I.

1.

Bill of Rights
Doctrine: Classification by itself is not prohibited. It can only be assailed if it is
deemed invidious, that is, if it is not based on substantial differences. A police power
measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly violates constitutional limitations
like due process and equal protection of the law.
---------Facts:
On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public
Works and Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited
motorcycles on limited access highways. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended
Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of
the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the
enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and
South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway
under DO 215.

Mirasol v. DPWH (2006) POLICE POWER

Facts: Petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of certain administrative issuances
of the DPWH for being inconsistent with RA 2000, entitled Limited Access
Highway Act. Among others, is AO1 which requires motorcycles shall have an
engine displacement of at least 400cc.
Issue: Whether or not said administrative issuances are unconstitutional
Held: Petition partly granted. It is the DOTC, not the DPWH, which has authority to
regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access facilities.
We find that AO1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines
several precautionary measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These rules
were designed to ensure public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within
limited access facilities.

Issue: Is DPWH Administrative Order No.1, DO 74 violative of the right to travel?

Are all motorized vehicles created equal?

The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise

of the police power of the state. The police power is far-reaching in scope and is the
most essential, insistent and illimitable of all government powers. The tendency is
to extend rather than to restrict the use of police power. The sole standard in
measuring its exercise is reasonableness.
-----------Facts:
In 1957, RA 2000 (LimitedHighways Act) was enacted.Subsequently, DPWHAdmin
istrative Order 1(prohibiting motorcycles onlimited access highways),DPWH Depart
ment Order 74(declaring certain portions of the NLEX and SLEX as limited
access facilities), and DPWH Department Order 215 (declaring Coastal Road as a
limited access facility) were
issued.James Mirasol, RichardSantiago, and the LuzonMotorcyclists Federation, Inc.
sought to have the DPWHissuances invalidated for violating RA 2000.Consequently
, the Toll Regulatory Board issued Department Order 123, which allowed
motorcycles with engine displacements of 400cc inside limited access
facilities.The trial court dismissed the petition but declared DO 123 invalid.

Held: DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare
certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which
is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of
transportation and to regulate related activities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power
or function which it does not possess in the first place.
We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only
justifiable classification among modes of transport is the motorized against the nonmotorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is
substantially different from other light vehicles. The first may be denied access to
some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be reasonably
differentiated from newer models.46 We find that real and substantial differences
exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its
classification among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types
of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a motorcycle is quite
different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling difference
would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a
four-wheeled vehicle.

Issue: W/N Administrative Order 1 is unconstitutional for violating the equal

protection clause
2.
Held:
NO. It is neither warranted nor reasonable to say that the
only justifiable classification amongmodes of transport is themotorized against the n
on-motorized. Not all motorizedvehicles are created equal. Real and substantial
differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient
to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the tollways. The
most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is
lessstable and more easilyoverturned than a four-wheeledvehicle. Public interest and
safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on tollways that do not apply
to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of
transport could use it

Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan (2014)

NATURE:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the Decision1 and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The assailed rulings denied Crisostomo
Aquinos Petition for Certiorari for not being the proper remedy to question the
issuance and implementation of Executive Order No. 10, Series of 2011 (EO 10),
ordering the demolition of his hotel establishment.
FACTS:
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building
permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in

Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism
Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioners application on the
ground that the proposed construction site was within the no build zone
demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131.

accidens, however, the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotels demolition.
This is because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause,
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
fulfill the objectives of the government. Moreover, the Local Government Code
authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief
executives, to issue demolition orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial
powers to order the closing and demolition of establishments.

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow
up, no action was ever taken by the respondent mayor.

FALLO:
A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the
expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay,
Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay
West Coves hotel.
EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances
followed wherein respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay
West Cove.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion
Contentions of West Cove:
1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se, given
the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.
2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before
proceeding with the demolition.
Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court order because the
municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to
order the removal of illegally constructed buildings
The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of
certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise
of executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will
not lie.
ISSUE:
Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can
order the closure and demolition of the property in question.
HELD:
The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per se
which can therefore be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotels particular
incident, its location and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance.
Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West
Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, even if the
hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still a nuisance per accidens
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless
such a thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per

Petition is denied
3.

Quezon City v. Ericta (1983) - EMINENT DOMAIN

FACTS:
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE
MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE
VIOLATION THEREOF. The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of
the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of
deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at
least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities.
QC justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no
reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total
area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes
the burden to private cemeteries.
----------Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The
Establishment, Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or
Burial Ground Within The Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For
The Violation Thereof" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall
be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed
and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval
of the application.

For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but
seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a
resolution to request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling

and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof
have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in
writing that Section 9 of the ordinance would be enforced.
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of
the Ordinance in question.
Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City
Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police
power.
Held:
Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power.
Section 9cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the
license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be
established or practiced in the City.
Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due processof law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the
other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state
interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1)police power, (2) eminent domain,
(3) taxation.
The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537
that reads as follows:
To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by
this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, , and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience
thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe
under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.

The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate
does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only
confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because
under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable
with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to
operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or
cancelled. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from
operating a memorial park cemetery.
Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually
exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner.
If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to
destroy in order to promote the general welfare.

It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of
Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives
a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation.
4.

OSG v. Ayala Land, et al.

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal and setting
aside of the decision of the court of appeals which affirmed the decision of the
Makati RTC in two civil cases and the resolution of the appellate court in the same
case which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the OSG.
Respondents herein are operators of shopping malls in various locations in Metro
Manila that have parking facilities (inside the main buildings, in separate buildings
and/or in adjacent lots solely provided for parking use). The respondents are also the
one which maintains the parking spaces and in turn, they collect parking fees subject
to their imposed parking rates.
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights
conducted a joint investigation to inquire on the legality of the parking fees and to
find out the basis and reasonableness of the parking rates. More importantly, to
determine the legality of the policy of the shopping malls denying liability in cases
of theft, robbery or carnapping by invoking the waiver clause at the back of
the parking tickets.
After the public hearings, the Senate Committees jointly concluded that the collectio
n parking fee is contrary to the NationalBuilding Code and that the reasonable
interpretation of the code is that the parking spaces are for free; thus, the Committee
recommended that the Office of the Solicitor General should institute the necessary
action to enjoin the collection of parking fees as well as to enforce the penal
sanctions of the National Building Code.
Two civil cases arise and by being of the same subject matter, the RTC Makati
issued an order to consolidate the cases. The court ruled that the respondents are not
obligated to provide parking spaces that are free of charge, compelling them to do so
would be an unlawful taking of property right without just compensation. The
petitioners sought for relief by filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Court of
Appeals but the appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the joint decision by
the RTC.
Hence, this present petition with a single assignment of error that the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the lower court.
Issue:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of RTC that respondents are not
obliged to provide free parking spaces to their customers or the public.
2. Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting the collection of parking fees is a
valid exercise of the police power of State.
Held:
1. No. The CA was correct in affirming the ruling of RTC, and the respondents are
not obliged to provide free parking spaces. SC found no merit in the OSGs petition:

Sec 803 of National Building Code.

Percentage of Site Occupancy states that maximum site occupancy shall be
governed by the use, type of construction, and height of the building and the use,
area, nature, and location of the site; and subject to the provisions of the local
zoning requirements and in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Secretary.
RULE XIX PARKING AND LOADING SPACE REQUIREMENTS
Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building Code (PD 1096) providing for
maximum site occupancy, the following provisions on parking and loading space
requirements shall be observed:
1. The parking space ratings listed below are minimum off-street requirements for
specific uses/occupancies for buildings/structures:
1.1 The size of an average automobile parking slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters
by 5.00 meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters
for parallel parking. A truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be computed at a
minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00 meters. The parking slot shall be drawn to scale
and the total number of which shall be indicated on the plans and specified whether
or not parking accommodations, are attendant-managed. (See Section 2 for
computation of parking requirements).
xxxx
1.7 Neighborhood shopping center 1 slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area
SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to safeguard life, health, property,
and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound environmental
management and control; and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to
provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials,
construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance.
The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the OSG argues, greatly contributes to
the aim of safeguarding life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with
the principles of sound environmental management and control. Adequate parking
spaces would contribute greatly to alleviating traffic congestion when
complemented by quick and easy access thereto because of free-charge parking.
Moreover, the power to regulate and control the use, occupancy, and maintenance of
buildings and structures carries with it the power to impose fees and, conversely, to
control partially or, as in this case, absolutely the imposition of such fees.
The explicit directive of the above is that respondents, as operators/lessors of
neighborhood shopping centers, should provide parking and loading spaces with the
minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor area. There is
nothing therein pertaining to the collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by
respondents. In fact, the term parking fees cannot even be found at all in the entire
National Building Code and its IRR. One rule of statutory construction is that if a
statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without any attempt at interpretation. Since Section 803 of the National Building
Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not mention parking fees, then simply, said
provisions do not regulate the collection of the same.
The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the National Building Code to expand the
coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include

the regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of Section
102 of the National Building Code declaring the policy of the State to safeguard
life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of sound
environmental management and control; but totally ignores the second part of said
provision, which reads, and to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to provide
for all buildings and structures, a framework of minimum standards and
requirements to regulate and control their location, site, design, quality of materials,
construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance. While the first part of Section 102
of the National Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the second part
thereof that explains how said policy shall be carried out in the Code. Section 102 of
the National Building Code is not an all-encompassing grant of regulatory power to
the DPWH Secretary and local building officials in the name of life, health,
property, and public welfare. On the contrary, it limits the regulatory power of said
officials to ensuring that the minimum standards and requirements for all buildings
and structures, as set forth in the National Building Code, are complied with.
Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in addition to fixing the minimum
requirements for parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR also mandates
that such parking spaces be provided by building owners free of charge. If Rule XIX
is not covered by the enabling law, then it cannot be added to or included in the
implementing rules. The rule-making power of administrative agencies must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the
law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the
law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in
favor of the basic law.
2. No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection of parking fees is not a valid
exercise of the police power of State.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that the power to regulate and control the
use, occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and structures carries with it the
power to impose fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this case,
absolutely, the imposition of such fees. Firstly, the fees within the power of
regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has been settled law in this
jurisdiction that this broad and all-compassing governmental competence to restrict
rights of liberty and property carries with it the undeniable power to collect a
regulatory fee. It looks to the enactment of specific measures that govern the
relations not only as between individuals but also as between private parties and the
political society. True, if the regulatory agencies have the power to impose
regulatory fees, then conversely, they also have the power to remove the same. Even
so, it is worthy to note that the present case does not involve the imposition by the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials of regulatory fees upon respondents;
but the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall
parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that the DPWH Secretary and local
building officials do have regulatory powers over the collection of parking fees for
the use of privately owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or prohibit such
collection arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection
of such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and local building officials

must pass the test of classic reasonableness and propriety of the measures or means
in the promotion of the ends sought to be accomplished.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is actually invoking police power to
justify the regulation by the State, through the DPWH Secretary and local building
officials, of privately owned parking facilities, including the collection by the
owners/operators of such facilities of parking fees from the public for the use
thereof. The Court finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from
collecting parking fees, the State would be acting beyond the bounds of police
power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely
regulate the use and enjoyment of the property of the owner. The power to regulate,
however, does not include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the power to regulate
does not include the power to confiscate. Police power does not involve the taking
or confiscation of property, with the exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of
protecting peace and order and of promoting the general welfare; for instance, the
confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is
no longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely,
eminent domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why the said power may not be availed of only to impose a burden
upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is a
settled rule that neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of value is essential
to taking. It is usually in cases where title remains with the private owner that
inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is merely
regulated or amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation that deprives any person
of the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to
compensation, unless the invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation to
be justified under the police power. Similarly, a police regulation that unreasonably
restricts the right to use business property for business purposes amounts to a taking
of private property, and the owner may recover therefor.
Although in the present case, title to and/or possession of the parking facilities
remain/s with respondents, the prohibition against their collection of parking fees
from the public, for the use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a taking or
confiscation of their properties. The State is not only requiring that respondents
devote a portion of the latters properties for use as parking spaces, but is also
mandating that they give the public access to said parking spaces for free. Such is
already an excessive intrusion into the property rights of respondents. Not only are
they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as they wish, they
are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom
the expenses for the maintenance and operation of the required parking facilities.

In conclusion, the total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking

fees from persons who use the mall parking facilities has no basis in the National
Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the same prohibition by
generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of
respondents property without payment of just compensation.
5. Ferrer v. Bautista (2015)
(see full text)
The Supreme Court on Tuesday junked a Quezon City ordinance for being unconstitutional
but upheld another, saying it was consistent with the law.
Voting unanimously, the high tribunal struck down the ordinance imposing an annual garbage
fee on Quezon City residents and ordered local officials to refund the amount collected since
its enforcement last year.
At the same time, it affirmed the citys socialized housing tax ordinance, saying it was
consistent with Section 43 of the law on the Comprehensive and Continuing Urban
Development and Housing Program which provides for such a tax. It also lifted the temporary
restraining order (TRO) it issued in February 2014 on its implementation.
According to the court, the imposition of the annual garbage fee was unconstitutional and
illegal.
Respondents are directed to refund with reasonable dispatch the sums of money collected
relative to its enforcement, it ordered.
The Quezon City government earned P4.7 million in garbage fees under the ordinance
authored by Councilor Victor Ferrer Jr. until the high court issued a TRO stopping its
implementation as well as the collection of the socialized housing tax.
According to the court, the annual trash fee was inconsistent with the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act of 2000 which allows cities to impose charges only [on] the collection and
transport of non-recyclable and special waste and for the disposal of these into the sanitary
landfill.
It noted that the ordinance, which based the garbage fee on an estimated per capita waste
generation volume of 0.66 kilograms among Quezon City residents, does not make a
distinction as to the type of waste generated.
[I]t is reasonable to presume that the amount pertains to the totality of wastes without
distinction generated by residents of Quezon City, the court said.
It added that Ferrers ordinance violates the equal protection clause and the provisions of the
Local Government Code that an ordinance must be equitable and based, as far as practicable,
on the taxpayers ability to pay, and not be unjust, excessive, oppressive and confiscatory.
Contacted for comment, Mayor Herbert Bautista thanked the court for upholding the local
governments socialized housing tax.
If the socialized housing tax (SHT) was indeed affirmed by the [court] then this becomes a
landmark decision. Local government units may now ordain SHT to address the six million
housing backlog our government needs to address, he said in a text message to the Inquirer.
At the same time, Bautista assured residents that the ruling would not affect solid waste
collection in the city.
As for Ferrer, the author of the ordinance, he told the Inquirer that he has yet to read the court
decision.

The annual garbage fee imposed on Quezon City households ranged from P100 to P500 based
on the land area occupied by the homeowner. For owners of condominiums and socialized
housing units, the charge was between P25 and P200, also based on the size of their dwelling.
The 2011 socialized housing tax ordinance, on other hand, imposed a 0.5-percent annual realty
tax on the owner of a property with a value of over P100,000. The proceeds, according to the
city government, would go to the construction of houses for the citys squatters.
The Supreme Court ruling was based on a petition filed by Quezon City resident Jose Ferrer
Jr. asking it to declare the two ordinances unconstitutional.
He had argued that the socialized housing tax was a form of punishment for real property
owners owing to the city governments failure to protect their land from informal settlers.
The garbage fee, on the other hand, amounted to double taxation because trash collection
was a primary function and duty of the city government which should be funded through taxes
and its internal revenue allotment share, he added.With Erika Sauler
6.

Ermita Malate v. City of Manila (1967)

Facts:
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members
Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14,
1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila City Board to
regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for
being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar because it would impose
P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form
specifying their personal information.

Held: No. Judgment reversed.

Ratio:
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law. However, the Judiciary should
not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal
or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police
power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the
absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter
on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail
and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional
guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due
process.

There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and
lodging houses would be open for inspection from city authorities. They claimed
this to be violative of due process for being vague.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a standard to

which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of
due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free
the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy
of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled
out and unfairness avoided.

The law also classified motels into two classes and required the maintenance of
certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due
process on this for being arbitrary.

Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances," decisions ordinances must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with
such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.

It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours.

Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the states police power.
In one case- much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were
viewed purely as a police power measure.

There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.

The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of
the hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause?

On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every

24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies,
is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law
for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of
society and the general well-being.

Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in
his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established
the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle, unlike
in the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent
given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of
property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the maintenance of
establishments, and the full rate of payment
Holmes- We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws
as saying what they obviously mean.
7.

People of the Philippines v. Andre Marti (1991)

Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to
Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland.
It was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley
refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for
shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and
proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of
standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious
odor which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He reported this
to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of
the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found driedmarijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A.
6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme
Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the
evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.
Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill
of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in
the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the

NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a
warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and
look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
The judgement of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged was AFFIRMED.

II.
1.

Due Process
Republic v. Cagandahan (2008)

FACTS:
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33,
of Siniloan, Laguna; such that, her name be changed to Jeff and her gender to
male.
She was born in January 13, 1981, and was registered as female, having the name
Jennifer Cagandahan. While growing up, she was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperpplasia (CAH), a condition where the person thus afflicted possesses
both male and female characteristics. She was also diagnosed to have clitoral
hypertrophy, small ovaries, no breast, and menstrual development. She alleged that
for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a
male person.

ISSUE: WON the correction of entries in her birth certificate be granted.

HELD:
Yes. The court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The
Court views that where a person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the
age of maturity, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. The respondent here thinks
of himself as a male considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones. There is preponderant biological support for considering him as a male.
2. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan (2001)
Ponente: J. Bellosillo
FACTS:
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder)
as amended by R.A. No. 7659 substantially provides that any public officer who
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series
of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its
constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the element of mens rea in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a violation
of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum
prohibitum.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of
criminal intent. Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder
is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. The predicate crimes in the case

of plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, and are
committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally by the offender, alleging his guilty
knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder is a malum in se.
****MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:
Before I explain my vote, I think it necessary to restate the basic facts.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was President of the Philippines until January 20,
2001 when he was forced to vacate the presidency by people power and then Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded him in office. [1] He was charged, in eight cases filed with
the Sandiganbayan, with various offenses committed while in office, among them plunder, for
allegedly having amassed ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P4.1 billion, more or less. He
moved to quash the information for plunder on the ground that R.A. No. 7080, otherwise
called the Anti-Plunder Law, is unconstitutional and that the information charges more than
one offense.
In its resolution dated July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion, along
with those filed by his co-accused, Edward Serapio, and his son, Jose Jinggoy
Estrada. Petitioner brought this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 to set
aside the Sandiganbayans resolution principally on the ground that the Anti-Plunder Law is
void for being vague and overbroad. We gave due course to the petition and required
respondents to file comments and later heard the parties in oral arguments on September 18,
2001 and on their memoranda filed on September 28, 2001 to consider the constitutional
claims of petitioner.
I. THE ANTI-PLUNDER LAW
The Anti-Plunder Law (R.A. No. 7080) was enacted by Congress on July 12, 1991
pursuant to the constitutional mandate that the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the
public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption. [2] Section
2 of the statute provides:
Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other

incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or
investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. (As amended by Sec. 12, R.A. No. 7659).
The term ill-gotten wealth is defined in 1(d) as follows:
Ill-gotten wealth, means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly
through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury.
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 4 of the said law states:
Rule of Evidence. For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.

II. ANTI-PLUNDER LAW NOT TO BE JUDGED

ON ITS FACE
The amended information against petitioner charges violations of 2, in relation to 1(d)(1)
(2), of the statute. It reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses former President of the Republic of the Philippines, Joseph Ejercito Estrada
a.k.a Asiong Salonga and a.k.a Jose Velarde, together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie
Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan
or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John Does & Jane
Does, of the crime of plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by
Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then a public officer,
being then the President of the Republic of the Philippines, by himself and/or in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates and/or other persons, by taking
undue advantage of his official position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire by himself,
directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of four billion
ninety seven million eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos and
seventeen centavos [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, thereby unjustly enriching himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar
schemes or means, described as follows:
(a) by receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the
aggregate amount of five hundred forty-five million pesos (P545,000,000.00), more or less,
from illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Jose Jinggoy
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, and John Does and Jane Does, in consideration
of toleration or protection of illegal gambling;
(b) by diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or misusing directly or indirectly, for
his or their personal gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less, representing a portion of the two
hundred million pesos [P200,000,000.00] tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province
of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie
Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does and Jane Does;

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, for his personal gain and benefit, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) to purchase 351,878,000 shares of stocks, more or less, and
the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 shares of stocks, more or less, of the Belle
Corporation in the amount of more or less one billion one hundred two million nine hundred
sixty five thousand six hundred seven pesos and fifty centavos [P1,102,965,607.50] and more
or less seven hundred forty four million six hundred twelve thousand and four hundred fifty
pesos [P744,612,450.00], respectively, or a total of more or less one billion eight hundred
forty seven million five hundred seventy eight thousand fifty seven pesos and fifty centavos
[P1,847,578,057.50]; and by collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by himself and/or in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, commissions or percentages by reason of said
purchases of shares of stock in the amount of one hundred eighty nine million seven hundred
thousand pesos [P189,700,000.00], more or less, from the Belle Corporation which became
part of the deposit in the Equitable-PCI Bank under the account name Jose Velarde;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts, shares, percentages, kickbacks, or
any form of pecuniary benefits, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does, in the amount of
more or less three billion two hundred thirty three million one hundred four thousand one
hundred seventy three pesos and seventeen centavos [P3,233,104,173.17] and depositing the
same under his account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-PCI Bank.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001
But, although this is a prosecution under 2, in relation to 1(d)(1)(2), what we are seeing
here is a wholesale attack on the validity of the entire statute. Petitioner makes little effort to
show the alleged invalidity of the statute as applied to him. His focus is instead on the statute
as a whole as he attacks on their face not only 1(d)(1)(2) of the statute but also its other
provisions which deal with plunder committed by illegal or fraudulent disposition of
government assets (1(d)(3)), acquisition of interest in business (1(d)(4)), and establishment of
monopolies and combinations or implementation of decrees intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests (1(d)(5)).
These other provisions of the statute are irrelevant to this case. What relevance do
questions regarding the establishment of monopolies and combinations, or the ownership of
stocks in a business enterprise, or the illegal or fraudulent dispositions of government property
have to the criminal prosecution of petitioner when they are not even mentioned in the
amended information filed against him? Why should it be important to inquire whether the
phrase overt act in 1(d) and 2 means the same thing as the phrase criminal act as used in the
same provisions when the acts imputed to petitioner in the amended information are criminal
acts? Had the provisions of the Revised Penal Code been subjected to this kind of line-by-line
scrutiny whenever a portion thereof was involved in a case, it is doubtful if we would have the
jurisprudence on penal law that we have today. The prosecution of crimes would certainly
have been hampered, if not stultified. We should not even attempt to assume the power we are

asked to exercise. The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is

not to be exercised with reference to hypothetical cases . . . . In determining the sufficiency of
the notice a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of the conduct with which a
defendant is charged.[3]
Nonetheless, it is contended that because these provisions are void for being vague and
overbroad, the entire statute, including the part under which petitioner is being prosecuted, is
also void. And if the entire statute is void, there is no law under which he can be prosecuted
for plunder. Nullum crimen sine lege, nullum poena sine lege.
Two justifications are advanced for this facial challenge to the validity of the entire
statute. The first is that the statute comes within the specific prohibitions of the Constitution
and, for this reason, it must be given strict scrutiny and the normal presumption of
constitutionality should not be applied to it nor the usual judicial deference given to the
judgment of Congress.[4] The second justification given for the facial attack on the AntiPlunder Law is that it is vague and overbroad.[5]
We find no basis for such claims either in the rulings of this Court or of those of the U.S.
Supreme Court, from which petitioners counsel purports to draw for his conclusions. We
consider first the claim that the statute must be subjected to strict scrutiny.
A. Test of Strict Scrutiny Not Applicable to Penal Statutes
Petitioner cites the dictum in Ople v. Torres[6] that when the integrity of a fundamental
right is at stake, this Court will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation
stricter scrutiny and that It will not do for authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties. As will presently be shown, strict scrutiny, as used in that
decision, is not the same thing as the strict scrutiny urged by petitioner.Much less did this
Court rule that because of the need to give stricter scrutiny to laws abridging fundamental
freedoms, it will not give such laws the presumption of validity.
Petitioner likewise cites the most celebrated footnote in [American] constitutional
law, i.e., footnote 4 of the opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,[7] in which it was
stated:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be

subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment than are most other types of legislation.

on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the
absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. [10]

Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at
particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.

Considering these degrees of strictness in the review of statutes, how many criminal
laws can survive the test of strict scrutiny to which petitioner proposes to subject them? How
many can pass muster if, as petitioner would have it, such statutes are not to be presumed
constitutional? Above all, what will happen to the States ability to deal with the problem of
crimes, and, in particular, with the problem of graft and corruption in government, if criminal
laws are to be upheld only if it is shown that there is a compelling governmental interest for
making certain conduct criminal and if there is no other means less restrictive than that
contained in the law for achieving such governmental interest?

Again, it should be noted that what the U.S. Supreme Court said is that there may be
narrower scope for the operation of the presumption of constitutionality for legislation which
comes within the first ten amendments to the American Federal Constitution compared to
legislation covered by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The American Court
did not say that such legislation is not to be presumed constitutional, much less that it is
presumptively invalid, but only that a narrower scope will be given for the presumption of
constitutionality in respect of such statutes. There is, therefore, no warrant for petitioners
contention that the presumption of constitutionality of a legislative act is applicable only
where the Supreme Court deals with facts regarding ordinary economic affairs, not where the
interpretation of the text of the Constitution is involved. [8]
What footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case posits is a double standard of judicial
review: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political
process, and deferential or rational basis standard of review for economic legislation. As
Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando explained in Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn v.
The City Mayor,[9] this simply means that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects what are at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.
Hence, strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation
of speech, gender, or race and facial challenges are allowed for this purpose. But criminal
statutes, like the Anti-Plunder Law, while subject to strict construction, are not subject to strict
scrutiny. The two (i.e., strict construction and strict scrutiny) are not the same. The rule of
strict construction is a rule of legal hermeneutics which deals with the parsing of statutes to
determine the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, strict scrutiny is a standard of
judicial review for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to
justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. It is set opposite such terms as deferential
review and intermediate review.
Thus, under deferential review, laws are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest, without courts seriously inquiring into the substantiality of such interest
and examining the alternative means by which the objectives could be achieved. Under
intermediate review, the substantiality of the governmental interest is seriously looked into and
the availability of less restrictive alternatives are considered. Under strict scrutiny, the focus is

B. Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines, as Grounds for Facial Challenge,

Not Applicable to Penal Laws
Nor do allegations that the Anti-Plunder Law is vague and overbroad justify a facial
review of its validity. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law.[11] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that a
governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. [12]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The theory is that [w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a
vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity. [13] The possible
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme
Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, we have not recognized an overbreadth
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment. [14] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,

[15]

the Court ruled that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and, again, that overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. For this reason, it has been held that a facial
challenge to a legislative Act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid.[16] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its
face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. A plaintiff who engages in some conduct
that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others.[17]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases.They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional. [18] As has been pointed out, vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce
facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] as applied to a particular defendant. [19]Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioners claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
C. Anti-Plunder Law Should be Construed As Applied
Indeed, on its face invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected.[20] It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual
settings and in sterile abstract contexts. [21] But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out
inYounger v. Harris:[22]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
This is the reason on its face invalidation of statutes has been described as manifestly strong
medicine, to be employed sparingly and only as a last resort, [23] and is generally disfavored.
[24]
In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged

to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged.[25]
This brings me to the question whether, as applied, 2, in relation to 1(d)(1)(2), of the
Anti-Plunder Law is void on the ground of vagueness and overbreadth.
III. ANTI-PLUNDER LAW NEITHER VAGUE NOR OVERBROAD
As earlier noted, the case against petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada in the
Sandiganbayan is for violation of 2, in relation to 1(d)(1)(2), of the Anti-Plunder Law, which,
so far as pertinent, provide:
SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. Any public officer who, by himself or
in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death....
SEC. 1. Definition of Terms. ...
(d) Ill-gotten wealth, means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of
any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury.
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
The charge is that in violation of these provisions, during the period June 1998 to
January 2001, petitioner, then the President of the Philippines, willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally amassed wealth in the total amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts, to wit: (1) by receiving or collecting the total
amount of P545,000,000.00, more or less, from illegal gambling by himself and/or in
connivance with his co-accused named therein, in exchange for protection of illegal gambling;
(2) by misappropriating, converting, or misusing, by himself or in connivance with his coaccused named therein, public funds amounting to P130,000,000.00, more or less,
representing a portion of the share of the Province of Ilocos Sur in the tobacco excise tax; (3)

by ordering the GSIS and the SSS to buy shares of stocks of the Belle Corp., worth
P1,102,965,607.50 and P744,612,450.00 respectively, or the total amount of
P1,847,578,057.50, for which he received as commission the amount of P189,700,000.00,
more or less, from Belle Corp.; (4) by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts,
shares, percentages, and kickbacks in the amount of P3,233,104,173.17, which he deposited in
the Equitable-PCI Bank under the name of Jose Velarde.

8. Whether illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the

National Government, as used in 1(d)(3), refers to technical malversation or illegal use of
public funds or property in the Revised Penal Code;

Anyone reading the law in relation to this charge cannot possibly be mistaken as to what
petitioner is accused of in Criminal Case No. 26558 of the Sandiganbayan. But, repeatedly,
petitioner complains that the law is vague and deprives him of due process. He invokes the
ruling in Connally v. General Constr. Co.[26] that a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. He
does this by questioning not only 2, in relation to 1(d)(1)(2), as applied to him, but also other
provisions of the Anti-Plunder Law not involved in this case. In 55 out of 84 pages of
discussion in his Memorandum, petitioner tries to show why on their face these provisions are
vague and overbroad by asking questions regarding the meaning of some words and phrases in
the statute, to wit:

10. Whether the phrase monopolies or other combinations in restraint of trade in 1(d)(5)
means the same thing as monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade in the Revised
Penal Code because the latter contemplates monopolies and combinations established by any
person, not necessarily a public officer; and

1. Whether series means two, three, or four overt or criminal acts listed in 1(d) in view
of the alleged divergence of interpretation given to this word by the Ombudsman, the Solicitor
General, and the Sandiganbayan, and whether the acts in a series should be directly related to
each other;
2. Whether combination includes two or more acts or at least two of the means or similar
schemes mentioned in 1(d);
3. Whether pattern as used in 1(d) must be related to the word pattern in 4 which
requires that it be indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy;
4. Whether overt means the same thing as criminal;
5. Whether misuse of public funds is the same as illegal use of public property or
technical malversation;
6. Whether raids on the public treasury refers to raids on the National Treasury or the
treasury of a province or municipality;
7. Whether the receipt or acceptance of a gift, commission, kickback, or pecuniary
benefits in connection with a government contract or by reason of his office, as used in 1(d)
(2), is the same as bribery in the Revised Penal Code or those which are considered corrupt
practices of public officers;

9. Whether mere ownership of stocks in a private corporation, such as a family firm

engaged in fishing, is prohibited under 1(d)(4);

11. Whether under 1(d)(5) it is the public officer who intends to confer benefit on a
particular person by implementing a decree or it is the decree that is intended to benefit the
particular person and the public officer simply implements it.
Many more questions of this tenor are asked in the memorandum of petitioner [27] as well
as in the dissent of MR. JUSTICE KAPUNAN. Not only are they irrelevant to this case, as
already pointed out. It is also evident from their examination that what they present are simply
questions of statutory construction to be resolved on a case-to-case basis. Consider, for
example, the following words and phrases in 1(d) and 2:
A. Combination or series of overt or criminal acts
Petitioner contends that the phrase combination or series of overt, or criminal acts in
1(d) and 2 should state how many acts are needed in order to have a combination or a series. It
is not really required that this be specified. Petitioner, as well as MR. JUSTICE KAPUNAN,
cites the following remarks of Senators Gonzales and Taada during the discussion of S. No.
733 in the Senate:
SENATOR GONZALES. To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this Act while
constituting a single offense, it must consist of a series of overt or criminal acts, such as
bribery, extortion, malversation of public funds, swindling, falsification of public documents,
coercion, theft, fraud, and illegal exaction, and graft or corrupt practices act and like
offenses. Now, Mr. President, I think, this provision, by itself, will be vague. I am afraid that it
might be faulted for being violative of the due process clause and the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation of an accused. Because, what is meant by series of overt or
criminal acts? I mean, would 2, 3, 4 or 5 constitute a series? During the period of amendments,
can we establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example, robbery in band? The law defines
what is robbery in band by the number of participants therein.

In this particular case, probably, we can statutorily provide for the definition of series so that
two, for example, would that be already a series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such a
determination?
SENATOR TAADA. I think, Mr. President, that would be called for, this being a penal
legislation, we should be very clear as to what it encompasses; otherwise, we may contravene
the constitutional provision on the right of the accused to due process. [28]
But, as the later discussion in the Senate shows, the senators in the end reached a
consensus as to the meaning of the phrase so that an enumeration of the number of acts needed
was no longer proposed. Thus, the record shows:
SENATOR MACEDA. In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even
two acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor
consider deleting the words a series of overt or. To read, therefore: or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such. Remove the idea of necessitating a
series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

succession of persons or things, or a group that has or admits an order of arrangement

exhibiting progression.[30]
In the Bicameral Conference Committee on Justice meeting held on May 7, 1991, the
same meanings were given to the words combination and series. Representative Garcia
explained that a combination is composed of two or more of the overt or criminal acts
enumerated in 1(d), while a series is a repetition of any of the same overt or criminal
acts. Thus:
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say, THROUGH
A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS
MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we
actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number
one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of
the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these
be included also?
....

SENATOR TAADA. That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts
mentioned in this.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that

THE PRESIDENT. Probably, two or more would be . . .

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Two.

SENATOR MACEDA. Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not
twice of one enumeration.

SENATOR TAADA: Accepted, Mr. President.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): No, no, not twice.
....
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular
crime. But when we say acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr.
President.[29]
Indeed, the record shows that no amendment to S. No. 733 was proposed to this
effect. To the contrary, Senators Gonzales and Taada voted in favor of the bill on its third and
final reading on July 25, 1989. The ordinary meaning of the term combination as the union of
two things or acts was adopted, although in the case of series, the senators agreed that a
repetition of two or more times of the same thing or act would suffice, thus departing from the
ordinary meaning of the word as a group of usually three or more things or events standing or
succeeding in order and having a like relationship to each other, or a spatial or temporal

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes, combination is not twice but combination, two
acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two
different acts. It can not be a repetition of the same act.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): That be referred to series. Yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): A series.

REP. ISIDRO: Thats not [a] series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination
or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes, this distinguishes it, really, from ordinary
crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one
act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts. So. . .
....
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAADA): Two different. . . .
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): For example, ha. . .
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition. . .[31]
Thus, resort to the deliberations in Congress will readily reveal that the word
combination includes at least two different overt or criminal acts listed in R.A. No. 7080, such
as misappropriation (1(d)(1)) and taking undue advantage of official position (1(d)(6)). On the
other hand, series is used when the offender commits the same overt or criminal act more than
once. There is no plunder if only one act is proven, even if the ill-gotten wealth acquired
thereby amounts to or exceeds the figure fixed by the law for the offense (now
P50,000,000.00). The overt or criminal acts need not be joined or separated in space or time,
since the law does not make such a qualification. It is enough that the prosecution proves that
a public officer, by himself or in connivance with others, amasses wealth amounting to at least
P50 million by committing two or more overt or criminal acts.
Petitioner also contends that the phrase series of acts or transactions is the subject of
conflicting decisions of various Circuit Courts of Appeals in the United Sates. It turns out that
the decisions concerned a phrase in Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides:
(b) Joinder of Defendants: Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the
same series of acts or transactionsconstituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be
charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be
charged on each count. (Emphasis added)

The fact that there is a conflict in the rulings of the various courts does not mean that
Rule 8(b) is void for being vague but only that the U.S. Supreme Court should step in, for one
of its essential functions is to assure the uniform interpretation of federal laws.
We have a similar provision in Rule 3, 6 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure. It reads:
SEC. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief
in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist,
whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in these
Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law
or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the action; but the
court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being
embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no
interest.(Emphasis added)
This provision has been in our Rules of Court since 1940 but it has never been thought
of as vague. It will not do, therefore, to cite the conflict of opinions in the United States as
evidence of the vagueness of the phrase when we do not have any conflict in this country.
B. Pattern of overt or criminal acts
Petitioner contends that it is not enough that there be at least two acts to constitute either
a combination or series because 4 also mentions a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall scheme or conspiracy, and pattern means an arrangement or order of things or
activity.
A pattern of overt or criminal acts is required in 4 to prove an unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. In such a case, it is not necessary to prove each and every criminal act done in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy so long as those proven show a pattern indicating the
scheme or conspiracy. In other words, when conspiracy is charged, there must be more than a
combination or series of two or more acts. There must be several acts showing a pattern which
is indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy. As Senate President Salonga explained, if
there are 150 constitutive crimes charged, it is not necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt
all of them. If a pattern can be shown by proving, for example, 10 criminal acts, then that
would be sufficient to secure conviction.[32]
The State is thereby enabled by this device to deal with several acts constituting separate
crimes as just one crime of plunder by allowing their prosecution by means of a single
information because there is a common purpose for committing them, namely, that of
amassing, accumulating or acquiring wealth through such overt or criminal acts. The pattern is
the organizing principle that defines what otherwise would be discreet criminal acts into the
single crime of plunder.

As thus applied to petitioner, the Anti-Plunder Law presents only problems of statutory
construction, not vagueness or overbreadth. In Primicias v. Fugoso,[33] an ordinance of the City
of Manila, prohibiting the holding of parades and assemblies in streets and public places
unless a permit was first secured from the city mayor and penalizing its violation, was
construed to mean that it gave the city mayor only the power to specify the streets and public
places which can be used for the purpose but not the power to ban absolutely the use of such
places. A constitutional doubt was thus resolved through a limiting construction given to the
ordinance.

Petitioner argues that, in enacting the statute in question, Congress eliminated the
element of mens rea, or the scienter, thus reducing the burden of evidence required for proving
the crimes which are mala in se.[37]

Nor is the alleged difference of opinion among the Ombudsman, the Solicitor General,
and the Sandiganbayan as to the number of acts or crimes needed to constitute plunder proof
of the vagueness of the statute and, therefore, a ground for its invalidation. For sometime it
was thought that under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code convictions can be had for the
complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson, and other common crimes.The question was
finally resolved in 1956 when this Court held that there is no such complex crime because the
common crimes were absorbed in rebellion. [34] The point is that Art. 134 gave rise to a
difference of opinion that nearly split the legal profession at the time, but no one thought Art.
134 to be vague and, therefore, void.

A. Plunder A Malum In Se Requiring Proof of Mens Rea

Where, therefore, the ambiguity is not latent and the legislative intention is discoverable
with the aid of the canons of construction, the void for vagueness doctrine has no application.
In Connally v. General Constr. Co.[35] the test of vagueness was formulated as follows:
[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law.
Holmess test was that of the viewpoint of the bad man. In The Path of the Law, Holmes
said:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares
only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a
good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the
vaguer sanctions of conscience.[36]
Whether from the point of view of a man of common intelligence or from that of a bad
man, there can be no mistaking the meaning of the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to petitioner.
IV. PLUNDER A COMPLEX CRIME REQUIRING PROOF OF MENS REA

There are two points raised in this contention. First is the question whether the crime of
plunder is a malum in se or a malum prohibitum. For if it is a malum prohibitum, as the
Ombudsman and the Solicitor General say it is, [38] then there is really a constitutional problem
because the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

Plunder is a malum in se, requiring proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and
that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator
Taada made during the deliberation on S. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA. . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be
evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish
the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[39]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the
transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section
4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentlemans view, would provide for a speedier and faster
process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA. Yes, Mr. President . . .[40]
Seator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the
pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the
requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code
to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element
of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
intent. It is true that 2 refers to any person who participates with the said public officers in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder. There is no reason to believe,
however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice
Holmes said: We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean.[41]

services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds

translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival
of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and
repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug
offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not
be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies
that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently
wrong, they are mala in se[43] and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special
law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed,
it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking,
without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
B. The Penalty for Plunder

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed
to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
among the heinous crimes punishable byreclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are
punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of
heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echagaray:[42]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature,
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a
human being. . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or
subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses
involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as
murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim
is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or
threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or
intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death,
are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications
of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in
which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the
political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated
criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the
populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic

The second question is whether under the statute the prosecution is relieved of the duty
of proving beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the defendant. It is contended that, in enacting
the Anti-Plunder Law, Congress simply combined several existing crimes into a single one but
the penalty which it provided for the commission of the crime is grossly disproportionate to
the crimes combined while the quantum of proof required to prove each predicate crime is
greatly reduced.
We have already explained why, contrary to petitioners contention, the quantum of proof
required to prove the predicate crimes in plunder is the same as that required were they
separately prosecuted. We, therefore, limit this discussion to petitioners claim that the penalty
provided in the Anti-Plunder Law is grossly disproportionate to the penalties imposed for the
predicate crimes. Petitioner cites the following examples:
For example, please consider the following combination or series of overt or criminal acts
(assuming the P50 M minimum has been acquired) in light of the penalties laid down in the
Penal Code:
a. One act of indirect bribery (penalized under Art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code
with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods),
combined with
one act of fraud against the public treasury (penalized under Art. 213 of the
Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its medium period to prision
mayor in its minimum period,

- equals plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death plus forfeiture of assets

under R.A. 7080)
b. One act of prohibited transaction (penalized under Art. 215 of the revised Penal
Code with prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from
P200 to P1,000 or both),
combined with
one act of establishing a commercial monopoly (penalized under Art. 186 of
Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine
ranging from P200 to P6,000, or both),
-equalsplunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets
under R.A. 7080.
c. One act of possession of prohibited interest by a public officer (penalized
with prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine of P200 to P1,000,
or both under Art. 216 of the Revised Penal Code),
combined with
one act of combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade (penalized under Art.
186 of the Revised penal Code with prision correccional in its minimum
period, or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or both,
- equals plunder, punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets)[44]
But this is also the case whenever other special complex crimes are created out of two or
more existing crimes. For example, robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
under Art. 294, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code is punished with prision correccional in its
maximum period (4 years, 2 months, and 1 day) to prision mayor in its medium period (6
years and 1 day to 8 years). Homicide under Art. 249 of the same Code is punished
with reclusion temporal (12 years and 1 day to 20 years). But when the two crimes are
committed on the same occasion, the law treats them as a special complex crime of robbery
with homicide and provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for its
commission. Again, the penalty for simple rape under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code

is reclusion perpetua, while that for homicide under Art. 249 it isreclusion temporal (12 years
and 1 day to 20 years). Yet, when committed on the same occasion, the two are treated as one
special complex crime of rape with homicide and punished with a heavier penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. Obviously, the legislature views plunder as a crime as serious as robbery
with homicide or rape with homicide by punishing it with the same penalty. As the
explanatory note accompanying S. No. 733 explains:
Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic
treason, punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of
acts done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may
involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial
units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of
malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute the plunder of an
entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy. The above-described crime
does not yet exist in Philippine statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a
safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a
deterrent to those with similar inclination to succumb to the corrupting influences of power.
Many other examples drawn from the Revised Penal Code and from special laws may be
cited to show that, when special complex crimes are created out of existing crimes, the penalty
for the new crime is heavier.
______________________
To recapitulate, had R.A. No. 7080 been a law regulating speech, I would have no
hesitation examining it on its face on the chance that some of its provisions even though not
here before us are void. For then the risk that some state interest might be jeopardized, i.e., the
interest in the free flow of information or the prevention of chill on the freedom of expression,
would trump any marginal interest in security.
But the Anti-Plunder Law is not a regulation of speech. It is a criminal statute designed
to combat graft and corruption, especially those committed by highly-placed public
officials. As conduct and not speech is its object, the Court cannot take chances by examining
other provisions not before it without risking vital interests of society. Accordingly, such
statute must be examined only as applied to the defendant and, if found valid as to him, the
statute as a whole should not be declared unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness of its
other provisions. Doing so, I come to the following conclusions:
1. That the validity of R.A. No. 7080, otherwise known as the Anti-Plunder Law, cannot
be determined by applying the test of strict scrutiny in free speech cases without disastrous
consequences to the States effort to prosecute crimes and that, contrary to petitioners
contention, the statute must be presumed to be constitutional;

2. That in determining the constitutionality of the Anti-Plunder Law, its provisions must
be considered in light of the particular acts alleged to have been committed by petitioner;
3. That, as applied to petitioner, the statute is neither vague nor overbroad;
4. That, contrary to the contention of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor General, the
crime of plunder is a malum in se and not a malum prohibitum and the burden of proving each
and every predicate crime is on the prosecution.
For these reasons, I respectfully submit that R.A. No. 7080 is valid and that, therefore,
the petition should be dismissed.
3.

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion (2000)

FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine
Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition
of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take
charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition
documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary
requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and
that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received
copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the
consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the
Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the
governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are

confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law
of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable
in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since
it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the
generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation
clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be
made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates
that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that
such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not
pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law
in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior
derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a
treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are
in conflict with the constitution.
4. Cudia v. Superintendent of the PMA (2015)
(see full text)
5.

Go v. Colegio de San Juan de Letran (2012)

RULING: Petition dismissed.

Facts:
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by
a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the
government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of
binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law
incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

In October 2001, one of the schools officials received information that certain
fraternities were recruiting new members among Letrans high school students. He
also received a list of the students allegedly involved. School authorities started an
investigation, including the conduct of medical examinations on the students whose
names were on the list. The school physician, reported that six (6) students bore
injuries, probable signs of blunt trauma of more than two weeks, on the posterior
portions of their thighs. The Assistant Prefect for Discipline, conferred with the
students and asked for their explanations in writing.

Four (4) students, admitted that they were neophytes of the Tau Gamma Fraternity
and were present in a hazing rite held in Tondo, Manila. They also identified the
senior members of the fraternity present at their hazing. These included Kim, then a
fourth year high school student.
In the meantime, the schools security officer, prepared an incident report that the
Tau Gamma Fraternity had violated its covenant with the school by recruiting
members from its high school department. He had spoken to one of the fraternity
neophytes and obtained a list of eighteen (18) members of the fraternity currently
enrolled at the high school department. Kims name was also in the list.
The long and short of it was that the parents refused to accept the fact that their son
is a member of the fraternity, and the school eventually suspended them from
attending classes.

schools to impose disciplinary sanctions on students who violate disciplinary rules.

The penalty for violations includes dismissal or exclusion from re-enrollment.
We find Letrans rule prohibiting its high school students from joining fraternities to
be a reasonable regulation, not only because of the reasons stated in DECS Order
No. 20, s. 1991, but also because of the adult-oriented activities often associated
with fraternities. Expectedly, most, if not all, of its high school students are minors.
Besides, Letrans penalty for violation of the rule is clearly stated in its enrollment
contracts and in the Students Handbooks43 it distributes at the start of every school
year.
6. Villanueva v. JBC (2015)
(see full text)
7.

On January, 2002, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of
Caloocan City claiming that the respondents had unlawfully dismissed Kim. Mr. and
Mrs. Go also sought compensation for the business opportunity losses they
suffered while personally attending to Kims disciplinary case.
In ruling for the petitioners, the RTC ruled that Kim was dismissed without due
process, his membership in the fraternity was not duly proven, and the the school
had no authority to dismiss KIM from school.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the RTC and reversed the decision, thereby
prompting the petitioners to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court decision:
DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991 reveals the education departments clear intent to
apply the prohibition against fraternity membership for all elementary and high
school students, regardless of their school of enrollment.
XXX
Even assuming arguendo that the education department had not issued such
prohibition, private schools still have the authority to promulgate and enforce a
similar prohibition pursuant to their right to establish disciplinary rules and
regulations. This right has been recognized in the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools, which has the character of law. Section 78 of the 1992 Manual of
Regulations of Regulations for Private Schools, in particular and with relevance to
this case, provides:
Section 78. Authority to Promulgate Disciplinary Rules. Every private school shall
have the right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations it may deem
necessary and consistent with the provisions of this Manual for the maintenance of
good school discipline and class attendance. Such rules and regulations shall be
effective as of promulgation and notification to students in an appropriate school
issuance or publication.

The right to establish disciplinary rules is consistent with the mandate in the
Constitution for schools to teach discipline; in fact, schools have the duty to develop
discipline in students. Corollarily, the Court has always recognized the right of

Republic v. Albios (2013)

FACTS:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married, as
evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the
RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer, alleging that
immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and
wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set
case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her
counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite
being duly notified of the schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC opined that the parties
married each other for convenience only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to
enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship and that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00. However, she did
not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter never processed her petition for
citizenship
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which
found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
HELD: The marriage between the parties is valid
CIVIL LAW: validity of marriage
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in
immigration cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not
intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.This standard was

modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986
(IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was
not ntered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States.The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life
together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must be noted,
however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore,
does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a marriage
entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a
valid marriage could not be avoided erely because the marriage was entered into for
a limited purpose.The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, further
recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a
nonsubsisting one.

regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or
live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so
on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as
convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply
with all the legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration
in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations,
not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage
for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondents marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of
immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
8.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A reely givenconsent
requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family
Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of
their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice
of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the
nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted
the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as
to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a
full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them,
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the
couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a
marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The
same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be
declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to

Dycaico v. Social Security System (2005)

Facts:
Bonifacio Dycaico was a member of the SSS, with his common-law wife Elena and
their eight children named in his data record as beneficiaries. In1989, Bonifacio was
considered retired and began receiving his monthly pension from the SSS.He
married Elena on the sameyear that he passed away. Shortly after Bonifacios death,
Elena filed with the SSS an application for survivors pension. However, the same
was denied on the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282(Social Security
Law), she could not be considered Bonifacios primary beneficiary became they
were not married at the time of his retirement. Elena brought her case to the Social
Security Commission, which still denied her claim.
Issue: W/N the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of RA
8282 violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. The classification violates the equal protection clause because: (1) it is not
germane to the purpose of the law. Classifying dependent spouses with respect to
their entitlement based on whether the marriage was contracted before or after the
retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears
no relation to the achievement of the police objective of the law, which is to
provide meaningful protection to members and their beneficiaries against the
hazard of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies
resulting in loss of income or financial burden. (2)it is not based on real and
substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory. It unfairly lumps marriages
contracted after the members retirement as sham relationships or were contracted
solely for the purpose of acquiring benefits accruing upon the death of the other
spouse. The proviso also violates the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the
surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were
contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors benefits. There is outright
confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an
opportunity to be heard. The proviso creates the presumption that marriages
contracted after the members retirement date were entered into for the purpose of
securing benefits under RA 8282. This presumption is conclusive because the said
surviving spouses are not afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the
illicit purpose, thereby also depriving them the opportunity to be heard.

Doctrine:
Generally, a statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection clause of the law. Irrebuttable
presumptions have long been disfavored under the due process clause, as they could
presume facts which are not necessarily or universally true.
9. Romualdez v. COMELEC (2008)
FACTS:
COMELEC Law Department filed two separate informations before the RTC
Barauen, Leyte against spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R.Romualdez for
knowingly making false or untruthful statement in their application for voters
registration relative to their place of residence and non registration in other areas,
which are violations of Sections 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of RA
8189 or the Voters Registration Act, to wit:
SEC. 10
Registration of Voters
.
xxx
The application shall contain the following data: x x x (g) Periods of residence in the
Philippines and in the place of registration; x x x (j) A statement that the application
is not a registered voter of any precinct;
SEC. 45.
Election Offense
. The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act: x x x (j)
Violation of any of the provisions of this Act. Pending the above case, the spouses
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari against COMELEC, on the ground, among
others, of the unconstitutionality of Section 45(j) for being contrary to the fair notice
requirement Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as
such penal provision is vague on its face.
ISSUE: WON Section 45(j) of RA 8189 is unconstitutional for having uncertain
election prohibition.
RULING: No, the Supreme Court held. Using the void for vagueness doctrine, it the
law is said to be facially invalid only if men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. As structured,
Section 45 of RA 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same Act.
Section 45(j) clearly specifies that a violation of any of the provisions of RA 8189 is
an election offense. The language of Section45(j) is precise. The challenged
provision renders itself to no other interpretation and involves no guesswork.
10. Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-terrorism Council
(2010)
FACTS:

Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism
Councilcomposed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as
Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting
Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior
and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary
Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also
impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar
Calderon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should prosper
HELD: No. Petitions Dismissed
REMEDIAL LAW- certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Petition for
certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of
particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective
jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
POLITICAL LAW- Requisites of power of judicial review
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the lis mota of the case.
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the
most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. Locus standi

or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as

to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must
show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injuryas a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action.
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected
"communist fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas
individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been subjected to "close
security surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by
"suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices
monitored by "men with military build." They likewise claim that they have
been branded as "enemies of the State. Even conceding such gratuitous
allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that
petitioners have yet to show any connection between the
purported"surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial

notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That
no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them,
three years after its effectivity,belies any claim of imminence of their perceived
threat emanating from the so-called tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No.
178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA.
They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA
9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members.
The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration
would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist
organizations. Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before
the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic
terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. From July 2007 up to the
present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely
without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under
RA 9372.
REMEDIAL LAW- A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise
of the spending or taxing power of Congress,whereas citizen standing must
rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.

REMEDIAL LAW- Requisites of Judicial Notice

Petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take
judicial notice of respondent's alleged action of tagging them as militant
organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its
armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging, according to
petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the
procedure under the law.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1)
the matter must be oneof common and general knowledge; (2) it must bewell
and authoritatively settledand not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be
known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that
of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it
is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court;
or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation
from Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitionercitizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of
the law. It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the
assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct
and personal interest is key.
POLITICAL LAW- judicial power operates only when there is an actual
case or controversy.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being
tagged as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of
prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an
advisory opinion, which is not its function. Without any justiciable controversy,
the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has

no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by

"double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official aremerely
theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.
POLITICAL LAW- A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free
speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly
excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like
"widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce
the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
A statute or act suffers from the defect ofvaguenesswhen it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.The
overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms.
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine
assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will
accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.

them.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes
speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the
definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of
expression protected by the free speech clause.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key
qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of
the government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the
first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into
a protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it
unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every
commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the
offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in
haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful
transaction.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a
credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness
analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible.
The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates
speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor
allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in
Congress.
Petitions Dismissed

Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers only extant facts

affectingreallitigants, afacial invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to
the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities.
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that
the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,as grounds for a facial challenge, are
not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial
challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth
grounds. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied
to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in
RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against

11. Imbong v. Ochoa (2014)

On the constitutionality of RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law
1. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the right to life:
NO. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life
begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members
could express their own views on this matter.
Ponentes view (Justice Mendoza): Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the

traditional meaning of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by
the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view
that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the
moment of fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon
fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and
female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the
unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent
abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with
this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that
prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction
of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized
ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as
abortifacients only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mothers womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mothers womb (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for
the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For
the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which
also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.
2. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the right to health
NO. Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite
risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. Rather,
they pray that the status quo under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws
prohibit the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the prescription of a
duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in
place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under
Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
thecontraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered
mandatory only after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated

and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are
safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective.
6. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the due process clause
NO. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as
the definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to
Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The
private health care institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous
to private health care service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by
religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from
giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to
Section 23 (a)(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice
and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health.
7. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause
NO. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to
Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall
prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since
Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law
does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education
program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic
freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education.
12. Agabon v. NLRC (2004)
FACTS:
Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as gypsum board and cornice installers
from January 1992 to February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work. Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was
decided in their favor by the Labor Arbiter. Riviera appealed to the NLRC
contending just cause for the dismissal because of petitioners abandonment of

work. NLRC ruled there was just cause and petitioners were not entitled to
backwages and separation pay. The CA in turn ruled that the dismissal was not
illegal because they have abandoned their work but ordered the payment of money
claims.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
RULING:
To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the existence of a just and valid
cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the right to be heard and to
defend himself. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his employment. For a valid finding or abandonment, two
factors are considered: failure to report for work without a valid reason; and, a clear
intention to sever employer-employee relationship with the second as the more
determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be
deduced that the employees has no more intention to work.
Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow
the due process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be
penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil
Doctrine of the Belated Due process Rule.
Art. 279 means that the termination is illegal if it is not for any of the justifiable or
authorized by law. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal but the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his statutory rights. The indemnity should be stiffer to
discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later which we sought to
deter in Serrano ruling. The violation of employees rights warrants the payment of
nominal damages.
NOTE:

Under the so-called WENPHIL DOCTRINE if the services of the employee was
terminated due to a just or authorized cause but the affected employees right to due
process has been violated, the dismissal is legal but the employee is entitled to
damages by way of indemnification for the violation of the right.

SERRANO vs. ISETANN et. al. abandoned the WENPHIL DOCTRINE and ruled
that if the employee is dismissed under just or authorized cause but the affected
employees right to due process has been violated, his dismissal becomes ineffectual.
Therefore, the employee is entitled to backwages from the time he was dismissed
until the determination of the justness of the cause of the dismissal.

AGABON vs. NLRC (Nov. 17, 2004) abandoned the Serrano doctrine and
REINSTATED THE WENPHIL DOCTRINE. The sanctions, however must be
stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil.
In the last couple of decades, the Supreme Court has grappled with the legal effect
and the corresponding sanction in cases where there exists a just and valid ground to
justify the dismissal but the employer fails to comply with the due process
requirement of the law. Prior to the promulgation in 1989 of Wenphil v. NLRC, [170
SCRA 69, February 8, 1989], the prevailing doctrine held that dismissing employees
without giving them proper notices and an opportunity to be heard was illegal and
that, as a consequence thereof, they were entitled to reinstatement plus full
backwages. Wenphil abandoned this jurisprudence and ruled that if the dismissal
was for a just or an authorized cause but done without due process, the termination
was valid but the employer should be sanctioned with the payment of indemnity
ranging from P1,000.00 to P10,000.00.
In 2000, the Supreme Court promulgated Serrano v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 117040,
January 27, 2000], which modified Wenphil. It considered such termination
ineffectual (not illegal) and sanctioned the employer with payment of full
backwages plus nominal and moral damages, if warranted by the evidence. In case
the dismissal was for an authorized cause, separation pay in accordance with Article
283 of the Labor Code should be awarded.
In 2004, the Supreme Court in Agabon v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 158693, November 17,
2004], abandoned Serrano and effectively reverted to Wenphil (known also as the
Belated Due Process Rule) and held that a dismissal due to abandonment - a just
cause - was not illegal or ineffectual, even if done without due process; but the
employer should indemnify the employee with nominal damages for noncompliance with statutory due process. (Glaxo Wellcome Phils., Inc. v.
Nagkakaisang Empleyado ng Wellcome-DFA, G.R. No. 149349, March 11, 2005).

III.
Equal Protection
1. Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission (2010)
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC)
dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and
the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial
body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people
in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create
a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the
Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive
power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations
to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised

Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman
and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions
do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated,
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of
each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the
powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the
validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as
legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private
suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest
is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make
out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The
Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of
the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty
is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts
and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled
to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative
to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of
its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill
of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It
is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,
the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the
courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited
to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public
authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down
for being unconstitutional.

2.

Kabataan Partylist v. COMELEC (2015)

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2015/december2015/221318.pdf
3.

Garcia v. Drilon (2013)

Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An
Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a
victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set
forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO
ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed
to comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an axercise in
futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an
invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for
failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral
attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality
was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on
the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory,
unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it
allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle
the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial
and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers
Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based
on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women
over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the
right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention that by
not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the
Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so
because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch
of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and
other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause (application of the substantive equality model)

The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is
justified to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state
to ensure the equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and
culturally endowed differences between men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental
objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The
gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women
and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives.
Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The genderbased classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied
in the 1987 Constitution.
Justice Brion: As traditionally viewed, the constitutional provision of equal protection simply
requires that similarly situated persons be treated in the same way. It does not connote identity
of rights among individuals, nor does it require that every person is treated identically in all
circumstances. It acts as a safeguard to ensure that State-drawn distinctions among persons are
based on reasonable classifications and made pursuant to a proper governmental purpose. In
short, statutory classifications are not unconstitutional when shown to be reasonable and made
pursuant to a legitimate government objective.
R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended to strengthen the family. Congress found that
domestic and other forms of violence against women and children contribute to the failure to
unify and strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the States mandate to actively promote the
familys total development. Congress also found, as a reality, that women and children are
more susceptible to domestic and other forms of violence due to, among others, the
pervasive bias and prejudice against women and the stereotyping of roles within the family
environment that traditionally exist in Philippine society. On this basis, Congress found it
necessary to recognize the substantial distinction within the family between men, on the one
hand, and women and children, on the other hand. This recognition, incidentally, is not the
first to be made in the laws as our law on persons and family under the Civil Code also
recognize, in various ways, the distinctions between men and women in the context of the
family.
Justice Leonen: It may be said that violence in the context of intimate relationships should not
be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue.
By concurring with these statements I express a hope: that the normative constitutional
requirements of human dignity and fundamental equality can become descriptive reality. The

socially constructed distinctions between women and men that have afflicted us and spawned
discrimination and violence should be eradicated sooner. Power and intimacy should not coexist.

The intimate spaces created by our human relationships are our safe havens from the helter
skelter of this world. It is in that space where we grow in the safety of the special other who
we hope will be there for our entire lifetime. If that is not possible, then for such time as will
be sufficient to create cherished memories enough to last for eternity.

I concur in the ponencia. Against abominable acts, let this law take its full course.
Justice Abad: RA 9262 is a historic step in the Filipino women's long struggle to be freed
from a long-held belief that men are entitled, when displeased or minded, to hit their wives or
partners and their children. This law institutionalizes prompt community response to this
violent behavior through barangay officials who can command the man to immediately desist
from harming his home partner and their children. It also establishes domestic violence as a
crime, not only against its victims but against society as well. No longer is domestic violence
lightly dismissed as a case of marital dispute that law enforcers ought not to get into.
Chief Justice Puno on Expanded Equal protection and Substantive Equality
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno espouses that the equal protection clause can no longer be
interpreted as only a guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality. "It ought to be
construed in consonance with social justice as the heart particularly of the 1987 Constitution
a transformative covenant in which the Filipino people agreed to enshrine asymmetrical
equality to uplift disadvantaged groups and build a genuinely egalitarian democracy." This
means that the weak, including women in relation to men, can be treated with a measure of
bias that they may cease to be weak.
Chief Justice Puno goes on: "The Expanded Equal Protection Clause, anchored on the human
rights rationale, is designed as a weapon against the indignity of discrimination so that in
the patently unequal Philippine society, each person may be restored to his or her rightful
position as a person with equal moral status."

4.

GSIS v. Montesclaros (2004)

FACTS: Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD 1146 being violative of due

process and equal protection clause. When her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for
survivorship pension. GSIS denied claim, it said surviving spouse has no right of survivorship
pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the pensioner within three years
before the pensioner qualified for the pension
HELD: There is denial of due process when it outrightly denies the claim for survivorship.
There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving her an
opportunity to be heard. There is also violation of equal protection. A proviso requiring certain
number of years of togetherness in marriage before the employees death is valid to prevent
sham marriages contracted for monetary gains. Here, it is 3 years before pensioner qualified
for the pension. Under this, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than 3
years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse would still not receive survivorship
pension if the marriage took place within 3 years before the pensioner qualified for pension.
The object of prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose intended.
Facts: The herein respondent is the wife of Nicholas Montesclaros, who is entitled for
retirement benefits under PD 1146 or the Revised Government Insurance Act of1977. Upon
application to GSIS, Nicholas designated his wife, Milagros, as his sole beneficiary. When
Nicholas died, Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. On
8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving
spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage
with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
Issue: Whether or not Section 18 of PD 1146 is violative of due process and equal protection
clause.
Held: Yes. The proviso is contrary to Section 1,Article III of the Constitution, which provides
that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process oflaw, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. The proviso is unduly oppressive
in outrightly denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent
spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period. There is
outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse
an opportunity to be heard.
5.

Tablarin v. Gutierrez (1987)

Facts: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine. However the
petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT). Republic Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical
Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of Medical Education (BME) whose functions
include "to determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine" (Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of the same Act requires from applicants to present a

certificate of eligibility for entrance (cea) to medical school from the BME. MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, established a
uniform admission test called National Medical Admission Test as additional requirement for
issuance of a certificate of eligibility.

Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a
prayer Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Sec. of
educ, BME from enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 and from
requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as condition for securing (cea).

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 violate the
constitution as they prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement

Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state.

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical
school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on
the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the
regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate
and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of
those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical
profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the
state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of regulation of this
type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools.
That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting,
among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the
aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the
difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical

schools in particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely
known.

The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants
into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the
country."
6.

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services (2009)

FACTS:

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA
affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the
constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months,
as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay,
and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.

ISSUES:

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the
end of April 1998.

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano
refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998,
serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion
of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

On the first issue.

Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on
the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to February 199, $413.90 for March 1998,
and $1640 for March 1999) as well as moral and exemplary damages.
The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing his
salaray for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment,
plus $45 for salary differential and for attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount;
however, no compensation for damages as prayed was awarded.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing
three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorney's
fees. This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July
15, 1995.

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on nonimpairment of contracts;

HELD:

The answer is in the negative. Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with
the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he
will receive is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a
prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to
laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof.
Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws
about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the
execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it
cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment
contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they
were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.

But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared
unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was
enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or
calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of
ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.
Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to
future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to
the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.
On the second issue.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector,
without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs.
However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent
against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with
employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who
were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims:
they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their
contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject
clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their
employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject
to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term
employment.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by
workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal
degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the
burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the
computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it
imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more
in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term
employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage.

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate,
when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the
classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions;
2) it is germane to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and
4) it applies equally to all members of the class.

There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the

Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and
determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a
classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the
challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate
state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show
that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is
at least substantially related to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a
legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional,
and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the
state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in
safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining access to information
on matters of public concern.

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest
that the subject clause may possibly serve.

In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a
compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against
OFWs under the subject clause.

The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Note:
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the
employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous
and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form
of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on
another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as
placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection
no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated
to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.

When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its coequals, such as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination;
(2) that the constitutional question is raised by a proper party and at the earliest opportunity;
and (3) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case, otherwise the Court will
dismiss the case or decide the same on some other ground.
----

Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of
placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place
that can be

As discussed earlier, prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary
awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to
local workers with fixed-term employment.

employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.
Article 605 of the Code of Commerce provides:
The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of LandBased Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary
measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant
workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary
disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the
Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar
administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.

Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding
local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the
right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the agent should be
for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged until the fulfillment of their
contracts, except for reasons of insubordination in serious matters, robbery, theft, habitual
drunkenness, and damage caused to the vessel or to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven
negligence.

Article 605 was applied to Madrigal Shipping Company, Inc. v. Ogilvie, in which the Court
held the shipping company liable for the salaries and subsistence allowance of its illegally
dismissed employees for the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.

While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present, Article 299 of the Code of
Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for a certain time and
for a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without sufficient cause, before the fulfillment
of the contract.

7.

Philippine Judges Association v. Prado (1993)

FACTS: The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. These measures withdraw the
franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC, MeTC and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices while
retaining the same for the president, VP, senators The petitioners are members of the lower
courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named
measures.
HELD: There is violation of equal protection. All persons similarly situated should be treated
alike both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It does not require universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact result in
unequal protection. What the law requires is equality among equals according to valid
classification. The postal service office claims that the expense from judiciary with regards
frank mails amounts to 73,574,864 as compared to 90,424, 175 total. The respondents are in
effect saying that franking privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it much
at all but not to those who need it badly. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and
withdrawing it from others especially where theres no substantial distinction. The distinction
made is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences
between the judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
Facts: Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing the constitutionality of Sec 35 of
RA 7354 due to, inter alia, its being discriminatory because of withdrawing the franking
privilege from the Judiciary but retaining said privilege for the President, the VP, members of
Congress, the Comelec, former Presidents, and the National Census and Statistics Office.
Respondents counter that there is no discrimination as the franking privilege has also been
withdrawn from the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language, the
Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National
Historical Commission, the AFP, the AFP Ladies Steering Committee, the City and Provincial
Prosecutors, the Tanodbayan (Office of the Special Prosecutor), the Kabataang Baranggay, the
Commission on the Filipino Language, the Provincial and City Assessors, and the National
Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.

Issue: Constitutionality of Sec. 35of RA 7354

should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others. The equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. In lumping the Judiciary
with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has
placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need
of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege,
there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of
the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking
privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to
understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee.

In the SCs view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the
perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of
substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of
communication between the government and the people. If the problem of the respondents is
the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it
altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem
is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is
no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the
Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
8.

Central Bank Employees Association v. BSP (2004)

FACTS:

On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old
Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.

On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central
Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and
the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that
it is unconstitutional.

Held: Hereby declared unconstitutional.

The EPC is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words,

Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:

Section 15, Exercise of Authority -In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:

(c) Establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring,
appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to
establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with
sound principles of management.

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to
the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentrals
human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own
system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No.
6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, that compensation and wage structure
of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance
with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. The thrust of petitioners challenge is
that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the
BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19
and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is
contended that this classification is a classic case of class legislation, allegedly not based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP
personnels position.

Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of
R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at
all levels in the BSP. Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments:

a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear
in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of
Senate Bill No. 1235;

d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus
within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the
BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon; and
e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and
resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers.

In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious,
and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also stresses: (a) that
R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b)
the urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have
been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1)
since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents implementation of
such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this
Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue
involved.

Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the provision does not violate the equal
protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony
with other provisions of the same law, such as fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP,
and the mandate of the Monetary Board to establish professionalism and excellence at all
levels in accordance with sound principles of management.

The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the
validity of the provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on
actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to
establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and
policies of the national government.

b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by
the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law of establishing professionalism and excellence
eat all levels in the BSP;
c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of
Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even
admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP;

ISSUE:

Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last
paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional
mandate that "No person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws."

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered
circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its
validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in
the light of changed conditions.

RULING:

A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c),

ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.

Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the
classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no
constitutional infirmities.

It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall
operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable.

B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS - EXEMPTING ALL

OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE
CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislatures power, we hold
that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs
leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.

The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere

comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute
may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to
another.

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored
legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar
salaries.

Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies
should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul
of the Constitution. The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right,
or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations
arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties,
and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis
should not suffice.

Furthermore, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the
challenged provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court,
but with Congress, which alone has the power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No.
7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has
supposedly been filed.

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its
legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the rational basis test, and the
legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection,
judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the
abdication of this Courts solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution
and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is
a private person or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be
struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.

Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the
issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the
limitations respected, is justifiable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of
legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications,
conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would
be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof
are the main functions of courts of justice under the Presidential form of government adopted
in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates.
As a consequence, we have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon
said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting and
peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land, to support and defend
the Constitution - to settle it.

In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officeremployee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher
grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the
BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while
the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The
implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented
rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and
opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them
to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people
whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is

they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment
This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide
adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality
of life for all. Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum
deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.

To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They
represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in
the private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and
negotiate for better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to
protest unfair labor practices. These BSP rank-and-file employees represent the politically
powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political solution to their unequal and
iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the legislature to act. They
cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any waiting time.
Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Courts duty
to save them from reasonless discrimination.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last
proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.