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21 ARMY GROUP
CLEARING OF
SCHELDT ESTU
OCT - NOV 1944
INCLUDING OPERATIONS:
SWITCHBACK
VITALITY I & II
INFATUATE I & II
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REPORT ON "CLEARITG OF TI~ SCEIDT ESTUARY"
4 O ornando - Brigade.
Any hibian Training Centre,
l.arine Parade,
Towyn, Merionethshire,
Ma3o rT. Boon,
Offices of the War Cabinet,
Historical Section,
8, Barton Street, S.W.1.
I1 D ZX
Section,
PAZRT I INITRO]DUCTION 1.5
UII S ~ LI G OI.TE :OTT BL.ELND IST H US 6- 9
Hr III CII'ld-I1T Ti.J,1 SOUSJ2i B' K 0OP-
TIE scnii2LD.
ORTION S. T,-C-iBACi 10o-32
Ut IV CIL ,IlIKC OF SOUTHiIBIJZLAL]'D
OP RATIONS VI'TALIY. I & II 33 - 56
it V COEI; IT I0N OFO y iPR'1' ION $ i! CrIIBACK 57 - 62
POST SCWT
ap
Fl3 of SOUTH BETE.,IAD. VITAiLITY I a~nd, II.
Ii 5 1./lpof 1"LUSLGo
14~ ~!jr
1r r s3 r 2 F
' 0CLP
iT .. - SoIfLD-S1 ' Y .*i
PART I
INT~RODU1.GIONT
E~EIY DISPOSITIONS
OUTLINE PLAN
A..T..
PA II
10. The 3 Canadian Infantry Division was. given the task. of clearing
this area, .This Division hd been engaged in liquidating "BOULOGN\Ea nd
CAAI:S, while 4' Canadian Armoured Division contained the enemy on the
I:panal line between SAVOJAi
lDSPLidLaT and ZEEBRUGGE. Completing the mopping-
:up process at CALAIS 0bi 30 September, the .Division arrived in its concen-
tration area, SOUTH of MALDEGEM, on the evening of ..4 October, except for
9 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group vwhich was :detached to the Gi-HETT area.
11. ... All available sources indicated that the bulk of the enemy
Stroops holding the "island" consisted of 64 Infantry Divis'ion. -Little
was known of the artillery and coastal defence units, or, possible
improvised battle: groups, but it was estimated that the garrison con-.
sisted of about 7,000 men, apart from administrative personnel.
12. The area is. completely flat, with a network of minor canals
and ditches, and numerous areas which<arc permanently flooded. It is
criss-crossed by dykes which 'mostly carry roads or 'tracks . The .fields,
or "polders", arce open and afford little or no cover:: . Church towers and
buildings are .the only viewpoints.
ALRTILLER Y
i'The enemy positions on the far side of the canal were known 'to
be dug in on the reverse side of the canal dyke. Owing to the difficulty'
of neutralising such positions with BE and SA fire, an exercise was carried-
out with 'ASPS on an exactly similar piece of ground, to see -whether flame
could be projected into the slit trenches. This trial showed that"if bthe
flame was aimed at the near edge of the dyke, just below the crown,a .
goodly portion of the fuel would riccochet and splash into the trenches.
On the LTFT however, heavy fire was met as .the Regina Rif assault
boats' were launched. 'A' Company on the RIGH-T was unable to launch itself
at all, while 'B' Company on the L 'T managed -to get across, not without
some casualties, but suffered severely when it moved inland. 'WEST of
STROOIBURG-, the LEOPOLD and DERIVATION Canals converge and are separated
by a narrow island. MGi positions on the island enfiladed the crossing
places and caused heavy casualties, while mortaring steadily increased.
17. Nevertheless, the two battalions held on to the far bank and the
remaining companies of the Regina Rif crossed at 'B' Comapny's ferry on the
~F'T. By darkness, 1 C SCOT R held a small bridgehead in the vicinity of
MIORSDO'D and YUILP2 . Regina Rif bridgehead consisted of a single line..
of men along the canal side of the dyke, stretching from opposite G-R~
F JAi
to the main road. Repeated efforts were made to get depth by pushing
groups out to the front, but every movement drew intense, fire.
18. On 7 October, the R TIG R were put in to close the. gap. They
crossed behind the RIGHT battalion and proceeded to move ,IEST to clear
OOSTHOEK, but this w-Ls no easy matter and the juncture was not made until
9 October. The enemy.showed no signs of slackening, and it was another
four days before it was possible to build-the -required bridges near
STROOIBURG. At the same time, he suffered severe losses, and it turned
out later that he had spent a considerable portion of his best troops in
the costly counter attacks against the bridgehead.
AUSS.ULT
IT: PLOSS SHOJAA DS iUT (For detailedaccount of this
operation see Immediate Report No. 63).
19. Meanwhile, '9 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group was preparing for.
its amphibious assault from TEII EUZEN. After brief training in the G-iENT
area, its Assault Group, consisting of two batcaions and 'actical Brigade
Headquarters, moved off in the evening of 7 October, sailing in LVTs up
the GIT-TERZNEU T Canal. The 20-mile journey was uneventful, until
the damaged locks at TEN' UZE" were reached about 2200 hours. Here,
ramps had been constructed to enable the LVTs to make a detour on land to
by-pass the locks, but owing to the difficulty of ascending the ramp, each
LVT had to be towed out singly, and it was found impossible to mount the
assault at the appointed hour viz: a "touch-dov'n" on the island at 0130
hours. It was therefore decided to postpone the assault for 24 hours,
and the troops and LVTs were qickly dispersed to harbour before first
light, and out of observation from the enemy.
20. For the carrie of the Assault Group, the LVTs had been
organised in two flotillas. "A" Flotilla consisted of 46 LVTs carrying
the Nth NS HIGRS who were to land on the more Northerly beach "GREEN."
"B1" flotilla had 51 LVTs, of which 5 were for Tactical Brigade Headquarters,
and 46 for ijLI of C who were to land on "A~ 'ER" beach . Each infantry
battalion s allotment included four LVTs for carriers of the Commandin
Officer ahd three FOOs, three for ,ASPS, four for 6-pr guns and four for
Loyd towers, four for Company Commanders' carriers and four for Jeeps.
21. K hour.for the touch-down was put back to 0200 hours 9 October.
personnel re-embarked on the evening of 8 October, and at 0020 hours the
leading flotilla commenced to move into the outer harbour, and shortly
'afterards the convoy emerged into the SC-IDLDT. "A" Flotilla had a 5-
miles journey to their beach; "B". Flotilla had 4 miles to go to AMR.
The convoy was piloted by an Officer 'RN, and each flotilla was precede
by a motor boat equipped with a compass. A careful study was made of
air photographs and charts, and marker shells were fired on to the land-
ing beaches as a further aid to navigation.
rBy 0500 hours, most of the LVTs had turned round to return for
the Follow-up Group, and this started to arrive on the beaches'about 0915
hours. During the morning the third, battalion, SD & G Highrs, disem-
barked and completed its arrangements to attack HOOFDPLA T.
23. In view" of the situation -on the LEOPOLD CAINAL, it was decided to
put 8 Canadian Infantry Brigade and the Recce Regiment, through the
SAVOJAARDS PIAT bridgehead. Their task was to push SW, and at the same-
time, to open a route from the SOUTH in the ISABELLA area, in conjunction
with the 4 Canadian Armoured Division. Until a land route was opened,
the progress of 9 Canadian Infantry Brigade' would be limited, as it would
soon be beyond effective support of its artillery, still FAST of
SAVOJA~ DS PLAAT.
25. With the arrival'of 8 Canadian Infantry Brigade, the area was
extended SOUTH and S'. On the evening of 14 October, this brigade joined
up with a battalion of 4 Canadian Armoured Division, who had come up from
the SOUTH after some fierce fighting among floods, mines and booby-traps.
26. During this time, 4 Canadian Armoured Division had done more than
merely picquet the canal line, and in addition to opening the. land route at
its Eastern end, had undertaken various diversions along its length. But
it was urgently required elsewhere, and on 17 October, 6 HLI and the Recce
Regiment of 52 (L) Division, took over, enabling the Armoured Division to
leave the area,
RPROGRESS
PURTRL CROSS TE] "ISLND, "t
28~ Continued pressure from the EAST caused the enemy to make a
general withdrawal. IJZM\DIJI was captured on 17 October, and on 19
October, the two bridgeheads linked up when 7 Canadian Recce Regiment made
contact with 157 Infantry Brigade near ST KRUIS.
finally cleared until 25 'dctober when the1ih NS HIG-GRS made it firm in.
our hands.,
iae .
9 Carnadian Infa ntry Bs; as noas withdrawn, in order to
puzzle the enemiy as to its future employment, and 7 Canadian Infantry
Brigade pushed through to;vards. GROEDE.
30 .BBC,
A bout this tine, the announced that the 'danadians had..
withdrawn from BES1E S, To.our troops Who were sitting there, this
seemed strange though NT iunprecedented, but t he German Commander, who*
also heard it, later admitted that he thought this was another example
of Canadian cunning.
P.A-R. T IV
PLANING
35. Owing to the. stiff fighting which had taken place around
WOETNSDRECE , and the enemy' s continued threats from BERGEN-OP-ZOOM, 156
Infantry Brigade was given the task Of making the assault from across the
SCHELDT. While 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade was bein concentrated,
preparatory to leading the way across the isthmus, on 23 October 6 Canadian
Infantry Brigade started an advance NORTH towards' KORTEVEN. At the same
time, 5 Canadian Infantry Brigade attacked N!y of W0~CSDRECHT to clear the
area NORTH of the railway line. Both brigades had limited success, but
the hold on the area was strengthened and 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade
was able to s tart its advance at.0430 hours on 24 October.
36. SOUTH of the main road, R Regt of C made good progress in face of
moderate opposition, but on the main road and NORTH of it, the ESSEX
SCOTTISH encountered stiff resistance from heavy gun and anti-tank fire,
and were further delayed, by the wholesale cratering of the road,
_eI NTNflNG
40. This operation entailed the placing of 15:6 Infantry Brigade Group
ashore on SOUTH BrEVEL A . from concentration areas in and near TERZIUZET,
and, subsequent to the initial assault, landing the .necessary build-up and
maintenance until such time as this could be brought by road along-the
SOUTH BEVJEL\1D isthmus.
Combined planning between 5 Canadian infantry Brigade and 1
Assault Brigade RP commenced on 21 October, 156 :Inantry Brigade.also
held a watching brief, and when it was decided on 22 October that they
should make the assault, they were already in the picutre.
&fEEIT ION
CRIFT AVAILAiBLL
42. 176 LVTs were used for the initial assault and follow up, 80
under command 5 Assault Regiment RE, and 96 under command 11 R Tks. In
addition, 25 LOAs were available and 27 .TEBRRAiiI'TS were used in the build
up and maintenance programme.
One squadron of STAFI0F'S YLO, under conrmiand 1 Assault Brigade RE
was in support of 156 Infantry Brigade.
ALLOCATION
LVT2. LVT 4 LCA
Assault (4/5 Ral Group 19 55 2 Initial load
6 .CirtONIi~N Group 20 .39 2 " "
156 Infantry Brigade
S'R' Group 1 3 - . "
INITIAL OBJECTrld:S
I:TD
STAS Or ABSAULT CGOUP
t .. GE
.assault CI beach and
45. RIGHI -4/5.lSIP Group. lotilla
.. capture .A, C, and D.
SOLlOW-UP GROUP
46. This formed '0F lotilla and would land as ordered by the Brigade
Commander. Its probable task would be to concentrate NORTH and W of
dRL'iD, with a view :-
'BT
TEi, ?ASSAG
PROGRESS O TM ASSAULT
40G. 4/5 RSF soon had one company in locality (A) and another in
BAKiDORP, and were approaching BA'iRLt2D, while 6 CiMRONIJANS made good
progress towards (F). At 0635 hours, the two battalions were in
contact.
The next day, 4 Canadian Infantry Brigade cleared the EAST end
of the causeway, and 5 Canadian Infantry Brigade, who passed through them,
had their leading elements within 100 yards of the' far end where they were
pinned by heavy mortar fire and a profusion of ?MGIsited in the WULCT~iE T
dykes.
COivUIvM 'TND
53. It was decided that GOC 52 (L) Division should command the
impending ALClEREN operations. Accordingly, he directed C 1 52 (L)
Division to assume general direction of the two infantry brigades and the
divisional artillery operating in SOUTE BEELA D. The task of the force -
to be known as "B NORCE" - was to take over from 2 Canadian Infantry
Division and to be prepared, subsequently, to clear the Eastern portion of
i-ALCi~2RN and to advance, firstly on FLUSHING and secondly, or alternatively,
on MIDDELBURT.
CONCLUSION OF VITALITY I ND II
55. The build-up programme from the OSSETISSE peninsula had been
continued during 26, 27 and the morning of 28 October. A'tno stage were
the operations suspended, although fog on the night 26/27 October reduced
visibility to 50 yards and a number of craft lost their bearings and were
unable to land. Attempts were made to ship a searchlight to be sited on
JAMI beach, but as it weighed 10 tons this was found impossible. Re-
course was then made to the firing of tracer in short bursts during the
.. night to
- 1 4.-
Heavy rain on. 27ctober, ahd: durin the night, made the :: Tand
OUT ramps practically .impassable, short of towing .each LVT separately
through the mud with a bulldozer. It. was therefore decided to transfer
the LVTs to TMERUZ i where conditions were better.
56. Prom the morning of 26 October, the LCAs and TEiR2PTMS had
successfully carried, out "a stores maintenance programme£from the small
harbour near OSSTEISSE. Conditions of tide prevented more than one
turn round being made each day, and .appreciable .delay was caused by the
difficulty of getting TE APINS and other vehicles-ff the beach and on
to the roads on the far side.
About 20 miles of tracing tape and 300 marking lamps were used
in marking the routes and marshalling areas. . LVTs .and TERAPINS used
27,000 gallons of. petrol during the operation,.
- 15 -
PAR T V
62. It now only remained to mop-up the strip between ZEEBRUGGE and
the LEOPOLD CIANAL. This was done- by 7 Canadian Recce Regiment, and
operation "SWIT LxB1CK" was concluded at 0930 hours, 3 November, having
yielded 12,500 prisoners.
- 16 -
PART. VI
1
D ASS5 1j QN
OULl
TIEE ISLAND01-IOAl 1TLCKEIT 01.x lh«-TUU TE I ANID'In
P ;NING .
II"f TUTE II - An attack. on the ies tern side of the island, near
STIKPIiELLE , by Noso, 41, 47 and' 48 Commandos of 4
.v SS Brigade., and No. 1 0 ( .A.) Conmmando.
PELIMITM.OP i:
IONS. . :.
..(a)/Bombing of
- .17 -
(a) Bombing of the ESTKPELLE and other dykes, to flood the island.
By flooding the island it was considered that many of the defences
Swould be submerged, and that the .garrison would be driven out or
appreciably restrictedin, its movements. If, at the.same time,
a large enough gap could be made in a sea dyke, it wvould enable
the defences to be taken in the rear by waterborne forces.
68. During the first week.in October, the dykes were breached by
Bomber Command at four points. . . .
NE , .I of VE
SOUTH - Both EAST and TEST of FLUSHING
EST' . - SOUTH end of the dEST1 EL DLIK .,
.ART .
.. /i liRUnvSH
- 18 -
TAR2BRUSI~ PiRTIES'
73. This was variable, with conditions worst between November and.
and February. Widespread land fog, which forms at night and clears by
day, is common in winter, when the NW beaches are subject to a heavy swell
and strong waves.
FINAL DECISION .
IdITI iTE I I
JA42- would be mounted on 1 November, weather permitting,
regardless of'flying conditions, and regardless of
whether INATUATE II sras launched that day or not.
TIMIINGS H-hour
i 0545 hours.
INFORME
. SN .(See Diar'ams 5)
NN2I.LL'FORCES -:
80. The close support squadron,\ as divided: into two groups, the
NORTH group to support 41 Commando, the SOUTH group to support 47 and
48 Commandos.
SFire .was NOT to be opened by. gun craft iuntil after .the LCT R)s
had fired, unless the enemy were firing, in. which -case, seen sources of
fire and pre-arranged targets were to be engaged as soon as they were
within effectie range. .
The LT(R)s were to fire when at the right range from their
respective targets, which should be EH- 10 minutes. Leading aves of
landing craft were to.keep station on LOT(R).
AIR SUPPORT
82. The intention was to assault the island with the /object of "
securing:- ,. ..
(a) The dune area from inclusive S'TI J.1 to FLUHNG and
destroying "t e batteries contained therein.
(b) ,The dune area fron STIApLtn. DYI 'to the Northern tip of
the island and destroying all the .batteri s tkherein.
(a) was the primary task.. The second was ,not to be carried
out until it, had been achieved
d.
,"
The landing was' to be E made in the dyke "gap, S of fESTKALL,E
D"TiE m . - : '"TA 'gap
the ....
.-". , * ..- .. .
S
and, called
. ,,S t ;f,-
HITE"'. . ...
GPET" '.SOUTH
. was
*, ..:of. ... .-.
T RED."
' t o the NORTH....
(b) 48 Commando in two waves to pass throughi the gap', seize a footing
th dunes to the SOUTH:iand
Ion Jcapture~l3.
Itv .toas:than ' .:
exploit and clear the- dune area SOUTH to ZOUTEINDE,, or further
if possible. . "
(c) 41
"Command, with two troops 10 (..) cozando, had the
primarytask of cap tu ring VSTKAPELL. It was ,then to
c apture 14 and if active, and coae into reserve.
.22,
(d) 47 Coomando was to pass. through the gap, and' clear the dune
,SOUT from,ZOUTELTDE to, inclusive 1ll. I: found necessary,
it was to destroy 2.. ',': .
..(e)/atical HQ
- 21 -
S
(e) Tactical HQ ,SS Brigade was to land with.'Comando
84. . Vith the exception of the.covering parties the assault -orce was
to be mounted .in LVTs (BT3UfAiJES) and M29Cs (-WASELS and landed from LCTs.
A total of. 104.LVTs were. providedfrom 11 R Tks and 5 Assault Regiment RE,
and 80. M290s were issued for wich units provided their own drivers.
Ten FLAILS and two BR<N gun tanks of' i' Squadron, 1 LOTHIANS.
E,'' ht E ( for carrying SBGs and fascines) and four bulldozers of
87 Squadron, 6 'Assault Regyiment RE.
I2TILERY .
86. (a) Each Commnando had a FOB party for the bombardment squadron, and
another -for the up.ort craft.
In addition i had 0.
..-
,one '" -
87:, : s. the artillery opened on the water front, the leading troops
left B'bi t3 at 0445 hours. Fires, which were started in the' town
illuminated a'prominent windmill immediately behind.UNCLE beach, andIielpe
.to keep direction. ' The first troop of 4 Commando'made a landing at the
tip of the mole at the-ST-of NCLE, and it was, not until the RNBeach
Group was rounding the mole that the enemy openecd fire. The defences
soon came to life and there was 20 mm and . fire on the main body Of LAS
as. they came in, but none: were stopped. One LC', -carry ng'3-inch mortars
and ;/T sets, ran on to an anti-landidng taread-san , but it was close
enough to the' shore to enable the occupants to salvage "the contents.
They were then clene on the beach and ready again very shortly.
88. he main body landed without many casualties, and the Commando'
T"'
cleared the immediate water front, inocluing: the Arsenal, baracks. W ith
the support of a capt'ured 37
i m un, oite troop eeched TROONt 090 hours.
Meanwhile. another troop pushed):EST and eventually reached BELA PRK,
and liquidated pillbox on the way, but came under hevy fare from the
neighbourhood' of'D RUYTR'S STTU . 4 KOSB were no'wcoming ashore, and
together with 4 Commando hac made good TROON, S 1 0R and TILL by 1000
hours, asualties 1lad been moderate, ut ~the' chief trouble was coming
from the i
flanks ' T'OUT' ,and. OR4'TL.C.' areas
PROGESS 2 F'STKAEL
PS
?I. Aa
T1ROnS" . . . .RO'.L
.. ,/passage was
- 22-
T-ITOUCIO D0N
92. The three LCI carrying the covering parties, discharged their
troops at 0957 hours, and the f -rstwave of five LCTs were successfully
beached .at 1005 hours: The nb wave of five LOTs was beached about
half an hour later, but three of these vwere subsequently lost., The
remaining LOTs (12), carryin:-g roops, ere bac~hed and. :suc:essfully
unloaded between 1;050 and 1230 b.ours
93. :? f the
:four LCTs carryin.g the -oans of LAILS, -AQsand
BU1DOZ S, twp approached P.'D beach at-1005 hours, bu:t wserheavily hit
and forced to retire. The second pair beached at 1020 hours and dis-
charged their loads, and shortly 'afterwarcs, one of t he first two vwas.
able to return and unload. " The "tan:ns in the fourth were badly, damaged,
and as the craft itself. had a damna ged dcoozr, the LOTf returned to OSTEND
without unloading. Of the tanks-which were unloaded,, four AVPERs, three
FPAllS and one BLLDOZER were irretr.ievably boged in the gap, and at.
night when the tide rose the three surviving LAILS. were drowned. '
94. Until the early a, crnoon the support 'cra were heavily en-
gaged with the host'ile bat teries, overing the landins and the advance
to the SOUTI During the first four, hours oses
The 0n'7URG 'atteres shelled the villages, but a call for air
support resulted in the.' being silenced for a time.
96. -47 GCommando.landed between 1200 and 1230 hours. but owing to the
very heavy fire on the SOUTH =side, whiich undoubtedly" iould have re-
sulted in. the LOTs being hit and. the amp hibians lost, three of the-ir L T
were directed to the NORTH side. of the gap. An LVT ferry service ;had
then to be organised Across the gap to the SOUTH side, I n oneb: 'the LOTs
which landed in the :correct place, three LVTs and one EASEL wre burnt out.
The Conmmando. then assembled in the vicinity of 2&5 w8here they remained
for the night.
97. . bout 1500 hours, permission was given for 41 commando to move on
hold .VSTKALL:, 41 advanced with two troops on the road, and two along
the. dunes, but were .,hampered by parties of potentially hostile Germans
who came out to surrender, and .by the f ailing light, DOI IRO~ entered
i:s
at 1815 hours, andc 17 surrendered without much fight. One pocket of
resistance was ehcountered in the sand dunes., causing casualties whi ch
included .a troop leader killed;. The advance was not continued beyond
DO BURG and the nilght was spe.nt in iioppi-ng-up.
99. ,At the s,L, _r SOUTH B=L!, Causeway, one batalion of' 5
Canadian Infantry igade had made some 400 - 500 yards' progress on to
the island earlier in,-the day, but were later forced..back aftersome--
fierce fighting.
100, RRF'sorties
a; flown during this day were as follows:-
'.STL..S
At -. - 36 Typhoons on pre-aranged targets
" " "- 77 Spitfires on pre arra nged targets
41' Spitfires l n immediate ,support.
. ,
Taregets ere gun positions: strong points, radar stations -etc.
l01. :- 157Infantry rigade took over the small bridgehead at the cause-
way from 5 Canai ... Infanty Brigade, with 1 lS , but further prgres s
was limited by the three- eney strong poins
. which faced The .
. ... he task
-24 -
In-the NORTH, the enemy began ;bo withdraw from .the front "of
41 Conimando, who wiere now ordered to hand over to 10 (I .), aid.con-
centrate at : ESTIKiELLE, preparatory to supporting 47 in their advance-
on FLUSHhIG. By nightfall, they reac hed STI ELS.
The salt marsh was af.ormicable obstacle, and at. times the
troops were well over t.he.r wasts 'in, liquid mud., ' Aittempts to use
Weasels were unavailing; they dug their:prows into the far bank of
the. runnels and slowed :round. : ' .: - . . . : :.
... /5 II
- 25 -
5 HI were put across by the same method during the night 3/4
November. T.heyou.ld.Ino, go.:alrlicr owiiVI to the need br 'building up"
~i6 ORNITS and the fac' that the crossing was only possible one hhour'
each side. of high tide.
105.. Good progress cas made in PLUSHIN and by the end'of the day, all
gerious resistance in the town]YEST of the ,IDDEIBURC-. canal had been over-
come. Arrangements were made o move 4 Commando across the gap to the
SESTIKAELIE - DOi'BURG aea but suff icient VTs were' not available.
107.. In the PLUJSHiG, area, the only serious resistance encountered was
his was held by about 40 men of 6 G.ermarn Divi'io who had fought so
stubbornly :against the Canadians SOUTH
Iof the SCOI DT.
It, is wortlyof interest thlt when these troops were finally put
in the "bag" .and used as a working party, theystill surprised some on-
lookers by the precision of their.drilling. .
CONCLUSION
PART VIII
115. The military plan required close support near the gap during the
'landing, with continued close support along the .lanks during the advance of tho
Commandos along the durles.- "It was abundantly clear to the Support Squadron
that their task, therefore-, .was to draw the fire of, engage and if possible,,
destroy any of the batteries or strong points found to be. active.
S The success of the landing at' ESTKAPELTS was largely due to-
the determintion of the :Support Squadron. to ensure that .the Commandos should
arrive safely on the beah,'. and receive the maximua support. The Squadron"
put up a magnificent 'fight against.formidable defences, iandsuffered severely,
but. they drew to"themselves the fire of .the enemy' batteries and thus enabled
the troop carrying craft to go in with relatively few casualties.
11i6. Complete fiure for sorties flown are not available, but sane
idea of the magnitude of the Royal Air Force's contribution to the operations,
may be obtained from the following" -
D day'
No-amount
-29-
GROUND FORGES
119. INFANTRY
120. ARTILLERY
121. ARMOUR
122. AMPHIBIANS
(b) . M29Cs (-EA.SELS) . Low free board and lack of steerage way when
swimring make thir employment in anything but calm-still water'
extremely hazardous. 500 of casualties were due to vehicles-
drowning. Their performance in mud, swamp and sand was good.
Steep banks, ditches or runnels of 6 ft width or mbre, are
impassable as the bow of model M29C protrudes in front of the tracks
and digs itself into the far bank of the obstacle. They are halted
by wire obstacles.
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DIAGRAM 2. ASSAULT I
ACROSS LEOPOLD CANAL
..11- ^ - K -- .
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DIAGRAM 4
WALC ER EN
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S EaL-Oos
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PELLLE
TA P S.
SExCTOQ
zOUT
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LL GLN D
E.NP4EM BATTrEPY
Q Okap- sTNGpotlNT
1
FLUSH IN
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o I 4- 5
UN CLL
i rMf
. ,
DIAGRAM 5
FLUSI-ING t/
qJ
GAP IN DyIA.
DOV E.,
WOP T HI
B LAC N LLG LN .D
SCAJLL - : 2-5,000
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FLOODING
SAT URATION
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ApE NDI 2
MRTILLRY IN Oi "Cil I
.RATION ~tK
.3. Its preparation Inst be :worked out after close study of Intelli-
gence maps showing all knowm or suspected enemy-positions. With this de-
tailed knowledge, and taking into account both artillery resources and the
infantry plan, it is possible to assign to every potential source of oppo-
sition an appropriate weight of shells, the amount varying according to
the nature and importance of the target. "This treatment has normally
resulted in a combination of..numbered medium concentrations and field
stonks, grouped under a code-name,
. .,/than the
-2-
than the map reference target hastily called for in the heat of battle,
for it is based on deliberate calculation, with all that that implies of
predicted laying (including angle of sight) and allowance for meteorological
conditions. Its preparation also permits adequate time for the proper
allotment of weight and natu~rs to each' targett lot least important is
its simplicity, for the s ystem is readily comprehended by infantry. The
distribution of traces (16 per brigade) is sufficiently wide that commanders-
of sub-units can themselves adjust fire, Even section leaders are able-
to appreciate fully this method of obtaining artillery support.
/O
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TABLE
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