Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1NC
1NC Democratization
CCP instability causes transition structure and movements
GFS 12 A Service of the Economists Intelligence Unit (Global Forecasting Service, Social
and political disorder undermine stability in China http://www.gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?
articleType=gr&articleid=846) RMT
In theory, the CCP structure is designed to allow the leadership to be guided by the masses,
whose opinion is channelled up through the party structures. For this reason, the five-yearly
party congresses are in principle the CCP's supreme agency, outranking even the PSC. In
practice, the country imposes a Leninist top-down management style. So although the new
leadership is theoretically meant to be chosen by the central committee, with input from lower
party cells, in practice it is the current PSC members who tend to choose their successors, with
input from powerful party elders and various CCP factions. Once the new party leadership is in
place, the associated changes in the state government will take place around March 2013 at the
annual session of the National People's Congress.
As a result, political uncertainty will continue well after the changeover. It is as yet impossible to
say whether one faction will be able to use Mr Bo's fall to secure a dominant position, but it
seems unlikely: the structure of China's political system suggests that the next leadership will
again reflect the fine balance of power between conservatives and (relatively) liberal reformers
within the CCP. As expected, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang will take over as president and premier
respectively in early 2013, following their elevation to the number one and three positions in the
CCP at the party congress in late 2012. Nevertheless, the new government's anti-corruption
drive could well prove destabilising, with, for example, the deputy party secretary of Sichuan
province, Li Chuncheng, the highest-profile individual so far to be caught up in the campaign.
He is unlikely to be the last, however,
In his departing speech in early November, Hi Jintao, the CCP's leader since 2002, warned that
China's development is "unbalanced, unco-ordinated and unsustainable". In reality, China's
leaders have little choice but to reform if they are to sustain China's economic growth and boost
the flagging legitimacy of the CCP. But there is a risk that internal party manoeuvres will
produce a less than effective set of leaders.
Conclusion
Should the Communist Party become distracted as the new set of leaders seek to establish
themselves, opponents of the present order - ranging from aggrieved minorities (including
Tibetans and Muslim Uyghurs), to on-line democracy campaigners - may take the opportunity
to step up their activism. This may only be further encouraged by the leadership's unwillingness
to permit any easing of its grip over the affairs of state: in his outgoing speech, Mr Hu was
steadfast in his defence of the one-party system, and his probable successor has shown little
predilection for political reform. Given that China has in effect been the engine of global
economic growth over the past few years, any signs of instability would damage global economic
confidence, as well as having substantial potential knock-on effects on those countries that have
directly benefited from China's economic boom (including, in particular, commodity exporters).
Impact
democracy is sure to be influenced by its practice in China, which will come to the game with a
rich tradition of indigenous innovation and, arguably, deeper cultural roots in the essential
principles of democracy such as tolerance, compromise, and egalitarianism . How will democracy change
as a result? There has been much recent discussion in the West of a democratic malaise where the associational and normsoriented life of a democracy is breaking down. Many scholars see the democratic waves of the past as having ended and the old
democracies in a state of slow regression. Some countries are thought to be stuck in minimal democracies of dispersed power but not
true equality. To some, the value of political power is unequal, some freedoms more cared for than others, and economic justice
unachieved. If modern-day social contractarians are right, a failure to achieve these things make a democracys claim to goodness
very thin indeed.
It is here that Chinas democratization may play a vital role. Most Chinese scholars
harbor the hope that China will surpass traditional forms of democracy as practiced in the rest
of the worldespecially the imagined Western modeland introduce to the world a new
system that will be even better.2 This is the so-called surpass sentiment (chaoyue qingxu) mentioned earlier. Of
course, there is not a little bit of cultural chauvinism at work here , the desire for China to retake its rightful place
as the dispenser of civilization to the worlds benighted peoples, especially the stubbornly
dynamic West. Even so, we should not rule out, nor rue, the possibility that China will pioneer a
unique version of democracy. As one Western scholar notes: It remains possible that some day
the Asian, perhaps even the Chinese, vision of the best form of government will become the
dominant vision.3 If so, it would be a cause for celebration because everyone benefits when a
more just system is available. Many Chinese scholars conjure up a new form of political order that is both strongly
democratic and strongly social-oriented. One talks of the emergence of a creative ambiguity, in China which defies easy labels, in
which a mixed economy with a state sector will exist alongside mixed politics with elements of both liberal democracy and social
democracy.4 Others seem to echo classical republican political theorists of the West with dreams of deliberative democracy
(shangyi minzhu)5 or policy democracy (zhengce minzhu) in which peoples considered views on issues actually translate into
outcomes.6 Here, elections lose their pride of place as the hallmark of democracy, being replaced by other mechanisms for
contesting state power and proposing interests and views of the good. One Chinese scholar anticipates a vast laboratory of
democratic experimentation which, given the sheer size of the country, would create a whole new lexicon of democratic forms and
theories: There are actual opportunities for transcending historically known systems and they might be seized by a conscious
people.7 There is much here that meshes with recent thinking on democracy in the West, which stresses issues like social capital,
popular deliberation, equality of political opportunity, and more. In other words ,
Democracy is key to the effectiveness of institutions the UN, The IMF, and the
WTO
Kendall 16 - Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and
Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council and a nonresident senior associate in the Human
Rights Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.. July
15th (How Democracys Decline Would Undermine the International Order, Center for
Strategic and International studies, available online at https://www.csis.org/analysis/howdemocracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-international-order, accessed 7/25/16,
HDA)
Democratic decline would weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important
foundation for U.S. cooperation abroad . Research demonstrates that domestic politics are a key
determinant of the international behavior of states. In particular, democracies are more likely to
form alliances and cooperate more fully with other democracies than with autocracies . Similarly,
authoritarian countries have established mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of worst
practices. An increase in authoritarian countries, then, would provide a broader platform for
coordination that could enable these countries to overcome their divergent histories, values, and
interestsfactors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the formation of a cohesive challenge
to the U.S.-led international system. Recent examples support the empirical data. Democratic backsliding in
Hungary and the hardening of Egypts autocracy under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have led to
enhanced relations between these countries and Russia. Likewise, democratic decline in
Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations
with China and Russia, in part to mitigate Western pressure and bolster the regimes domestic
standing. Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified
partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation
where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners
on specific issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently , further democratic
decline could seriously compromise the United States ability to form the kinds of
deep partnerships that will be required to confront todays increasingly complex
challenges. Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent
extremism demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding
would put in peril. Put simply, the United States is a less effective and influential
actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with other democratic nations .
A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current global order by diluting U.S.
influence in critical international institutions, including the United Nations , the World Bank,
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts
within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to
protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet.
Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to
censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the
Likeminded Group of Developing Countries within the United Nations to advocate their interests. Within the IMF and World
Bank,
existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global economic
governance will become fragmented and less effective.
bursting of Chinas demographic bubble and the limits of state-led growth to the suspicion of
well-armed neighbours. Yet these problems are intensified by and inherent to the nature of
the countrys political regime. Its system of bureaucratic authoritarianism creates incentives for
corruption and repression, as the Bo Xilai drama revealed. Western media investigations into
the family fortunes of incoming president Xi Jinping and outgoing premier Wen Jiabao have
suggested that members amassed extraordinary wealth in ways that correlate with the political
success of their patriarchs. This is not a peoples republic. Chinas state-directed economy has
generated rapid growth for three decades. But it has also produced imbalances. China has
overinvested in real estate and heavy manufacturing; state-owned enterprises are often run by
politicians rather than businessmen; banks dispense loans at non-market rates on the basis of
non-market principles; currency manipulation and intellectual piracy generate retaliation by
trading partners. Meanwhile, labour costs (and labour unrest) have increased. Government
suppression of information has stymied indigenous technological breakthroughs. This has
echoes of how political choices in the 15th century privileging government mandarins over
entrepreneurs closed China off to early industrial development and imperial expansion,
ceding a 500-year advantage to the west.
2NC Expansionism
Democracy solves Chinese aggression and preserves global stability
Friedman and McCormick 0 - Edward Friedman graduated from Harvard in 1968 and
is Currently a Professor at UM-Wisconsin, He received the Guggenheim Fellowship for Social
Sciences in the US and Canada, Barrett L. McCormick, Barrett L. McCormick. Professor of
Political Science, Coordinator of the Interdisciplinary Major in International Affairs. Ph.D.,
University of Wisconsin, 1985 (What If China Doesn't Democratize?: Implications for War and
Peace Jun 11, 2015, Google Books) RMT
To be sure, China's military might should not be exaggerated. But, ignoring the regional facts,
places where China already is bullying neigh- bors is also a mistake. Illusions protect war-prone
forces. Were China a democracy , there could be voices in a debate calling attention to
millen- nia of Chinese wars of incorporation and expansion. A democratic debate in China might
somewhat puncture virtually genetic notions of Japanese evil, Chinese purity, and an aggrieved
China as the eternal victim. In a democracy, supporters of China-Japan reconciliation as more
important than demands for endless Japanese apologies could ask, "Should Vietnam demand
that China apologize and face history for the Ming [dynasty] invasion of Dai Viet in the fifteenth
century, when Chi- nese commanders claimed 7 million killed and that the plains were turned
red?" And should China apologize for any of the subsequent Chinese attacks on the Vietnamese
state over the next four centuries. What should reparations be?" It might be possible in a
Chinese democracy to get the viewpoints of chinas anxious neighbors into Chinas policy debate .
As in its 1999 view of war in Yugoslavia which brackets Kosovo victims of Serbian policy,
Beijing sees no neighbors or minorities as victims of China.
China's expansionist chauvinism is not new ." Its invasion of Korea in 1950 was not a
matter of simple defense; Mao very much wanted into that war." Also, the Chinese side
provoked the 1969 conflict with Soviet Russia. In addition, China invaded Vietnam in 1979 and
then kept harassing Vietnam while putting out stories that Vietnam was provok- ing China with
border incidents. Beijing was also the backer of the genocidal Pol Pot; Beijing was the major
arms supplier of the murderous Khmer Rouge. It arms the murderous tyrants in Myanmar
(Burma). It armed the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda. Dictatorship precludes these
huge facts from entering the political discourse in China.
Violence and instability would also likely increase if more democracies give way to
autocracy. International relations literature tells us that democracies are less likely to fight wars against other democracies,
suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines. Moreover, within countries that are
already autocratic, additional movement away from democracy, or an authoritarian
hardening, would increase global instability. Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely
to experience state failure, as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In this way ,
democratic decline would significantly strain the international order because rising levels of
instability would exceed the Wests ability to respond to the tremendous costs of peacekeeping,
humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows. Finally, widespread democratic decline would
contribute to rising anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a global order that is increasingly
antagonistic to the United States and its values. Most autocracies are highly suspicious of U.S.
intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as an effective means for boosting their
own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, and Bolivian president Evo
Morales regularly accuse the United States of fomenting instability and supporting regime change. This vilification of the
United States is a convenient way of distracting their publics from regime shortcomings and
fostering public support for strongman tactics. Since 9/11, and particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring,
Western enthusiasm for democracy support has waned. Rising levels of instability, including in
Ukraine and the Middle East, fragile governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sustained threats
from terrorist groups such as ISIL have increased Western focus on security and stability. U.S.
preoccupation with intelligence sharing, basing and overflight rights, along with the perception that autocracy equates with stability,
are trumping democracy and human rights considerations. While rising levels of global instability explain part of Washingtons shift
from an historical commitment to democracy, the nature of the policy process itself is a less appreciated factor. Policy discussions
tend to occur on a country-by-country basisleading to choices that weigh the costs and benefits of democracy support within the
confines of a single country. From this perspective, the benefits of counterterrorism cooperation or access to natural resources are
regularly judged to outweigh the perceived costs of supporting human rights. A serious problem arises, however, when this process
is replicated across countries. The bilateral focus rarely incorporates the risks to the U.S.-led global order that arise from widespread
democratic decline across multiple countries.
Yes Transition
Republic of China evolved from a failed state that had to flee the mainland, to an inhibited and
increasingly pluralisticalbeit still auto- cratic and repressivepolitical center, eventually to
what Mctzgcr calls a "sub- ordinated" political center, giving extensive freedom and autonomy to
its citizens and allowing for many arenas of decision making.1 In somewhat differ- ent language,
one could say that Taiwan gradually shifted (and South Korea more rapidly) to democracy from
what Robert Scalapino calls an "authoritar- ian pluralist" system "wherein political life remains
under the unchallenged control of a dominant-party or single-party regime; strict limits are
placed on liberty ...; and military or national security organs keep a close eye on things," but
there exists a civil society with some autonomy from the state and some capacity to express
diverse interests, as well as a mixed or increasingly market- oriented economy.2
The top leaders sometimes get nicknames for the convenience of discussion. Such are the
guerilla war skills to bypass online censorship.
Thirdly, the internet is becoming a tool for organizing political action. The Xiamen walk in
2006 and Guangzhou walk in 2009 for environmental causes were both partially organized
through online communities. The Qian Yunhui case of 2010, in which the government and many
netizens argued over the reason for a peasants death (the government said it resulted from a car
accident while netizens attributed it to political retaliation since the peasant had been
organizing fellow villagers for land rights), generated so much publicity that some netizens
conducted independent investigations. It is true that such activists are still very few because of
information control and political risk, but the phenomenon of coordinating action through the
internet not only helps to maintain solidarity among activists but also provides a channel for
political dissidents to connect with the grassroots, a dangerous coalition in the eyes of the CCP.
Fourth, the internet is fostering a general social capital, which may not have immediate
political implications but can cultivate a democratic attitude in the long run. Despite
government control, many reading, traveling, discussion, charity, and sports groups, among
others, are thriving online. If Harvard professor Robert Putnams thesis39 that pro-social
networks are pro-democratic has an element of truth, the explosion of social interaction and
associations online can help to facilitate Chinas transition toward democracy
In summary, we contend that Chinese culture is not obstructing democratization to
the extent that some suggest . Cultural traits themselves are mixed. Many conservative
tendencies are superficial, and the political culture is in flux. Intellectual leadership is moving
toward liberalism, the traditional media are opening up, and the internet is becoming a cultural
arena which the state is too clumsy to effectively conquer.
K2 democracy
Sudworth 15 John, British Broadcasting Company (Hong Kong pro-democracy
protesters return to streets 1 February 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china31079840) RMT
Those who took to the streets in Hong Kong said they needed to stand up and be counted, if only
to protect existing freedoms. That means exercising the freedom to march even if no-one in
power is listening.
Some of the younger marchers put the low turnout down to fatigue, saying large numbers
would pour back on to the streets when the moment was right . But one 60-year-old
cautioned against youthful optimism, warning that Hong Kong would have to wait for the
downfall of the Chinese Communist Party before seeing genuine democracy.
That party has comfortably outlived many predictions of its demise. It is watching events in
Hong Kong closely and will see a low turnout as vindication of its strategy to avoid force and
overt direction of events while making no compromises on political reform.
At this point, Beijing will feel it has won the battle - if not yet the war - and is likely to carry on
shaping Hong Kong's political destiny according to its own design.
China has promised the semi-autonomous territory direct elections in 2017, but ruled that
candidates had to be vetted by Beijing.
Pro-democracy legislators - who hold about 40% of the seats in the Legislative Council - strongly
oppose the move.
Protester Julia Choi told the AP news agency that pro-democracy candidates "would not even be
nominated, so this is pseudo-universal suffrage, we do not have the rights to elect who we want".
Many demonstrators carried yellow umbrellas - the symbol of the political campaign . A large
banner caricaturing Hong Kong's Chief Executive CY Leung read: "Reject fake democracy, we
want real universal suffrage."
But speaking on local radio on Sunday, Lam Woon-kwong of the Executive Council, Hong
Kong's top policy-making body, warned protesters: "You can't threaten the central authorities."
In the case of China, the power of factions was manifested in the politics of the 1980s: the
Tiananmen movement of 1989 was in a way the showdown between conservatives and liberals
within the Party, although the conservatives led by Deng Xiaoping eventually defeated the
liberals led by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Zhiyang, who were advocating more political reforms. The
results were tragic, but show how political factions served to spur political and social reform in
China. The key question is: will the CCP split into opposing factions again? To answer this
question, one must examine the interplay of the next generation of leaders.
China is no longer ruled by strongman politics. No Chinese leader enjoys the kind of authority
and legitimacy once enjoyed by Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping.51 The new leaders, Xi Jinping
and Li Keqiang, will face tremendous challenges to their authority for two reasons. First, over
the last two decades, the trend has been to prevent individual leaders from accumulating too
much power. This means that Xi and Li will have less authority than previous leaders have had.
Second, the increasingly stagnant nature of the Party will weaken the authority of Chinas new
leaders even further.
Since the HuWen administration took over in 2002, the main social and economic policies
have taken a more or less left turn.52 The slogan harmonious society arguably represents a
major shift from the growth at all costs theme of Jiang Zemins era. The point here is that each
new administration must develop distinctive policies and slogans. The upcoming XiLi
administration is no exception. What kind of catchphrases can they create to build upon Hus
harmonious society? It is increasingly difficult for Chinas top leadership to be innovative
without addressing issues of political reform.
We already have clear evidence that other ambitious leaders are challenging the future authority
of Xi and Li. Many of Chinas new leaders have comparable CVs, without either undisputed
authority or unchallengeable support. Pushing political reform might become a way for certain
leaders to expand their support base. The party secretary of Chongqing city, Bo Xilai, as
mentioned earlier, has revived elements of Maoism, and when he comes to Beijing after the 18th
Party Congress next year, he might promote this model to all of China. As a response, other top
leaders of the next generation will have to either come up with their own version of political
innovations or fall behind Bo in terms of influence and reputation.
There are signs that other top leaders of the next generation are taking action as well. Wang
Yang, the party secretary of Guangdong province, has also publicly made remarks about a
different kind of campaign: liberating thought and other political reforms. Rumors have been
circulating that he wants to ease censorship in Guangdong. Many observers believe that Bo and
Wang are seriously competing for one of the slots in the next Standing Committee of the
Politburo at the 18th Party Congress to be held in 2012. It is hard to say with confidence that this
is the case, but one thing is clear: increasingly fierce competition for power and influence will
take place among ambitious leaders in the coming years, and rivals might try different political
experiments to achieve their goals.
Although it is impossible to predict the outcome of future power struggles, several general
trends can be identified: there will be greater competition for power within the Party, mainly
because no single individual leader has ultimate authority. The top leadership will thus become
less stable, particularly as the competition for power becomes public. Such competition will
inevitably push ambitious politicians to rely more on public opinion to gain political support, as
evidenced by Bos recent efforts in Chongqing. That competition will likely open up space for
new political experiments.
CCPs secret police, who used to be ferocious, are now treating them with courtesy, as
if dealing with future political leaders. This is not as weird as it seems, my friends say, because
the secret police, who have kept the top secrets of the country, know better than anyone else that
the CCP will collapse soon. Trying to leave a way out for themselves, the secret police take care not to offend those who
may become future leaders of China. The pro-democracy activists share the belief that the CCP is on the
brink of its demise. This belief is in part built on the information they acquired from high-level
Party officials. Some high officials are quite open-minded, and have a clear understanding of the evil nature of the CCP and its
demise, so they have long been sympathizers and supporters of democratic movements. Other officials also have sensed the
imminent collapse of the CCP, so they have wasted no time in connecting with democrats through various channels so as to leave a
chance for their own future. The activists are concerned with the harm that the CCP has done, and continues to do, to China. As one
if the CCP doesnt die out within 10 years, the Chinese nation will perish. Another
activist described the Chinese economy as an empty shell, pointing out that with a 50 percent
non-performing assets rate of the national banks, a serious stock market bubble that has raised
stock prices far past their value, and an astronomical deficit, China is now running mainly on
foreign investments and will collapse immediately if such investments are no longer available.
of the activists said,
They also mentioned that according to a high-ranking army officer, if China goes to war with Taiwan in the next ten years, China will
not be able to survive for a single week due to oil shortages. Therefore, the activists fear that the CCP will drag China into the abyss
along with it. I was also impressed by their active preparations for the coming new China free of the CCP. What a friend said may be
typical of their attitude: The CCP has millions of troops, but so what? They have no chance to win. According to the democrats,
various forces in China are planning how to maintain social stability and keep the country running smoothly after the CCPs
disintegration. The activists told me that they have supporters everywhere in China, including senior Party officials. They are in the
process of establishing a new party. The political bureau of the CCP knows their plan, and has been trying to deal with it. However
the CCP doesnt have enough power to stop this. Several years ago, the activists would have been in big trouble for doing this, but
Most of the Third Wave transitions gave way to successful democracies, a reflection both of the
stronger supporting conditions as well as the greater normative appeal of democracy by then. Of
the 28 new democratic states created out of the collapse of Eastern European and Central Asian
communist regimes in 198991, for example, 25 were considered either consolidated or moving
in that direction a decade later.1 Most of the modernday democratic failures have been in Africa,
where a nonexistent civil society, economic distress, and ethnic conflict have savaged the
foundations of political order. On that basis, there is reason to believe that China too will break
the cycle of failure and achieve a stable democracy. It will begin its democratic age with a strong
dose of normative support for democracy alongside the usual pragmatic supports related to the
crisis of dictatorship. The belief within society that democracy will eventually bring about a
superior point in terms of stable governance, a fair and just society, prosperous economy, and
a settled international role will ensure that the difficulties of consolidation will not overwhelm
the system.
Confucianism in particular has often been cited as an impediment to democracy. However, Fukuyama contends that
markets seem to have accepted the fact that sluggish growth for the world's
second largest economy is its new normal." Meanwhile, Goldman Sachs -- where in November 2001 Jim
O'Neil coined the term BRICs and forecast that China might surpass the United States economically by 2028 -- cut its forecast
of Chinese growth to 7.4 percent. The New York Times, Barron's and Goldman Sachs are all both
a seismograph of the conventional wisdom and the creators of the conventional wisdom. Therefore,
when all three announce within a few weeks that China's economic condition ranges from
disappointing to verging on a crash , it transforms the way people think of China. Now the
conversation is moving from forecasts of how quickly China will overtake the United States to
considerations of what the consequences of a Chinese crash would be. Doubting China Suddenly finding
Stratfor amid the conventional wisdom regarding China does feel odd, I must admit. Having first noted the underlying
contradictions in China's economic growth years ago, when most viewed China as the miracle Japan wasn't, and having been
what they want the world to believe about their growth, and the world has believed them -hence, the fantastic tales of economic growth. China in fact has had an extraordinary period of growth. The last 30
years have been remarkable, marred only by the fact that the Chinese started at such a low point due to the policies of the Maoist
period. Growth at first was relatively easy; it was hard for China to do worse. But make no mistake: China surged. Still, basing
economic performance on consumption, Krugman notes that China is barely larger economically than Japan. Given the
compounding effects of China's guesses at GDP, we would guess it remains behind Japan, but how can you tell? We can say without
a doubt that China's economy has grown dramatically in the past 30 years but that it is no longer growing nearly as quickly as it once
did. China's growth surge was built on a very unglamorous fact: Chinese wages were far below Western wages, and therefore the
Chinese were able to produce a certain class of products at lower cost than possible in the West. The Chinese built businesses around
this, and Western companies built factories in China to take advantage of the differential. Since Chinese workers were unable to
purchase many of the products they produced given their wages, China built its growth on exports. For this to continue, China had to
maintain its wage differential indefinitely. But China had another essential policy: Beijing was terrified of unemployment and the
social consequences that flow from it. This was a rational fear, but one that contradicted China's main strength, its wage advantage.
Because the Chinese feared unemployment, Chinese policy, manifested in bank lending policies, stressed preventing unemployment
by keeping businesses going even when they were inefficient. China also used bank lending to build massive infrastructure and
commercial and residential property. Over time, this policy created huge inefficiencies in the Chinese economy. Without recessions,
inefficiencies develop. Growing the economy is possible, but not growing profitability. Eventually, the economy will be dragged down
by its inefficiency. Inflation vs. Unemployment As businesses become inefficient, production costs rise. And that leads to inflation.
As money is lent to keep inefficient businesses going, inflation increases even more markedly. The increase in inefficiency is
compounded by the growth of the money supply prompted by aggressive lending to keep the economy going. As this persisted over
many years, the inefficiencies built into the Chinese economy have become staggering. The second thing to bear in mind is the
overwhelming poverty of China, where 900 million people have an annual per capita income around the same level as Guatemala,
Georgia, Indonesia or Mongolia ($3,000-$3,500 a year), while around 500 million of those have an annual per capita income
around the same level as India, Nicaragua, Ghana, Uzbekistan or Nigeria ($1,500-$1,700). China's overall per capita GDP is around
the same level as the Dominican Republic, Serbia, Thailand or Jamaica. Stimulating an economy where more than a billion people
live in deep poverty is impossible. Economic stimulus makes sense when products can be sold to the public. But the vast majority of
Chinese cannot afford the products produced in China, and therefore, stimulus will not increase consumption of those products. As
important, stimulating demand so that inefficient factories can sell products is not only inflationary, it is suicidal. The task is to
increase consumption, not to subsidize inefficiency. The Chinese are thus in a trap. If they continue aggressive lending to failing
businesses, they get inflation. That increases costs and makes the Chinese less competitive in exports, which are also falling due to
the recession in Europe and weakness in the United States. Allowing businesses to fail brings unemployment, a massive social and
political problem. The Chinese have zigzagged from cracking down on lending by regulating informal lending and raising interbank
rates to loosening restrictions on lending by removing the floor on the benchmark lending rate and by increasing lending to smalland medium-sized businesses. Both policies are problematic. The Chinese have maintained a strategy of depending on exports
without taking into account the operation of the business cycle in the West, which means that periodic and substantial contractions
of demand will occur. China's industrial plant is geared to Western demand. When Western demand contracted, the result was the
mess you see now. The Chinese economy could perhaps be growing at 7.4 percent, but I doubt the number is anywhere near that.
Some estimates place growth at closer to 5 percent. Regardless of growth, the ability to maintain profit margins is rarely considered.
Producing and selling at or even below cost will boost GDP numbers but undermines the financial system. This happened to Japan
in the early 1990s. And it is happening in China now. The Chinese can prevent the kind of crash that struck East Asia in 1997. Their
currency isn't convertible, so there can't be a run on it. They continue to have a command economy; they are still communist, after
all. But
they cannot avoid the consequences of their economic reality, and the longer they put
off the day of reckoning, the harder it will become to recover from it. They have
already postponed the reckoning far longer than they should have. They would postpone it
further if they could by continuing to support failing businesses with loans. They can do that for a very long time -provided they are prepared to emulate the Soviet model's demise . The Chinese don't want
that, but what they do want is a miraculous resolution to their problem. There are no solutions
that don't involve agony, so they put off the day of reckoning and slowly decline. China's
Transformation The Chinese are not going to completely collapse economically any more than the Japanese or South Koreans did.
the Chinese
will focus on containing the social and political fallout , both by trying to target benefits
to politically sensitive groups and by using their excellent security apparatus to suppress and
deter unrest. The Chinese economic performance will degrade, but crisis will be avoided and
political interests protected. Since much of China never benefited from the boom, there is a
massive force that has felt marginalized and victimized by coastal elites. That is not a bad
foundation for the Communist Party to rely on. The key is understanding that if China cannot
solve its problems without unacceptable political consequences, it will try to stretch out the
decline. Japan had a lost decade only in the minds of Western investors, who implicitly value aggregate GDP growth over other
What will happen is that China will behave differently than before. With no choices that don't frighten them,
measures of success such as per capita GDP growth or full employment. China
democratic institutions. Although structural and cultural factors shape political trends, the
leadership often plays a crucial role in deciding the timing of democratization, as demonstrated
by the Gorbachev factor in the democratization of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe or the
role of Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan. If Konstantin Chernenko had lived 20 more years, or if
Deng Xiaoping had lived 10 fewer, the process and outcome of democratization in those
countries might have been very different.
Three questions need to be addressed: First, do Chinese leaders embrace democracy in their
discourse? Second, to what degree do they implement democratic practices or reforms with
democratic characteristics? Third, how do faction politics affect the prospects of
democratization, particularly how will the upcoming 18th Party Congress influence political
reforms in the decades ahead? We also want to emphasize that political elites do not live in a
political vacuum. The rise of an increasingly independent civil society will change both elites
incentives and values in China.
Democracy Discourse
Despite Chinas stellar record of growth over the last 30 years, Chinese citizens are increasingly
dissatisfied with the growth first model and are demanding more social justice and equality.40
The CCP realizes this and its discourse on democracy has changed subtly in recent years.
Premier Wen Jiabao is perhaps the leader who has raised the most hope about Chinas political
reform in recent times. In 2006, for example, he told a delegation from the Brookings Institute
in the United States, We have to move to democracy. . .we know the direction in which we are
going. Wen mentioned three aspects of democracy: elections, judicial independence, and
supervision based on checks and balances.41 Although he did not offer specifics about how to
implement democracy, his remarks do represent a gradual shift from the old discourse of
socialist democracy. Since July 2010, Wen has promoted democracy on more than seven
occasions, including a special interview with CNN on many sensitive issues related to Chinas
political reforms.42 Most recently, in a meeting with entrepreneurs at the September 2011
World Economic Forum in Dalian, Wen again emphasized the importance of the rule of law,
social equality, judicial independence, peoples democratic rights, and anti-corruption
initiatives.43
Although different interpretations can be made of Wens recent remarks, there are other voices
both within and outside the CCP also calling for faster and deeper political reform. The most
notable Party theorist is Yu Keping, the deputy director of the Central Committees Compilation
and Translation Bureau, who has put forward a theory of incremental democracy, which
emphasizes the orderly expansion of citizen participation in politics. His article, Democracy is a
good thing, published in 2006, created a huge debate within the Party about the merits of
democracy.44
Despite such positive trends, one might wonder if all the talk about democracy has any real
impact on political development in China. We say it does, for several reasons. First, even if the
democratic discourse is just speechifying, it can provide a weapon for civil society to mobilize
and hold the Party accountable. It is interesting that, when protesting the persecution of three
netizens attacked because of their speech online, demonstrators held a banner quoting Premier
Wen, Justice Is More Brilliant than the Sun, in front of a local court in Fujian. Second, there is
good reason to believe that some Party members are genuinely interested in promoting
democracy in China. This is because they understand that the Partys legitimacy cannot stem
from economic performance alone but must be based upon multiple sources, including political
legitimacy.45 Moreover, they probably understand that the Party will be able to hold on to
power or protect its interests if it initiates the political reform and shapes the constitutional
design rather than if it is driven out of power by others in a time of crisis. Of course, it is
unrealistic to place hopes for democratization on mentions of democracy by Chinese political
leaders, even if some are genuinely interested in promoting political reforms, as there is
certainly strong opposition against democracy within the Party. Hence, even the much promoted
proposal for intra-party democracy should be viewed with caution.
Whats equally important, if not more important, than the rhetorical incorporation of democracy
into the Partys discourse is, ironically, the CCPs inability to come up with a coherent theoretical
alternative to liberal democracy. President Hu Jintaos attempt seems to be the concept of
Scientific Development, 46 but the concept means so much that it actually means very little.
The installment of a statue of Confucius in Tiananmen Square in January 2011 raised suspicions
that the CCP wanted to revive Confucianism as its official discourse, but the quiet and
mysterious removal of it in April 2011 suggests that the Party knows that it would be too much of
a stretch to go from Communism to Confucianism. The general secretary of Chongqing, Bo Xilai,
has attracted attention with his campaign of Singing the Red and Cracking down on the Black
(singing the revolutionary songs and eliminating crimes), but the blend of this semi-Maoist
campaign and the market economy does not amount to any coherent ideology. The current
ideological disarray might force some political elites to gradually turn to liberal democracy at
some point.
Actual Reforms?
There is no convincing evidence that the Party is now engaging in meaningful reforms, although
in some areas positive improvements have been made. One of the key themes of the ongoing
discourse is that mechanisms must be developed to ensure intra-party democracy, with a system
for the election, supervision, evaluation, and promotion of officials.
For example, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Party Congress in September 2009 stressed
the reform of the party electoral system. Public recommendation, direct election is being
quietly promoted in several areas. Interestingly in 2009, for the first time in the history of the
CCP, some district offices in Nanjing elected the secretary and deputy secretary of the Party
Committee. In June 2010, Nanjing became the first city to complete the city-wide public
recommendation, direct election of grassroots party officials.47 Similar experiments have been
conducted in other cities including Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Chengdu.
How are these elections conducted? First, candidates recommend themselves to ordinary party
members; second, candidates give presentations before the final vote; and third, candidates
answer questions put forward by other party members. Some party theorists believe that such a
trend toward the direct election of party officials is an irreversible process, as more cities and
regions are adopting this system. Although there is no sign that the CCPs top officials will be
subjected to direct election anytime soon, it does show that the Party is gradually moving toward
that ultimate goal.
In many other areas, however, political reform not only has not progressed, it has in fact
backslid. Journalists complain that censorship has intensified rather than loosened in recent
years. Many human rights activists and dissidents are frequently harassed, if not arrested.48 As
for the independents running for seats in local congresses in 2011, the Party has used all sorts of
measures to prevent them from being elected.49 However, we argue that the increasing
paranoia of the Party and its frequent resort to naked power is a sign of desperation rather
than confidence. It shows that the state has less and less capacity to persuade and co-opt. The
intensification of censorship and repression can alienate the society further, which will in turn
add more pressure on the state to reform.
Factional Politics: Democracys Friend
It should be noted that Chinas ruling elites and the CCP do not comprise a monolithic entity.
Under certain circumstances, it is possible for the ruling elites to split into multiple factions or
camps. Such divisions can contribute to democratization. Political scientists Guillermo
ODonnell and Philippe C. Schmitter have argued that the struggle between hard-liners and softliners has both a direct and an indirect influence on democratic transitions.50 According to this
logic, authoritarian elites will form factions to compete for power and legitimacy when it is very
hard to reach consensus on critical social and economic issues. Certain political liberalization
measures will be taken, and the more liberal leaders will seek support from civil society to
balance the more conservative leaders. Although democracy might not be the ultimate goal of
either coalition, the process can be a slippery slope that eventually leads to an unintended
outcome.
In the case of China, the power of factions was manifested in the politics of the 1980s: the
Tiananmen movement of 1989 was in a way the showdown between conservatives and liberals
within the Party, although the conservatives led by Deng Xiaoping eventually defeated the
liberals led by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Zhiyang, who were advocating more political reforms. The
results were tragic, but show how political factions served to spur political and social reform in
China. The key question is: will the CCP split into opposing factions again? To answer this
question, one must examine the interplay of the next generation of leaders.
China is no longer ruled by strongman politics. No Chinese leader enjoys the kind of authority
and legitimacy once enjoyed by Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping.51 The new leaders, Xi Jinping
and Li Keqiang, will face tremendous challenges to their authority for two reasons. First, over
the last two decades, the trend has been to prevent individual leaders from accumulating too
much power. This means that Xi and Li will have less authority than previous leaders have had.
Second, the increasingly stagnant nature of the Party will weaken the authority of Chinas new
leaders even further.
Since the HuWen administration took over in 2002, the main social and economic policies
have taken a more or less left turn.52 The slogan harmonious society arguably represents a
major shift from the growth at all costs theme of Jiang Zemins era. The point here is that each
new administration must develop distinctive policies and slogans. The upcoming XiLi
administration is no exception. What kind of catchphrases can they create to build upon Hus
harmonious society? It is increasingly difficult for Chinas top leadership to be innovative
without addressing issues of political reform.
We already have clear evidence that other ambitious leaders are challenging the future authority
of Xi and Li. Many of Chinas new leaders have comparable CVs, without either undisputed
authority or unchallengeable support. Pushing political reform might become a way for certain
leaders to expand their support base. The party secretary of Chongqing city, Bo Xilai, as
mentioned earlier, has revived elements of Maoism, and when he comes to Beijing after the 18th
Party Congress next year, he might promote this model to all of China. As a response, other top
leaders of the next generation will have to either come up with their own version of political
innovations or fall behind Bo in terms of influence and reputation.
There are signs that other top leaders of the next generation are taking action as well. Wang
Yang, the party secretary of Guangdong province, has also publicly made remarks about a
different kind of campaign: liberating thought and other political reforms. Rumors have been
circulating that he wants to ease censorship in Guangdong. Many observers believe that Bo and
Wang are seriously competing for one of the slots in the next Standing Committee of the
Politburo at the 18th Party Congress to be held in 2012. It is hard to say with confidence that this
is the case, but one thing is clear: increasingly fierce competition for power and influence will
take place among ambitious leaders in the coming years, and rivals might try different political
experiments to achieve their goals.
Although it is impossible to predict the outcome of future power struggles, several general
trends can be identified: there will be greater competition for power within the Party, mainly
because no single individual leader has ultimate authority. The top leadership will thus become
less stable, particularly as the competition for power becomes public. Such competition will
inevitably push ambitious politicians to rely more on public opinion to gain political support, as
evidenced by Bos recent efforts in Chongqing. That competition will likely open up space for
new political experiments.
Last but not least, we want to emphasize that the pressure coming from the emerging civil
society, which we discussed in the first two sections, will have its impact on elites. The CCP does
not live in a vacuum. The rise of a contentious society will increase the cost of repression for
Chinas authoritarian rulers, and when the cost of repression is too high, as MIT Professor
Daron Acemoglu has argued, democratic reform probably becomes a rational choice for the
elites to avoid a revolution.53
Also, the change of values in society might trickle up. University of Michigan Professor Ronald
Inglehart argues that elites tend to be better educated, and education is positively correlated
with liberal political views, which means elites are also affected by liberal views.54 Their
interests might point them in a conservative direction, but cognitive dissonance between selfinterests and values can reach a breaking point. Right now, the social pressure in China is
probably not big enough to change the incentives of political elites, and the cultural shift of
Chinese society has yet to reach a tipping point. But as argued earlier, there are reasons to
believe the momentum of change is building, and even if they do not want to be, the elites might
be forced into reform.
In sum, although there are few signs that the CCP is actively seeking political reform right now,
political elites can be forced to take a role in Chinas democratization. The inability to
ideologically innovate leaves liberal democracy as a more and more prominent option. The likely
factional struggle among the next generation of leaders might make adopting liberal reform a
strategy for some contenders who are competing for power. Even as the political elites are slow
to change their minds, the rise of civil society will put more and more pressure on the state,
forcing the regime to face peoples demands for rights of participation.
turmoil throws into question both the authorities' commitment to liberalizing the financial sector and, more importantly, their
ability to manage China's economic downturn," Nicholas Spiro, managing director at Spiro Sovereign Strategy, told CNBC. "The big
risk is that the selloff, if not quickly stemmed, could undermine the entire reform process in China if the Communist party feels it's
too much of a political risk." China's economy grew 7 percent in the first quarter of the year its slowest pace since 2009. The
extreme volatility of the stock market threatens that goal as well as raising the risk of a protracted slowdown in the world's secondlargest economy, analysts said. "The reason I think there is a paranoia on stocks in Beijing is that anything that threatens below-6percent growth threatens everything," Patrick Coveney, CEO of food firm Greencore, told CNBC. As a result, China had reacted "with
massive force" and repeatedly intervened in the stock market.
The level of inequality in China also affects its prospects for democratization. The nations Gini
coefficientthe standard measure of inequality, where 0 means everyone has exactly the same
amount of wealth and 1 means one person has all the wealthreached 0.48 in 2010, one of the
highest in the world.15 Even that value, according to Chinese scholar Wang Xiaolu, is a great
underestimation, because gray incomeunreported income often associated with corruptionis
not included in the official data.16
In the early stage of Chinas reform, increasing levels of inequality did not cause the CCP much
trouble politically for two reasons. The first is the nature of Chinas inequality. Due to various
factors, the main source of inequality in China has traditionally been the urbanrural income
gap; the intra-urban and intra-rural income gaps are not as great. In 2002, when the overall
Gini coefficient reached 0.47, within both the city and the countryside the coefficient was still
0.37.17 Therefore, the wealth gap has not been as visible in China as it is in many other
developing countries, where slums are located alongside gated communities. Such conditions
have political consequences, because more visible inequality understandably fuels political
discontent.In the early stage of Chinas reform, increasing levels of inequality did not cause the
CCP much trouble politically for two reasons. The first is the nature of Chinas inequality. Due to
various factors, the main source of inequality in China has traditionally been the urbanrural
income gap; the intra-urban and intra-rural income gaps are not as great. In 2002, when the
overall Gini coefficient reached 0.47, within both the city and the countryside the coefficient was
still 0.37.17 Therefore, the wealth gap has not been as visible in China as it is in many other
developing countries, where slums are located alongside gated communities. Such conditions
have political consequences, because more visible inequality understandably fuels political
discontent.
However, inequality has now become a major political issue. Abstract inequality is becoming
more real, with increasing numbers of people from rural areas moving into cities where luxury
shopping malls, apartment buildings, and restaurants are springing up, reminding the urban
poor of what is beyond their reach. In a survey conducted in March 2010 by the Statistics
Bureau of Shanxi, 11,510 randomly selected Shanxi residents were asked to express their
greatest wish for the New Year.18 Narrowing the income gap ranked first, with 38.59
percent of votes. Trailing behind at a distant second and third were, respectively, stabilizing
housing prices (10.27 percent) and creating employment opportunities (10.19 percent).
(3) Chinas economic growth bolsters performance legitimacy. Previous research has shown that
democratic transitions are often preceded by acute economic crises that delegitimize the regime
and generate discontent (e.g. Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Although Chinas growth will
inevitably slow down, a soft landing is still possible. Many respected economists remain
confident in Chinas long-term growth potential (e.g. Fogel 2010; Subramanian 2011). Though
short marchers often point to problems of over-investment and ghost cities (e.g. Cheng 2013),
Chinese rural migrants unstoppable desire to move to cities mean an imminent property bubble
may be premature also (Miller 2012b, Ch. 5). With the Renminbi recently becoming a global
reserve currency at the IMF and with the Peoples Bank of China sitting on trillions in reserves,
it seems highly unlikely that China will be soon crippled by a Latin American-style debt crisis .
On the whole, gloom on the economic front is not shared in the most recent forecasts of Chinas
economy by the OECD, World Bank, and IMF, which forecast a gradual decline in economic
growth to over 6% growth by 2017. 22 To the extent China is poised for long-run economic
growth (albeit at a lower level than in the past), this should bolster the CCP regimes survival.
But, to model the effects of economic crisis on democratization, I include a measure of the
change in GDP per capita between five years and two years before the current year.
Aff
Link Turns
First, international experience refutes performance legitimacy. Democratization has taken place
in many economically successful countries including Brazil, Chile, Greece, South Korea, Spain,
and Taiwan. Nations experiencing mid-level economic development seem particularly
susceptible to democracy. In the late 20th century, in the so-called third wave of
democratization, twenty-seven out of thirty-one countries that liberalized or democratized were
in the middle-income range.4 The cases most comparable to China, the states which
share a similar cultural or historical heritage, illustrate this point. In 1988, South
Korea and Taiwan, both of which had embarked on democratization , had a PPP
(purchasing power parity) per capita GDP (gross domestic product) of $6,631 and $7,913
($12,221 and $14,584 in 2010 dollars), respectively. In 1989, the PPP per capita GDP of the
Soviet Union (later Russia) and Hungary, also both on the journey toward democratization, was
$9,211 and $6,108 ($16,976 and $11,257 in 2010 dollars), respectively.5 Chinas PPP per capita
GDP in 2010 was $7,544.6.
The second challenge to the performance legitimacy view is the increasing gap between peoples
expectations and the means of government to co-opt society. It is true that the Chinese state is
still very strong, with enormous fiscal, repressive, and even normative strength. But growing
faster yet are the expectations of ordinary Chinese. With the memory of the Cultural Revolution
fading, the benchmark of good performance is shifting. Younger Chinese are increasingly
unlikely to compare their living standards with those of the revolutionary years. The opening up
of China and the rapid rate of urbanization have created a new set of reference points, and
people increasingly take a secure lifestyle for granted, seeing education, medical care, and
decent housing as welfare entitlements.
Second, the effects of socioeconomic change rising literacy, income, and urbanization rates,
along with the improvement of communications technologies greatly reduce the costs of
collective action, de-legitimize autocratic rule, and foster demands for greater democracy . ..
Few authoritarian regimes, unless they rule in oil-producing countries, can survive once per
capita income hits more than $6,000 (PPP)..China is well into this zone of democratic
transition Chinas is a robust regime surrounded by meta instability, said Columbia
Universitys Andrew Nathan, outlining three possible scenarios at a recent National Endowment
for Democracy meeting (above): collapse, resilience or democratization.
s
Transition
2AC - Speed
Transition is inevitable the squos fast collapse causes a war.
Pei 13 - Margot Pritzker 72 professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and a
non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.(Minxin Pei
February 13, 2013 5 Ways China Could Become a Democracy
http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/5-ways-china-could-become-a-democracy/?allpages=yes)
RMT
Happy ending would be the most preferable mode of democratic transition for China.
Typically, a peaceful exit from power managed by the ruling elites of the old regime goes
through several stages. It starts with the emergence of a legitimacy crisis, which may be caused
by many factors (such as poor economic performance, military defeat, rising popular resistance,
unbearable costs of repression, and endemic corruption). Recognition of such a crisis convinces
some leaders of the regime that the days of authoritarian rule are numbered and they should
start managing a graceful withdrawal from power. If such leaders gain political dominance
inside the regime, they start a process of liberalization by freeing the media and loosening
control over civil society. Then they negotiate with opposition leaders to set the rules of the
post-transition political system. Most critically, such negotiations center on the protection of
the ruling elites of the old regime who have committed human rights abuses and the
preservation of the privileges of the state institutions that have supported the old regime (such
as the military and the secret police). Once such negotiations are concluded, elections are held.
In most cases (Taiwan and Spain being the exceptions), parties representing the old regime lose
such elections, thus ushering in a new democratic era. At the moment, the transition in Burma is
unfolding according to this script.
But for China, the probability of such a happy ending hinges on, among other things, whether
the ruling elites start reform before the old regime suffers irreparable loss of legitimacy. The
historical record of peaceful transition from post-totalitarian regimes is abysmal mainly because
such regimes resist reform until it is too late. Successful cases of happy ending transitions,
such as those in Taiwan, Mexico, and Brazil, took place because the old regime still maintained
sufficient political strength and some degree of support from key social groups . So the sooner
the ruling elites start this process, the greater their chances of success. The paradox, however, is
that regimes that are strong enough are unwilling to reform and regimes that are weak cannot
reform. In the Chinese case, the odds of a soft landing are likely to be determined by what
Chinas new leadership does in the coming five years because the window of opportunity for a
political soft landing will not remain open forever. Gorby comes to China is a variation of the
happy ending scenario with a nasty twist. In such a scenario, Chinas leadership misses the
historic opportunity to start the reform now. But in the coming decade, a convergence of
unfavorable economic, social, and political trends (such as falling economic growth due to
demographic ageing, environmental decay, crony-capitalism, inequality, corruption and rising
social unrest) finally forces the regime to face reality. Hardliners are discredited and replaced by
reformers who, like Gorbachev, start a Chinese version of glasnost and perestroika. But the
regime by that time has lost total credibility and political support from key social groups.
Liberalization triggers mass political mobilization and radicalism. Members of the old regime
start to defect either to the opposition or their safe havens in Southern California or
Switzerland. Amid political chaos, the regime suffers another internal split, similar to that
between Boris Yeltsin and Gorbachev, with the rise of a radical democratizer replacing a
moderate reformer. With their enormous popular support, the dominant political opposition,
including many defectors from the old regime, refuses to offer concessions to the Communist
Party since it is now literally in no position to negotiate. The partys rule collapses, either as a
result of elections that boot its loyalists out of power or spontaneous seizure of power by the
opposition. Should such a scenario occur in China, it would be the most ironic. For the last
twenty years, the Communist Party has tried everything to avert a Soviet-style collapse. If the
Gorby scenario is the one that brings democracy to China, it means the party has obviously
learned the wrong lesson from the Soviet collapse.
will not be enough, especially for military leaders who think they can swallow the entire
enchilada. Senior Mainland generals have boasted that they can take the main island of Taiwan
in one day. That statement is nonsense, so we assume they don't actually believe what they say.
Yet grave miscalcu- lations and undiluted sentiments launch armies. When military leaders lose
their sense of reality and political masters have their own selfish agendas, a nation can choose
the wrong path. That's true especially if the survival of the Party is at stake. In the spring of
2000, Jiang Zemin commissioned briefings on the collapse of Communist and authoritarian
regimes around the world. He undoubt- edly learned the theory that the Second World War
deferred the demise of the Soviet Union by dampening corruption and reinforcing the notion of
self-sacrifice. Perhaps Beijing talks war these days because China's leaders share the notion that
minor hostilities, even a minor excursion such as China's forray into Vietnam in 1979. are
generally beneficial for the Peoples Republic. Or perhaps we are hearing those bellicose words
because Beijing thinks that it is now or never. Taiwan is drifting away, and someday it will be too
late to bring it back into the fold. Some think that if China has to fight, it should do so while
there are still serving generals who have seen combat. In a few years' time all experienced
officers will have retired, in- cluding Defense Minister Chi Haotian and Central Military
Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Wannian, both of whom are scheduled to leave their posts in
2002. And the PLA argues that the time for an invasion is now, before Taiwan can rearm with
the next generation of American weapons. So the stars are aligned toward war. Twice
Jiang Zemin has threat- ened conflict, and twice he has backed down. No government, especially
one in a country' where "face" is critical, can afford to do that a third time. Beijing's leaders think
that war will be popular, so it won't take much to start the next crisis. Maybe it will be a mistake
or perhaps a de- liberate act, but the next crisis looks as if it will be the one that leads to conflict.
And if there are hostilities, they will be the last for the People's Republic. We need a war, which
we will lose," said a Chinese journalist in May 2000. "That will destroy faith in the present
dynasty." If there is war, the Mainland will lose. And the losses will be high. For the Communist
leaders, losing ten thousand or one hundred thousand soldiers is noth- ing," said one Taipei
resident recently. "They consider the life of a Chi- nese worthless." The Party didn't even blink at
its horrendous Korean War casualties and probably will not care about those in the future even
if they are high. Beijing's leaders will just talk about glory and say that the human sacrifice was
worth it. But that's not how our Wang Chuanning will see it if his Jason is needlessly lost in a
misconceived military adven- ture. Wang and grieving relatives may not immediately take to the
streets, but the populace will lose its faith that the Communist Party can lead. It will be then that
the Chinese demand the right to govern them- selves.
c
2AC - No transition
Military and police prevent democratization other factors dont
apply
Chin 16 - John J. Chin, Ph.D. Candidate Politics Department Princeton University (The
Longest March: Why Chinas Democratization Is Not Imminent January 15,
2016https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/jchin/files/john_j_chin_the_longest_ma
rch_2016.01.15.pdf) RMT
Conditional Modernization: Why Chinas Democratization Is Not Imminent
The previous section showed that in large-N forecasting models intentionally constructed to
replicate the short march predictions of Henry Rowen and others, China is actually unlikely to
democratize in the short term, and is only likely to do so by 2025 at the earliest . In this
section, I show that the previous short march models may neglect key variables which bode for
an even longer march to democracy. I highlight four factors here: (1) Chinas military power, (2)
Chinas institutionalized processes for party leadership transitions and party control of the
military (which make coups unlikely), (3) Chinas economic growth, and (4) Chinas trade
openness. (1) China is a great power with tremendous military and repressive capacity. Recent
work by Carles Boix (2011) and Kevin Narizny (2012) indicates that the hierarchy of power in
the international system conditions the causal effect of development on democracy. Clients or
former colonies of democratic hegemons (the United States and United Kingdom) are the states
most likely to democratize. But as a great power or pole that sees itself as the center of East
Asia (Friedman 2009), armed with a nuclear deterrent, and which is a net creditor rather than
debtor nation, international pressure and spillover effects from democratic diffusion are less
effective on China (Chin 2014, 112; Diamond 2008). Thus, even if there is a coming wave of
democracy in Asia, China may well be the last to catch it, if it catches it at all. In the twentieth
century, it took two catastrophic world wars to democratize the illiberal but capitalist Germany
and Japan (Gat 2010). But a major power war to democratize a nuclear China is unthinkable.
Conflict in Asia also bolsters Chinese leaders nationalist narrative that a strong state led by the
CCP is necessary to protect Chinas interests in the South China Sea, to reunify Taiwan, and
restore China to national greatness. Whereas international and territorial peace fosters
conditions favorable to democracy (e.g. Thompson 1996; Gibler 2012), China has one of the
highest probabilities of being involved in a fatal militarized interstate dispute in the world
(Nordhaus et al. 2012); accordingly, China has made massive investments in the military
(Peoples Liberation Army, PLA) and its coercive apparatus (e.g. Peoples Armed Police) which
enhance its capacity to repress democratic opponents (Albertus and Menaldo 2012). I capture
the theorized negative effects of coercive investments on democratization by including a
measure of a countrys military power, the M Score. Developed by Phil Arena (2012), M scores
improve on the traditional measure of power in international relationsthe Composite Index of
National Capabilities (CIN). M scores vary from 0 to 1, where high values indicate more military
power than the global average (see data appendix for more details). Chinas M score doubled to
0.5 from 2000 to 2012, and in my benchmark forecast I assume a more modest upward trend,
with growth of 1-3% a year until China reaches Americas current M score of about 0.9 after
2040
-- social and political instability in China could have massive spillover effects
on the rest of the world. As Minxin Pei argues, China's new leadership has a window of
opportunity for a political soft landing. But the risk is that it will resist reform until it is too late .
to happen sooner or later
A recent document from the Communist Party's Central Committee General Office reportedly warned of the need to strengthen
internet management against the dangers of western ideas and "erroneous currents of thought". And the new government, in power
for only a few months, appears to have launched a new offensive, closing the social media accounts of some influential opponents. At
this stage, continued social and political repression, rather than opening up, seems to be the policy.
they directly nominate candidates and vote by secret ballot for a committee of candidates who serve three-year terms. Turnout has
national level, policy issues are more straightforward, generating a sense of community is easier, and mistakes are less costly. In
cities and provinces, the Chinese government tinkers with economic and social reform and then applies successes to the rest of the
country, while detecting problems and making adjustments to policies before they spread elsewhere. This experimentation takes
several forms, the most high-profile of which is the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, which tested controversial market-oriented
policies that were then extended across China. More recently, the government has tested initiatives that defy common assumptions
about authoritarian rule, including recruiting non-state groups to provide healthcare for the elderly and protect the rights of
workers. Acutely aware of the costs of its economic growth above all development model, the government encourages
municipalities to experiment with more diverse indices for assessing the performance of government officials: Hangzhou, for
example, prioritizes environmental sustainability, and Chengdu narrowing the income gap between rural and urban residents. Its a
form of experimentation that is made easier by Chinas flexible constitutional system, which doesnt enshrine a strict division of
powers between different levels of government. Political stability at the national level ensures that successful trials can be replicated
elsewhere in China. In
that dates to the Sui dynasty in the sixth and seventh centuries. These examinations were abolished in 1905precipitating the end of
the imperial system as a wholebut they have been reestablished over the last three decades. Aspiring government officials normally
must pass public-service examinationsIQ-like tests with some ideological contentwith thousands of applicants competing for
each entry-level spot. They must perform well at lower levels of government, with more rigorous evaluations at every step, to move
further up the chain of political command. Top leaders must also accumulate decades of diverse administrative experience, with only
a tiny proportion reaching the commanding heights of government. For example, Xis four-decade-long ascent to the presidency
involved 16 major promotions through county, city, and province levels, and then the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the top
spot in the Standing Committee of the Politburo, with reviews at each stage to assess his leadership abilities. Arguably, the Chinese
political system is the most competitive in the world today.
2AC - Inevitable
CCP stability causes democratization
Wong 15 - Ralph and Roz Halbert Professor of Innovation at the Munk School of Global
Affairs at the University of Toronto. He is also a Professor in the department of Political Science,
where he holds a Canada Research Chair. (Joseph Wong March 27, 2015When will China
collapse? is the wrong question http://policyoptions.irpp.org/2015/03/27/asking-when-chinawill-collapse-is-the-wrong-question-to-ask/) RMT
But why do we presume that China and the CCP will only choose democracy when it is about
to collapse? Is it not possible that an authoritarian regime may choose to concede democracy
when it is still relatively strong? Dan Slater (of the University of Chicago) and I are currently
writing a book in which we show that contrary to the received wisdom about why autocrats
concede democracy hello Mubarak the modal pathway of democratic transition in Asia has
been led by regimes that are not weak but instead very strong.
The Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan, a brutal dictatorial regime in the 1960s and 1970s, allowed
the formation of an opposition party in 1986, lifted martial law in 1987 and conceded full
democratic elections in 1992. And it made these concessions not when the ruling party was
weak, but rather when the party was very strong. Indeed, the KMT conceded democracy not to
concede defeat, but rather to remain dominant. And it has. Meanwhile, Taiwan has become a
full-fledged democracy, in many ways the model democracy in East Asia.
Democracy came to Taiwan not because of collapse but, rather the opposite. This same logic
conceding from strength explains the transitions in Korea, Indonesia, Japan, and it helps
explains what we are currently seeing in Burma, and what we might see in Singapore.
Why not in China? It would seem to me that at the present moment the CCP has nothing to
fear with democratization. Into the future, once the regime begins to crackup, however, the
CCP will have everything to fear about democratization. It has always struck me that if I was a
dictator Id prefer to end up like the KMT in Taiwan and not Mubarak in Egypt.
legitimacy endowed by a competitive political process, have essentially three means to hold on
their power. One is bribing their populations with material benefits, a second one is to repress
them with violence and fear, and the third is to appeal to their nationalist sentiments. In more
sophisticated and successful autocracies, rulers rely more on performance-based legitimacy
(bribing) than on fear or jingoism mainly because repression is costly while nationalism can be
dangerous. In the post-Tiananmen era, to be sure, the CPC has employed all three instruments,
but it has depended mainly on economic performance and has resorted to (selective) repression
and nationalism only as a secondary means of rule. However, trends since Xi Jinping came to
power in late 2012 suggest that repression and nationalism are assuming an increasingly
prominent role in the CPCs survival strategy. An obvious explanation is that Chinas faltering
economic growth is creating social tensions and eroding public support for the CPC, thus forcing
the regime to deter potential societal challenge with force and divert public attention with
nationalism. There is, however, an equally valid explanation that many observers have
overlooked. A survival strategy that depends on delivering economic growth to maintain
legitimacy is inherently unsustainable not only because economic growth cannot be guaranteed
and ever-rising popular expectations will be impossible to meet, but also because sustained
economic growth produces structural socioeconomic changes that, as demonstrated by social
science research and histories of democratic transitions, fatally threaten the durability of
autocratic rule. Autocracies forced to strike a Faustian bargain with performance-based
legitimacy are destined to lose the wager because the socioeconomic changes resulting from
economic growth strengthen the autonomous capabilities of urban-based social forces, such as
private entrepreneurs, intellectuals, professionals, religious believers, and ordinary workers
through higher levels of literacy, greater access to information, accumulation of private wealth,
and improved capacity to organize collective action. Academic research has established a strong
correlation between the level of economic development and the existence of democracy and also
between rising income and probabilities of the fall of autocracies.8 In the contemporary world,
the positive relationship between wealth (measured in per capita income) and democracy can be
seen in the chart below, which shows that the percentage of democracies (classified as free by
Freedom House) rises steadily as income level increases. Partly free countries decline as income
rises as well. The distribution of non-democracies, or authoritarian regimes, resembles a Ushape. While more dictatorships can survive in poorer countries (the bottom two-fifths of the
countries in terms of per capita income), their presence in the top two-fifths of the countries
seems to reject the notion that wealth is positively correlated with democracy. A closer look at
the data, however, shows that nearly all the wealthy countries ruled by dictatorships are oilproducing states, where the ruling elites have the financial capacity to bribe their people into
accepting autocratic rule.9 Chinese rulers, if they take a look at the chart, should worry about
their medium-to long-term prospects. There are 87 countries with a higher capita income,
measured in PPP, than China. Fifty-eight of them are democracies, 11 are classified by Freedom
House as partly free, and 18 are dictatorships (not free, according to Freedom House). But of
the 18 not free countries with higher per capita income than China, 16 are petro-states
(Belarus is included in this group because Russia provides it with significant subsidized energy).
The two non-oil states are Thailand (a military dictatorship that overthrew a semi-democracy in
2014) and Cuba (also a Leninist one-party dictatorship). Of the 11 partly free countries, Mexico
and Malaysia are significant energy producers while Kuwait and Venezuela are classical petrostates. What should give the CPC leaders even more cause to worry is that Chinese per capita
income of $13,216 (PPP) in 2014 is comparable to that of Taiwan and South Korea in the late
1980s, when both began to democratize.10 If the experience of regime transitions in upper
middle-income countries, including Taiwan and Korea, were applicable, the CPC should expect
rising societal demand and mobilization for political change in the coming decade (some signs of
such mobilization can already be detected).
For some time, I suspected that Henry Rowens projections were a bit optimistic and that
Chinas democratic moment, while foreseeable, was still 25 to 30 years away. Now, as the need
for a more open, accountable, and law-based regime becomes as obvious as the current leaders
inability to bring one about, I suspect that the end of CCP rule will come much sooner, quite
possibly within the next ten years. Unfortunately, a sudden collapse of the communist system
could give rise, at least for a while, to a much more dangerous form of authoritarian rule,
perhaps led by a nationalistic military looking for trouble abroad in order to unify the nation at
home. But this would likely represent only a temporary solution, for the military is incapable of
governing a rapidly modernizing, deeply networked, middle-class country facing complex
economic and social challenges.
Whatever the specific scenario of change, this much is clear: China cannot keep moving forward
to the per capita income, educational, and informational levels of a middle-income country
without experiencing the pressures for democratic change that Korea and Taiwan did more than
two decades ago. Those pressures are rising palpably now in Singapore and Malaysia. They will
gather momentum in Vietnam as it follows in Chinas path of transformational (even if not quite
as rapid) economic development. In Thailand, continuing modernization over the next decade
will change society in ways that will make democracy easier to sustain. In short, within a
generation or so, I think it is reasonable to expect that most of East Asia will be democratic. And
no regional transformation will have more profound consequences for democratic prospects
globally.