisdictional agency approving the ERP addresses specific requirements for
emergency planning zone (EPZ), public consultation, etc.
January 2008
27
Emergency Planning Zone

The appropriate emergency planning zone (EPZ) must be carefully selected and must be
adequate to ensure the safety of the public near the well.
The size and shape of the zone must reflect the maximum drilling H2S release rate but must
also have regard for the local terrain, density of population in the area, and access and
egress routes through the EPZ.
Consult the appropriate jurisdictional agency approving the ERP for specific requirements.
Emergency Response Plan Contents
(The contents listed below are basic contents only, and there needs to be a reference to the
minimum standard for provisional of detailed plan content.)
1)
Summary
This section is a summary of the key facts about the proposed well and the
emergency response plan, and should be consistent with any information found
in the respective resident information package.
2)
Emergency Definition and Action

This section describes the various circumstances that could lead to a sour gas
release and the intended response.
It defines the various stages of an emergency and describes the action for each
stage.
In addition, it describes the responsibility of company, agency and response
personnel involved in any stage of the emergency.
Other considerations for action planning include prioritization of response and
after the emergency recovery procedures.
This section would also describe the emergency organization and incident
management system to be used.
3)
Public Protection Measures
Evacuation Procedures
This section defines the criteria to be used to initiate an evacuation and
describes how the evacuation would be carried out.
Details respecting the air quality monitoring program and communication
procedures are also addressed.
For critical sour wells where the emergency planning zone includes all or a
portion of a densely populated area such as an acreage development or an
urban centre, additional stationary andmobile air quality monitoring units are
required during the drilling of the potential sour zones.
28
January 2008
Shelter in Place
This section defines the criteria to be used when sheltering indoors is a viable
public protection measure, instead of or along with evacuation of the public.
Shelter in place instructions need to be included in the ERP.
Ignition Criteria
This section defines the ignition criteria and circumstances leading to the
deliberate ignition of the well.
There must be clear and specific plans in place to ignite an uncontrolled flow of
sour gas, consistent with the ignition criteria, which needs to take into account
unevacuated public, H2S concentrations, effectiveness of monitoring and any
lack of control over the release.
4)
Resident Information Package

This section includes a copy of the Resident Information Package that is to be
provided to residents within the emergency planning zone.
The package provides a brief summary of the proposed well and operator, a
summary of evacuation and ignition procedures, emergency telephone numbers
and a description of the hazards of H2S and sulphur dioxide.
5)
Contact Information
This section provides a listing of the residents, company personnel, affected
agencies and response organizations and suppliers that would be contacted in
the event of a sour gas release.
6)
Maps
This section includes the maps necessary to show:
7)
the selected emergency planning zone and the surface developments, roads,
topographical features and any other criteria established by the jurisdictional
legislation, within the zone
other zones to be included on the map are:

o
emergency awareness zone
immediate hazard and response zones
Copies
A copy of the approved emergency response plan must be on site during drilling
operations, prior to drilling out the surface casing, and during all completion or
servicing operations of designated critical sour wells.
Copies of the approved emergency response plan must be sent to the
appropriate jurisdictional agencies and response providers as noted in the
jurisdictional legislation and as agreed to by the affected parties.
January 2008
29
8)
Appendices
Each plan should include all relevant information that could possibly be required
to prepare for, and respond to, a sour gas emergency. Items to consider are:
glossary of terms
ERP application documents
information on H2S exposure
emergency level designation criteria
evacuation criteria
shelter in place criteria and instructions
ignition criteria
communication and notification requirements
any necessary forms required to be used during an emergency event
1.3.5.
WELL TYPES
General
These recommended practices allow some flexibility based on the following three criteria:
complexity of the well (geology and well design);
the potential impact to the public (magnitude of the H2S release rate and proximity
to public); and
the simplicity or difficulty of evacuation (number of affected public and evacuation

issues)
Depending on the combination of these criteria, certain options may be used:
The options are discussed in the appropriate IRP section
The options must be discussed in the project plan
The options concern, for example:
Casing setting depth (see 1.4.20 Intermediate Casing Setting Depth)
Shear Blind Rams (see 1.5.3 Shear Blind Rams)
Mud-Gas Separators (see 1.7.2.1 IRP Mud Gas Separator General Requirements)
Low Complexity Well

A well is considered low complexity if it is in a known area with no drilling problems, based
on the geological prognosis of the proposed well:
30
The well must be in a known and established field area that offsets existing
development.
January 2008
A summary of offset wells confirms that no significant lost circulation problems or

other adverse drilling conditions are expected.
A summary of drill stem test pressures, mud densities, or other information verifies
normal formation pressures are expected.
Typically this would mean a development well may be a low complexity well, while an
exploration well would not.
A low complexity well would have less uncertainty and therefore would have lower risk of a
problem due to well conditions.
Low Impact Well
A well would have low potential impact to the public if it has a low H2S release rate and/or
is not in close proximity to public:
The maximum potential H2S release rate is less than 3 m3/s
The calculated EPZ does not intersect an urban centre,
Simple ERP Well

A well would have a simple ERP if it would be relatively easy to evacuate the EPZ:
The calculated EPZ encompasses less than 10 occupied dwellings.
There is no communication, evacuation route, terrain, or weather issues.
January 2008
31
1.4.
CASING DESIGN AND METALLURGY
1.4.1.
SCOPE
Casing Design
Basic casing design (burst, collapse, and tension) should follow the appropriate regulatory
requirements.
An additional design factor is included for burst design to ensure the casing would not come
close to its specified minimum yield stress (SMYS) and thus be more susceptible to Sulphide
Stress Cracking (SSC).
Recommended practice for intermediate casing is also provided.
Casing Metallurgy
Intermediate and production casing must be suitable for sour service.
Specific casing grades are specified based on API grades with additional chemistry and
testing requirements. This essentially means that the manufacturer will need to provide
proprietary grades of casing and couplings.
Adherence to this IRP should ensure that casing and couplings with adequate resistance to:
Sulphide Stress Cracking (SSC),
Hydrogen-Induced Cracking (HIC), and
Stress-Oriented Hydrogen-Induced Cracking (SOHIC)
(under normal stressing and environmental exposure situations).
Other grades of casing may be used provided they are approved by a qualified technical
expert adequately familiar with the metallurgical and testing requirements for sour service
casing and couplings in order to avoid the identified environmental degradation mechanisms
(SSC, HIC and SOHIC).
This IRP is applicable to carbon and low alloy steel casing and coupling grades. It does not
address corrosion or the use of corrosion-resistant alloys. Corrosion and its control by
chemical additives or by other means, and the specification of corrosion-resistant alloys, are
outside the scope of this IRP.
1.4.2.
CASING DESIGN: GENERAL
General
The following casing design recommended practices apply to the last casing string set prior
to the well becoming critical (typically intermediate, but possible surface casing) and
production casing.
They apply to both new casing and existing casing in re-entry wells. For a re-entry well, a
casing wear evaluation must be conducted and the design checked against these
recommendations.
January 2008
33
All applicable intermediate and production casing must meet the metallurgical specifications
in this IRP.
Note
As of January, 2002, IRP 1.4.5.1 IRP Casing Burst Design is being

reviewed for possible inclusion of alternate casing design criteria.
1.4.3.
CASING COLLAPSE DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS
1.4.3.1.
IRP Collapse Design
No internal pressure.
For re-entry wells, the assessment is required from:

o
surface to 150 m below the confirmed cement top or,
surface to 1,000 m.
whichever is the greater.
Collapse resistance is reduced by tensile load in accordance with the latest edition of
API Bull 5C3, Formulas and Calculations for Casing, Tubing, Drill Pipe and Line Pipe
Properties.
The ERCB publication Directive 015:Effect of Tensile Loading on Casing Collapse and
equations in API Bull 5C3 may be used to determine the collapse resistance.
The design check should be based on an external fluid gradient of the original mud
density prior to running the casing. Approval may be granted for less (minimum 10
kPa/m) provided the actual fluid gradient does not exceed design gradient.
Collapse strength is based on remaining wall thickness.
Safety Factor = 1.0
1.4.4.
CASING TENSION DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS
1.4.4.1.
IRP Casing Tension Design
34
Buoyant effect is neglected.
For re-entry wells, the assessment is required only from:

o
surface to 150 m below the confirmed cement top
surface to 1,000 m
whichever is the greater.
Yield strength of the casing wall is used if this is less than joint strength.
Tensile strength is adjusted to remaining wall thickness.
Safety Factor: New = 1.6
Safety Factor: Re-entry = 1.2
January 2008
The safety factor has been reduced from 1.6 to 1.2 since an existing casing
will not experience running or cementing loads anticipated in the original
design.
1.4.5.
CASING BURST DESIGN SPECIFICATION
1.4.5.1.
IRP Casing Burst Design
Production Casing Internal Pressure = 85% of original maximum producing formation

pressure or, if for a re-entry well, with the review and approval by a qualified technical
expert, 85% of current maximum producing formation pressure.
The 85 % factor is based on the data in Figure 1.4.4.1 Wellhead vs. Bottomhole
Pressure.
This data shows that for all normally pressured wells, the wellhead pressure is less
than 85 % of bottomhole pressure.
The four wells above the 85 % line represent shallow, highly overpressured
reservoirs which would not be applicable for Critical Sour wells.
Intermediate Casing Internal Pressure = the same as for the production casing = 85% of
maximum producing formation pressure.
Internal pressure is free to act over the full length of casing string.
No allowance is made for external pressure.
For re-entry wells, the burst rating of the casing = (1 - accuracy of wall thickness log) x
2(Specified Minimum Yield Strength) x (current wall thickness / casing O. D.)
Safety Factor = 1.25
For Critical Sour Wells, the safety factor has been increased from the standard 1 to
1.25.
This will ensure that even under maximum load the casing would be at less than
80% of its burst rating and so would not come close to its specified minimum yield
stress.
The lower stress load would greatly reduce the susceptibility to Sulphide Stress
Cracking (SSC).
A lower safety factor may be considered, provided that:

o
In addition to meeting the NACE TM0177-96 Method D (double cantilever

beam specimen) sulphide stress cracking test requirements in this document,
the casing material must also be tested using Method A (uniaxial tension
specimen) at a stress level at least 10 % higher than the intended loading
levels.
For example, if the safety factor is only 1.15, then the required test stress
level must be 1/1.15 + 10 %, or in this case, 96 % SMYS.
January 2008
35
Furthermore, for safety factors in burst less than 1.25, sulphide stress crack
testing must be conducted on every heat of Grade L80 Type 1, in addition to
Grade C90 Type 1 and T95 Type 1.
Figure 1.4.4 Wellhead vs. Bottomhole Pressure
Prepared by Bruce Slevinsky 11/4/97
0.95
Wellhead / Bottomhole Pressure Ratio

0.9
0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55
0.5
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
Mean Well Depth (m)
BHP gradient > 10.4 kPa/m
1.4.6.
BHP gradient < 10.4 kPa/m
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION MECHANISMS
Sour gas contains hydrogen sulphide (H2S) and carbon dioxide (CO2) at various partial
pressures and ratios.
These gases make any aqueous environment present acidic and potentially corrosive. In
addition, the presence of hydrogen sulphide may make the casing and coupling materials
susceptible to environmental embrittlement mechanisms.
This IRP addresses three environmental degradation mechanisms that may be active when
the casing and couplings are exposed to sour gas:
36
Sulphide Stress Cracking (SSC), which may be active in all casing and coupling
grades listed.
Hydrogen-Induced Cracking (HIC), which may be active in J55 and K55,

manufactured by either the seamless or the electric resistance welding process.
Quenched and tempered microstructures typically have high resistance to HIC.
Tensile stress is not necessary for the initiation and growth of HIC.
January 2008
Stress-Oriented Hydrogen-Induced Cracking (SOHIC), which also may be active in

J55 and K55 manufactured by either the seamless or the electric resistance welding
process.
Quenched and tempered microstructures typically have high resistance to SOHIC. SOHIC
appears to be a combination of HIC and SSC.
SSC may occur very quickly (minutes to hours) upon exposure of susceptible casing and
couplings to sour gas, depending on the level of tensile stress (residual and operating), the
temperature, acidity (pH) of the aqueous environment, partial pressure of H2S, and the
inherent resistance of the material. SOHIC and HIC are more time- dependent mechanisms,
though failure by SOHIC may occur within two days in highly susceptible material.
1.4.7.
CASING AND COUPLING GRADES
API Grades
This IRP refers to grades of casing and couplings referenced in the American Petroleum
Institutes Specification for Casing and Tubing, API 5CT Sixth Edition, October 1998,
Effective Date: April 15 1999.
Note
1.4.7.1.
As of January, 2002 IRP 1.4.6 is being reviewed for the possible

inclusion of Grade 110 casing
IRP Sour Service Casing Grades
Intermediate and production casing must be suitable for sour service.

The following grades listed in API 5CT are intended for sour gas exposure and are suitable
for use in critical sour gas wells at any temperature, provided that the additional
requirements identified in this IRP have been applied:
J55 and K55 (seamless or electric resistance-welded)
L80 Type 1 (seamless or electric resistance-welded)
C90 Type 1 (seamless)
T95 Type 1 (seamless)
1.4.8.
IRP HIGH TEMPERATURE SOUR SERVICE CASING GRADES
The following non-sour service-rated grades are suitable for use in critical sour gas wells
provided that their operating temperature remains forever above the minimum stated (per
NACE International Standard MR0175 latest edition, Material Requirements Sulfide
Stress Cracking Resistant Metallic Materials for Oilfield Equipment):
Proprietary seamless, quenched and tempered grades with 758 MPa (110 ksi)
maximum yield strength: 65 oC and above.
P110 (seamless process only, maximum permitted sulphur 0.010 %, maximum

permitted phosphorus 0.020 %): 80 oC and above.
Proprietary seamless, quenched and tempered grades to 965 MPa (140 ksi)
maximum yield strength: 80 oC and above.
January 2008
37
Q125 Type 1 (Cr-Mo chemistry, seamless process, quenched and tempered, 1,034
MPa (150 ksi) maximum yield strength only): 107 oC and above.
Operating temperature should be determined; the following should be considered:
An open-hole temperature log run is suggested across the uppermost proposed

location of the non - sour service rated casing.
Due to potential cooling associated with gas production, those casing joints at and
below the production packer should be sour service-rated grades.
The presence of underground aquifers and their potential effect on the temperature
of the casing and couplings shall be taken into account when specifying non-sour
service-rated casing and couplings.
1.4.9.
ADDITIONAL CASING SPECIFICATIONS
1.4.9.1.
IRP Additional Casing Specifications
The requirements identified below must be applied in addition to those of specification of

API 5CT
This IRP is intended to supplement the requirements of API 5CT. In all cases, API 5CT is the
basic specification to which the following enhancements are recommended.
Casing Chemical Composition Specifications
Casing and couplings made from steel meeting the minimum chemical composition
requirements of each grade listed in API 5CT and this IRP will not necessarily have adequate
resistance to sulphide stress cracking when used in critical sour gas wells.
The following product analysis chemical composition requirements shall be specified for
critical sour gas well casing and couplings (by grade, maximum or permitted range, in
weight %):
38
January 2008
Table: 1.4.7.1 Chemical Composition Requirements

Element
J55
L80
C90
T95
and K55
Type 1
Type 1
Type 1
Maximum OR Permitted Range, In Weight %

Carbon
Manganese
Silicon
Phosphorus
Sulfur
0.35
0.32
0.32
0.301
1.40
1.202
1.00
0.75
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.020
0.020
0.015
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.010
0.005
1.30
0.25 1.20
0.60 1.20
0.65
0.15 0.75
0.30 1.00
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.15
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.15
0.040
0.040
0.040
0.040
0.0.35
0.040
0.040
0.010 0.040
0.050
0.050
0.050
0.040
0.040
0.040
0.040
0.0025
0.0025
0.0025
0.0025
Chromium
Molybdenum
Copper
Nickel
Aluminum
Niobium
Vanadium
Titanium
Boron
The chemical composition specifications recommended in this IRP have been developed with
consideration to both proprietary specifications and mill capabilities. In all cases,
improvements to API 5CT as described above are within current mill capabilities, are within
1 Carbon may be increased to 0.35% maximum and Phosphorus may be increased to 0.015% maximum if the molybdenum is 0.50% minimum.
2 Manganese may be increased to 1.40% maximum if the sulfur is 0.005% maximum.
3 Not normally added to this grade
January 2008
39
economic limits and provide a significant increase in the performance of these tubulars in a
critical sour gas well environment.
Elements not listed in the above table may not be added without the prior written consent
of the qualified technical expert.
Manufacturers proprietary grades meeting the above chemical manufacturers propriety
grades meeting the above chemical composition requirements must also meet all other API
5CT requirements for the equivalent grade. Casing joints shall be dual-marked with the API
grade in addition to the manufacturers proprietary name.
The chemical composition requirements for electric resistance-welded ERW K55 may need to
be more restrictive than specified above to ensure resistance to HIC and SOHIC.
Typically, lower levels of C, Mn, P and S than the maxima specified in the table are
required to impart resistance to HIC and to SOHIC.
In addition, calcium treatment may be necessary to eliminate elongated Type II

manganese sulphide inclusions. These inclusions have been associated with HIC
development.
ERW J55 and K55 requires HIC (IRP 1.4.15 J55 and K55 Casing: HIC Test
Requirements) testing.
Hardenability Requirements
There are no hardenability requirements for Grade J55 and K55 casing and couplings.
Hardenability tests shall be conducted on Grade L80 Type 1 casing and couplings to meet
the requirements of API 5CT for Grade C90 Type 1 and Grade T95 Type 1 casing and
couplings.
The frequency of hardenability tests for Grade L80 Type 1 shall be per API 5CT for Grades
C90 Type 1 and T95 Type 1.
There shall be a minimum of 90 % as-quenched martensite in Grade L80 Type 1 per API
5CT for Grades C90 Type 1 and T95 Type 1.
Mechanical Property Requirements
Mechanical property requirements shall be per API 5CT.
Hardness Requirements
The following hardness restrictions are recommended for the sour service-rated grades
identified in this IRP.
Casing and coupling manufacturing specifications should stipulate that testing be performed
on the final product to confirm that these restrictions are met.
Testing shall be performed in accordance with API 5CT.
A hardness value is the average of three hardness readings or impressions per the API 5CT
definition.
40
January 2008
Table: 1.4.7.2 Hardness Requirements

J55
and
K55
L80
Type
C90
Type
1
T95
Type
22.0 HRC
23.0 HRC
25.4 HRC
25.4 HRC
22.0 HRC
22.0 HRC
25.0 HRC
25.0 HRC
1/100 pipes
or per heat6
1/100 pipes
or per heat7
Alternate
ends of
every pipe
Alternate
ends of
every pipe
1/50 pipes or
per heat8
1/50 or per
heat9
Both ends of
every pipe
Both ends of
every pipe
Hardness reading
(max)
Hardness value
(max)
Frequency
casing (one
quadrant)
Frequency
couplings (four
quadrants)
Hardness variation for all the above grades shall be per API 5CT for grades C90 Type 1 and
T95 Type 1.
Grain Size Requirements
There are no grain size requirements for Grade J55 and K55 casing and couplings.
Grain size determinations shall be conducted on Grade L80 Type 1 casing and couplings to
meet the requirements of API 5CT for Grade C90 Type 1 and Grade T95 Type 1 casing and
couplings.
The prior austenite grain size of Grades L80 Type 1, C90 Type 1 and T95 Type 1 casing and
couplings shall be 7 or finer.
The frequency and method of grain size determinations shall be per API 5CT.
Impact Toughness Testing Requirements
Impact toughness testing shall be per API 5CT. The temperature for impact toughness
testing shall be room temperature.
6 Whichever is more frequent

January 2008
41
1.4.10.
SULPHIDE STRESS CRACKING SSC TEST REQUIREMENTS
The following outlines the SSC testing requirements.

Testing of all casing and couplings (IRP 1.4.11 NACE Testing Protocols).
Pre-qualification of the manufacturer (IRP 1.4.13 Manufacturer Pre Qualification) and

subsequent testing of selected casing and couplings.
1.4.11.
NACE TESTING PROTOCOLS
1.4.11.1.
IRP NACE Testing Protocols
Four static-loaded SSC test methods have been standardized by NACE International in
Standard Test Method TM0177-96, Laboratory Testing of Metals for Resistance to Specific
Forms of Environmental Cracking in H2S Environments. The four test methods are:
Method A NACE Standard (Uniaxial) Tensile Test
Method B NACE Standard (Three-Point) Bent-Beam Test
Method C NACE Standard C-Ring Test, and
Method D NACE Standard Double-Cantilever-Beam (DCB) Test
Two test solutions (A and B) may be used with methods A, C and D:
Test Method B has its own unique solution.
Test Solution A is the original NACE environment.
Test Solution A is as aggressive as the most sour environment expected to be encountered

in sour gas production, though may not be as aggressive as some acidizing environments if
they have been contaminated with H2S.
SSC testing of casing and couplings for critical sour gas service shall be performed in
Solution A.
The principal stress on the casing is in the hoop (circumferential) direction, however the
most commonly used SSC test Method (A) applies stress in the longitudinal direction.
The material properties in the longitudinal direction might not be representative of those in
the hoop direction. Both Methods C and D more closely simulate the stress situation in
casing.
Method C (C-Ring) specimens are typically not used to test casing because of the practical
difficulties encountered when handling large specimens. However, the C-ring specimen is
ideal for testing the weld areas of electric resistance-welded J55 and K55 and electric
resistance-welded L80 Type 1 (if necessary) casing for resistance to SOHIC.
Method D (DCB) specimens do not have this size limitation, and are becoming more
frequently used for the qualification of higher strength casing and couplings for critical sour
service. The Method D test technique is not suitable for testing J55 and K55 casing because
of the difficulty in initiating sulphide stress crack growth in this low strength material.
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January 2008
1.4.12.
SULPHIDE STRESS CRACKING SSC TEST PROCEDURES AND

ACCEPTANCE REQUIREMENTS
1.4.12.1.
IRP Test Procedures and Acceptance Criteria
It is the responsibility of the purchaser / user to qualify the SSC test laboratory, (i.e., to
confirm that they are capable of performing the SSC test method(s) correctly.)
Specimens shall be taken from material as close as possible to the internal surface of the
casing or coupling.
The following procedures and acceptance criteria must be followed:
Seamless J55 and K55 Casing and Couplings
Testing shall be conducted in accordance with TM0177-96 Method A in the Solution A
environment.
Standard size specimens shall be used. At least three specimens of each sample shall be
tested to confirm the threshold stress.
Pass criteria are no failure and no visual observation of surface cracks per TM0177-96.
Metallography shall be conducted to determine whether cracks on the gauge length are
environmentally induced.
The acceptance criteria shall be a threshold stress of 80 % SMYS minimum.
Electric Resistance-Welded ERW K55 Casing
The parent material shall be tested per the requirements and acceptance criteria for
seamless K55 casing and couplings.
In addition, the weld area shall be tested in accordance with TM0177-96 Method C in the
Solution A environment.
The weld shall be located at the apex of the Method C specimen. At least three specimens of
each sample shall be tested to confirm the threshold stress.
Metallography shall be conducted to determine whether cracks on the Method C specimen
surface were environmentally induced.
The acceptance criteria shall be a threshold stress of 80 % SMYS minimum.
L80 Type 1, C90 Type 1
T95 Type 1 Casing and Couplings
Testing shall be conducted in accordance with TM0177-96 Method D in the Solution A
environment.
Standard size specimens shall be used if wall thickness permits.
Sufficient specimens of each sample shall be tested to provide a minimum of three valid test
results.
January 2008
43
Specimens of L80 Type 1 and C90 Type 1 shall be fatigue-precracked. Specimens of T95
type 1 need not be fatigue-precracked.
After sufficient fatigue crack growth has occurred, the peak load shall be reduced by 35 %,
and fatigue precracking shall continue for a further 20,000 cycles to sharpen the crack tip
and avoid plastic deformation of material immediately ahead of the crack.
Specimen side arm displacements shall be in the middle of the ranges for each grade
specified in TM0177-96.
Both parent material and weld area material of electric resistance-welded L80 Type 1 casing
shall be tested. The DCB specimens of the weld area material shall be machined so that the
weld is located at the bottom of the specimen side grooves.
Acceptance criteria shall be as follows for all grades and for both parent and weld area
material:
Standard size (B = 9.53 mm) specimens: An average K1SSC value of 33.0 MPam
minimum, and a single specimen K1SSC value of 29.7 MPam minimum.
Subsize specimens: If casing or coupling size prevents the use of standard size specimens,
subsize specimens shall be used. The manufacturer and the purchaser/user shall agree
upon the acceptance criteria for subsize specimens. It is common practice to decrease the
average and single specimen acceptance criteria for standard size specimens by 15 % for
subsize (B = 6.35 mm) specimens, but the validity of doing this has not yet been
substantiated through the application of fracture mechanics theory.
Test Frequency
Test frequency for all grades shall be one sample (i.e., one set of specimens) per heat per
casing or coupling size per heat treat lot, unless the manufacturer is pre-qualified.
If the manufacturer is pre-qualified (see 1.4.13 Manufacturer Pre Qualification and 1.4.14
J55 And K55 & Electric Resistance Welded ERW L80), subsequent testing of J55 and K55
or L80 Type 1 casing and couplings is optional.
Sample Selection
Test samples shall be obtained from material with the highest yield strength, as determined
by the mandatory mechanical properties testing.
In the event that one or more samples have similar yield strength, the sample with the
highest hardness values shall be selected for testing.
Additional SSC Testing for Secondary Longitudinal Stress
If the casing will be used in an application which results in an axial stress which is 50 %
SMYS (based on tube cross-sectional area), the purchaser / user shall require that quality
assurance SSC testing be conducted in accordance with TM0177-96 Method A in the
Solution A environment.
Test frequency for all grades shall be one sample (i.e., one set of specimens) per heat per
casing or coupling size per heat treat lot, unless the manufacturer is pre-qualified.
Standard size specimens shall be used.
44
January 2008
At least three specimens of each sample shall be tested to confirm the threshold stress.
Metallography shall be conducted to determine whether cracks on the gauge length were
environmentally induced.
The acceptance criterion for J55 and K55 casing and couplings shall be a threshold stress of
80 % SMYS minimum.
The acceptance criterion for L80 Type 1, C90 Type 1 and T95 Type 1 shall be a threshold
stress of 90 % SMYS minimum.
1.4.13.
MANUFACTURER PRE QUALIFICATION
1.4.13.1.
IRP Manufacturer Pre Qualification
The manufacturer shall be pre-qualified to supply casing and couplings by providing to the
purchaser/user sufficient and persuasive SSC test data to satisfy the purchaser/user those
materials with adequate resistance can be routinely and consistently provided.
Manufacturer pre-qualification may be accomplished through the provision to the
purchaser/user of appropriate archival SSC test data, or by successfully completing an
appropriate laboratory SSC test program.
The SSC test program outlined above (IRP 1.4.12 Sulfide Stress Cracking SSC Test
Procedures and Acceptance Requirements) on selected samples is required for the prequalification of casing and couplings intended for use in critical sour gas wells:
Sample Requirements
At least three different heats of casing and three different heats of coupling stock (or
individual couplings) shall be/shall have been tested as per IRP 1.4.12 Sulfide Stress
Cracking SSC Test Procedures and Acceptance Requirements
The samples of casing and couplings tested shall have been produced in exactly the same
manufacturing route as will be used for the materials for the critical sour gas well. In
particular, the chemical compositions and heat treatment procedures shall be identical
(within stated manufacturing tolerances).
The samples of casing and couplings tested shall have diameters and wall thicknesses
comparable with those that will be used in the critical sour well. The wall thicknesses of at
least two of the three samples shall not be less than that of the casing or couplings to be
used in the critical sour well.
1.4.14.
J55 AND K55 AND ELECTRIC RESISTANCE WELDED ERW L80
1.4.14.1.
J55 and K55 and ERW L80 Type 1 Casing: SOHIC Testing
NACE International has not standardized a test method for SOHIC in tubular goods.
However, both NACE Methods A and C are capable of determining the susceptibility of
tubular goods to SOHIC. The resistance to SOHIC of J55 and K55 casing and couplings will
be determined when SSC tests are conducted in accordance with Clause 1.4.10 of this IRP.
The SOHIC and SSC test acceptance criteria are identical.
January 2008
45
SOHIC is of particular concern in normalized and normalized and tempered materials, (i.e.,
seamless and electric resistance-welded J55 and K55.)
SOHIC is less of a concern in materials given a quench and temper heat treatment.
If the use of electric resistance-welded L80 Type 1 casing is planned, a qualified technical
expert shall determine whether testing for resistance to SOHIC is necessary.
1.4.15.
J55 AND K55 CASING: HIC TEST REQUIREMENTS
1.4.15.1.
IRP J55 and K55 Casing: HIC Testing Requirements
The following outlines the HIC testing requirements for J55 and K55 casing and couplings.
1.
Testing of all casing and couplings as outlined below.
2.
Pre-qualification of the manufacturer and subsequent testing of selected casing and
couplings at the discretion of the purchaser/user. The protocol used for manufacturer prequalification (for acceptable SSC resistance) given in clause 1.4.11.1, and the same testing
procedure and acceptance criteria as outlined below shall be followed.
HIC testing is not required on a heat by heat (order) basis if the manufacturer has
been pre-qualified.
HIC tests shall be conducted in accordance with NACE International Standard Test Method
TM0284-96, Evaluation of Pipeline and Pressure Vessel Steels for Resistance to HydrogenInduced Cracking for J55 and K55 casing and couplings.
Test frequency shall be one sample (i.e., one set of specimens) per heat, per casing size,
per heat treat lot.
The samples of casing and coupling shall be tested in the same manner as required for
seamless and electric resistance-welded linepipe.
Test environment shall be Solution A. It is mandatory to continuously bubble H2S through
the test solution for the duration of the test (after the initial saturation period) at the same
rate as specified in TM0177-96 Method A.
It is mandatory to lightly etch the metallographic cross-sections of the tested specimens
before examination for the presence of HIC damage.
Acceptance criteria shall be a sample average Crack Length Ratio (CLR) of 5.0 % maximum
and a sample average Crack Thickness Ratio (CTR) of 1.5 % maximum. The sample average
CLR and CTR are the average CLRs and CTRs of all nine cross-sections (three cross-sections
of each of three specimens). In addition, no single cross-section shall have a CLR which
exceeds 25 % or a CTR which exceeds 10 %.
46
January 2008
1.4.16.
ELECTRIC RESISTANCE WELDED (ERW) CASING
1.4.16.1.
IRP ERW Casing: Pressure Test Requirements
All ERW casing must be hydro-tested to 100 % burst rating prior to manufacturer's
inspection.
1.4.17.
CASING IDENTIFICATION
1.4.17.1.
IRP Casing Identification
These materials shall be dual marked with the API monogram and the manufacturers
proprietary grade identification/name.
1.4.18.
INSPECTION
1.4.18.1.
IRP Inspection of New, Compliant Casing
The following inspections are required for the detection of defects in casing and coupling
stock (per API 5CT):
Table: 1.4.16.1
J55
Casing
and K55
L80
Type 1
C90
Type 1
T95
Type 1
SR1 is acceptable
SR2 is recommended
SR2
SR2
SR2
SR14
SR14
SR14
SR14
Coupling stock
Special end area (SEA) inspection is required on every pipe length unless the manufacturer
crops the pipe ends not covered by the automated pipe body inspection equipment.
Visual and magnetic particle inspection (MPI) of both the internal and external surfaces of
the pipe ends for the presence of transverse and longitudinal defects shall be conducted.
The SEA inspection shall overlap the automated pipe body inspection by a minimum of 50
mm.
Exposed threads shall be visually inspected for damage. Consult API RP 5A5, Field
Inspection of New Casing, Tubing and Plain end Drill Pipe, Section 4.4, for details of the
required inspection.
1.4.18.2.
IRP Non Compliant Casing: Testing and Inspection

Requirements
New casing and couplings not originally made in conformance with this specification are
acceptable provided they pass the following inspection and testing requirements:
The casing and couplings shall be tested to confirm resistance to SSC, SOHIC and HIC per
the requirements in this IRP. This requirement applies to J55 and K55 and L80 Type 1 as
well as to C90 type 1 and T95 Type 1.
Special End Area inspection (SEA) shall be conducted on every joint of casing.
January 2008
47
For grades J55 and K55 and L80 type 1, random surface hardness tests shall be conducted
on one pipe in fifty and on all couplings (unless mill hardness testing records are
available).Hardness tests shall be conducted on both pipe ends.
Hardness readings greater than 22.0 HRC shall be cause for rejection of the Grade J55 and
K55 pipe or coupling, and for increased testing frequency of the remaining pipe.
Hardness readings greater than 23.0 HRC shall be cause for rejection or prove-up of the
grade L80 type 1 pipe or coupling, and for an increased testing frequency of the remaining
pipe. If any single hardness reading exceeds 23.0 HRC, two additional readings shall be
taken in the same area to prove-up the pipe or coupling. The average of all the readings
shall not exceed 22.0 HRC for the pipe or the coupling to be acceptable. The testing
frequency shall be increased to every pipe.
Every joint must be traceable back to mill certificates documenting yield and tensile
strength and chemistry at least.
Use of new, non-compliant grades C90 Type 1 and T95 Type 1 casing and couplings is not
recommended.
Note
1.4.19.
Clause 1.4.19.2 is only intended to cover new pipe manufactured

and purchased before the publishing date of this IRP (i.e., existing
inventory).
INTERMEDIATE CASING
IRP General
Intermediate casing must meet the design specifications as outlined in this IRP.
1.4.20.
INTERMEDIATE CASING SETTING DEPTH
1.4.20.1.
IRP Intermediate Casing: Setting Depth
Intermediate casing shall be set at a point before the cumulative release rate becomes
critical.
Note
1.4.20.2.
ERCB regulations require intermediate casing be set at 3600m, or

ERCB approval is required for a variance.
IRP Intermediate Casing: Exemption
Intermediate casing may not be required depending on the combination of the well type
criteria described in 1.3.5 Well Types:
Low Complexity well
Low Impact well, and/or
Simple ERP well.
This exemption must be approved by the appropriate regulatory agency and information
outlined in 1.3.5 Well Types included in the project plan.
If the exemption from setting intermediate casing is approved, the wellbore integrity,
including the casing and open hole sections, must be evaluated by an open-hole integrity
48
January 2008
test prior to penetrating the critical zone and must be found capable of holding anticipated
formation pressures before continuing to drill without intermediate casing.
If the exemption from setting intermediate casing is approved, the surface casing grade
must be suitable for sour service, (i.e., meet the specifications of this IRP).
If the exemption from setting intermediate casing is approved, kick tolerance calculations
must demonstrate the ability of the surface casing and formation leak-off at the casing
shoe, to handle a 3-cubic-metre gas kick.
1.4.21.
RE ENTRY WELLS: GENERAL
1.4.21.1.
IRP Re Entry Wells: General
Re-Entry well casing must meet the design specifications as outlined in this IRP.
A casing inspection log must be run and the casing design ratings must be calculated based
on this data.
Specific documentation of suitable metallurgy or evidence of sulphide stress cracking
resistance is required in order to qualify a casing which would not currently be considered
sour service.
Note
For a well to meet the specifications of this IRP, its age is likely to
be less than 15 years old.
Metallurgy can be verified with mill certification or sample and testing of the top joint of a
verified homogeneous string of casing.
The suitability of the existing casing's metallurgy must be reviewed and approved by a
qualified technical expert.
The casing must be pressure tested to 67 % of current formation pressure prior to drilling
into the critical sour zone.
January 2008
49
1.5.
BLOWOUT PREVENTER STACK
1.5.1.
SCOPE
The equipment considered includes all equipment which forms an integral part of the BOP
stack, equipment directly attached to the stack (from below the rotary table to the casing
bowl) and all BOP control systems.
Design Considerations
In selection of preferred BOP stack arrangements, it is necessary to accept the fact that
equipment can fail, and to design a redundant system to reduce the effect of a failure. The
design should take into account the probabilities of a given component failing and the
probabilities of a given situation occurring.
The safety of the on site personnel is the most important factor in any design.
1.5.2.
BOP STACK CONFIGURATION
1.5.2.1.
IRP Configuration
Minimum stack components shall consist of an annular preventer, two spools and three
rams.
An acceptable exception is that for maximum projected depths less than 1800 m, then
flanged side outlets on the lower ram preventer may be substituted for the lower drilling
spool.
The configuration of the BOP stack shall conform to Figures 1.5.1.1, 1.5.1.2, 1.5.1.3 and
1.5.1.4.
Configuration 3, Figure 1.5.1.3 should only be used where sufficient surface/intermediate
casing is in place to contain maximum anticipated reservoir pressure because the closing of
the lower pipe ram will result in the inability to bleed off pressure from the wellbore.
Otherwise, the configurations 1 or 2 should be used.
1.5.2.2.
IRP Pipe Ram Sizes
The pipe rams should be the correct size for the drill string used.
For drill strings with 2 pipe sizes, the top pipe ram should be sized for the larger pipe size.
The lower pipe ram should be a variable bore ram sized for both pipe sizes. The top rams
could also be variable bore.
If any rams are changed (e.g., casing rams) they must be pressure tested.
January 2008
51
Figure: 1.5.1.1 BOP Stack Configuration 1
52
January 2008
To further improve the benefits of this configuration, a ram blanking tool (Figure 4) could be
used when the drill string is out of the hole to allow the top ram to perform the function of a
blind ram.
January 2008
53
To further improve the benefits of this configuration, a ram blanking tool (Figure 1.5.1.4)
could be used when the drill string is out of the hole to allow the top ram to perform the
function of a blind ram.
54
January 2008
Figure: 1.5.1.4 BOP Ram Blanking Tool
To further improve the benefits of this configuration, a ram blanking tool (Figure 4) could be
used when the drill string is out of the hole to allow the top ram to perform the function of a
blind ram.
1.5.3.
SHEAR BLIND RAMS
Shear Blind Rams (SBRs) would replace the blind rams in the BOP stack.
They are designed to close and seal the open hole as normal blind rams.
They are also designed to cut (shear) drillpipe, tools, wireline, etc., and allow the objects to
drop out of the way of the rams, and then seal the open hole.
January 2008
55
They would only be used if other well control equipment has failed, likely in the following
circumstances:
Inside blowout & leak in surface equipment
Pipe rams & annular leak
Out of hole (used as blind rams)
Shear blind rams provide a last chance opportunity to regain control of a well and therefore
could prevent ignition (see 1.3.4 Emergency Response Plann).
However, if inadvertently or prematurely activated, that action could significantly hamper
well control operations since once the drillpipe is sheared, the primary well control capability
(i.e., circulation of weighted fluid) may not be immediately available.
1.5.3.1.
IRP Shear Blind Ram Use Requirements
Shear blind rams must be used for any critical sour well where:
the calculated emergency planning zone size intersects the boundaries of an urban
centre, or
the calculated emergency planning zone encompasses more than 100 occupied
dwellings.
Shear Blind Rams should be used for most other critical sour wells unless the well is a low
complexity, low impact and/or simple ERP well (see 1.3.5 Planning). The evaluation of the
well should be based on the balance of these three components.
Whenever blind shear rams are not installed, the operator should evaluate running a drill
string float / internal BOP (see 1.8.10 Downhole Floats).
1.5.3.2.
IRP Shear Blind Ram Design Requirements
Sour Service: All SBR components including the shearing member(s) and internal bolting
should meet the material standards as outlined in IRP 1.5.6 BOP Metallic Materials for Sour
Service and 1.5.7 NonMetallic Materials Requirements for Sour Service.
BOP Stack Configuration: SBR's replace the conventional blind ram in the preferred
configurations (see 1.5.2 BOP Stack Configuration). There are no technical or operational
advantages to having the SBR as an addition to the stack components illustrated. The SBR
performs the same function as the blind ram when the drill string is out of the hole, and
with similar reliability.
Casing design and setting depth should be reviewed to ensure the well can be effectively
shut in (see 1.4.20 Intermediate Casing Setting Depth).
1.5.4.
BOP STACK AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT
Choke Line Usage

The choke line is the flow line off the BOP stack used to control the flow during the kill
operation.
56
January 2008
The top choke line should be used as the primary line and the bottom choke line should only
be used as a back up system to control the flow in the well during a kill operation.
The bottom secondary spool should only be used as an emergency line to control the
pressure during a component failure when the top primary spool is inoperative. Unless
absolutely necessary, this bottom secondary spool is not to be used to kill the well. Instead,
the failure should be repaired and kill procedure resumed.
Wing Valves vs. Drilling Spool
Wing valves on the casing bowl or on the intermediate spool should not be considered
acceptable substitutes for a drilling spool.
HCR Valve Position
The position of the HCR valve should be at the contractor's and operator's discretion. The
configurations outlined in 1.5.2 BOP Stack Configuration are recommended arrangements.
Special cases are always discussed when deciding whether the HCR valve should be located
inside the manual valve. The inside location of the HCR offers advantages under special
circumstances. Since the distance between the stack and HCR is shortened, the potential for
plugging and freezing is reduced. This advantage becomes more important when high
viscosity weighted drilling fluids are being used and in the case where mud rheological
properties are affected by an H2S influx. Alternatively, the outside position enables workers
to isolate the well when servicing the HCR valve.
Handwheels
For manually locking rams, handwheels should be provided for each ram in a readily
accessible location.
When using variable bore rams, check the manufacturers specifications closely. Some
systems will not lock in two positions.
Drilling Through Equipment
Equipment items addressed include:
Rotary tables
Flow nipples
Automatic pipe wiping devices
Rotary drilling heads
The concern with auxiliary equipment installed above the annular preventer top and rig floor
base is the potential interference with non routine well control situations (i.e., installation of
snubbing units) where access to the topmost pressure rated flange on the annular through
the rotary table is required.
All drilling through equipment above the top flange of the annular preventer should be
designed and constructed to allow emergency access to that flange, i.e.:
Be removed with the drill pipe still in place (split in two or stripped over the drill
pipe)
January 2008
57
Open to a sufficient size to permit the installation of additional well control

equipment (i.e., an adapter / spacer spool of the same pressure rating as the BOP
stack) on top of the BOP stack.
Typical rotary table sizes may restrict the BOP stack which can be used, for example, if a
346 mm x 34,000 kPa BOP stack is used, a 699 mm rotary table would be required unless
the rotary can be split or stripped over drill pipe.
1.5.5.
BOP MECHANICAL SPECIFICATIONS: PRESSURE RATING AND CASING

BOWLS
1.5.5.1.
IRP Pressure Rating
The pressure rating of a BOP stack is equal to the API pressure rating of the weakest stack
component. BOP stack components are casing bowls, valves, preventers, and flanges or any
other equipment directly attached to the stack / casing bowl that would experience stack
pressure (i.e., surface casing if intermediate casing is not required).
Required pressure ratings as per the appropriate regulations.
1.5.5.2.
IRP Casing Bowls
Welded casing bowls shall be welded in accordance with an acceptable welding procedure
developed from API Spec 6A, Specification for Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment,
NACE MR-0175 and Section IX of ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
Threaded casing bowls shall be manufactured in accordance with API Spec 6A, the make-up
procedures and torque in accordance with API RP 5C1, Care and Use of Casing and
Tubing, and the thread compound used in accordance with 5A3 Thread Compounds for
Casing, Tubing, and Line Pipe ,
Casing bowl outlets should be flanged for service on wells that have stack pressure ratings
of 21,000 kPa or greater as per API RP 53, Recommended Practice for Blowout Prevention
Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells.
1.5.6.
BOP METALLIC MATERIALS FOR SOUR SERVICE
1.5.6.1.
IRP Metallic Material Requirements
Applies to all pressure-containing components within the BOP stack, with the potential to be
exposed to H2S gas, inclusive of:
attached valves
pressure gauges and sensors
choke lines through to the outside valves of the choke manifold
All such components shall be constructed of materials that meet the standards of the
National Association of Corrosion Engineering Standard (NACE) MR-0175.
Sour Service Identification: Components should be marked in a manner that shows their
suitability, under NACE MR-0175, for sour service. Identification stamping procedures as
detailed in NACE MR 01 75 5.4 should be followed.
58
January 2008
1.5.6.2.
IRP Bolting Requirements
External bolt selection should be carefully considered relative to the potential for H2S
contact.
Subcomponents not normally exposed to hydrogen sulphide, such as external studs and
nuts, are not required to meet NACE MR 0175 material standards (Note: API RP 53 does not
permit this exception).
Specific rig configuration should be considered with respect to BOP ventilation, coverings,
etc. to determine if, in fact, the studs and nuts could be exposed to H2S.
With respect to external bolt selection, three options exist:
Use of ASTM B7 & L7, which do not meet the sour service material requirements of
NACE MR 01 756, but provides full API pressure rating, but results in SSCC
susceptibility.
Use of ASTM B7M & L7M, which meet the sour service material requirements of NACE
MR 01 756 bolting provides SSCC resistance, but may require pressure derating of
the BOP stack in some sizes (API 6). Identification and control of bolting during rig
moves require special attention.
Use of high strength, high alloy bolting, (such as ASTM 453 Grade 660), stamped A 2
or equivalent, is the third option. These bolting materials are SSCC resistant and of
strength comparable to B7 bolting. Costs of these bolts are up 25 times that of B7
bolting. Identification and control of bolting during rig moves require special
attention.
1.5.7.
NONMETALLIC MATERIALS REQUIREMENTS FOR SOUR SERVICE
1.5.7.1.
IRP Non-Metallic Material Requirements for Sour Wells
Applies to the number of BOP Stack subcomponents which are constructed of non metallic
components, including:
annular preventer and ram rubbers
bonnet or door seals
packing for BOP secondary seals.
Non metallic materials for sour service should conform to API RP 53, 9.A.8.
As elastomer technology continues to evolve, consultation with the original equipment
supplier as to the most suitable elastomers is recommended. Elastomers tend to be less
tolerant than metallic materials due to the range of drilling environments encountered.
Detailed fluid properties and the range of operating conditions expected at the well should
be addressed in the elastomer / drilling fluid selection process.
January 2008
59
1.5.8.
BOP TRANSPORTATION, RIGGING UP AND MAINTENANCE
Cold Work
During transportation, rigging up and maintenance of BOP stacks, operating practices
should be used which avoid cold work, and hence hardening of equipment components.
Any hammering action which could deform the stack component material should be avoided.
Replacement Parts
Material control for replacement parts for the B0P stack should have specifications and
quality control equivalent to the original equipment.
Bolt Torque
Bolt up torque should be kept within the recommended range.
Component Marking
The marking of components with die stamps except where permitted by API 6A, Section
VIII, should be avoided.
Welding
Welding of brace supports to BOP materials is not recommended.
Where welding is required for component fabrication, the weldment and the heat affected
zone of the welded components should possess essentially the same chemical and physical
properties as the parent metals of the subcomponents. These include hardness properties
and impact properties where appropriate. The weldment is also required to be free of linear
defects, such as cracks, undercutting and lack of fusion.
Further details are contained in IRP 1.9 Welding.
1.5.9.
1.5.8 BOP CONTROL SYSTEMS
1.5.9.1.
1.5.8.1 IRP Hydraulic Pump Requirements
Two separate sources of hydraulic pressure should be provided to recharge the

accumulators.
For low complexity, low impact, and simple ERP wells, one source can be considered.
The nitrogen reserve system is not considered the second source of hydraulic pressure.
The pumps should have a working pressure equal to that of the accumulator system (API RP
53 5.A.11).
One of these units should start automatically when the accumulator pressure drops below
90% of its operating pressure (API RP 53 S.A.12).
The preferred combination of hydraulic power sources is one electric and one air powered.
Alternative power sources as detailed in API RP 53 5.A.135 are acceptable.
One hydraulic power source should, without the accumulator, be capable of closing the
annular preventer on drill pipe, opening the HCR valve and obtaining 1400 kPa above the
accumulator precharge pressure within five minutes.
60
January 2008
1.5.9.2.
IRP BOP Master Control Station Location
The BOP master control shall be installed at a location remote from the rig floor.
The master control station should be located at ground level and remote from the rig floor,
a minimum 15 m from well centre.
Locating the master BOP control station adjacent to the accumulators, or at an alternate
ground level locations, desirable when drilling a critical sour well because this:
Provides an opportunity to activate the BOPs in event of a fire on the rig floor or in
the substructure.
Provides an opportunity to activate the BOPs in event of a mechanical failure or

interference with BOP control station on the rig floor.
Provides greater potential for successfully rigging up an auxiliary BOP control

system, specifically power and control lines, should the original systems be rendered
inoperative.
Provides individual control and return lines for each BOP element and HCR actuator.
1.5.9.3.
IRP Minimum Accumulator Sizing
The accumulator system shall be sized such that when charged to its operating pressure
and with the recharge pump off, there shall be sufficient volume to:
open the HCR
close the annular preventer on drill pipe
and close, open, and close one ram preventer
The final accumulator pressure shall not be less than 8400 kPa. In addition, the accumulator
must have sufficient volume to close the annular preventer on an open hole.
Where blind shear rams are run, the accumulator size must be increased, or a separate
accumulator system installed, to provide sufficient volume and pressure to shear drill pipe.
Accumulator System Recommendations
The hydraulic manifold should be equipped with a full opening valve and provision for tie in
of an auxiliary source of closing fluid (API RP 53 5.A.16a).
Provision should be made to isolate the accumulators and pumps from the BOP controls to
facilitate the tie in of an auxiliary hydraulic power source (API RP 53 5.A.16b).
Provision should be made for isolation of accumulator banks into at least two sections.
If shear rams are included, the accumulator must be equipped with a hi-low pressure
bypass valve to allow full accumulator pressure to the shear rams. This bypass valve must
be identified and its proper use included in the Shearing Procedures (see 1.14 Practices)
Hydraulic Fluid
The fluid used in the hydraulic system should have a minimum pour point of 500 C and
should be of a type approved by the BOP manufacturer.
January 2008
61
Nitrogen Reserve System

A nitrogen reserve system should be sized to:
open the HCR valve
and close both the annular preventer and one ram preventer
and maintain at least 1400 kPa over the manifold pre charge pressure.
Provision should be included to isolate the nitrogen supply from the accumulator system.
If shear rams are included, a separate nitrogen booster system should be capable of
meeting pressure and volume requirements to shear tubulars in use.
1.5.10.
BOP INSPECTION AND SERVICING REQUIREMENTS
1.5.10.1.
IRP Servicing Timing
All blowout preventer systems, including BOP valves and spools must be shop serviced and
shop tested every three years.
As a minimum, any time a BOP stack is subjected to an uncontrolled flow of reservoir fluids,
the stack should be shop serviced and tested prior to that stack going back into service.
After a "serious" kick or a well control operation of extended duration, shop servicing should
be carried out at the contractor's or operator's discretion.
Shop Servicing
A shop servicing of a BOP should include the minimum of:
Complete disassembly of the preventer including all mechanical and hydraulic

components.
Visual inspection of all sealing surfaces and repairs where necessary.
A record of all repairs done and parts repaired keeping in mind that the preventer is
similar to a pressure vessel.
All repairs and replacements shall meet the same requirement as the original
preventer (NACE MR 01 75 and API RP 5.)
1.5.10.2.
IRP Pressure Testing
A pressure test is to be done after reassembly.

Two pressure tests are required:
1.
a low pressure (1400 kPa)
2.
to the pressure rating of the BOP
The pressure test of all hydraulics is to be done in both the open and closed position, to a
minimum pressure of 10,500 kPa or manufacturer's specification.
All pressure tests are to be conducted for a minimum of 15 minutes.
During drilling, the BOP pressure testing frequency is outlined in 1.14.3.1 IRP BOP Pressure
Testing.
62
January 2008
Hardness Testing
Hardness testing is to be conducted on any welding repairs, as per IRP 1.9 Welding.
Documentation
A common BOP shop testing and shop servicing form, similar to Test Report, Figure 1.5.9.1,
should be completed by a qualified technical expert stating the date of the service test.
A certificate indicating the date at which it was last performed should be installed in a
prominent position in the dog house.
A copy of the complete inspection report should be kept on file by the drilling contractor.
January 2008
63
Figure: 1.5.9.1 Sample of Three Year Test Report
BOP
Working
Size
mm
Single
Double
Serial
Pressure
kPg
Triple
Number
Rig
Inspected By
Date
Ram
Ram
Location
Description
INSPECTION
B
O
D
Y
Door Screw
Holes
Seat
Condition
Skid
Condition
Seat-To-Skid
Height
mm
Bore
Condition
Ring Groove
Condition
Item
Wear
mm
Door Seal
Area: Left
Ram
Cavity
Side Pad
Condition
Side Pad
Condition mm
Bore
Diameter
Right
Wear
mm
Max Side
Wear
Stamp Code
Stamp Code
Left
Right
Holder
Condition
Mounting Slot
Cond.
Holder Height
R
A
M
S
64
Holder Width
Block Height
mm
Wear
mm
mm
Wear
mm
mm
Wear
mm
mm
Wear
mm
mm
Wear
mm
Wear
mm
mm
Block
Condition
Rubber
January 2008
D
O
O
R
S
H
I
N
G
Door Seal
Groove
Snap Ring
Groove
Ram Shaft
Seal Cavity
Cylinder Stud
Holes
Door Cap
Screws
Hinge Bore
(I.D.)
Hinge Bore
Condition
mm
Wear
mm
Wear
mm
mm
Wear
mm
Hinge
Hydraulic
Ports
Hinge
Manifold
Holes
E
B
R
A
C
K
E
T
Hinge Cap
Screws
Hinge Pin
(I.D.)
mm
mm
Wear
mm
Hinge Bore
Condition
Hinge Pin
Grooves
Hinge Pin
(O.D.)
A
N
D
P
I
Hinge Pin
Condition
Manifold
Upper Pipe
Manifold
Lower Pipe
January 2008
65
Cylinder Bore
Y
L
I
N
D
Wear
mm
Wear
mm
Wear
mm
mm
Wear
mm
mm
mm
Wear
mm
mm
mm
Wear
mm
Cylinder Bore
Condition
Head Hydraulic
Port
Head Cylinder
Groove
Head Seal
Groove
Studs and Nuts
mm
Locking Shaft
Bore
N
D
H
E
A
D
Piston (O.D.)
P
I
S
T
O
Piston O.D
Condition
Wear Ring
(O.D.) (1)
Wear Ring
Condition (1)
Seal Groove
(1)
66
January 2008
R
A
M
Threads
Threads Inside
Neck Condition
Foot End
(O.D.)
Foot End
Condition
mm
Wear
mm
mm
mm
Wear
mm
mm
Wear
mm
A
F
T
Threads
L
O
Shaft (O.D.)
C
K
Wear
mm
Shaft Condition
I
N
G
S
H
A
F
T
(1) Slim Line Only
January 2008
67
1.5.10.3.
Reference List
Alberta Government, ERCB, Oil and Gas Conservation Regulations 1986, ERCB, Calgary,
Alberta.
API, Specification for Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment, Nineteenth Edition, July
2004 Spec 6A, Dallas, Texas.
API, Care and Use of Casing and Tubing, Eighteenth Edition, May 1999 RP 5C1, Dallas,
Texas.
API, Recommended Practice Thread Compounds for Casing, Tubing, and Line Pipe, Second
Edition, July 2003 RP 5A3, Dallas, Texas.
API, Recommended Practice for Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling
Operations, Third Edition, March 1997 RP 53, Dallas, Texas.
NACE, Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries - Materials for Use in H2S-containing
Environments in Oil and Gas Production - Parts 1, 2 and 3, 2003 NACE MR0175/ISO 15156,
Houston, Texas
68
January 2008
1.6.
CHOKE MANIFOLD
1.6.1.
SCOPE
The equipment considered includes the choke manifold and choke / kill lines, including
metallurgy requirements.
Choke lines discussed in this document refer to the line between all BOP stack valves and
the choke manifold.
The kill line refers to the section between the mud pump manifold and the BOP stack valves.
Manifold location, housing, configuration, and auxiliary equipment are included with respect
to manifold requirements.
Choke / kill line and manifold metallurgy covers qualification of existing equipment, use of
flexible hose, fabrication and certification of new installations and documentation of qualified
manifolds.
1.6.2.
CHOKE MANIFOLD GENERAL
1.6.2.1.
IRP Choke Manifold Design Specifications
The manifold and piping shall provide complete redundancy from the BOP stack, through the
manifold, to the mud-gas separators, and finally to the flare pit.
Figure 1.6.1.1 outlines the recommended manifold layout.
Where only one mud-gas separator is being used, redundancy from the manifold to the
single mud-gas separator and from the mud-gas separator to the flare pit is not required.
Bleed Off Lines
A separate bleed-off line from each spool to a separate manifold wing (side) is required and
must be equipped with a separate casing pressure gauge.
Chokes
A remote, hydraulic operated, non-rubber sleeve choke is required on the primary manifold
wing (upper BOP spool) and a manual operated choke is required on the secondary manifold
wing (lower BOP spool).
Each choke should be capable of being routed through either wing of the control manifold.
Material Specifications
Equipment for manifold systems should conform to API Spec 6A.
All components and materials including valves, chokes, lines, and fittings should comply
with NACE MR 0175.
Lines and Fittings
Lines should be kept as straight as possible leading up to the preferred horizontal manifold
configuration.
January 2008
69
Fitting (tee and cross) and pipe materials should be consistent. Internal diameters of fittings
should be matched to pipe ID.
Welding
All welds should be 100% radiographed after being stress relieved, and documented as
described in IRP 1.9 Welding.
Winter Operations
For winter operations, the manifold and related piping should be filled with water-soluble
antifreeze which is compatible with the manifold components. Diesel is not recommended
for use as antifreeze since diesel / mud segregation may allow an accumulation of water
based fluids and line blockage.
Figure 1.6.1.1 Choke Manifold Layout
70
January 2008
1.6.3.
1.6.2 VALVES & CHOKES
1.6.3.1.
1.6.2.1 IRP Valve and Choke Specifications
Valve specifications should require full bore gate valves with an opening equal to or greater
than manifold piping ID.
Valve bodies and bonnets should be constructed of forged or cast API Type 2 material.
Valves with integral flanges are preferred and are to be compatible with piping flanges.
Valves should be furnished with secured hand wheels indicating the direction of valve
opening.
If appropriate, the preferred pressure side of valves which are designed for working
pressure should be clearly marked.
Adjustable choke specifications should identify the fully open and the fully closed position on
the choke body and on the actuator, if so equipped. Recommended choke body materials
include API Type 2 AISI 8720 or equivalent. Inlet and outlet flanges should meet or exceed
manifold pressure rating.
1.6.4.
FLANGES, RING GASKET AND BOLTING
1.6.4.1.
IRP Flanges, Ring Gaskets and Bolting Specifications
Flanges should be utilized throughout without interconnection of API and ANSI types.
Table 1.6.3.1 Recommended API Flange Choke/Kill LineCombinations should be utilized for
specifying API Pipe / Flange combinations.
R or RX rings should be used on API 6B flanges while BX rings should be used on API 6BX
flanges. Ring types BX 150 through BX 160 should not be reused. Suitable gasket materials
should be determined from API Spec 6A.
ASTM A193 Grade B7M or ASTM A32 Grade L7M studs are recommended on jacketed
flanges. Hardness should be limited to HRc 22 when utilizing Proprietary Grade B7X.
ASTM A194 Grade 2HM or 7M nuts are recommended on jacketed flanges. Hardness should
be limited to HRc 22 when utilizing proprietary Grade 2HX nuts.
January 2008
71
Table 1.6.3.1 Recommended API Flange Choke/Kill Line Combination

FLANGE
ERCB
BOP
Class
Type
API 68
Class II
Class III
API 68
API 68
API 68
Class IV
API 68
API 68
Class V
API 68
Class VI
API 68x
Material
API
4
API
4
API
4
API
4
API
4
API
4
API
4
API
2
Normal Size
(Include)
Actual Id
(mm)
Actual
OD
(mm)
Press
Rating
(mPa)
Type
2 1/16
52.50
60.5
13.8
Type
77.93
88.9
13.8
Type
2/16
52.50
60.5
13.8
Type
77.93
88.9
13.8
Type
2/16
49.25
60.5
20.7
Type
73.66
88.9
20.7
Type
66.65
88.9
34.5
Type
3 1/16
777.8
110.3
69.0
PIPE
Type &
Grade
Nominal
Pipe Size
(Inches)
Linear
Density
(KG/M)
Actual
ID
(mm)
Actual
OD
(mm)
Wall
Thk.
(mm)
(1) Min.
Wall
(mm)
(2)
Calc.
Press
Rating
(mPa)
AP1 X46
5.43
52.50
60.3
3.91
1.5
35.98
AP1 X46
11.28
77.93
88.9
5.48
2.2
34.25
AP1 X46
5.43
52.50
60.3
3.91
1.5
35.98
AP1 X46
11.28
77.93
88.9
5.48
2.2
34.98
AP1 X46
7.47
49.25
60.3
5.53
2.25
50.94
AP1 X46
15.25
73.66
88.9
7.62
3.31
47.57
21.32
66.7
88.9
11.12
7.25
6.35
52.84
60.39
3(3)
27.65
58.42
88.9
15.24
9.07
115.82
ASTM
A106
Schedule
160
Grade B
Grace C
AP1
Note
(1) Based on API burst formula and required pressure integrity,

assuming uniform wear.
(2) Based on API burst formula P=0.875 (2 Ys t)
D
72
January 2008
where Ys = Min. Material Yield

t = wall thk.
D = Nominal OD
(3) Requires weldneck flange transition piece to match flange
and pipe boxes
1.6.5.
FLEXIBLE STEEL HOSES
1.6.5.1.
IRP Flexible Steel Hose Specifications
Flexible steel hoses are an acceptable alternative to interconnect rigid steel lines to BOP
spool outlets or other rigid steel lines.
Full length flexible steel hoses or kill lines will be permitted, but are not universally
recommended because they may be subject to external damage and therefore, may not
provide the most desirable type of installation.
Pressure Integrity
Flexible hose assemblies should possess pressure integrity rating to working pressure for
any temperature from 900C down to -400C. This rating should always equal or exceed rating
of BOP stack.
Internal Diameter
Internal diameters of flexible hoses should be consistent throughout.
Flanges
Flanges compatible with BOP and choke manifold connections should be used for end
connectors.
January 2008
73
Material Specifications
Specifications should include demonstration of capability of a representative assembly to
withstand 25% H2S in water saturated methane at 90% for a minimum of 24 hours at rated
working pressure without leaking.
All metal components which may be exposed to sour fluid (including connectors) should
meet NACE MR 01 75.
The material used in the internal bore should exhibit a high degree of abrasion resistance.
In addition, the material should not be susceptible to degradation by exposure to any of the
following fluids:
fresh or salt water
#1 or #2 diesel fuel with aniline points over 60 0C
water based, oil based, or mineral oil based drilling fluids
sweet or sour gas or condensate
C02 or water glycol solutions
Anchoring & Bends

All flexible hoses should be supported and anchored in accordance with manufacturer's
recommendations.
Support and anchoring devices should not be allowed to produce localized bends.
Any bends should occur at a point remote from end fittings and should contain a bend
radius safely in excess of manufacturer's specified minimum.
Bends with radius 1.5 times greater than specified minimums are preferred.
Heat Tracing
Heat trace temperatures should be controlled when winterizing hoses to avoid thermal
degradation of non metallic flex hose components
IRP Flexible Steel Hose: Testing & Documentation
New hose assemblies should pass a hydrostatic test at 1.5 times the working pressure
rating for a minimum of five minutes. Manufacturer should be requested to verify successful
compliance with this test.
Used hose assemblies should be pressure tested at least every threeyears to 70% of new
hose test pressure for ten minutes using a low viscosity solids free fluid. For standard stack
and manifold pressure tests, the flexible hose should be pressure tested to the BOP stack
rating.
Suitable types of flexible hose should be demonstrated to be capable of withstanding 4500C
of direct flame exposure for a minimum of 15 minutes at 10.4 MPa applied pressure.
Pressure testing should coincide with frequency for shop servicing of BOPs (1.5.9). Special
attention should be paid to pressure testing when using flexible hose, due to the difficulty in
assessing the condition of the pipe wall through conventional inspection means.
74
January 2008
Note
Inspection of flexible hoses may not be straightforward since areas

subject to erosion are difficult to locate due to a variable bend
location from well to well. In addition, ultrasonic thickness testing
is somewhat meaningless for flexible hose. Consequently, special
attention should be paid to pressure testing of flexible hose to
determine integrity for continued service. Since field inspections
are difficult, the periodic shop inspections are considered quite
important to evaluate the detailed condition of flexible hose.
Permanent markings on the flexible hose assembly should be visible and include the
working, test and burst pressure ratings, manufacturer and date of manufacture, and
minimum bend radius.
1.6.6.
PRESSURE GAUGES
The manufacturer, style, and physical size of pressure gauges and sensors should be left to
the contractors / operators discretion.
1.6.6.1.
IRP Standpipe and Casing Pressure Gauges
Existing standpipe gauges can be utilized on critical wells providing they do not significantly
exceed the BOP or manifold rating.
Except in the cases of Classes I and II rigs, the capability to install a low pressure gauge
(7000 kPa) to supplement the standpipe gauge is recommended. This gauge should be
installed in parallel with the existing standpipe gauge and must be protected by a pressure
limiting device or a needle valve rated at least as high as the BOPs and manifold. Where
sensors are used to supply signals to the low pressure gauge, a diaphragm type is
preferred.
The capability to install a low pressure (7000 kPa) casing gauge to supplement the regular
casing pressure gauge is recommended.
This low pressure gauge when utilized should be installed in parallel and must be protected
by a pressure limiting device or a needle valve rated at least as high as the BOPs and
manifold. For greatest accuracy at low pressures, diaphragm sensors are preferred to supply
signal to the low pressure casing gauge.
The use of excessively higher casing pressure range gauges than required for the BOP
pressure rating is to be avoided. Examples of such ranges would be 70,000 or 105,000 kPa
gauges on 21,000 or 35,000 kPa manifolds.
Recommended casing pressure gauge range is approximately 125 % to 167 % of the
maximum pressure that may be encountered and at least 110 % of the BOP manifold
working pressure rating.
Compound mud gauges employing dual bourdon tubes are an acceptable alternative to dual
gauge installations.
These gauges present both low and high pressure ranges using independent indicators on a
single gauge face.
The low pressure gauge is protected by a built in pressure limiting device.
January 2008
75
Diaphragm sensors are preferred to supply signals to these gauges for increased accuracy
on the low pressure scale.
Compound gauges may be used either on the drill pipe or casing pressure side.
1.6.6.2.
1.6.5.2 IRP Choke Panel Pressure Gauges
Choke panel gauges with ranges excessively higher than the choke manifold rating are not
recommended.
Remote drill pipe pressure gauges should be readable from the choke location.
A remote operated choke is required on all critical sour wells. A remote casing pressure
gauge would then be available at or near the driller's console to maximize the information
while circulating out a kick.
A remote drill pipe pressure gauge should be installed or readily accessible at the choke
manifold for all BOP classes. As a minimum the line must be laid to the manifold. These
provisions are considered adequate for most applications.
Assuming there is a tie in for a low-pressure gauge, the need for a second high pressure
gauge should be left to the operators / contractors discretion on all wells.
Installation of gauges and sensors should be in a vertical or near vertical position to reduce
the chance of solids build up. Isolation valves should be utilized so that operations need not
be shut down in the event of a failure.
Casing pressure gauges should be checked monthly for proper operation by pressurizing the
choke line side of the sensor, when conducting a pressure integrity test through the choke
manifold or pressure testing a new casing string.
A function test of the casing gauge should be conducted prior to penetration of the critical
zone.
1.6.6.3.
IRP Pressure Sensor Maintenance and Testing
Maintenance of sensors should be conducted at least monthly and prior to penetration of the
critical zone.
In general, diaphragm sensors are favoured for lower pressure applications such as those
found on Class I to Class IV rigs. Similarly, piston sensors are generally favoured for higher
pressure applications such as Class IV to Class VI rigs.
Gauge calibration and testing should be conducted by means of cross checking during BOP
pressure tests. This can be done by comparison with reference gauges kept by the rig
supervisor or operator's representative, or by comparison with pressure test truck readings.
Errors exceeding +5% of actual test pressure on the high-pressure gauge will require gauge
replacement, unless the gauge is equipped with a manual adjustment feature and is still
operating within its acceptable adjustment range.
Diaphragm sensors exhibit excellent sensitivity and consistent performance although they
are relatively easy to damage. They must be inspected or replaced periodically to ensure
segregation of the drilling mud and gauge liquid, such as glycol, low temperature hydraulic
fluid, or instrumentation fluid. The diaphragm type sensors are not designed to withstand
76
January 2008
differential pressure and therefore may be subject to rupture if the gauge liquid chamber is
not completely filled.
Piston style sensors are considerably more rugged and less prone to catastrophic failure.
They do, however, exhibit somewhat jerky or stair step pressure build up especially after
piston or sleeve wear is significant. This irregular pressure build up is caused by a threshold
differential pressure required to overcome friction and may be only a few kPa to perhaps a
few hundred kPa.
The pressure on the gauge side of the sensor may be less than the true pressure by a value
approximated by the threshold friction pressure of the sensor. Piston friction may be
particularly evident when the drilling fluid is heavily solids laden.
Studies have also shown that piston sensors may yield higher than actual gauge readings
when the casing or drill pipe pressure is declining.
This hysteresis error as well as lower sensitivity is significant at the lower end of the
pressure range but is acceptable at higher pressures. Piston sensors are particularly suitable
for long hose runs (exceeding 15 m) or for applications where multiple gauges are driven by
one sensor.
Routine maintenance of sensors would be conducted approximately as follows:
Knock off the union from the mud side of the sensor,
inspect bladder or piston O rings and sleeve,
remove any solids accumulation,
replace the union, and
check for leaks.
1.6.7.
INITIAL CHOKE MANIFOLD CERTIFICATION AND DOCUMENTATION
1.6.7.1.
IRP Choke Manifold Certification and Documentation
Manifold documentation should be retained by the equipment owner and updated following
any changes or replacements.
Documentation should include component mill certificates with written confirmation
indicating compliance with NACE criteria. All welds should be 100% radiographed for initial
certification and documented.
Component mill certificates should be obtained for all new equipment for purposes of initial
certification. The following information should be supplied for each component:
name of manufacturer
date of manufacture
serial number
part numbers and lot numbers (to allow tracking to mill certification)
material grade
January 2008
77
chemistry
physical properties
actual hardness
heat treatment used
confirmation of compliance with NACE criteria
One flange of each component should be die stamped with a unique identifier. It is
recommended that the unique identifier be cross referenced via documentation to the
inspection company, year and month of inspection and component number.
All valves passing inspection should be tagged to indicate subsequent disassembly.
The assembled system should be pressure tested to rating using a low viscosity, solids free
liquid.
Component suitability, manifold assembly, pressure testing and identification should be
witnessed and approved by a certified inspection company.
A detailed manifold and piping schematic illustrating individual component parts and unique
identifier should be prepared.
Maintenance and repair of equipment should be conducted in accordance with
manufacturer's recommendations. All repairs, including weldments, should be certified by a
qualified inspection company and fully documented.
1.6.8.
CHOKE MANIFOLD SHOP SERVICING AND PRESSURE TESTING
1.6.8.1.
IRP Choke Manifold Shop Servicing
Regular shop servicing of BOP choke manifolds is not required if the manifold has been
properly maintained and regularly pressure tested.
However, after a serious kick or a well control operation of extended duration, the manifold
and related piping should be inspected and tested as follows:
The choke(s) and valves used in the well control operation should be disassembled
and the internals visually inspected. Any components, which show signs of damage
or serious wear, should be replaced. The reassembled choke and valves should be
pressure tested to meet or exceed original manufacturer's specifications.
Ultrasonic thickness testing of piping and related fittings should be considered with
special attention given to areas of change in piping direction. Any remaining wall
which will not meet the working pressure at the minimum yield strength should be
replaced.
If a manifold has not been in recent service, or the operational history of the manifold is
unknown, the a shop service and test should be done.
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January 2008
1.6.8.2.
IRP Choke Manifold Pressure Testing Procedures
The integrity of the BOP choke manifold and its related piping should be established by
hydrostatically pressure testing to full work rating.
A solids free, environmentally acceptable fluid should be used for pressure testing.
The manifold and all piping upstream of the choke should be pressure tested to manifold
working pressure rating. Each valve should be individually tested in both the open and
closed position, with the exception of the last valve in a series, which is only tested closed.
During drilling, the choke manifold pressure testing frequency is outlined in 1.14.3.3 IRP
Choke Manifold Pressure Testing.
January 2008
79
1.7.
MUD GAS SEPARATORS
1.7.1.
SCOPE
This IRP addresses the minimum mud-gas separator requirements for critical sour wells.
The technical specifications contained in this IRP are directed at providing adequate capacity
to handle kicks of considerable volume without exceeding the acceptable back pressure in
the vessel and while maintaining good mud gas separation efficiency.
Two types of mud-gas separators are addressed:
1.
Open bottom, atmospheric pressure mud gas separators
2.
Closed, pressurized mud gas separators
Inlet line and vent lines are also addressed.

Recommended materials, fabrication, installation, and maintenance guidelines are outlined.
Certification and documentation are also addressed.
The designs presented are best practices at time of writing, however, alternate designs are
acceptable provided they are thoroughly engineered and have been reviewed through some
type of hazard and operability review.
1.7.2.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
1.7.2.1.
IRP Mud Gas Separator General Requirements
Two mud-gas separation devices are required for the drilling of critical sour wells. However,
one mud-gas separator is acceptable upon approval from the appropriate regulatory agency
provided that the well is a low complexity, low impact and/or simple ERP well (see 1.3.5
Well Types). The evaluation of the well should be based on the balance of these three
components.
One device must be an atmospheric, open bottom, mud-gas separator and must conform to
the specifications detailed in Table 1.7.2.1.Open bottom mud gas separators are
recommended for critical sour drilling for their simplicity, lack of moving parts, and high
reliability.
Production interval history should be accessed to provide gas rates and liquid production
potential to determine mud system contamination possibilities. If the zone of interest is
known to produce hydrocarbon liquids or water, consideration should be given to using a
pressurized separator.
Each separator is to be fed independently with separate inlet lines from each wing of the
choke manifold. Choke and piping arrangement from the manifold shall allow independent
control of flow to each mud gas separator.
Each separator requires its own vent line run independently to the flare facility. (i.e., flare
stack, flare pit, incinerator).
January 2008
81
All materials used in vessels, inlet lines, and vent lines for mud-gas separators must be
suitable for sour service and have a maximum yield strength not exceeding 550
megapascals. Suitable materials are detailed in Table 1.7.2.2.
Mud-gas separator vent lines shall slope down towards the flare pit.
1.7.3.
OPEN BOTTOM MUD GAS SEPARATORS
1.7.3.1.
IRP Open Bottom Mud Gas Separator Specifications
The recommended configuration for atmospheric pressure Open Bottom Mud-Gas

Separators are given in Figure 1.7.2.1.
The vessel should be positioned in the first mud tank compartment downstream of the sand
trap or shale shaker. It should be installed away from tank corners and 0.5 m or more away
from tank walls. Such horizontal positioning is more important when using shallower
submersion depths such as 1 m. In all cases the vertical position should be such that the
base is 0.3 m or more above the mud tank floor. The vessel should be removable and the
compartment housing the vessel shall be equipped with a dump gate.
An alternate configuration would be to place the Open Bottom Mud-Gas Separator(s) in a
remote tank as described in IRP 1.7.6 Remote Open Bottom Mud-Gas Separators.
Dimensional specifications for atmospheric pressure Open Bottom Mud-Gas Separators are
given in Table 1.7.2.1.
Materials used for vessel body and head should have a maximum yield strength of no
greater than 550 MPa. Recommended materials and fittings are outlined in Table 1.7.2.2.
Spiral welded pipe should not be used for mud gas separator bodies.
Weldments on external fittings such as vessel inlet and outlet flanges should be reinforced
and stress relieved.
Wall thickness for open bottom mud gas separator vessels should be no less than 6 mm,
with considerably thicker walls preferred. Allowances for additional wall thickness for erosion
and corrosion should be considered.
Flat topped vessels are not recommended.
Increased wall thickness in the inlet area should be considered when tangential inlet nozzles
are utilized. The internal profile of the vessel head should smoothly direct separated gas
into the vent line.
Internal components should be properly designed and positioned to augment separation
efficiency. To facilitate removal and repairs, internal components subject to wear should not
be welded in place. If internal components are welded in place, the wall behind such
locations may be difficult to inspect for signs of corrosion.
The inspection opening (access hatch) should be sized and positioned to facilitate inspection
and refurbish of internal components. Vessel plate materials are suitable for fabrication of
inspection hatch. The inlet line flange doubling as an inspection opening is an acceptable
alternative. Figure 1.7.2.1 illustrates a suggested configuration for atmospheric open
bottom mud gas separators.
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January 2008
Tank fluid level (head) is to be maintained equal to or greater than fluid height
requirements as indicated in Table 1.7.2.1. The compartment housing the separator should
be checked frequently to avoid solids build up around the bottom of the vessel.
Figure 1.7.2.1 Open Bottom Mud Gas Separator; Suggested Configuration
(See Table 1.7.2.1 Open Bottom Mud Gas Separator; Dimensions)
January 2008
83
Table 1.7.2.1 Open Bottom Mud Gas Separator; Dimensions
(See Figure 1.7.2.1 Open Bottom Mud Gas Separator; Suggested Configuration)
Separator Configuration
letters refer to Figure 1.7.2.1
D
Separator Inside Diameter
See below
Vent Line Inside Diameter
See below
Liquid Level
Minimum height 1 m.
Vapour Space
LG
Liquid-Gas Disengagement
Space
Distance from top of the inlet line (inside the

separator) to the tangent line of the vessel head.
Minimum height 0.9 m.
Distance from bottom of the inlet line (inside the
separator) to the maximum Liquid Level.
Separator Placement in Mud Tank

B
Open Bottom Underflow
Distance to Tank Wall
Minimum 0.5 m.
Separator Internals
Impingement Plate: if used, it should be removable and made from an abrasion resistant
material. Do not weld the plate directly to the separator body.
Baffles: should be installed to augment separator efficiency.
Inside Diameter (D) & Vent Line (d) Specifications
Drilling Depth
Less Than
m
Minimum Vessel
Inside Diameter (D)
mm
Minimum Vent Line Inside Diameter (d)

mm
750
355.6
With 1 m of Liquid
Level (L)
101.7
With 2 m of Liquid
Level (L)
101.7
1800
609.6
152.4
127.0
2700
660.4
172.9
152.4
3600
762.4
203.2
152.4
5000+
914.4
254.0
203.3
Vessel diameter was determined using a vapor load constant(k) of 0.11 /s
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January 2008
Table 1.7.2.2 Open Bottom Mud Gas Separator Vessel and Vent Line Materials
Regular Materials
Plate:
Body and Piping
ASTM A516
Grade 65
ASTM A516
Grade 70
ASTM A106
Grade B
ASTM A53
Grade B
API 5L
Grade B
API 5L
Grade X42
CSA Z245.1
Grade 241
Category I
API H41, J55< K55

seamless casing
(if hardness tested)
Low Temperature
Materials
Plate:
ASTM A516
ASTM A516
Inlet Piping
ASTM A333
CSA Z245.1
Grade 65 c/w
Supplementary 5
Grade 70 c/w
Supplementary 5
Grade 6
Grade 241
Category II
1.7.4.
INLET LINES FOR MUD GAS SEPARATORS)
1.7.4.1.
IRP Inlet Lines for Mud Gas Separators (Both Atmospheric

and Pressure)
Since these lines may be exposed to physical and thermal shock, low temperature tough
rated materials are recommended. Table 1.7.2.2 outlines recommended materials and
fittings and illustrates grades rated low temperature tough.
Only seamless pipe is recommended for use as inlet lines.
Line diameter should be 25.4 mm (1") larger O.D. than the BOP choke line outside diameter
to limit maximum flow velocity to the mud-gas separator.
Inlet lines to the mud-gas separators should be accessible full length and it is recommended
no portion of the line be submerged in drilling mud or positioned between bulkheads. If the
line is submerged, it must be inspected for wall thickness (UT) and integrity prior to spud of
the critical sour well.
The line should also be kept as straight as possible with internal diameters and wall
thickness consistent throughout the assembly.
The section of the inlet line from the manifold to the mud tank should be securely staked or
weighted. It is important that the section running vertically adjacent to the mud tank wall
be well secured in place.
Bull-plugged or targeted tees should be used for changes in piping direction.
January 2008
85
Connections should be made using flanges or hammer unions. Material selection must be
compatible with design criteria and special attention must be placed on elastomer
components.
Welds should comply with IRP 1.9 Welding.
During winter, the line from the BOP stack to the mud-gas separator is to be filled with
environmentally acceptable glycol water solution, or an equivalent water-soluble product.
Diesel is not an acceptable alternative.
While the requirements for vent lines and vessels vary considerably for open bottom and
enclosed mud gas separators, most inlet line requirements and specifications are identical
and are outlined together in the recommended practices above.
For atmospheric pressure mud-gas separators, no valves or other mechanical restrictions
should be permitted in the line, although inline glycol recovery drainage ports are
acceptable providing they do not compromise system integrity or function.
For pressurized systems, valves or mechanical restrictions are permitted.
For pressurized systems, inlet line material selection will depend upon design condition
relating to required pressures and temperature expectations. ASME section B31.3 may be
used as a guideline to thickness requirements.
1.7.5.
VENT LINES FOR OPEN BOTTOM MUD GAS SEPARATORS
1.7.5.1.
IRP Vent Lines for Open Bottom Mud Gas Separators
Materials and fittings used in vent lines for open bottom mud gas separators should follow
the recommendations as shown in Table 1.7.2.2.
Vent line sizing for open bottom mud gas separators should follow the schedule depicted in
Table 1.7.2.1, with consideration to the fluid head level that is to be maintained. If desired
and available, vent line sizes halfway between those shown for 1 m and 2 m of fluid head
may be utilized in conjunction with 1.5 m of minimum fluid head.
Vent lines should slope down towards the flare pit and are to be securely staked or
weighted. The section running adjacent to the mud tank wall should be rigidly secured in
place.
Consideration should be given to wear and vibrational loading (fatigue) when vent lines are
constructed from thin walled pipe.
Radiused bend fittings are acceptable for changes in pipe direction; however, wall thickness
and internal diameters of lines and fittings should be consistent throughout the entire vent
line.
Each open bottom mud-gas separator is to have a separate vent line extending to the flare
pit.
Consideration should be given to the possibility of flashback and the potential ramifications
of flashback for each specific installation. Such concerns are most prevalent when the
largest vent line diameters are required and when low flow rates occur.
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January 2008
1.7.6.
REMOTE OPEN BOTTOM MUD GAS SEPARATORS
1.7.6.1.
IRP Remote Open Bottom Mud Gas Separators
Remote Open Bottom Mud-Gas Separators should be installed in a tank equipped with a
dump gate and should be positioned near the rig mud tanks.
Gravity mud return line must be adequately sized to handle the highest anticipated mud
return rate.
Figure 1.7.5.1 illustrates the suggested remote layout and sizing.
Figure 1.7.5.1 Open Bottom Mud Gas Separator: Remote Layout and Sizing
January 2008
87
1.7.7.
ENCLOSED MUDGAS SEPARATORS: DESIGN SPECIFICATIONS
1.7.7.1.
IRP Enclosed Mud Gas Separators: Design Specifications
An enclosed mud gas separator may be used in conjunction with an open bottom mud-gas
separator on critical wells.
Additional information for pressure vessels is available in IRP Volume 4 Well Testing and
Fluid Handling.
Wall thickness should be determined by the maximum internal operating pressure required.
The design pressure should be at least 1.1 times the maximum allowable working pressure
(MAWP) or 200 kPa, whichever is greater.
Standard pressure vessel stress calculations should be based upon ASME Section VIII Div.
1. A safety factor of 4.0 should be used for the maximum allowable stress value.
Joint efficiency values depend upon weld procedure and X-ray requirements must also be
considered. (100 % - 1.0, 90 % - partial, 80 % - no X-ray).
In addition, a minimum 3 mm should be added to design wall thickness for purposes of
corrosion allowance.
As with open bottom separators, minimum thickness allowable should be 6 mm.
Vessels for atmospheric separators should be sized for gas flow rates at 100 kPa absolute
pressure (0 kPa gauge pressure) at 15 0C.
Vessels for pressurized separators using constant internal vessel pressure should be sized
for gas flow rates at 80% of MAWP at 15 0C.
Vessels for pressurized separators using variable internal pressure should be sized for gas
flow rates at 80 % of MAWP at 15 0C.
The vapour space section between the inlet line and the vessel head tangent line should
have a minimum height of 0.9 m.
The gas liquid disengagement section between the inlet line and the maximum internal fluid
level should be at least 0.3 m.
The liquid section should consist of an active fluid zone between maximum and minimum
fluid level, a buffer zone between minimum level and mud outlet, and sump zone below the
mud outlet. Each of these three zones should be 0.3 m or more in height.
The mud outlet line should be capable of handling 1.5 m3/min of drilling fluid. A vortex
breaker may be desirable in certain cases.
1.7.8.
ENCLOSED MUDGAS SEPARATORS: REQUIRED COMPONENTS
1.7.8.1.
IRP Enclosed Mud Gas Separators: Required Components
A fluid level control device (with manual override for internal fluid level control and
independent fluid level indicator).
A mud outlet control valve with opening equal to mud outlet line diameter.
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January 2008
A mechanical control for atmospheric enclosed vessel or a pneumatic or electric control for
pressurized vessels.
A minimum 76 mm diameter full opening clean out valve for solids removal. The valve
should include position indicator and lock.
A reliable, easy to read, externally mounted, internal fluid level indicator is strongly
recommended.
An accurate pressure gauge mounted on the vessel vapour space.
A 101.7 mm diameter or larger relief line (such as 152.4 mm) must be run to the pit and
securely staked or weighted.
A quick opening inspection hatch should be installed according to UG 46 ASME Section VIII,
Division I.
The separator support structure should be designed to safely support vessel filled
completely with 2100 kg/m3 drilling fluid to the overflow fluid level.
1.7.9.
ENCLOSED MUD GAS SEPARATORS: FABRICATION AND OPERATING

GUIDELINES
1.7.9.1.
IRP Enclosed Mud Gas Separators: Fabrication and Operating

Guidelines
Vessels used in unheated areas should be fabricated from low temperatures tough rated
materials. Atmospheric enclosed vessels should be fabricated from materials listed in Table
1.7.2.2
Pressurized vessel materials will be required to meet ASME, Section VIII, Division I and
NACE MR 01 75 (latest revision). Welding on pressurized separators should meet the Alberta
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and shall be performed per ASME, Section IX, Division I.
Identification plates are required for pressure vessels by the local governing boiler
inspector. Atmospheric tanks should contain a nameplate similar to that required for
pressure vessels. Flow capability is generally not included on the nameplate of pressure
vessels.
Enclosed separators should be accompanied by an operation and maintenance manual,
which describes primary and manual operation, inspection, function testing and routine
maintenance. Installation should be included along with a system schematic.
Drilling fluid outlet from atmospheric vessels should be directed to the sand trap or shaker
box. Procedures for sour fluid returns have to be developed for each rig configuration.
Drilling fluid outlet pressurized mud gas separators should be directed to a secondary
degasser (such as a vacuum degasser) to remove residual entrained gas.
Secondary degassers should be sized to handle full mud return rate anticipated. Separated
gas must be directed away from the mud tank and work areas.
Fluid level control mechanisms should be function tested upon installation, when testing the
choke manifold and prior to penetration of any critical zones.
January 2008
89
After major kicks or kicks of extended duration, mud gas separator systems should be fully
inspected. Any repair or replacement should conform to original requirements and should be
documented by equipment owner.
1.7.10.
VENT LINES FOR ENCLOSED SEPARATORS
1.7.10.1.
IRP Vent Lines for Enclosed Separators
Materials and fittings used in vent lines for enclosed mud gas separators should follow the
recommendations as shown in Table 1.7.2.2
Each enclosed separator must have a separate vent line extending to the flare pit.
Consideration should be given to the possibility of flashback and the potential ramifications
of flashback for each specific installation, particularly at low flow rates.
Vent lines for both types of enclosed separators (atmospheric and pressurized) should be
sized to provide a maximum back pressure equivalent to 70 % of vessel MAWP assuming
isothermal flow at 15 0C. In no case should the vent line be less than 101 mm in diameter.
Pressurized separators which operate under constant internal pressure utilize a control valve
located in the vent line. This variety is not recommended.
1.7.11.
REFERENCE LIST
ASME, Pressure Vessels 1986, Section VIII, Division 1, New York, New York.
NACE, Sulfide Stress Cracking Resistant Metallic Materials for Oilfield Equipment, 1984
Editorial Revision, MR 01 75, Houston, Texas.
ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Qualification Standard for Welding and Braising
Procedures, July, 1986 Section IX, New York, New York.
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January 2008
1.8.
DRILL STRING DESIGN AND METALLURGY
1.8.1.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND DISCLAIMER
The Drill String Pipe Design and Metallurgy IRP's have been developed recognizing the need
for drill pipe integrity during both routine drilling conditions and those conditions which
could be encountered during well control operations.
Qualification of existing drill pipe is addressed as well as minimum specifications for new
SS75, SS95 and SS105 drill pipe tube and tool joints. Conventional inspection and
documentation guidelines for critical drilling are included.
It should be emphasized that these recommended practices should be periodically updated
with advances in technology. After such on going improvements in techniques and
technology are field proven, they should be incorporated into critical drilling programs to
further reduce the possibility of drill string failure.
The "drillstring" includes all the components below the Kelley Saver Sub to the Bottom Hole
Assembly (drill collars) including:
o
Pup Joints
Heavy Weight Drill Pipe
Stabbing Valves, Inside BOP, Kelly cock, Kelly saver subs
Drill collars and Bottom Hole Assembly are not included since:
o
These components are at the bottom of the drill string and so if they failed
during drilling, it would have little negative impact on well control capability.
During tripping, these components are not highly stressed and so would likely
not fail.
1.8.2.
DRILL PIPE GRADES
This IRP refers to several different grades of drill pipe based on their metallurgical
specification:
o
API Grade E75, X95, G105, S135
Hardness Tested (as specified in this IRP) API E, X, G (referred to HE, HX,
HG)
New sour service drill pipe (as specified in this IRP) SS75, SS95, SS105
January 2008
91
1.8.2.1.
IRP Drill Pipe Grade: Use Specifications
Standard AP1 grade pipe, unless hardness tested, should not be used for Critical Sour Wells.
The only exception would be for S135 (see IRP 1.8.2.2 IRP Drill Pipe Grade: Use Preference
2).
Hardness Tested HE, HX, HG may be used until January 1, 2010, but consideration should
be given to using SS grade pipe.
All new drill pipe manufactured (weld date) after January 1, 2002 and used on Critical Sour
Wells must meet SS pipe specifications.
1.8.2.2.
IRP Drill Pipe Grade: Use Preference
Grades HX and HG drill pipe should only be used if heavy wall premium Grade HE drill pipe
does not meet the minimum overpull criteria.
API Grade S-135 pipe may be used, but not unless absolutely necessary, when heavy wall
Grade HG is insufficient for the tensile or torque loading. Strict exposure control is
mandatory (since API Grade S 135 is highly susceptible to both H2S and chloride-induced
failure).
1.8.3.
DRILL STRING OVER PULL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Grades HX 95 and HG 105 should only be used if the over pull margin of heavy wall HE is
insufficient.
The final margin of over pull at surface should be somewhat higher than the margin at the
crossover between two grades or two weights.
Desirable over pull margins are in the order of 30,000 - 50,000 daN. Heavy wall Grade E
refers to 25.6 lb/ft (37.4 daN/m) and 20.0 lb/ft (29.2 daN/m) for the 5" (127 mm) and 4
(114.3 mm) sizes, respectively.
Heavy wall Grade SS 95 or SS105 is desirable for the uppermost section in even deeper
critical wells, when the tensile capability of regular weight Grade SS 95, SS105 or heavy
wall Grade SS 75 is insufficient.
Moving to a stronger grade or weight of drill pipe will usually be required based on
insufficient over pull tensile margin at surface, as opposed to insufficient torsion capability,
which may be the limiting factor in certain deep, deviated wells.
Tensile Calculations: For drill string design purposes it is acceptable, at the operator's
discretion, to utilize the force balance (i.e., pressure area) method of drill string design.
1.8.4.
DRILL PIPE CLASS / TENSILE RATING
1.8.4.1.
IRP Drill Pipe Class / Tensile Rating
Only premium class or better drill pipe is recommended for critical sour drilling. Premium
Tensile Ratings are as per API RP 7G.
Tensile ratings for drill pipe can be increased to New Drill Pipe rating, for drill pipe design, if
the pipe has been inspected for wear, and it is less than 10 % wall loss, as per API RP 7G.
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January 2008
However, in certain cases such as very shallow wells, engineering judgments with respect to
anticipated drill string torque, internal and external pressure requirements, and lack of pipe
wall defects may suggest acceptability of Class 2 drill pipe.
1.8.5.
EXPOSURE CONTROL
1.8.5.1.
IRP Exposure Control
Exposure control is recommended for all grades of drill pipe. When HX95, HG105 or S135
must be used, strict exposure control is mandatory.
Drill pipe exposure control is accomplished by several means.
o
The drilling fluid density is maintained sufficiently high so that only drilled gas
is permitted to enter the annulus.
The pH of the mud (in a water-based system) is maintained above 10.0 to

solubilize the sulphides.
Scavengers are employed to treat out H2S.
The system may be treated with inhibitors to coat the tubulars and provide
some protection against short term exposure to H2S.
1.8.6.
HARDNESS TESTED API GRADE DRILL PIPE SPECIFICATION
1.8.6.1.
IRP Hardness Tested Grade Drill Pipe Specification: HE, HX, HG
All API E, X and G drill pipe not manufactured to SS specification, and without previous
hardness documentation, must be evaluated for hardness level prior to initial use for critical
sour gas drilling.
Hardness testing must be redone after any significant re-work (e.g., baking after H2S
exposure or tool joint rebuild).
Hardness testing will conform to API RP 5A5 Subsection 4.5 with the following additional
requirements:
o
Direct reading Rockwell "C" (HRC) scale is required for the drill pipe.
Rockwell "C", Brinell, or Equotip devices satisfactory for the tool joints.
A total of nine impressions per joint required; three each at the box, pin and
mid tube. Hard banding, heat-affected zones and areas of cold working such
as slip and tong marks should be avoided.
Abnormally high readings should be confirmed with additional tests on the

prepared surface. Readings less than HRC 20 will not normally require
retesting.
Each joint passing the hardness criteria will be marked with a unique identifier, which avoids
duplication within a pipe owner's stock.
January 2008
93
Table 1.8.5 API Drill Pipe Hardness Maximum Hardness (Rockwell C) For HE, HX, and
HG Drill Pipe
API Grade
Box
Pin
Tube
HE 75
38
38
27
HX 95
38
38
30
HG 105
38
38
32
Documentation and Reports:

Hardness inspection reports will include the following details:
location, rig, and pipe owner
inspection company, date(s), and inspector
diameter, weight, grade, connection type, and pipe classification
test equipment
calibration details
surface preparation technique (light filing or sanding)
individual and average readings for pin, tube, and box for each joint
summary indicating total number of joints inspected, total rejected, and rejection
criteria
make and model

each occurrence
1.8.7.
SS GRADE DRILL PIPE TUBE SPECIFICATIONS
1.8.7.1.
IRP Specifications for SS Drill Pipe Tube
SS grade drill pipe tube must meet the following specifications.

Mill certification shall be obtained for all material criteria stipulated herein, including
hardness test results.
Inspection results and string refurbish should be documented and included with the drill
string service history.
Suitability for continued sour service should be based on the above criteria and other
pertinent factors at operator / contractor discretion.
1.8.7.2.
IRP Tensile Property Specifications for SS Drill Pipe Tube
Tensile properties for SS grade drill pipe tube shall meet the limits listed in Table 1.8.6.2 SS
Drill Pipe Tensile Properties.
Specified elongation shall be a minimum of 17 %.
Testing frequency should be one specimen per heat per heat treat lot, or every 200 tubes,
whichever is the more frequent.
94
January 2008
Table 1.8.6.2 SS Drill Pipe Tensile Properties Mpa / Ksi

SS75
SS95
SS105
517 / 75
655 / 95
655 / 95
758 / 110
724 / 105
827 / 120
655 / 95
793 / 115
724 / 105
896 / 130
793 / 115
965 / 140
Yield Strength
Ultimate Tensile
Strength
1.8.7.3.
IRP Hardness Specifications for SS Drill Pipe Tube
Hardness specifications for SS drill pipe tube shall meet the limits listed in Table 1.8.6.3 SS
Drill Pipe Hardness.
Hardness level is to be verified on a ring sample with 9 impressions in each of four
quadrants. Hardness Testing will conform to API 5CT latest edition Through Wall Hardness
Test figure and ASTM E 18 Standard Methods of Tests for Rockwell Hardness and Rockwell
Superficial Hardness of Metallic Materials.
Testing frequency should be one set per heat, per heat treat lot or every 200 tubes,
whichever is the more frequent
A minimum of one impression on each tube (Rockwell or Brinnel) is required.
Table 1.8.6.3 SS Drill Pipe Hardness Rockwell C (HRC)
Grade
Maximum
Average
1.8.7.4.
Single Point Reading

Maximum
Minimum
SS75
22.0
24.0
SS95
25.0
27.0
18.0
SS105
28.0
29.0
21.0
IRP Toughness Specifications for SS Drill Pipe Tube
Toughness specification for SS Grade tube shall require the minimum longitudinal Charpy
"V" notch impact, from a 34 size specimen at room temperature per ASTM E23 latest
edition, as listed in Table 1.8.6.4 SS Drill Pipe Toughness.
Testing frequency should be one set of three specimens per heat, per heat treat lot or every
200 tubes; whichever is the more frequent.
Table: SS Drill Pipe Toughness Minimum Single Value CHARPY V
January 2008
95
Table 1.8.6.4 SS Drill Pipe Toughness Minimum Single Valve Charpy V

Grade
1.8.7.5.
Minimum
Joules
Ft. Lbs.
SS75
70
50
SS95
80
59
SS105
80
59
IRP H2S Resistance Specifications for SS Drill Pipe Tube
SS drill pipe shall have a demonstrated minimum threshold of 85 % of the specified

minimum yield strength for 720 hours per NACE TM-01-77 (latest revision), Method A using
Test Solution A.
Testing frequency should be one specimen per heat, per heat treat lot, or every 200 tubes,
whichever is the more frequent.
If any heat has a failed specimen, two additional specimens from the same heat / heat treat
lot are required as a retest. If either fail, the heat is unacceptable.
1.8.7.6.
IRP Chemistry Specifications for SS Drill Pipe Tube
Recommended chemistry specifications for new SS tube should include the maximum and
minimum weight per cent limits as listed in Table 1.8.6.6 Recommended SS Drill Pipe
Chemistry.
For sulphur levels approaching the specified maximum, a manganese limit of 1.2 %
maximum is recommended to avoid reduced SSC resistance and material toughness.
Additional micro alloys or processing materials may be utilized at manufacturer's discretion.
Alternative chemistries may be acceptable, but they must be reviewed and approved by a
Table 1.8.6.6 Recommended SS Drill Pipe Chemistry Weight per Cent
SS75
1.8.7.7.
SS95
SS105
Min
Max
Min
Max
Min
Max
Carbon
0.38
0.25
0.35
0.25
0.35
Manganese
1.60
0.40
1.00
0.40
1.00
Chromium
0.90
1.30
0.90
1.30
Molybdenum
0.30
0.60
0.30
0.60
Sulphur
0.010
0.010
0.010
Phosphorous
0.015
0.015
0.015
IRP SS Drill Pipe Tube Transformation and Grain Size
Minimum transformation to martensite after quenching should be 90 % across the full wall
of the SS 95 and SS-105 drill pipe wall.
Grain size specification shall be six or finer per ASTM E112 (latest revision).
96
January 2008
1.8.7.8.
IRP Tube / Tool Joint Transition
The transition from the drill pipe ID to the standard upset ID should occur over a sufficient
length as to minimize drill pipe tube fatigue failures adjacent to the upset area.
This minimum transition should be approximately 76.2 mm (3") for standard wall thickness
drill pipe and commensurately longer for higher strength and weight pipe so that the taper
angle remains relatively unchanged.
1.8.7.9.
IRP Drill Pipe Identification
All drill pipe conforming to SS specifications must be marked with a unique identifier that is
visible from the driller's location.
A suggested method is shown in Figure 1.8.6.9 Suggested Drill Pipe Identification.
Figure 1.8.6.9 Figure: Suggested Drill Pipe Identification
1.8.8.
SS GRADE TOOL JOINT SPECIFICATION
1.8.8.1.
IRP Specifications for SS Tool Joints
Tool Joints used on all grades of SS tube must meet the following specifications; there is
only one grade of SS Tool Joint.
It is recommended that mill certification be obtained for all material criteria stipulated
herein, including hardness test results.
January 2008
97
Inspection results and string refurbish should be documented and included with the drill
string service history.
Suitability for continued sour service should be based on the above criteria and other
pertinent factors at operator / contractor discretion.
Note
1.8.8.2.
These specifications apply to all SS tool joints using API or nonAPI thread forms.
IRP Tensile Property Specifications for SS Tool Joints
Tensile properties for SS grade tool joints shall meet the limits listed in Table 1.8.7.2 SS
Tool Joint Tensile Properties
Specified elongation shall be a minimum of 15 %.
Specified reduction in area shall be a minimum of 35 %.
Testing frequency should be one specimen per heat per heat treat lot or every 200 tool joint
box/pin set, whichever is the more frequent.
Table 1.8.7.2 SS Tool Joint Tensile Properties Mpa/Ksi
Minimum
Maximum
758/110
862/125
862/125
1000/145
Yield Strength
Ultimate Strength Tensile
1.8.8.3.
IRP Dimensional and Torsion Specifications for SS Tool Joints
Tool joint design, API and non-API, must be evaluated for torsional requirements.
For API thread forms, in conjunction with reduced yield strength, the tool joint pin ID and/or
box OD should be modified to maintain tensile and, in particular, torsional strength, as listed
in Table 1.8.7.3 Recommended Tool Joint Dimensions And Resulting Strengths For Typical
Connections.
Table 1.8.7.3.1 SS75 Drill Pipe Recommended SS Tool Joint Dimensions and Resulting
Strengths for Typical Connections.
Pipe
Size
Connecti
on
In.
(mm)
3
(88.9)
3
(88.9)
4
(101.6)
4
98
NC38
(3 IF)
NC38
3 IF)
NC38
3 IF)
NC40
Nom
Weight
Outside
Diam
Inside
Diam
Lb/Ft
(kg/m)
Inches
(mm)
Inches
(mm)
13.30
(19.79)
15.50
(23.07)
14.00
(20.83)
15.70
5.000
(127)
5.000
(127)
5.000
(127)
5.000
2.563
(65.09)
2.438
(61.91)
2.563
(65.09)
2.438
Tensile
Lbs (kN)
Torsional
Ft-lb (N-m)
Pipe
Tool JT
Pipe
Tool JT
271,600
(1,200)
322,800
(1,400)
285,400
(1,300)
324,100
594,800
(806,500)
648,900
(879,700)
594,800
(806,500)
648,900
18,600
(25,200)
21,100
(28,600)
23,300
(31,600)
25,800
18,400
(25,000)
20,200
(27,400)
18,400
(25,000)
20,200
January 2008
Pipe
Size
Connecti
on
In.
(mm)
Nom
Weight
Outside
Diam
Inside
Diam
Lb/Ft
(kg/m)
Inches
(mm)
Inches
(mm)
Tensile
Lbs (kN)
Torsional
Ft-lb (N-m)
Pipe
Tool JT
Pipe
Tool JT
(101.6)
(4 FH)
(23.36)
(127)
(61.91)
(1,400)
(879,700)
(35,000)
(27,400)
4
(101.6)
4
(101.6)
4
(114.3)
NC40
(4 FH)
NC40
(4 FH)
NC46
(4
XH)
NC46
(4
XH)
NC50
(4
NC50
(4
NC38
(3
NC38
(3
NC38
(3
NC38
(3
NC40
(4 FH)
NC40
(4 FH)
NC46
(4
XH)
NC46
(4
XH)
NC50
(4
NC50
(4
NC38
(3
NC38
(3
NC38
(3
NC38
(3
NC40
(4 FH)
NC40
(4 FH)
NC46
14.00
(20.83)
15.70
(23.36)
16.60
(24.70)
5.000
(127)
5.250
(133.35)
6.250
(158.75)
2.688
(68.28)
2.563
(65.09)
3.000
(76.2)
285,400
(1,300)
324,100
(1,400)
330,600
(1,500)
711,500
(964,600)
768,200
(1,041,500)
961,100
(1,303,000)
30,800
(41,800)
36,900
(50,000)
36,900
(50,000)
35,700
(48,500)
40,700
(55,100)
40,700
(55,100)
20.00
(29.76)
6.250
(158.75)
2.750
(69.85)
412,400
(1,800)
1,085,300
(1,471,400)
41,200
(55,800)
40,800
(55,300)
19.50
(29.02)
25.60
(38.10)
13.30
(19.79)
15.50
(23.07)
14.00
(20.83)
15.70
(23.36)
14.00
(20.83)
15.70
(23.36)
16.60
(24.70)
6.375
(161.93)
6.500
(165.1)
5.000
(127)
5.000
(127)
5.000
(127)
5.000
(127)
5.250
(133.35)
5.250
(133.35)
6.250
(158.75)
3.500
(88.9)
3.250
(82.55)
2.438
(61.91)
2.125
(61.91)
2.563
(65.09)
2.438
(61.91)
2.563
(65.09)
2.438
(61.91)
2.750
(69.85)
395,600
(1,800)
530,100
(2,400)
344,000
(1,500)
408,800
(1,800)
361,500
(1,600)
410,500
(1,800)
361,500
(1,600)
410,500
(1,800)
418,700
(1,900)
1,017,400
(1,379,500)
1,163,200
(1,577,100)
648,900
(879,700)
772,200
(1,047,000)
594,800
(806,500)
648,900
(879,700)
768,200
(1,041,500)
822,200
1,114,700)
1,085,300
(1,471,400)
41,200
(55,800)
52,300
70,900)
23,500
(31,900)
26,700
(36,200)
29,500
(40,000)
32,700
(44,300)
29,500
(40,000)
32,700
(44,300)
39,000
(52,900)
40,800
55,300)
46,900
(63,700)
20,2003
(27,400)
24,300
(32,900)
18,400
(25,000)
20,200
(27,400)
25,400
(34,400)
26,900
(36,500)
40,700
(55,100)
20.00
(29.76)
6.250
(158.75)
2.500
(63.50)
522,300
(2,300)
1,198,600
(1,625,100)
46,700
(63,400)
45,200
(61,300)
19.50
(29.02)
25.60
(38.10)
13.30
(19.79)
15.50
(23.07)
14.00
(20.83)
15.70
(23.36)
14.00
(20.83)
15.70
(23.36)
16.60
6.625
(168.27)
6.625
(168.27)
5.000
(127)
5.000
(127)
5.000
(127)
5.000
(127)
5.250
(133.35)
5.250
(133.35)
6.250
3.250
(82.55)
2.750
(69.85)
2.438
(61.91)
2.125
(61.91)
2.563
(65.09)
2.438
(61.91)
2.563
(65.09)
2.438
(61.91)
2.750
501,100
(2,200)
671,500
(3,000)
380,200
(1,700)
451,900
(2,000)
399,500
(1,800)
453,800
(2,000)
399,500
(1,800)
453,800
(2,000)
462,800
1,163,200
(1,577,100)
1,422,400
(1,928,500)
348,900
(879,700)
772,200
(1,047,000)
594,800
(806,500)
648,900
(879,700)
768,200
(1,041,500)
822,200
(1,114,700)
1,085,300
52,100
(70,700)
66,200
(89,700)
26,000
(35,200)
29,500
(40,000)
32,600
(44,200)
36,100
(49,000)
32,600
(44,200)
36,100
(49,000)
43,100
46,900
(63,700)
58,100
(78,800)
20,200
(27,400)
24,300
32,900)
18,400
(25,000)
20,200
(27,400)
25,400
(34,400)
26,900
(36,500)
40,700
4
(114.3)
5
(127)
5
(127)
3
(88.9)
3
(88.9)
4
(101.6)
4
(101.6)
4
(101.6)
4
(101.6)
4
(114.3)
4
(114.3)
5
(127)
5
(127)
3
(88.9)
4
(101.6)
4
(101.6)
4
(101.6)
4
(101.6)
4
January 2008
IF)
IF)
IF)
IF)
IF)
IF)
IF)
IF)
IF)
IF)
IF)
IF)
99
Pipe
Size
Connecti
on
In.
(mm)
(114.3)
4
(114.3)
5
(127)
5
(127)
(4
XH)
NC46
(4
XH)
NC50
(4 IF)
NC50
(4 IF)
1.8.8.4.
Nom
Weight
Outside
Diam
Inside
Diam
Tensile
Lb/Ft
(kg/m)
Inches
(mm)
Inches
(mm)
Pipe
Tool JT
Pipe
Tool JT
(24.70)
(158.75)
(69.85)
(2,100)
(1,471,400)
(58,500)
(55,100)
20.00
(29.76)
6.250
(158.75)
2.500
(63.50)
577,300
(2,600)
1,198,600
(1,625,100)
51,700
(70,000)
45,200
(61,300)
19.50
(29.02)
25.60
(38.10)
6.625
(168.27)
6.625
(168.27)
3.250
(82.55)
2.750
(69.85)
553,800
(2,500)
742,200
(3,300)
1,163,200
(1,577,100)
1,422,400
(1,928,500)
57,600
(78,100)
73,200
(99,200)
46,900
(63,700)
58,100
(78,800)
Lbs (kN)
Torsional
Ft-lb (N-m)
Hardness Specifications for SS Tool Joints
Hardness specification for SS tool joints shall be limited to a maximum average of HRC 30.0
with no single reading above 32.0 HRC.
Testing frequency should be one test traverse per heat per heat treat lot or every 200 tool
joint box / pin set, whichever is the more frequent.
A test traverse shall consist of full length hardness traverses mid wall and near inner and
outer surfaces on longitudinal strip type cross section sample.
In addition, one impression should be taken on every tool joint element (pin and box) prior
to threading and hard banding.
Hardness Testing will conform to ASTM E 18 Standard Methods of Tests for Rockwell
Hardness and Rockwell Superficial Hardness of Metallic Materials.
1.8.8.5.
Toughness Specifications for SS Tool Joints
Toughness specification for SS tool joints should require a minimum average longitudinal
Charpy "V" notch impact value of 90 joules (66 ft lb.) for a standard specimen at room
temperature, per ASTM E23 98.
Toughness specification for SS drill pipe weldments between tube and tool joint shall require
a minimum longitudinal Charpy "V" notch impact value of 27 Joules (20 ft lb.) at room
temperature.
Testing frequency should be one set per heat, per heat treat lot or every 200 tool joint box /
pin set, whichever is the more frequent.
1.8.8.6.
H2S Resistance Specifications for SS Tool Joints
H2S resistance specification for SS tool joints shall include a demonstrated minimum
threshold of 493 Mpa / 72 ksi (65 % of specified minimum yield strength) for 720 hours per
NACE TM-01-77 (latest revision), Method A using Test Solution A.
Testing frequency should be one set per heat, per heat treat lot or every 200 tool joint box /
pin set, whichever is the more frequent.
100
January 2008
To be acceptable, any heat / heat treat lot with a failed specimen requires two additional
specimens with no failures.
1.8.8.7.
Chemistry Specifications for SS Tool Joints
Recommended chemistry specifications for new SS tool joints should include the maximum
and minimum weight per cent limits as listed in Table 1.8.7.7 Recommended SS Tool Joint
Chemistry.
Alternative chemistries may be acceptable, but they must be reviewed and approved by a
Table 1.8.7.7 Recommended SS Toll Joint Chemistry
Weight per Cent
1.8.8.8.
Min
Max
Carbon
0.25
0.35
Manganese
1.00
Chromium
0.70
1.30
Molybdenum
0.40
0.70
Sulphur
0.010
Phosphorous
0.015
SS Tool Joint Transformation and Grain Size
Minimum transformation to martensite after quenching should be 90 % across the full wall.
Grain size specification shall be six or finer per ASTM E112 96.
1.8.8.9.
SS Tool Joint Hard banding
Hard banding should be applied to tool joints in a carefully controlled manner.

The hard band groove should be of limited precut depth avoiding sharp shoulders and
should be applied with preheat after final temper avoiding excessive innermost thread
temperature.
The welding should be performed in an inert atmosphere and matrix hardness should be
limited through appropriate filler material choice.
Recommended hard banding types include "casing friendly smooth or flat ground surface
varieties.
1.8.9.
INSPECTION
1.8.9.1.
IRP Inspection
Inspections must follow API RP 5A51 Sections 1 through 4.

Drill pipe should meet or exceed specifications from API RP 7G, Section 10 (Identification,
Inspection and Classification of Drill Stem Components) for Premium Class Drill Pipe.
Applicable sections are all subsections of 10.1 through 10.11.
January 2008
101
Note
These inspections do not include the hardness testing specified in

this IRP.
Frequency:
o
Prior to the penetration of the critical zone, unless a recent inspection has
been conducted on each pipe within 90 operating days or the operator can
otherwise demonstrate that the pipe is satisfactory. (this does not include
hardness testing).
Timing of inspection is to be at operators / contractors discretion.
Documentation and Reports:

Inspection documentation and updates are the responsibility of the pipe owner. Such
information is to be provided to the operator or governmental agencies upon request.
API inspections reports will include general information, inspection details, and a summary
section:
o
location, rig, and pipe owner
inspection company, date(s), and inspector
diameter, weight, grade, and connection type
total number of joints inspected
inspection summary
classification
1.8.10.
DOWNHOLE FLOATS
1.8.10.1.
IRP Downhole Floats
In general, downhole floats are recommended for use in the string while drilling the critical
zone. The suitability of utilizing a downhole float should be evaluated on a site-specific basis
at the discretion of the operator and/or contractor.
Whenever blind shear rams are not installed, a drillstring float / internal BOP should be used
unless a qualified technical expert evaluates the specific well conditions and recommends it
is not required.
When flapper type floats are utilized, they should be ported to facilitate procurement of
shut-in drill pipe pressure. The recommended opening size in the float is approximately 6
mm.
Downhole float should be made of H2S resistant material meeting NACE MR 01-75.
102
January 2008
Advantages and Disadvantages of Downhole Floats

The advantages and disadvantages of a downhole float should be considered for each critical
well.
Advantage
It maintains positive
resistance to flow up the drill
pipe during all phases of
drilling and well control
operations.
Reduced likelihood of plugging
bit nozzles.
Floats are advantageous when
water drilling, or when
extreme overpressures are
present.
Disadvantage
Potential drill pipe collapse
Aeration of drilling fluid

Increased surge pressures which may
induce lost circulation
The chances of hydraulic pipe sticking

may increase and there may be
difficulty in obtaining shut in drill pipe
pressures during well control
operations.
A second advantage is
With proper selection of downhole floats, however, and modification to trip speed and pipe
fill practices, the disadvantages of downhole floats can be significantly reduced.
1.8.11.
UPPER KELLY COCKS, LOWER KELLY COCKS AND STABBING VALVES
1.8.11.1.
IRP Upper Kelly Cocks, Lower Kelly Cocks and Stabbing Valves
Upper Kelly Cocks and Lower Kelly Cocks should be utilized in all critical wells.
Note
for Top Drive rigs, the "lower Kelly cock" is a drillstring valve
between the top drive quill and the first joint of drillpipe.
Kelly Cocks and Stabbing valves should be certified by the manufacturer as being able to be
routinely opened with 7000 kPa below the valve. The direction for testing Kelly Cocks is
recommended from below only. These valves should not be opened during field pressure
tests.
Function tests and pressure tests of Kelly Cocks and Stabbing valves should be performed
during BOP stack pressuring testing (see 1.14.3.1 IRP BOP Pressure Testing).
Valve Bodies:
o
Tensile strength: equivalent to that of the tool joints in use.
Metallurgical: Kelly Cocks and Stabbing valves shall be manufactured to

conform with the requirements of the IRP 1.8.8 SS Grade Tool Joint
Specification1 or with the requirements of NACE MR 01-75.
Inspection: inspected as per drillpipe (IRP 1.8.9 Inspection)
January 2008
103
Internal Working Parts: of Kelly Cocks, Stabbing Valves, and inside BOP's should be made of
H2S resistant material meeting NACE MR 01-75.
Note
Current regulations regarding the use of stabbing valves, inside

BOPs and associated subs are believed to be adequate. Proper
equipment maintenance and placement on the rig floor is, of
course, essential to properly prepare for any internal flow
situation.
1.8.12.
PUP JOINTS AND HEAVY WEIGHT DRILL PIPE
1.8.12.1.
Pup Joints and Heavy Weight Drill Pipe
In general, the bodies of drill string components (other than BHA) should conform to the
specifications for drill pipe tube or tool joints.
Hardness tested material will be allowed until January 1, 2010, but after that SS material
must be used.
The following are the material specification for the component bodies:
o
Pup Joints: SS drill pipe specifications (tube and tool joint, IRP 1.8.7 SS
Grade Drill Pipe Tube Specifications, 1.8.8 SS Grade Tool Joint Specification)
Heavy Weight Drill Pipe: hardness tested tool joint specification (IRP 1.8.6
Hardness Tested API Grade Drill Pipe Specification)
Inspection: Pup Joints and Heavy Weight Drill Pipe as per drillpipe (IRP 1.8.9 Inspection8)
104
January 2008
1.9.
WELDING
1.9.1.
SCOPE
Note
The Welding IRP guidelines have been developed with

consideration for drilling activities and environment, recognizing
the need for equipment integrity during both routine drilling
conditions and those conditions which could be encountered during
well control operations.
Pressure containing parts fabricated by welding shall be performed using guidelines stated
herein. Weld Procedures are developed to ensure that the pressure containing welds will
mitigate effects of exposure to H2S.
The weldments shall include casing bowls, piping in manifolds of any equipment that is
subjected to pressure.
Qualified personnel as mandated by provincial regulations must perform welding.
1.9.2.
APPLICABLE CODES
Relevant codes for the development of weld procedures are:
ASME Section IX Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
API 6A Specification for Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment
NACE MR0175/ ISO 15156, Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries Materials for Use
in H2S-Containing Environments in Oil and Gas Production; Part 1: General Principles
for Selection of Cracking-Resistant Materials, and Part 2: Cracking-Resistant Carbon
and Low Alloy Steels and Cast Irons.
CSA Standard Z662-03 Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems
ANSI B31.3 Process Piping
1.9.3.
WELDING PROCESS
The selection of appropriate welding process is dependent on field conditions and how well
the work area is protected from the elements. Shielded Metal Arc process is the preferred
process for welding of casing bowls to casing.
For other welding, such as pipe in manifolds or any pressure containment fabrication, any
process can be used provided the work area is well protected from the elements, and the
work pieces can be easily manipulated.
January 2008
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1.9.4.
WELDING ELECTRODES SOUR SERVICE
The selection of electrodes shall be dependent on matching mechanical properties of mating

pieces. The weld procedure and subsequent tests will confirm appropriate selection. For
welding of carbon steel and low alloy steel parts in sour service, electrodes must have less
than 1 % nickel content.
1.9.5.
WELDING PROCEDURE SPECIFICATION
A weld procedure specification (WPS) must be developed in accordance to ASME Section IX.
This procedure shall include the essential and non-essential variables in the welding
process. They include:
Materials to be welded
Filler material, root and cap
Pre-heat
Interpass temperature
Post heat
Shielding gas
Welding speed
Direction of welding
Welding technique
Mechanical tests to be conducted (yield, tensile, elongation, reduction in area)
Charpy impacts as required
Hardness Traverse test to be specified
Inspection requirements
Records
Requirements from API 6A and NACE MR0175/ISO 15156 Parts 1 and 2 must be included
when writing the Weld Procedure Specification.
1.9.6.
PROCEDURE QUALIFICATION RECORD
To comply with the requirements of ASME Section IX, a Procedure Qualification Record
(PQR) must be completed. Representative parts shall be assembled by welding.
Casing bowls can be substituted with wrought bars of equivalent dimensions, chemical
composition, heat treatment, and mechanical properties. Typical materials used to
manufacture casing bowls are AISI 4130 and AISI 4140, quenched and tempered with 414
MPa (60 ksi) minimum yield strength, 586 MPa (85 ksi) minimum tensile strength, charpy
impacts at 46 C (-50 F), 22 HRC maximum hardness. Actual casing of representative
size, material, grade and weight shall be used wherever possible.
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January 2008
For other welding, actual parts or representative materials of equivalent mechanical

properties and similar chemical composition shall be used as test pieces.
Each change in essential variable requires a different PQR. Example of change in essential
variable is the change in casing grade or material, change in weld process, change in filler
material, shielding gas and so on. A PQR that does not contain charpy impact test cannot be
used for welding where charpy impacts are required.
Fabricated assembly shall be subjected to post weld heat treatment. Tests will be conducted
on the fabricated assembly in accordance with ASME Section IX. In addition, yield strength
shall be included in the test, as well as charpy impacts and hardness traverse. The hardness
traverse shall be conducted in accordance with ISO 15156 Part 2 to meet the stated
maximum hardness criteria, (i.e., 22 HRC when the design stress does not exceed 0.67
SMYS.)
Data to be included in the PQR:
MTR of test pieces
Filler materials used
Test results of fabricated assembly
Yield, tensile, reduction in area, elongation
Charpy impacts
Hardness Traverse
Bend test
Welding variables
Name of welder
Shielding gas used
Voltage/Amperage
Welding speed
Heat Input
Record of pre heat
Record of interpass temperature
Record of post heat
For other welding, a similar process shall be adopted.
January 2008
107
1.9.7.
WELDER QUALIFICATION
The welder that performs the welding in the development of the PQR is qualified to the Weld
Procedure Specification (WPS). The welder must be qualified to perform pressure welding
per provincial regulations. The welder must also be qualified to the weld procedure. The
effective duration of the welders qualification to perform welding and to use the WPS is
subject to provincial regulations.
1.9.8.
FIELD WELDING
The welder that performs welding in the field must ensure that:
Correct WPS and PQR
Valid welding qualification
Valid procedure qualification record
Electrodes are protected from dirt and moisture
If welding is perform in darkness, adequate lighting is used
Work area shall be adequately protected from the elements such as wind, moisture
and dust
Visual examination of welding surfaces and surrounding areas. Ensure no defects are
visible.
Ensure work pieces are cleaned and free of moisture, dirt and grease
Counter weights, ground clamps and other temporary attachments should not be
welded to the pipe or fittings
For casing bowls, drilling fluid level shall be lowered to at least 600 mm below the
weld line
1.9.9.
PRE - HEAT
The pre heat shall be applied to both pieces prior to welding as per WPS. Heating shall be
accomplished by a suitable method, which would provide the required metal temperature,
uniform metal temperature increase and temperature control. The use of electric resistance,
or thematic processes are preferred. Use of propane or oxyacetylene under controlled
conditions is also acceptable.
The pre-heat temperature should be tested with crayons, thermocouple pyrometers or other
suitable methods to ensure that the required pre-heat temperature is obtained prior to, and
maintained during the welding operation.
For casing bowls, immediately before welding commences the pre-heat temperature should
be between 200 C and 315 C for a minimum distance of 100 mm on either side of the
weld area. Special attention should be given to the thicker sections of the casing bowl in
order to ensure uniform pre-heating.
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January 2008
1.9.10.
INTERRUPTED WELDING
If welding is interrupted before completion, interpass temperature using adequate heat

treatment shall be maintained on the work pieces. If interruption is for a prolonged period,
work pieces shall be subjected to controlled cooling; to ensure there are no detrimental
effects to the materials. This is accomplished by covering work pieces with heat insulation
blankets.
Before welding is resumed, pre-heat temperature must be used.
1.9.11.
POST HEAT
Post heat is the heat treatment of the fabricated assembly after all welding is completed. It
is the application of heat to the welded area at a specified temperature and for a specified
duration in accordance to the WPS used. The WPS shall ensure that the weldment hardness
is 22 HRC or less and that the mechanical properties of the weldment meet design
requirements. Heat treatment temperature should be checked by the use of thermocouple
pyrometers, or other suitable equipment to ensure that the proper heat treatment has been
accomplished.
Confirmation that the assembly is adequately stress relieved is by hardness testing.
1.9.12.
REPAIR WELDS
All repair welds shall be performed with the appropriate WPS. The selection of WPS shall be
based on the material and mechanical properties of the part to be repaired. The welder
performing the repairs shall be a qualified pressure welder and qualified to the selected
WPS.
1.9.13.
PRODUCT HARDNESS TEST
A surface hardness test shall be performed on the fabricated assembly after post heat is
completed. Location of hardness test shall be at the weld metal, casing bowl heat-affected
zone, casing heat-affected zone, and parent metal unaffected by welding. ASTM E10 or
ASTM E18 can be used to perform the hardness test. The hardness recorded in the PQR
shall be the basis for acceptance if the weld is not accessible for hardness testing. Such
hardness test shall be recorded as part of the welding documentation and kept on file for
the well. Maximum hardness for carbon and low alloy steel shall be 22 HRC or 237 HB.
1.9.14.
PRODUCT PRESSURE TEST
The fabricated assembly shall be pressure tested in accordance with appropriate codes that
governs the part.
1.9.15.
CASING BOWL PRESSURE TEST
Casing bowl shall be pressure tested through the test port provided and by internal
pressure. Test pressures shall be the lower of:
75 % of pipe collapse or burst and
rated working pressure of the top flange.
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109
Test media shall be either nitrogen or hydraulic oil or media not subject to freezing.
Pressure test shall be for a duration of 15 minutes for 2 cycles. Record of pressure test shall
be part of welding record for the well.
After pressure test, as much of the fluid shall be purged from the cavity with compressed air
or nitrogen.
1.9.16.
NON DESTRUCTIVE TESTING
Each weld shall be subject to non destructive testing.

Fabrication of casing bowls to surface casing shall be subjected to:
Visual examination of both weld joints
Surface NDE such as MPI or LPI
Other weldments shall be subjected to non destructive testing as required by ANSI B31.3 or
CSA Z662-03. As a minimum, weldments shall be visually inspected to ensure welds are
free of defects, verify dimensional accuracy, surface finish of weldment, weldment free of
undercut, pock marks, overlaps or cracks.
Fabricated assemblies that are subject to cyclic loading must be examined by surface NDE
such as MPI or LPI to ensure weldment and heat affected zone are free of surface cracks.
Acceptance criteria shall be per ANSI B31.3 or CSA Z662-03.
1.9.17.
WELDING DOCUMENTATION
Documentation of the welding performed and associated tests performed shall be recorded
and filed for easy retrieval. As a minimum the record shall contain:
110
Name of welder
Certificate number of welder qualification to perform pressure weld
Certificate number of welder qualification to weld procedure
Date of weldment
Location of well
WPS and PQR used
Pre heat temperature
Post heat time and temperature
Hardness test record
Pressure test record
Non destructive test results
Name of person performing NDE
January 2008
If there are any defects found during examination of the welds, a record of the repair shall
also be included in the welding documentation.
1.9.18.
REFERENCE LIST
API, Specification for Wellhead and Christmas Tree Equipment, Edition, 1996, Spec A,
Washington, D.C. 2005. (Note: a new version of 6A is due for release this spring).
NACE MR0175/1SO 15156, Petroleum and natural Gas industries Materials for use in H2Scontaining Environments in oil and gas production Part 1: General principles for selection
of cracking-resistant materials, and Part 2: Cracking-resistant carbon and low alloy steels,
and the use of cast irons. Geneva, Switzerland.
ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Qualification Standard for Welding and Brazing
Procedures, Welders, Brazers, and Welding and Brazing Operators, July, 2001, Section IX,
New York, New York.
CSA, Standard, Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems, 2003, CSA Z662-03, Mississauga, Ontario.
ANSI/ASME, Process Piping, April 2002, ASME B31.3-2002, ASME, New York, New York.
ASTM, Standard Test Methods for Rockwell Hardness and Rockwell Superficial Hardness of
Metallic Materials, 2003, E18, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
BPRC, Blowout Preventer Stack Systems Subcommittee Final Report, 1984, Calgary,
Alberta.
BPRC, Drill Pipe Manifolds and Auxiliary Equipment Subcommittee Report, 1987, Calgary,
Alberta.
January 2008
111
1.10. DRILLING FLUIDS

1.10.1.
SCOPE
The drilling fluid has many functions and properties, however the following are those
especially important for a critical sour well:
Fluid density: must provide enough hydraulic head to prevent a kick
H2S Scavenging Capacity: must be able to scavenge small amounts of H2S that may
enter the wellbore
Rheological Properties: must be viscous enough to suspend weighting material, but

not so viscous as to cause excessive swab / surge pressures
Alkalinity: must be alkaline enough to suppress (buffer) the solubility of small

amounts of H2S that may enter the wellbore
Note
These recommendations may be difficult to meet in a 100 % oil

based system. This is probably only an issue in a high GOR (gas /
oil ratio) critical sour oil well with a crude oil based drilling fluid.
Wellsite drilling fluid testing and monitoring practices, to ensure these properties are
maintained, are described.
Equipment and material inventory requirements are given.
The requirement to have a qualified drilling fluid specialist at the wellsite while in the critical
zone is also outlined.
1.10.2.
FLUID DENSITY
1.10.2.1.
IRP Minimum Drilling Fluid Density
Fluid density: the drilling fluid must provide enough hydraulic head to prevent a kick.
For wells shallower than 1500 m, the minimum drilling fluid density should be 100 kg/m3
higher than that required to balance the estimated formation pressure.
For wells deeper than 1500 m, the drilling fluid density should provide a hydrostatic
pressure that is a minimum 1500 kPa higher (overbalance) than the estimated formation
pressure.
This density should be maintained immediately prior to entering the critical zone and while
the critical zone is open.
A mud scale should be on site that will accurately measure the mud density.
January 2008
113
1.10.2.2.
IRP Drilling Fluid Density Check: Wiper Trips
As a check on the correct amount of overbalance, a 10 stand wiper trip should be made and
bottoms up circulated prior to pulling out of the hole the first trip after penetrating the
critical zone.
As well conditions warrant, additional wiper trips may be required.
1.10.3.
H2S SCAVENGING
H2S Scavenging: General

H2S Scavenging Capacity: the drilling fluid must be able to scavenge small amounts of H2S
that may enter the wellbore. Scavenging is the removal of soluble sulphides by a chemical
reaction.
Although many drilling fluid systems have natural H2S scavenging capacity, this is difficult to
measure and maintain. Therefore H2S Scavenging additives (H2S Scavengers) must be
used.
The initial addition of H2S Scavenger can be based on a calculated scavenging capacity;
however it is difficult to directly measure the actual scavenging capacity of the drilling fluid.
Soluble sulphides in the whole drilling fluid indicate that H2S has entered the drilling fluid
(both water based and oil based).
Water Based Fluids:
Soluble sulphides can be measured in the filtrate (although not oil based fluids).
When soluble sulphides are detected in the filtrate, it is an indication that the sulfide
concentration in the drilling fluid has exceeded the scavenging capacity of the fluid.
Scavenger should be added to reduce the soluble sulphides in the filtrate to zero.
Therefore, the ongoing treatment should be based on monitoring soluble sulphides in the
filtrate when drilling with water based fluid and monitoring soluble sulphides in the whole
mud when using oil based fluid.
1.10.3.1.
IRP H2S Scavenger Pretreatment
Prior to entering the critical zone, enough H2S Scavenger should be added to provide a
calculated scavenging capacity of 500 mg/l soluble sulphides.
Note
1.10.3.2.
No pretreatment may be considered for low complexity, low

impact, and simple ERP wells.
IRP H2S Scavenger Maintenance: Soluble Sulphides
Prior to becoming critical, monitor (IRP 1.10.3.3 IRP Soluble Sulphide Monitoring, 1.10.3.4
IRP Soluble Sulphide Monitoring) for soluble sulphides in the whole mud, both water based
and oil based fluids.
Water based fluids:
114
If soluble sulphides are in the whole mud, monitor for soluble sulphides in the
filtrate.
January 2008
Add the appropriate amount of H2S Scavenger to ensure there are no soluble
sulphides in the filtrate.
Oil Based Fluids:
Add the appropriate amount of H2S Scavenger to ensure there are no soluble
sulphides in the whole mud.
1.10.3.3.
IRP Soluble Sulphide Monitoring: Hach Test (water based fluids

only)
Hach tests apply to water based muds. They should be started 12 hours prior to penetration
of the sour zone and run every hour thereafter while circulating.
Hach tests should also be run on bottoms up after trips or drilling breaks.
Hach tests should be conducted using whole drilling fluid until soluble sulphides are
detected. Thereafter the test should be conducted using filtrate or preferably the Garrett
Gas Train.
Hach tests are typically done by the derrickman, and the tests must be recorded.
1.10.3.4.
IRP Soluble Sulphide Monitoring: Garrett Gas Train Tests
Garrett Gas Train tests should be conducted on the whole drilling fluid three times a day
while in the critical zone, and any time the Hach test indicates the presence of soluble
sulphides.
When drilling with water based fluids, if soluble sulphides are detected in the whole drilling
fluid, Garrett Gas Train tests should be conducted on the filtrate. When drilling with oil
based fluids, conduct the modified Garrett Gas Train test on whole mud.
If soluble sulphides are detected in the filtrate of a water based fluid or in the whole oil
based fluid, Garrett Gas Train tests should be conducted every two hours. (as per IRP
1.10.3.2 IRP H2S Scavenger Maintenance: Soluble Sulphides add the appropriate amount of
H2S Scavenger to ensure there are no soluble sulphides in the filtrate).
When no soluble sulphides are detected in the filtrate of a water based mud or in the whole
oil based mud, revert to testing whole drilling fluids three times per day.
Garrett Gas Train tests are typically done by the drilling fluid specialist.
A record of the soluble sulphide content of the drilling fluid must be maintained throughout
the critical period.
1.10.4.
RHEOLOGICAL PROPERTIES
1.10.4.1.
IRP Swab / Surge Pressure: Gel Strengths
In order to prevent high swab / surge pressures, the drilling fluid must not be too viscous.
The best indicator of this property is gel strengths.
Ten second, ten minute, and thirty minute gel strengths should be regularly measured and
recorded. They should not be progressive, as determined by drilling fluid specialist.
Ten minute gel strengths should not exceed 30 pascals.
January 2008
115
1.10.4.2.
IRP Rheological Properties
While in the critical zone, the drilling fluid rheological properties should be maintained so
that weight material remains suspended and circulation can be established readily after
tripping.
The drilling fluid specialist on location must conduct the appropriate tests and subsequent
drilling fluid adjustments to ensure these properties are maintained.
1.10.5.
ALKALINITY
Alkalinity: General
Alkalinity: the drilling fluid must be alkaline enough to suppress (buffer) the solubility of
small amounts of H2S that may enter the wellbore.
1.10.5.1.
IRP Alkalinity: pH Control
Water based drilling fluids: the pH should be maintained at 10.5 or greater.

Oil based drilling fluids: excess lime concentration should be maintained above 20 kg/m3.
1.10.5.2.
IRP pH Monitoring
Applicable to water based drilling fluids while critical.

A continuous pH monitoring system must be installed and located as close as possible to the
flowline discharge of the drilling rig.
This monitoring unit must be equipped with an alarm which will indicate a drop in pH.
1.10.6.
EQUIPMENT AND PRACTICES
1.10.6.1.
IRP Back-up Drilling Fluid Volumes
While in the critical zone, the usable surface drilling fluid volume should be 100 % of the
calculated volume of a gauge hole minus the drill string displacement.
If lost circulation occurs and the 100 % volume guideline is not maintained, drilling should
be stopped until the guideline can be met.
The minimum amount of mud material inventory on location should provide enough time for
replenishment from a nearby stock point.
1.10.6.2.
IRP Drilling Fluid Mixing System
A mechanical mud agitator should be in the suction tanks and agitation should be provided
in other compartments.
A minimum of two drilling fluid mixing systems (hopper, pump and piping) must be
installed.
Each drilling fluid mixing system must be capable of mixing two sacks of barite per minute
(80 kg/minute).
Each drilling fluid mixing system (minimum 80 kg/minute) must be independent of the
drilling rig's circulating system.
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January 2008
A bulk delivery system (minimum 80 kg/minute) should be considered if the drilling fluid
density is expected to be high or if remoteness and/or seasonal conditions dictate.
The rig's circulating system shall consist of a minimum of two mud pumps.
1.10.6.3.
IRP Drilling Fluid Material Inventory
The minimum amount of drilling fluid maintenance material inventory on location should
provide the ability to maintain the system to properties outlined in this IRP until the
materials can be replenished from the nearest stock point.
If overpressured zones are to be encountered and the formation pressure is known, the
amount of inventory on location should be enough to weight up to the formation pressure
plus the required overbalance (IRP 1.10.2 Fluid Density).
There should be enough inventory of H2S scavenger on location to provide the initial
treatment plus provide an additional calculated scavenging capacity of 500 mg/l soluble
scavenger capacity (IRP 1.10.4 Rheological Properties).
If lost circulation is expected or encountered, an appropriate inventory of Lost Circulation
material should be maintained on location.
1.10.6.4.
IRP Gas Detector
A total gas detection unit shall be installed prior to entering the critical zone.
While in the critical zone, the unit shall be continually monitored; which may include the use
of alarms.
1.10.6.5.
IRP Drilling Fluid Specialist
A qualified drilling fluid specialist shall be on location prior to drilling into, while drilling
through, and at least 100 m below the critical sour formation or at any time there are
soluble sulphides in the mud filtrate.
1.10.6.6.
IRP Suspension of Drilling Ahead
If the properties of the mud deviate from the above recommendations, drilling should stop
and the mud should be conditioned prior to drilling ahead or tripping.
If severe entrapped air / gas occurs or serious foaming occurs, drilling should not continue
until the problem has been alleviated.
The above recommended mud properties should enable the critical zone to be drilled
successfully. However, under specific circumstances, variations from these properties may
be required as dictated by the qualified drilling fluid specialist on location.
January 2008
117
1.11. KICK DETECTION

1.11.1.
SCOPE
Kick detection equipment, procedures, and well control training requirements are specified
by legislative requirements for all wells.
This IRP outlines the additional kick detection equipment required for a critical sour well to
improve these practices:
Drilling fluid volume measurement
Drilling fluid return flow indicator
Trip tank fluid volume measurement
Measuring Indirect indicators:
Electronic drilling parameter measurement
Driller's Instrumentation
Mud gas logging
1.11.2.
DRILLING FLUID VOLUME MEASUREMENT
1.11.2.1.
IRP Mud Tank Volume Monitoring System
A mud tank level monitoring system (e.g., Pit Volume Totalizer) that would meet the
following specifications is required.
The system must be designed and installed so that it is capable of detecting a change of +
1.0 m3 in total pit volume. In general, this means a probe must be installed in each active
compartment.
A fluid level monitoring station with an alarm system must be located at or near the driller's
position.
When drilling, the alarm must be set to detect a maximum change of + 2.0 m3.
Continuous recording must be used to record the mud tank volumes (this may be part of
the Electronic Drilling Recorder (EDR), see IRP 1.11.5 Monitoring Indirect Indicators).
The alarm system must include a visual indicator, which would come on automatically
whenever the alarm is shut off. The indicator must effectively alert the driller both on the
floor and in the doghouse.
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119
1.11.3.
FLOW LINE FLOW SENSORS
1.11.3.1.
IRP Flow line Flow Sensors
A flow line flow sensor shall be installed which meets the following specifications.
Capable of detecting a change of + 10 % in the circulating rate, and setting an alarm if a
change of 10% or greater is detected.
The alarm must be located at, or near, the driller's position.
The data must be recorded continuously on the EDR (see IRP 1.11.5.1).
The system must be checked once per tour while drilling by changing the pump SPM by
10%, ensuring the alarm sounds, and noting the corresponding flow reading. This will be
recorded on the EDR (see IRP 1.11.5.1).
The alarm system must include a visual indicator, which would come on automatically
whenever the alarm is shut off. The indicator must effectively alert the driller both on the
floor and in the doghouse.
1.11.4.
TRIP TANKS
1.11.4.1.
IRP Trip Tanks
A trip tank is required which meets the following specifications.

A change of level of 25 mm equals a volume change of not more than 0.075 m3. This
equates to a maximum surface area of 3.0 m2.
A minimum usable trip tank volume of 3.0 m3.
If the trip tank requires refilling during the trip, the pipe pulling operation must be stopped
while the tank is refilled.
The hole fill volume must be measured either by manual gauging of the trip tank or by
reading a mechanical or automated monitoring system visible at the driller's position.
If a mechanical monitoring system is in use, the volume increments on the monitoring
board must be 0.1 m3.
If an electronic probe is used, the monitor's measurement increments must not exceed
0.0375 m3 and the monitor must have readout to two decimal places.
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January 2008
1.11.5.
MONITORING INDIRECT INDICATORS
1.11.5.1.
IRP Electronic Drilling Recorder EDR
An Electronic Drilling Recorder EDR should be used to record:
rate of penetration
pump pressure / standpipe pressure
pump strokes per minute / Flow rate
hook load
rotary table or top drive RPM
rotary or top drive torque.
Pit Volume
Trip Tank Volume
Mud return flow volume ("flow-show")
Casing Annulus Pressure (choke manifold casing pressure)
Read-outs must be at the doghouse, wellsite supervisor's office, and rig manager's office.
The EDR primary data recording / storage computer must be more than 25 m from well
centre.
The record must be kept for the entire well and be made available for inspection at the
wellsite until rig release.
1.11.5.2.
IRP Driller's Instrumentation
Indicators must be in operation for measuring hook load, pump pressure, and pump strokes
per minute, and table or top drive torque. All such indicators must be visible from the
driller's position.
A cumulative pump stroke counter should be required with readout at or near the driller's
position. This might be included in the remote control system for a choke if in use. It may
also be included in the EDR.
1.11.5.3.
IRP Mud Gas Logging
A manned mud gas logging service should be used to provide continuous measurement of
the gas content in the mud returns coming out the flow line (see IRP 1.10.6.4 Gas
Detector).
An alarm system or intercom system should be in place to provide immediate
communication from the operator of the mud gas detector to the driller in case a sudden
increase in mud gas is noticed
January 2008
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1.12. WELLSITE SAFETY

1.12.1.
SCOPE
During any drilling operation, safety personnel and adequate safety equipment for all
workers must be on site as per the appropriate regulations (e.g., as per the Occupational
Health and Safety Act and Regulations).
The following recommendations address the unique conditions associated with critical sour
gas H2S drilling operations.
1.12.2.
GENERAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
1.12.2.1.
IRP Pre-Job Orientation
Prior to any work commencing on a critical sour well, a site-specific orientation must be
reviewed with all on-site personnel involved in the operation. Documentation supporting this
orientation must be kept at the wellsite.
Topics for review and discussion shall include, but not be limited to:
Hazards involved, such as pressures, H2S percentage, etc.
Emergency preparedness
Site specific equipment
Communications
Security
Work status (as to critical/non-critical) and subsequent responsibilities
1.12.2.2.
IRP H2S Training
ALL personnel on the location while the critical sour zone is open must have the equivalent
of H2S Alive certification.
Site access control personnel will deny access to anyone without certification (unless the
visitor is accompanied at all times by a guide with the required certification).
1.12.2.3.
IRP Safety Supervision
Prior to drilling into the critical sour zone, a minimum of two H2S safety supervisors are
required on a 24-hour basis, each working no more than 12-hour shift while on location.
Typical functions fulfilled by the safety supervisor include:
Monitor compliance of all personnel with established safety policy and guidelines
Inspect and maintain the safety equipment, monitors, and breathing apparatus.
Conduct inspections of the safety equipment a minimum of twice per shift.
Instruct personnel in the proper safety response to emergency situations, alarm

conditions, and gas-to-surface conditions.
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123
Instruct personnel in the use of breathing apparatus including safe mask-up

procedures and equipment limitations.
Conduct practical drills to practice the use of breathing apparatus.
Familiarize personnel with designated safe briefing areas and the safety equipment in
each area.
Instruct and supervise personnel in safe evacuation out of hazardous areas.
Provide training to wellsite personnel in:

o
H2S awareness
Site specific job hazards
Rescue procedures.
Personal Protective Equipment placement
1.12.2.4.
IRP Site Access Control
Prior to drilling into the critical sour zone, site access control must be in place. Only
authorized personnel will be allowed on the wellsite.
A record of all personnel on the wellsite must be maintained current at all times.
The number of personnel on the lease area during the critical sour drilling operation should
be kept to a minimum, and restricted to those directly involved in the operation. Visitors
must be briefed on emergency procedures before entering the lease area, and their
visitation kept as short as possible.
1.12.3.
1.12.3.1.
H2S MONITORING EQUIPMENT

Continuous H2S Monitoring System
A continuous H2S / LEL gas detection system is required while in the critical zone that
meets the following specifications:
A minimum of four sensors able to detect H2S concentrations of 5 ppm or greater
Audible and visual alarms near the driller's station.
Alarms set at 10 ppm
Sensor locations:
Shale shaker
Near the bell nipple
Rig floor
At the mud mixing unit
Qualified personnel must be on site to test and provide maintenance (typically the Safety
Supervisor).
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January 2008
1.12.3.2.
IRP Portable H2S Detection Devices
One portable H2S detection device is required while in the critical zone.
1.12.4.
BREATHING AIR EQUIPMENT
1.12.4.1.
IRP Breathing Air Equipment
A compressed breathing system shall be on location while drilling the critical zone.
The minimum basic equipment shall include:
2400 cu. ft. breathing air supply Emergency preparedness
2 - two-stage high pressure regulators
2 - six-outlet air header assemblies
8 - supplied air breathing apparatus c/w egress cylinders
8 - self-contained breathing apparatus
8 - spare 45 cu ft compressed breathing air cylinders
2 - 30 m x 10 mm I.D. special hose c/w quick couplers
6 - 30 m x 6 mm I.D. special hose c/w quick couplers
1 - 610 mm x 760 mm H2S warning sign on tripod
2 - wind direction indicators
Prior to drilling into the critical zone, the safety equipment must be installed and ready for
service, and crew members must be trained in the use of the equipment.
January 2008
125
1.13. WELLSITE PERSONNEL

1.13.1.
SCOPE
The Wellsite Personnel IRPs have been developed to address the issues regarding the
supervisory and crew qualifications and requirements for conducting a critical sour drilling
operation.
The roles and responsibilities for the operator's wellsite supervisor as well as the rig
manager are outlined.
Experience levels and training/certification requirements for supervisors and crews are
summarized.
1.13.2.
RESPONSIBILITIES
1.13.2.1.
IRP Operators Representative
The operator will delegate a primary wellsite supervisor as having overall control in the
chain of command.
The primary wellsite supervisor has the overall responsibility to his company for the well
and for compliance with all regulations relating to the operation of the well.
He must establish a chain of command and a line of communication at the wellsite.
The primary wellsite supervisor must be onsite (or readily available can get to location
within two hours) at all times.
1.13.2.2.
IRP Rig Contractors Representative
The rig contractors representative has the responsibility to the operators representative for
the operation of the rig during the drilling of the well which provides for a single chain of
command for the well operation.
He is responsible to his company for the rig equipment and crew, and for compliance with
all regulations relating to the operation of the rig.
1.13.2.3.
IRP Shared Responsibly
The day-to-day operations on a lease are a shared responsibility between the contractors
and operators representatives, but the ultimate responsibility for supervision of the well
operation is assigned by the operator to the operators representative.
1.13.3.
LEVEL OF SUPERVISION AND CREW REQUIREMENTS
1.13.3.1.
IRP Wellsite Supervisors
A 24 hour operation will require two supervisors, each working 12 hour shifts on site.
The primary wellsite supervisor must be delegated by the operator as having overall control
in the chain of command.
126
January 2008
1.13.3.2.
IRP Rig Manager
The rig manager must readily available
1.13.3.3.
IRP Drilling Crew
A minimum five man rig crew for each shift will be maintained while in the critical zone.
1.13.4.
MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS
Operating company office supervisors

The demands placed on office supervisors (e.g., superintendents) of a critical sour drilling
operation are very high due to the inherent complex nature of the operation, the increased
risk factor, and the public impact of the operation.
Office Supervisors must therefore, have the technical, organizational and operational
competence to meet these demands accordingly.
1.13.4.1.
IRP Primary Wellsite Supervisor
The primary wellsite supervisor must be competent in the application of existing IRPs and
Emergency Response Planning.
The Primary Wellsite Supervisor must have the following minimum experience levels:
Five years operator's wellsite supervisory experience (or three years drilling
engineering + two years wellsite supervisory experience)
must have supervised a minimum of five sour drilling operations while operations
were being conducted in the sour zone.
Since the complexity of a well generally increases with depth, the primary wellsite
supervisors previous sour well experience must have been on wells of similar complexity
and depth when compared to the critical sour drilling operation they will be supervising.
Training / certification requirements:
IRP 7 Standards for Wellsite Supervision of Drilling, Completions and Workovers,

Section 7.6.3 Training Requirements
Second Line BOP
H2S Alive
First Aid
WHMIS
TDG
Confined Space Entry (Pre-Entry portion only)
The supervisor must be prepared to substantiate his/her work history. Time forward work is
to be logged by the supervisor and supported by his/her direct supervisor of the operating
company.
January 2008
127
1.13.4.2.
IRP Second Wellsite Supervisor
The Second Wellsite Supervisor must have the following minimum experience levels:
Three years wellsite supervisory experience (operator or rig contractor) (or thee
years drilling engineering experience)
Must have supervised a minimum of two sour drilling operations while operations
were being conducted in the sour zone.
IRP 7 Standards for Wellsite Supervision of Drilling, Completions and Workovers,

Section 7.6.3 Training Requirements
Second Line BOP
H2S Alive
First Aid
WHMIS
TDG
Confined Space Entry (Pre-Entry portion only)
The supervisor must be prepared to substantiate his/her work history. Time forward work is
to be logged by the operating supervisor and supported by his/her direct supervisor of the
operating company.
1.13.4.3.
IRP Rig Manager
The Rig Manager must have the following minimum experience levels
Five years experience as a rig manager or driller.
Must have been involved (as rig manager or driller) in five drilling operations while
these wells were in the sour zone.
Training/certification requirements:
128
Second Line BOP
H2S Alive
First Aid
WHMIS
TDG
Confined Space Entry
Fall Protection
January 2008
1.13.4.4.
IRP Drilling Crew
Each member must be competent to fully handle his / her individual responsibilities and to
fully understand his/her responsibilities for the critical well control operation.
Drillers: must have a minimum of three years as a driller and / or derrick man, with
experience in sour well operations. Must have First Line BOP certification.
Derrickmen / motorman: must have a minimum of three years rig experience, with
experience in sour well operations.
Motorman / Floorhands: Must demonstrate crew competency requirements re BOP and Mandown drills as per IRP 1.14.4.1 IRP BOP Drills.
Training/certification requirements:
H2S Alive
First Aid
WHMIS
Confined Space Entry (at least 2 crew members)
Fall Protection (Driller and Derrickman)
1.13.4.5.
IRP Safety Specialist
Must have a minimum of two years as a field safety specialist, with experience in sour well
operations.
H2S Alive
First Aid
WHMIS
TDG
Confined Space Entry
Fall Protection
1.13.5.
CERTIFICATION AND TRAINING COURSE REFERENCES
The certification and training courses in this IRP refer to courses offered, or equivalent
courses sanctioned by, Enform.
January 2008
129
1.14. PRACTICES
1.14.1.
SCOPE
The following are specific practices to be followed while drilling a critical sour well. They
include:
Rig inspections
BOP / Casing andchoke manifold pressure testing
BOP drills
Tripping
Drill stem testing
Directional surveying
Coring
Fishing operations
Logging
Casing running and cementing
1.14.2.
IRP RIG INSPECTION
A detailed inspection shall be conducted:
Prior to drilling out the surface casing
Prior to drilling out the intermediate casing
Within the 24-hour period prior to penetrating the critical zone (if intermediate
casing is set immediately above the critical zone, this inspection would coincide with
the one above)
The operator must notify the appropriate governmental agency 48 hours prior these
inspections
In addition, the operator and the contractor shall conduct a weekly detailed rig inspection.
An inspection check sheet shall be used, dated and signed by the operator's wellsite
supervisor and the rig manager, and retained.
The inspection must include:
130
Pressure testing all equipment and casing in accordance the appropriate

governmental requirements such as ERCB Directive 036: Drilling Blowout Prevention
Requirements and Procedures.
January 2008
1.14.3.
BOP, CASING AND CHOKE MANIFOLD PRESSURE TESTING
1.14.3.1.
IRP BOP Pressure Testing
The BOP's shall be pressure tested (see IRP 1.5.10.2 IRP Pressure Testing):
At surface casing
Prior to drilling our intermediate and production casing.
While in the critical zone, every 30 days (minimum).
The pressure test shall be in accordance with the relevant governmental regulations.
1.14.3.2.
IRP Casing Pressure Testing
The intermediate casing shall be pressure tested prior to drilling out.

While in the critical zone, the casing integrity shall be evaluated either through a pressure
test, or appropriate casing wear log, every 30 days (minimum).
Consideration should be give for more frequent casing integrity evaluation if well conditions
indicate excessive casing wear (e.g., high dog legs, rig misalignment, wear on wear
bushing, metal contamination in drilling fluids, etc.)
1.14.3.3.
IRP Choke Manifold Pressure Testing
The Choke manifold shall be pressure tested (see IRP 1.6.8.2 IRP Choke Manifold Pressure
Testing Procedures
Choke Manifold Pressure Testing Procedures):
At surface casing
Prior to drilling our intermediate and production casing
After any use
The pressure test shall be in accordance with the relevant governmental regulations.
1.14.4.
BOP DRILLS
1.14.4.1.
IRP BOP Drills
Prior to entering the critical zone, each driller and crew must have an adequate
understanding of:
the correct operation of all the kick detection and monitoring equipment
as well as their well control duties as required to control a kick while drilling, tripping
and out of the hole
January 2008
131
To confirm crew competence, a detailed BOP drill shall be conducted and documented by
each rig crew:
Prior to drilling out the surface casing
Prior to drilling out the intermediate casing or prior to penetrating the critical zone
The crews must demonstrate competence before proceeding
At least two per week while in the critical zone
1.14.5.
TRIPPING PRACTICES
1.14.5.1.
IRP Trip Supervision
While in the critical zone, each trip must be preplanned by the operator's wellsite supervisor
and a pre-job safety meeting held with each crew participating in the trip.
While in the critical zone, a wellsite supervisor or rig manager with a Second Line BOP
certification must be on duty during all trips.
1.14.5.2.
IRP Hole Fill
The hole must be filled to surface after every 15 singles (maximum) of drill pipe, and after
every three singles (maximum) of drill collars are pulled.
Weighted pills should be used to ensure the pipe pulls dry.
The practice of leaving the fluid level partially down the annulus in order to pull dry pipe is
not allowed.
1.14.5.3.
IRP Trip Record
A trip record must be made for every trip during the well.
Each trip record must be signed and dated by the operator's well site supervisor and the
contractor's rig manager.
All trip records for the well must be kept and made available for inspection at the well site
until rig release.
Each trip record must show the actual volume required each time the hole is filled as
specified in IRP 1.14.5.2 IRP Hole Fill.
The cumulative total fill volume must also be recorded after each successive fill.
On the same page, the record must also show the theoretical value required at each fill
point, plus the theoretical cumulative fill volumes.
132
January 2008
1.14.5.4.
IRP Flow Checks
Whenever any of the direct or indirect indicators of a kick are noticed, a flow check should
be made. The well should be observed for 5 to 15 minutes to see if any flow occurs.
Rotating the string slowly during this time should be considered.
Flow checks should be conducted:
Tripping Out
After pulling 5% of the drill pipe
At the mid point depth of the wellbore
Prior to pulling the first stand of drill collars
Drill string out of hole
Hole continuously monitored
Tripping in
Upon reaching the surface casing point
At the mid point depth of the wellbore
Record the depth and time of all flow checks in the tour book.
As a check on the correct amount of overbalance, a 10 stand wiper trip should be made and
bottoms up circulated prior to pulling out of the hole the first trip after penetrating the
critical zone (also included in IRP 1.10.2.2 IRP Drilling Fluid Density Check: Wiper Trips)
1.14.6.
DRILL STEM TESTING
Critical sour zones shall not be drill stem tested.
1.14.7.
DIRECTIONAL SURVEYING
1.14.7.1.
IRP Directional Surveying
The location of the wellbore must be known in order to allow a relief well to be drilled.
Prior to entering the critical zone, directional surveys (azimuth & inclination) are required at
a maximum interval of 150 m when the wellbore is less than three degree inclination, or a
maximum interval of 60 m when the wellbore is at an inclination greater than 3 deg.
This survey could be a wellbore survey (e.g., Multishot, gyro, or logging survey) prior to
entering the critical zone.
January 2008
133
1.14.8.
CORING
1.14.8.1.
IRP Coring
If coring in the critical zone:
It is advisable to penetrate the upper porous interface prior to coring, however, if the
interface must be cored, the ability to circulate above the core barrel must be
available (e.g., a ported string).
After tripping in the core barrel, bottoms up must be circulated and the wellbore
confirmed dead prior to coring.
After coring, a 10 stand wiper trip should be made and bottoms up circulated prior to
pulling out of the hole for the core barrel
1.14.9.
FISHING OPERATIONS
1.14.9.1.
IRP Fishing Operations: Downhole Floats
For normal drilling operations, IRP 1.8.10 Downhole Floats that a downhole float be used.
However, for most trips made during fishing operations this option is not available due to
fishing tool requirements, etc.
Extra care must be taken making these trips:
Always circulate at least one bottoms up before tripping out.
Extra diligence on tripping procedures: flow checks, hole fill, reduced tripping speed.
Confirm crew competence of installing the stabbing valve.
Consideration should be given to run a profile sub that would provide the option of
setting a back pressure float, or plug, etc.
The system shall be tested for pressure integrity, recognizing that, depending on the
configuration, it may not be possible to test all connections.
All components of the system must be secured properly to prevent excessive

movement.
1.14.9.2.
IRP Fishing Operations: Through Drill Pipe Wireline Operations
Through drill pipe wireline operations: A lubricator and associated bleed off system shall be
used while running wireline tools inside drill pipe:
134
All piping, valves, hoses, and manifolds should be checked for appropriate pressure
rating and the materials must be suitable for sour service, as per the requirements
for Choke Manifolds IRP 1.6 Choke Manifold.
The complete system should be pressure rated to at least the working pressure of
the BOP Stack.
January 2008
1.14.9.3.
IRP Fishing Operations: Retrieving Open Hole Logging Tools
For retrieving stuck open hole logging tools, it is recommended that the cut and thread
technique not be used.
If considered, a full hazard and operability review should be done.
1.14.10.
LOGGING
1.14.10.1. IRP Logging

Prior to open hole logging operations, the well wellbore shall be confirmed to be in an
overbalanced condition with no formation fluids in the wellbore. A wiper trip, as outlined in
1.10.2.2 IRP Drilling Fluid Density Check: Wiper Trips may be warranted.
A logging job pre plan review should be conducted with the logging contractor to identify
any potential issues. Consideration should be given to the use of a lubricator. If a lubricator
is used, it must conform to 1.14.9.2 IRP Fishing Operations: Through Drill Pipe Wireline
Operations.
The wireline and tools should be treated with an appropriate inhibitor.
The hole must monitored continuously for any indications of flow.
For drill pipe conveyed logging, the pipe to logging tool connector shall be sour service
material.
1.14.11.
CASING / LINER RUNNING
1.14.11.1. IRP Casing / Liner Running

Prior to running casing / liner across the sour zone, the well wellbore shall be confirmed to
be in an overbalanced condition with no formation fluids in the wellbore. A wiper trip, as
outlined in1.10.2.2 IRP Drilling Fluid Density Check: Wiper Trips, may be warranted.
A casing / liner running job pre plan review should be conducted, and a cementing job pre
plan review should be conducted, to revise / confirm the original plan based on current well
conditions.
After running and cementing casing, prior to removing the BOPs, one of the following
should be done:
The casing primary seal must be energized (i.e., run through the BOP), and/or
The cement must provide a hydraulic seal across the sour zone (i.e., enough setting
time elapsed for the cement to provide a hydraulic seal)
After running and cementing a liner, the pressure integrity of the liner lap should be tested
prior to removing the BOPs. The casing should be cleaned to the top of the liner and a
positive or negative pressure test conducted.
Consideration can be given to changing BOP rams to casing rams, depending on casing
design. If casing rams are not used, there must be the appropriate crossovers from casing
to drill pipe readily available.
January 2008
135
1.14.12.
REVIEWS AND SAFETY MEETINGS
1.14.12.1. IRP Pre Job Safety Meeting

Immediately prior to starting critical sour drilling operations, a pre-job safety meeting must
be conducted with all personnel on location.
It should include a review of the project plan.
1.14.12.2. IRP Emergency Response Plan Meeting

Immediately prior to drilling into the potential sour zones, an Emergency Response Plan
(ERP) meeting must be conducted with all personnel involved with the ERP to review the
ERP.
The operator, its contractors, board staff, and the government departments and agencies
listed in the ERP should attend.
1.14.12.3. IRP Safety / Operational Meetings

When in critical zone, a short meeting must be conducted to review upcoming operations:
prior to each shift or crew change,
prior to a significant change in operations (e.g., tripping, logging, etc)
The meeting should include ALL personnel on location and should be documented on the
tour sheet.
1.14.13.
WEAR BUSHING
1.14.13.1. IRP Wear Bushing

Wear bushings should be run unless it can be demonstrated that there will be minimal
potential for significant wear in the BOP / wellhead area (e.g., short duration of drilling with
a downhole motor with minimal drill string rotation and trips).
136
January 2008

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CRITICAL SOUR DRILLING

AN INDUSTRY RECOMMENDED PRACTICE (IRP)

Critical Sour Drilling

Acknowledgements and Scope .................................................................1

1.1.1. Acknowledgements and Disclaimer .....................................................1

Hazard Assessment ................................................................................11

1.2.1. Scope ................................................................................................11

1.3.1. Scope ................................................................................................23

IRP Project Approval ..............................................................23

1.3.3. Project Plan.......................................................................................23

IRP Project Plan ....................................................................23

1.3.4. Emergency Response Plan.................................................................27

IRP Emergency Response Plan .................................................27

1.3.5. Well Types.........................................................................................30

Casing Design and Metallurgy ................................................................33

1.4.1. Scope ................................................................................................33

Critical Sour Drilling

1.4.2. Casing Design: General .....................................................................33

IRP Collapse Design ...............................................................34

1.4.4. Casing Tension Design Specifications ................................................34

IRP Casing Tension Design ......................................................34

1.4.5. Casing Burst Design Specification .....................................................35

IRP Casing Burst Design .........................................................35

1.4.6. Environmental Degradation Mechanisms...........................................36

IRP Sour Service Casing Grades...............................................37

1.4.8. IRP High Temperature Sour Service Casing Grades ...........................37

IRP Additional Casing Specifications .........................................38

NACE Testing Protocols .......................................................42

1.4.11.1. IRP NACE Testing Protocols .....................................................42

Manufacturer Pre Qualification............................................45

1.4.13.1. IRP Manufacturer Pre Qualification ........................................45

J55 and K55 Casing: HIC Test Requirements .......................46

Electric Resistance Welded (ERW) Casing ........................47

1.4.16.1. IRP ERW Casing: Pressure Test Requirements............................47

Casing Identification ...........................................................47

1.4.17.1. IRP Casing Identification .........................................................47

1.4.18.1. IRP Inspection of New, Compliant Casing ..................................47

Intermediate Casing Setting Depth .....................................48

1.4.20.1. IRP Intermediate Casing: Setting Depth....................................48

Critical Sour Drilling

1.4.20.2. IRP Intermediate Casing: Exemption ........................................48

Re Entry Wells: General ....................................................49

1.4.21.1. IRP Re Entry Wells: General .................................................49

Blowout Preventer Stack ........................................................................51

1.5.1. Scope ................................................................................................51

IRP Configuration ..................................................................51

IRP Pipe Ram Sizes ................................................................51

1.5.3. Shear Blind Rams ..............................................................................55

IRP Shear Blind Ram Use Requirements ....................................56

IRP Shear Blind Ram Design Requirements................................56

1.5.4. BOP Stack Auxiliary Equipment .........................................................56

IRP Pressure Rating ...............................................................58

IRP Casing Bowls ...................................................................58

1.5.6. BOP Metallic Materials for Sour Service .............................................58

IRP Metallic Material Requirements...........................................58

IRP Bolting Requirements .......................................................59

1.5.7. NonMetallic Materials Requirements for Sour Service .....................59

IRP Non-Metallic Material Requirements for Sour Wells................59

1.5.8. BOP Transportation, Rigging Up and Maintenance ............................60

1.5.8.1 IRP Hydraulic Pump Requirements ................................60

IRP BOP Master Control Station Location ...................................61

IRP Minimum Accumulator Sizing .............................................61

BOP Inspection and Servicing Requirements ......................62