Professional Documents
Culture Documents
8 April 2015
Submitted by:
KRISHA MARIE T. BUELA
Wednesday Class | 3:00-7:00 p.m.
Table of Contents
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES ................................................................................... 14
A. Preliminary Attachment (Rule 57) ................................................................ 14
ANITA MANGILA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LORETA GUINA ............ 14
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN .......................................... 15
ALEJANDRO NG WEE vs. MANUEL TANKIANSEE .................................... 18
SOFIA TORRES et al. vs. NICANOR SATSATIN et al. .................................... 19
B. Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58) .................................................................. 20
TERESITA V. IDOLOR vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS et. al ...................... 20
RIMEO S. GUSTILO vs. HON. RICARDO S. REAL, SR. ................................ 22
MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS vs. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB (PHIL.) et al. ...... 23
NELSON JENOSA et al. vs. REV. FR. JOSE RENE C. DELARIARTE, O.S.A.
et al. ...................................................................................................................... 24
SOLID BUILDERS, INC. and MEDINA FOODS INDUSTRIES, INC. vs.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION (CBC) ..................................................... 25
SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA et al. vs. GUILLERMO LUSTIVA et. al. . 26
C. Receivership (Rule 59) .................................................................................... 28
SPS. CESAR A. LARROBIS, JR. and VIRGINIA S. LARROBIS vs.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK ....................................................................... 28
EVELINA G. CHAVEZ and AIDA CHAVEZ-DELES vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ATTY. FIDELA Y. VARGAS .................................................... 29
ANA MARIA A. KORUGA vs. TEODORO O. ARCENAS et al. ..................... 30
D. Replevin (Rule 60) ........................................................................................... 31
JOSE S. OROSA and MARTHA P. OROSA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and FCP CREDIT CORPORATION ................................................................... 31
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. vs. REGINA M. ASTORGA ................. 32
KENNETH HAO vs. ABE C. ANDRES ............................................................. 33
ROGER V. NAVARRO vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO and KAREN T. GO .. 34
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS
BANK, INC. ......................................................................................................... 36
E. Support (Rule 61) ............................................................................................ 37
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The rules provide for certain remedies in cases where personal service could not be
effected on a party. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that
whenever the defendants "whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication
in a newspaper of general circulation x x x." Thus, if petitioners whereabouts could
not be ascertained after the sheriff had served the summons at her given address,
then respondent could have immediately asked the court for service of summons by
publication on petitioner.
Private respondent never showed that she effected substituted service on petitioner
after her personal service failed. Likewise, if it were true that private respondent
could not ascertain the whereabouts of petitioner after a diligent inquiry, still she
had some other recourse under the Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, as private
respondent also claims that petitioner was abroad at the time of the service of
summons, this made petitioner a resident who is temporarily out of the country.
This is the exact situation contemplated in Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, providing for service of summons by publication.
NB: The SCs disquisition on the required prior or contemporaneous service of
summons never touch the private respondents argument as to exceptions to the
compliance of the said requirement.
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Respondent admits that his court was not vested with the power or jurisdiction to
annul the proclamation, but seeks to justify his action on the ground that the
proclamation was void ab initio. In so doing, respondent wantonly usurped a power
exclusively vested by law in the COMELEC.
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ALMEDA
vs.
BATHALA
FACTS:
Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, renewed its Contract of Lease with
Ponciano L. Almeda with the following terms: (1) leased property is 7,348.25
square meters of the Almeda Compound in Pasong Tamo; (2) for a monthly rental
of P1,107,348.69; (4) term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent dealt
with petitioners, Poncianos heirs.
On two separate dates, petitioners advised respondent that the formers monthly
rentals shall be inclusive of VAT and that monthly rental shall be increased by 73%.
Petitioners asserted that the changes in the monthly rental is pursuant to condition
no. 6 and 7 of the contract of lease.
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners
but continued to pay the stipulated amount set forth in their contract. On February
18, 1998, respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of
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The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned.
Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the existence and the role of
each House is essential considering that the Constitution employs precise language
in laying down the functions which particular House plays, regardless of whether
the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether
in the exercise of its legislative or its non-legislative functions such as inter alia, the
power of appropriation, the declaration of an existence of a state of war, canvassing
of electoral returns for the President and Vice-President, and impeachment, the
dichotomy of each House must be acknowledged and recognized considering the
interplay between these two Houses. In all these instances, each House is
constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and with
keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in
consonance with the principle of checks and balances, as to the other branches of
government.
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C. Review of Judgments and Final Orders of COMELEC and COA (Rule 64)
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD) vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013
FACTS:
On 7 November 2012, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution canceling
petitioners Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation.
In the assailed Resolution dated 11 May 2013, the COMELEC affirmed the
cancellation of petitioners Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and
disqualified it from participating in the 2013 Elections. The COMELEC held that
while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party lacking in well-defined political
constituencies, its disqualification still subsists for violation of election laws and
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2. Prohibition (Section 2)
ALFEO D. VIVAS vs. THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 191424, August 7, 2013
FACTS:
On March 4, 2010, the MB issued Resolution No. 27623 placing Eurocredit
Bank under receivership. Assailing MB Resolution No. 276, Vivas (member of
Eurocredit Bank new management team) filed this petition for prohibition
before this Court, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting
Eurocredit Bank from continuing its banking business and for placing it under
receivership.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy to assail
an order of the BSP to place a bank under receivership.
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HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Vivas Availed of the Wrong Remedy.
To begin with, Vivas availed of the wrong remedy. The MB issued Resolution
No. 276, dated March 4, 2010, in the exercise of its power under R.A. No. 7653.
Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB placing a bank under
conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may not be restrained or set aside
except on a petition for certiorari. Pertinent portions of Section 30, R.A. 7653
read: x x x x The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or
under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be
restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the
ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave
abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition
for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the
majority of the capital stock within ten (10) days from receipt by the board of
directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, liquidation or
conservatorship.
Prohibition is already unavailing. Granting that a petition for prohibition is
allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the circumstances obtaining.
Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court
prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and
confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to
restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction
over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of
which it has cognizance.
Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered
which would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission
of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of
prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is
not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.
Though couched in imprecise terms, this petition for prohibition apparently
seeks to prevent the acts of closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership.
Resolution No. 276, however, had already been issued by the MB and the
closure of ECBI and its placement under receivership by the PDIC were already
accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate.
Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is
already a fait accompli.
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HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Settled is the rule that for the courts to exercise
the power of judicial review, the following must be extant: (1) there must be an
actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be
ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have the "standing."
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
mere hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety
of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence. Closely related thereto is that the question must be ripe for
adjudication. A question is considered ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
A mere issuance stating a possible liability and requiring a person to comment
thereon cannot be considered an actual controversy over which the power of
judicial review may be exercise by way of petition for prohibition.
In this case, petitioners action for prohibition was premature. The audit
investigative process was still in its initial phase. There was yet no Notice of
Disallowance issued. And, even granting that the AOM issued to petitioner
Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or resolution of the Auditor
or that such AOM is already tantamount to a directive for petitioner Corales to
reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for
prohibition is premature since there are still many administrative remedies
available to petitioners to contest the said AOM.
Prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the
defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to
be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is "no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
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HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is
employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that
is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a
well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it
must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be
done.
When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to
compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws
are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific
interest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the
enforcement of the citys ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of
petitioners to institute this proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the
duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief
executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as
it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.21 He has
no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged
invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were
to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the
lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
Assuming that the allegations of neglect on the part of the COA were true,
Office Order No. 2011-698 does not offer the strongest certainty that they would
not be replicated in the future. In the first place, Office Order No. 2011-698 did
not state any legal justification as to why, after decades of not auditing the
accounts of the MECO, the COA suddenly decided to do so. Neither does it
state any determination regarding the true status of the MECO. The
justifications provided by the COA, in fact, only appears in the memorandum it
submitted to this Court for purposes of this case.
HELD:
No. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person
to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy
the privilege.
A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office,
even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from
the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as
such, but always against the person to determine whether he is constitutionally
and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office
to which he lays claim. In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed
by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial
court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against
respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores.
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HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time
thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to
take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with
the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value
of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders
of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court
authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the
Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government
depositary.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to
forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly
submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties. Thus, a
writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government
of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon
deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value
of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these
requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. In this
case, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty
of the trial court to issue the writ of possession.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the
requirements laid down in 9-10 of R.A. No. 7279 and reiterated in the Filstream
ruling. This is error. The ruling in Filstream was necessitated because an order of
condemnation had already been issued by the trial court in that case. Thus, the
judgment in that case had already become final. In this case, the trial court has not
gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to
determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements
provided in R.A. No. 7279. It is, therefore, premature at this stage of the
proceedings to find that petitioner resorted to expropriation without first trying the
other modes of acquisition enumerated in 10 of the law.
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All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R.
No. 167998 was rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review
of decisions and rulings of the CA. It was a judgment on the merits of Planters
Banks's right to apply for and be issued a writ of possession. Lastly, the parties in
G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved in the present case.
The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in
nature. It is a judicial proceeding brought for the benefit of one party only and
without notice by the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding
wherein relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought
an opportunity to be heard.
By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a nonlitigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of
possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court,
by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a wrong or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. (Citations omitted)
Given the ex-parte nature of the proceedings for a writ of possession, the R TC did
not err in cancelling the previously scheduled hearing and in granting Planters
Bank's motion without affording notice to LZK Holdings or allowing it to
participate.
NB: Was the initial decision of the trial court, which was affirmed by CA and SC,
declaring the consolidated title of Planters Bank null and void abrogated by the
subsequent decision of the SC upholding the issuance of the writ of possession?
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ISSUE: Whether or not the act of presenting falsified documents before a court
constitutes direct contempt.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The use of falsified and forged documents is a
contumacious act. However, it constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt.
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 71, such act is an improper conduct which degrades the
administration of justice. In Santos v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI,
we ruled that the imputed use of a falsified document, more so where the falsity of
the document is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes indirect contempt, and
as such is subject to such defenses as the accused may raise in the proper
proceedings. Thus, following Section 3, Rule 71, a contemner may be punished only
after a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity has been given to the
accused to be heard by himself and counsel. Moreover, settled is the rule that a
contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a separate proceeding of a criminal
nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction. Thus, the modes of
procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far
as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions. Perforce, petitioner judge
erred in declaring summarily that respondents are guilty of direct contempt and
ordering their incarceration. She should have conducted a hearing with notice to
respondents.
On December 9, 2002, then Presiding Judge Bruselas issued an Order for the
immediate implementation of the September 10, 2002 Order. On several occasions,
petitioners failed to comply with the directive to produce documents for inspection.
On September 3, 2007, the trial court issued an order directing the defendants to
strictly comply with this September 10, 2002 order. Failure of the defendants to
comply with all the requirements of the order dated September 10, 2002 will
result in this court citing all the defendants in contempt of court. This Court
shall order defendants solidarily to pay a fine of P10,000.00 for every day of
delay to comply with the order of September 10, 2002 until the defendants shall
have fully and completely complied with the said order.
Further sanctions shall be meted upon defendants should the Court find that
defendants have been in bad faith in complying with the order of September 10,
2002 despite the order of this Court.
Petitioners questioned the aforesaid Resolution via Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioners claim that the threatened citation for contempt is not in line with the
policy that there should be willfulness or that the contumacious act be done
deliberately in disregard of the authority of the court. CA ruled that there is no
indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not an order of the court stating that failure to strictly comply
with it will result to the persons being directed thereby to be cited for contempt
constitutes a final order in an indirect contempt proceeding. Hence it violates due
process.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated
as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or
final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the
Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only serves as a reminder to caution
petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance of the long-overdue
order to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the
requested records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal to comply with
the directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect contempt
proceedings pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing
jurisprudence.
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In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any
error.
Finally, it should be noted that Petitioner opposed the petition for the appointment
of respondent as guardian before the trial court because, among other reasons, she
felt she was disliked by respondent, a ground which does not render respondent
unsuitable for appointment as guardian. Furthermore, Petitioner concealed the
deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial court, which is reflective of a
lack of good faith.
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LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
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HELD:
Yes. With Biasons demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with
resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship
of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the
guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to
delve into the propriety of Biasons appointment since the juridical tie between him
and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition,
will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief.
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The local civil registrar is thus an indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much
less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it
granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to
the filing of the complaint including the judgment.
NB: SC ruled that granting of correction of name is invalid for failure to comply
with the provisions of Rule 108 but failed to discuss whether correction of name
may be prayed for in a petition for adoption.
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ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.
3
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery
of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name.
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H. Prerogative Writs
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ et al. vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO
DEL ROSARIO, et al.
G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008
FACTS:
Private respondents spouses Sanson claiming to be owners of 1+ hectare parcel of
land located at Boracay filed complaint for forcible entry on the ground of force,
intimidation and threats and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners. The MCTC rendered a
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HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of
a final judgment affirmed with finality by the Supreme Court, is not included among
the enumeration of rights as stated in Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their
dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment
adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is,
therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that there was
no sufficient evidence to conclude that Col. Kasims disclosure unequivocally
points to some government complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis. Specifically,
the petitioners contend that Supreme Court erred in unduly relying on the raw
information given to Col. Kasim by a personal intelligence "asset" without any other
evidence to support it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of Writ of Amparo on the basis of a hearsay
evidence is valid.
HELD:
Yes. although the Kasim evidence was patently hearsay (and was thus incompetent
and inadmissible under our rules of evidence), the unique evidentiary difficulties
posed by enforced disappearance cases compel us to adopt standards that were
appropriate and responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. We noted that while
we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must also observe flexibility in
considering the evidence that we shall take into account. Thus, we introduced a new
evidentiary standard for Writ of Amparo cases in this wise:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence
adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible
under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test
of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all the other pieces of adduced evidence, Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this minimum test.
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HELD:
(1)
Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7
and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in
determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners.
These administrative order issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where
an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on
any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress.
It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the Government.
Venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an
action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of
the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place
of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts. Consequently, the RTCs
motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction is patently incorrect. At most, the error committed by the petitioners in
filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue.
Similarly, it would serve the higher interest of justice if the Court orders the transfer
of Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution,
with the RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of the case.
(2)
The RTCs mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is
apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under
Section 4(c), Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit: Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by
a court in an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually
pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an
environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall
subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule
8, Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains
jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is
performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance
of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision
that a final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that
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HELD:
Yes. An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder, homicide, or parricide that
meets the conditions of admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent
jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as a part of the res gestae,
or both.
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay
character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur,
namely: (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time the declaration is
made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death - There is
ample authority for the view that the declarants belief in the imminence of his death
can be shown by the declarants own statements or from circumstantial evidence,
such as the nature of his wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion
of his physician; (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) that
the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide,
in which the declarant is a victim.
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his ante-mortem
statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him. At
the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having
sustained a stab wound in the chest. Bolanon would have been competent to testify
on the subject of the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was
offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae
and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a
startling occurrence; (b) the statements are made before the declarant had
time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae concur
herein. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was
referring to a startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon was then
on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital, and thus had no time to
contrive his identification of Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about
Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the
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ISSUE: Whether or not a court may take judicial notice of the testimony of one
witness in a case pending before it and use the same to another case also pending
with it.
HELD:
No. As a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the
same court, or have been heard and are actually pending before the same judge. This
is especially true in criminal cases, where the accused has the constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial
notice of the testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in
deciding the cases against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied
due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive identification made
by some of the kidnap victims. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous crossexaminations conducted by appellants counsel.
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C. Rules of Admissibility
1. Object/Real Evidence
JUNIE MALILLIN Y. LOPEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008
FACTS:
On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure, a team of five police officers
raided the residence of petitioner. The search allegedly yielded two (2) plastic
sachets of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels
of the said substance. Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under RA 9165.
Accused was convicted. He appealed from the said decision and averred that
there was irregularity on the conduct of the search.
During the trial, the following persons were presented as witnesses: (1) two
members of the raiding team, i.e., Esternon and Bulanon; and (2) the forensic
chemist who examined the seized items. The member of the raiding team who
conducted the recording and marking of the seized items were not presented.
Furthermore the item seized was immediately sent to the laboratory without
presenting the same to the judge who issued the warrant. Furthermore, the
forensic chemist admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to the laboratory
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2. Documentary Evidence
Best Evidence Rule
CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD vs. EFREN S. TEODORO
G.R. No. 150905. September 23, 2003
FACTS:
Respondent made various purchases through his credit card. Accordingly, he
was billed by petitioner for those purchases, for which he tendered various
payments. However, as of January 20, 1995, petitioner claims that respondent
was not able to pay his bills despite demand. This prompted petitioner to file a
Complaint for collection. During the trial, petitioner presented several sales
invoices or charge slips. Because all these copies appeared to bear the signatures
of respondent, the trial court deemed them sufficient proof of his purchases with
the use of the credit card. Accordingly, the MTC ordered him to pay petitioner
the amount of P24,388.36 plus interest and penalty fee.
On appeal, RTC affirmed the MTC Decision in toto. However, CA reversed the
decision of the trial court and ruled that photocopies of the sales invoices or
charge slips as proof of the obligation are insufficient to prove any liability on
respondents part.
ISSUE: Whether or not mere photocopies as proof of obligations is admissible
as evidence where unavailability of the original thereof was not explained or
proved during trial.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The original copies of the sales invoices are the
best evidence to prove the alleged obligation following Section 3, Rule 130.
Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are
inadmissible because petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the
exceptions provided under Section 35 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of
the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
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(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated
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Parole Evidence
RAFAEL S. ORTAEZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 107372. January 23, 1997
FACTS:
Private respondents sold to petitioner two (2) parcels of registered land for a
consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively as evidence by two
(2) deed of sale.
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but
failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. When the latter demanded from the
former the delivery of said titles, Private respondents, refused on the ground that
the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, and petitioners
acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before
the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged
the existence of the following oral conditions which were never reflected in the
deeds of sale
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Electronic Evidence
HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN vs. ALBERTO C.
COMORPOSA et al.
G.R. No. 152807, August 12, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondents and alleged
that the disputed property was owned by Marcos Saez, predecessor of
petitioners; that Marcos son Adolfo, for humanitarian reasons, allowed
respondents to occupy a portion of Marcos Saez land without paying any rental.
On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the
premises but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they were
the legitimate claimants and the actual and lawful possessors of the premises.
MTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. On appeal, RTC reversed the
said decision. Affirming the RTC, the CA upheld the right of respondents as
claimants and possessors. The CA lend credence to the Certification issued by
the DENRs community environment and natural resources (CENR) officer was
proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still alienable
and was not yet allocated to any person. Therefore, respondents after
sufficiently proving their actual, physical, open, notorious, exclusive,
continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960 have better right to
possess alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Hence, this Petition, petitioners avers that CA gravely abuse its discretion in
giving weight to the CENR Officers Certification, which only bears the
facsimile of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda.
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3. Testimonial Evidence
a. Qualifications: one who can perceive and perceiving can make known
his perception
i. Ability to observe/perceive
ii. Ability to recall/remember
iii. Ability to relate/communicate
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C.
FACTS:
Benjamin Manaloto sold the conjugal lot without his wifes consent by forging
the latters signature in a contract of sale. Hence, Benjamin was charged with
falsification of public document by his wife.
At the trial, the prosecution called the complainant-wife to the witness stand but
the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking the Marital
Disqualification Rule under Sec. 20, Rule 130. The prosecution opposed said
motion to disqualify on the ground that the case falls under the exception to the
rule, contending that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against
the other."
ISSUE: Whether or not a wife may testify against her husband in a criminal
case for falsification of public document done by forging the signature of the
wife a contract of sale of conjugal property.
HELD:
The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case
for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness wife.
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c. Testimonial Privilege
d. Admissions
OSCAR CONSTANTINO et al. vs. HEIRS OF CONSTANTINO
G.R. No. 181508, October 02, 2013
FACTS:
In this case, there are two (2) deed of extrajudicial settlement involving estate
properties of Pedro Constantino, Sr., i.e., one in 1968 involving the 192 sqm
and another in 1992 involving the 240 sqm. The separate Deeds came into being
out of an identical intention of the signatories in both to exclude their co-heirs
of their rightful share in the entire estate of Pedro Sr.
Respondent, who are grandchildren of Pedro Sr. from Pedro Jr., filed a
complaint seeking to annul the 1992 extrajudicial settlement involving the
240sqm lot on the ground that they, who are also heirs of Pedro Sr., were
excluded thereto. On the other hand, Petitioners alleged that the respondents
have no cause of action against them considering that the respondents already
have their lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr. by virtue of the 1968 Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver. During the pre-trial, respondents
admitted that they executed the 1968 Deed to partition the 192 sqm which is the
share of their predecessor Pedro Jr., in Pedro Sr.s Estate.
RTC rendered a Decision finding both plaintiffs and defendants in pari delicto.
On appeal, CA rule in favor of respondent and declared that the 1968 Deed
covering the 192 sq m lot which actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not part
of the estate of Pedro Sr. Hence, heirs of Pedro Jr. (herein respondent), did not
adjudicate the 192 sqm lot unto themselves to the exclusion of all the other heirs
of Pedro Sr. Petitioners now assails the erroneous disregard by the CA of
stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference
ISSUE: Whether or not admissions made during pre-trial are binding upon the
parties.
HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the
party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the
instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule
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e. Confessions
JOSUE R. LADIANA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002
FACTS:
Accused, a member of the Integrated National Police (now PNP), was charged
with murder before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for the death of Fancisco San Juan.
During the trial, Cortez, the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
investigation, testified that the accused executed before him a counter-affidavit
admitting the commission of the crime. Before Cortez was presented as witness,
Defense counsel made an admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and
voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana,
which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. However, Accused Ladiana
allegedly did so in self-defense.
The same counter-affidavit became the basis of SB in convicting the accused.
The court a quo held that his Counter-Affidavit, in which he had admitted to
having fired the fatal shots that caused the victims death, may be used as
evidence against him.
On appeal with the SC, petitioner argued that the counter-affidavit cannot be
considered an extrajudicial confession as the same was executed during
custodial investigation with the assistance of a counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of the commission of an offense while
invoking self-defense in a Counter-affidavit executed during preliminary
investigation without the assistance of a counsel may be admitted as an
extrajudicial confession against him.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as
follows:
"SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
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Dying Declaration
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CESARIO MONTAEZ
G.R. No. 148257, March 17, 2004
FACTS:
Accused was charged of murdering Perlito Ollanes. Prosecution presented
Perlitos brother, Edmund, as witness. Edmund testified that on the day his
brother died the latter upon inquiry as to who shot him answered the Accuseds
name three times.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused may be convicted on account of a witness
testimony recounting the words of a deceased person few moments before the
latter died.
HELD:
Yes. Perlitos statement that it was the appellant who shot him was a dying
declaration. The statement is highly reliable, having been made in extremity
when the declarant is at the point of death and when any hope of survival is
gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and when the mind is induced
by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. Even if the declarant did
not make a statement that he was at the brink of death, the degree and
seriousness of the words and the fact that death superseded shortly afterwards
may be considered as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by the
victim with full realization that he was in a dying condition.
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Family Reputation
FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA
JISON
G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998
FACTS:
Monina Jison filed a petition for recognition as an illegitimate child of petitioner
Francisco Jison. In her complaint, she alleged that: (1) at the end of 1945 or the
start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar (who
was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes); (2)
MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo; (3) since childhood,
she had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of
FRANCISCO by his acts and that of his family; and (4) that FRANCISCO gave
her support and spent for her education, such that she obtained a Master's
degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central
Bank examiner.
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented as documentary evidence letters
written by Franciscos relatives as proof of her recognition as illegitimate
daughter of the latter.
The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, CA reversed the ruling of
the trial court and held that Monina was able to establish her filiation as
FRANCISCO's illegitimate daughter not just preponderant but overwhelming
evidence on record. Francisco elevated the case before the SC and assailed the
admissibility of the letters of his relatives.
ISSUE: Whether or not letter of the relatives of a putative father is admissible
in evidence as part of the family reputation.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative.
Under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of these documents may not be
admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-authors were dead or
unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and
MONINA shown by evidence other than the documents in question.
Neither may it be admitted under under Rule 130, Section 40.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
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HELD:
Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty
especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated,
and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other
competent evidence. Although police blotters are of little probative value, they
are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence
to refute the facts stated therein.
The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of
Court. Under the said rule, the following are the requisites for its admissibility:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially
enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired
by him personally or through official information.
In this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence.
The person who made the entries was likewise presented in court; he identified
and certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The information was
supplied to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest about any
inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him in comparison to the accident
report he made three (3) days after the accident. No explanation was likewise
given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names.
COMMISSION
ON
FACTS:
When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he
stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight
(8) months. Private respondent Florencio Librea filed a Petition to Deny Due
Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate
for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification. He alleged that petitioner
failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of
the Local Government Code.
In order to prove his compliance with the residency requirement, petitioner
presented as evidence his barangay certificate. The COMELEC in disqualifying
the petitioner did not consider the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan
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Commercial Lists
Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING vs. MANILA
ELECTRIC COMPANY
G.R. No. 142943, April 3, 2002
FACTS:
Meralco team conducted their inspection at petitioners meter and found alleged
meter tampering, they immediately disconnected petitioners' electrical supply.
During the inspection the following persons were present, four (4) MERALCO
inspection personnel and the secretary of appellees.
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Learned Treaties
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Child Witness
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN IBAEZ Y ALBANTE
and ALFREDO NULLA Y IBAEZ
G.R. No. 197813, September 25, 2013
FACTS:
Appellants were all charged in an Information for Murder of Wilfredo Atendido
y Dohenog.
The prosecution presented the victims wife, Rowena and minor daughter,
Rachel (10 years old) as witnesses. Rachel testified that she saw the appellants
killed her father. The defense, on the other hand, presented Aniceta as witness
whose testimony discredit that of Rachel. Aniceta testified testified that she and
Rachel were out on that day selling doormats and only returned at 6:00 p.m.
Thus, Rachel could not have witnessed the murder of Wilfredo.
The trial court convicted the accused. The conviction was affirmed by the CA.
Appellant, on appeal with the SC, tried to further discredit Rachels testimony
by arguing that Rachel was a mere child who had studied only until the first
grade of elementary school and could barely read, and did not know how to tell
time.
ISSUE: Whether or not a child witness may be disqualified on the ground that
she does not know how to read and tell time.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative.e With exceptions provided in the Rules of Court,
all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception
to others, may be witnesses. That is even buttressed by the Rule on Examination
of a Child Witness which specifies that every child is presumed qualified to be
a witness. To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party
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h. Opinion Rule
Expert Witness
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PO2 ALBERT ABRIOL et al.
G.R. No. 123137, October 17, 2001
FACTS:
Herein accused was charged and convicted of murder by the trial court. On
appeal, appellants argue that the prosecutions circumstantial evidence against
them is weak, ambiguous, and inconclusive. Specifically, appellants contend
that the testimony of P/Inspector Lemuel Caser, the prosecutions ballistics
expert, clearly shows that: (1) He is ignorant about such ballistics instruments
such as the micrometer, goniometer, and pressure barrel. (2) He is not
conversant with "the required references concerning ballistics," particularly
books on the subject by foreign authorities. (3) He could not "scientifically
determine the caliber of a bullet." Since P/Inspector Caser lacked adequate
training and expertise in ballistics, they claim that his opinion that the test
bullets and cartridges matched the slugs and cartridges recovered from the scene
of the crime was not reliable. Appellants also assail Casers failure to take the
necessary photographs to support his findings.
ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of an expert witness which was given
credence of the trial court may be assailed on appeal on the ground of
incompetence.
HELD:
An expert witness is "one who belongs to the profession or calling to which the
subject matter of the inquiry relates and who possesses special knowledge on
questions on which he proposes to express an opinion." There is no definite
standard of determining the degree of skill or knowledge that a witness must
possess in order to testify as an expert. It is sufficient that the following factors
be present: (1) training and education; (2) particular, first-hand familiarity with
the facts of the case; and (3) presentation of authorities or standards upon which
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Ordinary Witness
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMILIANO DURANAN
G.R. Nos. 134074-75, January 16, 2001
FACTS:
Herein accused was charged with two (2) counts of rape. Complainant Nympha
Lozada, who was 25 years old at the time of the incidents in question, is
considered to be retarded and finished up to the sixth grade only. During the
trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely, complainant Nympha
Lozada y de Lara, complainants mother Virginia de Lara Lozada, and the
attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon.
Accused was convicted by the trial court.
On appeal, Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of rape
since the victims mental age was not proven. He argues that an essential
element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric
evaluation of the complainants mental age to determine if her mental age is
under twelve. He further claims that only in cases where the retardation is
apparent due to the presence of physical deformities symptomatic of mental
retardation can the mental evaluation be waived. In this case, only the mother
of the complainant testified as to the latters metal age and fitness.
ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinary witness testimony on the mental fitness of
the complainant who is a mental retardate may be admissible in evidence.
HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. Rule 130, Section 50 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides: the opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given may
be received in evidence regarding (a) the identity of a person about whom he
has adequate knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient
familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.
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i. Character Evidence
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL DIOPITA y GUZMAN
G.R. No. 130601, December 4, 2000
FACTS:
Accused was charged with Robbery with Rape. During the trial, the accused
was positively identified by the victim as her assailant. The trial court formally
rejected his defense of alibi and convicted him of the crime charged;
consequently, accused-appellant is now before us on appeal. Accused-appellant
in his brief, maintains that it was impossible for him to have committed the
crime charged since he is a person of good moral character, holding as he does
the position of "Ministerial Servant" in the congregation of Jehovahs
Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a righteous person, a responsible family
man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may be acquitted on the ground of his god
moral character.
HELD:
An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good
moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his
conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had
discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since
the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict,
the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.The
fact that accused-appellant is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly
justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his
having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no guarantee
against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed,
religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the unreligious
alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape.
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2. Presumptions
a. Conclusive
IBAAN RURAL BANK INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MR.
and MRS. RAMON TARNATE
G.R. No. 123817, December 17, 1999
FACTS:
Respondent spouses entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage of the lots in question from its original owner Spouses Reyes. As,
Private respondents failed to pay the loan and the bank extra-judicially
foreclosed on the mortgaged lots. At the public auction, the bank was the sole
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4. Official Duty
FILOMENA G. DELOS SANTOS vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013
FACTS:
Congressman Cuenco entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the
Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC) appropriating to the
hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the
Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program. It was agreed that Cuenco shall
identify and recommend the patients who may availed of the program.
Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and
falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the availment of medicines under
the TNT Program surfaced. Consequently, an audit thereof was conducted and
rampant violations of bidding and audit procedure were revealed. Thereafter,
Special Audit Team Supervisor, Boado disallowed the amount of P3,386,697.10
for the payment of drugs and medicines for anti-rabies with falsified
prescription and documents, and holding petitioners, together with other
VSMMC officials, solidarily liable therefor.
By way of defense, petitioners nonetheless argue that VSMMC was merely a
passive entity in the disbursement of funds under the TNT Program and, thus,
invoke good faith in the performance of their respective duties, capitalizing on
the failure of the assailed Decisions of the CoA to show that their lapses in the
implementation of the TNT Program were attended by malice or bad faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not assertion of good faith in the performance of a public
function prevails over factual findings revealing violations of rules and
regulations in the performance of such function.
HELD:
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HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. In cases involving violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers
for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless
there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police
officers.
In this case, the prosecution witnesses were unable to show ill-motive for the
police to impute the crime against Cadidia. Trayvilla was doing her regular duty
as an airport frisker when she handled the accused who entered the x-ray
machine of the departure area. There was no pre-determined notice to
particularly search the accused especially in her private area. The unusual
thickness of the buttocks of the accused upon frisking prompted Trayvilla to
notify her supervisor SPO3 Appang of the incident. The subsequent search of
the accused would only show that the two female friskers were just doing their
usual task when they found the illegal drugs inside accuseds underwear. This
is bolstered by the fact that the accused on the one hand and the two friskers on
the other were unfamiliar to each other. Neither could they harbour any ill-will
against each other. The allegation of frame-up and denial of the accused cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of three prosecution witnesses who
corroborated on circumstances surrounding the apprehension.
5. Cohabitation
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS EDUALINO
G.R. No. 119072, April 11, 1997
FACTS:
Accused Jesus Edualino was charged with consummated rape of a pregnant
woman.
Prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Rowena Nantiza
victim/complainant; Aileen Yayen eyewitness; and Dr. Rogelio Divinagracia
medico-legal. On the other hand, accused-appellant relies on alternative
defenses of alibi and consent on the part of complainant. While accusedappellant's defense before the trial court alleges that he had left the scene of the
incident together with defense witness Calixto Flora, he alternatively raises
before this Court the contention that the elements of the crime of rape have not
been established.
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6. Legitimacy
7. Survivorship
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E. Presentation of Evidence
1. Order of Presentation of Evidence
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO FABRE y
VICENTE
G.R. No. 146697, July 23, 2002
FACTS:
Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court of raping his
own daughter Marilou Fabre.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou, that of Adela
Fabre, her mother and the wife of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon,
the doctor who examined Marilou, along with the medico-legal certificate
issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of Adela, and the criminal complaint
signed by both Marilou and Adela. The defense, during its turn in the
presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the accused himself.
On appeal, the defense argues, that the testimony of appellant should acquire
added strength for the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination
on him and to present any rebuttal evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court should give full weight as to the veracity
of a testimony which was not subjected to cross-examination by the adverse
party.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The cross-examination of a witness is a
prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called. The purpose of
cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness
made on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may
deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other
evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on what would be
believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not
bound to give full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination
merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party.
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5. Classes of Documents
YASUO IWASAWA vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN AND THE
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY
G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner, a Japanese national married Private respondent in 2002. In July 2009,
petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might
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6. Offer of Evidence
LOMISES ALUDOS, deceased, substituted by FLORA ALUDOS vs.
JOHNNY M. SUERTE
G.R. No. 165285, June 18, 2012
FACTS:
Lomises acquired from the Baguio City Government the right to occupy two
stalls in the Hangar Market in Baguio City. Lomises entered into an agreement
with respondent Johnny M. Suerte for the transfer of all improvements and
rights over the two market stalls. Before full payment could be made, however,
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vs.
AMOS
P.
FACTS:
Respondents filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages
arising from their investments against petitioner Westmont Investment
Corporation (Wincorp) and respondent Pearlbank Securities Inc. the case was
set for the presentation of the defense evidence of Wincorp.
On March 7, 2003, three (3) days before the scheduled hearing, Wincorp filed
a written motion to postpone the hearing. The RTC denied Wincorps Motion
to Postpone and considered it to have waived its right to present evidence. The
Motion for Reconsideration of Wincorp was likewise denied.
On September 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Francias
and held Wincorp solely liable to them. The CA affirmed with modification the
ruling of the RTC. Wincorp filed an MR with the CA attaching to the said
motion evidentiary evidence which it was not able to present during trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not documents attached to a motion for reconsideration
made before the appellate court may be considered for purposes of adjudicating
the merits of the case.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence
states that: "The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified."
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated to rest their findings
of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial. Its function is to enable the trial judge to know the purpose
or purposes for which the proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other
hand, this allows opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will not be
required to review documents not previously scrutinized by the trial court.
Evidence not formally offered during the trial cannot be used for or against a
party litigant. Neither may it be taken into account on appeal.
The rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter. Failure to make a
formal offer within a considerable period of time shall be deemed a waiver to
submit it. Consequently, any evidence that has not been offered shall be
excluded and rejected.
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Prescinding therefrom, the very glaring conclusion is that all the documents
attached in the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court and
all the documents attached in the defendant-appellants brief filed by defendantappellant Wincorp cannot be given any probative weight or credit for the sole
reason that the said documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial
court because to consider them at this stage will deny the other parties the right
to rebut them.
7. Tender of Excluded Evidence
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Preponderance of Evidence
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK
ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA and ROLANDO N. RAMOS
G.R. No. 158143, September 21, 2011
vs.
FACTS:
PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against
Antonio Balmaceda. PCIB alleged that Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his
position as branch manager, fraudulently obtained and encashed 34 Managers
checks amounting to 11M+. PCIB also impleaded Ramos as one of the
recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmacedas alleged fraud. For
failure to file an answer, Balmaceda was declared in default. On the other hand,
Ramos filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmacedas scheme.
Ramos admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment for the fighting
cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge of
the source of Balmacedas money.
RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB. On appeal, the CA dismissed the
complaint against Ramos, holding that no sufficient evidence existed to prove
that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latters fraudulent manipulations.8
According to the CA, the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee in
some of the Managers checks does not suffice to prove that Ramos was
complicit in Balmacedas fraudulent scheme. It was also observed that other
persons were also named as payees in the checks that Balmaceda acquired and
encashed, and PCIB only chose to go after Ramos. With PCIBs failure to prove
Ramos actual participation in Balmacedas fraud, no legal and factual basis
exists to hold him liable.
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Substantial Evidence
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ANTONIO T. REYES7
G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011
FACTS:
Reyes and Pealoza were charged with grave misconduct pursuant to a
complaint-affidavit executed by Jaime Acero. Pealoza filed a counter-affidavit
implicating Reyes as the mastermind behind the practice of extorting money
from those who failed the drivers licensure exam. In addition to Pealozas
affidavit, he submitted two other affidavits of LTO employees who allegedly
had first-hand knowledge of the practice of Reyes of imposing and pocketing
additional fees. Reyes was not furnished with the copies of two other affidavits
submitted by Pealoza.
Ombudsman convicted Reyes of grave misconduct with penalty of dismissal.
Reyes elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review. Court
of Appeals granted the petition of Reyes and reversed the judgment of the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. In assailing the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, petitioner avers that the findings of fact of the Office of the
Ombudsman are entitled to great weight and must be accorded full respect and
credit as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner argues
that it is not the task of the appellate court to weigh once more the evidence
submitted before an administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for
that of the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not findings of substantial evidence of administrative or
quasi-judicial body is not subject to review by appellate courts.
HELD:
The answer is in the negative. In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings,
only substantial evidence is necessary to establish the case for or against a party.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that amount
7
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Probable Cause
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. AMELIO TRIA and JOHN DOE
G.R. No. 193250, April 25, 2012
FACTS:
Respondent Tria was a former Branch Manager of PNB-MWSS. MWSS opened
a Current Account with the said PNB Branch and made an initial deposit of PhP
6,714,621.13. On April 22, 2004, PNB-MWSS received a letter-request from
MWSS instructing the deduction of PhP 5,200,000 from C/A and the issuance
of the corresponding managers check payable to a certain "Atty. Rodrigo A.
Reyes." The letter-request, supporting documents, and Managers Check
Application Form were then evaluated by the banks Sales and Service Officer
(SSO), Bagasani, who found the same to be in order. Thus, a managers check
was issued payable to Atty. Reyes.
On April 26, 2004, PNB-MWSS received cash delivery from PNBs Cash
Center in the amount of PhP 8,660,000. Onthe same day, respondent Tria
accompanied Atty. Reyes in presenting Managers Check No. 1165848 to
PNBs Circle Branch. SSO, Flandez of PNB-MWSS Sale and Service Head,
Veniegas and placement of Trias signature on the check above the handwritten
note "PAYEE IDENTIFIED AMELIO C. TRIA."
It was later on found that MWSS did not authorize the issuance of the said
managers check. PNB conducted its own investigation and, at its conclusion,
sought to hold Tria liable for qualified theft. During preliminary investigation,
the Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) issued a Resolution finding no probable
cause against Tria. ACPs resolution was affirmed both by DOJ and CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is probable cause to prosecute Tria with qualified
theft.
HELD:
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