Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16486

March 22, 1921

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, defendant-appellant.
Angel Roco for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee.
STREET, J.:
The rather singular circumstances attending the commission of the offense of homicide which is
under discussion in the present appeal are these:
At about noon, on November 29, 1919, while the interisland steamer Vigan was anchored in the
Pasig River a short distance from the lighthouse and not far from where the river debouches into
the Manila Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of
the accused, Calixto Valdez y Quiri, and six others among whom was the deceased, Venancio
Gargantel. The accused was in charge of the men and stood at the stern of the boat, acting as
helmsman, while Venancio Gargantel was at the bow.
The work raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too slowly to satisfy the accused, and he
accordingly began to abuse the men with offensive epithets. Upon this Venancio Gargantel
remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and they would work better, if he would not insult
them. The accused took this remonstrance as a display of insubordination; and rising in rage he
moved towards Venancio, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when
the accused had attained to within a few feet of Venancio, the latter, evidently believing himself
in great and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface
to be seen no more.
The boat in which this incident took place was at the time possibly 30 or 40 yards from shore
and was distant, say, 10 paces from the Vigan. Two scows were moored to the shore, but
between these and the boat intervened a space which may be estimated at 18 or 20 yards. At it
was full midday, and there was nothing to obstruct the view of persons upon the scene, the
failure of Venancio Gargantel to rise to the surface conclusively shows that, owing to his
possible inability to swim or the strength of the current, he was borne down into the water and
was drowned.
Two witnesses who were on the boat state that, immediately after Venancio leaped into the
water, the accused told the remaining members of the crew to keep quiet or he would kill them.
For this reason they made no movement looking to rescue; but inasmuch as there witnesses
are sure that Venancio did not again come to the surface, efforts at rescue would have been
fruitless. The fact that the accused at his juncture threatened the crew with violence is,
therefore, of no moment except tho show the temporary excitement under which he was
laboring.
On the next day one of the friends of Venancio Gargantel posted himself near the lighthouse to
watch for the body, in the hope that it might come to the surface and could thus be recovered.
Though his friendly vigil lasted three days nothing came of it.
It may be added that Venancio has not returned to his lodging in Manila, where he lived as a
bachelor in the house of an acquaintance; and his personal belongings have been delivered to a
representative of his mother who lives in the Province of Iloilo. His friends and relatives, it is
needless to say, take it for granted that he is dead.

The circumstances narrated above are such in our opinion as to exclude all reasonable
possibility that Venancio Gargantel may have survived; and we think that the trial judge did not
err in holding that he is dead and that he came to his death by drowning under the
circumstances stated. The proof is direct that he never rose to the surface after jumping into the
river, so far as the observers could see; and this circumstance, coupled with the known fact that
human life must inevitably be extinguished by asphyxiation under water, is conclusive of his
death. The possibility that he might have swum ashore, after rising in a spot hidden from the
view of his companions, we consider too remote to be entertained for a moment.
As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the death thus occasioned the likewise can
be no doubt; for it is obvious that the deceased, in throwing himself in the river, acted solely in
obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense legally responsible for his
own death. As to him it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils, and any reasonable
person under the same circumstances might have done the same. As was once said by a
British court, "If a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of dander which
causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injuries himself, the person who
creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result." (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L.
T. Rep. [N.S.], 701.
In this connection a pertinent decision from the Supreme Court of Spain, of July 13, 1882, is
cited in the brief of The Attorney-General, as follows: It appeared that upon a certain occasion
an individual, after having inflicted sundry injuries upon another with a cutting weapon, pointed a
shotgun at the injured person and to escape the discharge the latter had to jump into a river
where he perished by drowning. The medical authorities charged with conducting the autopsy
found that only one of the wounds caused by a cut could have resulted in the death of the
injured person, supposing that he had received no succour, and that by throwing himself in the
river he in fact died of asphyxia from submersion. Having been convicted as the author of the
homicide, the accused alleged upon appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting
serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated homicide. The Supreme Court, disallowing the
appeal, enunciated the following doctrine: "That even though the death of the injured person
should not be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound which
almost completely severed his axillary artery, occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch
under the circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless as the persistence of
the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap
into the river, an act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do after having
inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by said attack
manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all
possible help and putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed
from, the trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit
any error of law, as the death of the injured person was due to the act of the accused." (II
Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, p. 183.)
The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio
Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge
appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to commit
so great a wrong as that committed. (Par. 3, art. 9 Penal Code.) In accordance with this finding
the judge sentenced the accused to undergo imprisonment for twelve years and one day,
reclusion temporal, to suffer the corresponding accessories, to indemnify the family of the
deceased in the sum of P500, and to pay the costs. Said sentenced is in accordance with law;
and it being understood that the accessories appropriate to the case are those specified in
article 59 of the Penal Code, the same is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Malcolm, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARAULLO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case.

The only fact that the evidence shows in that Venancio Gargantel, one of those who were in a
boat of the steamer Vigan subject to the orders of the accused Calixto Valdez and who at the
time was engaged in the work of raising the anchor of that vessel, which was then lying at the
Pasig River, a short distance from the lighthouse and not far from its mouth at the Manila Bay,
upon seeing that the accused was approaching him, armed with a big knife, and in the attitude
of attacking him, threw himself into the water and disappeared from the surface and had not
been seen again. This event took place at noon on November 29, 1919, the boat being then
about 30 or 40 yards from land and about 10 steps from the Vigan, there being two lighters
moored to the shore and at a distance of about 18 or 20 yards from the boat. All of these facts
are stated in the decision itself.
The original information in the present case, charging Calixto Valdez y Quiri with the crime of
homicide and alleging that as a result of his having thrown himself into the river under the
circumstances mentioned, Venancio Gargantel was drowned, was presented on December 8,
1919, that is, nine days afterwards.
There is no evidence whatever that the corpse of Venancio Gargantel had been found or, what
is the same thing, that he had died. From November 28, the day when the event occurred, until
December 8, when the information was filed, it cannot in any manner be maintained that the
necessary time had passed for us to properly conclude, as is alleged in the information, that
said Gargantel had died by drowning, as a consequence of his having thrown himself into the
water upon seeing himself threatened and attacked by the accused. Neither does it appear in
the evidence that all the precaution necessary for us to assure ourselves, as a sure and proven
fact, that Venancio Gargantel then died by drowning, were taken; nor is there any evidence that
it would have been impossible for him, by swimming or by any other means to rise to the
surface at a place other than the Pasig River or that where the boat was, from which he threw
himself into the river, and in that manner save himself from death.
From the evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution which is the only evidence in the record,
for the accused di not take the stand, it only appears that Venancio Gargantel, after having
jumped from the boat, did not rise again to the surface. Such was the statement of two of those
witnesses who were members of the boat's crew at the time. Another witness also declared that
Gargantel was afterwards not again seen at the house where he lived in this city, No. 711 San
Nicolas Street, where he kept his trunks and some effects, a fact which caused his mother, who
lived in the municipality of Guimbal, in the Province of Iloilo, upon being informed of it and upon
the failure of Venancio to appear in said place, to give special power on the 28th of that month
of December, that is, one month afterwards, to a student, Ignacio Garzon, to get the trunks and
effects of Venancio from said house. Sid Garzon himself testified, upon being asked whether
Venancio Gargantel had returned to the house of his parents since November 29, 1919, that he
had no information about it, and another witness, Pedro Garcia, of the prosecution, stated that
he had probably died, because he had not seen Venancio Gargantel.
Therefore, in short, the only fact proved is that since Venancio Gargantel threw himself into the
river, upon being threatened with a knife by the accused, his whereabouts has remained
unknown even at the moment of rendering judgment in this case, or, February 9, 1920, that is,
two and one-half months after the occurrence of the event.
It is stated in the decision that the friend and parents of Gargantel give him up for dead. There is
nevertheless in the record no statement of any parent of Gargantel to that effect; for his mother
Maria Gatpolitan, a resident of the municipality of Guimbal, merely stated in the power of
attorney executed in favor of Ignacio Garzon that the latter should take steps in order that the
city fiscal might investigate the death of her son which, according to information, was caused by
another members, of the crew of the steamer Vigan; and none of his friends, that is, none of the
two members of the party in the boat at that time and of the crew of the steamer Vigan, nor
Maximo Gumbog, the owner of the house in which Gargantel lived in this city, nor Pedro Garcia,
another member of the crew of that steamer, and finally, nor Ignacio Garzon himself has stated
that he gave up Gargantel for dead, for the simple reason that this was not possible, for they
only knew that he did not again rise to the surface and was not seen again after having thrown
himself into the river from the boat.

For this reason it is stated in the decision that the circumstances therein stated are such that
they exclude all reasonable possibility that Venancio Gargantel could have survived and that the
circumstance that never rose to the surface after having jumped into the river, as witnessed by
the persons present, together with the admitted fact that human life is necessarily asphyxiated
under the water, is conclusive that he died. Then, there is nothing more than a deduction that
Gargantel had died based upon those facts and circumstances.
In my opinion this is not sufficient to convict the accused as guilty of homicide, because there is
the possibility that Gargantel had risen to the surface at some place away from the where he
threw himself into the river and had embarked on some other vessel in the same river or out of it
in the bay and had gone abroad, or to some province of these Islands and is found in some
municipality thereof, cannot be denied. And this is very probable inasmuch as it does not appear
in the record that the necessary investigation has been made in order to determined even with
only some measure of certainty, not to say beyond all reasonable doubt, that it was and is
impossible to find said person or determined his whereabouts.
Furthermore, there is not even a presumption juris tantum that he had died, for in order that this
presumption may exist, according to section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is necessary
that no information about him should have been received for seven years from his
disappearance upon his throwing himself into the river, which occurred on November 29, 1919,
that is, only about one year and four months ago. And if, in order that a finding of a civil
character in favor of or against some person, may be made, by virtue of that presumption, it is
necessary that seven years should have elapsed without any notice being received of the
person whose whereabouts is unknown, it is not just, reasonable, or legal that the period of one
year and four months from his disappearance or since Venancio Gargantel threw himself into
the water should suffice for us to impose upon the accused Calixto Valdez such a grave penalty
as that of twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, merely assuming without declaring it,
as a proven fact, that Gargantel has died and at the same time finding said accused to be the
author of that death.
Lastly, the decision of the English Supreme Court or that of the Spanish Supreme Court dated
July 13, 1882, cited by the majority opinion is not applicable. The first, is not applicable because
in the present case it is not proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that some damage resulted to
Gargantel, just as it cannot be considered as proved that he had died, or that he had been
injured or that he had suffered some injury after having thrown himself into the river as a result
of the threat of the accused. The second is not applicable because the decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain refers to a case, in which the injured party had already been wounded with a
cutting instrument by the accused before throwing himself into the river upon the latter aiming at
him with his gun, it having afterwards been proved upon his being taken out of the river that the
wound inflicted upon him by the accused was mortal; and, consequently, it was declared by said
court that, even if the death of the deceased be considered as not having resulted exclusively
and necessarily from that most grave wound, the persistence of the aggression of the accused
compelled his adversary to escape it and threw himself into the river, by depriving him of all
possible help and placing him in the serious situation related in the judgment appealed from -a
case which, as is seen, is very different from that which took place in the present case.
For the reasons above stated, I am of the opinion, with due respect to the opinion of the
majority, that the accused Calixto Valdez y Quiri cannot be found guilty of homicide and should
be acquitted.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-43530

August 3, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AURELIO LAMAHANG, defendant-appellant.
Honesto K. Bausa for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
RECTO, J.:
The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is before this court on appeal from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, finding him guilty of attempted robbery and sentencing him to suffer two
years and four months of prision correccional and to an additional penalty of ten years and one
day of prision mayor for being an habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law,
and to pay the costs of the proceeding.
At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling his beat on
Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caught the accused in the act of making
an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named
street. At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chinaman.
The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the
wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody.
The fact above stated was considered and declared unanimously by the provincial fiscal of
Iloilo, the trial judge and the Solicitor-General, as constituting attempted robbery, which we think
is erroneous.
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that
which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the
execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in
relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code. There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan
Yu's store by means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on
the wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing,
did not develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of
imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of
execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural
relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop
into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said
beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the
simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be
considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly
intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to
another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such purpose of the
accused may reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and stated in the decision, that
the accused on the day in question was making an opening by means of an iron bar on the wall
of Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident intention was to
enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final objective, once he
succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the inmates, or to
commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.1avvphil.et

It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the
material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly
be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts executed
(accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature,
by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons performing
the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show without any doubt,
that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double
interpretation , that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent
as well as a punishable act, must not and can not furnish grounds by themselves for
attempted nor frustrated crimes. The relation existing between the facts submitted for
appreciation and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct;
the intention must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to
avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them
the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have been the
intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender
must commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that
the acts performed must be such that, without the intent to commit an offense, they
would be meaningless.
Viada (Vol. I, p. 47) holds the same opinion when he says that "the overt acts leading to the
commission of the offense, are not punished except when they are aimed directly to its
execution, and therefore they must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense."
Considering says the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of March 21, 1892
that in order to declare that such and such overt acts constitute an attempted offense it
is necessary that their objective be known and established, or that said acts be of such
nature that they themselves should obviously disclose the criminal objective necessarily
intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground for the designation of the offense:
....
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold that the fact under consideration
does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwelling (People vs. Tayag and
Morales, 59 Phil., 606, and decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain therein cited). Under article
280 of the Revised Penal Code, this offense is committed when a private person shall enter the
dwelling of another against the latter's will. The accused may be convicted and sentenced for an
attempt to commit this offense in accordance with the evidence and the following allegation
contained in the information: "... the accused armed with an iron bar forced the wall of said store
by breaking a board and unfastening another for the purpose of entering said store ... and that
the accused did not succeed in entering the store due to the presence of the policeman on beat
Jose Tomambing, who upon hearing the noise produced by the breaking of the wall, promptly
approached the accused ... ." Under the circumstances of this case the prohibition of the owner
or inmate is presumed. (U.S. vs. Ostrea, 2 Phil., 93; U.S. vs. Silvano, 31 Phil., 509' U.S. vs.
Ticson, 25 Phil., 67; U.S. vs. Mesina, 21 Phil., 615; U.S. vs. Villanueva, 18 Phil., 215; U.S. vs.
Panes, 25 Phil., 292.) Against the accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, inasmuch as the record shows that
several final judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered against him and in his
favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. The breaking of the wall should not be
taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance inasmuch as this is the very fact which
in this case constitutes the offense of attempted trespass to dwelling.
The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the consummated offense of trespass to
dwelling, if committed with force, is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
a fine not exceeding P1,000 (art. 280, par. 2); therefore the penalty corresponding to attempted
trespass to dwelling is to degrees lower (art. 51), or, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods. Because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating
circumstance the penalty must be imposed in its maximum period. Pursuant to article 29 of the
same Code, the accused is not entitled to credit for one-half of his preventive imprisonment.
Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and the accused is hereby held guilty of
attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating
and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor,
with the accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.

Avancea, C.J., Abad Santos, Hull, and Vickers, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10126

October 22, 1957

SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA,
OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLAN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD
VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIANO MEDINA, defendant-appellant.
Lope E. Adriano, Emmanuel Andamo and Jose R. Francisco for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fortunato Jose for defendant and appellant.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left
the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado
Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. Among the
passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated
to the right of Bataclan, another passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the
witnesses just called Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the
driver, and a woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At
about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus,
Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or
ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave
the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three
passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman
behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the
passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans from inside the
bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said they could not get out of the
bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether or not the passengers already free from
the wreck, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and
rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to
the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a
lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently fueled with petroleum. These
men presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started,
burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on
the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground
under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call
for help set it on fire.
That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus were
removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud
Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to
recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded
P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise
being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and
the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed the
appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.
Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers
and their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions:

ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and
for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances
of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in
articles 1734, 1735, and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extra ordinary diligence for the
safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with
a due regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed
to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755
ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order of the common
carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees.
ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for
hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination,
Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the
defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of
the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by
the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the
point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zigzaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have
applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must
have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the
canal and turned turtle.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only
question is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the
death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus,
including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire
started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still
alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by
him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages
695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary

prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the
overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle
sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate
cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case
under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate
cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only
on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the
call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers
had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and
flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should
innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In
other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver
and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should
and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and
must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside
from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed
even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions abovereproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
As regard the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled, considering the earning capacity of the
deceased, as well as the other elements entering into a damage award, we are satisfied that the
amount of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS would constitute satisfactory compensation, this
to include compensatory, moral, and other damages. We also believe that plaintiffs are entitled
to attorney's fees, and assessing the legal services rendered by plaintiffs' attorneys not only in
the trial court, but also in the course of the appeal, and not losing sight of the able briefs
prepared by them, the attorney's fees may well be fixed at EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS
for the loss of merchandise carried by the deceased in the bus, is adequate and will not be
disturbed.
There is one phase of this case which disturbs if it does not shock us. According to the
evidence, one of the passengers who, because of the injuries suffered by her, was hospitalized,
and while in the hospital, she was visited by the defendant Mariano Medina, and in the course of
his visit, she overheard him speaking to one of his bus inspectors, telling said inspector to have
the tires of the bus changed immediately because they were already old, and that as a matter of
fact, he had been telling the driver to change the said tires, but that the driver did not follow his
instructions. If this be true, it goes to prove that the driver had not been diligent and had not
taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he changed the
tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably, despite
his speeding, as we have already stated, the blow out would not have occurred. All in all, there
is reason to believe that the driver operated and drove his vehicle negligently, resulting in the
death of four of his passengers, physical injuries to others, and the complete loss and
destruction of their goods, and yet the criminal case against him, on motion of the fiscal and with
his consent, was provisionally dismissed, because according to the fiscal, the witnesses on
whose testimony he was banking to support the complaint, either failed or appear or were
reluctant to testify. But the record of the case before us shows the several witnesses,
passengers, in that bus, willingly and unhesitatingly testified in court to the effect of the said
driver was negligent. In the public interest the prosecution of said erring driver should be
pursued, this, not only as a matter of justice, but for the promotion of the safety of passengers
on public utility buses. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and
the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite.

In view of the foregoing, with the modification that the damages awarded by the trial court are
increased from ONE THOUSAND (P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND (P6,000) PESOS, and
from SIX HUNDRED PESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS, for the death of Bataclan
and for the attorney's fees, respectively, the decision appealed is from hereby affirmed, with
costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B.
L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for plaintiffappellee.
Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, finding them guilty of multiple murder and attempted murder, sentencing
them to death and ordering them to indemnify each set of heirs of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2)
Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo S. Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio (5) Modesta R. Brondial (6)
Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F. Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the
sum of P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-966). The judgment of conviction was based on the
following facts:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio Nenita which is about
eighteen (or nine) kilometers away from Mondragon, Northern Samar. They are illiterate farmers
tilling their own lands. They were forty-eight years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than
Jose. Being twins, they look alike very much. However, Antonio has a distinguishing cut in his
ear (44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).
Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a laundrywoman since September,
1964. Jose's three children one girl and two boys, had stayed in Manila also since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him that she would
give him money. To have money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to
Jose's wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to see his children. He was
able to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita
and took a bus to Allen. From there, they took a launch to Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog,
they went to Daraga, Albay on board an Alatco bus, and from Daraga, they rode on the train,
arriving at the Paco railroad station in Manila at about seven o'clock in the morning of January
8th. It was their first trip to the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought them to Tondo. By means of a letter
which Aniano Espenola a labor-recruiter, had given them, they were able to locate an
employment agency where they learned the address of the Eng Heng Glassware. Antonio's
daughter was working in that store. Accompanied by Juan, an employee of the agency, they
proceeded to her employer's establishment. Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis
Antonio's grandson, gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket
of his pants. It was then noontime.

Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins returned to the agency where
they ate their lunch at Juan's expense. From the agency, Juan took the twins to the Tutuban
railroad station that same day, January 8th, for their homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clock in the
afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining car. The coach
had one row of two-passenger seats and another row of three- passenger seats. Each seat
faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the two rows. The brothers were seated side by side
on the fourth three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the back door. Jose was seated
between Antonio, who was near the window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a
woman breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal.
There were more than one hundred twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers were
standing on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who was
sleeping with her head resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). on the two-passenger seat
across the aisle in line with the seat where the brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat
woman, who was near the window, and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the
opposite seat were seated a woman, her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old
baby. They were in front of Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers
bought some chicos which they put aside. The vendors alighted when the train started moving.
It was around eight o'clock in the evening.
Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio stood up and with a pair of
scissors (Exh. B) stabbed the man sitting directly in front of him. The victim stood up but soon
collapsed on his seat.
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman who was seated
opposite him. She was not able to get up anymore. 1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her baby, attempted to leave her seat,
but before she could escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right hand with which she was
supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade entered the dorsal side and passed through the palm.
Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most of the passengers scurried away for safety but the
twins, who had run amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered inside the coach. 2
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train
escort who, on that occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his wife and children to Calauag,
Quezon. He was going to the dining car to drink coffee when someone informed him that there
was a stabbing inside the coach where he had come from. He immediately proceeded to return
to coach No. 9. Upon reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor near the
toilet. At a distance of around nine meters, he saw a man on the platform separating coaches
Nos. 8 and 9, holding a knife between the thumb and index finger of his right hand, with its
blade pointed outward. He shouted to the man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a
person in authority and Rayel ordered him to lay down his knife (Exh. A) upon the count of
three, or he would be shot.
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it between his palm and
little finger (with the blade pointed inward) and, in a suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on his left
breast. He slowly sank to the floor and was prostrate thereon. Near the platform where he had
fallen, Rayel saw another man holding a pair of scissors (Exh. B). He retreated to the steps near
the platform when he saw Rayel armed with a pistol.
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was stabbed to death.
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in the dining car when he
received the information that there were killings in the third coach. He immediately went there

and, while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs. Mapa who was wounded. He saw Antonio
stabbing with his scissors two women and a small girl and a woman who was later identified as
Teresita B. Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio was not wounded. Those victims were prostrate on
the seats of the coach and on the aisle.
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him with the scissors.
When Antonio was about to stab another person, Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly struck
Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol, knocking him down. Aldea then jumped and
stepped on Antonio's buttocks and wrested the scissors away from him. Antonio offered
resistance despite the blows administered to him.
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins
from the train and turned them over to the custody of the Calamba police. Sergeant Rayel took
down their names. The bloodstained scissors and knife were turned over to the Constabulary
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS).
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were picked up along the
railroad tracks between Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still alive were brought to
different hospitals for first-aid treatment. The dead numbering twelve in all were brought to
Funeraria Quiogue, the official morgue of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila,
where their cadavers were autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A Constabulary photographer took some
pictures of the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and J-2).
Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were found in the train, died from stab
wounds, namely:
(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.
(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan, Quezon.
(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San Juan, Rizal.
(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.
(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and
(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8,
C-9, C-11, L to L-2, N to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-2)
Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. Apparently, they jumped from the
moving train to avoid being killed. They were:
(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila. .
(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.
(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon and
(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D Jorge Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4.
C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-2).
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida
Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs.
Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn January 14, 1966).

Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her right hand by Jose
Toling, she was first brought to the Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later, she was transferred to
the hospital of the Philippine National Railways at Caloocan City where she was confined for
thirteen days free of charge. As a result of her injury, she was not able to engage in her
occupation of selling fish for one month, thereby losing an expected earning of one hundred fifty
pesos. When she ran for safety with her child, she lost clothing materials valued at three
hundred pesos aside from two hundred pesos cash in a paper bag which was lost.
The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Second Constabulary
Zone headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9, 1965
Constabulary investigators took down the statements of Mrs. Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet,
Corazon Bernal, Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. On that date, the statements of the
Toling brothers were taken at the North General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a
statement.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a person "from the
station" who wanted to get his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said that he
stabbed somebody "who might have died and others that might not". He clarified that in the train
four persons were asking money from him. He stabbed one of them. "It was a hold-up".
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he stabbed other persons
because, inasmuch as he "was already bound to die", he wanted "to kill everybody" (Exh. X or
8, 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he was stabbed by a person
"from Camarines" who was taking his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant with the
scissors. He said that he stabbed two persons who were demanding money from him and who
were armed with knives and iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the stabbing, he commented
that everybody was trying "to kill each other" (Exh. I-A).
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket and stabbed him in
the back with the scissors and then escaped. Antonio allegedly pulled out the scissors from his
back, gave them to him and told him to avenge himself with the scissors.
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in the municipal
court of Cabuyao, Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Through counsel, the accused waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation.
The case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on
March 10, 1965 filed against the Toling brothers an information for multiple murder (nine
victims), multiple frustrated murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as to three persons who
died after jumping from the running train to avoid being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty. After
trial, Judge Arsenio Naawa rendered the judgment of conviction already mentioned. The Toling
brothers appealed.
In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
argues that the appellants acted in self-defense and contends, in the alternative, that their
criminal liability was only for two homicides and for physical injuries.
According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from appellants' statements,
Exhibits 1 and 8), when the Toling twins were at the Tutuban Railroad Station in the afternoon of
January 8, 1965, Antonio went to the ticket counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose. To pay
for the tickets, he took out his money from the right pocket of his pants and later put back the
remainder in the same pocket. The two brothers noticed that four men at some distance from
them were allegedly observing them, whispering among themselves and making signs. The
twins suspected that the four men harbored evil intentions towards them.

When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them. They were facing the twins. They
were talking in a low voice. The twins sat on a two passenger seat facing the front door of the
coach, the window being on the right of Antonio and Jose being to his left. Two of the four men,
whom they were suspecting of having evil intentions towards them, sat on the seat facing them,
while the other two seated themselves behind them. Some old women were near them. When
the train was already running, the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up, approached
Antonio and pointed a balisong knife at his throat while the other man who was sitting near the
window and who was holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket,
threatening him with death if he would not hand over the money. Antonio answered that he
would give only one-half of his money provided the man would not hurt him, adding that his
(Antonio's) place was still very far.
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew out his hunting knife or small bolo
(eight inches long including the handle) from the back pocket of his pants and stabbed the man
with it, causing him to fall to the floor with his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was
picking his pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom he had stabbed as those shown in the
photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and
5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the
second man, another person from behind allegedly stabbed him on the forehead, causing him to
lose consciousness and to fall on the floor (Antonio has two scars on his forehead and a scar on
his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained consciousness when two Constabulary
soldiers raised him. His money was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the scissors the man who had
wounded his brother. Jose hit the man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back by
somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in the middle part of the abdomen, inflicting a deep
wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had stabbed because he
was already weak. He fell down and became unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the knife
used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors which he himself had used. He recovered
consciousness when a Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a physician of the North General Hospital
who treated them during the early hours of January 9, 1965 and who testified that he found the
following injuries on Antonio Toling:
Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each, midfrontal (wound on the forehead) and
Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level of 3rd ICS
right, penetrating thoracic cavity (chest wound (Exh. 11).
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the
left, penetrating the thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound was on the spinal column in line with
the armpit or "about one inch from the midline to the left" (113 tsn). The twins were discharged
from the hospital on January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins' rampageous behavior, which
resulted in the macabre deaths of several innocent persons, made the following observations:
What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run amuck? It
appears that the accused travelled long over land and sea spending their hard
earned money and suffering privations, even to the extent of foregoing their
breakfast, only to receive as recompense with respect to Antonio the meager
sum of P50 from his daughter and P30 from his grandson and with respect to
Jose to receive nothing at all from any of his three children whom he could not
locate in Manila.
It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike, a fact which
could easily invite some people to stare or gaze at them and wonder at their very

close resemblance. Like some persons who easily get angry when stared at,
however, the accused, when stared at by the persons in front of them,
immediately suspected them as having evil intention towards them (accused).
To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part of the accused
coupled with their unfounded suspicion of evil intention on the part of those who
happened to stare at them that broke the limit of their self-control and actuated
them to run amuck.
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the spectacle of middle-aged rustic
twins, whom, in the limited space of the coach, their co-passengers had no choice but to notice
and gaze at, was a novelty. Through some telepathic or extra-sensory perception the twins must
have sensed that their co-passengers were talking about them in whispers and making
depreciatory remarks or jokes about their humble persons. In their parochial minds, they might
have entertained the notion or suspicion that their male companions, taking advantage of their
ignorance and naivete, might victimize them by stealing their little money. Hence, they became
hostile to their co-passengers. Their pent-up hostility erupted into violence and murderous fury.
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial court and the
prosecution witnesses confounded one twin for the other. Such a confusion was unavoidable
because the twins, according to a Constabulary investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on the
witness stand CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong after pointing to the
twins, refused to take the risk of identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. They
confessed that they might be mistaken in making such a specific identification (28 tsn
September 3, 1965; 32 tsn November 5, 1965).
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the reliable guides would be their
sworn statements (Exh. 1 and 8), executed one day after the killing, their own testimonies and
the medical certificates (Exh. 10 and 11). Those parts of the evidence reveal that the one who
was armed with the knife was Antonio and the one who was armed with the scissors was Jose.
The prosecution witnesses and the trial court assumed that Antonio was armed with the
scissors (Exh. B) and Jose was armed with the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.
In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was armed with a knife, while Jose
declared that he was armed with the scissors which Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban
station, before he boarded the train and which he gave to Jose because the latter is a barber
whose old pair of scissors was already rusty. As thus clarified, the person whom Sergeant Rayel
espied as having attempted to commit suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing himself on
the chest would be Antonio (not Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the medical certificate,
Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested that Antonio had a wound in the chest. And the person whom
Sergeant Aldea subdued after the former had stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors
(not with a knife) was Jose and not Antonio. That fact is contained in his statement of January 9,
1965 (p. 9, Record).
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and vice-versa does not
detract from their credibility. The controlling fact is that those witnesses confirmed the admission
of the twins that they stabbed several passengers.
Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the evidence found in the trial
court's decision. He argues that the testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are contradictory
but he does not particularize on the supposed contradictions.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. The main point of Rayel's
testimony is that he saw one of the twins stabbing himself in the chest and apparently trying to
commit suicide. Aldea's testimony is that he knocked down the other twin, disabled him and
prevented him from committing other killings.
It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of Jose Toling was not
corroborated by Aldea. Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio was near Jose on the platform of
the train. Those discrepancies do not render Rayel and Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify
that Aldea and Rayel did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not compare notes.

Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of the train and it
was nighttime, it is not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not give identical testimonies (See
6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. 139-140; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234,
December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of
the acts of the twins but they did not observe the same events and their powers of perception
and recollection are not the same.
Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He contends that no one corroborated
her testimony that one of the twins stabbed a man and a sleeping woman sitting on the seat
opposite the seat occupied by the twins. The truth is that Mrs. Mapa's testimony was confirmed
by the necropsy reports and by the twins themselves who admitted that they stabbed some
persons.
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, other than the twins, could have
inflicted the stab wounds. There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. And there can be no doubt
that the twins, from their own admissions (Exh. 1 and 8) and their testimonies, not to mention
the testimonies of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were the authors of the
killings.
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability, since they were caught in
flagrante delicto the CIS investigators did not bother to get the statements of the other
passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that no one actually saw the acts of the twins from
beginning to end because everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in order to save his
life. The ensuing commotion and confusion prevented the passengers from having a full
personal knowledge of how the twins consummated all the killings.
On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that crowded coach
No. 9, which was lighted, it was improbable that two or more persons could have held up the
twins without being readily perceived by the other passengers. The twins would have made an
outcry had there really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they sustained, could
be attributed to the blows which the other passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous
rampage.
Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides, because they
admittedly killed Antonio B. Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical injuries because
they did not deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We have to reject that view. Confronted
as we are with the grave task of passing judgment on the aberrant behavior of two yokels from
the Samar hinterland who reached manhood without coming into contact with the mainstream of
civilization in urban areas, we exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the evidence.
We are convinced that the record conclusively establishes appellants' responsibility for the eight
killings.
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified, according to the trial court,
because they died due to stab wounds, should be added the name of Susana C. Hernandez
(Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission of her name in judgment was probably due to
inadvertence. According to the necropsy reports, four persons, namely, Shirley A. Valenciano,
Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C. Oriarte and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple
traumatic injuries consisting of abrasions, contusions, lacerations and fractures on the head,
body and extremities (Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to M-2 and S to S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid being killed but in so doing
they met their untimely and horrible deaths. The trial court did not adjudge them as victims
whose heirs should be indemnified. As to three of them, the information charges that the
accused committed homicide. The trial court dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. Had the necropsy reports been
reinforced by testimony showing that the proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and
murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter would be criminally responsible for their deaths.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which

he intended". The presumption is that "a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which
causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates
such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep.
[N.S.] 701, cited in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal assault is directed
reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape
jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for
homicide in case death results by drowning" (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People vs.
Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train of the four victims already
named precludes the imputation of criminal responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly
deaths of the said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. The charge of
multiple frustrated murder based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal,
Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for
lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved did not testify on the injuries
inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of murder and
attempted murder qualified be treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). The
unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins upon their co-passengers, who did not
anticipate that the twins would act like juramentados and who were unable to defend
themselves (even if some of them might have had weapons on their persons) was a mode of
execution that insured the consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their copassengers. The conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence,
they cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code which refers to cases where "a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other".
As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste dos formas:
(a) cuando un solo hecho constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b)
cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo)." (1
Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).
On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the rule, when there is "acumulacion
material de las penas", is that "si son varios los resultados, si son varias las acciones, esta
conforme con la logica y con la justicia que el agente soporte la carga de cada uno de los
delitos" (Ibid, p. 652, People vs. Mori, L-23511, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403).
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. (See People vs. Salazar,
105 Phil. 1058 where the accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen persons and wounded
others, was convicted of sixteen separate murders, one frustrated murder and two attempted
murders; People vs. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan massacre case, where six
defendants were convicted of fourteen separate murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607,
where a person who fired successively at six victims was convicted of six separate homicides;
U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil. 272, involving four murders; People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828,
involving eleven murders; U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260, 271.
Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82, 102-103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People
vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831;
People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61 Phil. 236; People vs. Penas, 66 Phil.
682; People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes committed by means of separate acts
were held to be complex on the theory that they were the product of a single criminal impulse or
intent).

As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in this case, the penalty
for murder should be imposed in its medium period or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248,
Revised Penal Code. The death penalty imposed by the trial court was not warranted.
A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants. No modifying
circumstances can be appreciated in the attempted murder case.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the death sentence.
Defendants-appellants Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found guilty, as co-principals, of eight
(8) separate murders and one attempted murder. Each one of them is sentenced to eight (8)
reclusion perpetuas for the eight murders and to an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of
prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum
for the attempted murder and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of heirs of
the seven victims named in the dispositive part of the trial court's decision and of the eight
victim, Susana C. Hernandez, or a total indemnity of P96,000, and an indemnity of P500 to
Amanda Mapa. In the service of the penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate
paragraph of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed. Costs against the
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and
Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 That initial stabbing was described by Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio in her
statement dated January 9, 1965 in this manner (page 16 of the Record):
"4. T: May nasaksihan ba kayong hindi pangkaraniwang pangyayari na naganap
nang gabing iyon at kung mayroon maaari ba ninyong maisalaysay sa maikli
ngunit maliwanag na pananalita?
"S: Mayroon po. Nakaupo ako nuon sa bandang hulihan nang tren.
Nagpapasuso ako nuon nang aking anak nang biglang nagkagulo. Iyong katabi
kong lalaki na may katandaan na ay biglang sinaksak iyong kaharap kong babae
sa upuan. Nabuwal iyong kanyang sinaksak, at ako naman ay nagtatakbo na
dala ko iyong dalawa kong anak. Sumiksik kami doon sa may kubeta nang tren
na nang mangyari iyon ay lumalakad. Hindi ko alam na iyong aking kanan sintido
ay nagdurugo. Nang tahimik na ay dinala kami sa ospital sa Calamba at doon ay
ginamot ako roon.
"5. T: Sinabi ninyo na nang biglang magkagulo samantalang lumalakad ang tren
ay iyong katabi ninyong lalaki na may katandaan na ay biglang sinaksak iyong
kaharap ninyong babae sa upuan, nakita ba ninyo kung ano ang ipinanaksak
nang lalaking ito?
"S: Hindi ko na po napansin dahil sa aking takot."
2 Mrs. Mapa's statement (Exh. E) reads:
"4. T: Sino po ang sumaksak sa inyo?
S: Iyon pong lalaking mataas na payat na bisaya. Hindi ko po kilala pero kung
makikita ko ay makikilala ko. Ito pong sumaksak sa akin na ito ay dinala rin sa
ospital sa Calamba, Laguna. Nauna po lamang ako at nakita kong siya ang
isinunod na may saksak din.

5. T: Bakit naman ninyo namukhaan itong sumaksak sa inyong ito?

S: Kahelera po namin iyan sa upuan.
6. T: Maaari po ba ninyong isalaysay sa maikli ngunit maliwanag na pananalita
ang buong pangyayaring inyong nasaksihan?
S: Opo. Nagpapasuso ako nuon nang aking anak, nang walang ano-ano ay
nakita ko na lamang iyong nakasaksak sa akin na biglang tumayo sa kanyang
kinauupuan at biglang sinaksak iyong kaharap niyang sa upuan na babae na
natutulog. Itong katabi nang nanaksak na ito ay tumayo rin at nanaksak din nang
nanaksak at ang lahat nang makitang tao ay hinahabol at sinasaksak. Bata,
matanda ay sinasaksak nang dalawang ito at madaanan. Nang bigla kong tayo
ay natamaan iyong aking kanang kamay nang kabig niya nang saksak. Nagtuloy
ako sa kubeta sa tren at doon ako sumiksik. Nang payapa na ang lahat ay dinala
ako sa Calamba sa ospital doon, at ako'y ginamot nang pangunang lunas.
7. T: Itong katabi na lalaking sinasabi ninyong nanaksak din ay kung makita
ninyong muli ay makikilala pa ninyo?
S: Makikilala ko rin po. Magkahawig po sila nang nakasaksak sa akin."
The statement of Cipriano Reganet who was wounded (Exh. D-4), in a way
corroborates Mrs. Mapa's statement. Reganet's statement reads in part as
follows (Exh. F);
"3. T: Maaari po ba ninyong masabi kung bakit kayo naririto ngayon sa PNR
Hospital dito sa Caloocan City?
S: Dahil po sa mga saksak na tinamo ko nang magkaroon nang gulo sa loob
nang tren kagabing humigit kumulang sa mga alas nueve (9:00 P.M.) petcha 8
nitong Enero 1965.
4. T: Sino po ang sumaksak sa inyo kung inyong nakikilala?
S: Hindi ko po alam ang pangalan pero mamumukhaan ko kung ihaharap sa
akin. Ang sumaksak po sa akin ay iyong kasama ko sa ambulancia na nagdala
saamin dito sa ospital na ito.
5. T: Bakit naman ninyo natiyak na ang sumaksak sa inyo ay iyong kasama ninyo
sa ambulancia na nagdala sa inyo sa ospital na ito?
S: Malapit po lamang ang kanyang inuupuan sa aking inuupuan sa loob nang
tren kaya namukhaan ko siya.
6. T: Ilan beses kayong sinaksak nang taong ito?
S: Dalawang beses po.
7. T: Saan-saan panig nang katawan kayo nagtamo nang saksak?
S: Sa aking noo at sa kanang kamay nang sangahin ko ang kanyang
pangalawang saksak.
8. T: Bakit po naman kayo sinaksak nang taong ito?
S: Hindi ko po alam. Primero nanaksak siya sa kanyang kaharap sa upuan at
saksak nang saksak sa mga taong kanyang makita.
9. T: Ilan ang nakita ninyong nananaksak?

S: Dalawa pong magkatabi na magkahawig ang mukha.

10. T: Nang mangyari po ba ito ay tumatakbo ang tren?
S: Tumatakbo po.
11. T: Papaano kayo nakaligtas?
S: Tumakbo po ako at kumabit sa rampa at nang medyo tahimik na balak kong
magbalik sa loob nang tren. Nakita ko na maraming sugatan at sa wari ko ay
patay na. Sa mga nakita ko sa loob nang tren ay iyong sumaksak sa akin, na
nakasandal at nang makita ako ay tinanganan iyong kanyang panaksak at
tinangka akong habulin. Tumakbo ako at tumalon sa lupa. Sa pagtalon kong iyon
ay napinsala ang aking kaliwang balikat.
12. T: Ano po ang ipinanaksak sa inyo?
S: Para pong punyal na ang haba ay kumulang humigit sa isang dangkal".
Mrs. Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, who was also wounded (Exh. D-3) executed a
statement which reads in part as follows (page 20, Record):
"4. T: Maaari po ba ninyong ysay sa maikli ngunit maliwanag na pananalita ang
buong pangyayari?
S: Opo. Nakaupo po ako nuon kaharap papuntang Bicol. Walang ano-ano ay
bigla na lamang nakita ko na may sinaksak at pagkatapos nakita ko na lahat
nang makita babae o lalaki at sinaksak. Nang ako'y tumayo para tumakbo ay
nilapitan ako at ako naman ang sinaksak. Sumigaw ako at humingi nang saklolo
at nakiusap sa isang tao na tagpan nang tualya iyong tinamo kong saksak sa
kaliwang puson na tumama sa buto. Makalipas ang ilang sandali ay dinala na
ako sa ospital.
5. T: Nakikilala ba ninyo iyong sumaksak sa inyo?
S: Kilala ko po sa mukha at kasama ko pa kahapon nang dalhin ako sa ospital na
ito.
6. T: Ilan po itong nakita ninyong nanaksak?
S: Dalawa po sila na magkahawig ang mukha.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed
the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City finding petitioner Filomeno
Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to
his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from
the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded
with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the
elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio
Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal
and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay
for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2
feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm
of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away
from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg
with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack
and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house
about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then went to the house of
Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there, Emilio looked for barrio
councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis, the Erfes together with Javier went to
the police station of San Fabian to report the incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier
was brought to a physician. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of
San Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario
Meneses because Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr. Guillermo
Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a medico-legal certificate
(Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I have examined the wound of Marcelo Javier, 20 years of
age, married, residing at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on
October 23, 1980 and found the following:
1 -Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of the lesser palmar
prominence, right.

As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days period. This wound

was presented to me only for medico-legal examination, as it was already treated
by the other doctor. (p. 88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences.
Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier. Hence, on October 27,
1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San Fabian Police to formalize their
amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the event in the police blotter (Exhibit A), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/103OH/ Re entry Nr 592 on page 257 both parties
appeared before this Station accompanied by brgy. councilman Felipe Solis and
settled their case amicably, for they are neighbors and close relatives to each
other. Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno Urbano who
shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical treatment, and promising to him
and to this Office that this will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any
grudge against each other. (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional
P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital
in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having
convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's
serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in
Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical findings of
Dr. Exconde are as follows:
Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm. With diffi#35, 421 culty opening his mouth. Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM. Sudden cessation of respiration and HR after
muscular spasm.
02 inhalation administered. Ambo
bag resuscitation and cardiac massage done but
to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao
at 4:18 P.M.
PMC done and cadaver brought
home by relatives. (p. 100, Original Records)

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of
homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as
charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from TWELVE (12)
YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined at the New
Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view of the nature of his
penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal but raised
the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the
appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for new trial was
based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex "A") which states:
That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang, San Fabian,
Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-elected to such position in the
last barangay elections on May 17, 1982;
That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there was a typhoon that
swept Pangasinan and other places of Central Luzon including San Fabian, a
town of said province;
That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the Bued irrigation dam
which irrigates the ricefields of San Fabian were closed and/or controlled so
much so that water and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and
reduced;
That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the dam leading to the
canals and ditches which will bring water to the ricefields, the water in said
canals and ditches became shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes;
That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the area affected, with my
secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I saw the late Marcelo
Javier catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals with some companions;
That few days there after,or on November l5, l980, I came to know that said
Marcelo Javier died of tetanus. (p. 33, Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
"Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended ..." Pursuant to this provision "an
accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631).
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo as a result
of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on November 14, 1981
which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious
condition and that on the following day, November 15, 1981, he died from tetanus.

Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural and
logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared responsible for Javier's
death. Thus, the appellate court said:
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from
the time the deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a
period of 23 days does not deserve serious consideration. True, that the
deceased did not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death was
due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said wound which was in
the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused his
death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim
suffered lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is
no other way by which he could be infected with tetanus except through the
wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981). Consequently, the proximate cause
of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the
settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences
of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C. People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072;
People v. Cornel 78 Phil. 418).
Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the victim's death was due to
his own negligence in going back to work without his wound being properly
healed, and lately, that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first
week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate attempt by
appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he found himself in. If the wound had
not yet healed, it is impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless
enough to work with a disabled hand. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier
was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that
Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his
tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected
with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the
wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment,
somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear
from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following definition of
proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
... A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as
follows:
... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-186)

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the
time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for
Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanusThe incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the
appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However,
over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short
incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2
or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
Non-specific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness, irritability, and
headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty
swallowing. As the progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients often
complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact, trismus in the commonest
manifestation of tetanus and is responsible for the familiar descriptive name of
lockjaw. As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and
sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity and sequence of
muscle involvement is quite variable. In a small proportion of patients, only local
signs and symptoms develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority,
however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the signs and
symptoms encountered depend upon the major muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first symptom, an interval
referred to as the onset time. As in the case of the incubation period, a short
onset time is associated with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden
intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity
and causes simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their
antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease
progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more intense and longer
lasting spasms with increasing frequency. Respiration may be impaired by
laryngospasm or tonic contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate
ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central nervous system damage
and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an
onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus is usually present, but dysphagia is
absent and generalized spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus
has a somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is marked,
dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but ventilation remains adequate
even during spasms. The criteria for severe tetanus include a short incubation
time, and an onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and rigidity
and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms. (Harrison's Principle of
Internal Medicine, 1983 Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on
the incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the
bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22
days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle
spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only
a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the
hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time
should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset
time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the

appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3
or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the
proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in
Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause
of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the
very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the
petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the
hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a
compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical
expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of
Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to
the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner
is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable,
may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R.
No. 74041, July 29, 1987), we said:
xxx xxx xxx
... While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established
beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v.
Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559).
The reason for the provisions of article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that
the acquittal of the accused on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for
the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as
follows:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given use to

numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal

was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the
guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as
the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when
the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those causes where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One
affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two
responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of
the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a
compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the
public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not
thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the
purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnity the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person
any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by
the criminal law?
"For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of
the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our
law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice-a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or
wronged."
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly
examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so
minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and,Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-36858 June 20, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MACARIO A. ULEP, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Castor Naval for accused-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J.:
A man must love his wife. He must not lift a finger to hurt her. Indeed he must be her protector.
When against this unwritten rule he beats her, he ceases to be a man. He becomes a beast.
And the law imposes the supreme penalty when in the process he kills her. It is parricide pure
and simple.
This is what Macario A. Ulep, was convicted of by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte,
Second Judicial District. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs in a
decision of March 20, 1973.
The facts are undisputed. On May 21, 1970, at nine o'clock in the evening, in San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte, one Asuncion Pablo Ulep died as a result of physical injuries inflicted upon her on
that very day by her husband, accused Macario Ulep. The following day, the Chief of Police of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte received a report of the said death of Asuncion Pablo who allegedly
died of a heart attack. The Chief of Police and the Rural Health Officer went to the house of the
deceased and there they saw the body on a bamboo bed surrounded by relatives, friends, and
the husband of the deceased, Macario. The Chief of Police suggested that an autopsy be
conducted but the husband refused to allow the same. However, the daughter of the deceased
by a previous marriage asked for a day or two to decide on her preference.
At the behest of the daughter, the request for an autopsy was made shortly before the burial.
Accordingly, the police chief and Dr. Eliseo Bonoan, a physician, caught up with the funeral
Procession at the Catholic cemetery and thereupon conducted an autopsy on the deceased.
The autopsy reports read as follows:
POSTMORTEM EXAMINATION
Name: ASUNCION PABLO ULEP
Age: 42
Nationality: Filipino
Address: No. 24, San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
Date: May 25, 1970
PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS

SKIN:
A rectangular area of about 1" x 3" bluish black in color was noted
on the upper half, anterior aspect of the arm, left.
SKELETAL SYSTEM:
Complete fracture of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th ribs, left. The 4th
and 5th ribs fractured along the midolavicular line, left. The 6th
and 7th ribs fractured along the anterior auxillary line, left.
Presence of extravascated blood and injuries of the surrounding
tissues of the broken ribs areas, left.
Complete fracture of the 3rd and 4th ribs at the juncture of the rib
and external cartillages with concomitant injury to its sounding
tissues and extravascated blood, right side.
THORACIC CAVITY:
Presence of about 200 cc. of a serous fluid found within the cavity.
Pleura lacerated at the points of fractures.
CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:
Heart with small amount of clotted blood. Coronary vessels
congested. The big blood vessels contained small amount of
clotted blood.
ABDOMINAL CAVITY:
Presence of about 500 cc. of serous fluid within the cavity.
DIGESTIVE SYSTEM:
Apparently normal
CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM:
The meningeal vessels were congested.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
CARDIAC ARREST
PRIMARY SHOCK.
(Exh. D, p. 16, rec.). 1
Two weeks after the burial, two (2) constabulary sergeants investigated Macario Ulep. A
statement was prepared and signed by the accused and was subsequently sworn to before
Fiscal Cesar Abaya of Ilocos Norte. In this statement, marked as Exhibit "A", he admitted that
he caused the death of his wife by elbowing her because his wife was then drunk and was
uttering indecent words. The following day, PC sergeant Damian Bautista of Camp Juan, Laoag
City conducted another investigation of accused Macario Ulep. His statement was reduced to
writing and then subscribed to before Fiscal Abaya. He reiterated that the cause of death of his
wife, Asuncion Pablo, was his elbowing her on her breast. This statement was marked Exhibit
"B".

Ulep narrated that this elbowing and attack took place at their home at 5:30 in the afternoon.
She vomitted and then went to bed, The accused then left for the fields and returned at around
9:00 in the evening and found his wife dead on her bed. He reported this death to their barrio
captain.
Despite these statements, (Exhibits "A" and "B") admitting his guilt, Ulep retracted his statement
in court by narrating that more than a year before that, and while his wife went to have their
palay milled, their bullcart loaded with sacks of rice turned upside down and pinned his wife on
her breast. With the pain in her chest, she was treated by a country quack doctor or "arbularyo."
The accused took exception to his conviction when he raised the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF
ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO THE ELBOW BLOWS BY THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ON HER BREAST, AS ADMIRED BY HIM IN HIS AFFIDAVITS,
EXHIBIT "A" AND EXHIBIT "A-1," ENGLISH TRANSLATION, WHEN SUCH
ADMISSION IS BUT A MERE BELIEF ON HIS PART.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF
DEATH OF SAID ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO A LONG STANDING
PROCESS OR CONDITION IN HER BODY SYSTEM, AS TESTIFIED TO BY
DR. PEDRO BLANCO FOR THE DEFENSE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED CONSEQUENTLY IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM
OF THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE.
Our primary concern is to determine the cause of death of Asuncion Pablo, the wife, of the
accused. Was her death a result of cardiac arrest and primary shock due to fractured ribs? The
appellant alleges that the gradual weakening of the heart due to a long standing illness of the
body system caused the cardiac arrest which claimed the life of Asuncion Pablo.
The post-mortem report on the deceased was prepared by Dr. Eliseo V. Bonoan who conducted
an autopsy at the behest of a daughter of tile deceased by a previous marriage. The husband
who previously denied permission to conduct an autopsy was present when the autopsy was
performed shortly before the body was buried at the cemetery of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. In
the necropsy report of Dr. Bonoan, the cause of death was manifestly due to cardiac arrest and
primary shock. We agree and see no fault in this finding made in the necropsy report of Dr.
Bonoan.
The defense took exception to Dr. Bonoan's testimony that the fractures in the chest could have
been caused by blows or physical pressure. Could such injuries not have been inflicted by
elbow blows when the victim was standing or by knee or feet blows when the victim was lying
on her back or was sitting with her back against the wall?
While the accused admitted that he delivered several elbow blows on the chest of his wife
immediately before her death and the prosecution attributed these blows as the proximate
cause of the cardiac arrest and primary shock which resulted in the wife's death, the defense
assails this theory of the prosecution in the following manner:
First, there were no contusions on the chest of the victim. This indicates that the
elbow blows were not of sufficient force to fracture the ribs. This is so because a
fracture necessarily results in the extravasation of blood in the fractured area and
it is the extravasated blood that causes the swelling or contusion. 2 Dr. Blanco
attributes the absence of swelling or contusion on the chest, where the fractures
were found, to the fact that the fracture conditions Were of long standing; that is,

some repairs has happened and that sufficient time have elapsed for the swelling
to disappear (t.s.n., p. 180).
Second, even on the theory that fractures of the ribs as that found by Dr. Bonoan
were present, the same could have not caused cardiac arrest and primary shock.
This is so because only extravasated blood was present around the immediate
area of the fractures, This means that the fractures were not depressed or that
the fractured ends did not cave-in, so as to injure the heart and impede its
functions to cause cardiac arrest. The claim of Dr. Bonoan that the chest is pliant
and is like an accordion which can be compressed is puerile to say the least.
Even so, the elbow blows of the accused could not have caused a compression
of the chest wall, no matter how pliant it could be. And even on the theory that
the fractures were caused by stamping the foot on a piece of wood placed on the
chest, while the victim was lying on her back, still the fractures could not have
injured the heart or impede its functions to cause cardiac arrest, because the
fractures, were not depressed fractures or cave-in fractures. The fractures merely
caused the extravasation of blood within the fractured areas. And neither would
the fractures cause primary shock because they were merely complete fractures;
which means a mere breakage that would not cause the stoppage of the heart,
because it does not tend to compress the heart. 3
And third, although the pleura or thoracic cavity was lacerated at the points of
fracture, the same could not have caused cardiac arrest or primary shock
because the lacerations were limited to the pleura. The points of fracture did not
cave-in or were not depressed and they did not injure or impede the heart to
cause cardiac arrest. Neither did the lacerations of the pleura cause primary
shock because blood did not spill into the pleura, which indicates that the
hemorrhage was nil. This is so because the serous fluid in the pleura -as not
reddish.
On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution shows that the deceased died of
cardiac arrest because of the weakening of the heart due to a long standing
process or condition in her body system. Thus the theory of the defense is
strengthened by the very evidence of the prosecution. 4
Furthermore, both sides in this case took issue to the presence of 200 cc. of serous fluid in the
pleura. The appellant claims that it is not normal whereas the prosecution says that the pleura
normally contains 100 to 200 cc. of serous fluid and that this is normal. Anyway both agree that
there should be enough serous fluid to lubricate the tissues.
The presence of 500 cc. of serous fluid in the abdominal cavity which, according to Dr. Blanco,
the physician, witness for the appellant, may be due to the chronic condition of the kidney like
nephritis and edema or the hardening of the liver or a long progressively weakening of the heart.
5
Dr. Bonoan did not concur in this view when he said that the fluid was rather increased as a
result of the diffusion of the medicine used in the embalming. 6 We find cogent basis in the
explanation given by Dr. Bonoan.
Another point raised in the necropsy report pertains to the presence of clotted blood in the heart
and blood vessels as well as the congestion of the meningeal vessels. The appellant bares that
this is a sign of the hardening of the heart. Dr. Bonoan of the prosecution disclosed that there
were no signs of circulatory weakening and that blood clots were not found adherent to the
heart and such being the condition there could be no abnormality and thus he further declares
that such clots are normally found in the heart of a dead person or in any part of the circulatory
system. 7
There is an admission by Dr. Blanco, the appellant's witness, that he has not "attended a case
of fractured ribs" 8 and that he explains cardiac failure as a "failing of the heart" and his further
concept is that it is "the stopping of the heart." He says that such stoppage could be due to
trauma, such as a fracture of the ribs. 9

A resume of the evidence presented by the parties establishes the fact of death of Asuncion
Pablo on May 21, 1970. She was legally married to Macario Ulep, the appellant herein. The
death, established in two affidavits, Exhibits "A" and "B," was caused by said accused. In these
affidavits, the appellant admitted that he elbowed and attacked his wife. This attack caused the
complete fracture of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th ribs on her left chest and the 3rd, and 4th ribs,
right chest of Asuncion Pablo on the same evening of May 21, 1970. The trial judge observed:
"There was never any attempt on the part of the accused to repudiate the sworn statements
wherein he admitted that the cause of death of his wife was his having elbowed her many times
on her breast." 10
Having realized the gravity of his act, the appellant presented a witness to prove that sometime
in February or March, 1969 his wife was pinned down by a sack of rice and the side portion of a
bullcart and was attended to by a town quack doctor called an arbularyo. This witness said that
two (2) ribs on each side of the chest were fractured, without stating which particular ribs were
so affected.
From all these observations, findings, and an incisive study of the necropsy report, the cause of
death of the wife-victim in this case is cardiac arrest and primary shock caused by the strong
pressure applied on the upper front chest bone. This happens when one steps, kneels or
presses the body of a victim against a wall. The man-size blows coming from the elbow of the
aggressor upon a thin-framed woman can only bring about fatal results.
We find relevance in Wharton and Stilles' findings in their book, Medical Jurisprudence under
the title of "SHOCK," to wit:
Sec. 225. Shock. Death may also be due to the shock associated with the
injury. The possibility of a person dying from the shock attendant upon an injury
which, by itself appears to be unimportant is attested by experience. No
satisfactory explanation of the cause of the shock seems to have been found,
though it is due in some way to the upsetting of the nervous equilibrium of the
body. Shock from an injury may be fatal even when the blow leaves no trace
behind it; as, for instance, when a person receives a violent blow upon the pit of
the stomach, or behind the ear, or to the larynx. ... In the case of Reg. v. Slane,
et al., 11 the deceased had received injuries to the abdomen by kick and blows,
but there were no marks of bruises present, or anything to show the cause of
death. Death however, had followed twenty minutes after the maltreatment and
was evidently due to the shock. The prisoners were convicted of murder. 12
We have previously stated that:
Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart disease, or
tuberculosis, if the blow delivered by the accused
(a) is the efficient cause of death; or
(b) accelerated his death; or
(c) is the proximate cause of death; then there is criminal liability.

13

Apropos to all these is that time-respected doctrine: "He who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused." This is the rationale in Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by a person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."
Again, We elucidated that: even though a blow with the fist or a kick does not cause any
external wound, it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis and cause
death, and even though the victim may have been previously affected by some internal malady,
yet if the blow with the fist or foot accelerated death, he who caused such acceleration is
responsible for the death as the result of an injury willfully and unlawfully inflicted. 14

We are, therefore, convinced that there is no fundamental disagreement between the two
medical witnesses as to the cause of the victim's death and that cardiac arrest and primary
shock took away the life of the victim, Asuncion Pablo.
There is that clear and categorical showing that on the appellant fell the blame for these in
human acts on his wife. He should answer for her tragic death.
The indemnity to the heirs of his deceased wife should be increased to P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to indemnity, the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Page 56, Rollo.
2 Page 36, Rollo; page 7, Appellant's Brief.
3 Page 36, Rollo; page 8, Appellant's Brief.
4 Page 36, Rollo; page 9, Appellant's Brief.
5 Page 36, Rollo; page 11, Appellant's Brief.
6 Page 56, Rollo; page 15, Appellee's Brief.
7 Page 56, Rollo; page 16, Appellee's Brief.
8 Ibid.
9 Page 56, Rollo: page 16, Appellee's Brief.
10 Page 13, Rollo; page 13, Decision of the Court of First Instance.
11 Citing Derham Wint. Ass. 1872.
12 Wharton & Stille's Medical Jurisprudence, 5th Ed.
13 People vs. Ilustre, 54 Phil. 594.
14 United States v. Rosalinda Rodriguez, 23 Phil. 22.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1
affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding
him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino
Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental
and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya
and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told
Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them
and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio
and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez
Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said
room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then
occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the
shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that
before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially
Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder.
Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an
impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. Criminal Responsibility shall be
incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons
or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.

On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not
impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for
attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the
Petition, respondent pointed out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a
cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous
desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time.
Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the
void in the Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the
person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing
appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that
the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as
these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him
criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired
by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act
which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove
inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of
Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person
or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently
impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause,
the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11
There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act
an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive,
desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the
actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is
the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim
would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner
failed to accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18
the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer
would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit
him and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:

The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined
where he was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an
attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country that where
the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an
obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are
unknown to the aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the
victim because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held
him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became
impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that
way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from committing the
murder. This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible
to commit the crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible
for the crime to be committed, either by outside interference or because of
miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to
materialize; in short it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows
out of extraneous acts not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if
there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his
criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the public
requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the unseen
depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or not.
The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing
intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in
other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the
incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking
that the latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house.
The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make
this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot
rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the
Philippine and the American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible
crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and
Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the
crimes enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of
committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators
and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual
impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the
crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant
believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of
commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal
liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to
smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if
done without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send
a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and the act was performed. However,
unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The

lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held
unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a defense to a
charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal
legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention,
the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the
principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal
by law. Further, it said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus
conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until
such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not
fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually
impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be
convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are
satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an
attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of
accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime neither for an attempt not for
an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as
an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a crime charge
that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The
impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized
by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal
impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the
intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the
absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render
useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would
be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the
offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of
attempted and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED.
We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4,
paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger
and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of
six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 People vs. Intod, C.A-G.R. No. 09205, August 14, 1991; Justice Fidel P.
Purisima, Ponente: Justices Eduardo R. Bengzon and Salome A. Montoya,
concurring.
2 TSN, p. 4, July 24, 1986.
3 Records, p. 65.
4 Guevarra, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code 15 (4th ed., 1946).
5 Albert, Ibid.
6 Albert, Ibid.
7 Albert, Ibid.
8 Albert, Ibid.
9 Grogorio and Feria, Comments on the Revised Penal Code 76 (Vol. I, 1st ed.
1958).
10 Reyes, The revised Penal Code, 90 (Vol. I, 11th ed., 1977).
11 Reyes, Ibid.
12 Reyes, Ibid.
13 U.S. vs. Berrigan, 482 F. 2nd. 171 (1973).
14 U.S. vs. Berrigan, Ibid.
15 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, (Vol. I, 1987).
16 U.S. vs. Berrigan, supra, p. 13.
17 U.S. vs. Berrigan, Ibid.
18 21 L.R.A. 626 (1898).
19 21 L.R.A. N.S. 898 (1908).
20 17 S.W. 145 (1888).
21 71 S.W. 175 (1902).
22 U.S. vs. HENG AWKAK ROMAN, 39 L. Ed. 2d. 874 (1974).
23 565 F. Supp. 1416 (1983).
24 Supra, n. 13.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116736 July 24, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE, MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA and JOHN DOE, accused,
BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE and MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA, accused-appellants.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
A person who commits a felony is liable for the direct, natural and logical consequences of his
wrongful act even where the resulting crime is more serious than that intended. Hence, an
accused who originally intended to conceal and to bury what he thought was the lifeless body of
the victim can be held liable as a principal, not simply as an accessory, where it is proven that
the said victim was actually alive but subsequently died as a direct result of such concealment
and burial. Nonetheless, in the present case, Appellant Garcia cannot be held liable as a
principal because the prosecution failed to allege such death through drowning in the
Information. Neither may said appellant be held liable as an accessory due to his relationship
with the principal killer, Appellant Ortega, who is his brother-in-law.
Statement of the Case
This case springs from the joint appeal interposed by Appellants Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Manuel Garcia from the Decision, 1 dated February 9, 1994 written by Judge Adriano R. Osorio,
2
finding them guilty of murder.
Appellants were charged by State Prosecutor Bernardo S. Razon in an Information 3 dated
October 19, 1992, as follows:
That on or about October 17, 1992 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable
cause, with treachery and evident premeditation and with abuse of superior
strenght (sic) and with deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab repeatedly with a pointed
weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y
ABLOLA, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which directly
caused his death.
During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia, assisted by counsel de oficio, 4 pleaded not
guilty to the charge. 5 Accused "John Doe" was then at large. 6 After trial in due course, the court
a quo promulgated the questioned Decision. The dispositive portion reads: 7
WHEREFORE, finding accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. y Conje and Manuel Garcia
y Rivera [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the Court hereby
sentenced (sic) them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
pay the costs of suit.
Accused are hereby ordered to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00 for
funeral expenses of deceased Andre Mar Masangkay and death indemnity of
P50,000.00.

The Notice of Appeal, dated March 9, 1994, was thus filed by Atty. Evaristo P. Velicaria 8 who
took over from the Public Attorney's Office as counsel for the accused.
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as follows: 9
Diosdado Quitlong substantially testified that on October 15, 1992 at about 5:30
in the afternoon, he, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo
Ortega, Roberto San Andres were having a drinking spree in the compound near
the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at Daangbakal, Dalandanan, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. That while they were drinking, accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and
Manuel Garcia who were [already] drunk arrived and joined them. That victim
Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the back portion
of the house. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed him and later they
[referring to the participants in the drinking session] heard the victim Andre Mar
shouted, "Don't, help me!" (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!) That he and Ariel
Caranto ran towards the back portion of the house and [they] saw accused
Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top of Andre Mar Masangkay who was lying down in a
canal with his face up and stabbing the latter with a long bladed weapon. That
Ariel Caranto ran and fetched Benjamin Ortega, Sr., the father of accused
Benjamin, Jr. That he [Quitlong] went to Romeo Ortega in the place where they
were having the drinking session [for the latter] to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr.
That Romeo Ortega went to the place of the stabbing and together with Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar Masangkay from the canal and
brought Andre Mar to the well and dropped the latter inside the well. That Romeo
Ortega, Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia then dropped stones measuring
11 to 12 inches high, 2 feet in length and 11 to 12 inches in weight to the body of
Andre Mar Masangkay inside the well. That Romeo Ortega warned him
[Quitlong] not to tell anybody of what he saw. That he answered in the affirmative
and he was allowed to go home. That his house is about 200 meters from
Romeo Ortega's house. That upon reaching home, his conscience bothered him
and he told his mother what he witnessed. That he went to the residence of Col.
Leonardo Orig and reported the matter. That Col. Orig accompanied him to the
Valenzuela Police Station and some police officers went with them to the crime
scene. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were
apprehended and were brought to the police station.
On cross-examination, he said that he did not talk to the lawyer before he was
presented as witness in this case. That he narrated the incident to his mother on
the night he witnessed the killing on October 15, 1992. That on October 15, 1992
at 5:30 in the afternoon when he arrived, victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Romeo
Ortega, Serafin and one Boyet were already having [a] drinking spree and he
joined them. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were not yet
in the place. That the stabbing happened between 12:00 midnight and 12:30 a.m.
That they drank gin with finger foods such as pork and shell fish. That he met the
victim Andre Mar Masangkay only on that occasion. That accused Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia joined them at about 11:00 p.m. That there was
no altercation between Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia in one hand and
Andre Mar Masangkay, during the drinking session. That at about 12:30 a.m.
Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the back portion
of the house. That he cannot see Andre Mar Masangkay from the place they
were having the drinking session. That he did not see what happened to Andre
Mar Masangkay. That he only heard Masangkay asking for help. That accused
Manuel Garcia was still in the drinking session when he heard Masangkay was
asking for help. That Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia are his friends and
neighbors. That when he heard Andre Mar Masangkay was asking for help, he
and Ariel Caranto ran to the back portion of the house and saw Benjamin Ortega,
Jr. on top of Andre Mar Masangkay and stabbing the latter. That Andre Mar
Masangkay was lying down with his back in the canal and Benjamin Ortega, Jr.

on top stabbing the former. That he did not see any injuries on Benjamin Ortega,
Jr. That he called Romeo Ortega to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr. That he did
not do anything to separate Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Masangkay. That he knows
that Andre Mar Masangkay was courting Raquel Ortega. That Raquel Ortega
asked permission from Andre Mar Masangkay when she left between 8:00 and
9:00 p.m. That there was no trouble that occurred during the drinking session.
PNP Superintendent Leonardo Orig substantially testified that Diosdado Quitlong
is his neighbor for about 9 years. That on October 16, 1992 at 5:00 in the
morning, he was summoned by Diosdado Quitlong and reported to him the
stabbing incident that occurred at Daangbakal near the subdivision he is living.
That he relayed the information to the Valenzuela Police Station and a police
team under police officer Param accompanied them to the place. That he asked
the police officers to verify if there is a body of person inside the well. That the
well was covered with stones and he asked the police officers to seek the help of
theneighbors (sic) to remove the stones inside the well. That after the stones
were removed, the body of the victim was found inside the well. That the lifeless
body was pulled out from the well. That the body has several stab wounds. That
he came to know the victim as Andre Mar Masangkay. That two men were
arrested by the police officers.
On cross-examination, he said that he saw the body when taken out of the well
with several stab wounds. That Diosdado Quitlong told him that he was drinking
with the victim and the assailants at the time of the incident. That Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. stabbed the victim while the latter was answering the call of nature.
NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat substantially testified that he
conducted [an] autopsy on the cadaver of Andre Mar Masangkay on October 16,
1992 at the Valenzuela Memorial Homes located at Macarthur Highway. That he
prepared the autopsy report and the sketch of human head and body indicating
the location of the stab wounds. That the cause of death is multiple stab wounds,
contributory, [a]sphyxia by submersion in water. That there were 13 stab wounds,
8 of which were on the frontal part of the body, 2 at the back and there were
contused abrasions around the neck and on the left arm. There was stab wound
at the left side of the neck. That the contused abrasion could be produced by
cord or wire or rope. That there is (an) incised wound on the left forearm. That
the stab wounds which were backward downward of the body involved the lungs.
That the victim was in front of the assailant. That the stab wound on the upper
left shoulder was caused when the assailant was in front of the victim. That the
assailant was in front of the victim when the stab wound near the upper left
armpit was inflicted as well as the stab wound on the left chest wall. That the stab
wound on the back left side of the body and the stab wound on the back right
portion of the body may be produced when the assailant was at the back of the
victim. That the assailant was in front of the victim when the stab wound[s] on the
left elbow and left arm were inflicted. That the large airway is filled with muddy
particles indicating that the victim was alive when the victim inhaled the muddy
particles. The heart is filled with multiple hemorrhage, loss of blood or decreased
of blood. The lungs is filled with water or muddy particles. The brain is pale due
to loss of blood. The stomach is one half filled with muddy particles which could
[have been] taken in when submerged in water.
On cross-examination, he said that he found 13 stab wounds on the body of the
victim. That he cannot tell if the assailant or the victim were standing. That it is
possible that the stab wounds was (sic) inflicted when both [referring to
participants] were standing or the victim was lying down and the assailant was on
top. That he cannot tell the number of the assailants.
Evidence for the Appellants
Appellant Manuel Garcia testified that in the early morning of October 15, 1992, he and his wife,
Maritess Garcia, brought their feverish daughter, Marjorie, to the Polo Emergency Hospital. He

left the hospital at seven o'clock in the morning, went home, changed his clothes and went to
work. 10 After office hours, he and Benjamin Ortega, Jr. passed by the canteen at their place of
work. After drinking beer, they left at eight o'clock in the evening and headed home. En route,
they chanced on Diosdado Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre Mar Masangkay, who invited
them to join their own drinking spree. Thereupon, Appellant Garcia's wife came and asked him
to go home because their daughter was still sick. To alleviate his daughter's illness, he fetched
his mother-in-law who performed a ritual called "tawas." After the ritual, he remained at home
and attended to his sick daughter. He then fell asleep but was awakened by police officers at six
o'clock in the morning of the following day.
Maritess Garcia substantially corroborated the testimony of her husband. She however added
two other participants in the drinking session aside from Diosdado Quitlong alias Mac-mac and
Andre Mar Masangkay, namely, a Mang Serafin and Boyet Santos. 11
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. likewise substantially corroborated the testimony of Appellant Manuel
Garcia. 12 According to him, between eleven and twelve o'clock in the evening, Masangkay left
the drinking session. Thirty (30) minutes after Masangkay left, he also left the drinking place to
urinate. 13 He went behind the house where he saw Masangkay peeping through the room of his
sister Raquel. He ignored Masangkay and continued urinating. 14 After he was through,
Masangkay approached him and asked where his sister was. He answered that he did not
know. Without warning, Masangkay allegedly boxed him in the mouth, an attack that induced
bleeding and caused him to fall on his back. When he was about to stand up, Masangkay drew
a knife and stabbed him, hitting him on the left arm, thereby immobilizing him. Masangkay then
gripped his neck with his left arm and threatened to kill him. Unable to move, Ortega shouted for
help. Quitlong came and, to avoid being stabbed, grabbed Masangkay's right hand which was
holding the knife. Quitlong was able to wrest the knife from Masangkay and, with it, he stabbed
Masangkay ten (10) times successively, in the left chest and in the middle of the stomach.
When
the stabbing started, Ortega moved to the left side of Masangkay to avoid being hit. 15 Quitlong
chased Masangkay who ran towards the direction of the well. Thereafter, Ortega went home
and treated his injured left armpit and lips. Then, he slept.
When he woke up at six o'clock the following morning, he saw police officers in front of his
house. Taking him with them, the lawmen proceeded to the well. From the railroad tracks where
he was asked to sit, he saw the police officers lift the body of a dead person from the well. He
came to know the identity of the dead person only after the body was taken to the police
headquarters. 16
The Trial Court's Discussion
The trial court explained its basis for appellants' conviction as follows:

17

The Court is convinced that the concerted acts of accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr.,
Manuel Garcia, Jr. and one Romeo Ortega in lifting, carrying and dumping the
victim Andre Mar Masangkay who was still alive and breathing inside the deep
well filled with water, head first and threw big stones/rocks inside the well to
cover the victim is a clear indication of the community of design to finish/kill victim
Andre Mar Masangkay. Wounded and unarmed victim Andre Mar Masangkay
was in no position to flee and/or defend himself against the three malefactors.
Conspiracy and the taking advantage of superior strength were in attendance.
The crime committed by the accused is Murder.
Concert of action at the moment of consummating the crime and the form and
manner in which assistance is rendered to the person inflicting the fatal wound
may determine complicity where it would not otherwise be evidence (People vs.
Yu, 80 SCRA 382 (1977)).
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Accused (m)ust
reimburse the heirs of victim Andre Mar Masangkay the amount of P35,000.00
for the funeral expenses of the deceased.

The Issues
In their ten-page brief, appellants fault the trial court with the
following: 18
I. The trial court erred in holding that there is conspiracy on the
basis of the prosecution's evidence that at the time both accused
and one Romeo Ortega lifted the body of Andrew Masangkay from
where he succumbed due to stab wounds and brought and drop
said body of Andrew Masangkay to the well to commit murder;
II. The trial court erred in finding and holding that Andrew
Masangkay was still alive at the time his body was dropped in the
well;
III. The trial court erred in convicting Manuel Garcia and in not
acquitting the latter of the crime charged; and
IV. The trial court erred in not finding that if at all Benjamin Ortega
Jr. is guilty only of homicide alone.
On the basis of the records and the arguments raised by the appellants and the People, we
believe that the question to be resolved could be simplified thus: What are the criminal liabilities,
if any, of Appellants Ortega and Garcia?
The Court's Ruling
We find the appeal partly meritorious. Appellant Ortega is guilty only of homicide. Appellant
Garcia deserves acquittal.
First Issue: Liability of Appellant Ortega
The witnesses for the prosecution and defense presented conflicting narrations. The
prosecution witnesses described the commission of the crime and positively identified
appellants as the perpetrators. The witnesses for the defense, on the other hand, attempted to
prove denial and alibi. As to which of the two contending versions speaks the truth primarily
rests on a critical evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and their stories. In this regard,
the trial court held: 19
The Court has listened intently to the narration of the accused and their
witnesses and the prosecution witnesses and has keenly observed their behavior
and demeanor on the witness stand and is convinced that the story of the
prosecution is the more believable version. Prosecution eyewitness Diosdado
Quitlong appeared and sounded credible and his credibility is reinforced by the
fact that he has no reason to testify falsely against the accused. It was Diosdado
Quitlong who reported the stabbing incident to the police authorities. If Quitlong
stabbed and killed the victim Masangkay, he will keep away from the police
authorities and will go in hiding. . . .
Because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment
on the stand as they rendered their testimonies, its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is
entitled to the highest respect. Therefore, unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts
of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment
of credibility must be respected. 20
In the instant case, we have meticulously scoured the records and found no reason to reverse
the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies 21 insofar as
Appellant Ortega is concerned. The narration of Eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appears to be
spontaneous and consistent. It is straightforward, detailed, vivid and logical. Thus, it clearly
deserves full credence.

On the other hand, in asserting alibi and denial, the defense bordered on the unbelievable.
Appellant Ortega claimed that after he was able to free himself from Masangkay's grip, he went
home, treated his injuries and slept. 22 This is not the ordinary reaction of a person assaulted. If
Ortega's version of the assault was true, he should have immediately reported the matter to the
police authorities, if only out of gratitude to Quitlong who came to his rescue. Likewise, it is
difficult to believe that a man would just sleep after someone was stabbed in his own backyard.
Further, we deem it incredible that Diosdado Quitlong would stab Masangkay ten (10) times
successively, completely ignoring Benjamin Ortega, Jr. who was grappling with Masangkay.
Also inconsistent with human experience is his narration that Masangkay persisted in choking
him instead of defending himself from the alleged successive stabbing of Quitlong. 23 The
natural tendency of a person under attack is to defend himself and not to persist in choking a
defenseless third person.
Murder or Homicide?
Although treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were alleged in the
information, the trial court found the presence only of abuse of superior strength.
We disagree with the trial court's finding. Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent
on the part of the accused to take advantage of such superiority. It must be shown that the
accused purposely used excessive force that was manifestly out of proportion to the means
available to the victim's defense. 24 In this light, it is necessary to evaluate not only the physical
condition and weapon of the protagonists but also the various incidents of the event. 25
In his testimony, Witness Dominador Quitlong mentioned nothing about Appellant Ortega's
availment of force excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available to the victim
to defend himself. Quitlong described the assault made by Appellant Ortega as follows: 26
ATTY. ALTUNA:
Q Will you please tell me the place and date wherein you have a
drinking spree with Andrew Masangkay and where you witnessed
a stabbing incident?
A It was on October 15, 1992, sir, at about 5:30 in the afternoon
we were drinking in the house of Mr. Benjamin Ortega, Sr.,
because the house of Benjamin Ortega Sr. and the house of his
son Benjamin Ortega, Jr. are near each other.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mr. Witness, who were the companions of said persons,
Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia, you (sic) in drinking in said
place?
A The other companions in the drinking session were Ariel
Caranto y Ducay, Roberto San Andres and Romeo Ortega.
Q What about this victim, Andrew Masangkay, where was he at
that time?
A Also the victim, Andrew Masangkay, he was also there.
Q You said that the two accused, Manuel Garcia and Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. arrived drunk and joined the group?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened next?

A While we were there together and we were drinking ...

(interrupted by Atty. Altuna)
Q Who is that "we"?
A Referring to Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia, Ariel Caranto,
Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres, myself and Andrew
Masangkay. Andrew Masangkay answer to a call of nature and
went to the back portion of the house, and Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
followed him where he was.
Q What happened next?
A And afterwards we heard a shout and the shout said "Huwag,
tulungan n'yo ako".
Q From whom did you hear this utterance?
A The shout came from Andrew Masangkay.
Q After Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed Andrew Masangkay to
answer a call of nature and after you heard "huwag, tulungan n'yo
ako" coming from the mouth of the late Andrew Masangkay, what
happened next?
A Ariel Caranto and I ran towards the back portion of the house.
Q And what did you see?
A And I saw that Benjamin Ortega, Jr. was on top of Andrew
Masangkay and he was stabbing Masangkay.
Q Will you please demonstrate to the Honorable Court how the
stabbing was done telling us the particular position of the late
Andrew Masangkay and how Benjamin Ortega, Jr. proceeded with
the stabbing against the late victim, Andrew Masangkay?
INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture, the witness demonstrating.)
Andrew Masangkay was lying down on a canal with his face up,
then Benjamin Ortega, Jr. was "nakakabayo" and with his right
hand with closed fist holding the weapon, he was thrusting this
weapon on the body of the victim, he was making downward and
upward motion thrust.
ATTY. ALTUNA: (To the witness)
Q How many times did Benjamin Ortega, Jr. stabbed Andrew
Masangkay?
A I cannot count the number of times.
It should be noted that Victim Masangkay was a six-footer, whereas Appellant Ortega, Jr. was
only five feet and five inches tall. 27 There was no testimony as to how the attack was initiated.
The accused and the victim were already grappling when Quitlong arrived. Nothing in the
foregoing testimony and circumstances can be interpreted as abuse of superior strength.
Hence, Ortega is liable only for homicide, not murder.

Second Issue: Liability of Appellant Manuel Garcia

Appellants argue that the finding of conspiracy by the trial court "is based on mere assumption
and conjecture . . ." 28 Allegedly, the medico-legal finding that the large airway was "filled with
muddy particles indicating that the victim was alive when the victim inhaled the muddy particles"
did not necessarily mean that such muddy particles entered the body of the victim while he was
still alive. The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Quitlong stated, "Nilubayan lang nang saksak nang
mapatay na si Andrew ni Benjamin Ortega, Jr." Thus, the prosecution evidence shows
Masangkay was already "dead" when he was lifted and dumped into the well. Hence, Garcia
could be held liable only as an accessory. 29
We do not agree with the above contention. Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states
that criminal liability shall be incurred by "any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The essential requisites for the
application of this provision are that (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is
likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor's
wrongful acts. In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the body of Masangkay to the well,
Appellant Garcia was committing a felony. The offense was that of concealing the body of the
crime to prevent its discovery, i.e. that of being an accessory in the crime of homicide. 30
Although Appellant Garcia may have been unaware that the victim was still alive when he
assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the well, he is still liable for the direct and natural
consequence of his felonious act, even if the resulting offense is worse than that intended.
True, Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the victim. But the autopsy
conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer showed that the victim at that time was still alive, and
that he died subsequently of drowning. 31 That drowning was the immediate cause of death was
medically demonstrated by the muddy particles found in the victim's airway, lungs and stomach.
32
This is evident from the expert testimony given by the medico-legal officer, quoted below: 33
ATTY. ALTUNA:
Q Will you please explain this in simple language the last portion
of Exhibit N, beginning with "tracheo-bronchial tree", that is
sentence immediately after paragraph 10, 2.5 cms. Will you
please explain this?
A The trancheo-bronchial tree is filled with muddy particles.
Q I ask you a question on this. Could the victim have possibly get
this particular material?
A No, sir.
Q What do you mean by no?
A A person should be alive so that the muddy particles could be
inhaled.
Q So, in short, you are telling or saying to us that if there is no
inhaling or the taking or receiving of muddy particles at that time,
the person is still alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q Second point?
A The heart is pale with some multiple petechial hemorrhages at
the anterior surface.
Q And this may [be] due to stab wounds or asphyxia?

A These are the effects or due to asphyxia or decreased amount

of blood going to the heart.
Q This asphyxia are you referring to is the drowning?
A Yes, sir.
Q Next point is the lungs?
A The lungs is also filled with multiple petechial hemorrhages.
Q What could have caused this injury of the lungs?
A This is due to asphyxia or the loss of blood.
Q Are you saying that the lungs have been filled with water or
muddy particles?
A Yes, sir.
Q And, precisely, you are now testifying that due to stab wounds
or asphyxia, the lungs have been damaged per your Report?
A Yes, sir.
Q Continuing this brain and other visceral organs, pale. What is
this?
A The paleness of the brain and other visceral organs is due to
loss of blood.
Q And, of course, loss of blood could be attributed to the stab
wound which is number 13?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the last one, under the particular point "hemothorax"?
A It indicates at the right side. There are around 1,400 cc of blood
that accumulate at the thoraxic cavity and this was admixed with
granular materials?
Q And what cause the admixing with granular materials on said
particular portion of the body?
A Could be muddy particles.
Q Due to the taking of maddy (sic) materials as affected by
asphyxia? Am I correct?
A It's due to stab wounds those muddy particles which set-in thru
the stab wounds.
Q So, because of the opening of the stab wounds, the muddy
particles now came in, in that particular portion of the body and
caused admixing of granular materials?
A Yes, sir.

Q Continuing with your report, particularly, the last two portions,

will you please explain the same?
A The hemoperitoneum there are 900 cc of blood that
accumulated inside the abdomen.
Q And what could have cause the same?
A [T]he stab wound of the abdomen.
Q The last one, stomach 1/2 filled with muddy particles. Please
explain the same?
A The victim could have taken these when he was submerged in
water.
Q What is the take in?
A Muddy particles.
Q And he was still alive at that time?
A Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied)
A Filipino authority on forensic medicine opines that any of the following medical findings may
show that drowning is the cause of death: 34
1. The presence of materials or foreign bodies in the hands of the
victim. The clenching of the hands is a manifestation of cadaveric
spasm in the effort of the victim to save himself from drowning.
2. Increase in volume (emphysema aquosum) and edema of the
lungs (edema aquosum).
3. Presence of water and fluid in the stomach contents
corresponding to the medium where the body was recovered.
4. Presence of froth, foam or foreign bodies in the air passage
found in the medium where the victim was found.
5. Presence of water in the middle ear.
The third and fourth findings were present in the case of Victim Masangkay. It was
proven that his airpassage, or specifically his tracheo-bronchial tree, was filled with
muddy particles which were residues at the bottom of the well. Even his stomach was
half-filled with such muddy particles. The unrebutted testimony of the medico-legal
officer that all these muddy particles were ingested when the victim was still alive proved
that the victim died of drowning inside the well.
The drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that. Appellant
Garcia had intended to commit; it exemplifies praeter intentionem covered by Article 4, par. 1, of
the Revised Penal Code. Under this paragraph, a person may be convicted of homicide
although he had no original intent to kill. 35
In spite of the evidence showing that Appellant Garcia could be held liable as principal in the
crime of homicide, there are, however, two legal obstacles barring his conviction, even as an
accessory as prayed for by appellants' counsel himself.
First. The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of "attack[ing],
assault[ing], and stab[bing] repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body

one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA." The prosecution's evidence itself shows that
Garcia had nothing to do with the stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega.
His responsibility relates only to the attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting
drowning of Victim Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused
cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.
Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would
be a violation of this constitutional right. 36 Section 14, par. 2, of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
guarantees the following:
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)
In People vs. Pailano, 37 this Court ruled that there can be no conviction for rape on a woman
"deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious" where the information charged the accused of
sexual assault "by using force or intimidation," thus:
The criminal complaint in this case alleged the commission of the crime through
the first method although the prosecution sought to establish at the trial that the
complainant was a mental retardate. Its purpose in doing so is not clear. But
whatever it was, it has not succeeded.
If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the ground
that he violated Anita while she was deprived of reason or unconscious, such
conviction could not have been possible under the criminal complaint as worded.
This described the offense as having been committed by "Antonio Pailano, being
then provided with a scythe, by means of violence and intimidation, (who) did,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
complainant, Anita Ibaez, 15 years of age, against her will'. No mention was
made of the second circumstance.
Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita while
she was unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason and not through force
and intimidation, which was the method alleged would have violated his right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [Article IV,
Sec. 19, Constitution of 1973; now Article III, Sec. 14(2)] This right is
safeguarded by the Constitution to every accused so he can prepare an
adequate defense against the charge against him. Convicting him of a ground
not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the ground alleged
would plainly be unfair and underhanded. This right was, of course, available to
the herein accused-appellant.
In People vs. Ramirez, [fn: 69 SCRA 144] we held that a person charged with
rape could not be found guilty of qualified seduction, which had not been alleged
in the criminal complaint against him. In the case of People vs. Montes, [fn: 122
SCRA 409] the Court did not permit the conviction for homicide of a person held
responsible for the suicide of the woman he was supposed to have raped, as the
crime he was accused of and acquitted was not homicide but rape. More to
the point is Tubb v. People of the Philippines, [fn: 101 Phil. 114] where the
accused was charged with the misappropriation of funds held by him in trust with
the obligation to return the same under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, but was convicted of swindling by means of false pretenses, under
paragraph 2(b) of the said Article, which was not alleged in the information. The
Court said such conviction would violate the Bill of Rights.

By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning in

an information that charges murder by means of stabbing.
Second. Although the prosecution was able to prove that Appellant Garcia assisted in
"concealing . . . the body of the crime, . . . in order to prevent its discovery," he can neither be
convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under Article 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal
Code. The records show that Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega, 38 the
latter's sister, Maritess, being his wife. 39 Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from
criminal liability as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. The penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and
adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees with
the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of
the next preceding article.
On the other hand, "the next preceding article" provides:
Art. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender
to profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the
crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order
to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the
escape of the principal of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or
whenever the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the
life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.
Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinity of the principal accused, Benjamin Ortega,
Jr., is legally entitled to the aforequoted exempting provision of the Revised Penal Code. This
Court is thus mandated by law to acquit him.
Penalty and Damages
The award of actual damages should be reduced to P31,790.00 from P35,000.00. The former
amount was proven both by documentary evidence and by the testimony of Melba Lozano, a
sister of the victim. 38 Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can give
credence only to those that are supported by receipts and appear to have been genuinely
incurred in connection with the death of the victim. 39 However, in line with current
jurisprudence, 40 Appellant Ortega shall also indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P50,000.00. Indemnity requires no proof other than the fact of death and appellant's
responsibility therefor. 43
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
which is imposable in its medium period, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as
in the case of Appellant Ortega. Because he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be one degree lower, that is, prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the joint appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Appellant
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. is found GUILTY of homicide and sentenced to ten (10) years of prision

mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. Appellant Ortega, Jr. is also ORDERED to pay the
heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity and P31,790.00 as actual damages. Appellant
Manuel Garcia is ACQUITTED. His immediate release from confinement is ORDERED unless
he is detained for some other valid cause.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Original Records, pp. 183-198; rollo, pp. 29-44.
2
3 Original Records, p. 1; rollo, p. 8.
4 Atty. Ricardo Perez of the Public Attorney's Office.
5 Original Records, p. 25.
6 After promulgation of judgment, John Doe was identified as Romeo Ortega and
the latest trial court's Order in this case was for the state prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation to determine his liability. (Original Records, pp. 207210).
7 Original Records, p. 198; rollo, p. 44; Decision, p. 16.
8 Original Records, p. 205.
9 Ibid., pp. 185-187.
11 Ibid., pp. 11-20.
12 TSN, August 16, 1993, pp. 7-19.
13 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
14 Ibid., pp. 23-25.
15 Ibid., pp. 26-35.
16 TSN, September 22, 1993, pp. 3-22.
17 Original Records, pp. 197-198; rollo, pp. 43-44; Decision, pp. 15-16.
18 Rollo, p. 63; original text in upper case.
19 Original Records, pp. 196-197; rollo, pp. 42-43; Decision, pp. 14-15.
20 People vs. De Guzman, 188 SCRA 405, 410-411, August 7, 1990.
21 People vs. Gabris, 258 SCRA 663, 671, July 11, 1996 citing the case of
People vs. Vallena, 244 SCRA 685, 691, June 1, 1995; People vs. Jaca, 229
SCRA 332, January 18, 1994; People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535, 552, December
4, 1991; and People vs. Uycoque, 246 SCRA 769, 779, July 31, 1995.
22 TSN, September 22, 1993, pp. 6-14.

23 Ibid., pp. 4-6.

24 People vs. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37, 46, March 29, 1995.
25 People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87, 97-98, May 11, 1995 citing the cases of
People vs. Martinez, 96 SCRA 714, March 31, 1980 and People vs. Cabiling, 74
SCRA 285, December 17, 1976.
26 TSN, February 12, 1993, pp. 11-15.
27 TSN, October 27, 1993, p. 12.
28 Rollo, p. 64.
29 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
30 Paragraph no. 2 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code provides for
accessories' manners of participation:
Art. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having
participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects
or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of
his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder or attempt to take the life of the Chief
Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
Under this Article, it is required that: (1) the accessory should have knowledge of
the crime, (2) he did not take part in its commission as principal or accomplice,
and (3) subsequent to its commission, he took part in any of the three ways
enumerated above.
31 The exact words used by the medico-legal officer were: "The multiple stab
wounds sustained by the victim and asphyxia by submersion in water." (TSN,
April 16, 1993, p. 8).
32 TSN, April 16, 1993, pp. 20-24.
33 TSN, April 16, 1993, pp. 20-24.
34 Pedor Solis, Legal Medicine, 1987, p. 448.
35 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 edition, Volume 1, p. 70 citing Pico
vs. U.S., 57 L. Ed. 812, 40 Phil. 117, 15 Phil. 549.
36 People vs. Guevarra, 179 SCRA 740, 751, December 4, 1989 citing the cases
of Matilde, Jr. vs. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456, 461, December 29, 1975 and U.S. vs.
Ocampo, 23 Phil. 396.
37 169 SCRA 649, 653-654, January 31, 1989.

38 TSN, June 14, 1993, p. 39; TSN, August 16, 1993, p. 9.

39 TSN, October 13, 1993, p. 16.
38 The following receipts were offered as evidence: (1) receipt of the Diocese of
Lucena for funeral and electricity charges (350.00); (2) receipt for transportation
expense for the transfer of remains of Andre Mar Masangkay (3,500.00); (3)
receipt of Funeral Helen for home and coach services (5,000.00); (4) receipt of
the Diocese of San Pedro Bautista Parish for mortuary rental (350.00); (5) receipt
of the Most Holy Redeemer Perish for use of mortuary (2,590.00); and (6) receipt
of La Funeraria Paz for their services (20,000.00).
39 People vs. Cayabyab, G.R. No. 123073, June 19, 1997 citing the cases of
People vs. Rosario, 246 SCRA 658, 671, July 18, 1995 and People vs. Degoma,
209 SCRA 266, 274, May 22, 1992.
40 People vs. Quinao, et al., G.R. No. 108454, March 13, 1997; People vs.
Azugue, G.R. No. 110098, February 26, 1997; People vs. Ombrog, G.R. No.
104666, February 12, 1997.
43 People vs. Cayabyab, supra.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 130487

June 19, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D. 1 We nullify the
proceedings in the court a quo and remand the case for proper disposition.
In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez was
charged with the crime of murder for the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The
Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO
ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being then armed with a butcher's knife, with intent to kill one
ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy place of worship, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the
said weapon, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to "Cardiorespiratory
Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound" as per Autopsy Report and
Certificate of Death both issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer,
this City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased ROGELIO P.
MARARAC in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00),
Philippine currency, and other consequential damages.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Dagupan City, Philippines December 29, 1994. 2
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellant's counsel, the Public Attorney's
Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric
Ward at Baguio General Hospital." It was alleged that accused-appellant could not properly and
intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental defect; that before the
commission of the crime, he was confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General
Hospital in Baguio City. He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and the issuance of an
order confining him at the said hospital. 3
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded
several questions on accused-appellant. Finding that the questions were understood and
answered by him "intelligently," the court denied the motion that same day. 4
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on accusedappellant's behalf. 5
The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel, the Assistant
Health Officer of Dagupan City who issued the death certificate and conducted the autopsy on
the victim; (2) Crisanto Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident; (3) SPO1 Conrado Francisco,
one of the policemen who apprehended accused-appellant; and (4) Rosalinda Sobremonte, the
victim's sister. The prosecution established the following facts:
In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. John's Cathedral, Dagupan City, the sacrament
of confirmation was being performed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the

children of Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a thousand people. At 11:00 A.M.,
nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop went down the altar to give his final blessing to the
children in the front rows. While the Bishop was giving his blessing, a man from the crowd went
up and walked towards the center of the altar. He stopped beside the Bishop's chair, turned
around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful, sat on the Bishop's chair. The man was accusedappellant. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the Bishop at the rites, saw accused-appellant.
Santillan approached accused-appellant and requested him to vacate the Bishop's chair.
Gripping the chair's armrest, accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese: "No matter what will
happen, I will not move out!" Hearing this, Santillan moved away. 6
Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral.
Mararac went near accused-appellant and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Accusedappellant stared intensely at the guard. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used it to tap
accused-appellant's hand on the armrest. Appellant did not budge. Again, Mararac tapped the
latter's hand. Still no reaction. Mararac was about to strike again when suddenly accusedappellant drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below his
left throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant went over the victim and tried to stab him again but
Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-appellant looked up and around him. He got up, went to the
microphone and shouted: "Anggapuy nayan dia!" (No one can beat me here!). He returned to
the Bishop's chair and sat on it again. Mararac, wounded and bleeding, slowly dragged himself
down the altar. 7
Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic outside, received a report of a
commotion inside the cathedral. Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man,
accused-appellant, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair at the
center of the altar. He ran to accused-appellant and advised him to drop the knife. Accusedappellant obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised his hands. Thereupon, Chief Inspector
Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan City, who was attending the confirmation rites at
the Cathedral, went near accused-appellant to pick up the knife. Suddenly, accused-appellant
embraced Chief Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled with each other. Chief Inspector
Rosario was able to subdue accused-appellant. The police came and when they frisked
appellant, they found a leather scabbard tucked around his waist. 8 He was brought to the police
station and placed in jail.
In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired a
few minutes upon arrival. He died of cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic
hemorrhage, stab wound." 9 He was found to have sustained two (2) stab wounds: one just
below the left throat and the other on the left arm. The autopsy reported the following findings:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal space, left,
1 1/2" x 1 1/2" penetrating. The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and
pointed.
2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, 1/2" x 1/4" x 1/2". The
edge of one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.
INTERNAL FINDINGS
Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower lobe of
the left lung. The left pulmonary blood vessel was severely cut. 10
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of court, filed a "Demurrer to
Evidence." He claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder because there
was no evidence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there was unlawful aggression
by the victim when he tapped accused-appellant's hand with his nightstick; and that accusedappellant did not have sufficient ability to calculate his defensive acts because he was of
unsound mind. 11

The "Demurrer to Evidence" was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged that the accused
"pretended to be weak, tame and of unsound mind;" that after he made the first stab, he
"furiously continued stabbing and slashing the victim to finish him off undeterred by the fact that
he was in a holy place where a religious ceremony was being conducted;" and the plea of
unsound mind had already been ruled upon by the trial court in its order of January 6, 1995. 12
On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail Warden of
Dagupan City to the trial court. Inspector Valdez requested the court to allow accused-appellant,
who was confined at the city jail, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to determine
whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to some other institution. The other prisoners
were allegedly not comfortable with appellant because he had been exhibiting unusual behavior.
He tried to climb up the jail roof so he could escape and see his family. 13
As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to the jail warden's letter. He
reiterated that the mental condition of accused-appellant to stand trial had already been
determined; unless a competent government agency certifies otherwise, the trial should
proceed; and the city jail warden was not the proper person to determine whether accusedappellant was mentally ill or not. 14
In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the "Demurrer to Evidence".
Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration.

15

While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26, 1996, counsel for accusedappellant filed a "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination."
Appellant's counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been exhibiting abnormal
behavior for the past weeks; he would shout at the top of his voice and cause panic among the
jail inmates and personnel; that appellant had not been eating and sleeping; that his co-inmates
had been complaining of not getting enough sleep for fear of being attacked by him while
asleep; that once, while they were sleeping, appellant took out all his personal effects and waste
matter and burned them inside the cell which again caused panic among the inmates.
Appellant's counsel prayed that his client be confined at the National Center for Mental Health in
Manila or at the Baguio General Hospital. 16 Attached to the motion were two (2) letters. One,
dated February 19, 1996, was from Inspector Pedrito Llopis, Jail Warden, Dagupan City,
addressed to the trial court judge informing him of appellant's irrational behavior and seeking
the issuance of a court order for the immediate psychiatric and mental examination of accusedappellant. 17 The second letter, dated February 21, 1996, was addressed to Inspector Llopis
from the Bukang Liwayway Association, an association of inmates in the Dagupan City Jail. The
letter, signed by the president, secretary and adviser of said association, informed the jail
warden of appellant's unusual behavior and requested that immediate action be taken against
him to avoid future violent incidents in the jail. 18
On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the
"Demurrer to Evidence." The court ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence on
October 15, 1996. 19
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel presented the testimony
of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, 20 a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the
Baguio General Hospital, and accused-appellant's medical and clinical records at the said
hospital. 21 Dr. Gawidan testified that appellant had been confined at the BGH from February 18,
1993 to February 22, 1993 and that he suffered from "Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid
Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type;" 22 and after four (4) days of
confinement, he was discharged in improved physical and mental condition. 23 The medical and
clinical records consisted of the following: (1) letter of Dr. Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health Officer,
Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del Prado, Director, BGH referring accused-appellant for
admission and treatment after "a relapse of his violent behavior;" 24 (2) the clinical cover sheet
of appellant at the BGH; 25 (3) the consent slip of appellant's wife voluntarily entrusting appellant
to the BGH; 26 (4) the Patient's Record; 27 (5) the Consent for Discharge signed by appellant's
wife; 28 (6) the Summary and Discharges of appellant; 29 (7) appellant's clinical case history; 30
(8) the admitting notes; 31 (9) Physician's Order Form; 32 (10) the Treatment Form/medication
sheet; 33 and (11) Nurses' Notes. 34

The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and
found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and in view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the accused
is sentenced to suffer the Death Penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P50,000.00.1wphi1.nt
The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual expenses and
P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. 25
In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD,
SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF INSANITY.
II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STABBING TO
DEATH OF ROGELIO MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY AND
AGGRAVATED BY CRUELTY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSEDAPPELLANT'S PLEA OF INSANITY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AN EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCE. 36
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed
by him. 37 Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of
criminal liability is human free Will. 38 Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free
will to choose between good and evil. 39 When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito
doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, 40 i.e., with freedom, intelligence
and intent. 41 Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long
as free will appears unimpaired. 42
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound
mind 43 and that all acts are voluntary. 44 The moral and legal presumption under our law is that
freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. 45 This presumption,
however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the
actor from criminal liability. 46
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt
from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law
defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the
hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid
interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was
committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or
asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the

accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed
by commitment of the accused to a mental institution. 47
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. 48 The
accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." 49 He must be
deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a complete absence
of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will. 50
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. 51 And the evidence on this point
must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution. 52
To ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive
evidence of the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that time.
53
Direct testimony is not required. 54 Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to
establish insanity as a defense. 55 Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for
the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A person's thoughts, motives, and
emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine whether these conform to the
practice of people of sound mind. 56
In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity at
the time he killed Mararac. The absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount
the probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit of Crisanto
Santillan 57 attached to the Information, there are certain circumstances that should have placed
the trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his mental
faculties when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane person to go up to the altar
and sit in the Bishop's chair while the Bishop was administering the Holy Sacrament of
Confirmation to children in a jampacked cathedral. It goes against normal and ordinary behavior
for appellant, without sufficient provocation from the security guard, to stab the latter at the altar,
during sacramental rites and in front of all the Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee,
or at least attempt to flee after the stabbing. He nonchalantly approached the microphone and,
over the public address system, uttered words to the faithful which the rational person would
have been made. He then returned to the Bishop's chair and sat there as if nothing happened.
Accused-appellant's history of mental illness was brought to the court's attention on the day of
arraignment. Counsel for accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that his client could not properly and intelligently enter a plea due to his mental
condition. The Motion for Suspension is authorized under Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the
time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
(b) x x x

xxx

xxx

The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof he appears to be

suffering from an unsound mental condition of such nature as to render him unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. Under these
circumstances, the court must suspend the proceedings and order the mental examination of
the accused, and if confinement be necessary for examination, order such confinement and
examination. If the accused is not in full possession of his mental faculties at the time he is
informed at the arraignment of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, the process
is itself a felo de se, for he can neither comprehend the full import of the charge nor can he give
an intelligent plea thereto. 58

The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the trial court. 59 And
the test to determine whether the proceedings will be suspended depends on the question of
whether the accused, even with the assistance of counsel, would have a fair trial. This rule was
laid down as early as 1917, thus:
In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an
accused person on the ground of present insanity, the judges should bear in mind that
not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify
such suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the accused would
have a fair trial, with the assistance which the law secures or gives; and it is obvious that
under a system of procedure like ours where every accused person has legal counsel, it
is not necessary to be so particular as it used to be in England where the accused had
no advocate but himself. 60
In the American jurisdiction, the issue of the accused's "present insanity" or insanity at the time
of the court proceedings is separate and distinct from his criminal responsibility at the time of
commission of the act. The defense of insanity in a criminal trial concerns the defendant's
mental condition at the time of the crime's commission. "Present insanity" is commonly referred
to as "competency to stand trial" 61 and relates to the appropriateness of conducting the criminal
proceeding in light of the defendant's present inability to participate meaningfully and effectively.
62
In competency cases, the accused may have been sane or insane during the commission of
the offense which relates to a determination of his guilt. However, if he is found incompetent to
stand trial, the trial is simply postponed until such time as he may be found competent.
Incompetency to stand trial is not a defense; it merely postpones the trial. 63
In determining a defendant's competency to stand trial, the test is whether he has the capacity
to comprehend his position, understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to
conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate, communicate with, and assist his
counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed. 64 This test is prescribed by
state law but it exists generally as a statutory recognition of the rule at common law. 65 Thus:
[I]f is not enough for the . . . judge to find that the defendant [is] oriented to time and
place, and [has] some recollection of events, but that the test must be whether he has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understandingand whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him. 66
There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) whether the defendant is
sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to
constructing a defense; and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial
and his relation to it. 67 The first requisite is the relation between the defendant and his counsel
such that the defendant must be able to confer coherently with his counsel. The second is the
relation of the defendant vis-a-vis the court proceedings, i.e., that he must have a rational as
well as a factual understanding of the proceedings. 68
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather
than of the public. 69 It has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of
God to make a just defense for his life or liberty. 70 To put a legally incompetent person on trial
or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial 71 and due
process of law; 72 and this has several reasons underlying it. 73 For one, the accuracy of the
proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent defendant who cannot comprehend the
proceedings may not appreciate what information is relevant to the proof of his innocence.
Moreover, he is not in a position to exercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in a
criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own
behalf, and the right to confront opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the
accuracy of the trial result. Second, the fairness of the proceedings may be questioned, as there
are certain basic decisions in the course of a criminal proceeding which a defendant is expected
to make for himself, and one of these is his plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings may be
disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a
manner which may destroy the decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains passive, his
lack of comprehension fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial process. A criminal

proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is not a conscious and

intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned interaction between an
individual and his community and becomes an invective against an insensible object. Fourth, it
is important that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a comprehension which is
greatly dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. An incompetent defendant
may not realize the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of institutionalized
retribution may be frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who
cannot comprehend its significance. 74
The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally
in the discretion of the trial court. 75 Mere allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be
evidence or circumstances that raise a "reasonable doubt" 76 or a "bona fide doubt" 77 as to
defendant's competence to stand trial. Among the factors a judge may consider is evidence of
the defendant's irrational behavior, history of mental illness or behavioral abnormalities,
previous confinement for mental disturbance, demeanor of the defendant, and psychiatric or
even lay testimony bearing on the issue of competency in a particular case. 78
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground of accused's mental condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the
questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by him. The court declared:
xxx

xxx

xxx

It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge asked questions
on the accused, and he (accused) answered intelligently. As a matter of fact, when
asked where he was born, he answered, in Tayug.
The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the questions asked of
him.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to
Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital, is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 79
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not
conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense.
Section 12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental condition that "effectively renders [the
accused] unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto." It
is not clear whether accused-appellant was of such sound mind as to fully understand the
charge against him. It is also not certain whether his plea was made intelligently. The plea of
"not guilty" was not made by accused-appellant but by the trial court "because of his refusal to
plead." 80
The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial
judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized
knowledge of determining the state of a person's mental health. To determine the accusedappellants competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered
the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the latter's history of mental
illness.
If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judge's mind of
accused-appellants competency to stand trial, subsequent events should have done so. One
month after the prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City wrote the trial
judge informing him of accused-appellant's unusual behavior and requesting that he be
examined at the hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be placed in some
other institution. The trial judge ignored this letter. One year later, accused-appellant's counsel
filed a "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination." Attached
to this motion was a second letter by the new Jail Warden of Dagupan City accompanied by a
letter-complaint of the members of the Bukang Liwayway Association of the city jail. Despite the
two (2) attached letters, 81 the judge ignored the "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical,

Mental and Psychiatric Examination." The records are barren of any order disposing of the said
motion. The trial court instead ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence. 82
Dr. Gawidan, testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid type, is
a "lifetime illness" and that this requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses. 83 After
accused-appellant was discharged on February 22, 1993, he never returned to the hospital, not
even for a check-up. 84
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that accusedappellant was waiving the right to testify in his own behalf because he was "suffering from
mental illness." 85 This manifestation was made in open court more than two (2) years after the
crime, and still, the claim of mental illness was ignored by the trial court. And despite all the
overwhelming indications of accused-appellant's state of mind, the judge persisted in his
personal assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a medical
examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death!
Sec. 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a "mental examination."
86
The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but
depends to a large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation. 87 Thus, an
intelligent determination of an accused's capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a
deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can make
through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made,
then can the legal question of incompetency be determined by the trial court. By this time, the
accused's abilities may be measured against the specific demands a trial will make upon him. 88
If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly made, it may
have served a dual purpose 89 by determining both his competency to stand trial and his sanity
at the time of the offense. In some Philippine cases, the medical and clinical findings of insanity
made immediately after the commission of the crime served as one of the bases for the acquittal
of the accused. 90 The crime in the instant case was committed way back in December 1994,
almost six (6) years ago. At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible for us
to evaluate appellant's mental condition at the time of the crime's commission for him to avail of
the exempting circumstance of insanity. 91 Nonetheless, under the present circumstances,
accused-appellant's competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to
participate, in his trial meaningfully.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a
fair trial.1awphil The trial court's negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due
process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be nullified. In People
v. Serafica, 92 we ordered that the joint decision of the trial court be vacated and the cases
remanded to the court a quo for proper proceeding. The accused, who was charged with two (2)
counts of murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder, entered a plea of "guilty" to all three
charges and was sentenced to death. We found that the accused's plea was not an
unconditional admission of guilt because he was "not in full possession of his mental faculties
when he killed the victim;" and thereby ordered that he be subjected to the necessary medical
examination to determine his degree of insanity at the time of commission of the crime. 93
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in
Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing
him to death is vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for the conduct of a proper
mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial, and
for further proceedings.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., on official leave.

Footnotes
1

The decision was penned by Judge Crispin C. Laron.

Records, p. 1.

Id., pp. 13-14.

Id., p. 16.

Id., p. 19.

TSN of January 19, 1995, pp. 4-5.

Id., pp. 6-10; Exhibit "E," Records, pp. 6-7.

TSN of January 20, 1995, pp. 3-13; Exhibit "G," Records, p. 5.

Exhibit "B," Records, p. 36.

10

Exhibit "A," Records, p. 35.

11

Records, pp. 45-48.

12

Id., pp. 51-52.

13

Id., p. 49.

14

Id., p. 56.

15

Id., pp. 62-63.

16

Id., pp. 92-93.

17

Exhibit "16," Records, pp. 95 and 96.

18

Exhibit "15," Records, p. 94.

19

Records, p. 75.

20

TSN of November 26, 1996, pp. 2-28.

21

Exhibits "1" to "14," Records, pp. 50, 107-128.

22

Exhibit "1," Records, p. 50.

23

TSN of November 26, 1996.

24

Exhibit "2," Records, p. 107.

25

Exhibit "3," Records, p. 113.

26

Exhibit "4," Records, p. 114.

27

Exhibit "5," Records, p. 115.

28

Exhibit "6," Records, p. 116.

29

Exhibits "7" and "14," Records, pp. 117 and 128.

30

Exhibit "8," Records, pp. 118-119.

31

Exhibit "9," Records, pp. 120-121.

32

Exhibit "10," Records, pp. 122-123.

33

Exhibit "11, "Records, p. 123.

34

Exhibits "12" and "13," Records, pp. 124-127.

35

Records, p. 204.

36

Brief for Accused-Appellant, p. 1, Rollo, p. 36.

37

Art. 4, Revised Penal Code.

38

Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Bk. I, pp. 37-38 [1981 ed.].

39

V. Francisco, The Revised Penal Code, Bk. I, p. 4 [1958].

40

Please see Guevara's Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 5th ed., pp. 5-6
[1957].
41

Art. 3, Revised Penal Code; see also Reyes, supra, at 39-40; People v. Renegado, 57
SCRA 275, 286 [1974]; United States v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488, 495 [1910].
42

Francisco, supra.

43

Art. 800, Civil Code.

44

United States v. Gloria, 3 Phil. 333, 335; also cited in Guevara, 5th ed., p. 6; see also
Francisco, supra at 32.
45

People v Sia Teb Ban, 54 Phil 52 [1929]; see People v. Renegado, supra.

46

People v. Renegado, supra.

47

See People v. Austria, 260 SCRA 106, 121 [1996]; People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 100
[1937]; United States v. Guendia, 37 Phil. 345-346 [1917].
48

People v. Ambal, 100 SCRA 325, 333 [1980]; People v. Renegado, supra; People v.
Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292 [1960]; People v. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 661 [1950] quoting
Guevara's Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th ed., pp. 42-43 citing the
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting Article 8, par. 1 of the old Penal
Code of Spain.
49

People v. Torres, 3 CAR 9 (2s) 43, cited in Padilla, Criminal Law, Bk. I, pp. 340-341
[1987].
50

People v. Renegado, supra, at 286; People v. Puno, 105 SCRA 151, 158-159 [1981];
People v. Formigones, supra, at 661.
51

People v. Renegado, supra, at 286; People v. Puno, supra, at 158.

52

People v. Austria, 260 SCRA 106, 117 [1996]; People v. Puno, supra, at 158; United
States v. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547, 550 [1914].
53

People v. Fausto, 113 Phil. 841, 845 [1961]; People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 91 [1937]
citing Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684.

54

Id.

55

People v. Bonoan, supra, at 93-94.

56

People v. Bonoan, supra, at 93; People v. Austria, 260 Phil. 106, 117 [1996].

57

Exhibit "E," Records, pp. 6-7.

58

Pamaran, The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure Annotated, p. 322 [1998].

59

In the landmark case of United States v. Guendia, 37 Phil. 337, 345 [1917], it was
declared that:
. . . [W]hen a judge of first instance is informed or discovers that an accused
person is apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his
discretion to investigate the matter, and if it be found that by reason of any such
affliction the accused could not, with the aid of his counsel, make a proper
defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the
accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. If,
however, such investigation is considered unnecessary, and the trial proceeds,
the court will acquit the accused if he be found exempt from criminal
responsibility by reason of imbecility or lunacy. In such case an order for his
commitment to an asylum should be made pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph 2 of article 8 (1) of the Penal Code [now par. 2, Article 12 (1)].
60

United States v. Guendia, 37 Phil, 337, 345 [1917]; also cited in Francisco, Criminal
Procedure, p. 330 [1996] and Herrera, Remedial law, vol. 4, pp. 384-385 [1992].
61

Pizzi, "Competency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts: Conceptual and Constitutional

Problems," 45 Univ. of Chicago Law Review 21-22 [1977]. The term "present insanity"
was used in the case of Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937 [1899] to distinguish it from
insanity at the time of commission of the offense.
62

21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law Sec. 97 [1981 ed.]; LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law, p.
333, 2d ed, [1986]; del Carmen, Criminal Procedure, Law and Practice, pp. 395-396, 3rd
ed. [1995]; Ferdico, Criminal Procedure for the Criminal Justice Professional, pp. 55-56,
7th ed. [1999].
63

Id.

64

21 Am Jur 2d, "Criminal Law," Sec. 96; see list of cases therein; see also Raymond
and Hall, California Criminal Law and Procedure, p. 230 [1999].
65

Id; see also LaFave and Scott, supra, at 333; Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal
Defense, 430 [1954]. Long before legislation on competency to stand trial, the case of
Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937 [1899] recognized that a federal court had the same
wide discretion established by the common law when the question of present insanity
was presentedUnited States v. Sermon, 228 F. Supp. 972, 982 [1964].
66

Dusky v. United States, 362 US 402, 4 L ed 2d 824, 825, 80 S Ct 788 [1960]. This is
commonly referred to as the "Dusky standard"LaFave and Scott, supra, at 334-335,
Note 26.
67

LaFave and Scott, supra.; see also Notes: "Incompetency to Stand Trial," 81 Harvard
Law Review, 454, 459 [Dec. 1967].
68

LaFave and Scott, supra, at 334.

69

State v. Swails, 223 La 751, 66 So. 2d 796, 799 [1953].

70

In re Buchanan, 129 Cal. 360, 61 P. 1120, 1121 [1900]; State v. Swails, supra; see
also Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense, p. 429 [1954].
71

Pate v. Robinson, 383 US 375, 15 L ed 2d 815, 822, 86 S Ct 836 [1966].

72

21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law, Sec. 95 [198 ed.]; Youtsey v. United States, 97 fed. 937,
940-946 [CA6 1899]; Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 43 L ed 2d 103, 113-114, 95 S Ct
896 [1975]; Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 815, 15 L ed 2d 815, 822, 86 S Ct 836 [1966];
see also Weihofen, supra, at 429-430.
73

Notes: "Incompetency to Stand Trial," 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454 [1967].

74

Id., at 457-459; see also LaFave and Scott, supra, at 334-335.

75

21 Am Jur 2d, "Criminal Law," Sec. 103 [1981 ed.].

76

The term "reasonable doubt" was used in Drope v. Missouri, supra, at 118; see also
LaFave and Scott, supra, Note 34, at 335-336.
77

In Pate v. Robinson, supra, at 822, the court used the term "bona fide doubt" as to
defendant's competence; See also LaFave and Scott, supra, Note 34, at 335-336.
78

21 Am Jur 2d, "Criminal Law," Sec. 104 [1981 ed.]; Drope v. Missouri, supra, at 118;
Pate v. Robinson, supra, at 822.
79

Order dated January 6, 1995, Records, p. 16.

80

See Second Order of January 6, 1995, Records, p. 19.

81

The two (2) attached letters were submitted as part of appellant's evidence and were
admitted by the trial court without objection from the public prosecutor Exhibits "15"
and "16," Records, pp. 94-96.
82

Order dated September 18, 1996, Records, p. 75.

83

TSN of November 26, 1996, p. 27. In People v. Austria, 260 SCRA 106, 116-117
[1996], "schizophrenia" was defined as a "chronic mental disorder," and that a "paranoid
type of schizophrenia" was characterized by unpleasant emotional aggressiveness and
delusions of persecution by the patient quoting Encyclopedia and Dictionary of
Medicine and Nursing, Miller-Keane, p. 860 and Noyes' Modern Clinical Psychiatry, 7th
ed., pp. 380-381.
84

Id.

85

See Order dated May 5, 1997, Records, p. 184.

86

The rule on suspension of arraignment for mental examination of the accused's mental
condition first appeared in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The 1917 case of U.S.
v. Guendia did not mention "mental examination."
87

Notes: "Incompetency to Stand Trial," 81 Harv. L. Rev. 454, 470 [1967].

Id; Gunther v. United States, 215 F. 2d 493, 496-497 (D.C. Cir. 1954) While expert
psychiatric judgment is relevant to determine a defendant's competence to stand trial, it
is not controlling. Resolution of this issue requires not only a clinical psychiatric judgment
but also a judgment based upon a knowledge of criminal trial proceedings that is
peculiarly within the competence of the trial judge; see also United States v. Sermon,
228 F. Supp. 972, 976-977 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
88

89

See Pizzi, "Competency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts: Conceptual and

Constitutional Problems, 45 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev. 21, 38, Note 84 [1977] dual
purpose examinations are the customary practice in the U.S.
People v. Austria, 260 SCRA 106 [1996] the medical examination was conducted 1
1/2 years after the crime's commission; People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 82 [1937] the
examinations were conducted 1 to 6 months after the crime; People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil.
204 [1922] the medical exam was conducted immediately after commission of the
crime.
90

91

See People v. Balondo, 30 SCRA 155., 160 [1969].

92

29 SCRA 123 [1969].

93

Id., at 129.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 134362

February 27, 2002

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EMELITO SITCHON y TAYAG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
For beating to death the two-year old son of his common-law wife, accused-appellant Emelito
Sitchon y Tayag was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. His case is now before this Court on automatic review.
Appellant was charged in an information stating:
That on or about June 12, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one MARK ANTHONY
FERNANDEZ y TABORA a minor, 2 years old, by then and there mauling and clubbing him
on the different parts of his body with the use of a steel hammer and a wooden stick,
approximately 18 inches long, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the above charge.2 However, before testifying in his own defense
on June 4, 1998, appellant admitted that he killed the victim and changed his plea to guilty.3
Five witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Lilia Garcia, a neighbor; the victim's eightyear old brother Roberto; the investigating officer, PO3 Paul Dennis Javier; Dr. Manuel
Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and Felicisima
Francisco, a forensic chemist of the same agency.
Appellant lived in the second floor of a three-square meter house located at 2001 Batangas
Street, Tondo, Manila. His neighbor of two months, Lilia Garcia, resided in the first floor of the
same house.
At about 10:00 in the morning of June 12, 1996, Lilia was in front of the house attending to her
children when she heard the sound of a boy crying. Curious, Lilia went up the stairway, her
children in tow. The open door of the upper floor allowed Lilia to witness appellant beating twoyear old Mark Anthony Fernandez. From a distance of less than three arms length, Lilia saw
appellant hit various parts of the boys body with a piece of wood, about 14 inches in length
and 2 inches in diameter. Appellant also banged the head of the boy against the wooden wall.
The beating went on for about one hour. Lilia then saw appellant carry the boy down the house
to bring him to the hospital. The two-year old was "already black" and no longer moving.4
Eight-year old Roberto Fernandez is the elder brother of the victim, also known as Macky.
According to Roberto, Macky had scattered his feces all over the house. Appellant, whom
Roberto called Kuya Chito, thus beat Macky with a belt, a hammer and a "2x2" piece of wood.
Roberto could not do anything to help his brother because he was afraid Kuya Chito might also
beat him up. When Kuya Chito brought Macky to the hospital, his little brother, who could barely
talk, was not crying anymore.5

Roberto identified the two pieces of wood6 that appellant allegedly used in beating the victim.
He also identified the T-shirt7 that Macky wore when he died.
A certain Alice Valerio from the Galang Medical Hospital informed PO3 Paul Dennis Javier that
a boy had been admitted there. When PO3 Javier went to the hospital, he found the boy already
dead. He observed that the child had wounds on the left middle finger, the right index finger and
both feet. The child also had lacerations in the upper lip and contusions all over his head and
body.
PO3 Javier proceeded to appellants house at No. 2001, Batangas Ext., Tondo, Manila. Human
feces and fresh blood splattered on the floor. PO3 Javier recovered from the house the broken
wooden sticks, the steel hammer,8 which were allegedly used to beat up the boy, as well as a
bloodstained white T-shirt.
PO3 Javier then went to the house of appellants sister in Del Fierro St., Tondo, who informed
him of matters relative to appellants identification. Thereafter, the police conducted a search
operation in Cavite where appellants mother lived but they did not find him there.1wphi1 Later
that afternoon, PO3 Javier learned that appellant had surrendered to Station 3 of their district.
The following day, a staff member of the television program Magandang Gabi Bayan turned
over to PO3 Javier a brown belt which appellant allegedly also used in beating the victim.
Roberto Fernandez, the victims brother, had given the belt to the staff member.9
Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the postmortem examination of
the victims body on June 12, 1996 at 4:40 p.m. He found that the boy had suffered many
injuries, including three wounds at the head and the anterior chest, which could have been
inflicted with the use of blunt objects such as a piece of wood or a fist. The child could have
been dead three to four hours, or not more than eight hours, prior to the postmortem
examination. Dr. Lagonera concluded that the victim died of "bilateral pneumonia secondary to
multiple blunt traversal injuries" or complication of the lungs due to said injuries.10 The autopsy
report of Dr. Lagonera shows that Mark Anthony Fernandez sustained the following injuries:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Multiple old scars, forehead.
2. Healing lacerated wound, left forehead.
3. Healed lacerated wound, above the left eyebrow, measuring 1.2x0.2 cm.
4. Healed linear abrasions, left cheek.
5. Lacerated wound, extending up to the mucous membrane of the upper lip, measuring
2 x0.3 cm.
6. Contussion (sic), left temporo-parietal region, measuring 6x5 cms.
7. Healing lacerated wound, left zygomatic region, measuring 0.5x0.3 cm.
8. Contussion (sic), left jaw, measuring 1.5x1 cm.
9. Contussion (sic), right anterior thorax, measuring 17x12 cms.
10. Contussion (sic), right anterior forearm.
11. Lacerated wound, tip of the forefinger, right.
12. Old scar, upper 3rd , right anterior thigh.
13. Contussion (sic), right lower leg, above and below the knee measuring 9x5 cms.

14. Contussion (sic), left lower leg, above and below the knee, measuring 13x6 cms.
15. Hematoma, big toe, under the nail bed, right.
16. Contusso-abrasion, dorsum of the left foot, measuring 6x2 cms.
17. Contussion (sic), left posterior thorax, measuring 17x6 cms.
18. Contussion (sic), right postero-lateral thorax, extending up to the right lumbar region,
measuring 13x6 cms.
19. Contussion (sic), right posterior forearm, measuring 24x8 cms.
20. Contussion (sic), left posterior forearm, measuring 22x7 cms.
21. Healing abrasion, right buttocks, measuring 2x0.5 cm.
22. Plucked finger nail, left middle finger, with hematoma of the nail bed.
23. Posterior hand, both swollen.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Presence of left sub-aponeurotic hematoma, temporo-parietal region and over the
mid-occipital region.
2. Hematoma over the sternum and pectoralis muscles.
3. Both lungs showed patcy and confluent consolidations.
4. Small amount of rice porridge was recovered from the stomach.11
Felicisima M. Francisco, NBI forensic chemist, conducted an examination to determine the
presence and "grouping" of human blood found on the steel hammer, the wooden sticks, and
the T-shirt that were sent to his office by P/Sr. Inspector Pedro Ramos Angulo, Jr. of the
Western Police District in Manila.12 She prepared Report No. B-96-941 stating that Specimen
No. 1 or the steel hammer, was positive for human blood "but insufficient for blood group."
Specimen Nos. 2 (the broken wooden sticks) and 3 (the white T-shirt) were also positive for
human blood "showing reactions of Group A."13
Only appellant, 40, a sidewalk vendor, testified for the defense. As stated earlier, appellant
admitted killing the two-year old victim, the son of his "live-in" partner. He and the boys mother
had lived together for two years before the incident, starting when the boy was about a year old.
He claimed he enjoyed a harmonious relationship with his partner and that he killed the boy only
because he was under the influence of shabu, marijuana and Valium 10 at that time. Appellant
professed that he began using drugs in 1974 and that he had also taken drugs two weeks
before the incident.
On June 12, 1996, appellant came upon Macky playing with his feces, scattering them all over
the pillow, the bed sheets and the curtains. Appellant scolded the boy, "Putang-ina ka Macky!
Bakit mo ikinalat ng ganyan ang tae mo? Halika, dadalhin kita sa baba para hugasan!"
Appellant got hold of Macky but the boy struggled to free himself from appellants grasp.
Appellant, still reeling from the Valium 10 he had just taken, became so angry that he picked up
a broom with a wooden handle, and hit the boy. Appellant did not realize that he had hit Macky
hard until he saw the boy sprawled on the floor, breathing with difficulty. He dressed Macky and
brought him to the Galang Medical Center at the corner of Abad Santos Avenue and Tayabas
Street, Manila. He prayed to God that nothing serious would happen to the boy.
A lady doctor immediately attended to Macky. Appellant pleaded to the lady doctor to do all she
can to save the child; otherwise, he would be in serious trouble. After examining the child, the

doctor told appellant that she could not do anything more Macky was dead. The same day,
appellant surrendered to the police. He was brought to the Homicide Section at 3:00 p.m.
Explaining his change of plea, appellant clarified that the killing of the boy was "accidental." He
reiterated that he was under the influence of drugs, which he had taken one after the other. He
was a drug dependent and, in fact, had been confined at the Tagaytay Rehabilitation Center. He
said he was conscious when the incident happened but he simply did not realize that he had hit
the child hard with the brooms wooden handle. He denied having hit the boy with a hammer or
having banged his head against the wall. He hoped the trial court would be lenient with him
because of his voluntary surrender. He prayed that the court would not impose upon him the
death penalty.14
Nevertheless, on July 3, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Emelito Sitchon y Tayag, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the death penalty and to pay the costs.
The accused is further ordered to pay the mother of the victim Christina Tabora, moral and
nominal damages in the respective sums of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, plus death
compensation in the sum of P50,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from this date
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.15
The Court entertains little doubt that appellant is guilty of the killing of Mark Anthony Fernandez.
Appellants guilt was adequately established by the testimonies of Lilia Garcia and Roberto
Fernandez, who both saw appellant beat Macky. These testimonies were further corroborated
by those of PO3 Paul Dennis Javier, Dr. Manuel Lagonera and Felicisima Francisco, as well as
the various pieces of object evidence. Indeed, appellant in open court admitted beating the poor
child, which beating resulted in the latters death.
That appellant purportedly did not intend to kill the toddler would not exculpate him from liability.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
"person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which
he intended." The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa
es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused).16
Thus, where the accused violently kicked the sleeping victim in vital parts of the latters body,
the accused is liable for the supervening death as a consequence of the injuries.17 Assuming,
therefore, that appellant merely intended to inflict physical injuries upon the boy, he is
nevertheless liable for the death of the victim caused by such injuries.
The killing in this case was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.18 It is beyond dispute
that the killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to
put up a defense, is treacherous.19
Evident premeditation is absent. For the court to appreciate evident premeditation, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the time the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act
manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between
the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequence of his
act.20 The prosecution failed to establish any of these requisites.
The trial court incorrectly appreciated cruelty against the accused. The test in appreciating
cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically
augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly
increased the victims suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse.21 The nature of
cruelty lies in the fact that the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and
gradually, causing him moral and physical pain which is unnecessary for the consummation of

the criminal act which he intended to commit.22 The sheer number of wounds, however, is not a
test for determining whether cruelty attended the commission of a crime.23
The prosecution did not show that appellant enjoyed inflicting injuries upon the victim. The
inordinate force employed by appellant appears to have been caused not by any sadistic bend
but rather by the drugs that diminished his capacity.
The trial court also considered intoxication as an aggravating circumstance. The Solicitor
General defends this ruling, contending that appellants habitual drug addiction is an alternative
circumstance analogous to habitual intoxication under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code:
Intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when
the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional,
it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The Court does not agree.1wphi1 Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code provides a list of
mitigating circumstances, which work to reduce the accuseds penalty. Article 13(10) allows
courts to consider "any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those"
mentioned therein. Neither Article 14 of the same Code on aggravating circumstances24 nor
Article 15 on alternative circumstances,25 however, contain a provision similar to Article 13(10).
Accordingly, the Court cannot consider appellants drug addiction as an aggravating
circumstance. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed and no person should be brought
within their terms who is not clearly within them.26
Appellant maintains that his plea of guilt mitigates his criminal liability. On this matter, this Court
said in People v. Ramos:27
To effectively alleviate the criminal liability of an accused, a plea of guilt must be made at the
first opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the accused. In determining the timeliness
of a plea of guilty, nothing could be more explicit than the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
requiring that the offender voluntarily confess his guilt before the court prior to the presentation
of the evidence for the prosecution. It is well-settled that a plea of guilty made after arraignment
and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a
mitigating circumstance.
As appellant changed his plea only after the prosecution had rested its case and just when he
was just about to testify, said mitigating circumstance is unavailing.
The trial court credited appellant with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.1wphi1 For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, these elements must be
established: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a
person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary.28 It
is sufficient that the surrender be "spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the
intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or
he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense which will necessarily be incurred in
searching for and capturing him.29
Appellant has failed to adequately prove voluntary surrender. While he claimed that he
"surrendered" to the police on the same day that the victim was killed, he did not detail the
circumstances like the time and place of such surrender. Neither did appellant state to whom he
surrendered. He did not indicate if the person was a person in authority or an agent of the latter.
PO3 Javiers testimony that he "learned" of appellants alleged surrender is hearsay and does
not serve to corroborate appellants claim.
The Court, however, discerns no intention on the part of appellant to commit so grave a wrong
against his victim. Appellants intention was merely to maltreat the victim, not to kill him. When
appellant realized the horrible consequences of his felonious act, he immediately brought the
victim to the hospital.30 Sadly, his efforts were for naught.

In view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the killing of the victim is
qualified to murder, punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion
perpetua to death. The murder was attended by the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention
to commit so grave a wrong and there is no aggravating circumstance. Hence, the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed upon appellant.31
Appellant is liable for civil indemnity of P50,000.00 without proof of damages.32 Moral damages
that are recoverable for the mental anguish or emotional distress suffered by the heirs of the
victim cannot be awarded here as the prosecution did not present any evidence to justify its
award.33
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Emelito Sitchon y Tayag is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder, as defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of
Mark Anthony Fernandez civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena,
Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1

Records, p. 1.

Id., at 17.

TSN, June 4, 1998, p. 3.

TSN, October 15, 1996, pp. 2-11.

TSN, October 29, 1996, pp. 14-19.

Exhs. "F" and "F-1."

Exh. "H."

Exh. "G."

TSN, October 29, 1996, pp. 3-11.

10

TSN, November 12, 1996, pp. 2-5.

11

Exh. "K."

12

Exh. "I."

13

Exh. "N."

14

TSN, June 4, 1998, pp. 4-9.

15

Records, p. 111.

16

People vs. Ural, 56 SCRA 138 (1974).

17

People vs. Flores, 252 SCRA 31 (1996).

18

REVISED PENAL CODE, ARTICLE 14 (16).

19

People vs. Palomar, 278 SCRA 114 (1997); People vs. Gonzales, 311 SCRA 547
(1999).
20

People v. Bias, 320 SCRA 22 (1999).

21

People v. Iligan, 369 Phil. 1005 (1999).

22

People v. Tanzon, 320 SCRA 762 (1999).

23

People vs. Panida, 310 SCRA 66 (1999).

24

ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. The following are aggravating circumstances:

1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position.
2. That the crime be committed in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities.
3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the
offended party on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that it be committed in the
dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation.
4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness.
5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive, or in his
presence, or where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their
duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship.
6. That the crime be committed in the nighttime, or in an uninhabited place, or by
a band, whenever such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the
offense.
Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the
commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band.
7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck,
earthquake, epidemic, or other calamity or misfortune.
8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure
or afford impunity.
9. That the accused is a recidivist.
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same
title of this Code.
10. That the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the
law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it
attaches a lighter penalty.
11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
stranding of a vessel or intentional damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive,
or by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin.
13. That the act be committed with evident premeditation.
14. That craft, fraud, or disguise be employed.

15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to

weaken the defense.
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.
17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add
ignominy to the natural effects of the act.
18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry.
There is an unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a way not intended for
the purpose.
19. That as a means to the commission of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or
window be broken.
20. That the crime be committed with the aid of a persons under fifteen years of
age or by means of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other
similar means.
21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately
augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission.
ART. 15. The concept. Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the
crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship,
intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender.
25

The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration

when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate,
natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of
the offender.
The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication,
if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but
when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
26

United States vs. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243 (1917).

27

296 SCRA 559 (1998).

28

People v. Aquino, 314 SCRA 543 (1999).

29

People v. Sambulan, 289 SCRA 500 (1998); People v. Ramos, supra.

30

People vs. Ural, supra.

31

REVISED PENAL CODE, ARTICLE 63(3).

32

People v. Borreros, 306 SCRA 680 (1999).

33

People v. Langres, 316 SCRA 769 (1999).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 140756

April 4, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN GONZALES ESCOTE, JR. @ Jun Mantika of Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan and VICTOR
ACUYAN y OCHOVILLOS @ Vic Arroyo of Sto. Nio, Poblacion, Bustos, Bulacan,
accused-appellants.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery is a
generic aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed treacherously.
The Supreme Court of Spain so ruled. So does the Court rule in this case, as it had done for
decades.
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision1 of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court
of Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 443-M-97 convicting accused-appellants Juan Gonzales
Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan of the complex crime of robbery with homicide, meting on each of
them the supreme penalty of death, and ordering them to pay the heirs of the victim, SPO1 Jose
C. Manio, Jr., the total amount of P300,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages and to pay
to Five Star Bus, Inc., the amount of P6,000.00 by way of actual damages.
The Facts
The antecedent facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
On September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular driver of Five Star
Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. ABS-793, drove the bus from its terminal at Pasay City to its
destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on board was Romulo Digap, the regular conductor of
the bus, as well as some passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six passengers boarded the
bus, including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. who were wearing maong pants,
rubber shoes, hats and jackets.2 Juan seated himself on the third seat near the aisle, in the
middle row of the passengers' seats, while Victor stood by the door in the mid-portion of the bus
beside Romulo. Another passenger, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles City, was
seated at the rear portion of the bus on his way home to Angeles City. Tucked on his waist was
his service gun bearing Serial Number 769806. Every now and then, Rodolfo looked at the side
view mirror as well as the rear view and center mirrors installed atop the driver's seat to monitor
any incoming and overtaking vehicles and to observe the passengers of the bus.
The lights of the bus were on even as some of the passengers slept. When the bus was
travelling along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan and Victor suddenly stood up, whipped
out their handguns and announced a holdup. Petrified, Rodolfo glanced at the center mirror
towards the passengers' seat and saw Juan and Victor armed with handguns. Juan fired his gun
upward to awaken and scare off the passengers. Victor followed suit and fired his gun upward.
Juan and Victor then accosted the passengers and divested them of their money and valuables.
Juan divested Romulo of the fares he had collected from the passengers. The felons then went
to the place Manio, Jr. was seated and demanded that he show them his identification card and
wallet. Manio, Jr. brought out his identification card bearing No. 00898.3 Juan and Victor took
the identification card of the police officer as well as his service gun and told him: "Pasensya ka
na Pare, papatayin ka namin, baril mo rin and papatay sa iyo." The police officer pleaded for
mercy: "Pare maawa ka sa akin. May pamilya ako." However, Victor and Juan ignored the plea
of the police officer and shot him on the mouth, right ear, chest and right side of his body.
Manio, Jr. sustained six entrance wounds. He fell to the floor of the bus. Victor and Juan then
moved towards the driver Rodolfo, seated themselves beside him and ordered the latter to
maintain the speed of the bus. Rodolfo heard one of the felons saying: "Ganyan lang ang

pumatay ng tao. Parang pumapatay ng manok." The other said: "Ayos na naman tayo pare.
Malaki-laki ito." Victor and Juan further told Rodolfo that after they (Victor and Juan) shall have
alighted from the bus, he (Rodolfo) should continue driving the bus and not report the incident
along the way. The robbers assured Rodolfo that if the latter will follow their instructions, he will
not be harmed. Victor and Juan ordered Rodolfo to stop the bus along the overpass in Mexico,
Pampanga where they alighted from the bus. The robbery was over in 25 minutes.
When the bus reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Rodolfo and Romulo forthwith reported the
incident to the police authorities. The cadaver of SPO1 Manio, Jr. was brought to the funeral
parlor where Dr. Alejandro D. Tolentino, the Municipal Health Officer of Mabalacat, Pampanga,
performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the police officer. The doctor prepared and signed an
autopsy report detailing the wounds sustained by the police officer and the cause of his death:
"Body still flaccid (not in rigor mortis) bathed with his own blood. There were 6 entrance
wounds and 6 exit wounds. All the entrance were located on his right side. An entrance
(0.5 cm x 0.5 cm.) located infront of the right ear exited at the left side just below the ear
lobe. Another entrance through the mouth exited at the back of the head fracturing the
occiput with an opening of (1.5 cm x 2 cm). Blood CSF and brain tissues came out.
Another fatal bullet entered at the upper right cornea of the sternum, entered the chest
cavity pierced the heart and left lung and exited at the left axillary line. Severe
hemorrhage in the chest cavity came from the heart and left lung. The other 3 bullets
entered the right side and exited on the same side. One entrance at the top of the right
shoulder exited at the medial side of the right arm. The other entered above the right
breast and exited at the right lateral abdominal wall travelling below muscles and
subcutaneous tissues without entering the cavities. Lastly another bullet entered above
the right iliac crest travelled superficially and exited above the right inguinal line.
Cause of Death:
Shock, massive internal and external hemorrhage, complete brain destruction and injury
to the heart and left lung caused by multiple gunshot wounds."4
Rodolfo and Romulo proceeded to the police station of Plaridel, Bulacan where they reported
the robbery and gave their respective sworn statements.5 SPO1 Manio, Jr. was survived by his
wife Rosario Manio and their four young children. Rosario spent P20,000.00 for the coffin and
P10,000.00 for the burial lot of the slain police officer.6 Manio, Jr. was 38 years old when he
died and had a gross salary of P8,085.00 a month.7
Barely a month thereafter, or on October 25, 1996, at about midnight, SPO3 Romeo Meneses,
the team leader of Alert Team No. 1 of Tarlac Police Station, and PO3 Florante S. Ferrer were
at the police checkpoint along the national highway in Tarlac, Tarlac. At the time, the BambangConcepcion bridge was closed to traffic and the police officers were tasked to divert traffic to the
Sta. Rosa road. Momentarily, a white colored taxi cab without any plate number on its front
fender came to view. Meneses stopped the cab and asked the driver, who turned out to be the
accused Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr., for his identification card. Juan told Meneses that he was a
policeman and handed over to Meneses the identification card of SPO1 Manio, Jr. and the
money which Juan and Victor took from Manio, Jr. during the heist on September 28, 1996.8
Meneses became suspicious when he noted that the identification card had already expired on
March 16, 1995. He asked Juan if the latter had a new pay slip. Juan could not produce any. He
finally confessed to Meneses that he was not a policeman. Meneses brought Juan to the police
station. When police officers frisked Juan for any deadly weapon, they found five live bullets of a
9 millimeter firearm in his pocket. The police officers confiscated the ammunition. In the course
of the investigation, Juan admitted to the police investigators that he and Victor, alias Victor
Arroyo, staged the robbery on board Five Star Bus and are responsible for the death of SPO1
Manio, Jr. in Plaridel, Bulacan. Meneses and Ferrer executed their joint affiavit of arrest of
Juan.9 Juan was subsequently turned over to the Plaridel Police Station where Romulo
identified him through the latter's picture as one of those who robbed the passengers of the Five
Star Bus with Plate No. ABS-793 and killed SPO1 Manio, Jr. on September 28, 1996. In the
course of their investigation, the Plaridel Police Station Investigators learned that Victor was a
native of Laoang, Northern Samar.10 On April 4, 1997, an Information charging Juan Gonzales

Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan with robbery with homicide was filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Bulacan. The Information reads:
That on or about the 28th day of September 1996, in the municipality of Plaridel,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each
other, armed with firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent of (sic) gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, take, rob and carry
away with one (1) necklace and cash in [the] undetermine[d] amount of one SPO1 Jose
C. Manio, Jr., to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the said undetermine[d]
amount; that simultaneously or on the occassion (sic) of said robbery, said accused by
means of violence and intimidation and in furtherance of their conspiracy attack, assault
and shoot with the service firearm of the said SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., thereby inflicting
serious physical injuries which resulted (sic) the death of the said SPO1 Jose C. Manio,
Jr.
Contrary to law.11
On the strength of a warrant of arrest, the police officers arrested Victor in Laoang, Northern
Samar and had him incarcerated in the Bulacan Provincial Jail. Assisted by Atty. Ramiro Osorio,
their counsel de parte, Juan and Victor were duly arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty
to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case on August 26,
1998, Juan escaped from the provincial jail.12 The trial court issued a bench warrant on
September 22, 1998 for the arrest of said accused-appellant.13 In the meantime, Victor adduced
his evidence.
Victor denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that in 1996, he
worked as a tire man in the vulcanizing shop located in Banga I, Plaridel, Bulacan owned by
Tony Boy Negro. On one occasion, Ilarde Victorino, a customer of Tony Boy Negro, ordered
Victor to sell a tire. Victor sold the tire but did not turn over the proceeds of the sale to Ilarde.
The latter hated Victor for his misdeed. The shop was later demolished and after two months of
employment, Victor returned to Barangay Muwal-Buwal, Laoang, Northern Samar. On
September 26, 1996, at 9:30 p.m., Victor was at the town fiesta in Laoang. Victor and his
friends, Joseph Iringco and Rickey Lorcio were having a drinking spree in the house of
Barangay Captain Ike Baluya. At 11:30 p.m., the three left the house of the barangay captain
and attended the public dance at the town auditorium. Victor and his friends left the auditorium
at 5:30 a.m. of September 27, 1996. Victor likewise testified that he never met Juan until his
arrest and detention at the Bulacan Provincial Jail. One of the inmates in said provincial jail was
Ilarde Victorino. Victor learned that Ilarde implicated him for the robbery of the Five Star Bus
and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr. to hit back at him for his failure to turn over to Ilarde the
proceeds of the sale of the latter's tire.
On January 14, 1999, Juan was rearrested in Daet, Camarines Norte.14 However, he no longer
adduced any evidence in his behalf.
The Verdict of the Trial Court
On March 11, 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision judgment finding Juan and Victor guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, meted on each of them the penalty of death and
ordered them to pay P300,000.00 as actual and moral damages to the heirs of the victim and to
pay the Five Star Bus Company the amount of P6,000.00 as actual damages. The decretal
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused, Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor
Acuyan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide as penalized under
Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and hereby sentences both to suffer
the supreme penalty of Death and to indemnify the heirs of the late SPO1 Jose C.
Manio, Jr., the amount of P300,000.00 as actual and moral damages and to pay the Five
Star Bus P6,000.00 as actual damage.
SO ORDERED.15

Assignment of Errors
Juan and Victor assail the Decision of the trial court and contend that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RODOLFO CACATIAN AND ROMULO
DIGAP, DRIVER AND CONDUCTOR OF THE FIVE STAR BUS, RESPECTIVELY, WERE
ABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE TWO (2) MEN WHO HELD-UP THEIR BUS AND
KILLED ONE PASSENGER THEREOF AT AROUND 3:00 O'CLOCK IN THE EARLY
MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 28, 1996.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TWO (2) ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.16
The Court's Verdict
Anent the first assignment of error, Juan and Victor contend that the trial court committed a
reversible error in relying on the testimony of Rodolfo, the bus conductor, for convicting them of
the crime charged. They aver that although their counsel was able to initially cross-examine
Rodolfo, the former failed to continue with and terminate his cross-examination of the said
witness through no fault of his as the witness failed to appear in subsequent proceedings. They
assert that even if the testimonies of Rodolfo and Romulo were to be considered, the two
witnesses were so petrified during the robbery that they were not able to look at the felons and
hence could not positively identify accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. They
argue that the police investigators never conducted a police line-up for the identification of the
authors of the crime.
The contentions of Juan and Victor are not meritorious. There is no factual and legal basis for
their claim that they were illegally deprived of their constitutional and statutory right to fully
cross-examine Rodolfo. The Court agrees that the right to cross-examine is a constitutional right
anchored on due process.17 It is a statutory right found in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the accused has the right to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. However, the right has always been
understood as requiring not necessarily an actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity
to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired.18 What is proscribed by statutory norm and
jurisprudential precept is the absence of the opportunity to cross-examine.19 The right is a
personal one and may be waived expressly or impliedly. There is an implied waiver when the
party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to
take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself alone.20 If by his actuations, the accused
lost his opportunity to cross-examine wholly or in part the witnesses against him, his right to
cross-examine is impliedly waived.21 The testimony given on direct examination of the witness
will be received or allowed to remain in the record.22
In this case, the original records show that after several resettings, the initial trial for the
presentation by the prosecution of its evidence-in-chief was set on November 18, 1997 and
December 5, 1997, both at 9:00 a.m.23 Rodolfo testified on direct examination on November 18,
1997. The counsel of Juan and Victor forthwith commenced his cross-examination of the
witness but because of the manifestation of said counsel that he cannot finish his crossexamination, the court ordered the continuation thereof to December 5, 1997.24 On December 5,
1997, Rodolfo did not appear before the court for the continuation of his cross-examination but
Rosemarie Manio, the widow of the victim did. The prosecution presented her as witness. Her
testimony was terminated. The court ordered the continuation of the trial for the crossexamination of Rodolfo on January 20, 1998 at 8:30 a.m.25 During the trial on January 20, 1998,
Rodolfo was present but accused-appellants' counsel was absent. The court issued an order
declaring that for failure of said counsel to appear before the court for his cross-examination of
Rodolfo, Victor and Juan waived their right to continue with the cross-examination of said
witness.26 During the trial set for February 3, 1998, the counsel of Juan and Victor appeared but
did not move for a reconsideration of the court's order dated January 20, 1998 and for the recall

of Rodolfo Cacatian for further cross-examination. It behooved counsel for Juan and Victor to
file said motion and pray that the trial court order the recall of Rodolfo on the witness stand.
Juan and Victor cannot just fold their arms and supinely wait for the prosecution or for the trial
court to initiate the recall of said witness. Indeed, the Court held in Fulgado vs. Court of
Appeals, et al:
xxx
The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is, in law, imposed on the party
who wishes to exercise said right. This is so because the right, being personal and
waivable, the intention to utilize it must be expressed. Silence or failure to assert it on
time amounts to a renunciation thereof. Thus, it should be the counsel for the opposing
party who should move to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses. It is absurd for the plaintiff
himself to ask the court to schedule the cross-examination of his own witnesses because
it is not his obligation to ensure that his deponents are cross-examined. Having
presented his witnesses, the burden shifts to his opponent who must now make the
appropriate move. Indeed, the rule of placing the burden of the case on plaintiff's
shoulders can be construed to extremes as what happened in the instant proceedings. 27
The trial was reset to March 31, April 17 and 24, 1998, all at 8:30 a.m. because of the nonavailability of the other witnesses of the prosecution.28 On March 31, 1998, the prosecution
presented Dr. Alejandro Tolentino, PO2 Rene de la Cruz and Romulo Digap. During the trial on
April 17, 1998, the counsel of Juan and Victor failed to appear. The trial was reset to June 3, 19
and 26, 1998.29 The trial scheduled on June 3, 1998 was cancelled due to the absence of the
counsel of Juan and Victor. The court issued an order appointing Atty. Roberto Ramirez as
counsel for accused-appellants.30
During the trial on August 26, 1998, Atty. Ramirez appeared in behalf of Juan and Victor. The
prosecution rested its case after the presentation of SPO2 Romeo Meneses and formally
offered its documentary evidence. The next trial was set on September 23, 1998 at 8:30 a.m. 31
On November 11, 1998, Juan and Victor commenced the presentation of their evidence with the
testimony of Victor.32 They rested their case on January 27, 1999 without any evidence adduced
by Juan.
Juan and Victor did not even file any motion to reopen the case before the trial court rendered
its decision to allow them to cross-examine Rodolfo. They remained mute after judgment was
rendered against them by the trial court. Neither did they file any petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals for the nullification of the Order of the trial court dated January 20, 1998
declaring that they had waived their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It was only on appeal to this
Court that Juan and Victor averred for the first time that they were deprived of their right to
cross-examine Rodolfo. It is now too late in the day for Juan and Victor to do so. The doctrine of
estoppel states that if one maintains silence when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will
debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent. He who remains silent
when he ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when he should be silent.33
The contention of accused-appellants Juan and Victor that Rodolfo and Romulo failed to identify
them as the perpetrators of the crime charged is disbelieved by the trial court, thus:
As can be gathered from the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, on
September 28, 1996, the accused boarded at around 3:00 a.m. a Five Star Bus driven
by Rodolfo Cacatian, bound to Pangasinan, in Camachile, Balintawak, Quezon City.
Twenty (20) minutes or so later, when the bus reached the vicinity of Nabuag, Plaridel,
Bulacan, along the North Espressway, the accused with guns in hand suddenly stood up
and announced a hold-up. Simultaneously with the announcement of a hold-up, Escote
fired his gun upwards. Acuyan, meanwhile, took the gun of a man seated at the back.
Both then went on to take the money and valuables of the passengers, including the bus
conductor's collections in the amount of P6,000.00. Thereafter, the duo approached the
man at the back telling him in the vernacular "Pasensiya ka na pare, papatayin ka
namin. Baril mo rin ang papatay sa iyo." They pointed their guns at him and fired several
shots oblivious of the plea for mercy of their victim. After the shooting, the latter
collapsed on the floor. The two (2) then went back at the front portion of the bus behind

the driver's seat and were overheard by the bus driver, Cacatian, talking how easy it was
to kill a man. The robbery and the killing were over in 25 minutes. Upon reaching the
Mexico overpass of the Expressway in Pampanga, the two (2) got off the bus. The driver
drove the bus to the Mabalacat Police Station and reported the incident. During the
investigation conducted by the police, it was found out that the slain passenger was a
policeman, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. of the Caloocan City Police Department.
The above version came from Rodolfo Cacatian and Romulo Digap, bus driver and
conductor, respectively, of the ill-fated Five Star Bus.34
The Court agrees with the trial court. It may be true that Romulo was frightened when Juan and
Victor suddenly announced a holdup and fired their guns upward, but it does not follow that he
and Rodolfo failed to have a good look at Juan and Victor during the entire time the robbery was
taking place. The Court has held in a catena of cases that it is the most natural reaction of
victims of violence to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and to
observe the manner in which the crime was committed.35 Rodolfo and Romulo had a good look
at both Juan and Victor before, during and after they staged the robbery and before they
alighted from the bus. The evidence on record shows that when Juan and Victor boarded the
bus and while the said vehicle was on its way to its destination, Romulo stationed himself by the
door of the bus located in the mid-section of the vehicle. The lights inside the bus were on. Juan
seated himself in the middle row of the passengers' seat near the center aisle while Victor stood
near the door of the bus about a meter or so from Romulo.36 Romulo, Juan and Victor were near
each other. Moreover, Juan divested Romulo of his collection of the fares from the
passengers.37 Romulo thus had a face-to-face encounter with Juan. After shooting SPO1
Manio, Jr. at the rear portion of the bus, Juan and Victor passed by where Romulo was standing
and gave their instructions to him. Considering all the facts and circumstances, there is no iota
of doubt that Romulo saw and recognized Juan and Victor before, during and after the heist.38
Rodolfo looked many times on the rear, side and center view mirrors to observe the center and
rear portions of the bus before and during the robbery. Rodolfo thus saw Juan and Victor stage
the robbery and kill SPO1 Manio, Jr. with impunity:
xxx
Q

So, the announcement of hold-up was ahead of the firing of the gun?

Yes, sir.

Q
And before the actual firing of the gun it was even still said bad words before
saying the hold-up?
A

After they fired the gun they uttered bad words, sir.

Q
Mr. Witness before the announcement of the hold-up you do not have any idea
that you will encounter that nature which took place, is that correct?
A

None, sir.

Q
Within the two (2) year[s] period that you are plying the route of Manila to Bolinao
that was your first experience of hold-up?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And the speed of above 70 kilometers per hour your total attention is focus in
front of the road, correct, Mr. witness?
A

Once in a while the driver look at the side mirror and the rear view mirror, sir.

Q
Before the announcement there was no reason for you to look at any at the rear
mirror, correct, Mr. witness?
Court:

Every now and then they usually look at the side mirror and on the rear, that was
his statement.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q

I am asking him if there was no reason for him....

Fiscal:
Before the announcement of hold-up, there was no mention.
Court:
Every now and then.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q

When you said every now and then, how often is it, Mr. witness?

I cannot tell how often but I used to look at the mirror once in a while, sir.

How many mirror do you have, Mr. witness?

Four (4), sir.

Where are these located?

Two (2) on the side mirror, center mirror and rear view mirror, sir.

The two side mirror protruding outside the bus?

Yes, sir, they are in the side of the bus, sir.

One of them is located on the left and the other on the right, correct?

Yes, sir.

You only look at the side mirror when you are going to over take, Mr. witness?

No, sir.

Where is this center mirror located, Mr. witness?

In the center, sir.

What is the purpose of that?

A
So that I can see the passengers if they are already settled so that I can start the
engine, sir.
Q

What about the remaining mirror?

Rear view mirror, sir.

What is the purpose and where is it located?

The rear view is located just above my head just to check the passengers, sir.

So that the center mirror and the rear view mirror has the same purpose?

They are different, sir.

How do you differentiate of (sic) one from the other?

A
The center mirror is used to check the center aisle while the rear mirror is for the
whole view of the passengers, sir.
Q
If you are going to look at any of your side mirrors, you will never see any
passengers, correct, Mr. witness?
A

None, sir.

Q
If you will look at your center mirror you will only see the aisle and you will never
see any portion of the body of your passengers?
A

Yes, sir.

Seated passengers?

It is only focus (sic) on the middle aisle sir.

Q
If you look at your rear mirror, you will only see the top portion of the head of your
passengers, correct?
A

Only the portion of their head because they have different hight (sic), sir.

Q
You will never see any head of your passengers if they were seated from the rear
mirror portion, correct, Mr. witness?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
Before the announcement of hold-up, all of your passengers were actually
sleeping?
A

Some of my passengers were sleeping, some were not, sir.

Q
But you will agree Mr. witness that when you said every now and then you are
using your mirror? It is only a glance, correct?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And by mere glancing, Mr. witness you were not able to identify any person on
the basis of any of your mirror, correct?
A

If only a glance but when I look at him I can recognize him, sir.

Q
You agree a while ago by every now and then it is by glancing, as a driver, Mr.
witness by your side mirror?
A
Not all glancing, there are times when you want to recognize a person you look at
him intently, sir.
Q
The purposes of your mirror inside your Bus is mainly of the safety of your
passengers on board, Mr. witness?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And as a driver, Mr. witness, you do not used (sic) your mirror to identify the
person particularly when you are crossing (sic) at a speed of 70 kilometers per hour?
A

I do that, sir.

Q
How long Mr. witness can you focus your eyes on any of these mirror before
getting back your eyes into the main road?
A

Seconds only, sir.

Q
When you said seconds, for how long the most Mr. witness that you can do to fix
your eyes on any of your mirrors and the return back of (sic) your eyes into the main
road?
A

Two seconds, sir.

Q
At that time Mr. witness, that you were travelling at about 70 kilometers you were
glancing every now and then on any of your mirrors at about two seconds, correct?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And when you heard the announcement of hold-up your natural reaction is to
look either at the center mirror or rear mirror for two seconds, correct?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And you were instructed Mr. witness to even accelerate your speed upon the
announcement of hold-up?
A

No sir, they just told me to continue my driving, sir.

Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular "alalay ka lang, steady ka lang.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q

Steady at what speed?

70 to 80, sir.

What is the minimum speed, Mr. witness for Buses along North Expressway?

60 kilometers, sir.

Are you sure of that 60 kilometers, minimum? Are you sure of that?

Yes, sir.

Q
That is what you know within the two (2) years that you are driving? Along the
North Expressway?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
And while you were at the precise moment, Mr. witness, you were being
instructed to continue driving, you were not looking to anybody except focus yours eyes
in front of the road?

Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular. Nakikiramdam ako.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q

That's what you are doing?

A
During the time they were gathering the money from my passengers, that is the
time when I look at them, sir.
Q

For two seconds, correct?

Yes, sir.

Q
Which of the four (4) mirrors that you are looking at within two seconds, Mr.
witness you said you are nakikiramdam?
A

The rear view mirror, sir.

The Bus that you were driving is not an air con bus?

Ordinary bus, sir.

Q
And at what time your passengers, most of your passengers were already sleep
(sic), Mr. witness?
A

Most of my passengers, sir. Some of my passengers were still sleep (sic), sir.

And the lights inside the Bus are off, correct Mr. witness?

The lights were on, sir.

Q
While the passengers were sleep (sic) the light was still on, Mr. witness, at the
time of the trip.?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
Now, Mr. witness when the hold-up was announced and then when you look for
two seconds in the rear mirror you were not able to see any one, you were only sensing
what is happening inside your bus?
A

I saw something, sir.

Q
You saw something in front of your Bus? You can only see inside when you are
going to look at the mirror?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
That is the only thing that you see every now and then, you said you were
looking at the mirror?
A

Yes, sir.

Q
How many times, Mr. witness did you look Mr. witness at the rear mirror during
the entire occurance (sic) of the alleged hold-up?

There were many times, sir.

Q
The most that you can remember, please inform the Honorable Court? During
the occurance (sic) of the alleged hold-up, Mr. witness?
A

I cannot estimate, sir.

How long did the alleged hold-up took place?

More or less 25 minutes, sir.39

When Rodolfo gave his sworn statement to the police investigators in Plaridel, Bulacan after the
robbery, he described the felons. When asked by the police investigators if he could identify the
robbers if he see them again, Rodolfo declared that he would be able to identify them:
8. T: Natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang itsura ng dalawang lalaki na nanghold-up
sa minamaneho mong bus?
S: Halos magkasing taas, 5'4" o 5'5" katam-taman ang pangangatawan,
parehong nakapantalon ng maong naka-suot ng jacket na maong, parehong naka
rubber shoes at pareho ring naka sumbrero.
9.

T:

Kung sakali bang makikita mo pa ang mga ito ay makikilala mo pa sila?

S:

Makikilala ko po sila.40

When asked to identify the robbers during the trial, Rodolfo spontaneously pointed to and
identified Juan and Victor:
Q

Fiscal:

(to the witness)

xxx
Q
Those two man (sic) who stated that it was a hold-up inside the bus and who
fired the gun are they inside the Court room (sic) today?
A

Yes, ma'am.

Point to us?

Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a man wearing red T-shirt and when asked his name
answered Victor Acuyan and the man wearing green T-shirt and when asked his
name answered Juan Gonzales.41
For his part, Romulo likewise spontaneously pointed to and identified Juan and Victor as the
culprits when asked by the prosecutor to identify the robbers from among those in the
courtroom:
xxx
Q
You said that you were robbed inside the bus, how does (sic) the robbing took
place?
A
They announced a hold up ma'am, afterwards, they confiscated the money of the
passengers including my collections.

Q
You said "they" who announced the hold up, whose (sic) these "they" you are
referring to?
A

Those two (2), ma'am.

Interpreter:
Witness pointing to the two accused.
Public Pros.:
May we request that the accused be identified, Your Honor.
Court:
(to both accused)
What are your names?
A

Juan Escote, Your Honor. Victor Acuyan, Your Honor.

Public Pros.:
May we know from the accused if his name is Juan Escote Gonzales because he
just said Juan Escote. In the Information, it is one Juan Gonzales, Jr., so, we can
change, Your Honor.42
Moreover, when he was accosted by SPO3 Romeo Meneses on October 25, 1997 in Tarlac,
Tarlac, Juan was in possession of the identification card43 of the slain police officer. Juan failed
to explain to the trial court how and under what circumstances he came into possession of said
identification card. Juan must necessarily be considered the author of the robbery and the killing
of SPO1 Manio, Jr. In People v. Mantung,44 we held:
xxx [T]he recovery of part of the loot from Mantung or the time of his arrest gave rise to a
legal presumption of his guilt. As this Court has held, '[I]n the absence of an explanation
of how one has come into possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded
and treacherously killed, he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression
and death of the said person and of the robbery committed on him.'
While police investigators did not place Juan and Victor in a police line-up for proper
identification by Rodolfo and Romulo, it cannot thereby be concluded that absent such line-up,
their identification by Romulo and Rodolfo as the authors of the robbery with homicide was
unreliable. There is no law or police regulation requiring a police line-up for proper identification
in every case. Even if there was no police line-up, there could still be proper and reliable
identification as long as such identification was not suggested or instigated to the witness by the
police.45 In this case, there is no evidence that the police officers had supplied or even
suggested to Rodolfo and Romulo the identities of Juan and Victor as the perpetrators of the
robbery and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr.
The Felony Committed by Juan and Victor
The Court finds that the trial court committed no error in convicting Juan and Victor of robbery
with homicide. Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act 7659, reads:
Art. 294. - Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. - Penalties. - Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the

robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall
have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
To warrant the conviction of Juan and Victor for the said charge, the prosecution was burdened
to prove the confluence of the following essential elements:
xxx (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by
intent to gain or animus lucrandi and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed.
xxx46
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life.47 In robbery with homicide, so long as
the intention of the felons was to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. In
People v. Barut,48 the Court held that:
In the controlling Spanish version of article 294, it is provided that there is robbery with
homicide "cuando con motivo o con ocasin del robo resultare homicidio". "Basta que
entre aquel este exista una relacin meramente ocasional. No se requiere que el
homicidio se cometa como medio de ejecucin del robo, ni que el culpable tenga
intencin de matar, el delito existe segn constanta jurisprudencia, aun cuando no
concurra animo homicida. Incluso si la muerte sobreviniere por mero accidente, siempre
que el homicidio se produzca con motivo con ocasin del robo, siendo indiferente que la
muerte sea anterior, coetnea o posterior a ste" (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975
14th Ed. P. 872).
Even if the victim of robbery is other than the victim of the homicide committed on the occasion
of or by reason of the robbery, nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony of
robbery with homicide. All the crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are
merged and integrated into a single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. This was the
ruling of the Supreme Court of Spain on September 9, 1886, et sequitur cited by this Court in
People v. Mangulabnan, et al.49
We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with
homicide it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7,
1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgo's Penal Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High
Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the
homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident (Decision of September 9, 1886; October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and July 14,
1917), provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
inasmuch as it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime,
that has to be taken into consideration (Decision of January 12, 1889 see Cuello
Calon's Codigo Penal, p. 501-502).
Case law has it that whenever homicide has been committed by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as
principals of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it
appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.50
In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Juan and Victor conspired
and confabulated together in robbing the passengers of the Five Star Bus of their money and
valuables and Romulo of his collections of the fares of the passengers and in killing SPO1
Manio, Jr. with impunity on the occasion of the robbery. Hence, both Juan and Victor are guilty
as principals by direct participation of the felony of robbery with homicide under paragraph 1,
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death.
The Proper Penalty

The trial court imposed the supreme penalty of death on Juan and Victor for robbery with
homicide, defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable with
reclusion perpetua. Under Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the felons should
be meted the supreme penalty of death when the crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime absent any mitigating circumstance. The
trial court did not specify in the decretal portion of its decision the aggravating circumstances
attendant in the commission of the crime mandating the imposition of the death penalty.
However, it is evident from the findings of facts contained in the body of the decision of the trial
court that it imposed the death penalty on Juan and Victor on its finding that they shot SPO1
Manio, Jr. treacherously on the occasion of or by reason of the robbery:
xxx
The two (2) accused are incomparable in their ruthlessness and base regard for human
life. After stripping the passengers of their money and valuables, including the firearm of
the victim, they came to decide to execute the latter seemingly because he was a police
officer. They lost no time pouncing him at the rear section of the bus, aimed their
firearms at him and, in a derisive and humiliating tone, told him, before pulling the
trigger, that they were rather sorry but they are going to kill him with his own gun; and
thereafter, they simultaneously fired point blank at the hapless policeman who was
practically on his knees begging for his life. Afterwhich, they calmly positioned
themselves at the front boasting for all to hear, that killing a man is like killing a chicken
("Parang pumapatay ng manok"). Escote, in particular, is a class by himself in
callousness. xxx.51
The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant in the commission of the
crime. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time
of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him.52
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring
its commission without risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was
warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the
infliction of the coup de grace.53 In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the
mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the
upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were
armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he
pleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close
range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his family after a hard day's
work. Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his family in grief for his untimely
demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter inhumanity of man to his fellowmen.
The issues that now come to fore are (1) whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide; and if in the affirmative, (b) whether treachery may be
appreciated against Juan and Victor. On the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. This Court has
ruled over the years54 that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in the felony of
robbery with homicide, a special complex crime (un delito especial complejo) and at the same
time a single and indivisible offense (uno solo indivisible).55 However, this Court in two cases
has held that robbery with homicide is a crime against property and hence treachery which is
appreciated only to crimes against persons should not be appreciated as a generic aggravating
circumstance.56 It held in another case that treachery is not appreciated in robbery with rape
precisely because robbery with rape is a crime against property.57 These rulings of the Court
find support in case law that in robbery with homicide or robbery with rape, homicide or rape are
merely incidents of the robbery, with robbery being the main purpose and object of the
criminal.58 Indeed, in People vs. Cando,59 two distinguished members of this Court advocated a
review of the doctrine that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with
homicide. They opined that treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. After all, in
People vs. Bariquit,60 this Court in a per curiam decision promulgated in year 2000 declared that
treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. However, this Court held in People vs.
Cando that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, citing its
prior rulings that in robbery with homicide, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance

when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery. This Court opted not to apply its ruling
earlier that year in People vs. Bariquit.
Legal Luminaries in criminal law and eminent commentators of the Revised Penal Code are not
in full accord either. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino (Retired) says that treachery is appreciated
only in crimes against persons as defined in Title 10, Book Two of the Code.61 Chief Justice Luis
B. Reyes (Retired) also is of the opinion that treachery is applicable only to crimes against
persons.62 However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado (Retired) is of a different view.63 He says that
treachery cannot be considered in robbery but can be appreciated insofar as the killing is
concerned, citing the decisions of this Court in People vs. Balagtas64 for the purpose of
determining the penalty to be meted on the felon when the victim of homicide is killed with
treachery.
It must be recalled that by Royal Order of December 17, 1886 the 1850 Penal Code in force in
Spain, as amended by the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 was applied in the Philippines.
The Penal Code of 1887 in the Philippines was amended by Act 3815, now known as the
Revised Penal Code, which was enacted and published in Spanish. In construing the Old Penal
Code and the Revised Penal Code, this Court had accorded respect and persuasive, if not
conclusive effect to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and construing the
1850 Penal Code of Spain, as amended by Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870.65
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. The following are aggravating circumstances:
xxx
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
The law was taken from Chapter IV, Article 10, paragraph 2 of the 1860 Penal Code and the
Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 of Spain which reads:
Art. 10 ...2. Ejecutar el hecho con alevosia. Hay alevosia cuando el culpable comete
cualquiera de los delitos contra las personas empleando medios, modos o for mas en la
ejecucion que tiendan directa y especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para su persona,
que proceda de la defensa que pudiera hacer el ofendido. xxx
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code is a reproduction of the 1850 Penal Code of
Spain and the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 with a slight difference. In the latter law, the
words "las personas" (the persons) are used, whereas in Article 14, paragraph 6, of the Revised
Penal Code, the words "the person" are used.
Going by the letter of the law, treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons as
enumerated in Title Eight, Chapters One and Two, Book II of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the Supreme Court of Spain has consistently applied treachery to robbery with
homicide, classified as a crime against property. Citing decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain, Cuello Calon, a noted commentator of the Spanish Penal Code says that despite the
strict and express reference of the penal code to treachery being applicable to persons,
treachery also applies to other crimes such as robbery with homicide:66
Aun cuando el Codigo solo se refiere a los delitos contra las personas, cabe estimarla
en los que no perteneciendo a este titulo se determinan por muerte o lesiones, como, en
el robo con homicidio, y en el homicidio del Jefe del Estado que es un delito contra la
seguridad interior del Estado, y no obstante la referencia estricta del texto legal a los
delitos contra las personas no es la alevosia aplicable a la mayoria de ellos, no lo es en
el homicidio, pues como su concurrencia lo cualifica lo transforma en delito distinto, en
asesinato, ni en el homicidio consentido (art. 409), ni en la ria tumultuaria (art. 408) ni
en el infanticidio (art. 410). xxx. 67

Viada also says that treachery is appreciated in crimes against persons (delitos contra
personas) and also in robbery with homicide (robo con homicidio).68
"Contra las personas. - Luego la circunstancia de alevosia solo puede apreciarse en los
delitos provistos desde el art. 417 al 447, y en algun otro, como el de robo con
homicidio, atentario, a la vez que contra la propriedad, contra la persona."
Thus, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said
crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is
not a qualifying circumstance because as ruled by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision
dated September 11, 1878, the word "homicide" is used in its broadest and most generic
sense.69
Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the
penalty for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However,
aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law
or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor shall not
be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.70 Under paragraph 2 of the law,
the same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to
such a degree that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially
punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing
the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the
penalty.
xxx
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in
the crime to such a degree that it must be of necessity accompany the commission
thereof.
Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime
specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with
homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of
robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.
In its Sentencia dated March 14, 1877, the Supreme Court of Spain declared that treachery is a
generic aggravating circumstance not only in crimes against persons but also in robbery with
homicide. The high court of Spain applied Article 79 of the Spanish Penal Code (Article 62 of
the Revised Penal Code) and ruled that since treachery is not a constitutive element of the
crime of robbery with homicide nor is it inherent in said crime, without which it cannot be
committed, treachery is an aggravating circumstance to said crime. The high court of Spain was
not impervious of the fact that robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property.
Indeed, it specifically declared that the classification of robbery with homicide as a crime against
property is irrelevant and inconsequential in the application of treachery. It further declared that
it would be futile to argue that in crimes against property such as robbery with homicide,
treachery would have no application. This is so, the high tribunal ruled, because when robbery
is coupled with crimes committed against persons, the crime is not only an assault (ataca) on
the property of the victims but also of the victims themselves (ofende):
xxx que la circunstancia agravante de alevosia ni es constitutiva del delito complejo de
robo y homicidio, ni de tal modo inherente que sin ella no pueda cometerse, sin que
quepa arguir que en los delitos contra la propiedad no debe aquella tener aplicacion,
porque cuando estos son complejos de los que se cometen contra las personas, no solo
se ataca a la propiedad, sino que se ofende a estas. xxx71
In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with
homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons
and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery is

applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the constituent crime of "robbery" of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or
as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated
as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime
conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating
circumstance.
In its Sentencia, dated July 9, 1877, the high tribunal of Spain also ruled that when the victim of
robbery is killed with treachery, the said circumstance should be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide:
xxx que si aparece probado que el procesado y su co-reo convinieron en matar a un
conocido suyo, compaero de viaje, para lo cual desviaron cautelosamente los carros
que guiaban, en uno de los cuales iba el interfecto, dirigiendolos por otro camino que
conducia a un aljibon, y al llegar a este, valiendose de engao para hacer bajar a dicho
interfecto, se lanzaron de improviso sobre el, tirandolo en tierra, robandole el dinero, la
manta y los talegos que llevaba, y atandole al pie una piedra de mucho peso, le
arrojaron con ella a dicho aljibon, dados estos hechos, no cabe duda que constituyen el
delito complejo del art. 516, num. I, con la circunstancia agravante de alevosia, puesto
que los medios, forma y modos empleados en la ejecucion del crimen tendieron directa
y especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para sus autores, procedente de la defensa del
ofendido.72
In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when the
victim of homicide is killed by treachery.
On the second issue, we also rule in the affirmative. Article 62, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code which was taken from Article 80 of the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870,73
provides that circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means
employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only
who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein.
The circumstances attending the commission of a crime either relate to the persons participating
in the crime or into its manner of execution or to the means employed. The latter has a direct
bearing upon the criminal liability of all the accused who have knowledge thereof at the time of
the commission of the crime or of their cooperation thereon.74 Accordingly, the Spanish
Supreme Court held in its Sentencia dated December 17, 1875 that where two or more persons
perpetrate the crime of robbery with homicide, the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery shall be appreciated against all of the felons who had knowledge of the manner of the
killing of victims of homicide, with the ratiocination that:
xxx si por la Ley basta haberse ejecutado un homicidio simple con motivo ocasin del
robo para la imposicion de la pena del art. 516, num. I, no puede sere ni aun discutible
que, concurriendo la agravante de alevosia, se aumente la criminalidad de los
delincuentes; siendo aplicable a todos los autores del hecho indivisible, porque no es
circunstancia que afecte a la personalidad del delincuente, de las que habla el art. 80
del Codigo penal en su primera parte, sino que consiste en la ejecusion material del
hecho y en los medios empleados para llevarle a cabo, cuando de ellos tuvieron
conocimiento todos los participantes en el mismo por el concierto previo y con las
condiciones establecidad en la segunda parte del citado articulo.75
Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated against Juan and Victor in the case at bar
because the same was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedures which reads:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.

Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance need not be
alleged in the Information, however, the general rule had been applied retroactively because if it
is more favorable to the accused.76 Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the
information, treachery cannot aggravate the penalty for the crime.
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony of robbery with
homicide, Juan and Victor should each be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably
with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Civil Liability of Juan and Victor
The trial court awarded the total amount of P300,000.00 to the heirs of SPO1 Manio, Jr. The
court did not specify whether the said amounts included civil indemnity for the death of the
victim, moral damages and the lost earnings of the victim as a police officer of the PNP. The
Court shall thus modify the awards granted by the trial court.
Since the penalty imposed on Juan and Victor is reclusion perpetua, the heirs of the victim are
entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. The heirs are also entitled to moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, Rosemarie Manio having testified on the factual basis
thereof.77 Considering that treachery aggravated the crime, the heirs are also entitled to
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. This Court held in People vs. Catubig78 that
the retroactive application of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
should not impair the right of the heirs to exemplary damages which had already accrued when
the crime was committed prior to the effectivity of the said rule. Juan and Victor are also jointly
and severally liable to the said heirs in the total amount of P30,000.00 as actual damages, the
prosecution having adduced evidence receipts for said amounts. The heirs are not entitled to
expenses allegedly incurred by them during the wake as such expenses are not supported by
receipts.79 However, in lieu thereof, the heirs are entitled to temperate damages in the amount
of P20,000.00.80 The service firearm of the victim was turned over to the Evidence Custodian of
the Caloocan City Police Station per order of the trial court on October 22, 1997.81 The
prosecution failed to adduce documentary evidence to prove the claim of Five Star Bus, Inc. in
the amount of P6,000.00. Hence, the award should be deleted. However, in lieu of actual
damages, the bus company is entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P3,000.00.82
The heirs are likewise entitled to damages for the lost earnings of the victim. The evidence on
record shows that SPO1 Manio, Jr. was born on August 25, 1958. He was killed on September
28, 1996 at the age of 38. He had a gross monthly salary as a member of the Philippine
National Police of P8,065.00 or a gross annual salary of P96,780.00. Hence, the heirs are
entitled to the amount of P1,354,920.00 by way of lost earnings of the victim computed, thus:
Age of the victim = 38 years old
Life expectancy

= 2/3 x (80 age of the victim at the time of death)

= 2/3 x (80-38)
= 2/3 x 42
= 28 years

Gross Annual
Income

= gross monthly income x 12 months

= P8,065.00 x 12
= P96,780.00

Living Expenses

= 50% of Gross Annual Income

= P96,780.00 x 0.5
= P48,390.00

Lost Earning
Capacity

= Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income-Living

expenses]
= 28 x [P96,780.00 P48,390.00]
= 28 x P48,390.00

= P1,354,920.00
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and
Victor Acuyan are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of robbery with
homicide defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no
modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony, hereby metes on each of them the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Said accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly
and severally the heirs of the victim SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P1,349,920.00 for lost earnings, P30,000.00 as
actual damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of P6,000.00 to the Five
Star Bus, Inc. is deleted. However, the said corporation is awarded the amount of P3,000.00 as
temperate damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Vitug J., please see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., I join J. Vitug's separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join J. Vitug's separate opinion.

Separate Opinion
VITUG, J.:
Should an attendant aggravating circumstance of treachery, exclusive to crimes against
persons, be appreciated in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide which Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code categorizes as a crime against property? I humbly submit that it
should not be appreciated.
A brief background. At past midnight on 28 September 1996, a Five Star passenger bus with
plate No. ABS-793, bound for Bolinao from Manila, stopped at the Balintawak junction to pick up
some passengers. Six passengers, among them victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote,
boarded the bus. Escote seated himself on the third seat near the aisle while Acuyan took the
mid-portion of the vehicle beside the bus conductor.
Along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, passengers Escote and Acuyan suddenly stood up, took
their positions and declared a holdup. Escote fired his gun upwards, jolting to consciousness the
sleepy and dozing passengers. The duo promptly divested the passengers of their valuables.
The bus conductor, Romulo Digap, was dispossessed of the fares he earlier collected from the
passengers. When the two repaired to the rear end of the bus, they came upon SPO1 Jose C.
Manio, a passenger on his way to Angeles City. The felons demanded that Manio show them
his identification card and wallet. Manio took out his identification card and his service gun. At
this point, the duo told the hapless law officer: "Pasensya ka na pare, papatayin ka namin, baril
mo rin ang papatay sa iyo." Ignoring his pleas for mercy, the robbers mercilessly and repeatedly
shot Manio to death. The two then proceeded to the driver's seat. Rodolfo Caciatan, the driver,
overheard one of the felons boast: "Ganyan lang ang pumatay ng tao. Parang pumapatay ng
manok." The other said: "Ayos na naman tayo pare. Malaki-laki ito." After warning Caciatan not
to report the incident to the authorities, the two alighted at an overpass in Mexico, Pampanga.
The bus driver and the bus conductor reported the incident to the police authorities in Dau,
Mabalacat, Pampanga. The lifeless body of SPO1 Manio, Jr., was brought to a nearby funeral
parlor where Dr. Alejandro D. Tolentino performed an autopsy.
Less than a month later, on 25 October 1996, about midnight, SPO3 Romeo Meneses, the team
leader of Alert Team No. 1 of the Tarlac Police Station, and SPO3 Florante S. Ferrer were at a
checkpoint along the Tarlac national highway. The police officers were diverting the traffic flow

to the Sta. Rosa Road because of the temporary closure of the Bambang-Concepcion bridge to
motorists. Meneses stopped the driver of a white-colored taxicab without any plate number. The
driver turned out to be Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. Escote introduced himself to be a police
officer. When asked to present his identification card, Escote at once produced the card issued
to and in the name of SPO1 Manio. Meneses became suspicious after noticing that the card had
already expired. When asked to produce a new pay slip, Escote was not able to show any.
Amidst intensive probing, Escote finally confessed that he was not a policeman. Meneses
forthwith brought Escote to the police station where five live bullets of a 9-millimeter firearm
were confiscated from him. Escote owned responsibility for the highway robbery committed
aboard the Five Star passenger bus and for the death of SPO1 Manio, Jr. Escote was turned
over to the custody of the Plaridel Police Station where the bus conductor, Romulo Digap, later
identified Escote as having been one of the two robbers. A further investigation on the case led
to the arrest of Victor Acuyan in Laoang, Northern Samar.
On 04 April 1997, an Information for robbery with homicide was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan against Juan Gonzales Escote and Victor O. Acuyan. When arraigned, Escote
and Acuyan entered a plea of not guilty. The trial ensued. After the prosecution had rested its
case, Escote escaped from the provincial jail. Only Acuyan was able to adduce evidence in his
defense. Acuyan denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. At the time of the
robbery, he claimed, he was in Laoang, Samar, for the town fiesta and had a drinking spree with
friends, after which they attended a public dance that lasted until dawn of the next day. He
denied having met Juan Escote before. On 14 January 1999, Juan Escote was re-arrested in
Daet, Camarines Norte, but he chose not to adduce any evidence in his behalf.
The trial court found Juan Escote and Victor Acuyan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide and meted upon each of them the penalty of death. In imposing
the penalty of death upon appellants, the trial court considered treachery as an aggravating
circumstance as to justify its imposition of the maximum penalty of death. The ponencia, while
finding that treachery could not be appreciated for not having been aptly alleged in the
information, expressed in an obiter, however, that had it been otherwise, i.e., that had treachery
been properly alleged, this circumstance could have aggravated the crime.
It is on the last pronouncement that I beg to differ.
Unlike ordinary complex crimes, robbery with homicide, defined by Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, is a special complex crime against property, explicitly carrying a corresponding
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
In an ordinary complex crime, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code expresses that "the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."
Article 48 means then that in the imposition of the penalty for such an ordinary complex crime,
i.e., where no specific penalty is prescribed for the complex crime itself, the composite offenses
and their respective penalties are individually factored, and it is possible, indeed warranted, that
any aggravating circumstance, generic or qualified, even if it be peculiar to only one of the
constituent crimes, can and should be logically considered in order to determine which of the
composite crimes is the "most serious crime," the penalty for which shall then "be applied in its
maximum period." The rule evidently is not in square with a special complex crime, like robbery
with homicide, where the law effectively treats the offense as an individual felony in itself and
then prescribes a specific penalty therefore. Article 294 is explicit, and it provides"Art. 294. Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
any person shall suffer:
"(1) The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall
have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson."
There being just an independent prescribed penalty for the offense, any circumstance that can
aggravate that penalty should be germane and generic not to one but to both of the constituent
offenses that comprise the elements of the crime.1 The suggestion that treachery could be
appreciated "only insofar" as the killing is concerned would unavoidably be to consider and hold

robbery and homicide as being separately penalized and to thus discount its classification under
Article 294 of the Code as a distinct crime itself with a distinct penalty prescribed therefor. Most
importantly, such interpretation would be to treat the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide no differently from ordinary complex crimes defined under Article 48, where the
composite crimes are separately regarded and weighed in the ultimate imposition of the penalty.
If such were intended, the law could have easily so provided, with the penalty for the higher of
the two offenses to be then accordingly imposed on the malefactor. In prescribing, however, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, where homicide results by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the law has virtually taken into account the particularly "nefarious" nature of the crime,
where human life is taken, howsoever committed, to pursue the criminal intent to gain with the
use of violence against or intimidation of any person.
Distinct penalties prescribed by law in special complex crimes is in recognition of the primacy
given to criminal intent over the overt acts that are done to achieve that intent. This conclusion
is made implicit in various provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, practically all of the
justifying circumstances, as well as the exempting circumstances of accident (paragraph 4,
Article 12) and lawful or insuperable cause (paragraph 7, Article 12), are based on the lack of
criminal intent.2 In felonies committed by means of dolo, as opposed to those committed by
means of culpa (including offenses punished under special laws), criminal intent is primordial
and overt acts are considered basically as being mere manifestations of criminal intent.
Paragraph 2, Article 4, of the Revised Penal Code places emphasis on "intent" over effect, as it
assigns criminal liability to one who has committed an "impossible crime," said person having
intended and pursued such intent to commit a felony although, technically, no crime has actually
been committed. Article 134 of the same Code, penalizing the crime of rebellion, imposes a
distinct penalty, the rebel being moved by a single intent which is to overthrow the existing
government, and ignores individual acts committed in the furtherance of such intent.
If a circumstance, peculiar to only one of the composite crimes, could at all be allowed to
aggravate the penalty in robbery with homicide, it should be with respect to the main offense of
robbery, the intent to gain being the moving force that impels the malefactor to commit the
crime. The attendant offense of homicide cannot be further modified, "homicide" this time being
so understood, as it should be, in its generic sense, comprehending even murder or parricide,
when committed "by reason or on the occasion of the robbery." The generic character of
"homicide" in this special complex crime, has been exemplified, for instance, in People vs.
Mangulabnan,3 where the court has held that, "[i]n order to determine the existence of the crime
of robbery with homicide, it is enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion
of the robbery and it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident provided
that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery inasmuch as it is only
the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes , modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into consideration."4
If the term "homicide" were not to be understood in its generic sense, an aggravating
circumstance, such as evident premeditation or treachery, would qualify the killing into murder.
Two separate crimes of robbery and homicide inevitably would result that effectively would
place the two felonies outside the coverage of Article 294. And, as to whether or not those
crimes should be complexed with each other would depend on the attendance of the requisites
enumerated in Article 48 for ordinary complex crimes, i.e., a) that a single act constitute two or
more grave or less grave felonies or, b) that an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other.
It is on the foregoing predicate, I am convinced, that this Court in People vs. Timple5 has
rejected the idea of appreciating treachery as being an aggravating circumstance in the crime of
robbery with homicide, an offense, I might repeat, is by law classified as a crime against
property. I certainly will not view the ruling as having been made in any cavalier fashion and with
little or no effort for an introspective ratiocination. Timple has, in fact, been stressed in People
vs. Arizobal;6 viz:
"But treachery was incorrectly considered by the trial court. The accused stand charged
with, tried and convicted of robbery with homicide. This special complex crime is
primarily classified in this jurisdiction as a crime against property, and not against
persons, homicide being merely an incident of robbery with the latter being the main
purpose and object of the criminals. As such, treachery cannot be validly appreciated as

an aggravating circumstance under Art. 14 of The Revised Penal Code. (People v.

Bariquit, G.R. No. 122733, 2 October 2000, 341 SCRA 600.) This is completely a
reversal of the previous jurisprudence on the matter decided in a litany of cases before
People v. Bariquit."7

Footnotes
1

Penned by Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr.

Exhibit "A."

Exhibit "H."

Exhibit "E."

Exhibits "A" and "G."

Exhibits "C to C-4."

Exhibit "B-1."

Exhibit "H."

Exhibit "I."

10

Exhibit "F."

11

Original Records of Crim. Case No. 443-M-97, p. 2.

12

Ibid., p. 161.

13

Id., p. 163.

14

Id., p. 179.

15

Id., p. 175.

16

Rollo, p. 70.

17

Savory Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, 62 SCRA 258 (1975).

18

Fulgado, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 182 SCRA 81 (1990).

19

People vs. Suplito, 314 SCRA 493 (1999).

20

See note 16, supra.

21

People vs. Digno, Jr. 250 SCRA 237 (1995).

22

See note 17, supra.

23

Original Records, p. 70.

24

Ibid., p. 86.

25

Id., p. 89.

26

Id., p. 92.

27

See note 18, supra.

28

Original Records , p. 96.

29

Ibid., p.107.

30

Id., p. 113.

31

Id., p. 157.

32

Id., p. 172.

33

31 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, 87, p. 494.

34

Original Records, pp. 192-193.

35

People vs. Ofido, 342 SCRA 155 (2000).

36

TSN, Cacatian, November 18, 1997, pp. 6-7.

37

TSN, Digap, March 31, 1998, p. 22.

38

Ditche vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 327 SCRA 301 (2000).

39

TSN, Cacatian, November 18, 1997, pp. 19-29.

40

Exhibit "A."

41

Ibid., pp. 8-9.

42

TSN, March 31, 1998, pp. 19-20.

43

Exhibit "H."

44

310 SCRA 819 (1999).

45

People v. Lubong, 332 SCRA 672 (2000).

46

People vs. Nang, 289 SCRA 16 (1998).

47

People vs. Ponciano, 204 SCRA 627 (1991).

48

89 SCRA 14 (1979).

49

99 PHIL. 992 (1956).

50

People vs. Cando, 344 SCRA 330 (2000).

51

Original Records, pp. 194-195.

52

People vs. Reyes, 287 SCRA 229 (1998).

53

People vs. Bustos, 171 SCRA 243 (1989).

54

e.g. People vs. Semaada, 103 Phil 790 (1958); People vs. Bautista, et al., 107 Phil
1091 (1960); People vs. Tiongson, et al., 6 SCRA 431 (1962); People vs. Pedro, et al.,
16 SCRA 57 (1966); People vs. Sigayan, et al, 16 SCRA 839 (1966); People vs. Pujinio,

et al., 27 SCRA 1185 (1969); People vs. Saquing, et al., 30 SCRA 834 (1969); People
vs. Cornelio, et al., 39 SCRA 435 (1971); People vs. Repato, 91 SCRA 488 (1979);
People vs. Pajanustan, 97 SCRA 699 (1980); People vs. Arcamo, et al., 105 SCRA 707
(1981); People vs. Tintero, 111 SCRA 714 (1982); People vs. Gapasin, et al., 145 SCRA
178 (1986); People vs. Badilla, 185 SCRA 554 (1990); People vs. Manansala, 211
SCRA 66 (1992); People vs. Bechayda, 212 SCRA 336 (1992); People vs. Vivas, 232
SCRA 238 (1994); People vs. Pacapac, et al., 248 SCRA 77 (1995); People vs. Mores,
et al., 311 SCRA 342 (1999); People vs. Reyes, et al., 309 SCRA 622 (1999); and
People vs. Abdul, et al., 310 SCRA 246 (1999).
55

Sentencia de 17 de Diciembre de 1875 of the Supreme Court of Spain. In several

cases, this Court held that robbery with homicide is a special complex crime, e.g.,
People vs. Jarandilla, 339 SCRA 381(2000); People vs. Quibido, 338 SCRA 607 (2000);
People vs. Aquino, 329 SCRA 247 (2000); People vs. Zuela, et al., 323 SCRA 589
(2000); People vs. Tao, 331 SCRA 449 (2000). In some cases, this Court has held that
robbery with homicide is a single and indivisible crime, e.g., People vs. Labita, 99 Phil.
1068 (unreported [1956]); People vs Alfeche, Jr., 211 SCRA 770 (1992).
56

People vs. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 (1994); People vs. San Pedro, 95 SCRA 306 (1980).

57

People vs. Loseo, G.R. No. 5508-09, April 29, 1954 (unpublished). Under Republic
Act 8383, rape is a crime against persons.
58

People vs. Navales, 266 SCRA 569 (1997).

59

344 SCRA 330 (2000).

60

341 SCRA 600 (2000).

61

AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 1987 ed., Vol. I, p. 386.

62

REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 1993 ed., Vol. I, p. 412.

63

REGALADO, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS, 1st ed., p. 95.

64

68 Phil. 675 (1939)..

65

People vs. Mangulaban, 99 Phil. 992 (1956); People vs. Mesias, 65 Phil. 267 (1939);
Marasigan vs. Robles, 55 O.G. 8297; United States vs. Samonte, L-3422, August 3,
1907; United States vs. Ipil, et al., 27 Phil 530 (1914), concurring opinion: United States
vs. Landasan, 35 Phil 359 (1916).
66

CUELLO CALON DERECHO PENAL, 1960 ed., Vol. I, p. 592.

67

Decisions dated January 19, 1905, April 18, 1908, June 28, 1922 and December 18,
1947.
68

SALVADOR VIADA CODIGO PENAL REFORMADO DE 1870, Concordado y

Comentado 5th ed. 1926, Tomo II, p. 252. Articles 417 to 447 refer to crimes against
persons under the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870. In Article 516, Title XIII, Chapter 1
of the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870, robbery with homicide is a crime against
property.
69

70

Cited in United States vs. Landasan, 35 Phil 359 (1916).

Article 62, paragraphs 1 and 2 were taken from Article 79 of the Penal Code of Spain,
viz:

No producen el efecto de aumentar la pena las circunstancias agravantes que por si

mismas constituyeren un delito especialmente penado por la Ley, o que esta haya
expresado al describirlo y penarlo.
Tampoco lo producen aquellas circunstancias agravantes de tal manera inherentes al
delito, que sin la concurrencia de ellas no pudiera cometerse. xxx.
71

Vide, Note 63, p. 254.

72

Ibid., p. 255.

73

Las circunstancias agravantes o atenuantes que consistieren en la disposicion moral

del delincuente, en sus relaciones particulares con el ofendido, o en otra causa
personal, serviran para agravar o atenuar la responsabilidad solo de aquello autores,
complices o encubridores en quienes concurrieren.
Las que consistieren en la ejecucion material del hecho o en los medios empleados
para realizarlo serviran para agravar o atenuar la responsabilidad unicamente de los
que tuvieren conocimiento de ellas en el momento de la accion o de su cooperacion
para el delito. xxx
74

United States vs. Ancheta, 15 Phil 43 (1910).

75

Ibid.

76

People vs. Onabia, 306 SCRA 23 (1999).

77

People vs. Tao, 331 SCRA 449 (2000).

78

363 SCRA 621 (2000).

79

People vs. Cordero, 263 SCRA 122 (1996).

80

Article 2234, New Civil Code.

81

Original Record, p. 82.

82

See note 79.

Vitug, J.:
1

Parenthetically, almost all of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of

the Revised Penal Code are generic, with few exceptions as so exemplified by Mr.
Justice Florenz B. Regalado in his book, "Criminal Law Conspectus," (First Edition,
2000, p. 73) like cruelty and treachery being exclusive to crimes against persons, person
in authority in physical injuries, unlicensed firearms in robbery in band, and abuse of
authority or confidential relations by guardians or curators in seduction, rape, acts of
lasciviousness, white slavery and corruption of minors. The mitigating circumstances
enumerated in Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, however, are generic to both
crimes against property and persons and their applicability to even the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide would be without question.
2

Regalado, Ibid., p. 14.

99 Phil 992

At p. 993; see also People vs. Ombao, (103 SCRA 233) where an accused was held
liable for the crime of robbery with homicide even though it could not be ascertained
whether the shots which killed the victim were fired by the malefactors or by the pursuing
constabulary troopers.

237 SCRA 52.

348 SCRA 143.

At p. 153.