1.

People v Bayotas
2. Panaguiton v DOJ
3. Recebido v People
4. Pangan v Gatbalite
5. Del Castillo v Torrecampo
6. Dimakuta v People
7. Almero v People
8. Colinares v People
9. Lagrosa v People
10. Vicoy v People
11. Francisco v CA

1. People v Bayotas

Rape; SC dismissed the criminal aspect

Issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.
Decision: Yes. The case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. With
reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory
construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished. The civil liability, however, poses a
problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment. It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of
the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act
as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of
the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the
former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle
does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally
from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale.
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefore may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where -during the prosecution of the criminal
action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription

2. Panaguiton Jr v DOJ
G.R. No. 167571
November 25, 2008

Facts:

Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums
of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his
business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili
and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored,
either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal
demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on
26 June 1995, but to no avail.

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the
preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However,
Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since
petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he
was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against
Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and
pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's

signatures, which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also
showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be
Cawili's business associate.

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable
cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial
appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed
before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was
possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his
signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack
of merit.

On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed
the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State
Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already
prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by

B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee,
dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.

On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez,
ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the
complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period
citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for
reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and
ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against
Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to
violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses
thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the
offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised
Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August
2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of
petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In
the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in
dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was
patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.

The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running
of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a
special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four
(4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.

Issue:

Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art.
90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?

Held:

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the
phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the
justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.

Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However,
from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor
(24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of
nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he

had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to
suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No.
3326.

Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their
causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances
beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
investigating agencies.

The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioners filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22.
Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim
of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the
Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department
of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs.

Digest No. 2

G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008

Luis Panaguiton Jr., petitioner
vs DOJ, Ramon Tongson and Rodrigo Cawili, Respondents
Ponente: Tinga
Facts:
This is a petition for Review of CA resolutions dismissing Luis Panaguiton, Jr. petition for
certiorari and motion for reconsideration
In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from petitioner and later issued checks as payment both
signed by Cawili and his business associate Tongson. But checks were dishonored either for
insufficiency of funds or closure of account.
Panaguiton then made a formal demands to Cawili and Tongson to pay but to no avail.
So Panaguiton filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP Blg. 22 before QC
Prosecutor's Office.
During PI, Tongson filed his counter-affidavit claiming that he had been unjustly included as
party-respondent since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in Cawili's personal capacity. He
averred that he was not Cawili's business associate and claimed that he himself has criminal
cases against Cawili. Tongson also denied that he had issued bounced checks and that his
signatures on the checks had been falsified.
As cpunter, Panaguiton presented documents showing Tongson's signature which was the same
as the signatures on the checks. Panaguiton presented also an affidavit of adverse claim
wherein Tongson claimed to be Cawili's business associate.
December 1995, Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the
charges against Tongson.
Panaguiton filed a partial appeal before DOJ even the case against Cawili was filed before the
proper court.
Later on July 1997, after finding that Tongson was possible to co-sign the bounced checks and
had altered his signature in pleadings submitte during PI, Chief State Prosecutor directed the
City Prosecutor of QC to conduct reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and refer the
signatures to NBI.
On March 1999, Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Tongson without
referring to the NBI, holding that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act. No. 3326,
stating that in this case the 4 year period started on the date the checks were dishonored and
that the filing of complaint in QC prosecutor's office did not interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period as the law contemplates judicial and not administrative proceedings. Four
years had elapsed and no information was filed against Tongson. And the order to refer the
matter to NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of rules of criminal
procedure because the initiative should come from the petitioner himself and not from the
investigating prosecutor.
Petitioner appealed to DOJ through undersecretary Teehankee but was dismissed. Petitioner
then filed a motion for reconsideration of DOJ and through undersecretary Gutierrez ruled in
his favor and declared that the prescription period was interrupted by the filing of the
complaint in the Prosecutor's office.

However, in August 2004, DOJ acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson ruled
the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered the withdrawal of 3 informations for
violation of BP Blg. 22 against Tongson. DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations
of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.
Panguiton thus filed a petition for Certiorari before CA assailing the august resolution of the
DOJ, but was dismissed by CA in view of failure to attach a proper verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.
Panaguiton then filed for instant petition claiming that CA committed grave error on
dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was
without merit and questions are too unsubstantial.
The DOJ stated that CA did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the
rules of court.
Then Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment arguing that CA did not err in dismissing
the petition for certiorari, and they also claim that the offense of violation of BP Blg. 22 has
prescribed and the long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State violated their
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. The petition is meritorious.
Issues: (1) Technical Issues, (2) Substantive Aspects
Ruling: (1) verification is merely formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that
matters which are alleged are true and correct-the court may simply order the correction of
unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance so that the ends of justice
may be served. We find that by attaching pertinent verification to his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner has sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.We
also agree that CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground of failure to attach a
certified copy or duplicate original of the 3 resolution of DOJ.
(2) This court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for PI suspends the
running of the prescriptive period.The delay was beyond petitioner's control but that of the
DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and misapplications.
Petition is granted.

3. Recebido v. People (346 SCRA 88)

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Public Document.
Petitioner was charged and convicted by the trial court of falsifying the signature of Caridad
Dorol, causing it to appear that said Caridad Dorol has signed her name on a Deed of Absolute

Sale of Real Property in his favor, when in truth and in fact he well knew, that Caridad Dorol
did not execute said document, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court except for the award
for damage.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed gave abuse of discretion in sustaining the
conviction of the petitioner?
Decision:
We hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it
affirmed petitioner's conviction by the trial court.
The petitioner admits that the deed of sale that was in his possession is a forged document as
found by the trial and appellate court. Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that notwithstanding
this admission, the fact remains that there is no proof that the petitioner authored such
falsification or that the forgery was done under his direction.
This argument is without merit. Under the circumstance, there was no need of any direct
proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As keenly observed by the Solicitor
General, "the questioned document was submitted by petitioner himself when the same was
requested by the NBI for examination. Clearly in possession of the falsified deed of sale was
petitioner and not Caridad Dorol who merely verified the questioned sale with the Provincial
Assessor's Office of Sorsogon. In other words, the petitioner was in possession of the forged
deed of sale which purports to sell the subject land from the private complainant to him.
Given this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be the author of the forged deed of
sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence of his authorship of the forgery. Since the
petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of the document found
in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of the falsification. As it
stands, therefore, we are unable to discern any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Appeals.

4. Pangan v. Gatbalite

Facts:
1. On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was
sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the
Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. Petitioner
never got to serve his sentence and hid forabout nine years.

2. Then, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat
Detention Cell. Four days thereafter, he filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the
RTC of Angeles City, impleading respondent (Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga).
Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that, a) the
straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under
No. 3,Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and(b) having been able to continuously evade
service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminalliability has long been totally
extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied since there was no evasion of the
service of the sentence. Evasion presupposes escape during the service of the sentence
consisting in deprivation ofliberty.
Issue: Whether or not the penalty already prescribed
HELD: NO.
The period of prescription of penalties the succeeding Article 93 provides "shall commence
to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". Article 157 of
the RPC discussed how evasion of service of sentence was perfected. It is provided therein
that,
"The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment. To consider properly the meaning of evasion
service of sentence, its elements must be present these are: (1) the offender is a convict by
final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3)
he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. For, by the
express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during
the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment."
That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the second sentence
of Article 157. It provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken
place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors,
or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through
connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of
sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles
93 and 157 of the RPC means the unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his
custody. Clearly, one who has notbeen committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped
therefrom.

In this case, the petitioner was never brought to prison. As the record would show, even
before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. He now
begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and
tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was
petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who
are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer
for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

8. Colinares v People
Eligibility for Probation Even After Appealing From an Erroneous Judgment : The Colinares
vs. People (G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011) Doctrine
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Accused-appellant Arnel Colinares (Arnel) was charged with frustrated homicide for
hitting the head of the private complainant with a piece of stone. He alleged self-defense but
the trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment from 2 years and 4 months ofprisioncorreccional, as minimum, to 6 years and
1 day ofprisionmayor, as maximum.Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under
the law was only up to 6 years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively,
seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction

of the penalty imposed on him.His conviction was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal to
the Supreme Court.
II. THE ISSUES
Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower [lesser] offense [of
attempted homicide] and a reduced probationable penalty, may he may still apply for
probation on remand of the case to the trial court?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court voted to PARTIALLY GRANTthe appeal, MODIFIED the CA decision
and found Arnel GUILTY of ATTEMPTED (not frustrated) HOMICIDE and SENTENCED him to and
indeterminate but PROBATIONABLE penalty of 4 months of arresto mayor as minimum and 2
years and 4 months of prision correccional as maximum. The Court also voted 8-7 to allow
Arnel to APPLY FOR PROBATION within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has
been remanded for execution to trial court.]
YES, Arnel may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having
appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But, the
Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the
maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for
probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
[W]hile it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the
right to such privilege; he certainly does not have.What he has is the right to apply for that
privilege.The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months.If
the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to
the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into
account the full circumstances of his case.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the
probation law on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment against him.He will not
be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on
him. More, the Supreme Courts judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter
penalty will also have to bend over to the trial courts judgmenteven if this has been found
in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous
judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala,
ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip).Where is justice there?

Here, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation.He did not have a choice between appeal and probation.He was not in a position
to say, By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation.The stiff penalty that the
trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to
now seek probation under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound
ruling inFrancisco.It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when
they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide,
but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on
him a probationable penalty.Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found
him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four
months maximum.This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.

12.

Franciso v CA

PABLO C. FRANCISCO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS

G.R. No. 108747. April 6, 1995
FACTS:
Pablo Francisco was accused of multiple grave oral defamation by his employees. The
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati sentenced him of prision correccional in its minimum period
in each crime committed on each date of each case. Francisco then elevated the case to the
RTC in which they sentenced him only of eight straight months for appreciating mitigating
circumstances.
Francisco failed to make an appeal on the RTCs decision making it final. The MTC issued a
warrant of arrest, but before Francisco was to be arrested, he filed an application for
probation which the MTC denied. He went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which was
also denied.
ISSUE: Whether Pablo Francisco is still qualified to avail of probation.
RULING:
No. Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation. First, Francisco violated Sec.4 of the
Probation Law in which no application for probation shall be entertained after the judgement
is final.
Second, Francisco misunderstood when he thought that his prison sentence held by the MTC
was not qualified for probation. Multiple prison terms should not be added up. Consequently,
Francisco lost his right to probation when he appealed the MTC decision to the RTC. The law
considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

Third, Franciscos appeal to the RTC was not for reducing his penalties but for his assertion of
his innocence. The Probation Law prevent opportunism when petitioners apply for probation
when their appeal was dismissed.
Lastly, the application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law.