Right To Information Cases

Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG et al., GR No.
130716, December 09, 1998
Locus Standi
Facts:
Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any

negotiations and/or agreements pertaining to the latter's task of recovering the
Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. The respondents argued that the action was premature
since he has not shown that he had asked the respondents to disclose the
negotiations and agreements before filing the case.
Issue:
Does the petitioner have the personality or legal standing to file the instant
petition?
Held:
The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access
to government records, documents and papers- a right guaranteed under section 7,
article III of the Philippine Constitution. The petitioner a former solicitor general, is a
Filipino citizen, and because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down
by decisional law to sustain petitioner's standing i.e
(1) ENFORCEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT

(2) ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN
we rule, that the petition at bar be allowed.
Chavez v pea
Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell
any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the
foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No.
3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total
area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four
(1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds
of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309,
7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as
the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road, Paraaque City.
PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.
On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate

Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of
their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the
JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as
alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of
title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential

Administrative Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the
legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the
Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,
and the Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of
the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a

taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends
the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed
lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of
the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner
now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract
be declared null and void."
Issue: The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent
events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of
governing the heirarchy of courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on ongoing neogtiations BEFORE a final agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the
transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the
1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is
grossly disadvantageous to the government
Held: 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its
approval by the President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court
of its jurisdiction.
PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin
the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes
preventing its implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in
violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the
renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public
domain to private corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial
contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of
reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation.
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly government
owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. All previous
decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its
counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to
private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties.
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in

this petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title
and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is
obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in
the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses, The Amended JVA even allows
AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the
reclamation project.
2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental

importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any
factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus
which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of
the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and
conditions for the sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA make this public
disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make
this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result
of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an
affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of
this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the
issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. The principal issue in the
instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the
constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private
corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
does not apply in the instant case.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition
seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two
constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision
intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain
among Filipino Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution,
compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning

the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the
issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the
social, economic and moral well being of the people.'
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the
enforcement of constitutional rights to information and to the equitable diffusion
of natural resources matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner
has the requisite locus standi.
5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public

interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public concern.
This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest."
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional

Commission understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a

consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to
information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to
expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the
contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal,
becomes a fait accompli.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The
right only affords access to records, documents and papers, which means the
opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the
records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also
subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and
to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and
how to conduct the inspection and copying.
6. Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as
follows:
"Art. 339.
Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a
similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general
public use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of the
national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the
territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In
contrast, property devoted to public service referred to property used for some
specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the
property.Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public
use, but also to property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth.
This class of property constituted property of public dominion although employed

for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or
to the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the
State." This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the
executive department pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed
for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or alienate
the property to private parties.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature

Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor
mineral land, shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural
purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under
the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed,

foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their
inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties.
The State always reserved these lands for some future public service.
However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to

classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not
sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution
banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private
corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public
domain is still CA No. 141.
Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum
area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to
acquire more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations
as his means would allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a
corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The
corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on
acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying
the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Being
neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands
necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain.
Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other
natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State"
forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas
under water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical
reclamation of areas under water whether directly or through private contractors.
DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is
tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged

areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the
National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of
PEA.
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to
sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and
administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525
declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." PEA's
charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer,
deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands . . . owned,
managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87 (Emphasis supplied)
There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether
patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties
its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from
constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's
patrimonial lands.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government

Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable government property
through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that:... "In the event
that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price
as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the
Commission."
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom
Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an
option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated
contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public
bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid
justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly
auctioned.
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the
certificate of title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes
private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section
60 of CA No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public
domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain
must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not
tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or
patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress
can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands
of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to

PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
This scheme can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."
The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
7. Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no
necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and
this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL
and VOID ab initio.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE,
AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication

(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September
18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN
Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during
which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to
accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that
the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in
contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until
such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and
abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others,
the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is
because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor
must be in operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may

be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought
likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive
privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions
fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public
officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that
the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are
presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close
advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third,
there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation
of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of

executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such
contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made
himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his
willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of
those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7
of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
CENTER FOR PEOPLE G.R. No. 189546
EMPOWERMENT IN
GOVERNANCE,
Petitioner, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,*
NACHURA,*
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
- versus - BRION,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,* and
SERENO,** JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 21, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns the duty of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disclose
the source code for the Automated Election System (AES) technologies it used in the
2010 national and local elections.
On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance

(CenPEG), a non-government organization,[1] wrote respondent COMELEC,
requesting a copy of the source code of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS)
programs, the Board of Canvassers Consolidation/Canvassing System (BOC CCS)
programs for the municipal, provincial, national, and congressional canvass, the
COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the in-house COMELEC programs
called the Data Capturing System (DCS) utilities.
CenPEG invoked the following pertinent portion of Section 12 of Republic Act (R.A.)
9369, which provides:
xxxx
Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall

promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any
interested political party or groups which may conduct their own review thereof.
Section 2(12) of R.A. 9369 describes the source code as the human readable
instructions that define what the computer equipment will do. This has been
explained in an article:
Source code is the human readable representation of the instructions that control
the operation of a computer. Computers are composed of hardware (the physical
devices themselves) and software (which controls the operation of the hardware).
The software instructs the computer how to operate; without software, the
computer is useless. Source code is the human readable form in which software is
written by computer programmers. Source code is usually written in a programming
language that is arcane and incomprehensible to non-specialists but, to a computer
programmer, the source code is the master blueprint that reveals and determines
how the machine will behave.
Source code could be compared to a recipe: just as a cook follows the instructions in
a recipe step-by-step, so a computer executes the sequence of instructions found in
the software source code. This is a reasonable analogy, but it is also imperfect.
While a good cook will use her discretion and common sense in following a recipe, a
computer follows the instructions in the source code in a mechanical and unfailingly
literal way; thus, while errors in a recipe might be noticed and corrected by the
cook, errors in source code can be disastrous, because the code is executed by the
computer exactly as written, whether that was what the programmer intended or
not x x x.
The source code in voting machines is in some ways analogous to the procedures
provided to election workers. Procedures are instructions that are provided to
people; for instance, the procedures provided to poll workers list a sequence of
steps that poll workers should follow to open the polls on election morning. Source
code contains instructions, not for people, but for the computers running the
election; for instance, the source code for a voting machine determines the steps
the machine will take when the polls are opened on election morning.
[2] (Underscoring supplied)
On June 24, 2009 the COMELEC granted the request[3] for the source code of the
PCOS and the CCS, but denied that for the DCS, since the DCS was a system used in
processing the Lists of Voters which is not part of the voting, counting and
canvassing systems contemplated by R.A. 9369. According to COMELEC, if the
source code for the DCS were to be divulged, unscrupulous individuals might
change the program and pass off an illicit one that could benefit certain candidates
or parties.
Still, the COMELEC apparently did not release even the kinds of source code that it
said it was approving for release. Consequently, on July 13, 2009, CenPEG once
more asked COMELEC for the source code of the PCOS, together with other
documents, programs, and diagrams related to the AES. CenPEG sent follow-up
letters on July 17 and 20 and on August 24, 2009.
On August 26, 2009 COMELEC replied that the source code CenPEG wanted did not
yet exist for the reasons: 1) that it had not yet received the baseline source code of
the provider, Smartmatic, since payment to it had been withheld as a result of a
pending suit; 2) its customization of the baseline source code was targeted for
completion in November 2009 yet; 3) under Section 11 of R.A. 9369, the customized
source code still had to be reviewed by an established international certification
entity, which review was expected to be completed by the end of February 2010;
and 4) only then would the AES be made available for review under a controlled
environment.
Rejecting COMELECs excuse, on October 5, 2009 CenPEG filed the present petition
for mandamus, seeking to compel COMELEC to immediately make its source codes
available to CenPEG and other interested parties.
COMELEC claimed in its comment that CenPEG did not have a clear, certain, and
well-defined right that was enforceable by mandamus because COMELECs duty to
make the source code available presupposed that it already had the
same. COMELEC restated the explanation it gave in its August 26, 2009 letter to
CenPEG.
In its manifestation and omnibus motion, CenPEG did not believe that the source
code was still unavailable considering that COMELEC had already awarded to an
international certification entity the review of the same and that COMELEC had
already been field testing its PCOS and CCS machines.
On February 10, 2010 COMELEC filed a manifestation, stating that it had already
deposited on February 9, 2010 the source code to be used in the May 10, 2010
elections with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Required to comment on this,
CenPEG said on February 22, 2010 that the manifestation did not constitute
compliance with Section 12 of R.A. 9369 but only with Section 11 of R.A. 8436.
In its earlier comment, COMELEC claimed, reiterating what it said in its August 26,
2009 letter to CenPEG, that it would make the source code available for review by
the end of February 2010 under a controlled environment. Apparently, this review
had not taken place and was overtaken by the May 10, 2010 elections.
On June 21, 2010 CenPEG filed a manifestation and omnibus motion, reiterating its
prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in this case notwithstanding the fact
that the elections for which the subject source code was to be used had already
been held. It claimed that the source code remained important and relevant not
only for compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof, but especially in the
backdrop of numerous admissions of errors and claims of fraud.
The Court finds the petition and this last manifestation meritorious.
The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear in that once an AES
technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall promptly make the
source code of that technology available and open to any interested political party
or groups which may conduct their own review thereof. The COMELEC has offered no
reason not to comply with this requirement of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for
not disclosing the source code was that it was not yet available when CenPEG asked
for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be done, apparently for security
reason, under a controlled environment. The elections had passed and that reason
is already stale.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for mandamus and DIRECTS the
COMELEC to make the source codes for the AES technologies it selected for
implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369 immediately available to CenPEG and all

other interested political parties or groups for independent review.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On Official Leave) (On Official Leave)
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
(On Official Leave) (On Official Leave)
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
(On Official Leave)
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
(On Leave)
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the

Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay
his membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution notwithstanding due
notice.
Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion
of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of
the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force
and effect.
Issue:
WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? NO
Held:
All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed
with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client,
but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes
part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of
justice as an officer of the court.
When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law
and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and
are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such
regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good,
even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to
submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have
clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his

constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why?
The right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or

arbitrary.
Malabanan v ramento
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of Respondent

University. They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold
a meeting from 8am to 12am. Pursuant to such permit, along with other students,
they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science
(VMAS) Basketball Court. The place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball
court as therein stated, but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering, they
manifested in vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed
merger of the Institute of Animal Science. They continued their language severely
critical of the university authorities and using megaphones in the process. There
was, as a result, disturbance of classes being held. Also, non academic employees
within hearing distance, stopped their work because of noise created. They were
asked to explain why they should not be held liable for holding an assembly.
Issue: Whether or not the suspension of students for one academic year was
violative of the constitutional rights of freedom of assembly and free speech?
Decision: Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters affecting their welfare or
involving public interest is not subjected to previous restraint or subsequent
punishment unless there be a showing of clear and present danger to a substantive
evil that the State has a right to prevent. The peaceable character of an assembly
could be lost, however, by an advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to be held in
school premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities who are devoid
to deny such request. In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the
time and place of an assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of
non-academic personnel. However, in violation of terms, penalty incurred should not
be disproportionate to the offense.
UNITED PEPSI-COLA VS. LAGUESMA
NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 122226 March 25, 1998

UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU), petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC.
respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20,

1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route
managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied
by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on
the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore,
ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor
Code, which provides:
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of

supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or
form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join,
assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of the order, dismissed.
Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of
Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be
ineligible to form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III, 8 of the Constitution
which provides:
The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged.
ISSUES:
(1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are
managerial employees and
(2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming,
joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art. III, 8 of the Constitution.
HELD: YES and NO
As a class, managers constitute three levels of a pyramid: (1) Top management; (2)
Middle Management; and (3) First-line Management [also called supervisors].
FIRST-LINE MANAGERS The lowest level in an organization at which individuals

are responsible for the work of others is called first-line or first-level management.
First-line managers direct operating employees only; they do not supervise other
managers. Examples of first-line managers are the foreman or production
supervisor in a manufacturing plant, the technical supervisor in a research
department, and the clerical supervisor in a large office. First-level managers are
often called supervisors.
MIDDLE MANAGERS The term middle management can refer to more than one
level in an organization. Middle managers direct the activities of other managers
and sometimes also those of operating employees. Middle managers principal
responsibilities are to direct the activities that implement their organizations
policies and to balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities of their
subordinates. A plant manager in an electronics firm is an example of a middle
manager.
TOP MANAGERS Composed of a comparatively small group of executives, top

management is responsible for the overall management of the organization. It
establishes operating policies and guides the organizations interactions with its
environment. Typical titles of top managers are chief executive officer,
president, and senior vice-president. Actual titles vary from one organization to
another and are not always a reliable guide to membership in the highest
management classification.
A distinction exists between those who have the authority to devise, implement and
control strategic and operational policies (top and middle managers) and those
whose task is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file
employees of an organization (first-level managers/supervisors). What distinguishes
them from the rank-and-file employees is that they act in the interest of the
employer in supervising such rank-and-file employees.
Managerial employees may therefore be said to fall into two distinct categories:
the managers per se, who compose the former group described above, and the
supervisors who form the latter group.
#1: It appears that this question was the subject of two previous determinations by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, in accordance with which this case was
decided by the med-arbiter.
To qualify as managerial employee, there must be a clear showing of the exercise of

managerial attributes under paragraph (m), Article 212 of the Labor Code as
amended. Designations or titles of positions are not controlling. As to the route
managers and accounting manager, we are convinced that they are managerial
employees. Their job descriptions clearly reveal so (Workers Alliance Trade Union
(WATU) v. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., Nov. 13, 1991)
This finding was reiterated in Case No. OS-A-3-71-92. entitled In Re: Petition for
Direct Certification and/or Certification Election-Route Managers/Supervisory
Employees of Pepsi-Cola Products Phils.Inc.
* doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary administrative proceedings
Thus, we have in this case an experts view that the employees concerned are
managerial employees within the purview of Art. 212.
At the very least, the principle of finality of administrative determination compels

respect for the finding of the Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial
employees as defined by law in the absence of anything to show that such
determination is without substantial evidence to support it.
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by the Secretary of Labor is
indeed supported by substantial evidence. The nature of the job of route managers
is given in a four-page pamphlet, prepared by the company, called Route Manager
Position Description, the pertinent parts of which read:
A. BASIC PURPOSE
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the sales plan; and you achieve this
objective through the skillful MANAGEMENT OF YOUR JOB AND THE MANAGEMENT
OF YOUR PEOPLE.
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route Manager. Within these functions
managing your job and managing your people you are accountable to your
District Manager for the execution and completion of various tasks and activities
which will make it possible for you to achieve your sales objectives.
Xxxx
Distinction is evident in the work of the route managers which sets them apart from
supervisors in general. Unlike supervisors who basically merely direct operating
employees in line with set tasks assigned to them, route managers are responsible
for the success of the companys main line of business through management of
their respective sales teams. Such management necessarily involves the planning,
direction, operation and evaluation of their individual teams and areas which the
work of supervisors does not entail.
The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors because
their work does not only involve, but goes far beyond, the simple direction or
supervision of operating employees to accomplish objectives set by those above
them.
While route managers do not appear to have the power to hire and fire people (the
evidence shows that they only recommended or endorsed the taking of
disciplinary action against certain employees), this is because thisis a function of
the Human Resources or Personnel Department of the company.
# 2: Constitutionality of Art. 245
Art.245 is the result of the amendment of the Labor Code in 1989 by R.A. No. 6715,
otherwise known as the Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike the Industrial Peace Act or the
provisions of the Labor Code which it superseded, R.A. No. 6715 provides separate
definitions of the terms managerial and supervisory employees, as follows:
Art. 212. Definitions. . . .

(m) managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay off,
recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those
who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial
actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature
but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any
of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this
Book.
The distinction between top and middle managers, who set management policy,
and front-line supervisors, who are merely responsible for ensuring that such
policies are carried out by the rank and file, is articulated in the present definition.
30 When read in relation to this definition in Art. 212(m), it will be seen that Art. 245
faithfully carries out the intent of the Constitutional Commission in framing Art. III,
8 of the fundamental law.
*Framers Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on Section 7, page 2, line 19, which
is to insert between the words people and to the following: WHETHER
EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. In other words, the section
will now read as follows: The right of the people WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE
STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS to form associations, unions, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, 8 infringed by a ban against
managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject
to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes not contrary to law. In the
case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from
forming or joining labor organizations.
PETITION is DISMISSED.
From Atty. Bayani^^
ACOSTA V COURT OF APPEALS
Posted by abegail guardian on October 14, 2013 Leave a Comment
Facts: Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in metro manila. On
various dates in September and October 1990, petitioners did not report for work
and instead, participated in mass actions by public school teachers at the liwasang
bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of their
grievances. On the basis of reports submitted by their respective school principals
that petitioners participated in said mass actions and refused to comply with the
return-to-work order issued September 17, 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cario
of the department of education, culture and sports (DECS), petitioners were
administratively charged with such offenses as grave misconduct, gross neglect of
duty, gross violation of civil service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office
regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave.
Petitioners failed to answer the charges. Secretary Cario found petitioners guilty as
charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from the service. Is hereby meted
out the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay. Petitioners appealed that
respondent court of appeals grievously erred when it affirmed the assailed
resolutions of CSC.
Issues:
WON respondent court of appeals grievously erred when it affirmed the assailed
resolutions of the civil service commission that wrongly penalized petitioners whose
only offense was to exercise their consitutional right to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances?
WON respondent court of appeals grievously erred when it affirmed the assailed
resolutions of the civil service commission that wrongly denied petitioners their
right to backwages?
Decision: No. Petition denied. In Bangalisan v. Court of appeals, petitioners, are

being penalized not because they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and
petition for redress of grievances but because of their successive unauthorized and
unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for whose
education they are responsible. The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, punishable under the civil
service law, rules and regulations.as aptly stated by the solicitor general, it is not
the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceable assemble
that was punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which
resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in
various public schools in metro manila. For, indeed, there are efficient and nondisruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners
could petition the government for redress of grievances.
As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he

has not rendered any service. While there recognized instances when backwages
may be awarded to a suspended or dismissed public official who is later ordered
reinstated, as pointed by petitioners in citing bangalisan, the factual circumstances
of the case at bar impel the Court to rule otherwise.
RENATO V. DIAZ and G.R. No. 193007
AURORA MA. F. TIMBOL,
Petitioners, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,** JJ.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE
and THE COMMISSIONER OF Promulgated:
INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondents. July 19, 2011
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
May toll fees collected by tollway operators be subjected to valueadded tax?
The Facts and the Case
Petitioners Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbol (petitioners) filed this petition for
declaratory relief[1] assailing the validity of the impending imposition of valueadded tax (VAT) by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the collections of
tollway operators.
Petitioners claim that, since the VAT would result in increased toll fees, they have an
interest as regular users of tollways in stopping the BIR action. Additionally, Diaz
claims that he sponsored the approval of Republic Act 7716 (the 1994 Expanded
VAT Law or EVAT Law) and Republic Act 8424 (the 1997 National Internal Revenue
Code or the NIRC) at the House of Representatives. Timbol, on the other hand,
claims that she served as Assistant Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry and consultant of the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) in the past
administration.
Petitioners allege that the BIR attempted during the administration of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to impose VAT on toll fees. The imposition was deferred,
however, in view of the consistent opposition of Diaz and other sectors to such
move. But, upon President Benigno C. Aquino IIIs assumption of office in 2010, the
BIR revived the idea and would impose the challenged tax on toll fees beginning
August 16, 2010 unless judicially enjoined.
Petitioners hold the view that Congress did not, when it enacted the NIRC, intend to
include toll fees within the meaning of sale of services that are subject to VAT; that
a toll fee is a users tax, not a sale of services; that to impose VAT on toll fees would
amount to a tax on public service; and that, since VAT was never factored into the
formula for computing toll fees, its imposition would violate the non-impairment
clause of the constitution.
On August 13, 2010 the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining
the implementation of the VAT. The Court required the government, represented by
respondents Cesar V. Purisima, Secretary of the Department of Finance, and Kim S.
Jacinto-Henares, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to comment on the petition
within 10 days from notice.[2] Later, the Court issued another resolution treating
the petition as one for prohibition.[3]
On August 23, 2010 the Office of the Solicitor General filed the governments
comment.[4] The government avers that the NIRC imposes VAT on all kinds of
services of franchise grantees, including tollway operations, except where the law
provides otherwise; that the Court should seek the meaning and intent of the law
from the words used in the statute; and that the imposition of VAT on tollway
operations has been the subject as early as 2003 of several BIR rulings and
circulars.[5]
The government also argues that petitioners have no right to invoke the nonimpairment of contracts clause since they clearly have no personal interest in
existing toll operating agreements (TOAs) between the government and tollway
operators. At any rate, the non-impairment clause cannot limit the States sovereign
taxing power which is generally read into contracts.
Finally, the government contends that the non-inclusion of VAT in the parametric
formula for computing toll rates cannot exempt tollway operators from VAT. In any
event, it cannot be claimed that the rights of tollway operators to a reasonable rate
of return will be impaired by the VAT since this is imposed on top of the toll
rate. Further, the imposition of VAT on toll fees would have very minimal effect on
motorists using the tollways.
In their reply[6] to the governments comment, petitioners point out that tollway
operators cannot be regarded as franchise grantees under the NIRC since they do
not hold legislative franchises. Further, the BIR intends to collect the VAT by
rounding off the toll rate and putting any excess collection in an escrow
account. But this would be illegal since only the Congress can modify VAT rates and
authorize its disbursement. Finally, BIR Revenue Memorandum Circular 63-2010 (BIR
RMC 63-2010), which directs toll companies to record an accumulated input VAT of
zero balance in their books as of August 16, 2010, contravenes Section 111 of the
NIRC which grants entities that first become liable to VAT a transitional input tax
credit of 2% on beginning inventory. For this reason, the VAT on toll fees cannot be
implemented.
The Issues Presented
The case presents two procedural issues:
1. Whether or not the Court may treat the petition for declaratory relief as one for
prohibition; and
2. Whether or not petitioners Diaz and Timbol have legal standing to file the action.
The case also presents two substantive issues:
1. Whether or not the government is unlawfully expanding VAT coverage by

including tollway operators and tollway operations in the terms franchise grantees
and sale of services under Section 108 of the Code; and
2. Whether or not the imposition of VAT on tollway operators a) amounts to a tax on

tax and not a tax on services; b) will impair the tollway operators right to a
reasonable return of investment under their TOAs; and c) is not administratively
feasible and cannot be implemented.
The Courts Rulings
A. On the Procedural Issues:
On August 24, 2010 the Court issued a resolution, treating the petition as one for
prohibition rather than one for declaratory relief, the characterization that
petitioners Diaz and Timbol gave their action. The government has sought
reconsideration of the Courts resolution,[7] however, arguing that petitioners

allegations clearly made out a case for declaratory relief, an action over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction. The government adds, moreover, that the petition
does not meet the requirements of Rule 65 for actions for prohibition since the BIR
did not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions when it sought to
impose VAT on toll fees. Besides, petitioners Diaz and Timbol has a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the BIR action in the
form of an appeal to the Secretary of Finance.
But there are precedents for treating a petition for declaratory relief as one for
prohibition if the case has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need
to be resolved for the public good.[8] The Court has also held that a petition for
prohibition is a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive officials that
amount to usurpation of legislative authority.[9]
Here, the imposition of VAT on toll fees has far-reaching implications. Its imposition
would impact, not only on the more than half a million motorists who use the
tollways everyday, but more so on the governments effort to raise revenue for
funding various projects and for reducing budgetary deficits.
To dismiss the petition and resolve the issues later, after the challenged VAT has
been imposed, could cause more mischief both to the tax-paying public and the
government. A belated declaration of nullity of the BIR action would make any
attempt to refund to the motorists what they paid an administrative nightmare with
no solution. Consequently, it is not only the right, but the duty of the Court to take
cognizance of and resolve the issues that the petition raises.
Although the petition does not strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 65, the
Court has ample power to waive such technical requirements when the legal
questions to be resolved are of great importance to the public. The same may be
said of the requirement of locus standi which is a mere procedural requisite.[10]
B. On the Substantive Issues:
One. The relevant law in this case is Section 108 of the NIRC, as amended. VAT is
levied, assessed, and collected, according to Section 108, on the gross receipts
derived from the sale or exchange of services as well as from the use or lease of
properties. The third paragraph of Section 108 defines sale or exchange of services
as follows:
The phrase sale or exchange of services means the performance of all kinds of
services in the Philippines for others for a fee, remuneration or consideration,
including those performed or rendered by construction and service contractors;
stock, real estate, commercial, customs and immigration brokers; lessors of
property, whether personal or real; warehousing services; lessors or distributors of
cinematographic films; persons engaged in milling, processing, manufacturing or
repacking goods for others; proprietors, operators or keepers of hotels, motels,
resthouses, pension houses, inns, resorts; proprietors or operators of restaurants,
refreshment parlors, cafes and other eating places, including clubs and caterers;
dealers in securities; lending investors; transportation contractors on their transport
of goods or cargoes, including persons who transport goods or cargoes for hire and
other domestic common carriers by land relative to their transport of goods or
cargoes; common carriers by air and sea relative to their transport of passengers,
goods or cargoes from one place in the Philippines to another place in the
Philippines; sales of electricity by generation companies, transmission, and
distribution companies; services of franchise grantees of electric utilities, telephone
and telegraph, radio and television broadcasting and all other franchise grantees
except those under Section 119 of this Code and non-life insurance companies
(except their crop insurances), including surety, fidelity, indemnity and bonding
companies; and similar services regardless of whether or not the performance
thereof calls for the exercise or use of the physical or mental
faculties. (Underscoring supplied)
It is plain from the above that the law imposes VAT on all kinds of services rendered
in thePhilippines for a fee, including those specified in the list. The enumeration of
affected services is not exclusive.[11] By qualifying services with the words all
kinds, Congress has given the term services an all-encompassing meaning. The
listing of specific services are intended to illustrate how pervasive and broad is the
VATs reach rather than establish concrete limits to its application. Thus, every
activity that can be imagined as a form of service rendered for a fee should be
deemed included unless some provision of law especially excludes it.
Now, do tollway operators render services for a fee? Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1112
or the Toll Operation Decree establishes the legal basis for the services that tollway
operators render. Essentially, tollway operators construct, maintain, and operate
expressways, also called tollways, at the operators expense.Tollways serve as
alternatives to regular public highways that meander through populated areas and
branch out to local roads. Traffic in the regular public highways is for this reason
slow-moving. In consideration for constructing tollways at their expense, the
operators are allowed to collect government-approved fees from motorists using the
tollways until such operators could fully recover their expenses and earn reasonable
returns from their investments.
When a tollway operator takes a toll fee from a motorist, the fee is in effect for the
latters use of the tollway facilities over which the operator enjoys private
proprietary rights[12] that its contract and the law recognize. In this sense, the
tollway operator is no different from the following service providers under Section
108 who allow others to use their properties or facilities for a fee:
1. Lessors of property, whether personal or real;
2. Warehousing service operators;
3. Lessors or distributors of cinematographic films;
4. Proprietors, operators or keepers of hotels, motels, resthouses, pension houses,

inns, resorts;
5. Lending investors (for use of money);
6. Transportation contractors on their transport of goods or cargoes, including

persons who transport goods or cargoes for hire and other domestic common
carriers by land relative to their transport of goods or cargoes; and
7. Common carriers by air and sea relative to their transport of passengers, goods
or cargoes from one place in the Philippines to another place in the Philippines.
It does not help petitioners cause that Section 108 subjects to VAT all kinds of
services rendered for a fee regardless of whether or not the performance thereof
calls for the exercise or use of the physical or mental faculties. This means that
services to be subject to VAT need not fall under the traditional concept of services,
the personal or professional kinds that require the use of human knowledge and
skills.
And not only do tollway operators come under the broad term all kinds of services,
they also come under the specific class described in Section 108 as all other
franchise grantees who are subject to VAT, except those under Section 119 of this
Code.
Tollway operators are franchise grantees and they do not belong to exceptions (the
low-income radio and/or television broadcasting companies with gross annual
incomes of less than P10 million and gas and water utilities) that Section
119[13] spares from the payment of VAT. The word franchise broadly covers
government grants of a special right to do an act or series of acts of public concern.
[14]
Petitioners of course contend that tollway operators cannot be considered franchise

grantees under Section 108 since they do not hold legislative franchises. But
nothing in Section 108 indicates that the franchise grantees it speaks of are those
who hold legislative franchises. Petitioners give no reason, and the Court cannot
surmise any, for making a distinction between franchises granted by Congress and
franchises granted by some other government agency. The latter, properly
constituted, may grant franchises. Indeed, franchises conferred or granted by local
authorities, as agents of the state, constitute as much a legislative franchise as
though the grant had been made by Congress itself.[15] The term franchise has
been broadly construed as referring, not only to authorizations that Congress
directly issues in the form of a special law, but also to those granted by
administrative agencies to which the power to grant franchises has been delegated
by Congress.[16]
Tollway operators are, owing to the nature and object of their business, franchise
grantees. The construction, operation, and maintenance of toll facilities on public
improvements are activities of public consequence that necessarily require a special
grant of authority from the state. Indeed, Congress granted special franchise for the
operation of tollways to the Philippine National Construction Company, the former
tollway concessionaire for the North and South Luzon Expressways. Apart from
Congress, tollway franchises may also be granted by the TRB, pursuant to the
exercise of its delegated powers under P.D. 1112.[17] The franchise in this case is
evidenced by a Toll Operation Certificate.[18]
Petitioners contend that the public nature of the services rendered by tollway
operators excludes such services from the term sale of services under Section 108
of the Code. But, again, nothing in Section 108 supports this contention. The
reverse is true. In specifically including by way of example electric utilities,
telephone, telegraph, and broadcasting companies in its list of VAT-covered
businesses, Section 108 opens other companies rendering public service for a fee to
the imposition of VAT. Businesses of a public nature such as public utilities and the
collection of tolls or charges for its use or service is a franchise.[19]
Nor can petitioners cite as binding on the Court statements made by certain
lawmakers in the course of congressional deliberations of the would-be law. As the
Court said in South African Airways v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
[20] statements made by individual members of Congress in the consideration of a
bill do not necessarily reflect the sense of that body and are, consequently, not
controlling in the interpretation of law. The congressional will is ultimately
determined by the language of the law that the lawmakers voted on. Consequently,
the meaning and intention of the law must first be sought in the words of the
statute itself, read and considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted
and most obvious significations, according to good and approved usage and without
resorting to forced or subtle construction.
Two. Petitioners argue that a toll fee is a users tax and to impose VAT on toll fees is
tantamount to taxing a tax.[21] Actually, petitioners base this argument on the
following discussion in Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) v. Court of
Appeals:[22]
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of
the Civil Code, likeroads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, are owned by the State. The term ports includes seaports and airports.
The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the State.
Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are
properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of
the Philippines.
x x x The operation by the government of a tollway does not change the character
of the road as one for public use. Someone must pay for the maintenance of the
road, either the public indirectly through the taxes they pay the government, or only
those among the public who actually use the road through the toll fees they pay
upon using the road. The tollway system is even a more efficient and equitable
manner of taxing the public for the maintenance of public roads.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property
whether it is for public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines
property of public dominion as one intended for public use. Even if the government
collects toll fees, the road is still intended for public use if anyone can use the road
under the same terms and conditions as the rest of the public. The charging of fees,
the limitation on the kind of vehicles that can use the road, the speed restrictions
and other conditions for the use of the road do not affect the public character of the
road.
The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA
charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations
of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an
airport for public use. Such fees are often termed users tax. This means taxing
those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the
public including those who never use the particular public facility. A users tax is
more equitable a principle of taxation mandated in the 1987 Constitution.
[23] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners assume that what the Court said above, equating terminal fees to a
users tax must also pertain to tollway fees. But the main issue in the MIAA case was
whether or not Paraaque City could sell airport lands and buildings under MIAA
administration at public auction to satisfy unpaid real estate taxes. Since local
governments have no power to tax the national government, the Court held that the
City could not proceed with the auction sale. MIAA forms part of the national
government although not integrated in the department framework.[24] Thus, its
airport lands and buildings are properties of public dominion beyond the commerce
of man under Article 420(1)[25] of the Civil Code and could not be sold at public
auction.
As can be seen, the discussion in the MIAA case on toll roads and toll fees was
made, not to establish a rule that tollway fees are users tax, but to make the point
that airport lands and buildings are properties of public dominion and that the
collection of terminal fees for their use does not make them private
properties. Tollway fees are not taxes. Indeed, they are not assessed and collected
by the BIR and do not go to the general coffers of the government.
It would of course be another matter if Congress enacts a law imposing a users tax,
collectible from motorists, for the construction and maintenance of certain
roadways. The tax in such a case goes directly to the government for the
replenishment of resources it spends for the roadways. This is not the case
here.What the government seeks to tax here are fees collected from tollways that
are constructed, maintained, and operated by private tollway operators at their own
expense under the build, operate, and transfer scheme that the government has
adopted for expressways.[26] Except for a fraction given to the government, the toll
fees essentially end up as earnings of the tollway operators.
In sum, fees paid by the public to tollway operators for use of the tollways, are not
taxes in any sense. A tax is imposed under the taxing power of the government
principally for the purpose of raising revenues to fund public expenditures.[27] Toll
fees, on the other hand, are collected by private tollway operators as
reimbursement for the costs and expenses incurred in the construction,
maintenance and operation of the tollways, as well as to assure them a reasonable
margin of income. Although toll fees are charged for the use of public facilities,
therefore, they are not government exactions that can be properly treated as a
tax.Taxes may be imposed only by the government under its sovereign authority,
toll fees may be demanded by either the government or private individuals or
entities, as an attribute of ownership.[28]
Parenthetically, VAT on tollway operations cannot be deemed a tax on tax due to

the nature of VAT as an indirect tax. In indirect taxation, a distinction is made
between the liability for the tax and burden of the tax. The seller who is liable for
the VAT may shift or pass on the amount of VAT it paid on goods, properties or
services to the buyer. In such a case, what is transferred is not the sellers liability
but merely the burden of the VAT.[29]
Thus, the seller remains directly and legally liable for payment of the VAT, but the
buyer bears its burden since the amount of VAT paid by the former is added to the
selling price. Once shifted, the VAT ceases to be a tax[30] and simply becomes part
of the cost that the buyer must pay in order to purchase the good, property or
service.
Consequently, VAT on tollway operations is not really a tax on the tollway user, but
on the tollway operator. Under Section 105 of the Code, [31] VAT is imposed on any
person who, in the course of trade or business, sells or renders services for a fee. In
other words, the seller of services, who in this case is the tollway operator, is the
person liable for VAT. The latter merely shifts the burden of VAT to the tollway user
as part of the toll fees.
For this reason, VAT on tollway operations cannot be a tax on tax even if toll fees
were deemed as a users tax. VAT is assessed against the tollway operators gross
receipts and not necessarily on the toll fees. Although the tollway operator may shift
the VAT burden to the tollway user, it will not make the latter directly liable for the
VAT. The shifted VAT burden simply becomes part of the toll fees that one has to pay
in order to use the tollways.[32]
Three. Petitioner Timbol has no personality to invoke the non-impairment of contract

clause on behalf of private investors in the tollway projects. She will neither be
prejudiced by nor be affected by the alleged diminution in return of investments
that may result from the VAT imposition. She has no interest at all in the profits to
be earned under the TOAs. The interest in and right to recover investments solely
belongs to the private tollway investors.
Besides, her allegation that the private investors rate of recovery will be adversely
affected by imposing VAT on tollway operations is purely speculative. Equally
presumptuous is her assertion that a stipulation in the TOAs known as the Material
Adverse Grantor Action will be activated if VAT is thus imposed. The Court cannot
rule on matters that are manifestly conjectural. Neither can it prohibit the State
from exercising its sovereign taxing power based on uncertain, prophetic grounds.
Four. Finally, petitioners assert that the substantiation requirements for claiming
input VAT make the VAT on tollway operations impractical and incapable of
implementation. They cite the fact that, in order to claim input VAT, the name,
address and tax identification number of the tollway user must be indicated in the
VAT receipt or invoice. The manner by which the BIR intends to implement the VAT
by rounding off the toll rate and putting any excess collection in an escrow account
is also illegal, while the alternative of giving change to thousands of motorists in
order to meet the exact toll rate would be a logistical nightmare. Thus, according to
them, the VAT on tollway operations is not administratively feasible.[33]
Administrative feasibility is one of the canons of a sound tax system. It simply

means that the tax system should be capable of being effectively administered and
enforced with the least inconvenience to the taxpayer. Non-observance of the
canon, however, will not render a tax imposition invalid except to the extent that
specific constitutional or statutory limitations are impaired.[34] Thus, even if the
imposition of VAT on tollway operations may seem burdensome to implement, it is
not necessarily invalid unless some aspect of it is shown to violate any law or the
Constitution.
Here, it remains to be seen how the taxing authority will actually implement the VAT
on tollway operations. Any declaration by the Court that the manner of its
implementation is illegal or unconstitutional would be premature. Although the
transcript of the August 12, 2010 Senate hearing provides some clue as to how the
BIR intends to go about it,[35] the facts pertaining to the matter are not sufficiently
established for the Court to pass judgment on. Besides, any concern about how the
VAT on tollway operations will be enforced must first be addressed to the BIR on
whom the task of implementing tax laws primarily and exclusively rests. The Court
cannot preempt the BIRs discretion on the matter, absent any clear violation of law
or the Constitution.
For the same reason, the Court cannot prematurely declare as illegal, BIR RMC 632010 which directs toll companies to record an accumulated input VAT of zero
balance in their books as of August 16, 2010, the date when the VAT imposition was
supposed to take effect. The issuance allegedly violates Section 111(A)[36] of the
Code which grants first time VAT payers a transitional input VAT of 2% on beginning
inventory.
In this connection, the BIR explained that BIR RMC 63-2010 is actually the product
of negotiations with tollway operators who have been assessed VAT as early as
2005, but failed to charge VAT-inclusive toll fees which by now can no longer be
collected. The tollway operators agreed to waive the 2% transitional input VAT, in
exchange for cancellation of their past due VAT liabilities. Notably, the right to claim
the 2% transitional input VAT belongs to the tollway operators who have not
questioned the circulars validity. They are thus the ones who have a right to
challenge the circular in a direct and proper action brought for the purpose.
Conclusion
In fine, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue did not usurp legislative prerogative
or expand the VAT laws coverage when she sought to impose VAT on tollway
operations. Section 108(A) of the Code clearly states that services of all other
franchise grantees are subject to VAT, except as may be provided under Section 119
of the Code. Tollway operators are not among the franchise grantees subject to
franchise tax under the latter provision. Neither are their services among the VATexempt transactions under Section 109 of the Code.
If the legislative intent was to exempt tollway operations from VAT, as petitioners so
strongly allege, then it would have been well for the law to clearly say so. Tax
exemptions must be justified by clear statutory grant and based on language in the
law too plain to be mistaken.[37] But as the law is written, no such exemption
obtains for tollway operators. The Court is thus duty-bound to simply apply the law
as it is found.
Lastly, the grant of tax exemption is a matter of legislative policy that is within the
exclusive prerogative of Congress. The Courts role is to merely uphold this
legislative policy, as reflected first and foremost in the language of the tax
statute. Thus, any unwarranted burden that may be perceived to result from
enforcing such policy must be properly referred to Congress. The Court has no
discretion on the matter but simply applies the law.
The VAT on franchise grantees has been in the statute books since 1994 when R.A.
7716 or the Expanded Value-Added Tax law was passed. It is only now, however,
that the executive has earnestly pursued the VAT imposition against tollway
operators. The executive exercises exclusive discretion in matters pertaining to the
implementation and execution of tax laws. Consequently, the executive is more
properly suited to deal with the immediate and practical consequences of the VAT
imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES respondents Secretary of Finance and Commissioner

of Internal Revenues motion for reconsideration of its August 24, 2010
resolution, DISMISSES the petitioners Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbols
petition for lack of merit, and SETS ASIDE the Courts temporary restraining order
dated August 13, 2010.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
(On Leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
(On Official Leave)
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 464
ENSURING OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS,

ADHERENCE TO THE RULE ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND RESPECT FOR THE
RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS APPEARING IN LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN AID OF
LEGISLATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, the Constitution guarantees the separate of powers of the Executive,

Legislative and Judicial branches of the government:
WHEREAS, Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution provides that heads of

departments may, with the prior consent of the President, appear before and be
heard by either House of Congress on any matter pertaining to their departments
and, when the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, such appearance shall be conducted in executive
session;
WHEREAS, pursuant to the rule of executive privilege, the President and those who
assist her must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and
making decisions since this is fundamental to the operation of the government and
is rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution;
WHEREAS, Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution mandates that the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate or
House of Representatives shall be respected;
WHEREAS, recent events, particularly with respect to the invitation of a member of

the Cabinet by the Senate as well as various heads of offices, civilian and military,
have highlighted the need to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of
powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of
persons appearing in such inquiries in aid of legislation and due regard to
constitutional mandate;
WHEREAS, there is a need to prevent such inquires in aid of legislation from being
used for partisan political purposes, disrupting diplomatic relations with foreign
government, and weakening the stability of the State, thereby impeding the efforts
of the government to generate and attract foreign investments;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees provides that public official and employees shall not
use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public
interest;
WHEREAS, Article 229 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits any public officer from
revealing any secret known to him by reason of his official capacity or wrongfully
delivering papers or copies thereof which he may have charge and which should not
be published;
WHEREAS, the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 provide that
the President shall have control of all government departments, bureaus and offices
and shall ensure that all the laws be faithfully executed.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the

Philippines, by the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. - In accordance

with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional
provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the
government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government
shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President
so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. -
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995).
Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees provides that public officials and employees shall not
use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public
interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the

President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including:
i. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official
covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995;
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);
ii. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of
national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23
May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998).
iii. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of

treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
iv. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on

Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
v. Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. - The following are covered by this executive order:
i. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department

heads are covered by the executive privilege;
ii. Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive
privilege;
iii. Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or
higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are
covered by the executive privilege;
iv. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and
v. Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. - All public

officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the
observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries
in aid of legislation.
SECTION 4. Repealing Clause. - All executive issuances, orders, rules and

regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provision of this Executive Order
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 5. Separability Clause. - If any section or provision of this executive order

shall be declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other sections or provision not
affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect.
SECTION 6. Effectivity. - This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 26th day of September in the Year of our Lord, Two
Thousand and Five.
(Sgd. ) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

By the President:
(Sgd.) EDUARDO R. ERMITA

Executive Secretary
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

Treatment or Punishment
The States Parties to this Convention,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the
United Nations, recognition of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that those rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter, in particular Article 55, to
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms,
Having regard to article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 7
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which provide that
no one may be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment,
Having regard also to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1975 (resolution
3452 (XXX)),
Desiring to make more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world,
Have agreed as follows:
Part I
Article 1
For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.This article is without
prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may
contain provisions of wider application.
Article 2
Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.No
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat or war,
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture.An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not
be invoked as a justification of torture.
Article 3
No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture.For the purpose of determining whether there are such
grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of
a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.
Article 4
Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal
law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any
person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.Each State Party shall
make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account
their grave nature.
Article 5
Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the following cases:When the
offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or
aircraft registered in that State;When the alleged offender is a national of that
State;When the victim was a national of that State if that State considers it
appropriate.Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged
offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite
him pursuant to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this
article.This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with internal law.
Article 6
Upon being satisfied, after an examination of information available to it, that the
circumstances so warrant, any State Party in whose territory a person alleged to
have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is present, shall take him into
custody or take other legal measures to ensure his presence. The custody and other
legal measures shall be as provided in the law of that State but may be continued
only for such time as is necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings
to be instituted.Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the
facts.Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article shall be assisted
in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of the
State of which he is a national, or, if he is a stateless person, to the representative
of the State where he usually resides.When a State, pursuant to this article, has
taken a person into custody, it shall immediately notify the States referred to in
article 5, paragraph 1, of the fact that such person is in custody and of the
circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which makes the preliminary
inquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of this article shall promptly report its findings
to the said State and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.
Article 7
The State Party in territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have
committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found, shall in the cases
contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.These authorities shall take
their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a
serious nature under the law of that State. In the cases referred to in article 5,
paragraph 2, the standards of evidence required for prosecution and conviction shall
in no way be less stringent than those which apply in the cases referred to in article
5, paragraph 1.Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection
with any of the offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at
all stages of the proceedings.
Article 8
The offences referred to in article 4 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable

offences in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties
undertake to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition
treaty to be concluded between them.If a State Party which makes extradition
conditional on the existence of a treaty receives a request for extradition from
another State Party with which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider this
Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect of such offenses. Extradition
shall be subject to the other conditions provided by the law of the requested
State.States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a
treaty shall recognize such offences as extraditable offences between themselves
subject to the conditions provided by the law of the requested state.Such offences
shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as if they
had been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the
territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with
article 5, paragraph 1.
Article 9
States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in
connection with civil proceedings brought in respect of any of the offences referred
to in article 4, including the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the
proceedings.States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph 1 of this
article in conformity with any treaties on mutual judicial assistance that may exist
between them.
Article 10
Each State Party shall ensure that education and information regarding the
prohibition against torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement
personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who
may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual
subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment.Each State Party shall
include this prohibition in the rules or instructions issued in regard to the duties and
functions of any such persons.
Article 11
Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation rules,
instructions, methods and practices as well as arrangements for the custody and
treatment of persons subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment in
any territory under its jurisdiction, with a view to preventing any cases of torture.
Article 12
Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt
and impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an
act of torture has been committee in any territory under its jurisdiction.
Article 13
Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he has been subjected
to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to complain to and to
have his case promptly and impartially examined its competent authorities. Steps
shall be taken to ensure that the complainant and witnesses are protected against
all ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of his complaint or any evidence
given.
Article 14
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture
obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation
including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of
the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to
compensation.Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other
person to compensation which may exist under national law.
Article 15
Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been
made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings,
except against a person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was
made.
Article 16
Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction
other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not
amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10,
11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture or
references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the
provisions of any other international instrument or national law which prohibit cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or which relate to extradition or
expulsion.
Article 17
There shall be established a Committee against Torture (hereinafter referred to as

the Committee) which shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided. The
Committee shall consist of 10 experts of high moral standing and recognized
competence in the field of human rights, who shall serve in their personal capacity.
The experts shall be elected by the States Parties, consideration being given to
equitable geographical distribution and to the usefulness of the participation of
some persons having legal experience.The members of the Committee shall be
elected by secret ballot from a list of persons nominated by States Parties. Each
State Party may nominate one person from among its own nationals. States Parties
shall bear in mind the usefulness of nominating persons who are also members of
the Human Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and are willing to serve on the Committee against
Torture.Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at biennial
meetings of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. At those meetings, for which two thirds of the States Parties shall
constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be those who
obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the
representatives of States Parties present and voting.The initial election shall be held
no later than six months after the date of the entry into force of this Convention. At
least four months before the date of each election, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations shall address a letter to the States Parties inviting them to submit
their nominations within three months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in
alphabetical order of all persons thus nominated, indicating the States Parties which
have nominated them, and shall submit it to the States Parties.The members of the
Committee shall be elected for a term of four years. They shall be eligible for reelection if renominated. However, the term of five of the members elected at the
first election shall expire at the end of two years; immediately after the first election
the names of these five members shall be chosen by lot by the chairman of the
meeting referred to in paragraph 3.If a member of the Committee dies or resigns or
for any other cause can no longer perform his Committee duties, the State Party
which nominated him shall appoint another expert from among its nationals to
serve for the remainder of his term, subject to the approval of the majority of the
States Parties. The approval shall be considered given unless half or more of the
States Parties respond negatively within six weeks after having been informed by
the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the proposed appointment.States
Parties shall be responsible for the expenses of the members of the Committee
while they are in performance of Committee duties.
Article 18
The Committee shall elect its officers for a term of two years. They may be reelected.The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure, but these rules
shall provide, inter alia, thatSix members shall constitute a quorum;Decisions of the
Committee shall be made by a majority vote of the members present.The SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations shall provide the necessary staff and facilities for the
effective performance of the functions of the Committee under this Convention.The
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the initial meeting of the
Committee. After its initial meeting, the Committee shall meet at such times as shall
be provided in its rules of procedure.The State Parties shall be responsible for
expenses incurred in connection with the holding of meetings of the States Parties
and of the Committee, including reimbursement of the United Nations for any
expenses, such as the cost of staff and facilities, incurred by the United Nations
pursuant to paragraph 3 above.
Article 19
The States Parties shall submit to the Committee, through the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, reports on the measures they have taken to give effect to their
undertakings under this Convention, within one year after the entry into force of this
Convention for the State Party concerned. Thereafter the States Parties shall submit
supplementary reports every four years on any new measures taken, and such
other reports as the Committee may request.The Secretary-General shall transmit
the reports to all States Parties.[Each report shall be considered by the Committee
which may make such comments or suggestions on the report as it considers
appropriate, and shall forward these to the State Party concerned. That State Party
may respond with any observations it chooses to the Committee.The Committee
may, at its discretion, decide to include any comments or suggestions made by it in
accordance with paragraph 3, together with the observations thereon received from
the State Party concerned, in its annual report made in accordance with article 24. If
so requested by the State Party concerned, the Committee may also include a copy
of the report submitted under paragraph 1.]
Article 20
If the Committee receives reliable information which appears to it to contain wellfounded indications that torture is being systematically practised in the territory of a
State Party, the Committee shall invite that State Party to co-operate in the
examination of the information and to this end to submit observations with regard
to the information concerned.Taking into account any observations which may have
been submitted by the State Party concerned as well as any other relevant
information available to it, the Committee may, if it decides that this is warranted,
designate one or more of its members to make a confidential inquiry and to report
to the Committee urgently.If an inquiry is made in accordance with paragraph 2, the
Committee shall seek the co-operation of the State Party concerned. In agreement
with that State Party, such an inquiry may include a visit to its territory.After
examining the findings of its member or members submitted in accordance with
paragraph 2, the Committee shall transmit these findings to the State Party
concerned together with any comments or suggestions which seem appropriate in
view of the situation.All the proceedings of the Committee referred to in paragraphs
1 to 4 of this article shall be confidential, and at all stages of the proceedings the
co-operation of the State Party shall be sought. After such proceedings have been
completed with regard to an inquiry made in accordance with paragraph 2, the
Committee may, after consultations with the State Party concerned, decide to
include a summary account of the results of the proceedings in its annual report
made in accordance with article 24.
Article 21
A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this article 3 that it
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider
communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is
not fulfilling its obligations under this Convention. Such communications may be
received and considered according to the procedures laid down in this article only if
submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in regard to
itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be dealt with by
the Committee under this article if it concerns a State Party which has not made
such a declaration. Communications received under this article shall be dealt with in
accordance with the following procedure:If a State Party considers that another
State Party is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention, it may, by
written communication, bring the matter to the attention of that State Party. Within
three months after the receipt of the communication the receiving State shall afford
the State which sent the communication an explanation or any other statement in
writing clarifying the matter which should include, to the extent possible and
pertinent, references to domestic procedures and remedies taken, pending, or
available in the matter.If the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both States
Parties concerned within six months after the receipt by the receiving State of the
initial communication, either State shall have the right to refer the matter to the
Committee by notice given to the Committee and to the other State.The Committee
shall deal with a matter referred to it under this article only after it has ascertained
that all domestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the matter, in
conformity with the generally recognized principles of international law. This shall
not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or
is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person who is the victim of the violation of
this Convention.The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining
communications under this article.Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (c), the
Committee shall make available its good offices to the States Parties concerned with
a view to a friendly solution of the matter on the basis of respect for the obligations
provided for in the present Convention. For this purpose, the Committee may, when
appropriate, set up an ad hoc conciliation commission.In any matter referred to it
under this article, the Committee may call upon the States Parties concerned,
referred to in subparagraph (b), to supply any relevant information.The States
Parties concerned, referred to in subparagraph (b), shall have the right to be
represented when the matter is being considered by the Committee and to make
submissions orally and/or in writing.The Committee shall, within 12 months after the
date of receipt of notice under subparagraph (b), submit a report.If a solution within
the terms of subparagraph (e) is reached, the Committee shall confine its report to
a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached.If a solution within the
terms of subparagraph (e) is not reached, the Committee shall confine its report to
a brief statement of the facts; the written submissions and record of the oral
submissions made by the States Parties concerned shall be attached to the report.In
every matter, the report shall be communicated to the States Parties concerned.
The provisions of this article shall come into force when five States Parties to this
Convention have made declarations under paragraph 1 of this article. Such
declarations shall be deposited by the States Parties with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other States Parties. A
declaration may be withdrawn at any time by notification to the Secretary-General.
Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the consideration of any matter which is the
subject of a communication already transmitted under this article; no further
communication by any State Party shall be received under this article after the
notification of withdrawal of the declaration has been received by the SecretaryGeneral, unless the State Party concerned has made a new declaration.
Article 22
A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this article that it
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider
communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim
to be victims of a violation by a State Party of the provisions of the Convention. No
communication shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to
the Convention which has not made such a declaration.The Committee shall
consider inadmissible any communication under this article which is anonymous, or
which it considers to be an abuse of the right of submission of such communications
or to be incompatible with the provisions of this Convention.Subject to the
provisions of paragraph 2, the Committee shall bring any communication submitted
to it under this article to the attention of the State Party to this Convention which
has made a declaration under paragraph 1 and is alleged to be violating any
provisions of the Convention. Within six months, the receiving State shall submit to
the Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the matter and the
remedy, if any, that may have been taken by that State.The Committee shall
consider communications received under this article in the light of all information
made available to it by or on behalf of the individual and by the State Party
concerned.The Committee shall not consider any communication from an individual
under this article unless it has ascertained that:The same matter has not been, and
is not being examined under another procedure of international investigation or
settlement;The individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies; this shall
not be the rule where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or
is unlikely to bring effective relief to the person who is the victim of the violation of
this Convention.The Committee shall hold closed meetings when examining
communications under this article.The Committee shall forward its views to the
State Party concerned and to the individual.The provisions of this article shall come
into force when five States Parties to this Convention have made declarations under
paragraph 1 of this article. Such declarations shall be deposited by the States
Parties with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall transmit parties
thereof to the other States Parties. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time by
notification to the Secretary-General. Such a withdrawal shall not prejudice the
consideration of any matter which is the subject of a communication already
transmitted under this article; no further communication by or on behalf of an
individual shall be received under this article after the notification of withdrawal of
the declaration has been received by the Secretary-General, unless the State Party
concerned has made a new declaration.
Article 23
The members of the Committee, and of the ad hoc conciliation commissions which
may be appointed under article 21, paragraph 1 (e), shall be entitled to the
facilities, privileges and immunities of experts on missions for the United Nations as
laid down in the relevant sections of the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations.
Article 24
The Committee shall submit an annual report on its activities under this Convention
to the States Parties and to the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Part III
Article 25
This Convention is open for signature by all States.This Convention is subject to

ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
Article 26
This Convention is open to accession by all States. Accession shall be effected by

the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
Article 27
This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the
deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the twentieth
instrument of ratification or accession.For each State ratifying this Convention or
acceding to it after the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or
accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of
the deposit of its own instrument of ratification or accession.
Article 28
Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or

accession thereto, declare that it does not recognize the competence of the
Committee provided for in article 20.Any State Party having made a reservation in
accordance with paragraph 1 of this article may, at any time, withdraw this
reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 29
Any State Party to this Convention may propose an amendment and file it with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall thereupon
communicate the proposed amendment to the States Parties to this Convention
with a request that they notify him whether they favour a conference of States
Parties for the purpose of considering and voting upon the proposal. In the event
that within four months from the date of such communication at least one third of
the State Parties favours such a conference, the Secretary-General shall convene
the conference under the auspices of the United Nations. Any amendment adopted
by a majority of the States Parties present and voting at the conference shall be
submitted by the Secretary-General to all the States Parties for acceptance.An
amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 1 shall enter into force when
two thirds of the States Parties to this Convention have notified the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations that they have accepted it in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes.When amendments enter into force, they shall
be binding on those States Parties which have accepted them, other States Parties
still being bound by the provisions of this Convention and any earlier amendments
which they have accepted.
Article 30
Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation, shall, at
the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from
the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to agree on the
organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the
International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the

Court.Each State may at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention or
accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by the preceding
paragraph. The other States Parties shall not be bound by the preceding paragraph
with respect to any State Party having made such a reservation.Any State Party
having made a reservation in accordance with the preceding paragraph may at any
time withdraw this reservation by notification to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
Article 31
A State Party may denounce this Convention by written notification to the

Secretary-General of the United Nations. Denunciation becomes effective one year
after the date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General.Such a
denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the State Party from its
obligations under this Convention in regard to any act or omission which occurs
prior to the date at which the denunciation becomes effective. Nor shall
denunciation prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which
is already under consideration by the Committee prior to the date at which the
denunciation becomes effective.Following the date at which the denunciation of a
State Party becomes effective, the Committee shall not commence consideration of
any new matter regarding that State.
Article 32
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all members of the United
Nations and all States which have signed this Convention or acceded to it, or the
following particulars:
Signatures, ratifications and accessions under articles 25 and 26;The date of entry
into force of this Convention under article 27, and the date of the entry into force of
any amendments under article 29;Denunciations under article 31.
Article 33
This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the United
Nations.The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit certified copies
of this Convention to all States.
On February 4, 1985, the Convention was opened for signature at United Nations
Headquarters in New York. At that time, representatives of the following countries
signed it: Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay. Subsequently, signatures were
received from Venezuela on February 15, from Luxembourg and Panama on
February 22, from Austria on March 14, and from the United Kingdom on March 15,
1985.
Created on July 16, 1994 / Last edited on January 25, 1997

Republic Act No. 9738
AN ACT SEPARATING THE CAGUBATAN NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL - AM-AM ANNEX IN

BARANGAY CADAD-ANAN, MUNICIPALITY OF TADIAN, MOUNTAIN PROVINCE FROM
THE CAGUBATAN NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL, CONVERTING IT INTO AN INDEPENDENT
NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL TO BE KNOWN AS AM-AM NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:
Section 1. Separation and Conversion into a National High School. - The Cagubatan
National High School - Amam Annex in Barangay CadadManan, Municipality of
Tadian, Mountain Province is hereby separated from the Cagubatan National High
School and converted into an independent national high school to be known
as Amam National High School.
Section 2. Transfer of Assets and Liabilities. - All personnel, assets, liabilities and
records of the Cagubatan National High School - Amam Annex are hereby
transferred to and absorbed by the Amam National High School.
Section 3. Appropriations. - The Secretary of Education shall immediately include in

the Department's program the operationalization of the Am - am National High
School, the initial funding of which shall be charged against the current year's
appropriations of the Cagubatan National High School - Am - am Annex. Thereafter,
the amount necessary for the continued operation of the school shall be included in
the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 4. Implementation. - The Secretary of Education shall issue rules and

regulations that may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act.1avvphi1
Section 5. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication
in the Official Gazette.
Approved,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE

President of the SenatePROSPERO C. NOGRALES C. NOGRALES
Speaker of the House of Representatives
This Act which originated in the House of Representatives was finally passed by the
House of Representatives and the Senate on October 7,2008 and July 28,2009,
respectively.
EMMA LIRIO-REYES
Secretary of the SenateMARILYN B. BARUA-YAP
Secretary General House of Representatives
Approved: OCT 29, 2009
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO

President of the Philippines
Inquest Procedures (DOJ Circular No. 61, 1993)Evidence Needed for an Inquest
ProceedingsSECTION 1.ConceptInquest is an informal and summary investigation
con-ducted by a public prosecutor in criminalcases involving persons arrested and
detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued bythe court for the
purpose of deter-mining whether or not saidpersons should remain undercustody
and correspondingly be charged in court.SEC. 2.Designationof Inquest OfficersThe
City or Provincial Prosecutor shall designate the Prosecutors assigned to inquest
duties andshall furnish the Philippine National Police (PNP) a list of their names and
their schedule ofassignments. If, however, there is only one Prosecutor in the area,
all inquest cases shall bereferred to him for appropriate action. Unless otherwise
directed by the City or ProvincialProsecutor, those assigned to inquest duties shall
discharge their functions during the hours oftheir designated assignments and only
at the police stations/headquarters of the PNP in order toexpedite and facilitate the
disposition of inquest cases.SEC. 3.Commencement and Termination of InquestThe
inquest proceedings shall be considered commenced upon receipt by the Inquest
Officerfrom the law enforcement authorities of the complaint/referral documents
which should include:a. the affidavit of arrest;b. the investigation report;c. the
statement of the complainant and witnesses; andd. other supporting evidence
gathered by the police in the course of the latters investigation ofthe criminal
incident involving the arrested or detained person. Theinquest Officer shall, as far
aspracticable, cause the affidavit of arrest andstatements/affidavits of the
complainant and thewitnesses to be subscribed and sworn tobefore him by the
arresting officer and the affiants. Theinquest proceedings must beterminated within
the period prescribed under the provisions ofArticle 125 of theRevised Penal Code,
as amended.SEC. 4.Particular Documents Required in Specific CasesThe submission,
presentation of the documents listed herein below should as far as practicable,be
required in the following cases by the Inquest Officer.

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Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG et al., GR No.

130716, December 09, 1998

Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any

(1) ENFORCEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT

we rule, that the petition at bar be allowed.

The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a

Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in

2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental

4. Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning

5. The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional

negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a

Property of public dominion is

This class of property constituted property of public dominion although employed

Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature

The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed,

However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to

Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication

The communications are covered by executive privilege

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of

CENTER FOR PEOPLE G.R. No. 189546

September 21, 2010

On May 26, 2009 petitioner Center for People Empowerment in Governance

Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall

implementation pursuant to R.A. 9369 immediately available to CenPEG and all

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Official Leave) (On Official Leave)

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Official Leave) (On Official Leave)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the

WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? NO

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his

penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or

Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of Respondent

UNITED PEPSI-COLA VS. LAGUESMA

NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

G.R. No. 122226 March 25, 1998

FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20,

Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of

HELD: YES and NO

FIRST-LINE MANAGERS The lowest level in an organization at which individuals

TOP MANAGERS Composed of a comparatively small group of executives, top

To qualify as managerial employee, there must be a clear showing of the exercise of