CRIMINAL LAW II REVIEWER

JURISPRUDENCE
ART 114- TREASON
1. US VS LAGNASON
2. Laurel vs Misa
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition
for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal
Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and,
consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2)
that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied
by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the
enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not
transferred thereby to the occupier, as we have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan
Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is
not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government.
Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines defined and
penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to be a crime against said
government as then organized by authority of the sovereign people of the United States, exercised
through their authorized representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was
made, upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the
Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom
the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by
virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which provides that "All laws of the
Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all
references in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under
this constitution;
Petition dismissed.
3. US vs Delos Reyes
Testimony by an officer as to a confession made to him by the accused will not support a
conviction of treason, as a confession of this crime, to be effective, must be made in open court.
The mere acceptance of the commission by the defendant, nothing else being done, was not an
overt act of treason within the meaning of the law. Blackstone says that "as treason is the highest
civil crime which (considered as a member of the community) any ,an can possibly commit, it
ought, therefore, to be the most freely ascertained.
Defendant is acquitted.

4. PP vs Agoncillo
Regardless of the writer's view on suspension of political laws and change of sovereignty as
heretofore expressed, the Court is of the opinion that the overt acts imputed to the appellant have
not been duly proven. With respect to the sale of 300 kilos of alum crystals, the testimony of the
prosecution witness Lorenzo Barria to the effect that the price was P3 a kilo, is not corroborated
by any other witness. With respect to the alleged sale of 100 pieces of water pipes, counsel for the
appellee admits that the price thereof was not known. An essential part of the overt act charged in
the information was therefore lacking. No pretense was made that the appellant donated the
articles in question. The alleged delivery of truck and auto tires, batteries and spare parts can be
disregarded. The only detail that may at most be considered established by the prosecution refers
to the fact that the appellant helped in pushing a handcart loaded with such articles, and the
evidence is even uncertain in one respect, namely that the cart was brought either to the
intermediate school premises or the high school building. Indeed it was acknowledged by the
lower court that the witnesses for the Government did not know how the appellant disposed of the
articles loaded in the cart.
Even supposing, however, that the appellant had really sold for a definite price alum crystals and
water pipes, the same did not per se constitute treason. As said articles or materials were not
exclusively for war purposes, their sale did not necessarily carry an intention on the part of the
vendor to adhere to the enemy. The theory of the prosecution is that the sale was treasonable in
view of the other proven acts showing appellant's adherence to the enemy. It appears, however,
that the alleged acts of adherence performed by the appellant took place after the overt act in
question. It is not unlikely that at the time the appellant made the sale, his motive was purely
personal gain, uninfluenced by any benefit inuring to the enemy. Where two probabilities arise
from the evidence, the one compatible with the presumption of innocence will be adopted
5. PP vs Perez
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because women's company
kept up their morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining them at parties, selling them food
and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. For any act of hospitality without doubt produces
the same general result. yet by common agreement those and similar manifestation of sympathy
and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political
intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country and its inhabitants. In the
nature of things, the occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts
between the invaders and the natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon
their nature degree and purpose.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be
to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition, be directly
in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give
money to an enemy as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal

necessities is to assist him as individual and is not technically traitorous. On the other hand, to
lend or give him money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against
the giver's country enhance his strength and by same count injures the interest of the government
of the giver. That is treason.
Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their
war efforts or to weaken the power of the United State. The acts herein charged were not, by fair
implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple the defense and
resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect the defendant's collaboration with the
Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional.
Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of
admission, may be gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular case.
Only guilty of rape.
6. PP vs Adriano
Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by another if
corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least one particular thing,
it a routine military chore, or just walking or eating.
We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of both
adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon one against his will,
membership in the Makapili organization imports treasonable intent, considering the purposes for
which the organization was created, which, according to the evidence, were "to accomplish the
fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the Philippines in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire
of Japan;" "to shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon
influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanese
Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the common enemies." Adherence, unlike overt
acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be
gather from the testimony of one witness, or from the nature of the act itself, or from the
circumstances surrounding the act.
At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not necessary, except for
the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant actually went to battle or committed
nefarious acts against his country or countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed
himself at the enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even though an
opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature gave the enemy aid and comfort.
The enemy derived psychological comfort in the knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the
country with which his was at war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces
augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count on men such as the
accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their own people. The principal effect of it was no
difference from that of enlisting in the invader's army.
But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the deposition of two witnesses.

The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for guidance from
American sources on its meaning and scope.
"The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason prosecution is that it shows
sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and
comfort to the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason
must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses."
This provision is so exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where two
or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed by the court or jury, the
defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the
culprit's guilt as gauged and tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of
finding the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from other testimony of a
most trustworthy witness or from other sources are unavailing as a substitute for the needed corroboration
in the form of direct testimony of another eyewitness to the same overt act.
Acquittal.
7. PP vs Dumapit
Aside from the fact that the appellant denied having had any hand in the arrest in question, the
circumstance remains that said arrest was effected as a result of the common crime of arson. That the
matter had no treasonous significance is shown by the further fact that those arrested were confined for
almost the whole period of their detention in the provincial jail, and not in the Japanese garrison.
The immediate background of the appellant is further refutation of the likelihood that he had any
treasonable intent. The appellant was before the outbreak of the last war a corporal of the Manila Harbor
Police and, upon order of his chief Alejo Valdes, was even the one who was entrusted with the task of
taking the personal properties of the family of President Quezon to the motorship Edil.
8. PP v Roble
Accused being a soldier of the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully, feloniously and
treasonably lead guide and accompany a patrol of 13 constabulary soldiers and did arrest and apprehend
Fortunato Linares for being guerrillas and or guerrilla supporters; that said accused did tie and torture the
aforesaid person and cut a portion of their ears, the tortures being so severe especially with respect to
Antolin Rodriguez who effectively died as a result of said tortures administered by the accused.
The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime of treason with murders with
the result that the penalty provided for the most serious offense was to be imposed on its maximum
degree. Viewing the case from the standpoint of modifying circumstances the court believed that the same
result obtained. It opined that the killing were murders qualified by treachery and aggravated by the
circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength cruelty and an armed band.

We think this is error. The torture and murders set forth in the information are merged in and formed part
of treason. They were in this case the overt acts which besides traitorous intention supplied a vital
ingredient in the crime. Emotional or intellectual attachment and sympathy with the foe unaccompanied
by the giving of aid and comfort is not treason. The defendant would not be guilty of treason if he had not
committed the atrocities in question.
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation superior strength treachery
and employment of means for adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.
The first three circumstances are by their nature inherent in the offense of treason and may not taken to
aggravate the penalty. Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is in many cases as in
this a long continued process requiring for the successful consummation of the traitor's purpose, fixed,
reflective and persistent determination and planning.
So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of treason. Treachery is merged in superior
strength
There is no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment of prisoners, Rapes, wanton
robbery for personal grain and other forms of cruelties are condemned and the perpetration of these will
be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong
to the main criminal objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The
atrocities above mentioned of which the appellant is beyond doubt guilty fall within the terms of the
above paragraphs.
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of superior strength are absorbed inn treason
characterized by killings, the killing themselves and other accompanying crime should be taken into
consideration for measuring the degree and gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in
which they were committed.
Article 115 Conspiracy and proposal to commit Treason
1. US v Bautista
The case at bar is to be distinguished from these and like cases by the fact that the record clearly
disclose that the accused actually and voluntarily accepted the apppointment in question and in
doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance, and that the charge in this case
is that of conspiracy, and the fact that the accused accepted the appointment is taken into
consideration merely as evidence of his criminal relations with the conspirators.
In conformance with the decisions of the Federal courts of the United States, that the crime of
conspiring to commit treason is a separate and distinct offense from the crime of treason, and that
this constitutional provision is not applicable in such cases.
In the United States vs. Nuez et al. -- wherein the accused were charged with brigandage, the
court held that, aside from the possession of commissions in an insurgent band, there was no

evidence to show that it they had committed the crime and, "moreover, that it appeared that they
had never united with any party of brigands and never had been in any way connected with such
parties unless the physical possession of these appointments proved such relation," and that it
appeared that each one of the defendants "were separately approached at different times by armed
men while working in the field and were virtually compelled to accept the commissions."
United States vs. de la Serna et al. it was contended that de la Serna had confessed that "he was
one of the members of the pulajanes, with a commission as colonel," but the court was of opinion
that the evidence did not sustain a finding that such confession had in fact been made, hence the
doctrine laid down in that decision, "that the mere possession of such an appointment, when it is
not shown that the possessor executed some external act by the virtue of the same, does not
constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of the defendant," applies only the case of Enrique
Camonas, against whom the only evidence of record was "the fact that a so-called appointment of
sergeant was found at his house."

Article 122 Piracy

PP vs Lol lo
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery
or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the
spirit and intention of universal hostility.
Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The
jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be
punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a
foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820],
5 Wheat., 184.)
PP v Tulin
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates inclusive, and for
sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, then manning a motor launch and armed with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire
upon, board and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum
products, together with the complement and crew members, employing violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were
unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must
be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger

thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was
widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential
Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a
member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an
exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the
instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a
special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters
ARTICLE 125 Delay in the delivery of detained persons
1. As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is concerned,
based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be
included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of
complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a no-office day. (Medina
vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints against Soria
for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed
with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May
15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about
6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could
be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of.
ART. 129- Search Warrants maliciously obtained
1. Uykhetin vs Villareal
It was urged (1) that the search warrant of April 30th was illegal because the requisites prescribed by the
General Orders No. 58 had not been complied with in its issuance; (2) that the searches and seizures made
on May 1st had been made without any semblance of authority and hence illegal; and (3) that the seizure
of the defendants' books and letters was a violation of the provisions of the Jones Law providing that no
person shall be compelled to testify against himself, and protecting him against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
The affidavit required by law was made. It is a general practice to issue search warrants on a single
affidavit. To require more than one or to require witnesses to be presented, would add to the law and
would defeat the very object of a search warrant, which is to seize evidence of crime before it can be
destroyed. Publicity, which would ordinarily follow the presentation of witnesses or even getting more
than one affidavit, would invite, if not assure, a failure.
If one witness may be sufficient to convict a man of the gravest crime, certainly one affidavit should be
sufficient for a judge to issue a search warrant upon.

2. PP vs Dela Pena
SEARCH WARRANTS; EVIDENCE; ILLEGAL PROCUREMENT OF SEARCH WARRANTS, HOW
ESTABLISHED. The motive of the person accused of illegal procurement of search warrants may be
established, not only by acts preceding, or coetaneous with, the commission of the offense charged, but,
also by acts posterior to the issuance of the process, such as, an attempt to extort money as a condition
precedent to the release of the complaint.
Alleged- conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, and pursuant to a
common intent, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously procure a search warrant without
a just cause, by then and there applying for the same and filing a deposition of witness in support of the
application for search warrant before the Court the Court of First Instance, this City; and by that reason
and on account of said application and deposition the said accused succeeded in procuring from the said
court a search warrant against Ty Kong Tek
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
Art. 134- Rebellion
1.

DBP vs Radio Mindanao Network

The insurance companies maintained that the evidence showed that the fire was caused by members of
the Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army (CPP/NPA); and consequently, denied the
claims.
Even assuming that the declaration of the bystanders that it was the members of the CPP/NPA who caused
the fire may be admitted as evidence, it does not follow that such declarations are sufficient proof. These
declarations should be calibrated vis--vis the other evidence on record. And the trial court aptly noted
that there is a need for additional convincing proof, viz.:
The Court finds the foregoing to be insufficient to establish that the cause of the fire was the intentional
burning of the radio facilities by the rebels or an act of insurrection, rebellion or usurped power. Evidence
that persons who burned the radio facilities shouted "Mabuhay ang NPA" does not furnish logical
conclusion that they are member [sic] of the NPA or that their act was an act of rebellion or insurrection.
2.

Pp vs Silongan

The political motivation for the crime must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be
rebellion. Merely because it is alleged that appellants were members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
or of the Moro National Liberation Front does not necessarily mean that the crime of kidnapping was
committed in furtherance of a rebellion. Here, the evidence adduced is insufficient for a finding that the
crime committed was politically motivated. Neither have the appellants sufficiently proven their
allegation that the present case was filed against them because they are rebel surrenderees. This court has
invariably viewed the defense of frame-up with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, it can be just as easily
concocted.
3.

Prov Prosecutor vs CA

Whether, even before the start of trial, the prosecution can be ordered to change the information which it
had filed on the ground that the evidence presented at the preliminary investigation shows that the crime
committed is not murder with multiple frustrated murder, but rebellion.
The New Peoples Army (NPA) is the armed component of the Communist Party in this country called the
National Democratic Front (NDF). The ultimate objective of the NPA/NDF is to overthrow the
constitutional democratic Philippine Government and supplant it with a government anchored on the
communist ideology. If an NPA fighter (terrorist, according to the military lexicon) commits homicide,
murder, arson, robbery, illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in furtherance or on the occasion of
his revolutionary pursuit, the only crime he has committed is rebellion because all those common crimes
are absorbed in the latter one pursuant to the ruling in People v. Hernandez.
4. UMIL vs RAMOS
Issue: mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid
ground for his arrest without warrant
s a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a
warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law.
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof,
or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all
in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from
their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of
his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by
actual facts that will be shown hereafter.
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect.
The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not
on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good
faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual
facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability
to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
5.

PP vs Hernandez READ!
Rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies.
Then follows a description of the murders, arsons and robberies allegedly perpetrated by the
accused as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. t is obvious, from the language of this
article, that the same presupposes the commission of two (2) or more crimes, and, hence, does not
apply when the culprit is guilty of only one crime
Another Angle:

Amado V. Hernandez, as a Communist, was an active advocate of the principles of Communism,

frequently exhorting his hearers to follow the footsteps of Taruc and join the uprising of the
laboring classes against capitalism and more specifically against America and the Quirino
administration, which he dubbed as a regime of puppets of American imperialism. But beyond the
open advocacy of Communistic Theory there appears no evidence that he actually participated in
the actual conspiracy to overthrow by force the constituted authority.
The acts of the appellant as thus explained and analyzed fall under the category of acts of
propaganda, but do not prove that he actually and in fact conspired with the leaders of the
Communist Party in the uprising or in the actual rebellion, for which acts he is charged in the
information.
Does his or anyone's membership in the Communist Party per se render Hernandez or any
Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion under the provisions of Article 136 of the
Revised Penal Code? The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not
to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy
of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient
unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an
uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the
working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself.
Artilce 139- Sedition
1. Umali - We are convinced that the principal and main, tho not necessarily the most serious,
crime committed here was not rebellion but rather that of sedition. The purpose of the raid
and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the
Government and for the purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised
Penal code under rebellion. The raiders did not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local
Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one object,
to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official,
namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this was
sufficient to constitute sedition.
The robberies were actually committed by only some of the raiders, presumably dissidents,
as an afterthought, because of the opportunity offered by the confusion and disorder resulting
from the shooting and the burning of the three houses, the articles being intended presumably
to replenish the supplies of the dissidents in the mountains. For these robberies, only those
who actually took part therein are responsible, and not the three appellants herein.
2. Tahil vs Tarson
In regard to Datu Tarson, it appears that he was one of those who took an oath on the Koran
to oppose the Government by force; that he took part in all the activities of the movement,
assisting in the construction of the fort; that in the day preceding the incident he was in the
fort; and while he left in the afternoon, he returned early the following morning and was
found in the fort when the Government forces appeared.
The facts proven, however, constitute the crime of sedition, defined in section 5 of Act No.
292, and not of rebellion according to section 3 of the same law, the acts committed being
limited to preventing the Government officials, throught force, from complying with their
duties in connection with the judicial order, the enforcement of which was entrusted to them.
lawphi1.net

3. Cabrera- Sedition is not the same offense as murder. Sedition is a crime against public order;
murder is a crime against persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of the
State, the authority of the government, and the general public tranquillity; murder is a crime
directed against the lives of individuals. (U.S. v. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437.) Sedition in its
more general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state; murder at
common law is where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully kills any human
being, in the peace of the sovereign with malice aforethought, express implied.
ARTICLE 142- INCITING TO SEDITION
1. Pp vs Perez- The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having
recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence.
2. US vs Abad -

ARTICLE 148- DIRECT ASSAULT

1. Rivera vs PP
The above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
employ force and seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a
policeman, by then and there challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter grappling
and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the
latter was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties.
Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for
the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance.
Unquestionably, petitioners case falls under the second mode, which is the more common
form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or
(b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand
upon a person in authority.
It is a matter of record that at the time of the assault, Lt. Leygo was engaged in the actual
performance of his official duties. He was wearing the designated police uniform and was
on board a police car conducting a routinary patrol when he first came upon the truck
unloading chicken manure. Because the unloading of chicken dung was a violation of La
Trinidad Municipal Ordinance No. 1-91, the lieutenant ordered the truck driver to return
from where he came, but petitioner, in defiance of such lawful order, commanded the

truck driver to return to Shilan, the place where the truck was first intercepted, and on
being informed that the same truck had returned, the lieutenant had every reason to
assume it did return for the purpose of unloading its cargo of chicken dung, thus stopped
it from doing so.
2. US vs Samonte
On meeting there they became engaged in quarrel, the appellant knocking or pushing
Rabe down, then proceeded to maltreat him. At this moment Rabe called "police! police!"
Gregorio Glindo, a municipal policeman of Pitogo, being on patrol duty that night in said
barrio, hearing these words went to the scene, arriving just as the offended party was
getting up, and attempted to arrest the appellant, saying to him: "In the name of the
United States, dont move."
The appellant was not arrested on that night on account of this resistance. He did not lay
hands on or touch with his knife either the policeman or the councilman, but he did refuse
to submit himself to the authorities, and resisted arrest. The policeman did not see the
appellant knock the priest down, neither did he see him kick the said priest, but he heard
the cries of the priest calling for help, saying "police! police!" and when he arrived on the
scene the priest was just getting up and freeing himself from the Appellant. When the
policeman heard these cries for help he was only a very short distance some 6 or 8
brazas away, and when he arrived the trouble had not terminated, although no active
fighting took place after his arrival. Under these facts and circumstances it was the duty
of this police officer to stop this disturbance by placing the defendant under arrest.
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at
once to the scene thereof; or the offense is continuing, or has not been consummated, at
the time the arrest is made.
The accused in this case, after an attempt had been made to arrest him by a duly
authorized police officer in the discharge of his duty as such, offered grave resistance by
refusing to submit himself to arrest and by striking at the policeman with a knife, thereby
attempting a personal injury. Although the policeman was not wounded or touched by the
accused, these facts do not relieve him from criminal responsibility.
3. US v Alvear
ASSAULT UPON PERSONS IN AUTHORITY; EVIDENCE; REASONABLE DOUBT.
A conviction of the grave offense of atentado (assault upon or resistance offered to
persons in authority or their agents) cannot be sustained in any case in which a reasonable
doubt arises as to whether the accused knew or ought to have known that the persons
assaulted or resisted were in fact persons in authority or their agents; provided that the
assault or resistance offered would have been justifiable in the event that the persons
assaulted or resisted had not been persons in authority or their agents.
2. ID.; SELF-DEFENSE IN RESISTING ARREST. The exemption from criminal

liability which is extended to any one who acts in defense of his own person or rights
from unlawful aggression, under article 8 of the Penal Code, must be held to include one
who assaults or resists a police officer under circumstances which would justify the
assault or resistance, if the person assaulted were not a police officer in the lawful
performance of his duties, when it further appears that the person making the assault did
not know, and had no reasonable grounds to believe, that the person assaulted was a
police officer acting in the performance of his duties as such.
all of the witnesses agree that the two Constabulary soldiers entered the house in plain
clothes; that immediately thereafter a violent altercation arose; and that all of the accused
promptly surrendered and offered no further resistance when the third Constabulary
soldier in uniform came up into the house and put them under arrest.
A conviction of the grave offense of atentado (assault upon or resistance offered to
persons in authority or their agents) cannot be sustained in any case in which a reasonable
doubt arises as to whether the accused knew or ought to have known that the persons
assaulted or resisted were in fact persons in authority or their agents; provided that the
assault or resistance offered would have been justifiable in the event that the persons
assaulted or resisted had not been persons in authority or their agents. (Art. 1, Penal
Code.)
That these accused assaulted and resisted the police officers who entered the house in
plain clothes is not denied; but the assault and resistance would have been wholly
justifiable if these men had been what they seemed to be to the occupants of the house;
that is to say, two strangers, who without lawful authority had entered the house and
physically assaulted the first man and woman they found there, at the same time
threatening their victims with a revolver if they moved or gave an alarm.
The exemption from criminal liability which is extended to anyone who acts in defense of
his own person or rights from unlawful aggression, under article 8 of the Penal Code
must be held to include one who assaults or resists a police officer under circumstances
which would justify the assault or resistance, if the person assaulted were not a police
officer in the lawful performance of his duties, when it further appears that the person
making the assault did not know, and had no reasonable grounds to believe, that the
person assaulted was a police officer acting in the performance of his duties as such.
(U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. Rep., 488.)
ARTICLE 150 Disobedience to summons
1. Drilon vs Ermita
EO 464
ARTICLE 153- Tumults and other disturbances
1. US v DOMINGO
A public meeting for the purpose of furthering his candidacy on the evening of the
day before the election. a party of 100 persons, more or less, composed largely, if not

exclusively, of partisans of the opposing candidate for the office of president,

marched down the street to the inspiring airs of a guitar. When this party arrived in
front of the house where the meeting was being held, it stopped. Some words passed
between the members of the crowd on the street and the people at the windows
upstairs where the meeting was being held, but no attempt appears to have been made
by the party outside to enter the house or to disturb the meeting inside by any
concerted action, other than by standing in a large crowd about the doors of the house
in such a way as to necessarily distract the attention of those attending the meeting
inside by the mere fact that they were doing so.
Under the provisions of Chapter VI [Title III, Book II] of the Penal Code we would
be entirely agreed with the trial judge in his characterization of the disturbance of
which the defendants were guilty, as a "grave" or a "gross" disturbance of public
order, had it taken place in connection with the actual holding of an election; for
instance, in or about a voting booth, or the place where the votes were being counted,
or, perhaps on the public highway along which voters on their way to exercise their
right to vote must necessarily pass. But we think that under all the circumstances of
this case, the fact that numerous meetings were being held at which the citizens and
voters called together in public by contending candidates and their partisans for the
purpose of inducing or persuading them to support one candidate or the other at the
forthcoming election, tends to justify a lenient rather than a severe judgment of the
nature, object, and conduct of the gathering of which the defendants formed a part. In
the excitement of a hotly contested campaign, some allowances must be made for the
tense state of public feeling, and not every petty incident should be magnified into a
matter of grave import. Within reasonable limits the candidates and their partisans
should be willing to bear and forbear with each other, recognizing that at such a time
things are often said and done in the heat of the contest, which the authors themselves
in a calmer moment would be the first to deprecate. And so the courts, in passing
upon the question whether a breach of the peace has resulted on such an occasion
from the clash of contending wills and the conflict of opposing policies, opinions, and
sentiments, and in characterizing such public disorders as do actually arise, should
keep in mind the actual conditions. The assembling of the people together, marching
and countermarching in bands from place to place, endeavoring by speeches and
debate, both public and private, to hold together the partisans of one set of policies or
candidates and to draw away the partisans of opposing policies and candidates, while
it undoubtedly tends to disturb the peace and quiet which ordinarily reigns in the
community, does not necessarily involve a criminal breach of the peace or
disturbance of public order. Where no municipal ordinance or public law or regulation
forbidding such gatherings is violated, a criminal breach of the peace can not properly
be said to have been committed, unless the disturbance created is such that it exceeds
the limits within which the partisans may fairly be required to restrict themselves
under the circumstances; and in imposing a penalty for a breach of the peace on such
occasions, it must not be forgotten that the reprehensible conduct of the partisans does
not consist of their assembling together and making public demonstrations, but in
exceeding those limits of public order and good behavior beyond which, under the
circumstances, the citizen may not pass.

ARTICLE 163- Making, importing or uttering false coins

defendant attempted to pay for a package of cigarettes which he bought at a certain
store with what appeared to be silver coin, but which, as a matter of fact, was a
Philippine copper cent; that he insisted that the owner of the store should accept the
same as a peseta, that is to say, a twenty cent piece; that the latter refused to accept it
upon noticing what the real value and denomination of the coin was; that the
defendant again insisted that the money be accepted and the owner of the store
refused to do so; that as a result of such refusal a quarrel ensued between them; that a
policeman then interfered, and upon being informed of what had happened, placed the
defendant under arrest and took him to the police station, where several Mexican and
Japanese coins were found in his possession together with a roll of Philippine copper
cents, the latter being silver plated, and identical with the coin which he had
attempted to pass at the store as a twenty-cent piece; and that upon an examination of
these plated coins it was found that they were genuine Philippine copper cents, which
apparently and been whitened with quicksilver to give them the color and brightness
of silver.c
There can be no counterfeiting of money when, as in this case, no spurious or clipped
coin was used. The coins in question were genuine copper cents and bore their
original designs and inscriptions. The defendant did not make or attempt to make any
alteration in the designs and inscriptions of the said coins. All that he did was to give
them the appearance of silver pieces for the purpose of passing them as twenty-cent
coins. He did not, however, attempt to imitate the peculiar design of such coins. The
acts committed by the defendant for the purpose of defrauding third persons by
deceiving them us to the real value of the coins in question constitute the crime
of estafa and not of counterfeiting money. There were not legal grounds upon which a
charge for these latter offenses could be based.c
Article 171- Falsification by public officer, employee, notary public or ecclesiastical minister.
1. Pacasum v PP
That on or about August 22-23, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in
Cotabato City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, a high ranking public official being the Regional
Secretary of the Department of Tourism in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Cotabato City, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense
in relation thereto, taking advantage of her official position, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsified her Employee Clearance submitted to the Office of
the Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the
signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, the Supply officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for the purpose
of claiming her salary for the months of August and September 2000.

When a person whose signature was affixed to a document denies his/her signature
therein, a prima facie case for falsification is established which the defendant must
overcome.
It is to be made clear that the use of a falsified document is separate and distinct from the
falsification of a public document. The act of using falsified documents is not necessarily
included in the falsification of a public document. Using falsified documents is punished
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the falsification of the
Employees Clearance was consummated the moment the signature of Laura Pangilan was
imitated.
In the falsification of a public document, it is immaterial whether or not the contents set
forth therein were false. What is important is the fact that the signature of another was
counterfeited.[54] It is a settled rule that in the falsification of public or official documents,
it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third
person for the reason that in the falsification of a public document, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed.[55] Thus, the purpose for which the falsification was made and
whether the offender profited or hoped to profit from such falsification are no longer
material.
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of
it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is
the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the
forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or
possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close
connection with the forgers. The presumption is inevitable that she is the material author
of the falsification.
The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting
evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is offered,
will thereby prevail. Were it not for her position and employment in the ARMM, she
could not have accomplished said Employees Clearance. In a falsification of public
document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position
when (1) he had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of
the document; or (2) he had official custody of the document which he falsified.[69] It
being her duty to prepare and submit said document, she clearly took advantage of her
position when she falsified or caused the falsification of her Employees Clearance by
imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan.
2. CSC vs Sta ana

Upon verification by Atty. Dante Huerta, Field Officer of the Civil Service Commission
in the Supreme Court, it was found that respondent Sta. Ana was not in the CSC-NCR
Master List of those who passed the MOWE Career Service Professional Examination
given by the Civil Service Commission on February 18, 1996 at Ramon Magsaysay High
School.[3] Atty. Huerta recommended the filing of a formal charge against respondent.
Respondents act of indicating in his personal data sheet that he passed that career service
professional examination when in fact he did not, also makes him liable for falsification
of a document by making an untruthful statement in a narration of facts, as defined under
Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code. In falsification by false narration of facts, (1)
the offender makes untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2) he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; (3) the facts narrated are
absolutely false; and (4) it was made with a wrongful intent to injure a third person.
By making a false statement in his personal data sheet to enhance his qualification and
increase his chances of being considered for promotion, which in fact happened because
he was issued an appointment as HRMO III by then Chief Justice Andres Narvasa,
respondent prejudiced the other qualified aspirants to the same position. It does not
matter that respondent did not actually assume the position and receive salaries and
benefits pertaining thereto. The law does not require that actual injury to a third person be
present. What is necessary is that there be intent to injure. Moreover, in People vs. Po
Giok To,[30] it is held that when official documents are falsified, the intent to injure a third
person need not be present because the principal thing punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein proclaimed.
Dismissal and termination of benefits.
3. Maguad vs de Guzman
The complaint[1] alleges that sometime in 1982, respondent Nicolas de Guzman (lawfully
married to Corazon Punzalan de Guzman), and respondent Ruby Barcenas, single,
unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at 137 Ignacio St., Pasay
City; that in October, 1983, when respondents' first illegitimate child Nathaniel Roy was
born, respondents unlawfully and maliciously conspired to falsify an entry in the Birth
Certificate of said child, making it appear that respondents were lawfully married on
December 8, 1982; that when respondents' second illegitimate child Natalia, was born in
1984, respondents unlawfully and maliciously conspired to falsify an entry in the said
child's Birth Certificate, making it appear that respondents were lawfully married on
December 8, 1984 (perhaps a typographical error meant to be December 8, 1982 as in the
first Birth Certificate).
The respondents explained that Barcenas was "constrained to supply such erroneous
information as regards her civil status solely for purposes of shielding her two children

from the stigma of shame and disgrace that they might encounter in their later years in
life by reason of their illegitimacy.
With respect to the charge of falsification, the complainants allege that the respondents
committed the offense when they made, through conspiracy, an entry in the birth
certificates of their children that they were married on December 8, 1982, or December 8,
1984, in Davao City, when in fact they were not. Apparently, this accusation is predicated
on one of the ways of committing falsification, i.e., by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code. One essential element
of this kind of falsification is that there must be a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the fact claimed to be false. In other words, there must be a law requiring, expressly or
impliedly, the disclosure of the truth of the fact alleged to have been falsified. No law has
been shown by the complainants making it either expressly or impliedly a duty of an
informant in a record of birth to disclose the truth that the parents of the child covered by
it are married or not. Consequently, the charge of falsification against the respondents
cannot likewise prosper.
4. US v Bayot
A complaint was filed against the defendant charging him, as a public official, with the
falsification of a public document, to wit, this pay roll, it being alleged that the certificate
which he attached thereto was false. He was convicted in the court below of the crime
charged against him and has appealed.
in view of all the testimony in the case, that it cannot be said that this statement was false;
in other words, that the vertical lines do not necessarily mean that the person against
whose name they appear was present in the building during every hour of the day. The
defendant, therefore, cannot be convicted of the crime of falsification of a public
document by a public official.
The crime thus charged does not depend upon the advantage of profit which the
defendant may obtain from the falsification. A defendant may be guilty of this crime
without in any way profiting thereby.
5. PP vs pio giok to
said accused, with intent to falsify or forge a public document, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify, or forge a public document consisting of
residence certificate No. A-1618529 issued to him in the City of Cebu, on January 7,
1952, by e representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu, to wit: by misrepresenting to the
said representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu that his name is Antonio Perez, that his
place of birth is Jaro, Leyte and that his citizenship is Filipino, and by means of such
misrepresentation, said representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu was made to issue
and write, and in fact did issue and write, on the corresponding lines on said residence

certificate No. A-1618529 the name of Antonio Perez, as the name of the taxpayer, Jaro,
Leyte as his place of birth, and Filipino as his citizenship, thus causing it to appear that
the said residence certificate No. A-1618529 dated January 7, 1952, was issued to one
Antonio Perez with his place of birth as Jaro, Leyte, and with his citizenship as Filipino,
when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, his true name is Po Giok To, his place
of birth is Amoy, China, and his citizenship is Chinese.
The sole issue is whether or not the information in question alleges sufficient facts to
constitute the crime of falsification of public document. The defense contends that the
information is insufficient for failure to recite two alleged essential elements of the crime
charged; namely, the obligation on the part of the accused to disclose the truth, and
wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure third persons.
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the first element allegedly lacking in the
information, viz., the obligation on the part of the accused to disclose the truth as to the
facts that should appear in a residence certificate, is inherent in the very nature and
purpose of said document. Section 3 Commonwealth Act 465 (otherwise known as the
Residence Tax Act)
Anent the second element allegedly lacking in the information in question, the law is
clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an
essential element of the crime of falsification of public document.

The distinction made by the law between falsification by private persons, first, of public
documents, and secondly of private documents, is clear; the first is committed by the mere
performance of any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171; while the second is
committed not only by the performance of any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171;
but it must likewise be shown that such act of falsification was committed to the damage of a
third party or with intent to cause such damage.
The reason for the distinction is given in a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated
December 23, 1885, cited by this Court in the case of People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48; i.e., that in
the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private
persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third
person, for the reason that, in contradiction to private documents, the principal thing punished is
the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed
In the present case, although it is true that it was the employee of the Office of the City Treasurer
of Cebu who performed the overt act of writing the allegedly false facts on the defendant's
residence certificate, it was however, the defendants who induced him to do so by supplying him
with those facts. Consequently, the employee was defendant's mere innocent agent in the
performance of the crime charged, while defendant was a principal by inducement.

The fact that Commonwealth Act No. 465 punishes the falsification of residence certificates in
the cases mentioned therein does not prevent the application of the general provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on other acts of falsification not covered by the special law, since under Art.
10 of the Rev. Penal Code, it has supplementary application to all special laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary, and Commonwealth Act No. 465 makes no provision that
it exclusively applies to all falsifications of residence certificates.
6. PP vs Monsanto
The defendant Wenceslao Cabagsang was the chief of police and the defendant Pedro Montano
was the justice of the peace of the municipality of Tanza in the Province of Cavite, in the month
of September, 1930, when the crimes for which they were convicted occurred.
The evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that prior to the hearing of said administrative
case, the defendants, in order to make it appear that there had been no violation of the said
instructions to the justices of the peace, falsified official records in their custody as follows:
The defendant chief of police fraudulently altered and falsified the municipal police blotter and
the book of records of arrests and the return of the warrant of arrest and Soriano's bail bond so as
to make them show that the said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and gave bond on the 13th day
of September, 1930, whereas, in truth and in fact, as said records showed before said
falsification, the said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and released on bond on the 6th day of
September, 1930; that the defendant Pedro Montano conspired and cooperated with his
codefendant in making said falsifications in order to meet the administrative charges then
pending against him. The court below rejected the defense of the accused that said alterations
were made in good faith and corresponded to the true facts of the case. There is no issue of law
raised in the assignment of errors. We have made a careful review of the evidence and have come
to the conclusion that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.
7. Manansala
People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil 1253, the possessor of the falsified document is presumed to be
the author thereof, and the one who stands to benefit therefrom is presumed to be the author
thereof. He admitted requesting his father to secure the said certification. He likewise admitted
that he has no participation in anyone of the projects mentioned therein. That despite such
knowledge of falsity of the contents of the document he accepted and allowed the same to be
used for the pre-qualification bidding before the PEA.
Article 173- falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents
1. De Rosales vs Ramos
This complaint for disbarment was filed in behalf of complainant Rosalinda Bernardo Vda. de
Rosales by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against respondent Atty. Mario G. Ramos
for violation of Act No. 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Title IV, Ch.
11, otherwise know as the Notarial Law.

On 3 September 1991 the Register of Deeds informed Rosalinda that her title to the property was
already transferred to Manuel by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale she purportedly executed in
favor of Manuel on 5 September 1990. The document was notarized by respondent Atty. Mario
G. Ramos on 1 October 1990 and entered in his Notarial Register as Doc. No. 388, Page No.
718, Book No. 10, Series of 1990. Rosalinda however denied having signed any deed of sale
over her property in favor of Manuel.
It is clear from the pleadings before us that respondent violated the Notarial Law in failing
to register in his notarial book the deed of absolute sale he notarized, which fact respondent
readily admitted. The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. It
requires him to keep a notarial register where he shall record all his official acts as notary, [6] and
specifies what information with regard to the notarized document should be entered therein.
[7]
Failure to perform this duty results in the revocation of his commission as notary public.[8]
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is
not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that
only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. [9] Notarization converts a
private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity.[10] A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely
upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.

Article 178- using of fictitious name and concealing true identity

1. US v To Lee Piu
We are satisfied on the whole case that the conviction must stand. From the fact and
circumstances in evidence it appears established beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant
used the name of another person for the purpose of deceiving Government and, by that
deception, to obtain a passport. He came to the Philippine Islands as a Chinese person traveling
for curiosity and pleasure. He so represented himself to the American consul at Canton and, by
that representation, obtained a section six certificate. In his application for that certificate he
stated that he was a Chinese person, and that his name was To Lee Piu .He came to the Philippine
Islands upon those representations; and, by virtue of the certificate obtained thereby, was
permitted to enter the country. Desiring to return to China, or travel in other parts of the world
and, at the same time, be permitted to return to the Philippine Islands at will, he sought to obtain
a passport as a citizen of the Philippine Islands under the sovereignty of the United States. In
order to accomplish his purpose it was necessary for him to show to the authorities of the

Philippine Islands issuing passport that he was in fact a citizen of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to a passport. He thereupon took unto himself a Filipino name, one not his own, and
made his application for a passport attaching to his application the name Toribio Jalijali.
As to the difference between the two names, To Lee Piu and Toribio Jalijali, a mere glance at, or
a single pronunciation of, the two names serves to demonstrate beyond question their complete
unlikeness. It is true that the name Toribio when pronounced by a Chinaman may sound like To
Lee Piu. But it must be observed, in the first place, that the name assumed by the appellant and
signed to the application for a passport is not Toribio but Toribio Jalijali; and, in the second
place, that the name assumed by the appellant in China and that under which he presented
himself to the American consul at Canton, was not Toribio nor Toribio Jalijali, but To Lee Piu,
thus clearly implying that he belonged to the family or tribe of To, and, therefore, was not of
Philippine origin or birth.
Article 183- False Testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation
1. US vs Estrana
Lope Estraa, having been duly sworn as a witness in the Court of First Instance of the
said province in criminal case No. 1055, entitled "United States vs. Gil Gamao et al.,"1 for
murder, illegally, maliciously, willfully, and falsely testified and declared, under oath, that
on the 15th day of May, 1909, one Dionisio Tambolero came to his house in Japitan,
within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Escalante, in said province, at about 7 p.m.
on the said 15th day of May, 1909, and that he remained in the house of the said accused
(Lope Estraa) until the following day; when, as a matter of fact, and as accused, Lope
Estraa, well knew, the said Dionision Tambolero was not at Japitan on the said 15th day
of May, 1909; all of which was in violation of the statutes in such case made and
provided.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, it is well settled that an indictment for perjury
must show conclusively that the testimony given or assertion made by the defendant on
the trial on which he was sworn or it will be fatally defective. This may be done either by
a direct allegation that it was material, or by the allegation of facts from which its
materiality will appear. The complaint in the case at bar is fatally defective for the want
of an allegation that the testimony, alleged to be false, was material to the issues involved
in the murder case. Our statute (section 3 of Act No. 1697, supra) specifically makes
materiality an essential element of the crime of perjury and without this the crime can not
legally exists. The materiality of a matter sworn to must be established by evidence and
can not be left to the presumption or inference.
The term "material matter" means the main fact which was the subject of the inquiry, or
any circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends

to corroborate or strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of the inquiry, or which
legitimately affects the credit of any witness who testifies
This definition of perjury, as modified by statute, may be more accurately defined to be the
willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood, under oath or information administered by authority
of law, in a material matter, the offense being enlarged and made to extend to other false oaths
than those taken in the course of judicial proceedings.
2. Monfort vs Salvatierra
Private respondents thus argue that they cannot be held liable for perjury since one of the
elements of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is that the assertion of
falsehood must be willful and deliberate; that the terms willful and deliberate imply
malice and evil intent in asserting falsehood; and that this element is lacking in the case at
bar.
Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law on a material matter.
The third element of perjury requires that the accused had willfully and deliberately
asserted a falsehood. A mere assertion of a false objective fact is not sufficient. The
assertion must be deliberate and willful.In the instant case, the petitioners failed to
establish the fact that the private respondents made a willful and deliberate assertion of
falsehood in their counter-affidavits dated 11 June 1998.
In this case, the private respondents believed in good faith that, based on the aboveexplained events, their statements in their respective counter- affidavits dated 11 June
1998 are true and correct. Good faith or lack of malice is a valid defense vis-a-vis the
allegation of deliberate assertion of falsehood in perjury cases. It should also be borne in
mind that perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as
to its truth. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an adequate defense.
3. Padua vs Paz
Complainant Medardo M. Padua charges respondent Ireneo S. Paz, Sheriff IV of Branch
31 of the Regional Trial Court, San Pedro, Laguna, with grave misconduct, falsification
of public document, perjury, giving false testimony, and abuse of position in connection
with Civil Case No. 3225.
Respondent sheriff stood to benefit from having the police report reflect that Ryan Padua
was an underage driver, showing that Ryan Padua was at the time of the accident not
qualified to drive a vehicle. As a father to a minor, complainant would also be liable for
the negligent acts of his son that cause damage to others.[14] Thus, as found by
Investigating Judge Geraldez, there is evidence to prove that Ireneo Paz may have

committed falsification of the Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Exhibit B-1), an act
constituting grave misconduct.
Another charge imputed against respondent sheriff is the act of having committed perjury.
Perjury is the deliberate making of untruthful statements upon any material matter before
a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law requires
such oath.[15]
There are four elements that comprise the crime of perjury, namely: (a) the accused made
a statement under oath on a material matter; (b) the statement was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oaths; (c) the accused made a
willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood in the statement and, (d) the sworn
statement containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
Respondent sheriff in his verified complaint for damages stated that Ryan Padua had no
drivers license on 12 June 1997, which was the date of the vehicular accident.
Respondent sheriff knew that this statement he made under oath was false. This
conclusion is drawn from the fact that in respondent sheriffs own copy of the police
report, at the time of the accident, Ryan Padua possessed license number NO1-95-179337
This information contained in respondent sheriffs copy of the police report completely
contradicts the statement respondent sheriff made in his very own complaint. Respondent
sheriff cannot merely feign ignorance of this detail which is material to his complaint for
damages. Based on the evidence, all the requisite elements of the act of perjury exist.
4. Villanueva vs Secretary of Justice
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect the earnest concerns of the
parties before a tribunal. The felony is consummated when the false statement is made.

A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The assertion must
be deliberate and willful.[31] Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of
the accused.[32] Willfully means intentionally; with evil intent and legal malice, with the
consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be
received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is equivalent to knowingly. Deliberately
implies meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts.[33] It must appear that the accused
knows his statement to be false or as consciously ignorant of its truth.[34]

Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief or conviction as to its
truth. A false statement of a belief is not perjury. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an
adequate defense.[35] A false statement which is obviously the result of an honest mistake is not
perjury.
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the statement made by the
defendants must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defendant did not believe
those statements to be true.
A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the contradictory sworn
statements of the accused. The prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false and
must show the statement to be false by other evidence than the contradicting statement.Rationale:
Proof that accused has given contradictory testimony under oath at a different time will not be
sufficient to establish the falsity of testimony charged as perjury, for this would leave simply one
oath of the defendant as against another, and it would not appear that the testimony charged was
false rather than the testimony contradictory thereof. The two statements will simply neutralize
each other; there must be some corroboration of the contradictory testimony. Such corroboration,
however, may be furnished by evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the
declarations of testimony of the accused.