Submitted by: Mahinay, Shammah Rey c.

, M6

JOSE V. LAGON, petitioner, vs. HOOVEN COMALCO INDUSTRIES, INC.,

respondent.
[G.R. No. 135657. January 17, 2001]
Facts: Jose V. Lagon, a businessman
and owner of a commercial building in
Tacurong,
Sultan
Kudarat
and
HOOVEN, a domestic corporation
manufacturing
and
installing
aluminum materials entered into two
(2) contracts in April 1981. HOOVEN
agreed to sell and install various
aluminum
materials
in
Lagons
commercial building in Tacurong,
Sultan Kudarat for P104,870.00. Upon
execution of the contracts, Lagon paid
HOOVEN P48,00.00 in advance.
However, HOOVEN alleged that Lagon
failed and refused to liquidate his
indebtedness
despite
repeated
demands after it delivered and
installed
several
construction
materials in Lagons commercial
building. The total cost of the labor
and
materials
amounted
to
P117,329.00 out of which P69,329.00
remained unpaid. Lagon, on the other
hand, argued that HOOVEN failed to
deliver and install some of the
materials specified in the proposals
and that as a result he was compelled
to procure the undelivered materials
from
other
sources.
HOOVEN
commenced an action for sum of
money with damages and attorneys
fees against petitioner Lagon before
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City
on 24 February 1987.

The trial court conducted an ocular

inspection of Lagons commercial
building on 9 October 1987 to
determine whether the items alleged
in the complaint and appearing in the
invoices and delivery receipts had
been delivered and installed on the
premises and found that some
materials are missing and uninstalled.
The trial court decided in favor of
Lagon. This was made partly on the
basis of the result of the ocular
inspection finding that the total actual
deliveries and installations made by
HOOVEN cost P87,140.00. and only
P39,140.00 remained unpaid and
where Lagon incurred in delay. As a
result of the partial breach of contract
on plaintiff's (Hooven Comalco) part,
the defendant is entitled to actual
damages only to the extent of the
undelivered materials and undone
labor or to the amount of P26,120.00.
Both parties appealed to the Court of
Appeals and resolved the case in favor
of HOOVEN. It held that the trial court
erred in relying solely on the results of
the ocular inspection since the
delivery and installation of the
materials in question started as early
as 1981, while the ocular inspection
was conducted only in 1987 or six (6)
years later, after the entire mezzanine
was altered and the whole building

renovated. The case was again

appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not all the
materials specified in the contracts
had been delivered and installed by
respondent in petitioners commercial
building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat.

P117,329.00 while under the delivery

receipts it is only P112,870.50, or a
difference of P4,458.00. Moreover, the
materials listed in the two (2)
Proposals, upon which HOOVEN based
its claims, is only for the total sum of
P104,870.00.

Held: Not all materials were delivered.

The Supreme Court MODIFIED the
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Jose V. Lagon is ordered to
pay respondent Hooven Comalco
Industries,
Inc.,
P6,377.66
representing the value of the unpaid
materials admittedly delivered to him.
On the other hand, respondent is
ordered to pay petitioner P50,000.00
as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
attorney's fees and P46,554.50 as
actual
damages
and
litigation
expenses.

Also, all the delivery receipts did not

appear to have been signed by
petitioner or his duly authorized
representative acknowledging receipt
of the materials listed therein.
Deliveries were made to a certain Jose
Rubin, claimed to be petitioners driver,
Armando Lagon, and a certain
bookkeeper.
Unfortunately
for
HOOVEN, the identities of these
persons were never been established,
and there is no way of determining
now whether they were indeed
authorized
representatives
of
petitioner.

Ratio:
There
is
an
apparent
discrepancy in the items listed in the
documents presented in court. The
quantity of materials and the amounts
stated in the delivery receipts do not
tally with those in the invoices
covering them, notwithstanding that,
according to HOOVEN OIC Alberto
Villanueva, the invoices were based
merely on the delivery receipts. The
total value of the materials as
reflected in all the invoices is

Despite the breach of contract by

respondent in failing to deliver and
install in the premises of petitioner all
the stipulated materials, the Court
acknowledged the right of respondent
to recover the unpaid balance from
petitioner for the materials actually
delivered. There is no proof that
petitioner already paid for the value of
the
undelivered
and
uninstalled
materials to respondent.

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner, - versus - BOARD OF MEDICINE and

EDITHA SIOSON, Respondents. G.R. No. 177407
Facts: Editha Sioson went to Rizal
Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on
February 4, 1995 due to lumbar pains.
Sometime in 1999, she was ordered

several diagnostic laboratory tests.

The tests revealed that her right
kidney is normal. It was ascertained,
however, that her left kidney is non-

functioning and non-visualizing. Thus,

she underwent kidney operation in
September, 1999.
During the operation, the doctors
removed the fully functional right
kidney, instead of the left nonfunctioning and non-visualizing kidney.
On February 18, 2000, private
respondents husband, Romeo Sioson
(as complainant), filed a complaint for
gross negligence and/or incompetence
before the [BOM] against the doctors
who allegedly participated in the
fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr.
Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr.
Gerardo
Antonio
Florendo
and
petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
The complaint was heard by the
[BOM]. After complainant Romeo
Sioson presented his evidence, private
respondent Editha Sioson, also named
as complainant there, filed her formal
offer
of
documentary
evidence.
Attached to the formal offer of
documentary
evidence
are
her
Exhibits A to D, which she offered for
the purpose of proving that her
kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time she
was operated.
Petitioner
filed
his
comments/objections
to
private
respondents [Editha Siosons] formal
offer of exhibits. He alleged that said
exhibits are inadmissible because the
same are mere photocopies, not
properly identified and authenticated,
and intended to establish matters
which are hearsay. He added that the
exhibits are incompetent to prove the
purpose for which they are offered.

The formal offer of documentary

exhibits of private respondent [Editha
Sioson] was admitted by the [BOM]
per its Order dated May 26, 2004.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of
the abovementioned Order basically
on the same reasons stated in his
comment/objections to the formal
offer of exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner in its
Order dated October 8, 2004. It
concluded that it should first admit the
evidence being offered so that it can
determine its probative value when it
decides the case.
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as
previously adverted to, Atienza filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA,
assailing the BOMs Orders which
admitted Editha Siosons (Edithas)
Formal
Offer
of
Documentary
Evidence. The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence
presented by Sioson is admissible or
not.
Held: Yes, the evidence is admissible.
The petition is DENIED affirming the
Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Ratio: Petitioner argues that the
exhibits formally offered in evidence
by Editha: (1) violate the best
evidence rule; (2) have not been
properly identified and authenticated;
(3) are completely hearsay; and (4)
are incompetent to prove their
purpose. Thus, petitioner contends
that the exhibits are inadmissible
evidence.

The rules of evidence are not as

strictly applied in proceedings before
administrative bodies such as the BOM
as that in trial courts. It was ruled by
the court that in case of doubt, it is
better to admit evidence than to reject
it.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioner,
the best evidence rule is inapplicable.
The proper anatomical locations of
Edithas kidneys at the time of her
operation at the RMC may be

established not only through the

exhibits offered in evidence but by the
natural biological structure of the
human body.
These exhibits do not constitute
hearsay evidence of the anatomical
locations of Edithas kidneys. The
anatomical positions, whether left or
right, of Edithas kidneys, and the
removal of one or both, may still be
established
through
a
belated
ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal
area.

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and
LEOPOLDO HALILI, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128538. February 28, 2001]
Facts: SCC Chemicals Corporation
(SCC for brevity) through its chairman,
Danilo Arrieta and vice president,
Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a
loan worth P129,824.48 from State
Investment House Inc., (hereinafter
SIHI) on December 13, 1983. The loan
carried an annual interest rate of 30%
plus penalty charges of 2% per month
on the remaining balance of the
principal upon non-payment on the
due date-January 12, 1984. To secure
the payment of the loan, Danilo
Arrieta
and
private
respondent
Leopoldo
Halili
executed
a
Comprehensive
Surety
Agreement
binding
themselves
jointly
and
severally to pay the obligation on the
maturity date. SCC failed to pay the
loan when it matured. SIHI then sent
demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and

Halili, but notwithstanding receipt

thereof, no payment was made.
On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed a Civil
Case against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila
for a sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment.
The case proceeded to trial on the sole
issue of whether or not the defendants
were liable to the plaintiff and to what
extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its
claim. The cross-examination of said
witness was postponed several times
due to one reason or another at the
instance of either party. The case was
calendared several times for hearing
but each time, SCC or its counsel
failed to appear despite notice. SCC
was finally declared by the trial court

to have waived its right to crossexamine the witness of SIHI and the
case was deemed submitted for
decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court
promulgated its decision in favor of
SIHI and SCC elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals.
There, SCC contended that SIHI had
failed to show, by a preponderance of
evidence, that the latter had a case
against it. SCC argued that the lone
witness presented by SIHI to prove its
claim
was
insufficient
as
the
competency of the witness was not
established and there was no showing
that he had personal knowledge of the
transaction. SCC further maintained
that no proof was shown of the
genuineness of the signatures in the
documentary exhibits presented as
evidence and that these signatures
were neither marked nor offered in
evidence by SIHI. Finally, SCC pointed
out that the original copies of the
documents were not presented in
court.
The appellate court affirmed in toto
the judgment appealed from. SCC filed
its motion for reconsideration, which
the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolution dated February 27, 1997.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of
Appeals made an error of law in
holding that private respondent SIHI
had proved its cause of action by
preponderant evidence.
Held: No, the Court of Appeals did not
make an error of law in holding that
private respondent SIHI had proved its

cause of action by preponderant

evidence. The instant petition is
partially granted and the decision of
the Court of Appeals is affirmed with
modification that the award of
attorneys fees to private respondent
SIHI is deleted.
Ratio: Petitioner contends that SIHI
violated Sections 36[3] and 48,[4] Rule
130 of the Rules of Court due to its
introduction of documentary evidence
through the testimony of a witness
whose
competence
was
not
established
and
whose
personal
knowledge of the truthfulness of the
facts
testified
to
was
not
demonstrated. Petitioner charges the
appellate court with committing an
error of law when it failed to disallow
the admission in evidence of said
testimony pursuant to the hearsay
rule contained in Section 36, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined
to
personal
knowledge;
hearsay
excluded. A witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these
rules.
However,
the
court
found
arguments lacking merit.

the

As a rule, hearsay evidence is

excluded and carries no probative
value but if a party failed to object to
hearsay evidence, then the same is
admissible. The rationale for this
exception is to be found in the right of
a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled
that it is the opportunity to cross-

examine which negates the claim that

the matters testified to by a witness
are hearsay. However, the right to
cross-examine may be waived. The
repeated failure of a party to crossexamine the witness is an implied
waiver of such right. Petitioner was
afforded several opportunities by the
trial court to cross-examine the other
partys witness. Petitioner repeatedly
failed to take advantage of these
opportunities. No error was thus

committed by the respondent court

when it sustained the trial courts
finding that petitioner had waived its
right to cross-examine the opposing
partys witness. Also, the requirements
of Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court as to the admissibility of his
testimony were satisfied because the
witness of SIHI was a competent
witness as he testified to facts, which
he knew of his personal knowledge.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL

OMATANG, appellants.
[G.R. No. 158203. March 31, 2005]
Facts: On July 14, 1991 at 7:00 oclock
in the evening, at Pamplona Coconut
Plantation,
Negros
Oriental,
Calumpang and Omatang feloniously
attacked and hacked spouses Alicia
and Santiago Catipay with the use of
bolos,
subsequently
killing
both
victims.
Magno Gomez, who was with the
victims before the hacking, testified
that the appellants followed them
after stopping by a store to drink beer.
Magno and the spouses reached the
narrow waterway and Magno started
to cross ahead of the spouses.
Santiago and Alicia stayed slightly
behind because Santiago had to
remove his shoes.
When Magno turned around to wait for
his companions and saw appellants
attacking the spouses. With a bolo,
appellant Calumpang hacked Santiago
on the head and stabbed his
abdomen.
At the same time,

appellant Omatang attacked Alicia.

Scared that appellants would also
attack him, Magno ran away and
reached Alexander Ebiass house. He
asked Alexander for a torch then
continued
walking
towards
Sitio
Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. After a
kilometer, however, he saw the house
of his cousin Rolando Retada. He
decided to spend the night there.
Magno further testified that he did not
tell either anyone about what he saw
at the waterway because he was
afraid. It was only after he was turned
over to the police authorities of
Pamplona and brought to the police
station for questioning that he
reported what he saw the day before
at the waterway in the plantation.
For its part, the defense contradicted
the version of the prosecution. Analyn
Andagan testified that she was
tending the store of her mother, when
appellants Calumpang and Omatang

arrived with one Conchito Nilas. Then,

Magno and the spouses arrived and
immediately left after finishing their
beers. Analyn testified that appellants
did not follow Magno, Santiago and
Alicia when the three left her mothers
store. Appellant Omatang stayed until
7:00 p.m. and continued talking with
his
two
companions,
appellant
Calumpang and Conchito Nilas. He left
when his 12-year-old nephew, defense
witness Joseph Rabor, came to fetch
him for supper. Appellant Calumpang,
for his part, stayed until 8:00 p.m. and
helped her close the store. He walked
home with her and Conchito Nilas.
Visitacion Rabor, on the other hand,
testified that she overheard Santiago
berating Magno when they passed her
store around 6:30 p.m. on July 14,
1991. Santiago was mad at Magno
because Magno did not want to help
Santiago clean the dam at Mangoto,
Pamplona, as Magno was supposed to.
She added that Santiago continued
calling Magno useless at Anas store
until Alicia prevailed upon Santiago to
go home. When Santiago and Alicia
left, Magno followed them.
The trial court gave credence to the
testimony of Magno Gomez and
accepted his account of the murders
and convicted appellants of double
murder with imprisonment of the
maximum
penalty
of
reclusion
perpetua, and further ordered to
indemnify jointly and severally the
heirs of the spouses Santiago and
Alicia
Catipay
the
amount
of
PhP100,000.00, and to pay moral
damages
in
the
amount
of
PhP100,000.00.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the appellants
guilt for double murder has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: No, the appellants guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellants
Rico
Calumpang
and
Jovenal Omatang are ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. They are ordered
released from custody immediately,
unless they are being lawfully held for
another cause.
Ratio:
There
are
material
inconsistencies
between
Magnos
testimony in court and his affidavit,
which
he
executed
during the
preliminary
examination.
Magno
testified that the spouses were
simultaneously
attacked
by
appellants, with appellant Calumpang
attacking Santiago and appellant
Omatang attacking Alicia. However,
during the preliminary examination,
Magno declared that both appellants
attacked Alicia first and that Santiago
was
hacked
because
Santiago
attempted to save his wife. Further,
the fact that Magno was a principal
suspect and that he did not choose to
exonerate himself right away when he
was arrested for questioning by
members of the Philippine Army,
render his credibility suspect.
The trial court overlooked pertinent
pieces of evidence favorable to the
accused and disregarded several
significant facts and circumstances
that cast doubt on the veracity of the
testimony of the prosecutions lone
eyewitness, Magno Gomez, justifying a
departure from the settled rule that

factual findings of the trial court bind

this Court.
Generally, an affidavit, being taken ex
parte, is considered almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate or
lacking in details and is deemed
inferior to the testimony given in open
court.
Jurisprudence,
however,
forewarns that when serious and
inexplicable
discrepancies
exist
between a previously executed sworn
statement of a witness and his
testimonial declarations, with respect
to a persons participation in a serious
imputation such as murder, there is
raised a grave doubt on the veracity of
the witness account.
There seems to be no explanation as
to why appellants ignored Magno and
did not chase him considering that he
was only five feet away when he
allegedly got an unobstructed view of
appellants murdering the spouses.
Likewise, it makes no sense why, if it
were true that he was running away
for fear that appellants might also
attack him, Magno chose to run only a
short distance of only 50 meters, and
while still unsure that appellants did in
fact not run after him, Magno took the

time to stop by Alexander Ebiass

house, called out to Alexander, asked
for some dried coconut leaves, and
made a torch to light his path.
Magnos actions were certainly not the
actions of someone seeking to avoid
peril to his life. The lighted torch and
the noise he made calling out to
Alexander would have revealed his
location to the very people he said he
was running from.
Finally, no
convincing proof could show that
appellants had any reason to kill
Santiago and Alicia in cold blood.
Appellants defense of alibi was indeed
weak,
since
their
alibis
were
corroborated only by their relatives
and friends, and it was not shown that
it was impossible for them to be at the
place of the incident. However, the
rule
that
an
accused
must
satisfactorily prove his alibi was never
intended to change or shift the burden
of proof in criminal cases. Unless the
prosecution
overturns
the
constitutional
presumption
of
innocence
of
an
accused
by
competent and credible evidence
proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, the presumption remains.

ANGEL UBALES y VELEZ, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.
G.R. No. 175692
Facts: On October 17, 2001, in the
City of Manila, the accused, armed
with a .38 caliber paltik revolver
marked Smith and Wesson, shot MARK
TANGLAW SANTOS y ORPIANA on the
head causing death.

Laila Cherry Cruz, the sister of Mark

Santos, testified that on 16 October
2001, at about 8 p.m., petitioner
Ubales and the deceased Mark Santos
(Mark) were drinking liquor in front of
the victims house with a group which

included a certain Jon-Jon, Solo Perez,

and Jojo Santos. In the course of their
carousal, Ubales and Mark engaged in
an argument but was soon resolved,
with Ubales patting the shoulders of
Mark. Ubales asked permission from
Laila Cruz to use their comfort room.
Before Ubales went inside the comfort
room, Laila Cruz saw Ubales place his
gun with black stripes on top of the
dining table. Mark and Ubales then
left.
Eduardo Galvan (Galvan), a 65-year
old balut vendor and the best friend of
the deceased Mark Santos, testified
that at 3 a.m. in the morning of 17
October 2001, while he was selling
balut near the Malacanang area, he
saw Mark and Ubales quarreling
around a meter away from him. The
argument lasted for about three
minutes, culminating with Ubales
taking out his gun and shooting Mark
on the head. Galvan is certain about
this, as he was still only one meter
away from Mark and Ubales when the
former shot the latter, and the place
was well-illuminated. When Mark fell,
Ubales ran towards Atienza Street.
Ubales filed a Motion to File Demurrer
to Evidence on the ground that the
prosecution
presented
insufficient
evidence to destroy the presumption
of innocence of the accused. The trial
court
denied
the
Motion
and
accordingly set the hearing for
presentation of the evidence of the
defense.
Ubales testified that on 16 October
2001, at around 6 or 7 p.m., he went
to the home of his friend Guido
Almosera on Uli-Uli Street, where he

saw Joseph Karunungan, Rico Sison,

Eric Marquez and Henry Ponce. Ubales
stayed with the group until 10 p.m.
Along the way, he saw Mark who had
been having a drinking spree with
other persons. He decided to join the
group for a while before returning
home.
At around 12 midnight, Ubales bade
leave to go home. Mark went along
with him to the place where he could
get a ride home. They parted ways
and Ubales got on a jeep which he
rode to J.P. Laurel Street. On the way
home, Ubales saw the group of Guido
Almosera still having drinks. He
decided to join them again until
around 1 a.m. of 17 October 2001.
Ubales also testified that although he
is a former policeman, he no longer
had a gun and that his sidearm is in
the custody of the WPD. He stated
further that he was arrested without a
warrant.
On 20 July 2004, the Regional Trial
Court rendered its Decision finding
Angel Ubales guilty of the crime of
homicide with penalty of ten (10)
years of Prision Mayor as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day medium of Reclusion
Temporal, as maximum.
On 28 July 2004, the trial court issued
an Order giving provisional liberty to
Ubales provided the bonding company
agrees to the extension of the bond.
On 30 July 2004, the bonding company
manifested its assent to continue its
undertaking as bondsman for Ubales
during the pendency of his appeal.
Ubales appealed to the Court of
Appeals. On 30 November 2006, the

Court of Appeals rendered its Decision

affirming
with
modification
the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Hence, this Petition.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence
for the prosecution proves that
petitioner
committed
the
crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: No, the prosecution did not
prove that Ubales was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Petitioner Angel
Ubales y Velez is ACQUITTED of the
crime of homicide on account of
reasonable doubt.
Ratio: Petitioner Ubales was arrested
on 25 October 2001, eight days after
Marks body was found. Ubales arrest
was made by SPO2 Rosales Fernandez
at the insistence of Laila Cruz, who
approached SPO2 Fernandez for
assistance in apprehending Ubales. Up
to the time of this arrest, the only
piece of evidence which remotely links
Ubales to the killing of Mark Santos is
the recovery of a gun resembling a
gun allegedly seen by Laila Cruz in his
(Ubales) possession the night Mark
was killed. This gun found several
meters away from where Marks body
was found but was never identified as
the gun where the bullet that killed
Mark came from. All that the forensic
firearm examiner testified to about
this gun was that this is a .38 caliber
paltik revolver with three bullets and
one empty shell. The slug found in the
head of Mark was never subjected to a
ballistic examination, either.

For evidence to be believed, it must

not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but must be credible
in itself such as the common
experience of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances.
At the onset, we can easily see that
Galvans version of the facts raises
very serious questions. Since it took
an hour after the killing before the
presence of the dead body of Mark
Santos was reported to the police, it
can fairly be assumed that if Galvans
version of the facts were true, there
were no other people at the scene of
the crime. Why was Galvan selling
balut at a place with no pedestrian
traffic at 3 a.m.?
Furthermore, in both versions of the
facts, Mark had been gracious enough
to accompany Ubales after their
carousal,
clearly
showing
that
whatever misunderstanding they had
during their drinking spree was
already resolved. If Galvans version of
the facts is to be believed, Ubales and
Mark had even been together for a
several hours more before Mark was
killed.
In the instant case, while it is possible
that the accused has committed the
crime, there is also the possibility,
based on the evidence presented, that
he has not. He should be deemed to
have not for failure to meet the test of
moral certainty.

NENA LAZALITA TATING, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA,

represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 155208
Facts: The present case arose from a
controversy involving a parcel of land
located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental owned by Daniela
Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela).
Daniela sold the property to her
granddaughter, Nena Lazalita Tating
(Nena) on October 14, 1969 but the
land remained in possession of
Daniela. The agreement between her
and Nena was simply to transfer title
over the subject property in favor of
the latter to enable her to obtain a
loan by mortgaging the subject
property but she later discovered that
Nena did not secure any loan nor
mortgage the property. On December
28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn
statement claiming that she had
actually no intention of selling the
property, and she wants the title in the
name of Nena cancelled and the
subject property reconveyed to her.
Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving
her children as her heirs, namely:
Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and
Cirilo.
On September 6, 1989, Carlos and
Felicidad, represented by her son
Salvador, filed a complaint Nena
praying for the nullification of the
Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Daniela in her favor. Nena denied that
any
fraud
or
misrepresentation
attended the execution of the subject
Deed of Absolute Sale. The trial court
rendered the decision in favor of the

plaintiffs nullifying
Absolute Sale.

the

Deed

of

Nena filed an appeal with the CA but

CA rendered its Decision affirming the
judgment of the RTC. Hence, herein
petition for certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the case for
the private respondents rests on the
proposition that the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated October 14, 1969 is
simulated because Danielas actual
intention was not to dispose of her
property but simply to help petitioner
by providing her with a collateral.
Petitioner asserts that the sole
evidence which persuaded both the
RTC and the CA in holding that the
subject deed was simulated was the
Sworn Statement of Daniela dated
December
28,
1977.
However,
petitioner argues that said Sworn
Statement should have been rejected
outright
by
the
lower
courts
considering that Daniela has long
been dead when the document was
offered in evidence, thereby denying
petitioner the right to cross-examine
her.
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC
and the CA erred in departing from the
doctrine held time and again by the
Supreme Court that clear, strong and
convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance is required to show the
falsity or nullity of a notarial
document. Petitioner also argues that

the RTC and the CA erred in its

pronouncement that the transaction
between
Daniela
and
petitioner
created a trust relationship between
them because of the settled rule that
where the terms of a contract are
clear, it should be given full effect.
Issue: Whether or not the Sworn
Statement is a clear and convincing
evidence to nullify the Deed of
Absolute Sale.
Held: The Sworn Statement is not a
clear and convincing evidence to
nullify the Deed of Absolute Sale. The
petition is GRANTED.
Ratio: The CA and the trial court ruled
that the contract of sale between
petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A
contract is simulated if the parties do
not intend to be bound at all
(absolutely simulated) or if the parties
conceal
their
true
agreement
(relatively simulated). The lower
courts used the sworn statement of
Daniela as main evidence.
The Court found that both the trial
court and the CA committed error in
giving the sworn statement probative
weight. Since Daniela is no longer
available to take the witness stand as
she is already dead, the RTC and the
CA should not have given probative
value on Danielas sworn statement
for purposes of proving that the
contract of sale between her and
petitioner was simulated and that, as

a consequence, a trust relationship

was created between them.
Private respondents should have
presented
other
evidence
to
sufficiently prove their allegation that
Daniela, in fact, had no intention of
disposing of her property when she
executed the subject deed of sale in
favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases,
the burden is on the plaintiff to prove
the material allegations of his
complaint and he must rely on the
strength of his evidence and not on
the weakness of the evidence of the
defendant.
If the subject Deed of Absolute Sale
did not really reflect the real intention
of Daniela, she should have told any of
her relatives regarding her actual
purpose in executing the subject deed.
The private respondents failed to
prove by clear, strong and convincing
evidence beyond mere preponderance
of evidence that the contract of sale
between Daniela and petitioner was
simulated. The legal presumption is in
favor of the validity of contracts and
the party who impugns its regularity
has the burden of proving its
simulation. Since private respondents
failed to discharge the burden of
proving their allegation that the
contract of sale between petitioner
and Daniela was simulated, the
presumption of regularity and validity
of the October 14, 1969 Deed of
Absolute Sale stands.

PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING
CORPORATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 107518. October 8, 1998]
On September 21, 1977, the M/V Maria
Efigenia XV, owned by private
respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation,
was
navigating the
waters
near
Fortune
Island
in
Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to
Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided
with the vessel Petroparcel which at
the time was owned by the Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).
An investigation by the Board of
Marine
Inquiry
found
that
the
Petroparcel
at
fault.
Private
respondent sued the LSC and the
Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo,
before the then Court of First Instance
of Caloocan City, praying for the
payment of damages of the fishing
nets, boat equipment and cargoes of
M/V Maria Efigenia XV,. Meanwhile,
during the pendency of the case,
petitioner
PNOC
Shipping
and
Transport Corporation sought to be
substituted in place of LSC as it had
already acquired ownership of the
Petroparcel.
The trial court rendered the decision in
favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant PNOC Shipping & Transport
Corporation
citing
the
evidence
presented by private respondent
consisting of the testimony of its
general manager and sole witness,
Edilberto del Rosario, testifying that at
the time the vessel sank, it was then
carrying assorted fish, two cummins
engines (250 horsepower), radar,

pathometer and compass. Together

with the testimony, they submitted
price quotations as documentary
evidence of the losses.
On the other hand, petitioner only
presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior
estimator at PNOC Dockyard &
Engineering Corporation, as sole
witness and it did not bother at all to
offer any documentary evidence to
support its position. Lazaro testified
that the price quotations submitted by
private respondent were excessive
and that as an expert witness, he used
the quotations of his suppliers in
making his estimates. However, he
failed to present such quotations of
prices from his suppliers, saying that
he could not produce a breakdown of
the costs of his estimates as it was a
sort of secret scheme.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for
the reconsideration of the lower courts
decision but the lower court declined
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals which, however,
affirmed the same in toto on October
14, 1992 awarding P6,438,048 of
damages to Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation.
Hence, the instant recourse.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
testamentary
and
documentary
evidences submitted by del Rosario

are sufficient evidence in determining

the damages demandable from PNOC.
Held: No, the evidence is considered
hearsay evidence. The challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED insofar as it awarded actual
damages to private respondent Maria
Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the
amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of
evidentiary
bases
therefor.
Considering the fact, however, that:
(1) technically petitioner sustained
injury but which, unfortunately, was
not adequately and properly proved,
and (2) this case has dragged on for
almost two decades, we believe that
an
award
of
Two
Million
(P2,000,000.00)[59] in favor of private
respondent as and for nominal
damages is in order.
Ratio: The burden of proof is on the
party who would be defeated if no
evidence would be presented on either
side. Damages cannot be presumed
and courts, in making an award must
point out specific facts that could
afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are
borne.
In this case, actual damages were
proven through the sole testimony of
private respondents general manager
and certain pieces of documentary
evidence. The price quotations are
ordinary private writings which under
the Revised Rules of Court should have

been
proffered
along
with
the
testimony of the authors thereof. Del
Rosario could not have testified on the
veracity of the contents of the writings
even though he was the seasoned
owner of a fishing fleet because he
was not the one who issued the price
quotations. Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that a
witness can testify only to those facts
that he knows of his personal
knowledge. For this reason, Del
Rosarios claim that private respondent
incurred losses in the total amount of
P6,438,048.00 should have been
admitted with extreme caution.
The price quotations also presented as
exhibits partake of the nature of
hearsay evidence considering that the
persons who issued them were not
presented as witnesses. Any evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is
hearsay if its probative value is not
based on the personal knowledge of
the witness but on the knowledge of
another person who is not on the
witness stand. Hearsay evidence
whether objected to or not has no
probative value. Accordingly, damages
may not be awarded on the basis of
hearsay evidence.
Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of
said exhibits does not mean that it
totally deprives private respondent of
any redress for the loss of its vessel.
The private respondent was awarded
nominal damages.

CALAMBA STEEL CENTER, INC. (formerly JS STEEL CORPORATION),

petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

[G.R. No. 151857. April 28, 2005]

Facts: Petitioner is a domestic
corporation
engaged
in
the
manufacture of steel blanks for use by
manufacturers
of
automotive,
electrical, electronics in industrial and
household appliances.
Petitioner filed an Amended Corporate
Annual Income Tax Return on June 4,
1996 declaring a net taxable income
of P9,461,597.00, tax credits of
P6,471,246.00 and tax due in the
amount of P3,311,559.00 and reported
quarterly payments for the second and
third quarters of 1995 in the amounts
of P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00,
respectively.

examination of petitioners claim and

found petitioner liable for deficiency
value added tax. Petitioner also
presented rebuttal evidence.
In denying petitioners refund, the CA
reasoned out that no evidence other
than that presented before the CTA
was adduced to prove that excess tax
payments had been made in 1995.
From the inception of the case to the
formal offer of its evidence, petitioner
did not present its 1996 income tax
return to disclose its total income tax
liability, thus making it difficult to
determine whether such excess tax
payments were utilized in 1996.

It is the proposition of the petitioner

that for the year 1995, several of its
clients withheld taxes from their
income payments to petitioner and
remitted the same to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) in the sum of
P3,159,687.00.
Petitioner
further
alleged that due to its income/loss
positions for the three quarters of
1996, it was unable to use the excess
tax paid for and in its behalf by the
withholding agents.

Hence, this Petition.

An administrative claim was filed by

the petitioner on April 10, 1997 for the
refund of P3,159,687.00 representing
excess
or
unused
creditable
withholding taxes for the year 1995.
The instant petition was subsequently
filed on April 18, 1997.

Held:
The
Petition
is
partly
meritorious. the Petition is hereby
PARTLY GRANTED, and the case is
REMANDED to the Court of Tax
Appeals for the proper and immediate
determination of the amount to be
refunded to petitioner on the basis of
the latters 1996 final adjustment
return.

The petitioner presented documentary

and testimonial evidence. Respondent,
on the other hand, presented the
revenue officer who conducted the

Issue: Whether or not the Court of

Appeals gravely erred when, while
purportedly requiring petitioner to
submit its 1996 annual income tax
return to support its claim for refund,
nonetheless ignored the existence of
the tax return extant on the record the
authenticity of which has not been
denied or its admissibility opposed by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Ratio: A taxable corporation is

entitled to a tax refund when the sum
of the quarterly income taxes it paid

during a taxable year exceeds its total

income tax due also for that year.
Consequently, the refundable amount
that is shown on its final adjustment
return may be credited, at its option,
against its quarterly income tax
liabilities for the next taxable year.
Petitioner is a taxable corporation is a
corporation liable to pay income taxes
under Section 24 of the NIRC. In 1995,
it reported that it had excess income
taxes that had been paid for and on its
behalf by its withholding agents; and
that, this excess should be credited
against its income tax liabilities for
1996. However, it claimed in 1997 that
it should get a refund, because it was
still unable to use the excess income
taxes paid in 1995 against its tax
liabilities in 1996.
A tax refund may be claimed even
beyond the taxable year following that

in which the tax credit arises. No

provision in our tax law limits the
entitlement to such a refund, other
than the requirement that the filing of
the administrative claim for it be made
by the taxpayer within a two-year
prescriptive period. Petitioner filed its
claim in 1997 -- well within the twoyear prescriptive period. Thus, its
unused tax credits in 1995 may still be
refunded.
Having been unable to use the excess
income taxes paid in 1995 against its
other tax liabilities in 1996, petitioner
clearly deserves a refund. It cannot by
any sweeping denial be deprived of
what rightfully belongs to it.
The petitioner is entitled to a refund;
however, the amount must still be
proved in proper proceedings before
the CTA.

PEOPLE OF THE PIIILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTONIO BARAOIL,

Accused-Appellant.
[G.R. NO. 194608 - July 9, 2012]
Facts: Five (5) year old AAA was
walking near the house of the
accused-appellant when the latter saw
her. He asked where she was going
then he invited her to take a ride with
him on his bicycle. AAA acceded
because accused-appellant is a friend
of her parents. The accused-appellant
and AAA biked together towards the
town rice mill. BBB, the elder sister of
AAA, saw them. Worried about AAA s
safety, BBB sought the help of CCC,
her other sister, and their cousin DDD
to look for AAA.

Upon arriving at the rice mill, the

accused-appellant parked his bicycle
against the wall, and pulled AAA inside
the mill's comfort room. The accusedappellant then raped five-year-old
[AAA] inside the comfort room and
threatened AAA not to tell his mother
or father about what happened or else
he will repeat the act. At that moment,
BBB, CCC, and DDD arrived at the rice
mill and saw the accused-appellant's
bicycle. They entered and heard
thumping sounds coming from the
comfort room. The accused-appellant

then suddenly opened its door and

walked out. AAA followed him after a
while towards his bicycle looking
visibly sweating and walking with
difficulty.
CCC
approached
the
accusedappellant and told him that they will
take AAA home but accused-appellant
refused and told them that he will take
AAA home after a chocolate-filled
biscuit for AAA.
After half an hour, the accusedappellant took AAA back to the
comfort room of the same rice mill and
repeated the act.
The next day, DDD asked AAA what
happened when she was with the
accused-appellant. AAA did not say
anything but she started to cry until
she told her mother EEE all that
transpired. On August 10, 2004, EEE
brought AAA to the police station
where they reported the incident.
For the defense, the accused-appellant
denied the charges and proferred an
alibi by stating that he was with his
friend Renato at the fish pond at the
time when the alleged rape took
place. He claimed that they were
fishing from 7:30 to 10:00 in the
morning. They also drank gin at
around 3:00 p.m. and went home at
4:00 p.m. He, moreover, claimed that
AAA was nice to him before the
alleged rape. However, AAA's family
got mad at him after he disconnected
their jumper connection from the
power source. They even threatened
that they will hack him to death. Thus,
the accusation of AAA's family was a
means of revenge.

The RTC found the accused GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of two
crimes of rape, respectively defined
and penalized under Republic Act No.
8353 amending the Revised Penal
Code provisions on rape.
The trial court lent credence to the
testimony of AAA that she was raped.
The trial court found her testimony
categorical,
straightforward
and
candid. Moreover, in upholding the
credibility of AAA, the trial court relied
heavily on established doctrines in
rape cases.
On September 1, 2008, the accusedappellant filed a notice of appeal. The
CA, in a Decision dated May 26, 2010,
affirmed
the
accused-appellant's
conviction with modification. The CA
sustained the conviction of the
accused-appellant after finding that
the testimony of AAA was credible,
natural, convincing and consistent
with human nature and the normal
course of things. There was no reason
to overturn the accused-appellants
conviction for the crime of statutory
rape considering that AAA was
undeniably under 12 years old and
that the accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge with her.
The accused appealed to the Supreme
Court. Hence, this case.
Issue: Whether or not the accusedappellants guilt has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt based on
the evidence presented by the victim.
Held: Yes, the accused is guilty
beyond
reasonable
ground.
The
decision of Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION.

Accused-appellant Antonio Baraoil is
ordered to pay civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00, moral damages
in the amount of P50,000.00 and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
plus interest of 6% per annum on each
of the amounts awarded reckoned
from the finality of this decision.
Ratio: The law presumes that an
accused in a criminal prosecution is
innocent until the contrary is proven.
Courts use the following principles in
deciding rape cases: (1) an accusation
of rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent,
to disprove; (2) due to the nature of
the crime of rape in which only two
persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. Due to the
nature of this crime, conviction for
rape may be solely based on the
complainants testimony provided it is
credible, natural, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things.
After a meticulous review of the
records of the instant case, the Court
holds that the totality of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution proved
the guilt of the accused-appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the trial court's appreciation of

the credibility of the prosecution

witnesses' testimony. Findings of trial
court relative to the credibility of the
rape victim are normally respected
and not disturbed on appeal.
AAA testified in a spontaneous and
straightforward manner and never
wavered in positively identifying
appellant as her rapist despite
grueling cross-examination. The trial
court thus found the testimony of AAA
to have been amply corroborated.
AAA was categorical in stating that
appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina.
A young girl would not usually concoct
a tale of defloration; publicly admit
having been ravished and her honor
tainted; allow the examination of her
private parts; and undergo all the
trouble and inconvenience, not to
mention the trauma and scandal of a
public trial, had she not in fact been
raped and been truly moved to protect
and
preserve
her
honor,
and
motivated by the desire to obtain
justice for the wicked acts committed
against her. It is well-settled that the
presentation of the medico-legal to
testify on the examination of the
victim and the medical certificate itself
are not indispensable in a prosecution
for rape.
The accused-appellants defense of
alibi deserves scant consideration.
Since alibi is a weak defense for being
easily fabricated, it cannot prevail
over and is worthless in the face of the
positive identification by a credible
witness that an accused perpetrated
the crime.

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN, et al, petitioners, vs. ALBERTO C.

COMORPOSA, et al, respondents.
[G.R. No. 152807. August 12, 2003]
Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual
possessor of the lot located at Darong,
Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur. In 1960, he
died leaving all his heirs, his children
and grandchildren.
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who
was working in the land of Oboza was
terminated
from
his
job.
He
approached the late Marcos Saezs son,
Adolfo Saez, the husband of Gloria
Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of
pity
and
for
humanitarian
consideration,
Adolfo
allowed
Francisco Comorposa to occupy the
land of Marcos Saez. Francisco
Comorposa occupied a portion of
Marcos Saez property without paying
any rental. Francisco Comorposa left
for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in
his possession by the respondents who
likewise did not pay any rental and are
occupying the premises through
petitioners tolerance.
On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was
made upon the respondents to vacate
the premises but the latter refused to
vacate the same and claimed that
they were the legitimate claimants
and the actual and lawful possessors
of the premises. The parties failed to
arrive at an amicable settlement.
Thus, the corresponding Certificate to
File Action was issued by the said
barangay and an action for unlawful
detainer was filed by petitioners
against respondents.

Respondents, in their Answer, denied

the material allegations of the
Complaint and alleged that they
entered and occupied the premises in
their own right as true, valid and
lawful claimants, possessors and
owners of the said lot way back in
1960 and up to the present time. They
have allegedly acquired just and valid
ownership and possession of the
premises by ordinary or extraordinary
prescription, and that the Regional
Director of the DENR, Region XI has
already upheld their possession over
the land in question when it ruled that
they were the rightful claimants and
possessors and, therefore, entitled to
the issuance of a title.
The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz,
Davao del Sur rendered judgment in
favor of petitioners but the Regional
Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on
appeal, reversed and set aside the
said decision. Affirming the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the
right of respondents as claimants and
possessors. The appellate court held
that -- although not yet final -- the
Order issued by the regional executive
director
of
the
Department
of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) remained in full force and
effect, unless declared null and void.
The CA added that the Certification
issued by the DENRs community
environment and natural resources
(CENR) officer was proof that when the
cadastral survey was conducted, the

land was still alienable and was not

yet allocated to any person.
According to the CA, respondents had
the better right to possess alienable
and disposable land of the public
domain, because they have suffiently
proven their actual, physical, open,
notorious, exclusive, continuous and
uninterrupted possession thereof since
1960.
Issues: (1) Did the Court of Appeals
gravely abuse its discretion in
sustaining the ruling of the Regional
Trial Court giving credence to the
Order dated 2 April 1998 issued by the
regional executive director?
(2) Did the Court of Appeals gravely
abuse its discretion and err in
sustaining the Regional Trial Courts
ruling giving weight to the CENR
Officers Certification, which only bears
the facsimile of the alleged signature
of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and,
[worse], it is a new matter raised for
the first time on appeal?
(3) Did the Court of Appeals gravely
abuse its discretion and err in holding
that the land subject matter of this
case has been acquired by means of
adverse possession and prescription?
(4) Did the Court of Appeals gravely
abuse its discretion, and err in
declaring that, neither is there error on
the part of the Regional Trial Court,
when it did not give importance to the
affidavits by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel
[Oboza], and Paulina Paran for
allegedly being self-serving?
Held: The Petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED.

Ratio: Petitioners claim that the

reliance of the CA upon the April 2,
1998 Order issued by the regional
director of the DENR was erroneous.
The reason was that the Order, which
had upheld the claim of respondents,
was supposedly not yet final and
executory.
The powers given to the LMB and the
DENR to alienate and dispose of public
land does not, however, divest regular
courts of jurisdiction over possessory
actions instituted by occupants or
applicants to protect their respective
possessions and occupations. The
power to determine who has actual
physical possession or occupation of
public land and who has the better
right of possession over it remains
with the courts. But once the DENR
has decided, particularly through the
grant of a homestead patent and the
issuance of a certificate of title, its
decision on these points will normally
prevail.
Therefore, while the issue as to who
among the parties are entitled to a
piece of public land remains pending
with the DENR, the question of
recovery of possession of the disputed
property is a matter that may be
addressed to the courts.
Petitioners also contend that the CENR
Certification is a sham document,
because the signature of the CENR
officer is a mere facsimile citing
Garvida v Sales
The Certification is being contested for
bearing a facsimile of the signature of
CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The
facsimile referred to is not the same as

that which is alluded to in Garvida.

The one mentioned here refers to a
facsimile signature, which is defined
as
a
signature
produced
by
mechanical means but recognized as
valid in banking, financial, and
business transactions.
If the Certification were a sham as
petitioner claims, then the regional
director would not have used it as
reference in his Order. Instead, he
would have either verified it or
directed the CENR officer to take the
appropriate action, as the latter was
under the formers direct control and
supervision.
Petitioners further claim that the
Certification was raised for the first
time on appeal is incorrect. As early as
the
pretrial
conference
at
the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR
Certification had already been marked
as evidence for respondents as stated
in the Pre-trial Order. However, the
Certification was not formally offered
because respondents had not been
able to file their position paper.
The Court ruled that there is no
sanction for the admission of evidence
that has not been formally offered
during the trial. But this evidentiary
rule is applicable only to ordinary
trials, not to cases covered by the rule
on summary procedure -- cases in
which no full-blown trial is held.
Petitioners then assert that the CA
erred in disregarding the Affidavits of
their witnesses, insisting that the Rule
on Summary Procedure authorizes the
use of affidavits. They also claim that
the failure of respondents to file their

position paper and counter-affidavits

before the MTC amounts to an
admission by silence.
The admissibility of evidence should
not be confused with its probative
value. Admissibility refers to the
question of whether certain pieces of
evidence are to be considered at all,
while probative value refers to the
question of whether the admitted
evidence proves an issue. Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight
depends on judicial evaluation within
the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.
While
in
summary
proceedings
affidavits are admissible as the
witnesses respective testimonies, the
failure of the adverse party to reply
does not ipso facto render the facts,
set forth therein, duly proven.
Petitioners still bear the burden of
proving their cause of action, because
they are the ones asserting an
affirmative relief.
Petitioners claim that the court a quo
erred in upholding the defense of
prescription proffered by respondents.
It is the formers contention that since
the latters possession of the land was
merely being tolerated, there was no
basis for the claim of prescription. The
Court disagrees. The petitioners have
first to prove that the possession of
respondents was by mere tolerance.
The only pieces of evidence submitted
by the former to support their claim
were a technical description and a
vicinity map drawn in accordance with
the survey dated May 22, 1936. Both
of these were discredited by the CENR

Certification, which indicated that the

contested lot had not yet been
allocated to any person when the
survey was conducted. The testimony
of petitioners witnesses alone cannot

prevail over respondents continued

and uninterrupted possession of the
subject lot for a considerable length of
time.