TIMOTHY

ASSERTION,

WILLIAMSON

DENIAL
RULES

AND
IN

SOME

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CANCELLATION

LOGIC

0. The technical parts of this paper concern the effect of some nonstandard rules of proof on normal modal logics. There is also a
philosophical motive for investigating this topic, which it is as well to
explain first.
Consider two philosophical claims:

(A)

Assertibility-conditions

determine truth-conditions.

(W

Assertibility-conditions

are truth-conditions.

(A) and (B) arc deliberately schematic. In particular: the discussion

will apply to a variety of epistemological concepts, each of which can
bc used as a reading for asscrtibility. The assertibility of a sentence
might be a dcscriptivc matter (Quines dispositions to assent), or it
might have prescriptive overtones (Dewey and Dummetts warranted
assertions). It might require conclusive proof. or only defcasible cvidence. (A) and (B) could also be rephrased in a less linguistic mode.
as concerning the relation between the truth-conditions
of thoughts
and the conditions under which they can bc verified. accepted or confirmed. They clearly have something to do with philosophical disputes
about verificationism and anti-realism. On the face of it, (A) seems
to bc thenatural destination of certain arguments summarized in the
slogan Meaning cannot transcend USCand (B) an absurdly strong
form of verificationism: any dificulty in holding (A) without (B)
would therefore constitute a prirnajbcie objection to those arguments.
A better understanding of the logical relations between (A) and (B)
might throw some light on this confusing area.
(B) obviously entails (A); identity is a special case of determination,
provided that (as here) the latter is taken in a logical rather than a
causal sense. (A) does not obviously entail (B); after all. someone who
holds that falsity-conditions determine truth-conditions
is not thereby

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committed to holding that fdlsity-conditions are truth-conditions.

If
(A) does not entail (B), them is a philosophical position to be considered on which (A) is asserted and (B) denied; it would offer a nontrivial explanation of how sentences get their truth-conditions,
without doing so at the expense of an implausibly verificationist
consequence. That might be a good way of reconciling realist and
anti-realist insights. On the other hand, if (A) does in some nonobvious way entail (B), then anyone who wishes to deny the vcrificationism of the latter faces the task of saying what beyond
asscrtibility-conditions
determines truth-conditions,
if they arc determinate at all. There would be the prospect of non-trivial connections
between semantics and metaphysics, for it looks as though semantic
premises might entail (A), while (B) might entail metaphysical
conclusions.
Section 1 shows that on a variety of assumptions (A) does entail
(Hf. The assumptions have some prima ,fucie plausibility, but their
detailed evaluation is not attempted here; it will be sensitive to the
notion of assertibility at issue. Section 2 is technical; it investigates a
rule of proof in modal logic corresponding to (A). Section 3 discusses
the proposal that someone who wants to avoid (B) but thinks that
epistemological facts do determine truth-conditions might replace (A)
by:
(A)

Assertibility-conditions
and dcniability-conditions
together determine truth-conditions.

Section 4 is technical; it investigates a rule of proof in modal logic

corresponding to (A). Section 5 concludes that (A) is not in a much
stronger position philosophically than (A).
1. Consider a language L of whose (indicative) sentences (A) is true.
L will be assumed to contain the usual truth-functional
connectivcs,
satisfying classical propositional logic; since some anti-realists reject
classical logic, the scope of this assumption can itself be regarded as
under test. It will also be assumed that a concept of assertibility is
rcprcsented in L by an operator (not a predicate) L with the sense it
is assertiblc that. For present purposes, asscrtibility-conditions and
truth-conditions
can be thought of as classes of possible situations in

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which a sentence may be uttered; such situations will be called contexts. The usc of an assertibility operator in the object language will
be defended at the end of Section I.
The gist of (A) is that two scntenccs with the same asscrtibilityconditions have the same truth-conditions.
A quick argument from
(A) to (B) then goes as follows: it is asscrtible that A if and only if it
is asscrtiblo that it is assertiblc that 4: therefore A and LA have the
same assertibility-conditions;
therefore, by (A), they have the same
truth-conditions:
since the truth-condition
of LA is the assertibilitycondition of A, the asscrtibility-condition
of A is its truth-condition,
which gives (B). More formally. (A) corresponds to the L-cancellation
pru~err~., that for any sentences A and LJ of L. if LA ++ LB is true in
all contexts then so is 4 H B. (B) corresponds to the L-colhpse
pwyerz~~: that for any sentence A of L, A t, 15.4 is true in all contexts. The assumption used above in moving from the former to the
latter is a kind of S4 biconditional, that for any sentence 4 of L,
LA ++ Ll,A is true in all contexts; it has considerable intuitive plausibility, and by itself does not require asscrtibility to be either neccssary or sufficient for truth. The idea is that warrants for assertion
must be recognizable to speakers, for otherwise such warrants could
not play the role required of them in governing the speakers USCof
the language; but then speakers can reflect that a warrant to assert
that it is assertible (in their context) that 4 gives them a warrant to
assert that 4: conversely. they can reflect that a warrant to assert that
A gives them a warrant to assert that it is assertibie (in their context)
that 4. Nevertheless, this equivalence can itself be regarded as under
test. ?;otc that the argument did not appeal to any laws of truthfunctional logic for L al alL3
Different assumptions about L can be used to construct another
argument from (A) to (B). It may seem reasonable to assume that the
assertibility of a conjunction entails the asscrtibility of its conjuncts
and that if a sentence is assertible, it is not also assertiblc (in the same
context) that the sentence is trot asscrtiblc, nor is the negation of
the sentence assertiblc. Thus for any sentences A and LI of L.
L(A & B) -+ (LA & I&), LA + -L -- LA and LA -+ -L - A
(that is, LA + ,WL4 and LA + MA) are true in all contexts. In

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contrast to the previous case, the S4 principle LA --f LLA is not

assumed. By the first assumption we have f&4 & -LA) --f
(LA & L - LA) and L(A 8~ -A) + (LA & L - A), whose consequcnts the second and third assumptions rcspectivcly make inconsistent. Thus I,(,4 8~ -LA) and L(,4 & -A) are true in no contexts,
and so L(A & - LA) ++ L(A & -,4) in all. By L-cancellation,
(A & -LA) c, (A & -A) and so A -+ LA arc true in all contexts.
As a special CBSCwe have -A --) L - A; combining this with the
third assumption gives LA -+ A. Thus A c1 LA is true in all
contexts.4 (A) again yields (B).
Although the arguments above require L and the truth-functional
operators to be present in L, this is less of a restriction than it might
appear. All t.hat is really required is that these operators can
coherently be added to any language, for then - given the extra
assumptions -- it follows that if (A) is true of all languages, so is (B).
Of course, it has not been ruled out that the sentences of a restricted
language (one not containing L, for instance) should obey (A) but not
(B), even if the extra assumptions hold in all languages: but the
ambitions of the litcraturc on realism and anti-realism call for rcadings of (A) and (B) on which they aspire to characterize all languages,
rather than merely distinguishing some from others. For instance, the
claim Meaning cannot transcend USCis not intended to state a
contingent fact about English.
This is not the place to decide whether one should USCthe conditional If (A) then (B) for a Modus Ponrns or for a Modus To1ien.s
(the latter looks more promising); that may partly depend on which
concept of assertibility is at issue. The present point is just that
it is much harder than one might imagine to combine (A) with the
negation of(B).
2. The discussion above can be set in the context of normal modal
logics. The syntax is standard: sentential variables p, 9, r, . . . , the
usual truth-functions,
including the contradiction I and the tautology
T, L, and M abbreviating -.-.L - . For present purposes, a normal
modal logic can be defined simply as a set of formulae that contains all truth-functional
tautologies and the formula L(p + y) +
(Lp -+ Lq) and is closed under the rules of Modus Ponens,

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Ncccssitation and Uniform Substitution; thus the logic is idcntilicd

with the set of its theorems. This formal language L should not be
confused with the language L of Section I. L may contain all sorts of
compositional devices not definable from the resources of L (L and
the truth-functions).
Rather L can be thought of as a meta-language
for L. with the atomic sentential variables of the former ranging over
all scntcnces of the latter. On one such interpretation, a formula of L
will be valid if and only if the result of uniform substitution of sentences of L for its variables always yields a sentence of L true in all
contexts (note that the truth-functional
operators and L are thcrcfore
thought of as in common between L and L). Thus the rule of Uniform Substitution takes vahd formulae of L to valid formulae of L.
Upper-case italic letters are used as meta-linguistic variables ranging
over sentences of L. The standard notation for rules of proof is used,
on which Xcccssitation becomes: A/LA.
That the valid sentences of L arc closed under Necessitation and
that L(p + q) + (LI, + Lq) is a valid sentence. on this interprctation, are substantive assumptions. Their plausibility will, of
course, depend on which concept of assertibility is at issue. There
might indeed be a decisive objective to them if they amounted to the
assumption that the set of sentences of L assertible in 0 given confext
is closed under logical consequence, for then membership of such a
set would characteristically not bc a dccidablc property and it may be
essential to the philosophical motivation for (A) that assertibility in a
given context is a decidable property (othenvise it might lack the right
connection with the u.re of language). However, all that is really being
assumed is that the set of valid sentences of L is closed under logical
consequence, and membership of this set may well be a decidable
property even if membership in the set of assertiblc scntcnccs of L is
not. It will turn out that the most relevant modal Iogics for present
purposes arc indeed decidable: trivially, where (B) is true of the sentences of L, so that p c) Lp is valid in L (modal collapse), validity in
L reduces to truth-functional
validity and is therefore decidable.
Thus the USCof normal systems may not involve too damaging an
idealization.
Just as p tf 1-p is valid on the above interpretation if(B) is true of
the scntenccs of L, so the following rule of proof L c* C holds in L

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if (A) is true of the sentences of L: if LA t+ LB is valid, so is A tf B.

For if LA w LB is valid, then LA H LB is true in all contexts for
any sentences A and B of L resulting from n and B respectively by
uniform substitution of sentences of L for their variables, so by (A)
A t* R is always true in all contexts, so A c-f B is valid (note that
the convcrsc argument from the validity-preservingncss of L t, C to
the satisfaction of (A) by sentcnccs of L is not valid without extra
assumptions, since a particular sentence LA t, LB of L might bc
true in all contexts for reasons dependent on the content of A and
H, so that no scntcncc LA H LB of L of which it was a
substitution-instance would be valid). Obviously, L tt C no more
says that any sentence (LA tf L/3) --f (A +-+ B) is valid than the rule
of Necessitation says that any scntcncc A --f LA is valid. Questions
about the rule indepcndcnt of the original interpretation, but with
consequences for it, now suggest themselves. What is the effect of L
t) C on normal modal logics?
WC may begin by noting that I, ++ C has a number of equivalent
forms:
L + c:

LA + LB/A + B

L t, C: LA ++ LB/A t, B

M -+ C:

MA + MB/A

M++C:MActMBjA++B

L&l

LA + LB, MA -+ MB/A

-+ C:

-+ B

-+ BR

It is obvious that L, M -+ C is derivable from L -+ C and from

M + C, that L ++ C is derivable from I, + C and M H C from
M -+ C, that L cf C is interderivable with M +-+C and that I, -+ C is
intcrdcrivable with M + C. L + C follows from L ++ C because in
any normal system LA +-+ L(A & B) follows from LA + LB. To complete the chain of equivalences it is sufficient to show that L + C is
derivable from L, M --f C. So suppose that LA + LB E S (a normal
modal system). Evidently LA + L(A + B) E S. Now - M(A + B) +
(LA & L - B) is in any normal system, so - M(A + B) +
(LB&LB)E!$so-M(A--+B)-,
-MAES,SOMA-+
M(A + B) E S. Thus, given L, M + C, A + (A + B) E S, so
A + B E S. Thus all five of the above rules are equivalent. To
revert to the interpretation above: M H C says in effect that

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clerziuhilit!:-conditions determine truth-conditions;

L -+ C might be
compared with the intuitionist semantics for the conditional, which
allows one to assert a conditional when one has seen the assertibility
of its antecedent to guarantee the assertibility of its consequent.
In Section 1, it was in effect observed (N. 4) that the addition of
L ++ C to any normal system containing Lp --t 11and L(p & 4) +
(1,~ & Ly) causes modal collapse; since any normal system contains
the latter formula. the addition of L +-+C to any normal system that
includes the system T (KT) causes modal collapse. Similarly. it was
observed that the addition of L tt C to any normal system containing I217tt LLp has the same effect. Sot all normal systems collapse
under L tf C. however. For instance K. the smallest normal system.
is closed under L ++ C. For suppose that A tf H $ K. Since K is
complete with respect to the class of all models. there is a world x
in some model at which A t, B dots not hold. The model can be
extended by the addition of a world J. accessible from no world and
from which only .Y is accessible. so that LA and LB hold at J if and
only if A and B respectively hold at s. Thus I.4 tf LB does not
hold at J, and so is not in K. Contraposing, if LA +-+LB E K then
A * H E K. This argument also shows the closure under L +-+C of
the system D. which results from the addition of MT to K, for D is
complete with respect to the class of serial models (those in which
from every world at least one world is accessible) and the cxtended
model will be in this class if the original one is. A quirkier system
closed under L c* C results from the addition of p cf LLp to K: for
if LA t* LB is a theorem. so is L(LA cf LB). therefore LLA H L1.H
and therefore 4 * B. None of these systems contains p +-+Lp (in the
last case, consider models with two worlds. each acccssiblc from the
other but not from itself).
Two somewhat bcttcr-known rules of proof can bc derived from
I- ++ C: they are M.4,:4 and L,,f/A. For in any normal system S, if
MA E S then L - A -+ LI E S. so if S is closed under L H C and
therefore under L --f C then -A + i E S, and therefore A E S.
Similarly. if LA E S then LT + LA, giving T + A E S and therefore
A E S by L + C. Both of these rules are weaker than L -+ C. This is
obvious for LA/A. under which all systems that include T arc closed,

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whcrcas I, c+ C has been seen to cause modal collapse in them. The

rule of proof MA/A must of course be distinguished from the schema
MA -+ A; the former says that if MA is a thesis then so is A, not that
MA entails A. The addition of MA/A also causes any nominal system
that includes T to collapse, since it contains the thesis M(P + Lp),
but the consistent system which results from the addition of Ll to K
is vacuously closed under this rule, not having any theorem of the
form MA, whereas the addition of I, ++ C would make it inconsistent,
since LT ++ LI is a theorem.
Finally, a gcncral connection can be made between L H C and the
standard semantics, where a model (W, R, V) consists of a set of
worlds W, an accessibility relation R and a valuation V, a formula A
holds at a world iff V(A, x) = T and a characteristic model for a
system is one such that the formulae holding at all worlds in the
model are precisely the thcorcms of the system:

FACT. A normal modal Iogic S is closed under 1, H C iff it has a

characteristic model (W, R, V) in which Vx E W 3y E W Vr E W
ORZOZ
= x)
Proof: Suppose that S has such a characteristic model (W, R, V)
and that LA tf L,B E S. Let x E W, and choose y E W such that
Vz E W(yRz o z = x). Thus V(LA, y) = V(A, x) and V(LB, y) =
l(B, x), so V(A - B, x) = V(LA ti LB, JJ) = T. Thus A ++ B holds
at each world in W, so A cf B E S.
Conversely, suppose that S is closed under L t, C. Let (W, R, V)
be the canonical model (whose worlds are maximal S-consistent sets
of formulae) for S, which is always charactcrislic. Let x E W. Consider the set X = {MA: A E x) u {LB: B E x). Suppose that X is
S-inconsistent. Thus there arc A,, . . . , A,,, H,, . . . , B, E x such that
(LB, & . . . & LB,) + -(MA, & . . . & MA,,) E S; since S is
normalL(U,&...&R,)~L(--A,
v ___ v -A,)ES.H~L-+C,
andsobyI,tiC,(B,&...&B,)-+-A,
v . . . v -A,,)eS,
contradicting the S-consistency of x. Thus X is S-consistent. Let ) E W
be a maximal S-consistent extension of X. By the definition of R for
the canonical model, yRx because {MA: A E -Y} c I; yRz requires
z = x because if B E x, LB E y so B E z, so x G z, so z = x.

/\SSER-lION

3. The following

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principle is at lcast plausible:

It is assertible that it is assertible that A if and only if it

is assertiblc that A.

Howwer. (C) was seen in Section 1 to yield the equivalence of (A)

with (13). There is thus a problem for those who feel that (A) has the
right end of the stick and (D) the wrong one. An obvious move for
them to make, and one that has been proposed in the literature, is to
treat nc~ziufon a par with assertion, and to hold that truth-conditions
arc dctcrmined only by assertibility-conditions
and deniabilityconditions together, as in (.4). This feature is already built into
Quints model of radical translation. on which the natiw speakers
assent and dissent bchaviour have equal status. In less linguistic
terms: a version of (A) would say that the content of a thought
is determined by the conditions for its falsification (disconfirmation.
rejection) as well as those for its verification (confirmation, acceptancc). The truth-conditions of It is assertible that A could then be
distinguished from those of A, cvcn on the assumption (C) that they
have the same asscrtibility-conditions,
for when there is no evidence
either for or against A. It is asscrtible that A is deniable while A is
not. Of course. this shows only that one quick argument from [A)
and (C) to (B) cannot immediately be transformed into an argument
from (A) and (C) to (R); it dots not rule out the possibility of a
different argument from (A) and (C) to (B), for (A) says that
identity in assertibility- and deniability-conditions
is .wfi~bzt for
identity in truth-conditions,
not that it is necessury. The acceptance of
(A) and (C).does turn out to be consistent with the rejection of (U).
but more work will be nccdcd to show this.
The denial of a sentence is, of course, equivalent to the assertion of
its negation. It has been objected that to put denial on a par with
assertion in determining truth-conditions
is to treat ncgatice sentences
as semantically unstructured, and thereby to flout an obvious constraint of compositionality:
for the meaning of - /I should be
exhibited as a function of the meaning of A. This point might
be well taken if the denial of a sentence could bc expressed onI4
as the assertion of its negation. However, Quines model of radical

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translation suggests otherwise: assent and dissent are conceived symmetrically (saying Yes or No, shaking or nodding ones head). For
the purposes of (B), assertion and denial should be treated as equally
basic speech acts, with the cquivalcncc bctwccn the denial of a sentence and the assertion of its negation defining negation rather than
denial.
4. Just as (A) corresponds to the rule of proof L ++ C on a
certain interpretation of modal logic, so (A) corresponds to
the rule:
L. M t, C:

LA +-+LB, MA +-+MB/A +-+B

For A is deniable if and only if B is deniable is equivalent to *.- A

is assertiblc if and only if - B is asscrtiblc, which is formalizable
as I, ~~-A t-+ L -~ B. which is equivalent to MA t-+ MB. Now
L, M t--) C would fit into the conspicuously empty corner in the
table of rules in Section 2; it stands to L, M + C just as L tt C and
M t) C stand to L - C and M + C, and to L tt C and M - C
just as I,, M 4 C stands to L + C and M + C. Since those other
live rules are all equivalent to each other, it is a natural guess that L,
M + C is equivalent to them too (it is obviously a consequence of L
1--f C), in which case there would be an argument from (A) and
(C) to (B) after all, at least on the assumption that the logic of
assertibility is a normal one. Surprisingly, this is not the case. Some
modal logics which contain the principle Lp H LLp (corresponding to
(C)) arc closed under L, M t) C but not under L t* C, and therefore
do not contain p c--f Lp. Thus (A) and (C) do not entail (B).
To establish this result, it suffices to consider the following frame,
where arrows as usual represent the accessibility relation:

The effect of the L and M operators on propositions (qua sets of

worlds) can bc shown in a table:

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Note that Lp 1--t LLp is valid on the frame (since accessibility is transitive) but that p t) Lp is not. Now L. M H C preserves validity on
the frame. For suppose that L,4 c* LB and MA ++ MB arc valid on
it; thus in any model LA holds at the same worlds at LB and MA as
MB, in which case A holds at the same worlds as B, by inspection of
the table (no two rows of which have the same entries in both the
second and third columns); thus A ++ B is valid on the frame. In
contrast. L c, C dots not preserve validity on the frame: for instance.
L(p & -1,~) t* L-t is valid while (1~& - Lp) tt I is not.
The reader may have noticed that the formula Z,p + p (indeed, the
system S4) is valid on the above frame. This formula is not logically
valid on the intended interpretation of L as the ordinary, dcfcasiblc
notion of assertibility. However, it can be shown to be a consequence
of the assumptions made so far about asscrtibility together with
the uncontroversial assumption that a blatant contradiction is not
assertihle (- LI, or equivalently MT). That is, any normal system S
closed under L, M t) C which contains I-p ++ LZ,p and MT also
contains Lp --t p. For one can shown in order that S contains the
following formulae:
(1)

up

-+ L(p & Lp)

(2)

Z>(I, & Zap) + z,zJl

(3)

LO -

(4)

:W( p & Lp) -+ MZ

(5)

Lp + L( p & Lp)

Lp -+ LLp E s

(6)

LP + M(p & Lp)

5. MT E S

(7)

MLp + MM(p

(8)

MLp + M(p & Lp)

UP & -0)

& Z-p)

LLp + Lp E s

1, 2

7. z-p + LLp E s

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(9

MLp

(10)

LP +-+(P & 1-P)

3, 9, L, M t-) C

(11)

LP -+ P

IO

t,

M(p

& Lp)

4, 8

Thus in particular K + Lp tf LLp + MT + L, M t* C is simply

s4 + L, M cf c.
Within the context of normal systems, the rccoursc to denial in
determining truth-conditions fails to have its intcndcd effect; (A) and
(C) cannot bc satisfied together in a normal system without violating
the logic of dcfcasible assertibility, either by not making a tautology
assertiblc or by making truth a consequence of assertibility. However,
there are other concepts of asscrtibility on which Lp + p is acceptable as a theorem; for instance, one might read L as Thcrc is conclusive evidence that, or (in the case of mathematical language) as It
is informally provable that. Another possible reading would be It is
implicitly known that, where implicit knowledge had the requisite
closure properties. Thus the possibility remains open for someone to
adopt a concept of assertibility obedient to S4, and then endorse (A),
and thus I,, M t* C. In order to investigate the prospects for this
move, it is necessary to find out what system S4 + L, M tf C is.
It can be shown that S4 + L, M cf C is a system called K4 by
Sobocinski, which results from the addition of LMp ++ MLp to S4.4,
which in turn results from the addition of p -+ (MLp + Lp) to S4
(this K4 should not bc confused with the one better known under the
same name, which results simply from the addition of Lp + LLp
to K).
The system has a rather simple canonical model. For if R is the
accessibility relation on this model, it follows by a standard result
that, since 1~--f (MLp + Lp) is a theorem, R obeys the condition:
VxVyVz((xRy and .xRz and x # y) + zRy)
Similarly, since p + (LMp
is a theorem, R obeys:

-+ Lp) (and therefore Mp + (p v MLp))

tlxV~>((xR~ and x # JJ) =$

* 3z(xRz

and Vw(zRw + HI = y)))

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Together with the reflexivity of R (from Lp -+ p). these conditions

entail:

V.uVyVz((.uRy and ~Rz) =z. (.y = 1 or r = z))

It follows that every generated subframc of the canonical model is
isomorphic either to the two world frame illustrated carlicr or to a
single self-accessible world. Since every such subframc is isomorphic
either to the illustrated frame or to a gcncratcd subframe of it. and
every theorem of the system is valid on that frame, it follows that the
formulae valid on the illustrated frame arc prcciscly the theorems of
the system. This, of course, provides a straightforward decision
procedure for S4 + L1 !I4 c+ C: in fulfilmcnt of an earlier promise.
The presence of the formula p H (1-p v (Mp & - MLp)) in
S4 + L, ;M H C is of particular interest. For, on the earlier interpretation, it means that truth. although not equivalent to assertibility, is
at least definable in terms of asscrtibility and dcniability: it says. in
cffcct. that a formula is true if and only if cithcr it is asscrtiblc or its
asscrtibility but not the formula itself is deniable. It remains to bc
seen whether there are any concepts of assertion and denial for which
this rather bizarre equivalence is plausible. Clearly. (A) is a conscqucncc of any such definition of truth in terms of asscrtibility and
dcniability. More formally: any normal system is closed under L, A4
t+ C if it has a theorem of the form p ++ A, where .4 is a modal
function of Lp and Mp (just as it will be closed under L c, C and
M tf C if A is a modal function cithcr of Lp or of Alp). On the other
hand, a normal system can bc closed under f.. M ++ C even if it has
no such theorem. The systems K and I> arc examples. For if they had
such a theorem, so would S5, which would therefore bc closed under
LI :%I tf C, which it is not - indeed S5 collapses under L, M q--tC1
since S4 + L, M t* C. and therefore S5 + I., IM ++ C, contains the
thcorcm p + (LMp + Lp) and S5 contains p + LMp. Yet K and 1)
arc closed under L. M ++ C. for they arc closed under 1, ++ C.
5. Is there any concept of asscrtibility for which S4 + L, A4 H C is a
plausible system? One might attempt to model some sort of speculative

312

TIMOTIIY

WII.I.IAMSON

interpretation on the characteristic two world frame. Suppose, for

instance, that we could make sense of the phrases the world of
reality and the world of appearance in such a way that scntenccs of
the language L not containing L could be said to hold or to ladi1to
hold at these worlds. Then one might stipulate that LA holds at
the world of appearance if and only if A hoids at the world of
appearance, but that LA holds at the world of reality if and only if A
holds at both the world of reality and the world of appearance, with
standard clauses for the logical constants. One might read L as it is
evident that, understood as a factivc. Perhaps there is some limited
domain in which this intcrprctation would be useful one, but taken
generally it seems both fanciful and crude.
Does any concept we actually employ validate S4 + L, M ++ C? If
L is read as something like it is informally provable that, at least S4
is arguably validated: but many additional theorems of S4 + L,
M t) C arc not. Consider the theorem L( -p + L(p 4 Lp)), for
instance: on this reading, it says that it is informally provable that if I)
is false then it is informally provable that p is informally provable if
true; but no such informal proof seems to be generally forthcoming.
Again, the theorem LMp v L - Lp is mad as making the not generally plausible assertion that cithcr it is informally provable that p is
not informally disprovable or it is informally provable that p is not
informally provable.
No concept of assertibility that I know of validates S4 + I,,
A4 ++ C. The retreat from (A) to (A) therefore does not by itself
meet the objections to (A) in a philosophically satisfying manner. The
discussion in this paper has of course been based on a number of
simplifying assumptions, which may need to be called into question.
Of these, the appeal to the concept of truth-conditions is perhaps the
lcast significant, for although thcrc obviously are conceptions of truth
which many tcmptcd by (A) or by (A) would regard as suspect. they
are not required by the preceding discussion. For just as the identity
of A and B in assertibility-conditions
amounted to the validity 01
LA ++ LB, so their identity in truth-conditions amounted to the
validity of A tf B, where it was not essential that the notion of
validity should itself be cxplaincd in terms of some controversial
notion of truth. In effect, the operative notion of truth was that of a

ASSERTION

AND

DENIAL

IN

MODAL

313

LOGIC

redundant sentential operator, representing the identity truthfunction. More deserving of controversy are the closure assumptions about assertibility (the use of normal logics). the treatment of
asscrtibility as though it did not come in degrees. even the appeal to
classical logic. A claim often made at this point is that the truthcondition of a sentence is determined by its compositional structure as
weli as by its asscrtibility- and deniability-conditions;
that may be so:
but as a bare claim it hardly comes to grips with the problem for it
dots not explain what determines the effect of a compositional device
other than the conditions for the assertion and denial of the sentences
which serve as its arguments and values. In any case, if a more tructo-life model does imply a relation between assertibility and truth
essentially different from the results above, it should at least be illuminating to discover what the crucially misleading simplifications were.
and why.

APPENDIX

It will be proved that S4 + L, !+I ++ C is Sobocinskis K4. In order

to show that S4 + L, M t) C includes Sobociriskis system. WC can
start by showing the former to contain p + (:Mlq -+ Lp):
(1)

A4 - p +-+M(-p

v (34 - p & MLp))

(2)

(-p

(3)

L(-p

v (M - p & MLp)) -+ LA4 - p

(4)

q-p

v (A4 - p & MLp)) -+ LLM

3, s4

(5)

((-p

v (M - p & MLp))

+ A4 - p

s4
T

- p

v (M - p & MLp)) &

& LiM - p) + -p
(6)

(L(-p

v (M - p & MLp)) &

& LLM
(7)

L( -p

(8)

L-pt*L-p

- p) + L - p

v (M - p & ML/I)) + I, - p
v (M-p&MLp))

5
4, 6

314

TIMOTHY

WILLIAMSON

(9)

-P-(-P

CM - P&MLPN

(10)

p -+ (MZq -+ I-p)

We can now show S4 + L, M ++ also LOcontain p

(1)

-UP & Ml-p

(2)

-JFP&WP&M

(3)

L(P & M(-P & MPH

& MP))
-PII

- L(-P & M(P & M - PI)

-+ (ML

-p

1, 8, L, M t, C

+ L - p)

(LMp + Lp):
T
T

1, 2

(4)

-p

Previous result

(9

t--p 8~ MP) -+ LMP

(6)

(-p

& Mp) 4 LLMp

5, 54

(7)

(-p

& M(p & M - p)) + LLMp

(8)

(MCI, & M - PI & LLMP)

+ M(p & LMp & M - p)

(9)

(M(P 3~M - P) 3~LLMP)

-+ MP

(10)

& M(-P

(-P&WP&M

3~MP>>
- ~1)

+ WP & Ml-p
(11)

& MP>>

7, 9

MC--P 8~ M(P & M -- ~1)

+ MM(P

(12)

& MC-P

& M/I)>

10

MC -P & f+f(~ & M - ~1)

+ M(P & MC-P

& MP))

11, s4

ASSERTION

(131

AND

MODAL

& M(p & M - p))

M(p & M( -p
-

(15)

IN

315

LOGIC:

M(p & M( -p & Mp))

-+ M(-p

(14)

DENIAL

M-p

As 12

& Mp))
& M(p & M - p))

12, 13

(P & *+f( - p 6%Mp))

+-+(-p

& M(p 6%M - p)

3, 14, L.

++ C

1.5

(16)

-(p&M-p&

Mp))

07)

P + Q/VP -+ P)

16

(18)

p --+ (LMp

17

+ Lp)

It is now straightforward
to show that S4 + L, M t) C contains the
remaining axiom of Sobociriskis system, L:Wp ++ MLp:

(1)

p + (ML/l

+ Lp)

Previous result

(2)

p + (MLp

+ LMp)

1, T

(3)

-p

+ (:ML - p --t I,

Previous result

(4)

-p

+ (Mp + L:Mp)

(5)

--.p -+ (MLP + ZMp)

4. T

(6)

MLp 4 LMp

2, 5

(7)

p + (LA4p ----tLp)

Previous result

(8)

p + ( zxp

7. T

(9)

-p

(10)

- p --* (A4p + MLp)

(11)

-p

10, T

(l-2)

LMP + MLp

8, 11

(13)

LMp +> :WLp

6. 12

+ :MZ2p)

---) (LM

- p --+ L

--$ (LMp

+ MLP)

PI

Previous result

Thus S4 + L, M ++ C includes Sobocifiskis system. In order

to prove the converse, it suffkes to show that his system, which

316

TIMOTHY

WILLIAMSON

includes S4, is closed under L, M H C. We first show it to contain

p tf (Lp v (Mp & - MLP)):
(1)

P - (MLP -+ 0)

Axiom

(2)

p + (Lp v - MLp)

(3)

P + MP

(4)

P --f (r,l

(5)

-p

(6)

(MP&

(7)

LMp 4 MLp

Axiom

c-9

(MI, & - MLp) + p

6, 7

(9)

LP + P

(10)

(LP v (MP & - M~>P)) + P

8, 9

(11)

P*

4, IO

v (MP & - MLP))

--t (ML -p
-LMP)

-+ L - p)

2, 3
I, substitution
5

+ P

(LP v (Mp g - Ml,pN

Soboci6skis system can now be shown to bc closed under L, M tf C,

as follows:

(1)

LA ++ LB

Assumed theorem

(2)

MA *

Assumed theorem

(3)

(LA v (MA & - MLA))

-

MB
+-*

(LB v (MB & -MI-B))

1, 2

(4)

A H (LA v (MA & -MLA))

Previous result

(5)

B w (LB v (MB & - MLB))

Previous result

(6)

A-B

3, 4, 5

This completes the proof that S4 + L, M H C (and therefore

K + MT + Lp H LLp + L, M tf C) is equivalent to Sobocitiskis
system.

ASSERTIOY

AND

DENI.AL

IN

MDDAL

LOGIC

317

Two alternative axiomatizations of this system may be noted. First,

it is equivalent to K + p ++ (/-/I v (Ml> & -Ml-p)).
For the latter
formula has been seen to bc contained in it. and in turn to ensure
closure under L, A+ H C. Thus it remains only to show that K +
y ++ (Ly v (/MI, & -&IQ))
contains the characteristic S4 axioms.
I-/, -+ p is obvious. For Lp 4 LLp, substitute p & -.. 1-p for p; the
result simplifies to M(p & ---LIT) ---f (p & - I+), which yields
L,o --, L(p -+ Lp). Second. the system is cquivalcnt to T + p -+
(MLy + 1,~) + p -+ (LMp + Lp); this follows without difficulty
from what has been established so far.
NOTES
I:or a rccenl discussion
bearing on this point SW Peacocke
181.
. In this scnsc. the trutbcondition
of a sentence is the set of possible situations
in
which it can be truly uttered; it is not the set of situations
with respect to which thr
sentence.
as uttered in a fixed context,
is true. The sophistications
of t\%o-dimensional
modal logic will bc avoided.
The assertibility-condition
of a sentence is. corrcspondingly,
something
!ike the set of possible situations
in which its assertive uttcrancc
is warranted.
Arguments
of this kind are propuscd
in Brandom
[?I, following
Dummett
[3] at
pp. 350 -45 1.
The second and third assumptions
are of course conscqurnccs
of the validity
of L.4
+ .-l. Given the first assumption,
the argument
therefore
applies to any truth-entailing
concept
of asscrtibility,
such as provability
in mathematics.
Its application
is clearly
more ycneral than that. however.
Hughes and Cresswcll
[5] provide a suitable background
for the technical
discussion.
The rewards of a finer-gained
approach
are illustrated
in Humbcrstonc
[6]. which
distingmshcs
between the dcrivabllity
of a rule in a system and the mere closure of the
system under the rule Interesting
questions
could he raised in these terms about the
rules discussed
in this paper. hut they go hcyond
its scope.
For some relevant
results see I.emmon
and Scott 171: pp. X1-85.
c for cancellation;
in other respcts
the choice of labels should he self-explanatory.
liotc that L. :M + C differs from LM --t C which. by analogy,
would bc the rule
INA
---t L.!f WA - B.
Note that L e, c and L + C are the converses
of the standard
rules called RE and
R:W by Lemmon
and .%wtt (ihid. p. I I ),
Ibid.. p. 47.
I&f., p. 86: further
wsults concerning
the rule LA.,1 are at pp. 46 and 80, and it is
discussed
in Ilumherstonc
[6j.
The proof prcsuppuscs
the mntcrial
at pp. 22-X
of Hughes and Cresswell
[5],
Dummett
141. p, 112. cp. Price [9].
l:or a discussion
in the context
of language learning see Quint [IO]. Part II.
Appiah
II]. pp. 135:6.
I6 Sobocitiski
[I I]. The proof is in the Appendix.

318
Lemmon
and Scott
lx The technical
parts
Lloyd Humbcrstone.
of S4 + p c.+ (1,~ v
(MLp
+ l,p) and the
comments.
The referee

TIMOTHY

WILLIAMSON

[7]. pp. 6668.

of this paper are largely the outcome
of corrcspondcnce
with
Itc did most of the work in Section 2. pointed out the equivalence
(Mp & - MLp))
and T + p - (LMp
+ Lp) + p --t
facts about its canonical
model, and made other helpful
also made useful suggestions.

BlBI.IOGRAPIIY
[l] hppiah,
Anthony:
1986, Fir Truth in Semanrics.
Oxford,
Blackwell.
[2] Brandom,
Robert:
1976, Truth and Assertibility,
7%~ Journrrl of Philosophy
83,
13749.
[3] Dummctt,
Michael:
1973, Fregc- Phihxwphy
of Idnguage,
London,
Duckworth.
141 Dummett,
Michael:
1976, What Is a Theory
of Meaning!
(II), in G. Evans and J.
McDowell
(cds.), Truth und Meaning,
Oxford,
Oxford
University
Press, pp. 67.137.
[S] JIughes,
G. E. and Cresswell,
M. J.: 1984, A (bnr~cmion
to 1%40&l Logic, London,
Methuen.
[6] Humberstone,
I. L.: A More Discriminating
Approach
to Modal Logic,
unpublished.
[7] Lemmon.
E. J. and Scott, D. S.: 1977, The Lemmon
No/es:
An Infruduction
IO
Modui Logic-, cd. K. Scgerbcrg,
Oxford,
Blackwell.
[8] Peacocke,
Christopher:
1986, What Determines
Truth Conditions?
in P. Pettit
and J. McDowell
(cds.), Subjerr,
Thoughl. rind Conrrxf,
Oxford,
Clarendou
Press,
pp. 181-208.
[9] Price, H.: 1983, Sense, hsscrtion,
Dummett
and Denial,
Mind 92, 161-73.
[IO] Quine, W. V. 0.: 1973, The Roofs of Refwence,
La Salle, Open Court.
(1 I] Sobocitiski,
B.: 1964, Family
X of the Non-Lewis
Modal Systems,
Norre IJame
Journal
of Formul Logic 5 313 -318.

Dcpurtment of Philosophy,
Trinity College, University
Dublin 2, Ireland.

of Dublin