There is a possibly great argument to be made from Martha Nussbaum's position in favor of

cosmopolitanism. The
argument says that because birthplace is arbitrary, no one chose to be born whether they are, nor did they
earn it.
One doesn't live in an American suburb instead of a war-torn village in Africa because of moral superiority
or hard
work. Instead, it’s all random5. As a result, we shouldn’t hold birthplace against a person, and thus when
making
moral judgments, we can't evaluate it with any reference to nationality. If it's wrong not help save an
American life
if you can, then it's wrong not to help anyone in the same situation. This argument is pretty interesting and
helps to
make a strong foundation for the moral obligations. Most importantly, it can get out of a lot of arguments
the
negative will make about moral obligations to citizens first or solely.
By extension, another good argument stems from the rescue principle 6. Here’s how the argument goes: if
there is an
action that has minimal impact on the actor, and huge benefit for the recipient, you as the actor are morally
compelled to do it. The classic example is as follows. Suppose that I’m lying in a hospital bed dying fro m
an
extremely rare disease that can only be cured by being touched on the forehead by Henry Fonda. Now, if to
cure me
he would have to travel across the country, loss his job, and risk his health to help me, he wouldn’t be
compelled to
do it. But, if he was walking by my hospital bed, and was well aware of the fact that he could save my life
by
extending his hand and touching me, he would be morally compelled to do so. In fact, if he chose not to do
so, he
would be rejecting the rescue principle, and going against a moral obligation7. Within the context of the
resolution,
the argument goes that the United States has a great deal of resources and political power on the
international scale.
Intervening in one conflict will almost definitely not endanger the typical American’s way of life, but at the
same
time, it could save the lives of thousands of innocent people. To American’s it’s a matter of a few more tax
dollars
whereas to others it’s the difference between life and death. This is a rhetorically effective way of saying,
“We are
morally compelled to act. Arguments about cost, political capital, or whatever else, just don’t matter. You
can't ever
value money over human life 8.”
4

A "Good Samaritan" justification can also be effective in making the case for the a moral obligation in this
resolution.9 The basic idea here is that not taking an action can be morally reprehensible. Let me give an
example to
illustrate. Suppose I really want my little cousin to die, because if he does I stand to inherit a ton of money.
As a
result, I decide I’m going to drown him in the bath. Now lets look at two scenarios. The first is that I go in
while
he’s in a bath, and hold him under the water. My cousin dies, and obviously I did something morally
reprehensible.
The second scenario is, I walk into the bathroom and notice that he has tripped and banged his head; he is
now lying
face down in the water. Instead of pulling him out, I decide to let him drown.10 Here’s the question: am I a
better
person in the second case than in the first? Well, I really think if I am, it’s a marginal difference. Because
by
choosing to not take an action when you are aware that you could influence the outcome of that situation in
a
significant, needed way, you become morally reprehensible. If you have the power to stop or aid a
situation, good
Samaritan theory concludes that you're morally wrong if you don’t. Here’s how this applies: If the United
States is
aware that an is atrocity taking place, let’s say in Kosovo, and chooses not to act, we become morally
culpable for
the horrible impacts that result. In other words, we have a moral obligation to intervene in such
international
conflicts.
Princeton philosopher Peter Singer makes a similar case for our moral obligation to intervene in
international
conflicts. Singer asserts that distance should not make a difference when it comes to moral responsibility.
The basic
argument is that I would be wrong for valuing my own happiness over some else fundamental rights, like
happiness
or food if that person was right in front of me. For example, if I could save my car from being hit or save
someone’s
life, I’d have to save the person’s life. Singer then argues that the principle doesn’t change when we expand
the area
that we are talking about. If this is true when the decision is right in front of me, its still true when the
person I’m
trying to save is across the globe. In other words, by choosing not to intervene, we are allowing the death of
people,
and that is an immoral action.