G.R. No.

168852

September 30, 2008

SHARICA
MARI
L.
GO-TAN,
Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN,
Respondents.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution 1 dated
March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC
Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and
Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. 3 Out of this union, two
female children were born, Kyra Danielle 4 and Kristen
Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) 6 against
Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and
Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged
that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) 7
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, 8 otherwise known as the
"Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice 9
granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss
with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection
Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition, 10
contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons
since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not
covered by R.A. No. 9262.

On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on

Opposition11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that
respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal
interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and
safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution 12 dismissing
the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the
parents-in-law
of
the
petitioner, they were
not
included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under
the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius."13
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for
Reconsideration14 contending that the doctrine of necessary
implication should be applied in the broader interests of
substantial justice and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the
Verified Motion for Reconsideration 15 arguing that petitioner's
liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A.
No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the
alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of
R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution 16 denying
petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that
to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262
would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER
OR
NOT
RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES
PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA,
MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE
WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN ACT OF 2004".17
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in
the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262
which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on

"conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily

applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving
her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring
her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly
abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically;
that respondents should be included as indispensable or
necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not
covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly
provides that the offender should be related to the victim only
by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual
relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents
require a factual determination which cannot be done by this
Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be
characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since
their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but
altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as
offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women
and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife,
or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering,
or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related
or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a
sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for
the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act,
the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall
have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)

Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:

ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code.
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable
under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may
be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished
under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the
special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied suppletorily the
provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to
cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the
"Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did
not contain any provision that the defendant could be
sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung, 19 the Court applied suppletorily
the rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of
the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of
multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
"Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of
similar rules under the special law.
In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily
Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words
"principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No.
8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not
defined therein, although the special law referred to the same
terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal
recruitment.

RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary provision

therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under
Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No.
9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the
RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general
provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No.
9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a
criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all
the conspirators are principals.23
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262
expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women
and their children may be committed by an offender through
another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.
- The crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:

(4) Destroying the property and

personal belongings or inflicting harm
to animals or pets of the woman or her
child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of
harassment or violence; x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the
purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the
woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x x x The protection orders that
may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of
the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening
to commit or committing, personally or through
another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of
this Act; 1avvphi1.net
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing,
annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with the petitioner, directly or
indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child.
This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or
her child in public or private places;

In Yu v. People,21 the Court applied suppletorily the provisions

on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
"Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an express
provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.

(2) Peering in the window or lingering

outside the residence of the woman or
her child;

Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied

suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the

(3) Entering or remaining in the

dwelling or on the property of the
woman or her child against her/his
will;

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal

construction of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed
to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law 24 and
that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the
present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects
the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best
ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its
true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim

"expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application
here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an
"ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal
application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only
as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not
otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the
plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.25

ABAD, J.:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of
violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the
girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face
on it.
The Indictment

The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great

length on the attendance of circumstances evidencing the
conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to
cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her.
However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be
threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be
determined in the present petition since this Court is not a
trier of facts.26 It is thus premature for petitioner to argue
evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on
the determination of whether respondents may be included in
a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of
conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the
merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy
may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will
no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered
indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an
exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and
SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against
respondents is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182835

That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria

Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless
conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS)
using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish
Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the
latter was attached to a completely naked body of another
woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is
depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture
thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological
distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud. 1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant
Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at
Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish
and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end of
2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a
live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant,
Irish broke up with him.

April 20, 2010

RUSTAN
ANG
y
PASCUA,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH
SAGUD, Respondents.
DECISION

The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang

(Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler,
Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an
information that reads:

Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish

and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did
not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the
proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the
other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone
number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and
sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers
for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-

8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask

him to leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through
multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with spread legs and with Irishs face superimposed
on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The senders cellphone number,
stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the
numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the
picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in
Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text
messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for
him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he
threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.
One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text
messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my
chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who
referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish
contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in
sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked
Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada,
Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After
parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police
officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and
seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM
cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police
station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of
Technology, testified as an expert in information technology
and computer graphics. He said that it was very much
possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and
superimpose it on the body of another woman in another
picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by
computer to make it appear that the face and the body
belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had
two distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to
the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the
picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the
picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how
this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to a
cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.

For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began

visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation lasted
until December of that year. He claimed that after their
relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in
December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that
time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out on
him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking
him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help
in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two
police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the
contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because
Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was
sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the
senders number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the
person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages
from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his
cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene
messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone
number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the
obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures
of a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7). 5
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustans wife, testified that she was
sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she
received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that
contained them because she was jealous and angry. She did
not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the
pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked
as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2,
4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the
woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the
woman in the picture was fully dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irishs testimony completely
credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The
RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience,
prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible
expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she
suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of
the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of
her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and
experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the
RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262.

On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 the latter

rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008, 8 affirming the
RTC decision. The CA denied Rustans motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus,
Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused
Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her
face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish,
psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of
Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed
between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined
in R.A. 9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like
the sending of the nude picture in this case,
already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict
Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his
constitutional rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in
evidence the obscene picture presented in the
case.
The Courts Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against
women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman
with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children"
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife,

former wife, or against a woman with whom the

person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or against
her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is
likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute
violence against women and these include any
form of harassment that causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to a woman.
Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and
Their Children. The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through
any of the following acts:
xxxx
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child.
This shall include, but not be limited to, the
following acts:
xxxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or
violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the
elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another,

commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution
needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating
relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating
relationship" includes a situation where the parties are
romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis
during the course of the relationship. Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the
parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A
casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two
individuals in a business or social context is not a dating
relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved,"
implies that the offender and the offended woman have or
had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a
sexual act. He cites Websters Comprehensive Dictionary
Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal
meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make
love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the
colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not
say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended
woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a
couples relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women
x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself
distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship.
Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while
Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a
single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing
of a common child." The dating relationship that the law
contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual
intercourse taking place between those involved.

Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish

and him was of the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their
romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time
and on a continuing basis." But the two of them were
romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October
to December of 2003. That would be time enough for
nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is
a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that
the romantic relation between the two should be deemed
broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining
what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when
she could not reply to Rustans messages, he would get
angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their
three-month romantic relation as continuous.10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive
picture should not be considered a form of harassment. He
claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a
very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262
punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence
against women. This means that a single act of harassment,
which translates into violence, would be enough. The object
of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only
violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated
ones.
Rustan alleges that todays women, like Irish, are so used to
obscene communications that her getting one could not
possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her
substantial emotional or psychological distress. He claims
having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such
that she was already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife
give their testimonies was not impressed with their claim that
it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits
2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since
her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustans wife, claimed that she deleted several
other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her
testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know
that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the
pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time
to delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all
the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at

all to keep and hide such memory card. There would have
been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures
remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it
for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous
to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC
was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.1avvphi1
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish
experienced based on Rustans low regard for the alleged
moral sensibilities of todays youth. What is obscene and
injurious to an offended woman can of course only be
determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here,
the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and
bearing Irishs head and face, was clearly an obscene picture
and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any woman
like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be
scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a picture.
What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified,
Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet
for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain
items were seized from him without any warrant, the evidence
presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But
the fact is that the prosecution did not present in evidence
either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers
seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did
not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the
prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony
Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone
Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him
consisted in Irishs testimony that she received the obscene
picture and malicious text messages that the senders
cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had
been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the
cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police
used such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess
Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not
have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to
prove that Rustan sent those messages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text
messages to Irish.13 His defense was that he himself received
those messages from an unidentified person who was
harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her,
using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the

cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the

messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not
give credence to such version and neither will this Court.
Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on
Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish
through a text message constitutes an electronic document.
Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic
signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility

of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this
Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected
to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it
was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.14
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present
criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies
only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved

each and every element of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567
dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25,
2008.
SO ORDERED.