Pursuant to Section 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P Blg.

129) and to
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases referred to herein,
the Court Resolved to promulgate the following Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:

I.
Applicability
Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction
A. Civil Cases:

(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of
damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney's fees are awarded,
the same shall not exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).
(2) All other civil cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the
plaintiff's claim does not exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), exclusive of interest
and costs.

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged
is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding (P1,000.00), or both,
irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not
exceed ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiffs cause of action is pleaded in
the same complaint with another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor
to a criminal case where the offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal
case subject to the ordinary procedure.

Sec. 2. Determination of applicability. Upon the filing of a civil or criminal action, the
court shall issue an order declaring whether or not the case shall be governed by this
Rule A patently erroneous determination to avoid the application of the Rule on
Summary Procedure is a ground for disciplinary action.
II.
Civil Cases
Sec. 3. Pleadings.
A. Pleadings allowed. The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaints,
compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims' pleaded in the answer, and the answers
thereto.
B. Verifications. All pleadings shall be verified.
Sec. 4. Duty of court. After the court determines that the case falls under summary
procedure, it may, from an examination of the allegations therein and such evidence as
may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds apparent
therefrom for the dismissal of a civil action. If no ground for dismissal is found it shall
forthwith issue summons which shall state that the summary procedure under this Rule
shall apply. d-c chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 5. Answer. Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall
file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and
negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not
asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or
cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10) days from service of the answer in
which they are pleaded.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint
within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff,
shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, that the court may in its
discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being
excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the applicability of
Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.
Sec. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later than thirty (30)
days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on
pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless
inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.chanrobles virtual law library chanrobles
virtual law library
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for
the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff

shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof.

All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in
accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more
defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense
shall appear at the preliminary conference.
Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. Within five (5) days after the termination
of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up
therein, including but not limited to:
(a) Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the terms
thereof;
(b) The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;.
(c) Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by
the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in which
event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;
(d) A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted; and
(e) Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case.
Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers. Within ten (10) days from
receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the
order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon
by them.
Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment. Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last
affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the
court shall render judgment.
However should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during
the said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the
parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days
from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the
receipt of the last clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of the period for filing the
same.
The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the rendition of
the judgment.
III.
Criminal Cases

Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of
this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities. such cases shall be commenced only by
information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the compliant
and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies
for the court's files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date
of filing, the care may be dismissed.
Sec. 12. Duty of court.
(a) If commenced by compliant. On the basis of the compliant and the affidavits and
other evidence accompanying the same, the court may dismiss the case outright for
being patently without basis or merit and order the release of the amused if in custody.
(b) If commenced by information. When the case is commenced by information, or is
not dismissed pursuant to the next preceding paragraph, the court shall issue an order
which, together with copies of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the
prosecution, shall require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits
of his witnesses as well as any evidence in his behalf, serving copies thereof on the
complainant or prosecutor not later than ten (10) days from receipt of said order. The
prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after receipt of the counteraffidavits of the defense.
Sec. 13. Arraignment and trial. Should the court, upon a consideration of the
complaint or information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or
ground to hold the accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise,
the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial.
If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be immediately arraigned
and if he enters a plea of guilty, he shall forthwith be sentenced.
Sec. 14. Preliminary conference. Before conducting the trial, the court shall call the
parties to a preliminary conference during which a stipulation of facts may be entered
into, or the propriety of allowing the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense
may be considered, or such other matters may be taken up to clarify the issues and to
ensure a speedy disposition of the case. However, no admission by the accused shall
be used against him unless reduced to writing and signed by the accused and his
counsel. A refusal or failure to stipulate shall not prejudice the accused.
Sec. 15. Procedure of trial. At the trial, the affidavits submitted by the parties shall
constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same. Witnesses
who testified may be subjected to cross-examination, redirect or re-cross examination.
Should the affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not be considered as competent
evidence for the party presenting the affidavit, but the adverse party may utilize the
same for any admissible purpose.

Except in rebuttal or surrebuttal, no witness shall be allowed to testify unless his

affidavit was previously submitted to the court in accordance with Section 12 hereof.
However, should a party desire to present additional affidavits or counter-affidavits as
part of his direct evidence, he shall so manifest during the preliminary conference,
stating the purpose thereof. If allowed by the court, the additional affidavits of the
prosecution or the counter-affidavits of the defense shall be submitted to the court and
served on the adverse party not later than three (3) days after the termination of the
preliminary conference. If the additional affidavits are presented by the prosecution, the
accused may file his counter-affidavits and serve the same on the prosecution within
three (3) days from such service.
Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. The court shall not order the arrest of the accused
except for failure to appear whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall
either be on bail or on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court.
Sec. 17. Judgment. Where a trial has been conducted, the court shall promulgate
the judgment not later than thirty (30) days after the termination of trial.
IV.
COMMON PROVISIONS
Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of
compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice and may be
revived only after such requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall
not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the
preceding section;
(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for opening of trial;
(d) Petition for relief from judgment;
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
(f) Memoranda;
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court;
(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;

(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;

(j) Reply;
(k) Third party complaints;
(l) Interventions.
Sec. 20. Affidavits. The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall
state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in
evidence, and shall show their competence to testify to the matters stated therein.
A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the
same to disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or
portion thereof from the record.
Sec. 21. Appeal. The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate
regional trial court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the regional trial court in civil cases governed by
this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory,
without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule
70 shall be deemed repealed.
Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. The regular procedure prescribed in the
Rules of Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory
capacity insofar as they are not inconsistent herewith.
Sec. 23. Effectivity. This revised Rule on Summary Procedure shall be effective on
November 15, 1991.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22485

March 13, 1968

CONSUELO V. CALO, doing business under the trade name CVC Lumber
Industries, assisted by MARCOS M. CALO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
AJAX INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED, defendant-appellee.

Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for plaintiffs-appellants.

Sergio P. Villareal for defendant-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Sometime on May 7, 1959, plaintiff-appellant Calo ordered from defendantappellee Ajax International, Inc., 1,200 ft. of John Shaw wire rope at P2.85 per foot. The
transaction was evidenced by Charge Order No. 37071, for P3,420.00.

According to plaintiff Calo, when the wire rope was delivered to Butuan City, the
same was found short of 300 ft. Plaintiff then wrote two letters to defendant asking for

either completion of delivery or account adjustment of the alleged undelivered 300 ft. of
wire rope.

On November 20, 1961, a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. IV-93062 was
filed in the Municipal Court of Manila by one Adolfo Benavides who claimed to have
acquired the outstanding credit account of Calo from defendant Ajax International, Inc.
Charge Order No. 37071 was among those included in the assigned account.
Subsequently, a judgment by default was entered, and a writ of execution issued,
against plaintiff Calo. The latter resorted to this Court on a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.1 We set aside the judgment of default and writ of execution
issued against plaintiff Calo and remanded the case for further proceedings.

On January 23, 1962, plaintiff Calo, assisted by her husband, Marcos Calo, filed
in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a complaint against defendant asking (1) that
the latter either effect complete delivery of Charge Order No. 37071 or that she be
relieved from paying P855.00 and (2) that the latter indemnify her for P12,000 as
attorney's fees, damages and expenses of litigation.2 The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 860.

Instead of filing an answer, defendant moved for the dismissal of Civil Case 860
on the ground, inter alia, that the subject thereof was involved and intimately related to
that in Civil Case No. IV-93062 of the Municipal Court of Manila. The court a quo
sustained the motion and dismissed the case.

Plaintiff-appellant moved for reconsideration and new trial. When this failed, she
instituted the present appeal.1wph1.t

The dismissal of Civil Case No. 860 by the court a quo because of the pendency
of Civil Case No. IV-93062 in the municipal court of Manila is predicated on the
supposition that plaintiff's claim is a compulsory counter-claim that should be filed in the
latter case. There is no question that it arises out of the same transaction which is the
basis of the complaint in Civil Case No. IV-93062 and does not require the presence of
third parties over whom the municipal court of Manila could not acquire jurisdiction.

However, plaintiff's claim is not a compulsory counterclaim in Civil Case No. IV93062 for the simple reason that the amount thereof exceeds the jurisdiction of the
municipal court. The rule that a compulsory counterclaim not set up is barred, when

applied to the municipal court, presupposes that the amount involved is within the said
court's jurisdiction. Otherwise, as this Court had already noted in Yu Lay v. Galmes 3 we
would come to the absurd situation where a claim must be filed with the municipal court
which it is prohibited from taking cognizance of, being beyond its jurisdiction.

Besides, the reason underlying the rule, which is to settle all related controversies
in one sitting only, does not obtain. For, even if the counterclaim in excess of the
amount cognizable by the inferior court is set up, the defendant cannot obtain positive
relief. The Rules allow this only for the defendant to prevent plaintiff from recovering
from him.4 This means that should the court find both plaintiff's complaint and
defendant's counterclaim (for an amount exceeding said court's jurisdiction) meritorious,
it will simply dismiss the complaint on the ground that defendant has a bigger credit.
Since defendant still has to institute a separate action for the remaining balance of his
counterclaim, the previous litigation did not really settle all related controversies.

Plaintiff Calo's claim of P12,000.00 not being a compulsory counterclaim in Civil

Case No. VI-93062, it need not be filed there. The pendency then of said civil case
could not be pleaded in abatement of Civil Case No. 860. Consequently, the lower court
erred in dismissing plaintiff's complaint.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby reversed and the
case remanded for further proceedings. Costs against appellee Ajax International, Inc.
So ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

\
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 107356 March 31, 1995

SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Sancho Rayos was an overseas contract worker who had a renewed contract with the
Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) for the period covering April 16, 1980, to April
15, 1981. As part of Aramco's policy, its employees returning to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
from Manila are allowed to claim reimbursement for amounts paid for excess baggage
of up to 50 kilograms, as long as it is properly supported by receipt. On April 1980,
Rayos took a Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight to report for his new assignment, with a 50kilogram excess baggage for which he paid P4,147.50. Aramco reimbursed said.
amount upon presentation of the excess baggage ticket.
In December 1980, Rayos learned that he was one of several employees being
investigated by Aramco for fraudulent claims. He immediately asked his wife Beatriz in
Manila to seek a written confirmation from SIA that he indeed paid for an excess

baggage of 50 kilograms. On December 10, 1980, SIA's manager, Johnny Khoo,

notified Beatriz of their inability to issue the certification requested because their records
showed that only three kilograms were entered as excess and accordingly charged. SIA
issued the certification requested by the spouses Rayos only on April 8, 1981, after its
investigation of the anomaly and after Beatriz, assisted by a lawyer, threatened it with a
lawsuit. On April 14, 1981, Aramco gave Rayos his travel documents without a return
visa. His employment contract was not renewed.
On August 5, 1981, the spouses Rayos, convinced that SIA was responsible for the
non-renewal of Rayos' employment contract with Aramco, sued it for damages. SIA
claimed that it was not liable to the Rayoses because the tampering was committed by
its handling agent, Philippine Airlines (PAL). It then filed a third-party complaint against
PAL. PAL, in turn, countered that its personnel did not collect any charges for excess
baggage; that it had no participation in the tampering of any excess baggage ticket; and
that if any tampering was made, it was done by SIA's personnel.
Judge Jesus O. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, rendered
judgment on September 9, 1988, in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion of
which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, sentencing the latter to
pay the former the following:
1. The sum of Four Hundred Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos and
Eighty Centavos (P430,900.80) as actual damages, with interest at the
legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid.
2. The sum of Four Thousand One Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos and Fifty
Centavos (P4,147.50) as reimbursement for the amount deducted from
Mr. Rayos' salary, also with legal rate of interest from the filing of the
complaint until paid in full;
3. The sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
4. The sum equivalent to ten Per Cent (10th) of the total amount due as
and for attorney's fees; and
5. The cost of suit.
The defendant's counterclaim is hereby dismissed.

ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT, the third-party defendant PAL is

ordered to pay defendant and third-party plaintiff SIA whatever the latter
has paid the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the court a quo concluded that the excess baggage ticket of Rayos was
tampered with by the employees of PAL and that the fraud was the direct and proximate
cause of the non-renewal of Rayos' contract with Aramco.
All parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. SIA's appeal was dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees, which dismissal was eventually sustained by this Court. The
Rayos spouses withdrew their appeal when SIA satisfied the judgment totaling
P802,435.34.
In its appeal, PAL claimed that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against SIA
because it was the inefficiency of Rayos which led to the non-renewal of his contract
with Aramco, and not the alleged tampering of his excess bagged ticket On the other
hand, SIA argued that the only issue in the said appeal is whether or not it was entitled
to reimbursement from PAL, citing
the case of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Tempongko. 1
The appellate court disagreed with SIA's contention that PAL could no longer raise the
issue of SIA's liability to the Rayoses and opined "that SIA's answer to the complaint
should inure to the benefit of PAL, and the latter may challenge the lower court's
findings against SIA in favor of plaintiffs-appellees (the Rayos spouses) for the purpose
of defeating SIA's claim against it, and not for the purpose of altering in any way the
executed judgment against SIA." In its answer to the main complaint, SIA set up the
defense that the excess baggage ticket was indeed tampered with but it was committed
by PAL's personnel. On September 21, 1992, the appellate court granted PAL's appeal
and absolved it from any liability to SIA.
In this petition for review, SIA argues that PAL cannot validly assail for the first time on
appeal the trial court's decision sustaining the validity of plaintiff's complaint against SIA
if PAL did not raise this issue in the lower court. It added that the appellate court should
have restricted its ruling on the right of SIA to seek reimbursement from PAL, as this
was the only issue raised by SIA in its third-party complaint against PAL.
The instant appeal is impressed with merit.
The petitioner correctly pointed out that the case of Firestone squarely applies to the
case at bench. In said case, the Court expounded on the nature of a third-party
complaint and the effect of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant and
in favor of such defendant as third-party plaintiff against, ultimately, the third-party

defendant. Speaking through then Justice and later Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee,
the Court stated:
The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device whereby a
"third party" who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained
of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the
defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such thirdparty defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of the plaintiff's claim. The third-party complaint is
actually independent of and separate and distinct from the plaintiff's
complaint. . . . When leave to file the third-party complaint is properly
granted, the Court renders in effect two judgments in the same case, one
on the plaintiff's complaint and the other on the third-party complaint.
When he finds favorably on both complaints, as in this case, he renders
judgment on the principal complaint in favor of plaintiff against defendant
and renders another judgment on the third-party complaint in favor of
defendant as third-party plaintiff, ordering the third-party defendant to
reimburse the defendant whatever amount said defendant is ordered to
pay plaintiff in the case. Failure of any of said parties in such a case to
appeal the judgment as against him makes such judgment final and
executory. By the same token, an appeal by one party from such judgment
does not inure to the benefit of the other party who has not appealed nor
can it be deemed to be an appeal of such other party from the judgment
against him.
It must be noted that in the proceedings below, PAL disclaimed any liability to the
Rayoses and imputed the alleged tampering to SIA's personnel. On appeal, however,
PAL changed its theory and averred that the spouses Rayos had no valid claim against
SIA on the around that the non-renewal of Sancho's contract with Aramco was his
unsatisfactory performance rather than the alleged tampering of his excess baggage
ticket. In response to PAL's appeal, SIA argued that it was improper for PAL to question
SIA's liability to the plaintiff, since this was no longer an issue on account of the finality
and, in fact, satisfaction of the judgment.
Surprisingly, the appellate court ignored the Court's pronouncements in Firestone and
declared:
[T]here is nothing in the citation which would suggest that the appellant
cannot avail of the defenses which would have been available to the nonappealing party against the prevailing party which would be beneficial to
the appellant. After all, PAL's liability here is premised on the liability of SIA
to plaintiffs-appellees, In its own defense, it should have the right to avail
of defenses of SIA against plaintiffs-appellees which would redound to its

benefit. This is especially true here where SIA lost the capability to defend
itself on the technicality of failure to pay docket fee, rather than on the
merits of its appeal. To hold otherwise would be to open the door to a
possible collusion between the plaintiff and defendant which would leave
the third-party defendant holding the bag.
There is no question that a third-party defendant is allowed to set up in his answer the
defenses which the third-party plaintiff (original defendant) has or may have to the
plaintiff's claim. There are, however, special circumstances present in this case which
preclude third-party defendant PAL from benefiting from the said principle.
One of the defenses available to SIA was that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, that
is, it had no valid claim against SIA. SIA investigated the matter and discovered that
tampering was, indeed, committed, not by its personnel but by PAL's. This became its
defense as well as its main cause of action in the third-party complaint it filed against
PAL. For its part, PAL could have used the defense that the plaintiffs had no valid claim
against it or against SIA. This could be done indirectly by adopting such a defense in its
answer to the third-party complaint if only SIA had raised the same in its answer to the
main complaint, or directly by so stating in unequivocal terms in its answer to SIA's
complaint that SIA and PAL were both blameless. Yet, PAL opted to deny any liability
which it imputed to SIA's personnel. It was only on appeal in a complete turn around
of theory that PAL raised the issue of no valid claim by the plaintiff against SIA. This
simply cannot be allowed.
While the third-party defendant; would benefit from a victory by the third-party plaintiff
against the plaintiff, this is true only when the third-party plaintiff and third-party
defendant have non-contradictory defenses. Here, the defendant and third-party
defendant had no common defense against the plaintiffs' complaint, and they were even
blaming each other for the fiasco.
Fear of collusion between the third-party plaintiff and the plaintiffs aired by the appellate
court is misplaced if not totally unfounded. The stand of SIA as against the plaintiffs'
claim was transparent from the beginning. PAL was aware of SIA's defense, and if it
was convinced that SIA should have raised the defense of no valid claim by the
plaintiffs, it should have so stated in its answer as one of its defenses, instead of waiting
for an adverse judgment and raising it for the first time on appeal.
The judgment, therefore, as far as the Rayoses and SIA are concerned, has already
gained finality. What remains to be resolved, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, is
whether it is entitled to reimbursement from PAL, considering that PAL appealed that
part of the decision to the appellate court. This is where the rule laid down
in Firestone becomes applicable.

The trial court's decision, although adverse to SIA as defendant, made PAL ultimately
answerable for the judgment by ordering the latter to reimburse the former for the entire
monetary award. On appeal, PAL tried to exonerate itself by arguing that the Rayoses
had no valid claim against SIA. From PAL's viewpoint, this seemed to be the only way to
extricate itself from a mess which the court a quo ascribed to it. This cannot, however,
be allowed because it was neither raised by SIA in its answer to the main complaint nor
by PAL in its answer to the third-party complaint. The prudent thing that PAL should
have done was to state in its answer to the third-party complaint filed by SIA against it
everything that it may conceivably interpose by way of its defense, including specific
denials of allegations in the main complaint which implicated it along with SIA.
The appellate court was in error when it opined that SIA's answer inured to the benefit
of PAL for the simple reason that the complaint and the third-party complaint are
actually two separate cases involving the same set of facts which is allowed by the court
to be resolved in a single proceeding only to avoid a multiplicity of actions. Such a
proceeding obviates the need of trying two cases, receiving the same or similar
evidence for both, and enforcing separate judgments therefor. This situation is not, as
claimed by the appellate court, analogous to a case where there are several defendants
against whom a complaint is filed stating a common cause of action, where the answer
of some of the defendants inures to the benefit of those who did not file an answer.
While such a complaint speaks of a single suit, a third-party complaint involves an
action separate and distinct from, although related to the main complaint. A third-party
defendant who feels aggrieved by some allegations in the main complaint should, aside
from answering the third-party complaint, also answer the main complaint.
We do not, however, agree with the petitioner that PAL is solely liable for the satisfaction
of the judgment. While the trial court found, and this has not been adequately rebutted
by PAL, that the proximate cause of the non-renewal of Rayos' employment contract
with Aramco was the tampering of his excess baggage ticket by PAL's personnel, it
failed to consider that the immediate cause of such non-renewal was SIA's delayed
transmittal of the certification needed by Rayos to prove his innocence to his employer.
SIA was informed of the anomaly in December 1980 but only issued the certification
four months later or, more specifically, on April 8, 1981, a few days before the expiration
of Rayos' contract. Surely, the investigation conducted by SIA could not have lasted for
four months as the information needed by the Rayoses could easily be verified by
comparing the duplicate excess baggage tickets which they and their handling agent,
PAL, kept the record purposes. The fact that the Rayos spouses had to be assisted by
counsel who threatened to file a damage suit against SIA if the certification they urgently
needed was not immediately issued only strengthens the suspicion that SIA was not
dealing with them in utmost good faith. The effect of SIA's mishandling of Beatriz Rayos'
request became instantly apparent when her husband's contract was not renewed in

spite of his performance which was constantly "highly regarded" by the manager of
Aramco's equipment services department.
Former Chief Justice and noted remedial law expert Manuel V. Moran opined that "in an
action upon a tort, the defendant may file a third-party complaint against a joint tortfeasor for contribution." 2
The non-renewal of Rayos employment contract was the natural and probable
consequence of the separate tortious acts of SIA and PAL. Under mandate of Article
2176 of the Civil Code, Rayos is entitled to be compensated for such damages.
Inasmuch as the responsibility of two or more persons, or tort-feasors, liable for a quasidelict is joint and several, 3 and the sharing as between such solidary debtors is prorata, 4 it is but logical, fair, and equitable to require PAL to contribute to the amount
awarded to the Rayos spouses and already paid by SIA, instead of totally indemnifying
the latter.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
20488 dated September 21, 1992, is hereby REVERSED and a new one is entered
ordering private respondent Philippine Airlines to pay, by way of contribution, petitioner
Singapore Airlines one-half (1/2) of the amount it actually paid to Sancho and Beatriz
Rayos in satisfaction of the judgment in Civil Case No. 142252, dated September 9,
1988.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.