Foundations of Science (2007) 12:109137

DOI 10.1007/s10699-006-0007-y

Springer 2006

PIERRE UZAN

THE ARROW OF TIME AND MEANING

Time is the substance I am made of.
Time is a river which sweeps me along, but I am the river ;
it is a tiger which destroys me, but I am the tiger ;
it is a re which consumes me, but I am the re.
(Jorge Luis Borges)

ABSTRACT. All the attempts to nd the justication of the privileged evolution of phenomena exclusively in the external world need to refer to the
inescapable fact that we are living in such an asymmetric universe. This leads
us to look for the origin of the arrow of time in the relationship between
the subject and the world. The anthropic argument shows that the arrow of
time is the condition of the possibility of emergence and maintenance of life
in the universe. Moreover, according to Bohrs, Poincares and Watanabes
analysis, this agreement between the earlier-later direction of entropy increase
and the past-future direction of life is the very condition of the possibility
for meaningful action, representation and creation. Beyond this relationship
of logical necessity between the meaning process and the arrow of time the
question of their possible physical connection is explored. To answer afrmatively to this question, the meaning process is modelled as an evolving tree-like
structure, called Semantic Time, where thermodynamic irreversibility can be
shown.
KEY WORDS: arrow of time, entropy, meaning, irreversibility, semantic,
time
INTRODUCTION

Anyone can observe phenomena taking place according to a privileged direction. For example, one always observes1 the homogenisation of temperatures (equilibrium state) in an isolated system
while the reverse phenomenon, the spontaneous appearance of
different temperatures, is never observed. In other words, heat

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ows from the hotter body to the colder one until equilibrium
is reached and not the contrary. The thermodynamic asymmetry,
which was rst expressed by Carnots principle, is governed by the
more general second law of thermodynamics, which asserts that,
for an isolated system, the entropy never decreases with time.
The times arrow metaphor, which was rst proposed by
Eddington in order to describe the asymmetry of thermodynamic
phenomena, is commonly used to account for the privileged direction of all phenomena (Eddington, 1928). It is the case for the
concentrically outgoing waves that can be observed on a pond
after a stone has been dropped and not before. Another important example is provided by the expansion of the universe, as
shown by the observation that galaxies are moving away (redshift), while the reverse phenomenon of universes contraction
(blueshift) is not observed.
1. CAN PHYSICS EXPLAIN THE ARROW OF TIME?

In order to explain the privileged direction of thermodynamic

phenomena Boltzmann derived the rst H-theorem2 from the
time-symmetrical laws of mechanics and statistical considerations (Boltzmann, 1898). However, Boltzmanns proposal was
confronted by Loschmidts objection according to which the
entropy of an isolated system can decrease by reversing its evolution, which is allowed by the laws of mechanics in Brush (1966).
Generalising Loschmidts objection, Bitbol has shown that the
direction of time for which, the H-theorem is valid is indeed the
direction of time for which we consider the elementary transitions
and for which we then apply the probability calculation (Bitbol,
1988). That is, the right H -theorem, corresponding to what we
actually observe, can be shown if we apply the probability calculation in prediction, prediction according to our inter-subjective
experience of what we call the future.
Generally speaking, and contrary to very deep-rooted opinions (Eddington, 1928; Reichenbach, 1956; Gal-Or, 1983; Hawking, 1985; Balian, 1994), the right direction of time according
to which the second law of thermodynamics and any phenomenological law must be applied to agree with observation is not
specied therein and cannot then be dened from them. This right

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direction of time is indeed determined independently, from a statement of fact: for example, to assert that the entropy change for
any spontaneous transformation of an isolated system is a nondecreasing function of time implicitly assumes that the considered
transformation occurs along the direction of time (of ageing)
that bears us from our past to our future and not the reverse.
Consequently, as emphasized for a long time by many scientists
and philosophers, the privileged direction of phenomena3 cannot
be explained from the laws of physics (Costa de Beauregard, 1963;
Mehlberg, 1980; Bitbol 1988; Uzan 1998).
In order to provide a genuine explanation of the arrow of time,
it is often believed that cosmological considerations can be helpful. According to the so-called astrophysical school of thought
(Gal Or, 1972), the origin of irreversibility in all local processes
as well as all time asymmetries observed in nature, can be traced
back to the boundary conditions that gave rise to the expansion of
the universe as a whole. The origin of irreversibility is thus not in
the symmetrical laws of dynamics but in the boundary (or initial)
conditions. A well-known illustration of this argument is provided by Gold (Gold, 1962). According to this author, because
the universe is expanding, it . . . seems to have an unlimited
capacity for swallowing up heat, and all the energy that has been
pumped out seems not to have taken it a noticeable way towards
thermodynamic equilibrium. The essential property that the universe has is clearly that the sky is dark and that it will absorb
radiation without limit. Consequently, the large scale motion
of the universe thus appears to be responsible for times arrow
since, this irreversible ight of radiation would be responsible for
the radiation asymmetry (no ingoing radiation but only outgoing and thus retarded radiation could be detected) and then for
the spontaneous degradation of energy of small scale systems, as
expressed by the second law of thermodynamics.
Such a cosmological argument is now reformulated according
to slightly different methods. Within the framework of classical
cosmology, which is based on non-quantized general relativity, a
notion of cosmological time can be dened as the proper time
that would be common to all galaxies.4 Thus, according to the
astrophysical school, it would be possible to justify the privileged
direction of phenomena by adding some improbable initial

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condition of low entropy for the whole universe to the symmetrical laws of physics (Gal Or, 1972; Zeh, 1989; Penrose 1989)
the term initial referring to the cosmological time dened previously. For, in accordance with Golds argument mentioned above,
such a cosmological condition5 would impose the same condition
for small-scale systems for which, consequently, even if they are
governed by temporally symmetrical laws, an increase in entropy
would be much more probable that a decrease. For example, in
addition to the standard FriedmannRobertsonWalker model,
which is totally symmetric with regards to (cosmological) time,
Penrose has suggested that the constraint of very low entropy of
the initial singularity was imposed by the very low-value of the
Weyl curvature (which roughly characterises the properties of
distortion of space-time due to gravity) (Penrose, 1989, ch. 7).
According to the latest developments of physics, combining
quantum physics with relativistic cosmology (quantum cosmology), the state of the universe is ruled by a timeless equa
tion analogue to a stationary Schrodinger
equation, the so-called
Wheeler-de Witt equation, because of the fact that no invariant
denition of time can be provided for a global space-time conguration of the universe (the very expression of gravity in general relativity) (de Witt, 1967). Nevertheless, a notion of intrinsic time can then be relationally dened from a change of the
spatial tri-metric conguration: for example, a parameter, which
characterises the universes expansion (its radius) can play the
role of intrinsic time for the model obtained by quantization of
the standard relativistic model of FriedmannRobertsonWalker
considered above (Zeh, 1989 Section 6.1). Within the framework
of quantum cosmology, the astrophysical approach then consists
in setting adequate boundary conditions for the wave function of
the universe in order to explain the privileged direction of phenomena with regards to this intrinsic time. For example, according
to Hawkings proposal, which is formulated within the so-called
path-integral approach (initiated by Feynmann), the wave function of the universe, which is a solution of the Wheeler-de Witt
equation, should have a particular form: it should be written as
the sum of all possible histories of the universe from its fundamental state. This condition imposes that the universe is
nearly homogeneous and isotropic when it is small. But it is more

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regular when it is large. In other words, disorder increases, as

the universe expands. Furthermore, from this generally undisputed conclusion, Hawking has inferred that one gets an arrow
of time (Hawking, 1994, p. 351).
These suggestions clearly show that a tight correlation such
can be established between most of the observed asymmetries
(as thermodynamic and radiation asymmetries) and the master cosmological asymmetry dened by the universes expansion. However, as emphasized by Price they appeal to additional premises, without noting that in order to do the job, these
additions must effectively embody the very temporal asymmetry,
which was problematic in the rst place (Price, 1994). In effect,
the expansion and contraction of the universe are symmetrically
described according to the two, possible opposing directions of
variation of any cosmological time parameter dened in (classical or quantum) cosmological models (Elbaz 1992, ch. 4; Zeh
1989; Uzan 1998; Section A.II.e). Thus, how to dene the positive direction of cosmic time, relative to which can be understood
the crucial notion of initial state of the universe (and, correlatively, that of its expansion) on which the astrophysical schools
suggestion is based? For example, how is the notion of an initial singularity dened, for which the Weyl tensor vanishes in
Penroses proposal? In the case of Hawkings proposal, how do
we know that the small size of the universe is associated with its
initial state (or with its early stages) and its larger size with
the subsequent states ?
Generally speaking, as stressed by Price, these cosmological
arguments are blind to temporal direction since the low entropy
condition could be applied as much to the initial state of the
universe as to its nal state. A proper justication of the cosmological arrow of time would require to show that it is possible
to explain why the universal entropy is low near the Big Bang
without thereby demonstrating that it must be low near a Big
Crunch, in the event that the universe recollapses (Price, 1994,
p. 3). Indeed, cosmologists are faced with the dilemma to accept
either (option 1) that entropy decreases towards all singularities,
including future ones; or (option 2) that temporal asymmetry,
and particularly the low entropy condition of the Big Bang, is
not explicable by a time-symmetric physics (Price, 1994, p. 12).

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However, the option 2, which is chosen by Penrose who suggests the construction of a time-asymmetric theory of quantum
gravity (Penrose, 1989), still leads to the same ambiguity: how
is dened the positive direction of cosmological time according to which the laws of such an asymmetric quantum gravity
will be applied ? Consequently, in both cases, we are forced to
admit the incompletness of the astrophysical schools proposals
to derive the arrow of time, at least in their present form. As was
already the case for the laws governing the thermodynamic and
radiative phenomena, their success relies on an additive hypothesis
that stipulates the agreement between the past-future direction of
life and the earlier-later direction of the universal expansion.
The privileged direction of phenomena cannot then be justied from the laws of physics, neither in their classical form
(be they parameter time-invariant or not6 ) nor in their more
recent form (for which the very notion of time seems to evaporate). Moreover, adding assumptions bearing on the initial
state of the universe cannot lead to a genuine justication of the
arrow of time since, as explained above from Prices analysis, these
assumptions remain blind to temporal direction. Physics can
only explain the compatibility between the different asymmetries
observed in nature, providing us with a very precise description
of the manner in which these asymmetries are correlated with
the master cosmological arrow of time, namely the universes
expansion (see Zeh, 1989, for instance). Physics, however, cannot
provide any justication of the essential fact on which the arrow
of time relies: we live in an expanding universe where entropy is
increasing and waves are retarded.
The previous conclusion suggests a shift in the very formulation of the question of the arrow of time. The question of
nding the justication of the privileged evolution of phenomena
exclusively in the external world, independently of any observer,
should be replaced by the more pertinent question:
Why we, as observers, live in such an asymmetric universe ?
In order to deal with this question, the relationship between
the Observer and the universe will be considered within the framework of the weak anthropic argument. This argument is based on
the existence of such an Observer7 and investigates the conditions of the possibility of his emergence in the universe.

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2. AN ANTHROPIC INVESTIGATION

2.1. The Arrow of Time as Precondition of Life

As justly remarked by Carter (1993):
..an observational result that is inconsistent with the means by which it is
observed has no chance of actually being observed. . ..

This tautological remark on which the weak anthropic principle is based entails that what can be observed must necessarily be cognizable, that is, compatible with the very conditions
of observability (Dicke, 1961; Carter, 1974; Barrow and Tipler,
1986). It then suggests a more global mode of explanation that considers that what is observed could be explained from the very
presence of the Observer and not as something that exists independently of him. Since the presence of an Observer requires
the universe to produce the organic elements with which he is
composed, the weak anthropic principle states that (Barrow and
Tipler, 1986, p. 16):
The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable but they take on values restricted by
the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can
evolve and by the requirement that the Universe be old enough
for it to have already done so.
The anthropic argument then takes the following form: the
existence of an Observer, implicitly regarded as a human
being, requires appearance and development of life on earth. Life
requires the existence of certain heavy elements (such as carbon)
that must be synthesised out of hydrogen in the heart of stars,
through thermonuclear fusion. According to current astrophysical, chemical and biological knowledge, making a star such as
our sun with a planet around it (the earth), capable of allowing appearance and development of life requires constraints on
the age, the size, the mass and even the structure of the universe
(Barrow and Tipler, 1986). Moreover, each of the steps of the
complexication process that lead the universe from the state of
primordial soup, made of photons, quarks, and electrons, of
the earlier moments of the Big Bang, to its present state where
life has appeared and developed imposes very strict constraints

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on the possible range of variation of the fundamental constants

that characterise the basic physical interactions (Reeves, 1986).
We should note, that the weak anthropic principle, which is a
principle of selection of the possible features of the universe, is
generally considered as an uncontroversial methodological principle. It must be distinguished from the more speculative form
of the strong anthropic principle, proposed by Barrow and Tipler, which is clearly based on a nalist conception of existence.
This principle states that The Universe must have these properties which allow life to develop within it at some stage of its
history.8
The question of knowing why we, as Observers, live in an
expanding universe governed by a law of entropy increase can
also nd an a posteriori mode of explanation that uses the
Observers existence as a premise.
A rst allusion to the idea of a possible relation between the
past-future direction of life and the temporal direction for which
the second law of thermodynamics is valid can be found in Boltzmanns reply to Zermelo who had pointed out that the assumption
of low initial entropy for the universe is not really an explanation
of the observed thermodynamic asymmetry but a renunciation
of any explanation (Boltzmann, 1897). In his reply, Boltzmann
suggested that this initial condition could indeed only be assumed
to be a uctuation of the universal thermal equilibrium for regions
of the universe where life exists:
A living being that nds itself in such a world at a certain period of time can
dene the time direction as going from less probable to more probable states
(the former will be the past and the latter the future).

More accurately, the idea of a strict correlation between,

on one hand, the emergence and maintenance of life and, on
the other hand, the thermodynamic arrow of time due to the
strong thermal ux associated with the difference in temperature
between the hot sun and the cold earth can be found in a
lecture given by Boltzmann (1886 p. 24):
The general struggle for existence of animate beings is therefore not a struggle for raw materials . . . ..nor for energy . . . .but a struggle for entropy, which
becomes available through the transition of energy from the hot sun to the
cold earth.

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Generally speaking, the idea that the preservation of life needs

a strong thermodynamic arrow is generally explained as follows
(Hawking, 1985; ch. 9; Penrose, 1989 ch.7): to survive, living
beings must feed themselves; therefore, they must consume an
ordered form of energy (food) to maintain (or develop) internal
processes, such as metabolism, then rejecting a disorganised form
of energy (heat) into the cosmos. The latter transformation can
then only be realised in the presence of a strong thermal imbalance between a hot source that provides the ordered form of
energy and a cold source that absorbs the disorganised form
of energy.
Note that the latter argument is valid for any form of life and
not only for human life. For example, it is well known that a
green plant needs the suns energy (in the form of low entropic photons) to carry out the synthesis of carbohydrates from
carbon dioxide and water (photosynthesis), rejecting heat into
the atmosphere (in the form of highly entropic infra-red photons). As emphasized by Schneider and Kay, all living systems
(from the cell to entire ecosystems) are dependent on outside
energy uxes to maintain their organisation and dissipate energy
gradients to carry out these self-organising processes. This organization is maintained at the cost of increasing the entropy of the
larger global system in which it is imbedded (Schneider and
Kay, 1995, p. 164). The growth of organisation in living systems
at the expense of the degradation of the suns energy is indeed
realised in several steps of a food chain, where the sunlight is progressively dissipated since at each step less-ordered (infra-red)
light is emitted towards the cold, empty space.
In addition, as briey mentioned above, the anthropic argument can be applied to each of the steps of the universal complexication process that leads to the emergence of life and not only to its
preservation (Reeves, 1986, 1993; Layzer, 1990). The formation
of nuclear, atomic or molecular structures, and that of large scale
structures closely rely on the universes expansion. For example,
during the formation of a star by gravitational condensation of a
cold cloud of gas, and during its life-time, more and more light and
heat is emitted from its heart. Consequently, the formation and
the evolution of the star is possible provided that it is surrounded
by a colder environment capable of absorbing throughout its life,

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the increasing amount of emitted radiation. Such a mechanism

of absorption of radiation is thus actually made possible by the
universes expansion.
Thus, from the previous considerations one can conclude that
the expansion of the universe, which, as explained in Section 1,
governs the privileged direction of all phenomena (and especially,
for our purpose, the thermodynamic arrow of time), is necessary
for the whole universal complexication process that led to the
appearance and the preservation of life.
Is it now possible to apply this conclusion to the complex
functions of living beings that really characterize the notion of
Observer? These complex functions are the ability to act intelligently in the world, to experiment, to represent and to create, that
is, in brief, the observers ability to give a meaning to the universe
he lives in. The next section (Section 2.2) shows that this last step
can be accomplished by extending the anthropic argument.
2.2. The Arrow of Time as Precondition of Meaning
To plan an action in order to obtain the intended effects obviously presupposes that the agent be able to predict, or at least to
vaguely anticipate, the possible effects of these actions. Indeed,
this predictive knowledge makes possible the minimal stability
of experience which is required for any meaningful action. However, such a predictive knowledge would be impossible in an antiCarnot world governed by a law of entropy decrease according
to which physical systems would spontaneously evolve toward more
and more improbable states.
An attempt to develop such an argument can be found in Poincares book entitled Science et Methode (Poincare, 1947, ch. 4);
this argument was later developed by Costa de Beauregard and
by Barrow and Tipler (Costa de Beauregard, 1963, p. 111; Barow
and Tipler, 1976). Poincare asserts that in this anti-Carnot universe (governed by a law of entropy decrease) prediction would be
impossible since an observer, would observe a world becoming
more and more diversied from a sort of primitive chaos; the
changes observed by him would be unexpected and impossible to
foresee. In such an anti-Carnot world friction would be a destabilizing force rather than a damping force. Two bodies initially

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at the same temperature would later acquire different temperatures, and it would be impossible to predict in advance which
one will become the warmer. Therefore, in such an anti-Carnot
world prediction (even understood as vague anticipation) and
thus meaningful action would be quite impossible.
Bohr developed a similar argument for the law of entropy
increase, focusing on the possibility of elaborating any meaningful
description of nature and thus any science of nature, a possibility
which is in turn based on that of experimentation and observation
(Bohr, 1932):
In fact, irreversibility, as exhibited in the levelling of temperatures, does not
mean that a reversal of the course of events is impossible, but that the prediction of such a reversal cannot be part of any description involving a knowledge
of the temperature of the various bodies.9

Bohrs example shows that the law of entropy increase is a necessary condition for any description made in terms of evolution of
the temperature variable since, as explained by Bitbol, to measure a temperature . . . .we must begin by bringing into contact a
thermometer and the body we want to measure. We then have to
wait until the temperature of the thermometers reservoir be the
same as that of the body. From then on, one can perform the reading (Bitbol, 1994). Of course, this conclusion can be applied to
any description of nature and to the choice of any dynamic variable dened for this description. Therefore, according to Bohrs
argument, the law of entropy increase is a necessary condition for
the elaboration of any possible science of nature inasmuch as a
science of nature is based on the form of action called experimentation (or that of seeking and nding) which presupposes,
as shown above, the possibility of predicting.
Turning now to the more general possibility of creation,
Watanabe maintains the thesis according to which man can
create order and organisation in his world precisely because the
entropy of his physical world is increasing, representing a tendency toward disorder and disorganisation (Watanabe, 1972).
As claimed by Watanabe, creation rst presupposes a principle
of freedom which states that with certain limits, we have freedom to generate selectively a situation in our environments so that
this situation as a cause will, according to our causal knowledge,

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give rise with large probability at a later time the effect which
is desirable to us. However, this principle is based on the possibility of predicting the possible effects of the situation we have
selected from knowledge of causal laws (our causal knowledge).
Therefore, as claimed by Watanabe, we need predictive science
to create future.
Moreover, as seen in Section 1, the predictive application of the
laws of physics (and, more precisely, the use of predictive probabilities) is closely connected with the possibility of deriving a law
of entropy increase. Therefore, one can conclude, as does Watanabe, that the nomologically10 predictive science is the condition
for both human freedom of action and entropy increase. A very
close parallelism is then brought out between the ability to create and the earlier-later direction of entropy increase: to live
in an anti-Carnot universe where science would be retrodictive
and entropy would decrease, would forbid any freedom of action
and thus any creation. The law of entropy increase is therefore
necessary for freedom of action and thus for creation.
Kant has shown that time is an a priori form of experience
since it is presupposed for the perception of simultaneity, and
succession and that the very concept of change can only be constructed by and in a previous representation of time. However,
considering now the subject of experience not only with regard
to his passive reception and purely mental shaping of perceptions
but for his ability to construct meaning by his actions in the world,
his representations and his creations, one can infer from the previous analysis that the arrow of time is a precondition of meaning.

3. SEMANTIC TIME

The previous developments show that the arrow of time is a precondition for the whole complexication process that led to the
existence of Observers capable of giving a meaning to the universe they live in. In other words, a relationship of logical necessity is established between the possibility of constructing meaning
and the arrow of time. The subject of knowledge and action can
only observe an expanding universe governed by a law of entropy
increase.

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However, is it possible to go beyond this conclusion? Is it possible to show a genuine physical connection between the arrow of
time and the meaning process? In particular, following Borges
intuition put in as an epigraph to this paper or Merleau-Pontys
idea of our active participation in the very appearance of time
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945, third section, ch. II), can we consider the
thermodynamic irreversibility that consumes us as a physical
consequence of our very existence as Observers?
This last section aims to explore this rather surprising hypothesis. For this, we shall begin by briey reviewing the proposals
that have been made in this sense by some modern physicists and
philosophers, like Szillard, Brillouin, Costa de Beauregard, and
Wheeler. Subsequently, this assumption will be explored according to different ways, by proposing an inter-subjective model of
time, called Semantic Time, where thermodynamic irreversibility can be shown.
An interesting attempt to explore quantitatively this psychophysical connection can be found in the book by Costa de Beauregard mentioned in Section 1, entitled Le Second Principe de
la Science du Temps (Costa de Beauregard, 1963). In this book
Costa de Beauregard suggests that the decreasing of the universal
negentropy (which is dened as the negative of entropy) would
exactly compensate for the increasing of experimental and metaphysical information acquired by the subject of knowledge and
action:
Negentropy + Experimental Information
+Metaphysical Information = constant.
Costa de Beauregards Second Law of the Science of Time
relies on Szillards and Brioullins analysis according to which
the acquisition of any information about the world has a thermodynamic cost. That is, the acquisition of information about a
physical system must necessarily be paid in turn by an increasing
of its entropy (or of the entropy of the environment) according to Brillouins negentropy principle of information.11 These
authors have set this equivalence between negentropy and information in order to resolve the paradox of Maxwells demon12

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which questioned the validity of the second law of thermodynamics. (Szilard, 1929; Brillouin, 1956).
However, such an equivalence between negentropy and
information is now subject to controversy. According to Landauer and Bennett, it is not the acquisition of information by
an observation (which can always be made reversible) that has
a thermodynamic cost. Indeed a complete analysis of the process of observation that involves the observers memory shows
that the thermodynamic cost of an observation is due to its erasure (that is, to a destruction of information) which is required
to restore it before the recording of new information (Landauer,
1961; Bennett, 1988). To be precise, Bennetts assertion is valid
on the average, by considering a series of observations, as in the
functioning of Szillards engine (which models the work of Maxwells demon). However, it is exactly in this sense that the second
law of thermodynamics is meant to apply. In other words, as concluded by Caves in his very detailed analysis of this question, the
demon wins occasionally, but not in the long run. (Caves, 1990).
Nevertheless, the general idea according to which the universal
becoming relies on the subjects ability to construct representations and to act in the world has been investigated in other ways.
In this direction of research, the physicist Wheeler has proposed
his participatory anthropic principle which refers especially to the
role of the Observer as participating in the very making of the
physical world he observes (Barrow and Tipler, 1986, p. 21)13
Observers are necessary to bring the Universe into being.

According to Wheeler, the existence of observers would then

be as necessary for that of the universe as is the existence of the
universe for that of the observers. To support his thesis, Wheeler
refers to the essential role of observation (analysed in the quantum domain) in the emergence of perceived phenomena and,
especially, in the emergence of past phenomena in the famous
delayed-choice experiment. However, if, as commonly admitted,
the observer is really brought to existence by the universe, in a
strong ontological sense, the supposed making (or altering) of past
events by an experiment performed now must be understood in
a completely different way. It is nothing but a historical reconstruction of a series of past events compatible with the present

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observations and not a genuine (re)making of past events that

had really occurred.14 Wheelers expression according to which
observers bring the universe into being has then to be understood in semantic terms, referring to his concept of meaning
circuit: the universe engenders physically the community of
observers, the latter observers being in turn capable, from their
observations and by their ability to communicate and to represent, to construct an inter-subjective reality he depicts as follows:
What we call reality consists of a few iron posts of observation between which
we ll in by an elaborate papier-mache construction of imagination and theory.

As mentioned above, and in accordance with Bohrs philosophy, Wheelers concept of reality relies on the essential role of
language as a tool of communication. To make this point precise, Wheeler appeals to Fllesdals inter-subjective denition of
meaning (Fllesdal, 1975):
I think that the notion of meaning we are after, and that underlies communication, is the joint product of all the evidence available to persons who in their
daily life try to communicate.

Without developing here in detail Wheelers semantic cosmogenesis,15 let us comment on two points that will appear important
for the following developments. The rst one regards Fllesdals
denition of meaning. This denition seems far too restrictive
if, as it is actually the case, the notion of evidence is understood by this author as constituted by only the sensorial experience (Fllesdal, 1975, p. 28), even though any sort of experience is
involved and contributes to the construction of meaning. Moreover, Fllesdals denition of meaning refers to the notion of
communication between the members of the human community
as the only way to construct signication, discarding then all the
other cultural forms that contribute to this construction. To overcome these difculties, one can dene the notion of meaning
more generally as the human symbolic system. The human symbolic system is constituted by the entanglement of all cultural
forms (language, myth, art, religion, science) in which and by
which any experience appears to be signicant for him (Cassirer,
1972). The symbolic system is constructed progressively from

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simpler signicants (the evidence) to more and more complex

signicants (such as theories or metaphysical concepts).
The second point regards the central role of quantum measurement in Wheelers cosmogenesis. Wheeler suggests that the
acquisition of evidence about the world can only be obtained by
quantum measurements (the elementary acts of observation,
in his words), which may appear somewhat reducing. However,
any observation of the physical world is a priori interpreted
within the current paradigm of quantum physics, that is, in terms
of quantum measurement. So, it would be very difcult to escape
the quantum representation unless a new and more fertile theory
of physical interactions is proposed.
Moreover, beyond this contingent reason, a second one,
more fundamental, can be mentioned. The quantum measurement operation allows the emergence of the phenomenon, that is,
the appearance of new elements of the physical reality and not
the discovering of properties already existing. In effect, although
in classical physics it is permissible to think that a physical quantity has, at any moment, a well-dened value, independently of
its measurement, we cannot say the same in the framework of
quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics only gives an operational rule (the Born rule) concerning the statistical distribution
of possible outcomes of the measurement of this quantity. It does
not say anything about the value of this quantity independently
of its measurement. Even more, the violation of Bells inequalities (Bell 1964), which is corroborated by a lot of experiments
(see, for example, Aspect, 1972), shows that the very possibility of
assigning such a property to the considered system independently
of its measurement is in contradiction with its principles.16
Consequently, one can say that the measurement act is an
objectication process of the basic elements of the physical reality,
this integration of new signicant elements of the physical reality in the physicists universe involving his whole symbolic system.
For example, the observation of a particle in a bubble chamber
is an elementary fact which acquires a meaning only by referring to the functionality of a bubble chamber, that is, to a network of scientic knowledge that includes thermodynamics and
electromagnetic theory. In this sense, the measurement act can be

THE ARROW OF TIME AND MEANING

125

considered as a (very explicit) paradigm of semantic act. (Uzan,

1998, part E)
As a consequence, a rudimentary model of the meaning process can be provided by analysing the structure of the interactive
process of measurement that leads to the acquisition of information on the world by the Observer such a toy model is
developed in the Appendix. In this model the thermodynamic
irreversibility of phenomena (and then the privileged direction of
all the phenomena that dene the arrow of time) appears as a
dynamical property of the meaning process.
Generally speaking, in any attempt to model the meaning process the notion of subject should be characterized by his ability to know and to create and not by his empirical characteristics.
This denition refers to Wittgensteins abstract notion of subject as what is presupposed by experience its formal limit
(Bouveresse, 1987). Such a subject can be modeled as anInformation Gathering and Utilizing System (IGUS). The construction
of meaning by the IGUS denes an evolving structure that we
can call Semantic Time. This relational concept of Time17 is
based on the dynamical aspect of the meaning process: a temporal transition, which is a causal change of the IGUS state, is
engendered by the realization of a semantic act a measurement
operation in our toy model.
Semantic Time is not linear (as in common representations
of time) but it has a branching structure that expresses the fact
that production of signicance entails choice or selection among
several possible representations or several possible actions18
and then among possible futures. This branching structure is
dened from a partial ordering relation on the set of the possible
IGUS states (the instants of the Semantic Time). An IGUS
state can be represented as in a formal way by a state of memory and a set of operations that can be performed on the world.
The IGUS state must indeed be regarded as an inter-subjective
state of knowledge and action since the subject of experience and
action is not considered by his empirical characteristics but by
his ability to act, to represent and to create, an ability which is
shared by all empirical subjects (as it happens, in our toy model,
by the community of physicists). The realisation of the possible
operations by the subject engenders a series of transformations

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PIERRE UZAN

of his memory in which meaning is encoded. Which denes the

ow of Semantic Time.
The idea to consider such a connection between the ow of
time and the meaning process can be compared with Bergsons
concept of duration as creation or constant invention (Bergson
1922). However, in the theory of Semantic Time there is no fundamental opposition between the mechanical time of Relativity
or that of Newtonian evolutions and Bergsons creative time.
For the time of Physics can be fully reconstructed from the
structure of Semantic Time. In effect, by using Chaitins concept of algorithmic information (Chaitin, 1977), a measure of
the informational content of the IGUS states can be provided.19
Consequently, for any branching model of Semantic Time the
totally ordered set of these informational evaluations can dene
an internal, linear time-information scale to which the possible
evolutions of any physical system can be referred. (see Appendix)
It can still be said that time-information produces the duration that allows the preservation of the world (Klein, 2005).
However, if, as emphasized by Klein, the ow of time, which
imposes an absolute chronology to events that are causally
related, should a priori be distinguished from the arrow of
time, which refers to the privileged directionality of phenomena that occur in time, the theory of Semantic Time brings
new insights about this question. The arrow of time-information, which still refers to the possibility of physical systems to
become, which appears here as a consequence of the branching
dynamics of Semantic Time, that is, nally, of its ow. To be
precise, the dissipative, thermodynamic evolution of an isolated
system relies on the scattering of information-structure which is
inherent to the objective20 branching dynamics of Semantic Time
(see Appendix). In other words, according to our approach, the
two concepts of ow of time and arrow of time are intimately
linked.
According to this conception, the objective time of the external world is nothing but a attening21 of the Semantic Time
since it is an evaluation of the informational content of the complex structures of signication that make up meaning. Its ow,
which is caused by the actions of those who look for meaning,
is responsible for the scattering of information in the physical

THE ARROW OF TIME AND MEANING

127

universe. The arrow of time then appears as the necessary counterpart of the meaning process.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to the four anonymous referees for their very illuminating critiques of my paper that suggested
many valuable improvements. I am also indebted to Guido Baccagaluppi for his critical reading and for his suggestions.

APPENDIX

A Toy Model of Semantic Time: the Branching Quantum Time

Model
In this very simple model of Semantic Time the notion of meaning is drastically reduced to the (supposed invariable) theoretico-experimental context C in which a series of measurement
operations is performed by the IGUS.
Let us dene the informational states F of the IGUS as the
triplet:
E = (C, D , O ),

where O is the set of operations that can be performed in the state

E and D is the information relative to the experimental data
recorded in the memory. Unlike the set of data D , it is assumed
in a rst approximation that, as for the theoretico-experimental
context, the set of operations O does not change when new information is recorded by the IGUS. The set D , which is constructed
by recording successively pieces of information i , can be written according to Everetts notation as a series: D = [.., i . . .i ].
The term successively refers to a linear time scale that will be
dened hereafter.
The realisation of a quantum measurement engenders a set of
alternative causal transitions, noted as E E j , where j indexes
the possible results of that measurement. The set D j can be written as D j = [.., i . . .i i j ], where the last information recorded

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PIERRE UZAN

i j corresponds to the result j of the measurement. A strict partial ordering relation on the set of the possible informational states
E of the IGUS can be dened as follows:
E RE

if D is a strict nal extension of D .

It is easy to see that R satises the property of linearity of the

past (tree property), which means that the set of predecessors (by
the relation R) of any sate of the IGUS is totally ordered. Moreover, it is assumed that R satises the property of connectedness
according to which any couple of state of the universe has a greatest lower bound according to R, which is the formal expression
of the assumption of unicity of the (Semantic) Universe.
The resulting structure:
U = < E, R >,

where E = {E } is the set of informational states of the IGUS

and R is the strict, partial, connected ordering relation dened
above, is progressively constructed from the acquisition of information by the IGUS. It constitutes an evolving branching model
of Quantum Time.
A history of Quantum Time is dened as a maximal set of
states of the IGUS totally ordered by the relation R.
The models U can be synchronized by dening a timeinformation scale to which all possible histories of Quantum Time
can be referred. This can be done by using Chaitins notion of
algorithmic information:
k(D ), the algorithmic information content of D can play
the role of a universal time parameter dened from U (and not
from an external point of view). Indeed, for any (arbitrary) strictly
increasing function f dened from the set of natural numbers to
the set of real numbers a time parameter t ranging on that set
can be dened:
t = f (k(D )).

The structure T = (t , <), where the ordering relation < is

the usual total order on real numbers (restricted to Im f), is a strict
total order to which the different histories of the evolving model U
can be referred.

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129

The possibility of synchronising the models of Quantum Time

by referring the possible histories to a unique linear time
information scale gives a meaning to Grifths notation to represent a history as a time-ordered sequence of operators in the
Heisenberg picture (Gell Mann and Hartle, 1990):
1
2
k
n
h = (P1
(t1 ), P2
(t2 ), . . . , Pk
(tk ), . . . , Pn
(tn )),

where the index k denotes the particular event that occurs at

time tk in the set, indexed by k , of alternative projectors. Each
projector corresponds to a property that could be observed.
For any physical system with initial density operator (in
the Heisenberg picture), Wigners formula allows the denition
of a probability distribution for alternative decohering histories:
1
n
1
n
(t1 ), . . . , Pn
(tn )).
(t1 )P1
(h) = T r(Pn
(tn ), . . ., P1

The Representation of Physical States in the Branching Models

of Quantum Time
The branching models of Semantic time allow a historical representation of the state of a physical system. That is, a formal
representation that encodes, at each time of the informational
linear scale T , not only the information about the system, which
is available at that time but also all the information about its possible evolutions since the moment it was prepared. This historical
representation is made possible within an extended representation space dened as follows:
In the models of branching Semantic Time synchronised by k
and weighted by :
U = < E, R, k, >,

the quantum state associated with a physical system S for some

value t of the informational parameter is a vector of the following
Hilbert space (Uzan 1998) :
H (t) =df B(t) Hj .
H (t) is the direct sum, on the set B(t) of beginning branches
at t , of copies Hj = H {bj }, indexed by the branch j , of the
Hilbert space H on complex numbers dened as usually for S .

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PIERRE UZAN

B(t) is dened as follows: if bjt is the set of states E of a branch

j whose memory content is smaller than t :
bjt =df {E bj ; f (k(D )) t},

then B(t) is the set of all the bjt for all branches j created at t :
B(t) =df {bjt for all the branches bj of U}.

Note that for practical reasons the number of branches that are
created at a splitting point can be considered as nite. For any
measurement has a nite resolution and the set of values that can
actually be measured by a measuring device is always bounded
(even if the spectrum of possible values predicted by quantum
theory is continuous and ranges over the set of real numbers).
The space H (t) is then the orthogonal sum of a nite number of
the orthogonal Hilbert spaces Hj .
A vector V of H (t), which is the formal representation of the
quantum state assigned to a physical system, can be written as :
V = (a1 1 , . . ., an n )

with  |a |2 = 1

(normalization condition), while a notion of density operator can

be dened as usually in the spaces Hj :
j = r qr Pr,j ,

where Pr,j is the projector on the state r,j (the index j species
the history and the index r species the possible states r of the
system in H).
An operator algebra acting on the generalized spaces H (t) can
be dened in a similar way as the algebra of operators acting on
the original Hilbert space H. On this algebra one can dene a
linear sum, a product by a complex number, a non-commutative product and an operation of hermitian conjugation. Like in
H , the functions of operators acting on H (t) are dened from
complex variables functions expandable into power series.
The most general operators that can be dened on the generalized Hilbert space are operators whose action depend on branches.
The action of such operators is dened differently for each of the
branches that are created at time t . The use of such multiaction operators may prove very successful in order to develop
physics within the branching models of Quantum Time.

THE ARROW OF TIME AND MEANING

131

In particular, the possibility of dening such operators leads to

the reformulation of the usual equations of evolution within the

branching framework, as for Schrodinger

equation. The Hamiltonian operator can be redened in the models of Quantum Time
while the notion of derivation is understood as the rate of change
of a vector of H (t) for the smallest amount of time-information
that can be dened.22
Thermodynamic Irreversibility in Branching Quantum Time
Models
In the evolving models of Quantim Time, a quantum system is
submitted to an evolution by scattering of information in addi
tion to the Schrodinger-like
evolution. This spreading of information along its possible evolutions is objectively integrated in
the branching dynamics of the Quantum Time since, the splitting
of histories is triggered by effective actions on the world, namely,
measurement operations. It does not result from purely subjective
considerations, as a principle of limitation in the knowledge of
the exact state of the system, which leads to coarse-graining
procedures (Gibbs, Pauli), or from the idea that its Hamiltonian
operator is incompletely know (Jaynes, Balian).
To any physical can be associated a density operator in the
Hilbert spaces H (t):
= j j j ,

where j is the representation of (which is dened as usually in

the Hilbert space H) in the copy Hj relative to the history j .
The temporal evolution of an isolated physical system whose
initial density operator is (0) is unitary23 according to each of
the possible futures j. Consequently, the statistical entropy j (t),
at t > 0, of the system along the history j, dened as usually by:
S[j (t)] = T rj (t)Lnj (t)

is equal to that of (0):

S[j (t)] = S[(0)].

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PIERRE UZAN

However, by the property of concavity of the statistical entropy,

it can be shown that the statistical entropy of the mixture of states:
(t) = j j j (t),

in which the maximal information available at t on the system is

encoded, has increased:
S[(t)] S[(0)].

The statistical entropy S[(t)] of the system increases until

its maximum value Smax [e ] which is reached when the information encoded in the density operator e about its possible histories since the moment it was prepared (its historical information)
becomes irrelevant for the calculation of predictions. Moreover,
as is well known, this maximum value of the statistical entropy
can be identied to its maximum thermodynamic entropy which
is reached at the equilibrium state. (Balian 1982)
As explained above, this progressive loss of information in
physical systems which characterizes the thermodynamic irreversibility can be regarded as a direct consequence of the objective
branching dynamics of Semantic Time which, in this rudimentary
model, relies on measurement operations.
NOTES
1. The observation of the homogenisation of temperatures in a gas or that
of more complex phenomena mentioned in this paper (as the universal
expansion) is of course the result of a complex process of interpretation
from more simple perceptions (as the observation of the position of a
needle on the dial of a measuring device) within a network of physical
theories. The construction of the phenomenon, which constitutes one of
the basic elements of the general process of construction of meaning (see
section 3), has been analysed in detail by many authors, as for example Duhem (1906) or Hacking (1989). However, for sake of simplicity,
and in accordance with common practice of scientic language, the word
observation will be employed all along this paper to designate in brief
this complex process of construction.
2. Boltzmanns H-theorem, which is historically the rst of a wide class of
similar theorems, asserts that a decreasing function (called H ) of time
and of the generalised coordinates (momentum and position) of the components of a physical system can be dened to interpret the notion of
thermodynamic entropy in fact, its opposite.

THE ARROW OF TIME AND MEANING

133

3. The question of the arrow of time, which regards the privileged direction
of phenomena, must not be confused with that of their asymmetry which
is itself generally clearly implemented in the phenomenological laws of
physics.
4. This denition is possible provided their local movement is ignored,
being thus only submitted to the global movement of the universes expansion (they are said to be comobile with space) a condition seems to be
fullled in a volume whose characteristic length is of the order of ten times
that of a cluster of galaxies.
5. Note, that this condition of low entropy was rst suggested locally by
Boltzmann, that is, only for the region of the universe we live in (Boltzmann, 1897). However, as explained by Gold, different regions of the
universe cannot be thought of as thermodynamically mutually isolated.
Consequently, it seems that the condition of low initial entropy must be
imposed to the whole universe.
6. As was the case above for the H -theorem and the second law of thermodynamics, the mathematical property that a law of physics is or is not
invariant by reversing their time parameter has nothing to do with the
fact that the direction of time for which this law must be successfully
applied is postulated independently. This answers to the claim according
to which the impossibility of explaining the arrow of time from physics
would lie in the fact that the fundamental laws are time-invariant (or
CPT-invariant) while the phenomenogical laws (as the second law of
thermodynamics) are not time-invariant (Prigogine, 1980, ch. 1; Hawking, 1985; Zeh, 1989; Rohlicht 1998, 2000). Thus, contrary to Prigogines
or Rohlichts claims, the replacement of parameter time-invariant laws by
asymmetrical laws regarding their time parameter (by the presence of non
time-invariant terms) miss the question of the arrow of time.
7. The notion of Observer should not only be considered as the passive
subject of perception but also as the subject of action and creation, as
will be claried below (Sections 2 and 3). More precisely, a formal model
of such an IGUS (information gathering and utilizing structure) will be
proposed in the Section 3.
8. The word must has been underlined here to emphasize the idea of nality on which the strong anthropic principle is based.
9. The passage in italic is underlined by the author of the present article.
10. Watanabe makes use of the adjective nomological as a synonym of
law-like (which is opposed to factual).
11. This principle stipulates that the acquisition of the quantity I of information(-knowledge) on a system is correlative to a minimal destruction of
order in that system (its negentropy) and then to the increase of its entropy
S according to: S k ln 2I 0, where k is the Boltzmanns constant.

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PIERRE UZAN

12. Maxwells demon is a minuscule intelligent creature that guards the trapdoor between two containers lled with gas at the same temperature. By
observing the molecules and allowing, by opening or not the trapdoor,
to separate faster from slower molecules, he would create a difference of
temperature between the two containers, which seems to contradict the
second law of thermodynamics.
13. Wheelers participatory anthropic principle is then situated beyond the
nalist conception of existence of the strong anthropic principle mentioned in Section 2.
14. A critical discussion of Wheelers delayed choice experiment can be
found in the references (Park, 1989; Uzan, 1998, Section G).
15. A critical analysis of Wheelers concept of meaning circuit can be found
in the reference (Uzan, 1998, Section G) and a more general criticism of
Wheelers philosophy can be found in (Shalom, 1989).
16. For a precise analysis of this question concerning the impossibility of
maintaining a principle of local causality in quantum mechanics, see the
chas. 8 and 9 of dEspagnats book Le reel voile (dEspagnat, 1994).
17. In Aristotles terminology, one can say that the Semantic Time is dened
as the number of the meaning process.
18. This characteristic can be compared with Watanabes principle of freedom
of action.
19. This can be done because the notion of algorithmic information provides
a quantitative estimation of the amount of information encoded in some
single object and is not at all reliant on the possibility of dening a collection of such objects through some statistical distribution (as Shannons
concept of missing information).
20. That is, indeed, inter-subjective.
21. And not as an alternative, as claimed by Bergson.
22. It is of course an approximation of the rigorous notion of derivation where
the innitesimal change of a continuous variable is replaced by that of the
smallest change of a discrete variable. However, we have to notice that,
as for example emphasized by Carnap (1966), the physical quantities we
actually measure form discrete sets because of the nite resolution of measuring devices. Continuity of variables (which is then always approximate
in physics) is only supposed when we apply the laws that are formulated
with the help of differential calculus. Moreover, this link can also be
justied here by noting that the change of the time-information parameter corresponding to the minimal increase of 1 bit for the IGUS memory
content can be made as small as we want by suitably choosing the arbitrary
function f involved in its denition.

23. That is, it is ruled by Schrodinger

equation reformulated within the
branching framework (see above and reference Uzan, 1998).

THE ARROW OF TIME AND MEANING

135

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Institut dHistoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et Techniques

IHPST (Paris I/CNRS/ENS-UMR

8590)
University Paris I - la Sorbonne
13, rue du Four,
75000 Paris, France
E-mail: uzanpier@numericable.fr