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Mediterranean Sea[8] but would ultimately steam to within a few miles of the Sinai
Peninsula.
On the night of June 7 Washington time, early morning on June 8, 01:10Z or 3:10 AM
local time, the Pentagon issued an order to 6th Fleet headquarters to tell the Liberty to
come no closer than 100 nmi (120 mi; 190 km) to Israel, Syria, or the Sinai coast (Oren,
p. 263). [1](pages 5 and Exhibit N, page 58).
According to the Naval Court of Inquiry[9](p. 23 ff, p. 111 ff) and National Security
Agency official history[10], the order to withdraw was not broadcast on the frequencies
that the Liberty crew was monitoring for orders until 15:25 Zulu, hours after the attack,
due to a long series of administrative and communications problems. The Navy said a
large volume of unrelated high-precedence traffic, including intelligence intercepts
related to the conflict, was being handled at the time and it also faulted a shortage of
qualified radio men as a contributing factor to the failure to send the withdrawal message
to Liberty in time.[9](p. 111 ff)
During the morning of the attack, early June 8, the ship was overflown by Israeli Air
Force (IAF) aircraft including a Nord Noratlas "flying boxcar" and Mirage III jet fighters
eight times.[11][12] At least some of those flybys were from a close range.[13]. At about
5:45 a.m. Sinai time (GMT +2), reports were first received at Israeli Central Coastal
Command (CCC) about the Liberty, identified by pilots as a Destroyer and the vessel was
placed on the plot board using a red marker, indicating an unknown vessel. At 6:03 a.m.
that morning, the Nord identified the ship as a U.S. supply ship, though the marker was
only changed from the red 'unknown ship' to a green 'neutral ship' at 9 a.m., when CCC
was ordered to do so after naval command inquired as to the marker's status. Also around
9 a.m. an Israeli jet reported that a ship north of El-Arish had opened fire on him after he
tried to identify the vessel, resulting in naval command dispatching two destroyers to
investigate. These destroyers returned to previous positions at 9:40 a.m. after doubts
emerged during debriefing over the pilot's claim of receiving fire. When the Nord landed
and its naval observer was debriefed, the ship was further identified as the USS Liberty
based on its "GTR-5" markings.[14] Many Liberty crewmen gave testimony that one of
the aircraft flew so close to Liberty that its propellers rattled the deck plating of the ship,
and the pilots waved to the crew of Liberty, and the crewmen waved back.[15]. The ship
was removed from CCC's plot board at 11 am, due to its positional information being
stale.[16]
At 11:24 a.m., the Central Coastal Command received the first of several reports that El
Arish, on the Sinai coast was being shelled from the sea, and half an hour later sent three
torpedo boats to investigate. This was near the Liberty's position.
The ship, at this time, was slowly heading westward, in international waters, along the
northern coast of the Sinai Peninsula. By 2 p.m, this course took the Liberty
approximately 45 km (28 mi) from its last sighting by IAF pilots.[citation needed]
At 1:41 p.m., the torpedo boats detected a target "20 miles northwest of El Arish and 14
miles off the coast of Bardawil" on their radar.[17] The Combat Information Center
officer on the torpedo boat Division flagship, "Ensign Yifrach Aharon, reported that the
target had been detected at a range of 22 miles, that her speed had been tracked for a few
minutes, after which he had determined that the target was moving westward at a speed
of 30 knots. These data were forwarded to the Fleet Operations Control Center."[17]
The speed of the target was significant because it indicated that the target was a combat
vessel.[17] "The Chief of Naval Operations asked the [torpedo boat] Division to doublecheck their calculations."[17] "A few minutes later, the Division Commander reported
that the target, now 17 miles from him, was moving at a speed of 28 knots" on a different
heading.[18] "Since the Division was cruising at the same speed as the target, and
therefore could not intercept it the Division commander requested that IAF planes be
dispatched."[17]
At 1:48 p.m., the Chief of Naval Operations requested dispatch of IAF fighter aircraft to
the ship's location.[19] Two Mirage III type aircraft arrived at the ship at about 2:00 p.m.
[17] The formation leader, Captain Spector, reported the vessel appeared like some type
of non-Israeli warship.[17] Authorization to attack was issued by the chief air controller,
Lieutenant Colonel Shmuel Kislev, immediately after a recorded exchange between a
command headquarters weapons systems officer, one of the air controllers, and the chief
air controller questioning a possible American presence.[20]