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Table of Contents

1.

ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS 3

2.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABE VALDEZ .................................................5

3.

CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN ........7

4.

PEOPLE VS. GALIT ..............................................................................................................8

5.

SALCEDO-ORTAEZ VS. CA ...........................................................................................9

6.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUEL BACONGUIS y INSON .....................9

7.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT" ................ 11

8.

PEOPLE VS. TUMIMPAD ............................................................................................... 12

9.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (plaintiff-appellee) vs. JOEL SARTAGODA y


BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUA y LAZARTE, VICENTE STA. ANA y GUTIERREZ and
JOHN DOE, accused-appellants. ................................................................................ 14

10.

PEOPLE VS. CARPO ......................................................................................................... 15

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ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise,
as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices, and their families.

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ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 127240; March 27, 2000
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of CAs decision
(CA reversed RTCs [Branch 24 Koronadala S. Cotabato] decision admitting
Ong Chia to Philippine Citizenship)
FACTS
[1989] Petitioner, at the age of 66, filed a verified petition to be admitted as a
Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization
Law, as amended.
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony.
Petitioner, born on January 1923 in Amoy, China
In 1932 (9y/o), petitioner arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel
Angking and stayed in the Phils. since then
He got employed/eventually started his own business and married a Filipina
with whom he had 4children
Administrative was first sought in filing a petition for naturalization with the
Special Committee on Naturalization (Office of the SolGen) but the same was
not acted upon as it was not reconstituted after Feb 1986 revolution such that
processing of petitions by Administrative process was suspended.
Hence, the consequence of seeking judicial intervention.
With such testimony, the Prosecutor got impressed asking the trial court to admit
petitioner to Philippine citizenship and wished not to present any evidence to
counteract/refute the testimony for the petitioner which the trial court did (in
1999).
The State, however, through the Office of the SolGen, appealed for:
failure to his other name in 1989 petition
o a copy of the 1977 petition filed with the Committee was annexed to the
States appellant brief, in which petitioner stated that in addition to his
name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as
"Loreto Chia Ong
failure to state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7
o as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, petitioner
resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in
the petition
failure to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his
entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of 2
o petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage
from 1953 until they were married in 1977
o petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any
having no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have
been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of 2

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o income tax returns allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to


show that his net income could hardly support himself and his family
failure to support his petition with the appropriate documentary
evidence

CA reversed the decision of the trial court.


Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contention: The appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which,
justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and
formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any
evidentiary value," so it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners contention is tenable.
HELD: NO. The SC found the contention to have no merit.
(1) Naturalization; Evidence; Pleadings and Practice; Formal Offer of Evidence. The
rule on formal offer of evidence is clearly not applicable to a petition for
naturalization; Decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule
on res judicata
Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of Court which provides that the rules
shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
The rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, 34) invoked by petitioner is clearly not
applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance
when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical
and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings
are not covered by the rule on res judicata. Consequently, a final favorable judgment does
not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization
on the basis of the same documents.
(2) Same; Same. The reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which
has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to
their admissibility.
Petitioner cannot claim that, as a result of the States failure to present and formally offer
its documentary evidence, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity,
thus, depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. Indeed, the reason
for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is
to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot
claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted to the appellate court by the State.

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(3) Same; Same; Public Documents. Where a party fails to make a satisfactory
showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of
documents which have been executed under oath, the court may rely on them.
The Court notes that the documents namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767,
petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents. As such, they have been
executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory
showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these
documents, it is in the conclusion of the SC that the appellate court did not err in relying
upon them.
Disposition: Decision of the CA AFFIRMED; instant petition DENIED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABE VALDEZ
G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000
Admissibility of Evidence
FACTS:
Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused
was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated
and cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which
dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned and with
assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V.
Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all
member of the police force, who testified how the information was received, the
commencement of their operation and its details under the specific instruction of
Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then,
proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7)
five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters away
from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and,
according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven
marijuana plants, took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and
arrested him. One of the said plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory for analysis which produced a positive result. The prosecution also presented
a certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the land
cultivated by appellant where the growing marijuana plants were found, was part of the
public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the certification as the occupant of the lot,
but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.
The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his
vegetable farm when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was
asked to go with the latter to see something. This unknown person then brought appellant
to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from
his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the
hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing
there. When he denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told
him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous and afraid that he
admitted owning the marijuana. The police team then brought him to the police station at
5|EVID ENCE Cas e d i gests

Villaverde. At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about
the marijuana plants seized by the police. Appellant contends that there was unlawful
search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure
a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does
not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of
one's person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is
lawful and the seized evidence admissible.
(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.
(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.
HELD:
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time
to obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally
mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The
mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike
against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness
of their intentions.
With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an
illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the
marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an
unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the
proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a
quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict
appellant.
In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be
convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt
that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence
arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must
likewise be credible and competent. Competent evidence is "generally admissible"
evidence. Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or
judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial. And as earlier
discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted evidences against the
accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is doubly
tainted.

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In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." To justify the conviction of the
accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its
evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused.
Absent the required degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.

CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN


G.R. No. 107383; February 20, 1996
Right to privacy and communications (Art 3, Sec. 3)
Nature of the Case: Petition to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the
RTC of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken
by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
FACTS
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin.
On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport,
and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and
for damages against petitioner.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive
owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia
Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties
to Dr. Martin and to pay him certain amount including nominal and moral damages.
The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the documents and papers, so forcibly/illegally taken or seized by the
wife from and without the consent of her husband as the capital owner of the same, are
admissible in evidence in a case of legal separation to which they are parties.
HELD: NO.
(1) Illegally obtained evidence; Constitutional Law; Privacy of communication and
Correspondence; Privacy of Communication and Correspondence is inviolable. The
only exception in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Indeed the
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documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional


injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be]
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved
by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is
to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
"lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
(2) The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking
the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity, as in the instant case. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
(3) The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But
one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to
share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.
Disposition: Petition for review DENIED for lack of merit.
PEOPLE VS. GALIT
GR No. L-51770 March 20, 1985
Miranda Rights (Art 3, Sec. 12)
FACTS:
The accused was arrested for killing the victim on the occasion of a robbery. He had
been detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He
consistently maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime.
Obviously, something drastic has to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So
the investigating officers began to maul him and torture him physically. Still the prisoner
insisted on his innocence. His will have to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So
they continued to maltreat and beat hi,. They covered his face with a rag and pushed his
face into the toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take it anymore. His
body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer.
He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed a
confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his
investigators, purporting it to be a re-enactment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against
him.
HELD:
The accused was acquitted. Such a long question followed by monosyllabic
answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his
rights under the constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and
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clear questions and every right in simple word dialect or be known to the person under
investigation. He accused is from Samar and no showing that he understands Tagalog.
Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his
lawyers, a relative or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he
had been brought to the NBI for the investigation and it was only two weeks after he had
executed the statement that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does
not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigate one did not
assist him. The supposed re-enactment, again counsel of his choice did not assist the
accused. These constitute gross violations of his right.

SALCEDO-ORTAEZ VS. CA
GR No. 110662 August 4, 1994
Right to privacy and communications (Art 3, Sec. 3)
Anti Wire-tapping Law (Sec. 4, RA 4200)
FACTS:
Respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed City a complaint for annulment of marriage
with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage
license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by
private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations
between petitioner and unidentified persons. CA dismissed the petition stating tape
recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be
admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and
offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and
the even handed administration of justice.
ISSUE:

W/N Tape recordings are admissible as evidence.

HELD:
No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping
and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes"
expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Clearly, respondents trial court and
Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in
evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the
telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the
subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Rule 128: Collated Matters
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RUEL BACONGUIS y INSON
GR No. 149889 December 2, 2003
Paraffin Test
It is settled that circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict, the following requisites must
be met: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
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While Lydia Mercado-Lledo was sleeping in her bedroom, she heard a gunshot and when
she
looked at the window, she saw a man jumping at their fence. The man allegedly turned his
face which enabled Lydia to see his face. When Lydia went to the sala, she saw her
younger brother Roberto Mercado bleeding. She thereafter brought him to the hospital
but subsequently died. The investigating officers found that the description of the man
that Lydia saw matched that of Ruel Baconguis who was a suspect in several cases of theft
and robbery. Baconguis was then captured by the police and was subjected to paraffin
testing where he was found positive for gunpowder nitrates on both hands. Lydia, upon
seeing Baconguis, told the police that he was the man she saw. Baconguis denied the
allegations against him. The Regional Trial Court (RTC), however, gave credence to the
results of the paraffin test and found Baconguis guilty of Murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the paraffin test and Lydias testimony are sufficient to convict Ruel
Baconguis of the crime charge
HELD:
It bears noting that the evidence relied upon by the prosecution is circumstantial. It is
settled that or circumstantial evidence to suffice to convict, the following requisites must
be met: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
The value of the in-court identification made by Lydia, however, is largely dependent upon
the
out-of-court identification she made while Baconguis was in the custody of the police. In
People v. Teehankee, Jr., the Court held that corruption of out-of-court identification
contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial case. The totality of
circumstances test has been fashioned to assure fairness as well as compliance with the
constitutional requirements of due process in regard to out-of-court identification. Under
the circumstances attendant to the identification of Bocanguis, the Court is not prepared
to hold that the prosecution had established that Bocanguis was the man seen leaving the
house-scene of the crime soon after a gunshot was hear. As for the positive paraffin
findings on Bocanguis, it is well settled that nitrates are also found in substances other
than gunpowder. But even assuming arguendo that Bocanguis being positive for
gunpowder may be credited as circumstantial evidence indicating his culpability, that is
only one circumstance, and since no other circumstance was established by the
prosecution, the first requirement of circumstantial evidence to warrant conviction of
Bocanguis has not been met.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT"


G.R. No. 150224 (428 SCRA 504); May 19, 2004
Credibility of witnesses| Circumstantial Evidence| DNA Testing
DNA Test
FACTS
Accused-appellant was sentenced to death for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim. Appellant was charged to have
had carnal knowledge of a certain Kathylyn Uba against her will, and with the use of a
bladed weapon, stabbed the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in her
untimely demise.
In the instant case, appellant raises the issue of credibility of witnesses, specifically
assigning as error on the part of the trial court, the latters giving of much weight to the
evidence presented by the prosecution notwithstanding their doubtfulness.
ISSUE (1)
Whether appellants contentions as regards the witnesses credibility are meritorious.
HELD: NO.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved
against appellant. This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a
reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a
better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect
the result of the case, the trial judges assessment of credibility deserves the appellate
courts highest respect. Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the
prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith
and credit.
The weight of the prosecutions evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled
rule which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as
long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond
doubt that the accused committed the crime.
ISSUE (2)
Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence

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HELD: Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an


unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the
exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is
sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
ISSUE (3)
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample
taken from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain
silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
Constitution.
Is the contention of appellant tenable?
HELD: NO.
The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion.
The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from
the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought
to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples
were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for
forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what
is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in
nature acquired from the accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin,
blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,
where immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused
without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against
self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to
determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
PEOPLE VS. TUMIMPAD
GR No. 109144 August 19, 1994
Drug Test/DNA test (?)
FACTS:
Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and
daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a 5-year old
who still needed to be fed and dressed up. Her vocabulary was limited and most of the
time she expressed herself by motions.
Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental. Four
security men were assigned to him, two of then were accused Constable Rule Prieto and
accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad.

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It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs. Salcedo


then brought her to a doctor in Oroquieta for check-up. Medication was given to Sandra
but her condition did not improve. Sandra became irritable and moody. She felt sick and
unhappy.
The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out from
the kitchen and told her mother, Mama, patayin mo yan, bastos.
Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second check-up. Dr. Conol,
the examining physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose Lim, a medical technologist, conducted
the urinalysis. The result revealed that Sandra was pregnant.
During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both Major Blood Grouping
Test and Pheno Blood Typing be conducted on the offended party, her child Jacob and
the two accused. The result of the test conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed
that Jacob Salcedo has a type O blood. Sandra Salcedo type B, accused Rule Prieto type
A and accused-appellant type O.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Moreno Tumimpad and Rule Prieto are guilty of rape.

HELD:
Accused-appellants culpability was established mainly by testimonial
evidence given by the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as
evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of many others of the same blood
type may have been the father of the child. As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. CA:
Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples
of the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be established
conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child. But group
blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states,
and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such
tests. Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of
non-paternity where the results of the test, made in the prescribed manner,
show the impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of the few cases in
which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be completely accurate,
and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is
allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test. The
findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as
they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of many others
with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (plaintiff-appellee) vs. JOEL SARTAGODA y BOCANEGRA,


JIMMY BASCUA y LAZARTE, VICENTE STA. ANA y GUTIERREZ and JOHN DOE, accusedappellants.
G.R. No. 97525; April 7, 1993
Finger Printing
FACTS
All the three accused-appellants were convicted by the Trial Court as the latter
found all guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime of Robbery
with Rape, and each sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with the
accessories provided for by the law.
On appeal:
The accused-appellants fault the trial court of ignoring the fingerprint
examination report submitted by the Crime Laboratory of the PC/INP Camp
Crame which stated that none of the specimen latent fingerprints were found
to be positive.
o It is their contention that since their fingerprints were not found in the
objects found in the scene of the crime they cannot be held guilty of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
They claim that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascua did not flee,
even when they had all the opportunities to do so, prove their innocence.
When they were allowed to go home after Vilma failed to identify them during
the first confrontation at the police station, they stayed home and did not flee
until they were again required to appear at the police station for the second
time. The accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight is an indication of
guilt, non-flight or the decision not to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a
sign of innocence.
ISSUE (1): Whether the absence of fingerprints as accused-appellants posited,
eliminates possibility that accused could have been at the crime scene.
HELD: NO. The SC agrees that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great
significance, however, it cannot sustain their (accused-appellants) theory that from the
negative findings in the fingerprint examination conducted in the course of the
investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded that they could not have been at the
scene of the crime.
Negative findings do not at all times lead to a valid conclusion for there may be
logical explanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints other than their not
being present at the scene of the crime. Only latent fingerprints found on smooth
surface are useful for purposes of comparison in a crime laboratory because prints left on
rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines instead of complete and continuous
lines. Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint examination. The latent
fingerprints are actually oily substance adhering to the surfaces of objects that come in
contact with the fingers. By their very nature, oily substances easily spread such that
when the fingers slide against the surface they touch, no identifiable latent print is left,
only smudges instead. Not all police investigators are aware of the nature of latent
fingerprints so as to be guided accordingly in deciding which objects to submit for
fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting the interplay of many circumstances involved
in the successful lifting and identification of proper latent fingerprints in a particular
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crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the possibility that the
accused-appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet they
had not left any identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent
fingerprints are involved. The findings in this particular fingerprint examination are not
sufficient to case even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime
charged.
ISSUE (2): Whether police line-up is required by law for proper identification of the
accused.
HELD: NO. Face and body movement of assailant create lasting impression on victim.
Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that they were positively
identified at the trial. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification. The complainant's recognition of the accused-appellants as her attackers
cannot be doubted for she had during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces of
the men who ravaged her. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal
violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the
manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and
body movement thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot easily be erased from
their memory.
ISSUE (3) Rule 128, subsequent circumstance: Whether non-flight can be
considered a proof of innonce.
HELD: NON-FLIGHT NOT PROOF OF INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. They claim that the
fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascua did not flee, even when they had all the
opportunities to do so, prove their innocence. The accused-appellants in effect posit that if
flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not to flee, having the opportunity
to do so, is a sign of innocence. The SC does not agree. Although it is settled that
unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does not necessarily follow that absence thereof
proves innocence, specially so when there is overwhelming evidence to establish
their guilt.
Disposition: Appealed decision AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accusedappellants are held jointly and severally liable to indemnify Vilma de Belen for multiple
rape and that none of the accused is required to recognize the offspring
PEOPLE VS. CARPO
GR No. 132676 April 4, 2001
Polygraph Test
After the filing of briefs, the accused filed an Addendum to Appellants Brief urging that
the favorable result of their lie detector tests with the NBI be admitted into the records.
A lie detector test is based on the theory that an individual will undergo physiological
changes, capable of being monitored by sensors attached to his body, when he is not
telling the truth. The Court does not put credit and faith on the result of a lie detector test
inasmuch as it has not been accepted by the scientific community as an accurate means of
ascertaining truth or deception.

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