Substance and Reflection: Aristotle and Hegel

Author(s): Nicholas Lobkowicz

Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Sep., 1989), pp. 27-46
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SUBSTANCE AND REFLECTION:ARISTOTLEAND HEGEL

NICHOLAS LOBKOWICZ

I
the

A.T

of the

beginning

sixth

book

of his Metaphysics,
to him, was
and

Aristotle

to a question
to
continues
which,
according
was
issue.
eternal
it
from
debated
Although
philosophical
to the post-Par
the Ionian
thinkers
the Italian
schools
through
to
from
Tha?es
menidean
Democritus
in fact even to
and
systems,1
refers

be

an

it

Plato,

still

remained

concerns

controversial.
What

This

claims,
being:
It certainly
to say
is not an exaggeration
has
controversial
until
remained
question
today.

of the twentieth
sense,
Leibniz3

century have asked

at all and

is anything

Socratics
obviously
One
is that

it the

and Plato

sion?

nothing.4

of

However,
had

same

thinkers

day, quoting
to why
there
even the pre

did not ask it explicitly; Aristotle's

claim

is

said.

interpretation
they
of the reasons why this question
has remained
controversial
it is not easy to say precisely
what
it asks.
two
The almost

of philosophical

made

amounts

reflection that separate us from

it virtually
to say what
this
impossible
exactly
to. Does
it ask about
the meaning
of an expres

is common

what

to everything

there

is?

1
La M?taphysique,
ed. J. Tricot (Paris: J.
Aristotle,
G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic
Philosophers
Press,
bridge 2 University
1960), ixff.
1028b2.
Metaphysics
3Aristotle,
Gottfried W. Leibniz, Principes
de la nature et de
zur Metaphysik
Schriften
Insel, 1965), para.
(Frankfurt:
4
Martin
in die Metaphysik
Heidegger,
Einf?hrung
1953), 5ff.
Niemeyer,
Review

very

it is true; in a
the
as

meaning

Could it possibly be asking for a definition?

to asking

this

Not many

it explicitly,

puzzling

of what

have

question

quite
rather

an

and a half millenia

Aristotle

not

that

it to a question

raised

only Heidegger
and giving

Aristotle

question,

is it?2

of Metaphysics

43

(September

1989):

27-46.

Copyright

Does

it amount

Or does

Vrin, 1953),
(Cambridge:

it look

I, 349;
Cam

la grace, in Kleine
7, p. 426.
(T?bingen: Max

1989

by

Metaphysics

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the Review

of

NICHOLAS LOBKOWICZ

28
the act which

for

all beings

makes

there

is, individually

really

real,

Is it a question

or collectively?
even about God?

perhaps

it concern

Does

be?

everything
about what

we do not have
to pursue
such detailed
Fortunately,
to
that to him
For Aristotle
saying
proceeds
immediately
means
else
is being?"
ti to on, "what
nothing
question,
is
"what
substance?"
ousia,
In a way,
he does

raphy;
this word,
text

we

When
we

it.

After

a hibiscus

likely to be inquiring
know how to use.
Aristotle,

audience
it is?just
and how

what

the
old

dog
tree

on the

might

a republic.
those addressed

debate

to an

is speaking

contrary,
the expression
ousia

words,
of realities

in the

and

what

be called

should
one

lecture

asking

what
is

democracy

mentioned

obviously

As

ousiai.

themselves
among
a
cat
that was
through
just chasing
how
often
about which
puzzled
they

have

would

of

from

it differs

kinds

term;5 and the

for an audience

notes

not have

with
familiar
already
as in class
the students

In other

Plato

to explain
his terminology.
or a lepidopteron
or a pronuntio
is,
we do
term which
about an unfamiliar

did

Aristotle

ask what

is an expression

ousia

all,

is a set of lecture

are

not

tis he

second

had coined as a philosophical

himself

to whom

insiders

use

consideration

under

than

not

or should

and Aristotle

questions.
the eternal

is no less puzzling
than
question
seem
to
be
in
interested
does
Aristotle
lexicog
or
we use
how
not ask what we mean
"substance"
by
this

however,

For

the first.

is

examples,

called
the

knew

Coriscus,6
or
courtyard,
it would

they
or
the

survive.

long
or "this
man"
here."
"a
examples
usually
a
become
that
Coriscus'
knew
the
audience
just having
Moreover,
not
or the dog's dirty yellow
age, were
color, or the tree's
father,
an
that
and
relations
kata symbebekoi,
These were
ousiai.
qualities
mentions

Aristotle

ousia,

each

according

as

to its kind,

happens

to have.

5
in everyday Greek the expres
not very common, originally
Although
the real estate
the
for example,
sion means
together with
"possessions";
Plato already
used the expression
animals.
and the domestic
buildings
See also the index
270e.
in Aristotle's
sense; see Republic
359a, Phaedrus
in Paul Natorp, Piatos Ideenlehre
1922), 563ff., and
(Hamburg: F. Meiner,
72 (1913): 42-64.
in Philologus
the classical
Rudolf Hirzel
study
by
6
inMetaphysics
it is disputed whether
While
Callias, mentioned
1.1,
was a member
Coriscus
is very likely to have been
of Aristotle's
audience,
one; cf. W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics
Press, 1924),
(Oxford: Clarendon
vol.

1, p.

117.

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ARISTOTLE AND HEGEL

Now

it mean

can

what

29
a substance

to ask what

man
or a particular
a definite
here,
The
situation
is a substance?
language

dog or an individual
is somewhat
similar

this

that
tree,
to one

someone
to call dogs but still
knows which
animals
is a dog?"
The only satisfactory
reply that one can
a
a
case
of
"A dog, an example
is
kind of definition:
in such
not sit), is
it incidentally
should
you see on the sofa (where
in which

insists:
give
which

"What

a domesticated
wolf

is if it is clear

and
The

of a genus

variety
jackal are

the

chosen

approach

of beasts

wild

familiar

by Aristotle

of prey,

species."
is somewhat

of which

more

the

In

subtle.

the Categories he had suggested a nominal definition of ousia1 which

in the Metaphysics
else

he repeats
is said while

several

an ousia

times:

it itself

is not

said

is that

of which

of anything

else.8
everything
a
it is large, yellowish,
that
We
say of
barking,
dog, for example,
on
we
a
or
but
would
have
in
the
cat,
sofa;
chasing
sitting
difficulty
After
that
it could be said of anything
else.
admitting
all, only
a
are
not a
of
and
is
said
something,
dog
obviously
predicates
predicate.
And
we

call

distinction
them.
first

is a sense

yet there
a this-here
between

So, in fact,
substance
and

an

a dog is a predicate
as well:
in which
a dog, after
we
a
all.
would
suggest
Today,
two dogs: a dog in quotes
and a dog without
a
he calls the dog without
does Aristotle:
quotes
dog in quotes
a universal;
second
the

a second

ousia.

the
and the question
individual,
a
in
amounts
to
how the two
stance
sense,
is,
asking
to submit
to you a brief
At
I have
this point
was
semantics.
Aristotle
the first thinker
consciously

field

of

specialist
somewhat

as well

research

in systematic

probably
A few pages

after

the

ethics.
for

puzzling,
false.

as

he

first
His

assumes

the passage

semantics,

that which
predicate,
our mind
that
is strictly
a
I
of
When
say
dog that

7
8Categories
Metaphysics

pursuing

quoted

from

logician

quite
book

is

sub

related.

remark

however,

something

first

of what
are

metaphysician,

physics, in lines 1029a23-24, he suggests something

A

The

may
strange

about
this
and
seem
and

7 of the Meta

like the following.

we

to something,
is a pattern
attribute
in
some
with
of
feature
isomorphic
reality.
it is yellowish,
the expression
"yellowish"

5.
5.8.1017bl3-15.

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NICHOLAS LOBKOWICZ

30
for

a mental

with
the dog's
color
pattern
isomorphic
our
that
"This dog is yellowish,"
is
of course,
statement,
(provided,
we
what
to
do
this
the
attribute
Now
question
is,
correct).
pattern
are two possible
or universal?
There
and Aristotle
answers,
sup
stands

such

poses

that

lowish

dog;
answer

other
for

we

is: we
we

is: we

first

The

statement

the

attribute
not

would

it to the dog without

In other
predicate.

attribute
not

would

to assume

we

that whenever

say that

it to the yel
The
be true.

its yellowishness;
words:
Aristotle

is something,
that
with
isomorphic
To say that x is y

something

a pattern
or structure
this pattern's
subject.
or another.
in x in one way
to saying
that y is inherent
on metaphysics
I do not
and not semantics,
this is an essay
in our mind

have

we

which

correct.

otherwise

for

otherwise

seems

are

both

amounts
As

to

attribute

or even meaningful.
is correct,
"is" means
it seems
In a way
false: on the one hand,
something
quite
on
to
it is puzzling
the other
and
from
different
hand,
"inheres";
to a subject
is attributed
considered
without
that a property
claim
to decide

want

this

property.
it in
is important
because
of predication
same
as
mat
not be the
ousia might
to ask whether

duces

Aristotle

ter.

Properties

are

said

be

said

might

predicate,
Socratics

notion

this

However,

another

but

nothing

If one

Yet Aristotle
tum
an

to the

will

why

is here

carpenter

Aristotle

point

matter

Nor

is the nondescript
it be an individual

is nothing
later say the

but

a spatiotemporal

because

the

of Mind
in fact
and
table

same

who

built

it.

rejects

the

notion

ousia

abstract
is now,
as

There
that

its

and

substra
only, since
of
location

at the beginning
are not the

by showing

"here"

that

the most

everything
as much

that

adds that this cannot be what ousia

such

of his Phenomenology
but
concrete
most

color,

can

material.

of everything
as

everything
size and

of a

notion

all, we had agreed

to as a "this-here."

can

be matter

Hegel

After

immediately

individual

matter.

we

to which

It cannot

the pre
of which

the

a "this-hereness."

is something

This

is a material
real
really
into account
the later
takes

it is a

as

insofar
itself,
is in fact what

of matter"
circum
that
is, of a "piece
signata,
some
of
framework
coordinates,
spatiotemporal
same
claim
is
to
that
ousia
would
be
the
saying

of

way

so ousia

of ousia,
of matter.

assumed:

tacitly
consists.
everything
materia
quantitate
the
scribed within

is.

notion

this

whether

"now"

of all notions.
the horse

location

is, however,
ousia might

or

as much

Indeed,
as its

its relationship
one more
reason
be

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the

same

as

ARISTOTLE AND HEGEL 31

one

matter:
things

are

of the aims

7 is to show

of book

that

not

only material

ousiai.

II

But what

is the ousia?

then

to us that we have difficulty

reply

in grasping

sounds

tes morphes,
the compound
of matter
a theory
to the advantage
is not always
a notion
we are so familiar
with
that

often,
to grasp

able

so familiar

its significance:

kai

tes hyles
with
Familiarity
synolon

standing;

Aristotle's

it is the
and

we

and

its

form.

of under
are

no

without

originality
original
impact
a special
effort.
are the phantasms
What
that come to mind when we hear what
was
We
of ideas and then view
think of Plato's
theory
just said?
as the thinker
who
Aristotle
returned
these
ideas to where
they
to the individuals.
This view
is historically
correct
but all
belong,
longer

making

us into thinking
of a compound
seduces
of matter
and
easily
or
as
a
sort of "materialized
the ousia,
Yet Aristotle
idea."
form,
as
denies
that
such
ideas
which
would
enter
into
explicitly
anything
an
of
he would
the composition
individual
have
exists;
probably,
too

even

"eternal
though
they are mere
objects,"
no
no
or without
There
within
is
pattern,
structure,
potentialities.
a mind,
that is prior to realities
that exist;
there
is only the human
mind which
abstracts
such patterns
from reality.
to, for
Contrary
objected

to Whitehead's

Aristotle

all universals
ante rem,
explicitly
rejects
re
rem.
et
in
admitting
post
only
an ousia,
Yet what
then does
it mean
that an individual,
is a
means
matter
of
It
and
form?
that
individuals
compound
simply
are structured;
and this in turn means
that each material
individual
example,

Aquinas,
them

to some

extent

a relationship
of partial
with
certain
isomorphy
In a sense,
even
other
individuals.
univer
indeed, Aristotle
rejects
in re: an individual's
salia
structure
is not a universal,
but only a
one. What
abstraction
Aristotle
may become
pattern which
through
a
not
a
teaches
is
doctrine
of universalia
in re but only
doctrine
of
universalia
re

in mente

in the

minds
definite
among

has

strictest

of human
individuals

which

possible
beings which
as

these

their

for
sense.

are

part

have

Universals
as

isomorphic
are
individuals

a fundamentum
are

patterns
some
with

in part

themselves.

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in
in the
part

isomorphic

of

NICHOLAS LOBKOWICZ

32
In other

an

words,

ousia

is an

from

individual

can be abstracted
and then predicated.
pattern
is only
in the strict sense of the term: its matter
substratum

of the

that

for

there

Yet

the

case,

are

of which
means

be achieved

sense

definite

of a subject
from

nor

the

predicable
as inherent

it
this

and

and

and

substance

second

the

accidents

second

this

horse
us

are

return

is predicated
not only "this-heres"
to the question
from

author who
The Byzantine
being?
on the Metaphysics
the commentary
at the beginning
of Aphrodisias
the

answer

since it is primary
process

as follows:

means

of without
being

the

one.

a subsistent

the ousia

accidents:

are

both
of

predicable
in turn,
is the

it as well

or
species
of the ousia,
since this man
but also "somethings."
we

which

in the eleventh

started:

what

is

century

completed
Alexander
begun by
sum
of the third
century
A.D.,
sense
it is substance,
"In the truest
of Aristotle

"To be" means

a substance

and

primary

predicable
or this horse."9

in time and in notion and with

of) cognition."10
that is not

everything
be conceived
term

being

as a universal

Let

marized

from

substance,

to any

is neither

this man

instance,

and

complicated
is familiar

truest

is that which

in it; for

present

in a quite
doctrine

in the

"Substance
of the word

of an ousia,
in it. The

which

genus

of

"piece

is "individualized,"

This well known definition of the Categories distinguishes

both

things;

isomorphy.
"Isomorphy,"
an identity
that can
identity,
and thus in the mind.

potential
partial
abstraction
through

of Aristotle.

student

of that

a "piece"

of

relations

only
I have
summarized
Although
somewhat
awkward
therefore
way,

most

connects

individual

is nothing
universal
that would
have to be individualized.
same
with
is connected
other
individuals
individual
by re
some

lations,
in this

It is an
its matter,
all material

the structure
its form,
in this individual
that

is exclusively
is nothing
There

matter."

and

underlies

its form

and

a basic

which

exists
"Being"
individual

respect

to (the

of all to be a substance:

first

in virtue
in the

of one and

primary

in part

sense

isomorphic

9
Categories
10
Alexander

cannot
of the
with

5.2allff.
libros
In Aristotelis
of Aphrodisias,
Metaphysicorum
ed. M. Hayduck
1899), p. 461, 1. 28-30.
(Berolini: G. Reimer,
commentaria,
on the Metaphysics
assumed
is generally
The author of this commentary
a
who
lived
of
Aristotle
commentator
to be Michael
Byzantine
Ephesios,
or possibly
at the beginning
of
the end of the eleventh
towards
century,
the twelfth
century.

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ARISTOTLE AND HEGEL

33
a being

individuals.

other

is only
Something
to an ousia.
it is related

as

sofar

me

Let

two

add

further

remarks,
As I have

the

sense

in another

first

in

concerns

of which

one of the
sensible.
already
indicated,
7 of the Metaphysics
is to show that immaterial
ousiai
a material
An ousia
is not by definition
exist.
individual;
by
might
a
struc
of
individual.
Some
structured
these
is
it
definition,
only
a portion
of the com
tures are interwoven
and occupy
with matter
are not

ousiai

that

aims

of book

mon

of the material

substratum

of them

each

themselves,
Since

our

intellect

world.

being

receives

are

Others

a structure

that

individuals

subsists

all of its content

by
by itself.
the senses,

through
in understanding
the manner
of being
of
difficulty
are abstractions
To us, all structures
substances.
these
immaterial
of "pure
Thus we have only a kind of limit concept
and universals.
are
we
cannot
fathom
how
in
forms";
truly
they
supposed
particular,

we

some

have

to be

individuals.
of the way

growth
other hand, goes
are ours because

is in Aristotle's

There
tries

an error, Platonism
out
is a natural
Though
on
we acquire
the
Aristotelianism,
knowledge.
that
of the cognitive
inclinations
the grain
against
our
senses.
we depend
upon

to correct

until
plicit
that besides

this

Plotinus
the notion

a notion
which
however,
It was not made
truly ex
to saying
It amounts

Metaphysics,
inclination.

natural

and, finally,
Aquinas.
of ousia
there
is still

another

to be an ousia; everything
"To be" means
of being.
an ousia.
But there
that comes
from or affects
sense
sense

is also

a being
is an ousia.
"To be" in the most
primary
to being an individual,
nature
amounts
the whole
a thinking
a thinking
of thinking,
is a no?sis
of
no?seos,
term

as thinking.11

This

is the way

is.

God

He

is a subsistent

thoroughly present to itself and limited by nothing.

are

limited:

are

compounds
The
importance

only

a primary

in which
of the

of which
itself

sense
primary
else is something

in an

are

either

pure
they
of form and matter.

implicit

of
way,

this
is the

forms

insight,

but

All other beings

pure

The

pure

or

acts,

in Aristotle

which

following.

not

act

forms

is present
are more

11
12.7.1072bl9.
It is not by chance that Hegel
Metaphysics
Greek text of 1072bl8-30
at the end of his Enzyklop?die;
according
Aristotle's
of God corresponds
moving
description
exactly to what
self considers
to be; see p. 36.
philosophy

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they

put the
to him,
he him

NICHOLAS LOBKOWICZ

34
than

which

structures,

are

we

indeed

as

to view

able

hardly
minds.

indi

are spirits
or indeed
"To be," in the most
They
a
sense
to
to
of
the
is
not
be a mind
be
but only
term,
mind;
original
a deficient
to have one is already
to have a mind
of being.
Not
way
can
as real.
at all amounts
to being
that
count
something
hardly
us but our minds
are really
Not
not
the things
around
real; minds
viduals.

upon material
see this might

dependent
does not
pursue

To

ousiai.

telligent
ities as

if they
an Aristotelian

no sense.

as
its quality?and
or
its accidents.
vidual
among

of course,

such,
The

supreme

is spiritual
being
remark
second

as being.
Although
being
definite
and most
sense,
other

than

or a cosmic
an error;

abyss
it makes

or its property,
a person
a structured
an ousia,
indi

actuality
and personal.
concerns
Aristotle's
emphasizing
amounts

being

of

meanings

real

transmaterial

being,
although
and therefore

is pure

many,

acknowledges
also its size,

or other

as
in

is aWho

is immaterial

Whatever

Whoever
he

In an ontology
such
are
not
that
beings

forces
impersonal
of
is more
view
point

or

The

insight
exist

or a law

were

real.

cannot
ontology,
as Aristotle
of metaphysics,
that beside
the material
things
immaterial
realities
which
(or

the whole

of the Divine

speak

more

but

minds.
only be subsistent
no
for
immaterial
is
there
place

Aristotle's,

limited

to pursue

even

can

who)

ousia

able

be

upon the
it, pivots
come
there
across,

wre daily

from

are

For

metaphysics.

conceived

rather

realities

notion

that

in a sense
a person.

one
Un

of on he on, of

in the

to being
Not
"being."

truest,
primary
an ousia, Aristotle
but
only a horse,

and so on are.
Though
color, speed,
location,
they may
as
to
in
relation
its
the
poson, poion, pros ti, quantity,
horse,
only
of summing
shortest
relation
way
up the nine
(Aristotle's
quality,
are beings.
of
that
nevertheless
besides
substance),
they
categories
exist

To on
may

senses
are many
"there
pollachos,
never
ceases
to be,"12 as Aristotle
as such
of being
is tricky.
this notion

legetai
be said

Yet

is still not able to distinguish

to the fact that Aristotle

tween
We

of a word,

the meaning
therefore

pollachos
whether

12
For

cannot

reliably

"The

means,
it means,

example,

"The

in which
to repeat.
In part,

a concept,
and the nature
his phrase
say whether

expression
concept

Metaphysics

this

is due

clearly be
of a reality.
to on

legetai
or
meanings,"
in different
ways,"

has many

'being'
of being
applies

1028al,

something

the opening

sentence

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of book

7.

ARISTOTLE AND HEGEL

or possibly,

itself into different

As Aristotle
modes."
"Being unfolds
one might
that being
want
is not a genus,
to suggest
the first and the second meaning.
between
But what

emphasizes
something

is being
4 states,

exactly
of book

35

it a structure?

as the famous
sentence
when,
opening
or a science
as being?
looks at being
Is
of structures?
Is there really a concept
Or a cluster
contemplated
the mind

as such, a structure
of being
of everything
that exists?
answer
later
hard

this

which
Aristotle

and

univocal.
claims,
or system

it is a decisive

yet

question;
If there
quarrels.
to avoid
the claim

some

is isomorphic
with
us no hint
gives

as

one with

feature
to how

to

to
respect
it is then

is one concept
of being,
really
sense
in some elementary
that
"being"
as Aristotle
term or concept,
is an analogical

If "being"
to on he on cannot
of structures,

be a structure.
the

It can

is

be a cluster

only

categories.

Ill
the best point to enter into a discussion
is perhaps
of Hegel.
I want
to argue
As the title of my essay
that the two great
indicates,
are those of Aristotle
of metaphysics
alternatives
and Hegel.
Some
This

will of course object that Hegel did not accept anything like meta
physics; for him, this term designated a way of thinking that had
been

definitively
was
mind

overcome

by Kant.
who
indeed

The
had

Leibniz,
the basic principle
of metaphysics,
namely,
But this is an historical
which
objection

gel's
considered
of

identity.
to take
clined

after all, what

seriously;
how he uses an expression.
that Hegel's
whole
philosophy

does,
no doubt

many

for
words:

philosophy
the

counts

not

and

account

last metaphysician
what
emphasized

universal

everything

is.

there

"Metaphysics,"

of his Encyclopaedia,
determinations

of

he

himself

in the

"is nothing
thought,

in fact

section

the first

Hegel
there

claims
can be

he wants
says
on

so to speak

the

to

it in so
natural

but the extension

net with which we catch all reality and thereby make

for

Hegel
the principle
I am not in

is metaphysics:

In fact

he writes

is what

And

to He

of

diamond

it intelligible

time."13

13
der philosophischen
Georg W. F. Hegel, Enzyklop?die
Wissenschaften
im Grundrisse,
vol. 9 in S?mtliche
ed. H. Glockner
F.
Werke,
(Stuttgart:
If not indicated
the quotations
refer
Frommann,
1927), 44ff.
otherwise,

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NICHOLAS LOBKOWICZ

36

to begin by doing something which

I wish
almost

irresponsible:

of Hegel's

in a few

to sketch
There

philosophy.
is intended

the basic

many
to get

of doing
ways
across
to you;

are of course
I want

to suit what

is so risky as to be

sentences

intent
this.
this

My

way

may,

if you permit me to say so, lighten my burden

of responsibility,
if you wish,
extenuate
my
irresponsibility.
as he sums
it up in his Encyclo
philosophy,
Hegel's
systematic

or,

a standpoint

from

way

theists

first

sounds.14

do,

a theist

that

as the standpoint

of God.
this

is not

For what

an approach

from which

in 1817, is written

first published

Sciences,

of Philosophical

paedia

not

could

describe

than

otherwise

does not believe

As Hegel

in God in the

as preposterously
as it at
presumptuous
is
that
claims
he
found
has
Hegel
simply
of the real may
be understood
the totality

by first developing the basic categories (the "Logic"), then their

in Nature (the Naturphilosophie)
and finally their
materialization
part

unfolding?in

culture which Hegel

is being,

the

process
to a self-understanding
that

chance

treats

which
famous
the

passage

it is suggested,

Aristotle,

end,

as Aristotle's

anything
how

is, of course,

to arrive

at the point

God:

itself.

It

ousia,

but

itself.

fairly

preposterous

of view

thus

itself.

constitutes

It is not by

so
Hegel's
philosophy,
the unlimited
actuality

is, however,
rather
the

reflecting

like this were possible,

amounts

which

of his Encyclopaedia,
the
from Aristotle,
namely,
7 of the Metaphysics
in which

12, chapter
no?seos.
of the no?sis

speaks
is the same

of

section

last

in book

to
transparent
not an individual

claim

the

a quotation

tality of being thoroughly

This

philosophy
and
of reality

that is real grasping

to

the world

systematic?in

The starting point of this thought

philosophy?a
of the whole

adds
Hegel
of philosophy,

Stagirite

thoroughly

calls Mind.

of everything

the totality

in part

historical,

the inevitable
that makes

such

not

the God

fully

unfolded

as well,

for

of
to

even

be

question would
a vision

if

possible.

Hegel claims to have achieved it in and through the Phenomenology

ofMind, his first great success, published in 1807. This book, which
is as fascinating

as

it is preposterous,

constantly

shifting

from

sys

is still
in many
to this edition of Hegel which,
respects,
though outdated
vol.
25 in
See also H. Glockner,
convenient.
the most
Hegel-Lexikon,
1531.
S?mtliche
Werke,
14
in Franz Gr?goire, ?tudes
See the unsurpassed
h?g?liennes
analysis
de Louvain,
Publications
Universitaires
1958), 140-220.
(Louvain:

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ARISTOTLE AND HEGEL

to historical

tematic

and back,
claims
to lead the reader
analyses
sense
an
to
of
absolute
the
simplest
insights
knowledge,
the Encyclopaedia
from which
is then written.
One of

the

from

standpoint
the difficulties

sense

that

even

not

did

is reality
after
all

try

of being which
real, ought
of how this

by Hegel.
Now

let us first

He

proceeds
the notion

tiating
follows:

Aristotle

exist

philosophy

how Hegel
and most
simplest

of being.
By
a process
which
starts

in the Metaphysics
it on the
scend

his

of

endeavor

besides

He

of being.

important
reply,
its kata symbebekoi.

sions

a first

question
as we have

and

from

of culture.
most

as

culminates
to tran
there

assumption
mover
of an unmoved
an analysis
of the
in De Anima,
the

step towards
is contained

mover

ini

it is the form
On

this

of a material
Ar

assumption,

is no
and

as to what

longer
intrinsically
immaterial
realities,
is
then
finds
its
being

in the

seen,

notion

of ousia

from

and

the other

by analyzing

it,

it. The result is the whole of reality in its different dimen

the most
then

upon

of this

all this and proceeds

presupposes
Hegel
tacitly
He takes
of being
the notion
end, as it were.
and,

unfolds

being
The

reality.
touched

proceeds
substances

material

of the existence

The

most

point,

which

then

correctness

soul, which,
study of the human
although
or sensible
the latter.
transcends
reality,
istotle
at a notion
arrives
of being
that
a
that
notion
embraces
material
material,
the notion

If philosophy

his Encyclopaedia.
of all notions,
all-embracing

nature.

The

realities.

an unmoved

such

into

incorporated

develops

theoretical

by analyzing
that
assumption

immaterial

from

to be
himself
it, he believes
analyzing
can be described
in traditional
terms

is proved by the demonstration

at the end of the Physics;
and
nature

is to be

in fact

and
ascent

reflects upon.

consider

the

from

in solving,
of how this

succeeded

to its starting
the path
itself,
in some way
to be part of this
come about
even
is never
should

understanding

question

never

Hegel

to solve,
is the question
to absolute
knowledge

experience

the whole

also

37

It is as

aspects.
abstract
these
While

abstract,

if Hegel

had

and

all-embracing
the various
details
Aristotle

Hegel

descends

found

a way

to elicit

from

of notions
of nature,

ascends
from

from

first the categories,

and finally
the history
the most
concrete
to the

the most

abstract

to the

back

concrete.

What
Aristotle

at
arrives
Hegel
in mind
has
when

is, however,
he speaks

not

the

truly

of the prot?

concrete
ousia,

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the

that
first

NICHOLAS LOBKOWICZ

38
substance.

really
of the Phenomenology
is universal.
here"

real.

I speak

about

here,"

everything

the concrete

that

claims

For Hegel

is not

He

to show

tries

of Mind:

the "this
individual,
this in the first chapter
we can say about a "this

everything
a "this-here,"
to capture
is no way
is universal.
When
I say of this here

There

it is an individual thing, I overlook that anything

an

individual

thing;

can be pointed
turns
about

everything
of language
to be

of

makes

of the

fun

reality
his
accept

by
claim

realist

So Hegel
that

that everything
showing
to universals,
As
Hegel
universal

Traugott

that
that

really
an
unless

simply
could

be

course,

rather

his

aim

on

the

cogent.17
articulations

is to understand
other

by setting

hand,

different

way,

one

is an

an

idealist

could

by
deduce

it was

never
pen

be deduced:

in fact

each

by

universal.16
each

determination

of being

in motion,

that it contains.

his

senses

in advance

present
of his

his thought

to him; the idealist,

tasks
and therefore

tells him.

Though

in a

in a similar
vein: whether
had already
argued
a
or a realist
is a
Fichte
dubs
"dogmatic")
(whom
character
The realist's
character.
of individual
impels him
Fichte

idealist

question
to be a slave

to what

is given;

the

into mind.18
the given
and
is inexhaustible
individual

to dissolve

even

are, of
arguments
shown,
Hegel's
at
In fact, they are not real arguments
The realist
decides
that
of a decision.

despairs

to accept only what

in a

In 1802,

has

what

decides

all.15

Krug,
Hegel
real is constituted

of

phrase,
the notion

by eliciting

all but

said

can

from it the hidden features

Ottmann

of

he would
writing,
to deduce
his
proceeded

can be reached

Henning
far from

unreal

he was

of thought,
As

now.

and

I forget that

idealist.

the

claims,
they
to use Hegel's

or,

the most
is an

Hegel
a certain

Krug
argued
pen with which

claims.

every

is in reality

Plato,

books

things.
of the

the

and

here

and

As Hegel
puts it, the "divine nature"
senses
the
tell us: what
the senses

what
real

really
from
way

several

individual

out.

the

In a different
review

everything

is

and everything

is this

to help out speech by pointing out something,

If Iwant

claim

in fact,

for
that

idealist,
In a way,
that

on

the

Aristotle's
therefore

wants

contrary,
even

insight

that

the

ousia

15
S?mtliche
Werke, vol. 2, 92.
Hegel,
16
ibid., vol. 1, 193ff.
17
inHegels Phi
einer Einleitung
H. Henning
Ottmann, Das Scheitern
171ff.
A.
Pustet,
1973),
losophie
18 (M?nchen:
ed. F. Medicus
Johann G. Fichte, Werke,
(Leipzig: Eckardt Verlag,
has
18.
Habermas
taken
vol.
up this line of argument
J?rgen
3, p.
1908),
und Interesse
in Erkenntnis
1968), 235ff.
Suhrkamp,
(Frankfurt:

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ARISTOTLE AND HEGEL

39

to saying
amounts
this with
be a predicate
the sole
might
exactly
or
that Aristotle
for
the
difference
To him,
opts
given.
epist?m?
is the attempt
to show
science
that what
the senses
upon
impress
us through
what
he calls empeiria,
experience,
on the contrary,
it is. Hegel,
opts for the

two

these

then,

I will

Instead,

try
leads to.

sequences

and

the following
as a ladder
insights
one has
once
away

in common:

one may

which
reached

the

leave

Plato

Though

have

decide
con

and Hegel
other

to the

loftiest

in fact

and

behind

of

among

they
the ascent

view

both

should

the metaphysical

option
Hegel's
to add one remark,
however.
in two quite
idealists
different
senses,

things

one

how

to sketch

I want

are

on

metaphysics
hinge
on metaphysics,
this is an essay
to analyze
further
what
kinds

As
epistemologies.
on epistemology,
I do not wish
which
alternatives
arguments
support
among

to
thought;
of the mind,
and is.

alternative

not

them.

than

be other
of

cogency
or science,
is a self-determination
that it contains
itself of everything

him, Wissenschaft,
its eliciting
from
Ultimately,
two different

cannot

Plato's

throw

to
troglodyte
seen the sun, it is true;19 but even in the dark
his cave after having
ness of the cave he sees everything
in the light of what
he has learned
the sun.
absolute
thinker
to
about
rid of his ascent
gets
Hegel's
top.

returns

the divine point of view in all respects; he is no longer willing

edge.

he

how

consider

Both

Plato

from the
reality
those who follow

his

could

him,

on the contrary,

never

they have reached by climbing

known

to us

through
common

into

to

knowl

absolute

incorporate
it possible
to interpret
and Hegel,
believe
however,
that they have reached.
and
Aristotle
lofty height

which

"immediate

ascent

to that which

that

the

from that which

known

in itself

insights

is better

never

offer

an

that has been

reached
something
and
The
abstraction,
great
analysis.
argument,
temptation
to all idealists
that they are able to view and
is to believe
given"

but

is better

forget

rather

to describe the universe as God sees it; by having reached an insight

into the Divine,
in transcending

they succumb
the "condition

though feeling

that

Ethics?0)

they

should

to the opinion
that they have succeeded
"
humaine.
Aristotelians,
by contrast,

(as their master

athanatizein,

writes
achieve

in the Nicomachean
immortality

19
This point is well-emphasized
by Martin Heidegger
von der Wahrheit
19ff.
Francke,
1947),
(Bern:
20
10.7.1177b34.
Ethics
Nicomachean
Aristotle,

by

inPiatons

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tran

Lehre

NICHOLAS LOBKOWICZ

40
never

human

the

scending
themselves

condition,
it and should

from

not

that

forget

even

cannot

they

free

to.

try
two questions
should
does
be asked:
said,
being
1) How
as
answer
to
How
what
and
Aristotle's
is?;
being
question
2)
In order
to tackle
the
terms
ousia?
he view what
Aristotle

This
Hegel
does

we

first

question,
it has at least

notice

should

two meanings:
a being
to be called

deserves

it asks

hand,
the

is to be

what

real

it is put by Aristotle,
that in the way
on the one hand,
it inquires
about what
in the strictest
and on the other
sense,
real.
really
Aristotle
individuals,

considered

is constituted

Since
has

for him,
no reason

really
by
two meanings:
to distinguish
it is each and every ousia
these
that
a being
to be called
in the most
and
is
deserves
sense,
prominent
one of the many
real things;
that is not an ousia
really
everything
as
it
to the former.
is
insofar
relates
In
is a being
real) only
(and
Hegel,
being."
of which

however,
When

one

looks

in vain
for the expression
"a
Seiendes,
in
of Sein,
he
has
mind
"being,"
something
all that is. Again,
and which
embraces
partakes

he speaks

everything
he does not have

however,

what

of what
is thinking
most
to
the
abstract
is
him,
"Being,"
sense
as ens, yet in the specific
that
of
is the whole
other words,
being
he

Rather,

abstract

way

could

in it.
partake
To put it in another
call

would

one

for Hegel,

way,

of being,

the

in mind.
esse, be-ing,
on
h? on, being as such.
calls
It means
the same
of notions.
In

speak
conceived

of entia.

is what

Aristotelians

cannot

in the most
reality,
the most
universal
indeed
It is a universal,
or in addition
to it which
is nothing
besides

possible.
but there

of universals,

calls

Aquinas
Aristotle

being
understood

yet
concept
to but embraces
not only applies
of being
concept
one
of all concepts,
is
the
it
In
is.
way,
emptiest

as a reality.

The
there

everything

in another

but

way, it is the fullest of all since nothing can be added to it. Every
thing by which one wants to specify it is contained in it. It can
only be unfolded or explicated from within, not specified from with
In this

out.
as well

them

contains
generic

and

differences,

Hegel

their

specific
not only

specifications.
from
of abstracting
subsumes
it
concepts,

the

is not meaningful

specifications

it "transcends"

or reality

in Hegel's

all genera

In fact,
it implicitly
to all
them, for contrary
all

possible

specifying

themselves.

this concept of being as if it were

of thought

determinations

since

conceivable

instead

treats

a genus,

it is not

sense,

as all

(a distinction

philosophy)

a reality; all

which

in a sense

are specifications

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of this

ARISTOTLE AND HEGEL

41

most

of reality.21
I say quite
For ultimately,
Hegel
most
dimension
elementary

dimension
elementary
not "of the realities."
reality,"

one
whose

the god whose

self-articulation
developed

reality:
most

as

him

stands

in which

the

being

is not
itself)
an advancing
the

logic and
ophy of mind

between

(one is almost
one.

the traditional

under
the way

course,

to say specifies

tempted

It is what

the philosophy
of nature
is mental
and in the philos
or culture
in part historical.
becomes
The confusion

the systematic

the Phenomenology
it is based
upon
objective
least

and the historical which Hegel

of Mind

the

in its essential

result

common

assumption
that
namely,

on

the

one

of sloppiness;
to all modern
hand

we

that which

features,

has
relevance;
Hegel
as we witness
in Plato.
Even

some

follows

features,

is of little

Imagine
to admit

however,

if it may

should

not make

point of view, what Hegel

a human mind
able to reach
anything

that

logical

rather,
forms
steps

of
can

perceive

is beyond

to

logic.
Compared
as really happening

the same

for the empirical

contempt
a
be
is a
there
legend,
only
reply to a student who pointed

ring of truth about the story of Hegel's

out that the former's
did not seem
astrononomy
"All the worse
for the facts."23
observations,
This,
Aristotelian

in

exhibited

terms and that on the other hand history,

in historical

essential

is not

the

idealism,

be described
these

in all

reality

which

calls "dialectics,"
Hegel
an
from the thesis
to a synthesis
antithesis
through
a new thesis,
a process
embraces
both and becomes
that
in

which

at

only

is specified

is philosophy,
Of
aspects.22

"of
explicitly
knows
of only
is being and

us overlook

to square
that

with

even

recent

from

an

is remarkably
consistent.
there
is, but unable
everything
the reach of its immediate
grasp.
says

21
even the neo-scholastics
Sometimes
have not completely
avoided
this way; thus J. Gredt,
in his Elementa
thinking
Philosophiae
([Barcelona:
Herder,
1956], vol. 2, p. 4ff.), speaks of a natura entis and argues that ens
is a concept that is ontologice primus.
Without
being able to demonstrate
this in detail,
I am inclined to believe
that his tendency goes back to the
Cursus of John of St. Thomas, who was a contemporary
of Descartes.
One
should never overlook
the fact that Aristotle
does in fact deal only with
his categories
both in logic and in metaphysics;
is something
he
being
never even mentions
in logic.
22
The best treatment
of this subject
is still I. Iljin, Die Philosophie
Gotteslehre
Hegels 23 als kontemplative
(Bern: G. Olms, 1946).
The story seems to be an invention
based on the fact that in the
thesis he submitted
for his post-doctoral
tried to find a logical
degree, Hegel
for the distances
between
the planets,
justification
ignoring the discovery
of Ceres made six months
in January
earlier
1801 by G. Piazzi.

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NICHOLAS LOBKOWICZ

42

to divine
status.
have attained
such a mind must
Secondly,
Firstly,
to
is
not
universal.
that
it cannot
Thirdly,
acknowledge
anything
ens quasi notissimum
et
such a mind will
uconcipere
quote Aquinas,
as
omnes
in
that
which
in eo resolvere
"grasp
being
conceptiones,"
a sense

is better

notions

can be resolved."24

source

than

known

very
side

is being.

into which

and

not accept any

it knows
everything

Finally,
it will deduce

is mind

side

the

subject
that reflects,

If it is a mind

on

and

that

is, pursues
itself
grasp

no access

has

to

do not

individuals

such

even

However,
ousiai

such

except

and

himself,

exist.
really
a philosophy

cannot

Napoleon
window

for him

therefore

they

are

deny
I can

that

course,

sense

something
or
Caesar

see

through
from afar.

or a dog which
I hear barking
of my
study
would
individuals
say, but they are
exist, Hegel
think they are.
additionally
They are not individuals

realists

that

recognizing
in the
individuals

cannot
be
of course,
These,
their
of
very nature
them; by
spoke
a human
But Hegel
does not
mind.
or that there
is a cow which
existed

beyond

object

avoid

exist.

Aristotle

its

from

the

ab
Hegel's
the fundamental
is a god with
are universals.
He
thoughts

he recognizes,
all his
mind:

individuals

external

philosophy,
as the com

from being
and in the end
proceed
in all its specifications.
of this very being
prehension
it will

the only reality

solute,
of a human
limitations

all other

as it does

of

its cognitions,
on
which
nature,

else

anything

the
Of

not what
related

to each other so that in the end the whole of reality could be described
is the

of a whole
Rather,
they are shapes
ist das Ganze,"
"Die Wahrheit
truth.

sum.

as their

preface

only
to

which

can be grasped only by a philosophy

"emerges"
These
reality
lations.

like
These

"predicamental,"
erty of being
substance.25

from

step by step
have
ideas

really

only

an ontological
relations,
not

created
In Hegel,

says
in the
says
is a universe
Hegel

as he
real

that understands

how it

being.
In Aristotle,

consequences.
far-reaching
to each other,
related
individuals

is structured

something

the

the Phenomenology:

which

sequence
to use the

"transcendental";
is a predicamental
on the contrary,

between
traditional
in Aquinas,
relation,
all relations

24
De Veritate,
Thomas Aquinas,
1,1.
25
See the monumental
study by A. Krempel,
chez Saint Thomas
1952), 554ff.
(Paris: J. Vrin,
relation"
"transcendental
admitted
that Aquinas

and

substance

is

there
and

re
are

terminology,
even the prop
that
are

is, added

to

"transcen

de la relation
tries to prove
Krempel
only as a relatio rationis.

La doctrine

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ARISTOTLE AND HEGEL

or,
dental,"
"internal."26

to use

F. H.

43
and G. E. Moore's

Bradley's
not added

terminology,
but make
up
They
they relate
its total reality.
the son of some parents,
A son is by his very nature
is by his very nature
the teacher
and a teacher
of some pupils.
But
no one?not
even the Logos,
is first of all God?is
who
by his very
a son just as no one is a teacher
nature
and nothing
else.
There
is
are

a human

"first"

being

to what

a son or a teacher

is "then"

who

or whatever?

an insight that lies at the very basis of all sound social and political
philosophy.
and teachers,
The

on the contrary,
knows
Hegel's
philosophy,
of roles behind which
there
is no one who

universe

itself,

scendental

relations,
in its very essence.
all particular
statements

that

to everything
related
being
to be called

else, in fact
to something
true,

and

is the

This
are

false:

else;
is real.

reason
since

is anything

nothing

only

philosophy

why

there

out,

one might

is a sense

believe.

in which

claims

Hegel

everything
in terms of its
except
as a whole
deserves

is closer

Hegel

tran
is not

is related

And yet in spite of all the radical differences

point

them.

plays
a system
of such
of its own that

or God,
is nothing
but
a subject with
nothing

related

of sons

only

I have tried to
to Aristotle

than

Let me conclude by trying to show why

this

is so.

IV

in his History

When
he offers

what

He

things
gel's
point

discusses Aristotle,

of energeia
and dynamis,
act and
strange
analysis
the relationship
likens
between
and
act to
potency
a being and its self-comprehension.
By becoming
truly

previously

was

only

potential

istotle would never have said anything

he, after

Hegel

a very

potency.27
that between
actual,

of Philosophy,

understands

itself.

of this kind, it is true; for

of act and potency

to discuss
all, uses the notions
as much
man
as to treat of
and immaterial
ousiai.

strange
interpretation,
of view,
nevertheless

wrong
reflects

as

Ar

it may

Yet He

an historical

be from

the Aristotelian

mindless

insight

made

26
Cf. the famous paper by G. E. Moore,
"External
and Internal Re
lations" (1920), republished
in Philosophical
Studies
(New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 1922), 276-309.
At the beginning, Moore quotes the relevant
from Bradley's Appearance
and Reality
passages
(New York: The MacMillan
Co., 1893).
27
Hegel, S?mtliche
Werke, vol. 18, 321ff.

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NICHOLAS LOBKOWICZ

44

that in a preeminent
"to be" means
sense,
explicit
by neoplatonism
to be a mind.
to be intelligent
Not
and conscious
of oneself
is a
lack of being.
is truly real is thus a mind.
Whatever

Of course, this Aristotelian

not
not
with

with

only actuality
a becoming

are

different

from men
since

ideas

in Marxism
of the

does

not

term,
count; he

Man

with

a capital

as Hegel
identifies
the becoming
actual
as it were
sucks
actuality

historical
nature

also

it is conscious

of being.
in man's
self

changes
of man.
Modern

or in the Middle Ages

in Antiquity

man

is

in his very

in a different

himself

way; Hegel's
into the culture
he produces.
dissolved
completely
the horrifying
of such
consequences
political
as the true man, man
in the full
put into practice:
is a product
is nothing

but

The

"M."

future, man
a step towards

of the

brutality

of Marxism

as he actually
the emergence
realized

has

is
of
its

in Hegel's

origin
the

calls
is what

in the very

he understands

substance,
man
is, so to speak,
We
have witnessed

sense

consciousness,
he
what

a reality
the
for Hegel,

changes

but

is vitiated by his

for

sense;

original

conscious,
actual:

it makes
up what
As a consequence,
awareness

in the

ousiai

recognizing

insight of Hegel's

This,
level

metaphysics.
not
should
however,
of metaphysics,
Hegel

us from admitting
prevent
an insight
has preserved

a glimpse
and which
caught
When
very explicit.
Aquinas
speaks
treats
of everything
else as something
is transparent
he speaks
of an act that

Aristotle

parence

being until
all awareness
gentiles,

dimmer

grows

and

dimmer

in Aquinas,
for example,
is
as
the ipsum esse and
of God
in esse,
that merely
shares
to itself.
This
self-trans
as we

descend

in the end actuality

is so submerged
In the fourth
book
disappears.

Aquinas
with
connection

discusses
the reditio

that, at
of which

the hierarchy

in potentiality
of the Summa

of
that

contra

this

of self-transparence
in
hierarchy
a notion which
he inherited
ad seipsum,

Each
the Liber
de causis.2*
he
being,
through
neoplatonism
a
on
can
to
its
of
be
scale
argues,
being
according
capacity
placed
it: at the bottom
emanates
from
of the ladder,
in
to retain what
ever retaining
act on each other without
animate
bodies
anything
from

28
IV.ll.
Cf. In librum de
contra gentiles
Thomas Aquinas,
Summa
of this notion
causis VII.7, ed. Pera, p. 191. The most
analysis
thorough
Geist in Welt (M?nchen:
in Aquinas
dissertation
is found in Karl Rahner's
1957, 2nd ed.), esp. 129ff.
K?sel-Verlag,

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ARISTOTLE AND HEGEL

of what

45

they cause; at the top of the ladder,

unto Himself
since even creation,

to return

God

no

longer even
we cannot

though
is an actio

has
un

as a sort of making,
it except
God
immanens;
to Himself,
have
to return
since He never
to go
needed
are the plants,
man
In between
the animals,
and
beyond Himself.
or whom
a little more
the angels,
each of which
retains
of whatever
derstand

not

does

emanates

it.

from

outside

In man,

the

concepts

which

he

has

are

himself

of

things
intelli

produced
by himself;
Aquinas's
species
a looking-glass
is not, as it is sometimes
described,
through
we reach
the real but id quod intellectus
in seipso concipit
de
re intellecta,
in itself grasps
what
the intellect
of the object
outside

gibilis
which

itself.29
them

is even

and

in the mind

of the

no

to
external
longer
anything
as they do not create
in motion;
intellect
the
cannot
but
follow
St.
knowledge,
Aquinas
Augustine
that God as it were
creates
twice: once in
everything

of their
objects
who
suggested
itself

there

In angels,
that sets their

once

created

pure spirits.30
as well
as in Hegel's
in Aquinas'
Aristotelianism
the idea that a given degree
idealism
of actuality
corresponds
exactly
to a given
which
in turn is a degree
of possessing
type of knowledge
one is. As Hegel
of being master
of what
is much more
of
oneself,
So we

an

find

or Aristotle,
than either Aquinas
this taking
pos
or
means
in
to
fact
freedom
To
him.
of,
possessing
oneself,
means
so that,
to be self-contained,
for Hegel
in the end, his

intellectualist

session
be free

kind of philosophy

is the fulfillment

of freedom.

The complicated

that the Hegelian

school underwent
in
developments
are
and early forties
of the nineteenth
all
due
century
to the growing
consternation
of Hegel's
at the fact that the
pupils
real world
to want
did not seem
to bow to philosophical
insights;

philosophical
the thirties

the
which

which

same

applies

is nothing
then
Let me
Hegel

owes

to recent

ideologies

such

as

liberation

a late variety
of left Hegelianism.31
that there
conclude
is a deep
by saying
more
cares
to Aristotle
than he himself

theology,

but

sense

in

to admit.

This has been noticed more often by British than by German scholars
29
The best analysis
is still Pierre Garin, La th?orie de Vid?e suivant
V?cole thomiste
(Paris:
1932).
30
Thomas Aquinas,
Summa
Theologiae
I, qu. 55, art. 2. For St. Au
Latina
gustine,31 see Migne Patrolog?a
(Paris: Migne,
1841), vol. 34, p. 269.
Cf. my Theory and Practice
(London: Notre Dame University
Press,
1967), esp. 159ff.

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NICHOLAS LOBKOWICZ

46
since

the

former,

at Oxford,

studied

having

far from
Nevertheless,
a
even
is
in
effect
losophy
genuine,
totle's metaphysics.
Where
Aristotle

very well.32

knew

their

Aristotle

being Aristotelian,
Hegel's
phi
if perverse,
to Aris
alternative
as the sum total
reality
it as a net of relations

views

sees
to each other, Hegel
su
to
but themselves.
which
And while
relate
Aristotle's
nothing
other ousiai,
preme
is, on the one hand, an ousia among many
being
on
the
of thought
other hand, pure thinking
about
and,
itself, Hegel's
is
but
the
universe
in
such a way
itself
god
nothing
comprehending
of ousiai

that
only

related

ultimately
real
really

becoming
ever one

actual
in fact

once

it has
Aristotle's

truly real.33
is god?and

his

is the

only

way,

a human
though
endeavor,
its ultimate
consummation.

becomes

the

For Hegel,
a
is
of what
taking
through
possession
knowledge
is and thus
is ultimately
not
cognitive
reflection,

like an ousia,
into account,

something
this
takes
losophy,

philosophy,
or at least

god,

which
there

reached

determines
is even

a sense

its apogee,
is a philosopher;

god
like Spinoza's

god

a thing
is.
in which
Hegel's

what

is the

but

only

thing

but Hegel's
in a much

If one
phi
is
that

philosophy
more
subtle

reality.34

Katholische

Universit?t Eichst?tt

32
are McTaggart
recent studies on
and Stace.
The more
Examples
are strongly
influenced
scholars
and are therefore
in
Hegel
by German
in history more than in truth.
terested
33
In the concluding
(575-577) of the Enzyklop?die,
Hegel
paragraphs
the relationship
between
of nature, and
logic, philosophy
briefly discusses
of mind.
He submits
three alternatives,
each of which he con
philosophy
the whole
siders correct in a way; but only the third expresses
truth.
Ac
nature and nature becomes mind.
Ac
cording to the first, logic becomes
and mind
to the second, nature has a logical structure
is its re
cording
to the third, "Reason which knows itself" posits mind
flection.
According
as its subjective
The first sequence
and nature as its objectivity.
activity
sees logic as God, nature as His creation,
and mind as nature's
conscious
as the basic reality,
return to God; the second views nature
logic as its
to the third
and mind as its self-reflection.
structure,
Finally,
according
is the primary
view, philosophy
reality, and both logic and nature are its
See Hegel, S?mtliche
"manifestations."
Werke, vol. 10, 474ff.
34
on being;
to Spinoza
in the first paragraph
See the explicit reference
1830
der
Wissenschaften
Hegel, Enzyklop?die
philosophischen
(Hamburg:
F. Meiner,
1959), 107.

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