Batao, Farida D.

Constitutional law 1 (Digest)

1. Kilosbayan, Inc. v Guingona, Corona GR No. 113375 May 5, 1994
232, SCRA 110
Note: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Facts: (1) Petitioners contend that denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of
Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that "only a court injunction can stop Malacaang," and the
imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KI LOSBAYAN, with its copetitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.
In support of the petition, the petitioners claim that:
THE OFFICE OF THE PRESI DENT, ACTING THROUGH RESPONDENTS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND/OR
ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, AND THE PCSO GRAVELY ABUSE[D] THEI R DI
SCRETI ON AND/OR FUN CTI ONS TANTAMOUN T TO LACK OF JURISDI CTI ON AND/OR AUTHORI TY IN
RESPECTIVELY:
(A) APPROVING THE AWARD OF THE CONTRACT TO, AND
(B) ENTERING INTO THE SO-CALLED "CONTRACT OF LEASE" WITH, RESPONDENT PGMC FOR THE
INSTALLATION, ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATI ON OF THE ON-LINE LOTTERY AND TELECOMMUNICATION
SYSTEMS REQUIRED AND/OR AUTHORIZED UNDER THE SAID CONTRACT, CONSI DERING THAT:

a) Under Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO, the PCSO is prohibited from holding and conducting
lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or
entity";
b) Under Act No. 3846 and established jurisprudence, a Congressional franchise is required before
Any person may be allowed to establish and operate said telecommunications system;
c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60% Filipino-owned and/or
controlled corporation, like the PGMC, is disqualified from operating a public service, like the said
telecommunications system; and
d) Respondent PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the Foreign Investment Act (R.A.
No. 7042)to install, establish and operate the on-line lot to and telecommunications systems.
(2) Public respondents Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona, J r., Assistant Executive Secretary
Renato Corona, and the PCSO maintain that the contract of lease in question does not violate
Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and that the petitioner's interpretation of
the phrase "in collaboration, association or joint venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow, strained
and utterly devoid of logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO, as a corporate entity, is vested with
the basic and essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or contracts as may be
necessary for the attainment of its purposes and objectives."
Issue: Whether or not the locus standi of the petitioners, and
the legality and validity of the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association
or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign."
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged Contract
of Lease executed on 17 December 1993 by respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
and respondent Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) is hereby DECLARED contrary to
law and invalid.
No interpretation of the said provision to relax or circumvent the prohibition can be allowed since the
privilege to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, or other similar activities is a franchise
granted by the legislature to the PCSO. It is a settled rule that "in all grants by the government to
individuals or corporations of rights, privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly
against the grantee .... [o]ne who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation of the common rights of the
public must prove his title thereto by a grant which is clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot

enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally

granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication.
2. Chamber of Real Estate & Builders Associations v. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform
G.R. No. 183409: June 18, 2010
Facts: Oct 1997 Sec of DAR issued DAR A.O. entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses. The said AO embraced all private agricultural
lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced and all untitled agricultural lands and
agricultural lands reclassified by LGU into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988. March 1999, Sec
DAR issued Revised Rules and Regulations on Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses,
it covers the following: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and
other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as
livestock, poultry, and fishpond the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than
that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other nonagricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section
20 of Republic Act No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such
uses. The 2 earlier AOs was further amended by an AO issued Feb 2002 - 2002 Comprehensive Rules on
Land Use Conversion; covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to
another agricultural use.The AO was amended again in 2007 to include provisions particularly addressing
land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. To address the conversion to lands to nonagricultural, Sec of DAR suspended processing and approval of land conversion through DAR Memo 88.
CREBA claims that there is a slowdown of housing projects because of such stoppage.

Issues: Whether or not DARs AO entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that in POLITICAL LAW: Constitutionality of DARs A.O. entitled
Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural
Uses. RA 6657 and 8435 defines agricultural land as lands devoted to or suitable for the cultivation
of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including
the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in
conjunction with such farming operations done by a person whether natural or juridical, and not classified
by the law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. However, he issued an AO
included in this definition - lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other nonagricultural uses before 15 June 1988. In effect, lands reclassified from agricultural to residential,
commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural
lands for purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. This is violation of RA 6657 because there is
nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the
jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to its
conversion authority. It also violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it was not provided
therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or that
the DARs approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification.
The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the constitutional
mandate on local autonomy under Section 25, Article II and Section 2, Article X of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. There is deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law because under
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DARs jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily
and oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on pain of administrative and criminal
penalties. More so, there is discrimination and violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased in favor of the peasantry at
the expense of all other sectors of society.
DISMISSED.

3. Occena v. COMELEC G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981

Facts: Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and
former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as
taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is
not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue: (1) What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how may it
be exercised? More specifically as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes that may be introduced,
the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper
submission?

Issue: (2) Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the
limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National
Assembly? Was there revision rather than amendment?

Held: The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads
thus: The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the
regular National Assembly and the Members thereof. One of such powers is precisely that of proposing
amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with
the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore,
the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos,
met as a constituent body its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the
amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may be observed parenthetically that as
far as petitioner Occena is concerned, the question of the authority of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to
propose amendments is not new. Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of
the Constitution extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts
from sixty-five (65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935
Constitution and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as
well as through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment.
Held: Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or
entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology
foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for
ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new
Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one is no
argument against the validity of the law because amendment includes the revision or total overhaul of
the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally
changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.