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Compromising Stephen
D. Krasner
Westphalia
The
Peace of West-
phalia, which ended the ThirtyYears War in 1648,is taken to mark the beginning of the modern internationalsystemas a universecomposed of sovereign
states, each with exclusive authoritywithin its own geographic boundaries.
The Westphalianmodel, based on the principlesof autonomy and territory,
offersa simple, arresting,and elegant image. It orders the minds of policymakers.It is an analyticassumptionforneo-realismand neo-liberalinstitutionalism,bothofwhichposit thatstatescan be treatedas iftheywere autonomous,
unified,rationalactors.It is an empiricalregularityforvarious sociologicaland
constructivist
theoriesof internationalpolitics.Moreover,it is a benchmarkfor
observers who discern a basic erosion of sovereigntyin the contemporary
world.
This articledemonstrates,however,that the Westphalianmodel has never
been an accuratedescriptionofmanyoftheentitiesthathave been called states.
The assumption thatstates are independentrationalactors can be misleading
because it marginalizesmany situationsin which rulershave, in fact,not been
autonomous. Moreover,the conclusion that sovereigntyis now being altered
because the principles of Westphalia are being transgressedis historically
myopic. Breaches of the Westphalian model have been an enduring characteristicof the internationalenvironmentbecause thereis nothingto prevent
them.Rulers have chosen or been forcedto accept otherprinciples,including
human rights,minorityrights,democracy,communism,and fiscalresponsibility There has never been some golden age of the Westphalian state. The
Westphalianmodel has neverbeen morethana referencepointor a convention;
it has neverbeen some deeply confiningstructurefromwhich actorscould not
escape.
The Westphalianstate is a systemof political authoritybased on territory
means thatpolitical authorityis exercisedover a
and autonomy.Territoriality
Relationsin theDepartnentofPolitical
ofInternational
StephenD. Krasneris GrahamH. StuartProfessor
Scienceat StanfordUniversity.
Thanks to David Abernethy,Michael Bratman,Ellen Comisso, JohnFerejohn,Martha Finnemore,
GeoffreyGarrett,JudithGoldstein,JosephLepgold, MargaretLevi, Lisa Martin,Condoleezza Rice,
Duncan Snidal, Georg Sorensen,and Monika Wohlfeldfortheir
Philip Roeder,Philippe Schmitter,
comments,to Daniel Froatsand JaySmithfortheirsuggestionsand researchassistance,and to the
two anonymous reviewersforexceptionallyhelpfulcriticisms.
Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter1995/96),pp. 115-151
Initerinational
Secutity,
? 1995 by the Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College and the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology
115
Security20:3 1116
International
Westphalia
Compromising
I 117
distinguished
bywhether
thebehaviorofone actordependson thatofanother
and by whetherat leastone of theactorsis betteroffand noneworseoff.In
rulersenterintoagreements,
suchas humanrightsaccords,from
conventions,
whichtheyexpectsome gain,but theirbehavioris not contingent
on what
but
rulersagreeto violateWestphalian
principles,
othersdo. In contracting,
the
suchas a foreign
loan.In coercion,
onlyiftheyare providedsomebenefit,
rulersof stronger
statesmakeweakerones worseoffby engagingin credible
the
threatsto whichthe targetmightor mightnot acquiesce.In imposition,
of
targetis so weak thatit has no optionbut to complywiththepreferences
thestronger.
coercion,and impositionhave all been enduring
Conventions,
contracts,
ofbehaviorin theinternational
and thusmanystateshavenot
system,
patterns
model.Everymajorpeace treatysince1648conformed
to theWestphalian
and Helsinki-has violatedtheWestWestphalia,
Utrecht,
Vienna,Versailles,
theWestphalian
model
Compromising
phalianmodelin one way or another.
is alwaysavailableas a policyoptionbecausethereis no authority
structure
to preventit: nothingcan precluderulersfromtransgressing
againstthedoauthority
structures
thattranscend
mesticautonomyofotherstatesor creating
territory.
In theinternational
arelessconstraining
and morefluid,
system,
institutions
The
moresubjectto challengeand changethanin moresettledcircumstances.
forlockingin particular
suchas socialization,
mechanisms
institutional
forms,
betweenstructures
and agents,or path-dependent
propositivereinforcement
levelthanin well-established
domestic
cesses,are weakerat theinternational
statewhichis takento be the
polities.Thisis even truefortheWestphalian
formof the moderninternational
core institutional
system.In international
politics,nothingis everoffthetable.
in whichterritoriality
Ratherthanbeingregardedas an empiricalregularity
of mostif not all states,or as an
and autonomyare accuratedescriptions
as capableof indeanalyticassumptionthatregardscentraldecision-makers
imposedby the
pendentlyformulating
policiessubjectonly to constraints
international
system,the Westphalianmodel is betterconceptualizedas a
thebehavior
convention
or reference
pointthatmightor mightnotdetermine
and
who are also motivatedby materialinterests,
of policymakers
security,
outcomesdependsupon their
nationalideals,and whoseabilityto influence
theWestpower.All statesare notthesame.Somehave closelyapproximated
formsof political
phalian model. Othershave not. Some non-Westphalian
International
Security20:3 1118
TheWestphalian
Modeland OtherVersions
ofSovereignty
One of thereasonsthatobservershave been so quickto pointto changesin
is thatthe termhas been used in at least three
the natureof sovereignty
model.First,studentsof comdifferent
ways in additionto theWestphalian
bypublic
parativepoliticshavefocusedon boththedegreeofcontrolexercised
entitiesand the organization
of authority
withinterritorial
boundaries.For
to regulateeconomicactivities
instance,
theinability
ofthecentralinstitutions
The siteof
or to maintainorderhas been describedas a loss of sovereignty.
withthepopulace,a hereditary
or an
monarch,
publicauthority-for
instance,
oligarchy-hasbeendefinedas thelocationofsovereignty.
has beencomprehended
as ifitweresynonymous
with
Second,sovereignty
movethedegreeof controlexercisedby publicauthorities
overtransborder
ments.This is a meaningfrequently
employedby scholarsworkingfroma
liberalinterdependence
The inabilityto regulatethe flow of
perspective.3
boundarieshas been describedas
goods,persons,and ideas acrossterritorial
a loss ofsovereignty
2. Charles Tilly,Coercion,Capitaland EuropeanStates,AD 990-1990 (Cambridge,Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Hendrik Spruyt,The SovereignStateand Its Competitors:
An Analysisof SystemsChange
(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,1994); and David Strang,"Anomalyand Commonplace
in European PoliticalExpansion:Realistand InstitutionalAccounts,"International
Organization,
Vol.
45, No. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 143-162.
3. See, forinstance,RichardCooper,TheEconomicsofInterdependence:
EconomicPolicyin theAtlantic
Community
(New York:McGraw-Hill,1968).
Compromising
Westphalia
I 119
Third,sovereignty
has beenunderstood
as therightofcertainactorsto enter
intointernational
agreements.
This is theconceptused in international
legal
scholarship.
Sovereignstatescan maketreaties.4
Finally,sovereignty
has been understoodas the Westphalianmodel: an
institutional
arrangement
fororganizing
politicallifethatis based on territoriWithintheseterritories,
alityand autonomyStatesexistin specificterritories.
domesticpoliticalauthorities
are the onlyarbitersof legitimate
behavior.A
Westphalian
statesystemis different
froman empire,in whichthereis only
one authority
itis different
inwhichauthority
is claimed
structure;
fromtribes,
overgroupsofindividualsbutnotnecessarily
overspecificgeographicareas;
it is different
fromEuropeanfeudalism,
wheretheCatholicChurchclaimed
over some kindsof activitiesregardlessof theirlocation;and it is
authority
different
froma systemin whichauthority
structures
overdifferent
issueareas
are notgeographically
one possibledescription
oftheEuropean
coterminous,
Union.
These fourconceptions
of sovereignty
are distinct,
but changesin the parameters
ofone can lead to changesin theparameters
ofothers.Forinstance,
if centralauthorities
in a statehave lost controlover activitieswithintheir
boundaries(a loss ofsovereignty
as understood
bysomestudentsofcomparativepolitics),
itis morelikelythatexternal
actorswouldbe abletocompromise
theautonomyof thestate(a loss ofsovereignty
accordingto theWestphalian
and sense of
model).Actorsin otherstatescould influencetheexpectations
of groupswithinthecivilsocietyoftheweakerstate.Rulerscould
legitimacy
surrender
controlin exchangeforexternalsupport.Rulersin more
legitimate
powerfulstatescouldcoerceor imposechangeson rulerswho wereno longer
able to extractresourcesfromtheirdomesticpopulation.
In anotherexample,an inabilityto controltransborder
flows(a loss of
could
as understoodfroma liberalinterdependence
sovereignty
perspective)
thatcompromise
theautonomyof thestate
lead to contractual
arrangements
(a violationof the Westphalianmodel). Changes in technology,
especially
and communication,
have createda
reductionsin the cost of transportation
moreintegrated
forstatesto reguglobaleconomyand made it moredifficult
ofgoods,capital,ideas,and labor.To enhance
latetheinternational
movement
inwhich
theirregulatory
rulersmayenterintocontractual
capacity,
agreements
see Daniel Deudney, "The Philadelphian System:Sov4. For a similardiscussion of sovereignty,
ereignty,Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-unioncirca 1787-1861,"
Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), p. 198.
International
Organization,
International
Security20:3 1120
Compromising
Westphalia| 121
International
Security20:3 1122
rationalautonomousentitiesstriving
to maximizetheirutilityin thefaceof
constraints
that emanatefroman anarchicalthoughinterdependent
internationalenvironment.
fromneo-realism
is
Whatdistinguishes
neo-liberalism
itsdifferent
understanding
ofthecharacteristic
problemfortheseWestphalian
states:forneo-liberal
institutionalism,
theproblemis theresolution
ofmarket
it is security
whereasforneo-realism
and distributional
conflicts.10
failures,
The Westphalian
modelis also a coreconceptforinternational
societyapproaches,most notablythe Englishschool and various constructivist
approaches.11Here the Westphalianmodel is understoodas a behavioral
regularity
based on sharedunderstandings
ratherthanas an analyticassumption. All participantsin international
society-publicofficials,diplomats,
statesmen,
politicalleaders-hold thesame fundamental
viewsaboutthenatureof the system,the actors,and how theybehave.Moderninternational
unitswithinwhichpublicinstitutions
societyis composedofterritorial
exercise
exclusiveauthority.
Actionsfollowparticularpatternsnot because theyare
dictatedby some higherauthority,
or coercedby thethreatof force,or constrainedby the power of otherstates,but because playershave a shared
The consequencesofanarchyitselfare socially
intersubjective
understanding.
constructed.
The roleof sovereignstatespermitssome kindsof activities
but
not others.The rulesof sovereignty
give statesfullautonomyoveractivities
withintheirown bordersand prohibitintervention
in theinternalaffairsof
otherstates.
The Westphalianmodel is an excellentstartingpointforanalyzing(neorealismor neo-liberal
or understanding
institutionalism)
(international
society
muchofwhatgoes on in theinternational
environment.
A great
perspectives)
10. For the classic expositionof the problemscaused by interdependence,see Cooper, TheEconomFor a discussion of the distinctionbetweenmarketfailureand distributional
ics ofInterdependence.
issues, see Stephen D. Krasner,"Global Communicationsand National Power: Life on the Pareto
Frontier,"WorldPolitics,Vol. 43, No. 3 (April 1991), pp. 336-367.
11. Hedley Bull, TheAnarchicalSociety(London: Macmillan, 1977); JohnG. Ruggie, "Territoriality
and Beyond: ProblematizingModernityin InternationalRelations,"International
Organization,
Vol.
47, No. 1 (Winter1993), pp. 139-174; Alexander Wendt,"Anarchyis What States Make of It: The
Social Constructionof State Politics," InternationalOrganization,Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992),
Vol. 20,
pp. 391-425; AlexanderWendt,"ConstructingInternationalPolitics,"International
Security,
No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 71-81; J.Samuel Barkinand Bruce Cronin,"The State and the Nation:
Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereigntyin InternationalRelations,"International
Organization,Vol. 48, No. 1 (Winter1994),pp. 107-130; Hedley Bull and Adam Watson,eds., The Expansion
of International
Society(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1984); Adam Watson, The Evolutionof
International
Society(London: Routledge,1992). See BarryBuzan, "From InternationalRealism to
InternationalSociety: StructuralRealism and Regime Theory Meet the English School," InternaVol. 47, No. 3 (Summer1993),pp. 327-352,fora comparisonof U.S. and British
tionalOrganization,
approaches to internationalrelations.
Compromising
Westphalia| 123
and Autonomy
Compromising
Territoriality
The principlesofautonomyor territoriality
can be breachedthrough
convenThe fourmodalitiesthroughwhich
tions,contracts,
coercion,or imposition.
can be compromised
aredistinguished
autonomyand territoriality
bywhether
or not.Conventionsand
theyare paretoimprovingor not,and contingent
contracts
are pareto-improving,
thatis,theymakeat leastone partybetteroff
withoutmakinganyoneworseoff.Rulersare not forcedintosuch arrangements.Theyenterthemvoluntarily
becausecompromising
Westphalian
printhanhonoring
them.Coercionand imposition
ciplesis moreattractive
leaveat
leastone oftheactorsworseoff;theyarethusnotpareto-improving.
Contracts
and coercioninvolvecontingent
behavior;theactionsofonerulerdependupon
whattheotherdoes. Conventions
and impositiondo notinvolvecontingent
behavior.Giventhemanyopportunities
and incentives
to violateWestphalian
it is notsurprising
thatmanystateshave existedwitheithertheir
principles,
or autonomycompromised.
territoriality
International
Security20:3 | 124
CONVENTIONS
in whichrulersmakecommitments
thatexpose
Conventionsare agreements
theirown policiesto some kind of externalscrutiny
by agreeingto follow
certaindomesticpractices.12
Signatoriesmight,forinstance,endorseliberal
conceptionsof humanrights,or agreeto hold regularelections,or stipulate
would notaffect
thefranchise
or opportunities
thatreligiousor ethnicidentity
foremployment,
or thatrefugeeswould be entitledto specificsocialsecurity
benefits
and educationalopportunities.
Conventions
areenteredintovoluntarily
Theymakeat leastone actorbetter
offwithoutmakinganyworseoff;iftheydid not,rulerswouldnotsignthem,
do notusually
sincethestatusquo would stillbe available.The signatories
secureany directgain exceptthepledgefromotherpartiesto theagreement
ofa particular
thattheywillbehavein thesameway.The willingness
stateto
is notcontingent
on thebehaviorofothers.Somerulers
abidebya convention
can violatea convention
withoutprompting
anychangein thedomesticpolicies or institutions
ofothers.
In thecontemporary
is thatof
world,themostobviousclassofconventions
betweenrulers
humanrights
accords.Humanrights
agreements
coverrelations
and ruled,includingbothcitizensand non-citizens.
Theyinvolvepledgesby
to treatindividualswithintheirterritory
in a certainway.
nationalauthorities
As of 1993theUnitedNationslistedtwenty-five
suchinstruments.13
Another
records
those
with
associated
compendium
forty-seven
compactsincluding
and specializedagencies.14
regionalorganizations
Theseconventions
covera wide rangeofissuesincludinggenocide,torture,
statelesspersons,women'srights,
chilracialdiscrimination,
slavery,
refugees,
dren'srights,
forcedlabor,and therightoflabortoorganize.In someinstances,
humanrightsagreements
broadprinciples,
butinothers
specify
onlyrelatively
the1953Convention
on thePoliticalRights
theyareveryprecise.Forinstance,
of Women,whichhas been ratified
providesfor
by morethan100 countries,
The 1979
equal votingrightsforwomenand equal rightsto hold office.15
ofall FormsofDiscrimination
Convention
on theElimination
AgainstWomen,
whichhas been ratified
by morethan120 states,obligatespartiesto takeall
legalmeasuresnecessary
toassuretheequalityofmenand women,to "modify
12. I am indebted to JaySmithforsuggestingthe term"conventions."
13. United Nations,Human Rights:International
Instruments:
ChartofRatifications
as of31 December
1993, ST/HR/4/Rev.9,New York,1994.
14. Ian Brownhle,Basic Documentson Human Rights,3rd ed. (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1992).
15. Ibid., pp. 106-108; UN, Human Rights,p. 10.
Compromising
Westphalia
1125
18. JackDonnelly,International
HumanRights(Boulder,Colo.: Westview,1992),pp. 82-83; David P
Forsythe,Human Rightsand WorldPolitics(Lincoln: Universityof Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 19.
International
Security20:3 1126
Compromising
Westphalia| 127
23. JohnMeyer and othershave argued thatmany of the formalstances of rulers(not necessarily
such as thelevel ofsocio-economic
theiractual behavior)are dictatednotby internalcharacteristics,
development, but ratherby expectations that are generated in the internationalsystem. For
example, states create science agencies, even if theyhave no scientists.See JohnW. Meyer,John
Boli, and George M. Thomas, "Ontologyand Rationalizationin the WesternCulturalAccount,"in
Structure:
George M. Thomas, JohnW. Meyer,Francisco 0. Ramirez,and JohnBoli, Institutional
Constituting
State,Society,and theIndividual(Newbury Park,Calif.: Sage, 1987), pp. 12-13; Strang,
"Anomalyand Commonplace in European PoliticalExpansion"; MarthaFinnemore,"International
Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific,and Cultural
Vol. 47, No. 4 (Autumn1993),pp. 565Organizationand Science Policy,"International
Organization,
597; Paul J. DiMaggio and WalterW. Powell, "Introduction,"in Dimaggio and Powell, eds., The
New Institutionalism
in Organizational
Analysis(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press,1991),pp. 1315; and JohnW. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "InstitutionalizedOrganizations:Formal Structurein
pp. 41-60.
Myth and Ceremony,"in Dimaggio and Powell, TheNew Institutionalism,
International
Security20:3 1128
CONTRACTS
A contract
is an agreement
betweenthelegitimate
in two or more
authorities
statesor stateauthorities
and anotherinternational
actor,suchas an internationalfinancial
institution,
thatis mutuallyacceptable,pareto-improving,
and
A contract
contingent.
can violatetheWestphalian
modelifit altersdomestic
conceptions
of legitimate
behavior,
subjectsdomesticinstitutions
and personnel to externalinfluence,
or createsinstitutional
arrangements
thattranscend
nationalboundaries.Obviously,manycontracts
betweenstatesdo nottransgresstheWestphalian
model.An international
agreement
thatobligatesa state
only to changesome specificaspect of its foreignpolicywould not be a
violationof autonomy,
nor would a treatythatinvolvedonly a changein
domesticpolicybuthad no otherconsequences.
Rulersmustbelievethata contract
makesthembetteroff;otherwisethey
wouldnotenterintoitin thefirst
place,sincethestatusquo remainsavailable.
The behaviorofone oftheactorsis contingent
on thebehavioroftheothers.
In contractual
rulerswould notcompromise
arrangements,
theautonomyor
territorial
oftheirstateunlessthebehaviorofothersalso changed:if
authority
one actorabrogatesthecontract
theotherwould preferto do so as well.
COMPROMISING AUTONOMY: SOVEREIGN LENDING. Historically,
lendsovereign
ing,especiallyto weakerstates,has frequently
involvedcontractual
arrangementsthatcompromisethe autonomyalthoughnot the territoriality
of the
borrower.
Borrowershave not simplyagreedto repaytheirobligations,
an
thatwould have no impacton autonomy.Rathertheyhave
arrangement
frequently
agreedto dedicatespecificrevenues,or to acceptoversight
of domesticpolicies,or to permitrevenuesto be collectedby foreign
or to
entities,
changetheirdomesticinstitutional
structures.
Sovereignlendingposes uniqueproblems.In lendingbetweenprivateparties,it is possibleto appeal to a courtsystemif theborrowerfailsto repay;
lenderscan also seek collateralthatcan be seized if theborrowerdefaults.
However,loans to sovereignsprecludereviewby any authoritative
judicial
future
fundsmaybe the
systemand collateralis hardto comeby.Withholding
onlysanctionavailableto lenders.Therehave beenmanydefaults.24
24. For a review of defaultsin the nineteenthand twentiethcenturies,see Peter H. Lindertand
PeterJ.Morton,"How SovereignLending Has Worked,"in Jeffrey
D. Sachs, ed., DevelopingCountry
Debtand EconomicPerformance
(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press,1989),pp. 41-43. For a review
of experiencesin Latin America, see Carlos Marichal, A Centuryof Debt Crisesin Latin America:
FromIndependence
to the GreatDepression1820-1930 (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,
1989). Lending to thesovereigncan also be a problemdomestically,
notjustinternationally.
Efficient
| 129
Compromising
Westphalia
ratesto compensatefortherisks
One approachis to chargehighinterest
thedomestic
creditto sovereigns,
butnotto compromise
inherent
in extending
This was the typicalpracticeduringtheRenaisautonomyof theborrower.
rates,and soverbankersdid chargehighinterest
sance:privateinternational
more
eignsdid default.Thisregimeforsovereignlendingwas, paradoxically,
becauseit
modelthanmorerecentpractices,
consistent
withtheWestphalian
25
did notinvolveefforts
to compromise
domesticautonomy
High interestratesand frequentdefaults,however,may not be the best
solutionforeitherborrowersor lenders.Sovereignborrowerswould prefer
lowerinterest
rates,but theycan onlysecuresuchtermsiftheycan in some
so thatpotential
providway tietheirown hands,thatis,limittheirdiscretion
of beingrepaid.One strategy
is forborers of capitalhave moreconfidence
rowersto violate theirown domesticautonomyby givinglenderssome
withintheirown borders.
overfiscal,and sometimes
activities
other,
authority
and twentieth
centuries,
International
sovereignlendingin the nineteenth
by contractsin which
especiallyto weakerstates,has been characterized
willbe honored
borrowers
lendersthatobligations
securefundsbyreassuring
modelis violated:lenderspartwiththeirfundsat
because theWestphalian
lowerinterestratesbecause theyare givensome controlover the domestic
oftheborrower.
activities
and institutional
arrangements
sovereign
involving
century,
contractual
arrangements
Duringthenineteenth
more
sometimesin the initialcontract,
loans frequently
violatedautonomy,
to default.Greece,thefirststate
expostifthesovereignthreatened
frequently
fromtheOttomanEmpire,offers
examplesofseveral
to becomeindependent
thatinvolvedcompromising
autonomyto secure
contractual
arrangements
statein 1832,
funds.WhenGreecewas recognizedas an independent
foreign
itreceiveda sixtymillionfrancloanfromBritain,
France,and Russia,butonly
pledgingthatthe"actualreceiptsoftheGreektreasby signingan agreement
ofall,tothepaymentofthesaid interest
and sinking
uryshallbe devoted,first
fund,and shallnotbe employedforanyotherpurpose,untilthosepayments
domestic financialinstitutionsrequired the creation of an institutionalstructurethat provided
lenderswith the confidencethattheywould be repaid iftheylentmoney to theirown sovereigns.
See Douglass North and BarryWeingast,"Constitutionand Commitment:The Evolution of InstiVol.
ofEconomicHistory,
tutionsGoverningPublic Choice in SeventeenthCenturyEngland,"Journal
49, No. 4 (September1989), pp. 803-833.
1955), p. 59; Edward W.
25. GarrettMattingly,RenaissanceDiplomacy(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin,
Fox, Historyin GeographicPerspective:The OtherFrance (New York: Norton, 1971), pp. 60-61;
Bankingand AmericanForeignPolicy(New Haven,
International
BenjaminJ.Cohen, In WhoseInterest?
Conn.: Yale UniversityPress, 1986), pp. 84-90.
Security20:3 | 130
International
Compromising
Westphalia
1131
International
Security20:3 | 132
Compromising
Westphalia
| 133
behavioror changinginstitutional
arrangements
withinborrowing
countries,
suchas theroleofstate-owned
enterprises.
is now acceptedeven thoughit can pose politicaland ecoConditionality
nomicproblemsforrulers.One studyby IMF officials
concluded:"In retrospect,theWorldBankand theIMF staff,
as wellas theauthorities,
havetended
to underestimate
thetimerequiredto designand implement
reforms."37
Structuraladjustment
programscan depriverulersin centralized
butweakstatesof
thepossibility
ofpatronage
bywayofpubliccorporations
and importlicenses,
and oftheabilityto exploittheagricultural
sectorto subsidizemorepolitically
volatileurban areas. The conditionality
imposedby international
financial
institutions
thepositionsof rulerswhosecountries
has threatened
are subject
to largeswingsin theirtermsof tradeand lack adequate social safetynets.
Borrowing
countries
enterintostand-by
agreements
becausetheyarebetteroff
withthemthanwithoutthem,but some have had to accepttroubling
constraints
on theirdomesticautonomy38
In sum,sovereignlendinghas, sincethenineteenth
been characcentury,
terizedby contractualarrangements
thathave compromisedthe domestic
The motivations
oflendershave varied.In thenineautonomyof borrowers.
teenthcentury
lendersfrequently
actedsimplyto enhancetheprobability
that
theywouldbe repaid,althoughinboththeBalkansand LatinAmericasecurity
considerations
(balancingagainstothergreatpowers)werealso involved.In
morerecentyearslendershavebeenconcerned
notsimplywithrepayment
but
also witheconomicreform
forhumanitarian,
reasons.
ideological,or security
modelhave been the
Regardlessof motivation,
violationsof theWestphalian
normforsovereignlendingto weak statessincetheNapoleonicwars.39
CONTRACTS COMPROMISING TERRITORIALITY. Contracts
have also been used
to violatethe principleof territoriality,
thatis, to establishexplicitpolitical
37. Susan Schadler,Franek Rozwadowski, SiddharthTiwari,and David 0. Robinson,"Economic
Adjustmentin Low-Income Countries: Experience Under the Enhanced StructuralAdjustment
Facility,"Occasional Paper No. 106 (Washington,D.C.: InternationalMonetaryFund, 1993), pp. 1314.
Vol. 18,
38. Jeffrey
Herbst,"The StructuralAdjustmentof Politics in Africa,"WorldDevelopment,
"Riskand Trade
No. 7 (July1990),pp. 949-958; RobertH. Bates,Philip Brock,and JillTienfenthaler,
Regimes: AnotherExploration,"International
Organization,
Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter1991), pp. 1-18;
RobertH. Bates,Marketsand Statesin TropicalAfrica(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1981).
39. Strongstateshave not had theirautonomycompromisedin the same way. Many statesof the
United States defaulted in the 1830s and 1840s without sufferingthe kinds of constraintson
autonomy thatbefellthe Balkan and Latin American defaulters.The conditionalityrequirements
imposed by internationalfinancialinstitutionshave been less stringentfor more industrialized
states.
Security
20:3 | 134
International
The European
withterritory.
in whichauthority
is notcoterminous
structures
twoexamUnionand theExclusiveEconomicZone (EEZ) fortheoceansoffer
ples.In bothofthesecases,rulerschosetoacceptorestablisha systeminwhich
In thecase of
withterritory.
structures
wereno longercoterminous
authority
theEuropeanUnion,autonomywas also violated.
that
worldthemostdramaticexampleof contracting
In thecontemporary
is theEuropeanUnion.
and authority
theidentity
ofterritory
has compromised
TheultimateshapeoftheUnionis notyetvisible.It couldjustbecomea larger
with
state,one in whichtheboundarieshave changedbutwhichis consistent
thatlooksmorelike
model.It couldalso revertto something
theWestphalian
inwhichexisting
territorial
boundaries
international
agreement,
a conventional
of theUnion,suchas theCourtand
structures
remainand theauthoritative
however,
The thirdalternative,
theCommissionare weakenedor abolished.40
structures
govin whichdifferent
authority
would be a politicalarrangement
policymightbe
areas.Foreigntradeand monetary
functional
erneddifferent
issues mightbe decidedby
at the Union level. Environmental
determined
boundaries.Socialpolicymight
territorial
thatcrossedexisting
regionalentities
fromthe
would be different
be set by the nationalstate.Such a structure
withterritory.
At some
is coterminous
statein whichauthority
Westphalian
it
by
defined
as
is
de
violate
sovereignty
facto
such
would
also
system
a
point,
reserve
mightformally
law. Althoughnationaldecision-makers
international
the rightto abrogatethetreatieson whichtheUnionis based,it would,in
practice,be impossibleforthemto do so becausethe economic,social,and
high.
electoralcostswould be extremely
oftheExclusiveEconomicZone fortheoceansis another
The establishment
model.The EEZ is an
whichviolatestheWestphalian
exampleof a structure
area between12 and 200 milesfromthe coast in whichstatescan exercise
offishingand mineralsbutnotovershipping.41
controlovertheexploitation
are subjectto thelittoralstatesbutothersare not,the
Becausesomeactivities
is broken.The EEZ does notviolatethe
linkbetweenterritory
and authority
shipping.
principleof autonomy:no actorhas a rightto regulatecommercial
40. For instance,while Maastrichthas the very ambitious aim of establishinga single European
monetarysystem,it also explicitlylimitsthe authorityof the European Court in several areas and
gives Britainthe rightto opt out of the social provisions of the treaty.See Andrew Moravcsik,
"Idealism and Interestin the European Community:The Case of the FrenchReferendum,"French
Politicsand Society,Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter1993), pp. 46-47.
41. The area to twelve miles out is the territorialsea over which the littoralstate exercisesfull
control.
Compromising
Westphalia| 135
The EEZ was definedin the 1982 Law of the Seas TreatyWhile the Treatyitself
was initiallyrejectedby the United States and otherindustrializedcountries,
the provisionsforthe EEZ were implementedby individual states including
the United States,and a revised treatywas ratifiedby major statesin the early
1990s.
The European Union and the EEZ are examples of contractsin which rulers
have broken the relationshipbetween territory
and authority,conditionalon
other actors providing them with some specific benefit(including mutual
recognitionof the EEZ). The motivationshave varied. For therulersof Europe,
securityconsiderations(especiallytheintegrationofGermanyintoEurope) and
economicinterestsled themto compromisetheirauthorityin a numberofissue
areas. The EEZ was a way to increase the economic reach of littoralstates
without threateningthe freemovement of commercialand naval ships; this
outcome was ideal for the United States, which has not only the longest
coastlineof any country,but also the largestnavy.
POWER AND CONTRACTING. Power considerationscan be consequential for
contractualarrangementsby determiningthe range of possible options and
which actors can come to the table.42For example, the United States wanted
conditionalityfor InternationalMonetary Fund loans. Although it failed to
carryits point at the BrettonWoods negotiations,it later cut offfundingfor
the IMF, a move which led other member states to accept the U.S. position.
U.S. decision-makerscould alter the terms of the contractgoverning IMF
activitiesbecause theycontrolledthe only significantpool of available capital.
In another example, the major industrializedcountriesrefusedto accept the
termsof the 1982 Law of the Seas Treaty,which would have established an
InternationalSeabed Authorityfor the exploitationof deep seabed nodules
containingcobaltand nickel,an institutionalstructurethatwould have violated
the principleof territoriality
Only the industrializedcountriespossessed the
technologynecessaryto dredge the nodules; the developing countries,which
lacked the capabilityto move ahead on their
supported the Seabed Authority,
own. Similarly,in 1898 the major powers were able to forceGreece to accept
externalcontrolof its tax collectionbecause it was the only way that Greece
could get the loans thatit needed to pay the war indemnityto Turkeyand to
remove Turkishtroops fromGreek soil.
In sum, contractualarrangementscan compromisethe Westphalianmodel if
theyalterdomesticconceptionsof legitimacy,
change institutionalstructuresor
42. Krasner,"Global Communications."
International
Security20:3 | 136
thatsupersede territorial
boundapersonnel,or createauthoritativeinstitutions
ries. Rulers have enteredinto such arrangementsfor security,economic,and
ideological reasons. Power can be consequentialin settingthe range of available options and determiningwhich actorscan sit at the bargainingtable.
COERCION AND IMPOSITION
| 137
Compromising
Westphalia
International
Security20:3 | 138
Compromising
Westphalia
| 139
International
Security20:3 | 140
theJewishsabbathand therefore
electionswould notbe held on Saturday.48
The Treatywas made partofthefundamental
law ofPoland.
The minorities
rightstreatiesof Versaillesare examplesof imposition.
For
therulersor would-berulersofthesestates,thestatusquo was non-existence.
Theywould not have statesto ruleunlesstheyacceptedtheconditionsimposed by the victorsin WorldWar I. They lacked material,military,
and
diplomaticresourcesto bargainor resist.
The implications
thatcan be drawnfromthedata presentedthusfarabout
the empiricalvalidityof theWestphalian
model are modestbecause I have
selectedon thedependentvariable.Nevertheless,
severalinferences
arereasonable. The Westphalian
modelhas neverbeen takenforgranted;rulershave
exploredinstitutional
alternatives.
In someareasoftheworld,notablycentral
and easternEurope,therehaveneverbeenanysmallerWestphalian
states,that
is, entitiesthatenjoyedfullautonomy.
Manydevelopingcountriesthathave
withinternational
signedstand-by
agreements
financial
institutions
have had
toagreeto changesand on-goingsupervision
oftheirdomesticinstitutions
and
policies.The 200 or so statesthathave signedat least one humanrights
convention
haveopenedtherelationship
betweenrulersand ruledwithintheir
own territory
to some degreeof externalscrutiny
and in some cases have
In
domesticconceptsof legitimacy.
altered,eitherwillinglyor unknowingly,
one way or another-as a resultofconventions,
contracts,
coercion,
or imposition-mostofthestatesinthecontemporary
international
systemdo notfully
conform
withtheWestphalian
model.
PEACE
SETTLEMENTS
tothepresentoffer
anotherbody
Themajorpeace settlements
fromWestphalia
ofdata,one notselectedon thedependentvariable,withwhichtoexaminethe
or lack thereof,
of the Westphalianmodel. Major peace
actual functioning,
treatiesembodythesharedunderstanding
of rulers,or at leastthedeals that
with
theyhavefoundmutuallyacceptable.All ofthemajortreaties,
beginning
the
Westphalia,includeviolationsof the "Westphalian"
model,specifically
principleofautonomy.
Infractions
againsttheWestphalian
model,whetherin
the formof conventions,
have not been
contracts,
coercion,or imposition,
hidden,coveredup, or explainedaway On the contrary,
theyhave been
withautonomy,
thatare inconsistent
suchas
justified
by alternative
principles
48. Article 2; Article 7; Article 8; Article 11. The text of the Treatyis reprintedin Macartney,
Minorities,
pp. 502-506.
Compromising
Westphalia| 141
humanrights,
minority
rights,
fiscalresponsibility,
domesticstability,
or external balance.
The Peace of Westphaliaof 1648 (comprising
the two separatetreatiesof
Munsterand Osnabruck),the mythological
beginningof the modernstate
system,includeda numberof provisionsregarding
religiouspracticesin the
model.Whilerhetorically
Holy RomanEmpirethatviolatedtheWestphalian
endorsingtheAugsburgprinciplethattheprincecould setthereligionofhis
subjects,theactualprovisionsofthePeace constrained
sovereignprerogatives
inGermany
infavorofsomeformsofreligioustoleration.
ThoseCatholicswho
livedin Lutheranstatesor Lutheranswho livedin Catholicstatesweregiven
therighttopracticein theprivacyoftheirhomes,and toeducatetheirchildren
at homeor to send themto foreignschools.Five citieswithmixedLutheran
and Catholicpopulationswereto have freedomof religiouspracticeforboth
groups.In fourof thesecities,officeswere to be divided equallybetween
TheTreaty
ofOsnabruckprovidedthatCatholicsand
Catholicsand Lutherans.
in the assembliesof the Empire.
Lutheransshould be equally represented
Religiousissuesweretobe decidedbya consensusthatincludedbothCatholics
and Protestants.
to the imperialcourtswere also to include
Representatives
Ifthejudgesdividedalongreligiouslines,thenthe
membersofbothreligions.
case couldbe appealedtotheDietoftheHolyRomanEmpire,wherea decision
also requireda consensusof Protestants
(onlyLutheransand Calvinistswere
included)and Catholics.49
The Treatiesof Munsterand Osnabruck,one or the otherof whichwas
signedby almostall thegreatpowers,did notsanctiontherightof German
princesto do whatevertheypleased withregardto the practiceof religion
withintheirown territories.
The Peace dictateda setof internalpracticesfor
wereguaranteed
muchoftheHolyRomanEmpire.TheTreaties
byFranceand
50 In the
forchallengesto Germanautonomy
Sweden,providinglegitimation
area of religion,thecentralpoliticalquestionof theseventeenth
the
century,
withtheWestphalian
Peace ofWestphalia
was less consistent
modelthanwas
earlier.51
thePeace ofAugsburg,concludedalmosta century
49. Stephen D. Krasner,"Westphaliaand All That," in JudithGoldstein and Robert0. Keohane,
and PoliticalChange(Ithaca,N.Y: CornellUniversity
Institutions,
eds., Ideasand ForeignPolicy:Beliefs,
Press, 1993).
50. Michael Hughes, EarlyModernGernany,1477-1806 (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 97-98.
51. Even the Peace of Augsburg provided forreligioustolerationin several Germancitiesthathad
mixed Catholic and Lutheran populations. See JohnGagliardo, GermanyUnderthe Old Regime,
1600-1790 (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 16-21.
International
Security20:3 1142
The Habsburgmonarch
The Peace ofWestphaliais an exampleofcontract.
He refusedto accepttoleration
in the
did notwantto sanctionProtestantism.
but thatwereoutsidetheHoly RomanEmpire.
areas thathe ruleddirectly
Endingthe ThirtyYears War withprovisionsforreligioustolerationwas,
to morefighting.
however,preferable
The Peace ofUtrecht
was signedin 1713.It broughtan end to warbetween
France,the majorpowerin Europe,and an alliancethatincludedEngland,
Holland,Sweden,theAustrianHabsburgs,the Holy RomanEmpire,Savoy,
and manyGermanprincipalities.
Thewarhad beenprecipitated
byLouisXIV's
to extendhis controlto Spain and even Austria.The Peace provided
efforts
thatPhilipV,a Bourbon,would be recognizedas theKingofSpain,butonly
if the BourbonfamilyagreedthatFranceand Spain would neverbe united
undera singleruler.Utrechtwas a contract
betweenBritainand Francein
which,in exchangeforpeace and someterritorial
aggrandizement,
Louis XIV
on thedomesticpoliticalarrangements
and personnel
acceptedconstraints
that
could governFranceand Spain.52
One outcomeof the peace settlements
reachedat the conclusionof the
Napoleonicwars,althoughnot the onlyone, was the creationof the Holy
Alliance.The aim of theHoly Alliance,establishedby Prussia,Austria,and
Russia,was topreventtheriseofrepublican
Themembers
ofthe
governments.
Alliancepledgedtoresistsuchdevelopments
domestically
and torepressthem
A protocolsignedat theConference
ofTroppauin 1820stated:
internationally.
due to revolution,
Stateswhichhave undergonea changeof government
the
resultsof whichthreaten
otherstates,ipsofactocease to be membersof the
EuropeanAlliance,and remainexcludedfromit untiltheirsituationgives
forlegalorderand stability
immediate
guarantees
If,owingto suchalterations,
otherstates,thepartiesbindthemselves,
dangerthreatens
by peacefulmeans,
orifneedbe byarms,tobringbacktheguiltystateintothebosomoftheGreat
Alliance.53
The rulersofthepowerfulconservative
statesofEuropehad no compunction
modelin the
againstusingcoercionor impositionto violatetheWestphalian
52. Mark Trachtenberg,"Interventionin Historical Perspective," in Laura W. Reed and Carl
Kaysen, eds., EmergingNormsof Justified
Intervention:
A Collectionof Essaysfroma Projectof the
AmericanAcademyofArtsand Sciences(Cambridge,Mass.: AmericanAcademy ofArtsand Sciences,
1993), p. 17; W.E. Lingelbach,"The Doctrineand Practiceof Interventionin Europe," Annalsofthe
AmericanAcademyofPoliticaland Social Science,Vol. 16, No. 1 (July1900), p. 5; Andreas Osiander,
The States Systemof Europe 1640-1990: Peacemakingand the Conditionsof InternationalStability
(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1994), pp. 123-133.
53. Quoted in Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A.J. Thomas, Jr.,Non-Intervention:
The Law and Its
Importin theAmericas(Dallas: SouthernMethodistUniversityPress, 1956), p. 8.
Compromising
Westphalia| 143
name of an alternativeprinciple,the preservationof peace throughthe repression of republicangovernments,althoughthe Holy Alliance had only limited
success partlybecause of Britishresistance.Austria received internationalapproval for the repressionof republican governmentsin some German states
and in Naples. At the Congress of Veronain 1822,France secured the support
of Russia, Prussia, and Austria to intervenein support of the monarchyin
Spain, which it did in 1823. The Alliance functioneduntil 1825,when it broke
up over the question of whetherto interveneto aid the rebellionin Greece.54
The Holy Alliance was not only an instrumentof coercion and imposition
vis-a'-vispotential republican governments,but also a conventionamong the
signatorieswho committedthemselves to maintain their own conservative
regimes.
Provisions of the Treatyof Versaillesand other agreementsreached at the
end of World War I were explicitlydesigned to alter the domestic political
arrangementsof the new statesthatemergedaftertheconflict.The treatiesand
the League of Nations embodied Wilsonian conceptions of the relationship
among the rightsof minorities,national self-determination,
democracy,and
internationalpeace. Collective securitycould only be enacted by democratic
states. Democratic states had to respectnational self-determination.
National
self-determination,
however, could not resolve the problem of minorities.
therightsof minoritieshad to be protectedso thattheywould accept
Therefore,
and supportthe democraticpolitieswithinwhich theyresided. The minorities
treaties associated with the Versailles settlementviolated the Westphalian
model. They were imposed on the would-be rulers of new and powerless
states, and were repudiated when it later became apparent that neitherthe
great powers nor the League of Nations could or would enforcethem. Symmetricalconditionsconcerningthetreatmentof minoritieswere neveraccepted
by the victoriouspowers. There were no internationalagreementsabout the
treatmentof the Irish by the Britishgovernment,or of Asians and blacks by
federalor state authoritiesin the United States.55
There was no generalpeace settlementafterWorldWar II; rather,the United
States and the Soviet Union coerced or contractedto encourage political regimes that were consonantwith theirown preferences.In 1975, however,the
54. GoronwyJ.Jones,The UnitedNationsand theDomesticJurisdiction
of States:Interpretations
and
Applications
oftheNon-Intervention
Principle(Cardiff:Universityof Wales Press, 1979),pp. 3-4; R.J.
Vincent,Nonintervention
and International
Order(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1974),
pp. 77-79, 86-87; StanleyHoffmann,"The Problemof Intervention,"
in Hedley Bull, ed., Interventionin WorldPolitics(Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 12.
55. Jones,Code ofPeace,p. 45.
International
Security20:3 | 144
on Security
majorpowersdid concludetheFinalActoftheHelsinkiConference
and Cooperationin Europe (CSCE). The CSCE was a contractbetweenthe
Sovietsand theWestin whichtheSovietsnominallyacceptedsome human
rightsprinciplesand the Westrecognizedexistingbordersand regimesin
Europe.The CSCE reflected
the Sovieteffort
to securelegitimation
of their
dominanceof easternEurope,and thedesireof theWestto gettheSovietsto
acceptsome liberalprecepts.PrincipleVI of the "Declarationon Principles
States"endorsednon-intervention,
GuidingRelationsbetweenParticipating
while PrincipleVII endorsedhumanrightsincludingfreedomof thought,
conscience,and religion.The Westused theHelsinkiaccordto pressurethe
SovietUnion on humanrights,rejectingthe chargethatthisamountedto
in internal
affairs
interference
by claimingthathumanrightswereuniversally
to dictateto other
recognizedand thatnon-interference
referred
onlyto efforts
countries.The UnitedStatesjustifiedits impositionof sanctionsagainstthe
SovietUnion in 1979 partlyin termsof Sovietviolationsof humanrights.
Daniel Thomashas shownthatthe Helsinkiaccordsalteredconceptionsof
humanrightsand legitimate
statebehaviorthatwereheldbygroupsin eastern
theprincipleofautonomy.56
Europe,and in thisway compromised
Hence,everymajorpeace settlement
fromWestphaliato Helsinkihas inmodel.At Utrechtand Helsinki,rulers
volved violationsof theWestphalian
enteredintocontracts
thatcompromised,
eitherimmediately
orpotentially,
the
domesticautonomy
ofsomestates.In theHolyAllianceand atVersailles,
rulers
in themostpowerfulstatesimposedtheirpreferences
regarding
specificdoevenconstitutional
structures.
Therewas always
mesticpoliciesand sometimes
some competingprinciple-theneed forreligiouspeace at Westphalia,for
forinternational
balanceof powerat Utrecht,
peace at Viennaand Versailles
kindsofdomesticregimes),
for
different
(assumedto emergefromcompletely
the Weststabilityat Helsinki-thatwas invokedto justifycompromising
phalianmodel.
Weaknessand Persistence
modelhas persistedfora longperiodof timebut has been
The Westphalian
frequently
defeated.It has been bothenduringand flimsyIn someinstances,
56. R.J.Vincent,HumanRightsand International
Relations(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1986),pp. 66-70; Brownlie,BasicDocuments,
pp. 454-473,fortextof theagreement;Thomas, "Social
Movements and InternationalInstitutions."
Compromising
Westphalia| 145
International
Security20:3 | 146
Compromising
Westphalia| 147
"A Rational Choice Perspectiveon the Role of Ideas: Shared BeliefSystemsand StateSovereignty
in InternationalCooperation," Politicsand Society,Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 1995). For a realist
critiqueof internationalinstitutions,
see JohnJ.Mearsheimer,"The False Promise of International
Institutions,"International
Security,
Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter1994/95),pp. 5-50.
International
Security20:3 | 148
even thoughsome
subjectto gunboat diplomacyduringthenineteenthcentury,
ofitspublic entitiesdefaultedon theirinternationalobligations.Minorityrights
protectionsimposed on easternEurope at the conclusionof WorldWar I were
not reciprocallyaccepted by U.S. policymakers.The United States has signed
relativelyfew human rightsconventions,even thoughthe highlyindividualistic conceptions of human rightsdeveloped afterWorld War II reflectedU.S.
values.
In contrast,weaker stateshave been more subjectto externalimpositionand
coercionand have been more likelyto enterintocontractualarrangementsthat
violate theirautonomybut not thatof the otherparties.All of the statesthat
emerged from the Ottoman and Habsburg empires in the nineteenthand
twentiethcenturies were subject to some constraintson their institutional
structuresor policies. Whetherforcedto accept the minorities'protectionsof
the Treatyof Berlinof 1878 or the VersaillessettlementafterWorldWar I, the
impositionof communistrule, or the political conditionalityof the European
Bank,not one of the statesof easternEurope createdsince theNapoleonic Wars
has ever conformedwith the Westphalianmodel.
The internationalsystemis a less stable and less institutionalizedenvironmentthan establisheddomesticpolities.Authoritystructurescannotdominate
power asymmetries.At the internationallevel, different
rulerscan champion
different
principlesnot only because theirinterestsvarybut also because their
normativeframesof reference,primarilyderived fromtheirdomestic experiences and constituencies,also vary.Rulers mightendorse autonomy,but then
again theymightfindthatinterveningin the domesticaffairsof anotherstate
or even jeopardizing the autonomyof theirown state offersa more attractive
policy option. New problemscan be solved with new solutions.For instance,
the Exclusive Economic Zone for the oceans, which violates the principleof
territoriality-someactivitiesin the same geographicarea (the exploitationof
mineral and marine life) are subject to the authorityof the littoralstate but
others(naval and commercialshipping) are not-was inventedwhen technological changes opened new commercialopportunitiesforlittoralstates.These
opportunitiescould only be fully realized if the concerns of major states,
especially the United States,about freedomof navigationwere satisfied.Minorityprotectioncould be imposed on new statesafterWorldWarI in response
to concerns about stabilityand collective security,and then forgottenafter
World War II, only to be revived again in response to ethnicconflictsin the
1990s.
Compromising
Westphalia| 149
61. If there really is an end of history,and democracy and capitalism are the only available
institutionalforms,then socialization could become more powerfulat the internationallevel. See
No. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18.
Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?"The NationalInterest,
62. Even here thereare exceptions.The Third World stronglysupported internationalsanctions
designed to end apartheid in South Africabecause the eliminationof a racistregime was more
in the internalaffairsof
compelling than universallyadhering to the norm of non-intervention
states.
63. Keohane, "Hobbes's Dilemma," p. 172. The extentto which even strong states have been
willing to honor each other's autonomy has depended on the resources they have had for
intervention.
The United Statesand especiallytheSoviet Union,which could employ theattraction
of communistideology,attemptedto undermineeach other's domesticautonomy.
International
Security20:3 | 150
Conclusions
In the contemporaryworld, peace and stabilitywould be betterserved by
explicitlyrecognizingthat the Westphalianmodel has, in fact and in theory,
always been contested.It is historicallymyopicto take the Westphalianmodel
as a benchmarkthat accuratelydescribes some golden age when all states
exercised exclusive authoritywithin theirown borders. Weaker states have
frequentlybeen subjectto coercionand impositionand been unable to defend
theirautonomy Strongerones have enteredintoconventionsand contractsthat
violate theirautonomy and even territoriality.
Some analysts have suggested that the basic nature of the international
systemis changing:sovereigntyis dramaticallyeroding;domesticand internationalpoliticscannotbe distinguished;rulerscannotunilaterallygoverncritical
statefunctionssuch as monetarypolicy;multilateralismis comingto dominate
otherformsof diplomacy.64
Violationsof Westphalia,however,are an old problem,not a new one, even
though contractualarrangementspromptedby greaterglobalizationhave become more prominent.The activitiesof contemporaryinternationalfinancial
institutionshave theiranalogs in foreigncontrolledcommitteesthatgoverned
financein some weaker states in the nineteenthcentury.Concerns about minorityrightsgeneratedby the Balkan war of the 1990s resemblesimilarissues
thatarose afterearlierBalkan wars and WorldWar I. Coercion and imposition
have almost always involved a multilateralcomponent,because greatpowers
have recognized that mutuallyantagonisticattemptsto forceothersto act in
specificways can be costly.The gold exchangestandardoperated by Britainin
the late nineteenthcenturyarguably imposed more rigid constraintson the
domestic monetaryautonomy of states than do contemporaryfinancialflows
and agreements.
Given the asymmetriesof power,diversityof interests,and the weakness of
institutionalizingmechanisms in the internationalsystem,it would be more
productiveto stop thinkingof theWestphalianmodel as some ideal or historical realityand to treatit as a referencepoint or conventionthat is useful in
some circumstancesbut not others.Some states have the power to preserve
64. See forinstance,JamesRosenau, Turbulence
in WorldPolitics:A TheoryofChangeand Continuity
(Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1990); Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sorensen,"Introduction:What Has Changed?" in Holm and Sorensen, WhoseWorldOrder?,pp. 5-6; JohnG.
Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism
Matters:The Theoryand Praxis of an InstitutionalForm (New York:
Columbia UniversityPress, 1993).
Compromising
Westphalia| 151
theirterritory
and autonomy;
othersdo not.f5
Someoftheweak are incapable
of governing
theirown populations,and are threatsto international
stability
as well.The populationsofthesestates,ifnottheirrulers,wouldbe betteroff
if Westphaliawerecompromised.
Many ThirdWorldstatesare incapableof
independently
implementing
reasonableeconomicpolicies.For themcondiis a good thing,evenifitis inconsistent
tionality
withtheWestphalian
model.
Given the configuration
of power in the Middle East-the existenceof a
numberof large Arab statesthatwill always be in one way or anothera
potentialthreatto Israel-the Palestinianquestioncannotbe resolvedby the
creation
ofa Westphalian
state:theautonomy
ofanyPalestinian
statewillhave
to be compromised
in one way or another.
At the same time,relationsamong the major powers-entitiesthatare
theirterritory
capableofdefending
and autonomy-arestabilizedbyrecognizing the Westphalian
model unless,as is the case in Europe,theyhave contractedotherwise.Russia may be able to compromisethe autonomyof the
membersoftheCommonwealth
ofIndependent
are
States,butothercountries
unlikelyto be able to compromisethe autonomyof Russia.A Panamanian
forcewillnotinvadetheUnitedStates,arrestitspresident,
military
and return
himor herto Panama fortrialregardlessof how perverseU.S. drugpolicies
mightbe. ManuelNoriega,however,suffered
exactlythisfate.
The entitiesthatare now calledstatesvaryenormously
in theircapabilities.
a sovereign
stateis no guaranteethatitwillbe able todefend
Callingan entity
itsautonomyCompromising
it can also be
Westphaliais notonlyinevitable,
thatdifferent
good. Explicitly
recognizing
principlesoughtto varywiththe
capacityand behaviorofstateswouldnotonlymakenormative
discoursemore
consistent
withempiricalreality,
itwould also contribute
to themoreimaginativeconstruction
ofinstitutional
forms-forms
thatcompromise
Westphaliathatcould createa morestableand peacefulinternational
system.
65. RobertJacksonhas pointed out thatthe nineteenth-century
rule of basing internationalrecognitionon the abilityto maintaininternalcontrolwas abandoned afterWorld War II. See Jackson,
Quasi-States:Sovereignty,
International
Relationsand theThirdWorld(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1990).